Criminal financesCriminal finances

Criminal Criminal conductconduct

Case of concern ?Case of concern ?

Sounding the tocsinSounding the tocsin 15 years of anti-laundering policy: measurable

results? Prices of most drugs have gone down. 15 years of suspicious transaction report: insights?

Effects on the organisation of crime-for-profit?** Modest at most, though some more heat** Drug market has its own, almost autonomous

momentum** Economic crime merely raised some eyebrows

and otherwise lip service as usual** Tax crime belatedly added

Crime-money: threat or Crime-money: threat or inconvenience?inconvenience?

The scale of threat: differentiate per economy Which sectors? From underground economy to upperworld

enterprises? Do criminals climb the long ladder? Where is the biggest impact? Banking? Real estate? Unfair competition? Economic and fiscal erosion effect! The case of

Greece, Spain and Iceland: laundering? Power concentration, but by whom and what level

The ‘terrifying’ extend of The ‘terrifying’ extend of crime-money crime-money (?)(?)

Utrecht School of Economics:

** € 18,5 billion in the Netherlands. Trillions world wide:

The crystal ball methodology of the FATF and UN UN: trillion + crime money per year Precipitation of crime-money: where does it come down for

spending and investment?

consumption: life style

assets: valuables ranging from cars to gadgets

real estate: criminals also hit by crisis

production factors: producing things and giving services?

Take-overs of production sectors?

The threat of crime-The threat of crime-money or managementmoney or management Basic: erosion of the integrity of the financial system (?)

However: “Who saws the branch on which he sits?” Dubious banks are dangerous . . . . for launderers!

Calvi, hanging from a London bridge;

Sidonia: a poisonous cup of coffee in prison;

Russian bankers murdered (too many for one slide)

Nugan Hand Bank (Australia, “suicides”)

European Union Bank (20 million disappeared) Threat to launderers: (ex) bank staff selling CDs with names Worse: banks and bankers cheating the whole system:

Goldman Sachs & the Greek budget fraud Credit crisis: deceptive creation of non-existing money

Threat to the Threat to the systemsystem??

The usual suspect: hectic The usual suspect: hectic but short lifebut short life

Does the threat come Does the threat come from below . . . from below . . .

Or from the smart and Or from the smart and slick guys in the slick guys in the

upperworld? upperworld?

The 200 million guy

The threat scale of the The threat scale of the criminal money criminal money managementmanagement

Corruptive penetration Sport and gambling Security industry? Real estate?

Criminal upperworld subsidy: political parties Once-only investment: defusion by integration Re-investment in own criminal enterprise Nest-egg or criminal pension (if one gets that old) Life style: bad role model

Wijzen van het verhullen van misdaadgelden: Wijzen van het verhullen van misdaadgelden: Aantal waarnemingenAantal waarnemingen

Vormen van verbergen

drugs Econ. misdaad

Andere misdrijven

totaal

Uitvoer 11 9 2 42

Eigendom verhulling

10 5 4 19

Rechtvaardigen

Terug-lenen

3 3 6

Loonrol 2

Speculatie

Boekhouding

7 4 2 13

Onnaspeurbaar

4 8 2 14

Obversations:54 € Obversations:54 € million + casesmillion + cases

Levels of penetration drugs Economic crime

Other crime for profit

Total

Corrupting permeation 3 3 6

Criminal subsidy 6 3 9

Once-only infusion 8 2 10

Investment in crime-enterprise

9 4 1 14

'Rainy day' 20 9 1 30

Life style 9 6 2 17

Same from another angleSame from another angleLevels of penetration observations persons value €

Corruptive penetration 3 3 919.000

Upperworld subsidy 6 7 560.000

Once only 8 9 6.979.000

Own crime firm 6 12 4.153.000

Nest egg 20 21 14.361.000

Life style 9 - -

Traces of spending of Traces of spending of crime-moneycrime-money

(52 million + cases)(52 million + cases) Total proceeds: € 101 million

Of which: Stored cash: € 7 Consumption/assets: € 9 Conventional investment/houses: € 62 Commercial investment: € 23

Of which: Reinvestment in criminal enterprise: € 4,5 million or

less than 5 %.

Nature of real estateNature of real estate

living place

parking/garage

Land(building/agr.)

business/enterpr.

other

Unequal division of Unequal division of propertyproperty

7% of the owners have > 10 properties:

Owns 31% of the confiscated real estate

67 % of the one-piece owners has 37% of the confiscated properties

Other assets:Other assets: Cash € 74 mj Dutch bank accounts € 42 mj Foreign accounts € 3,8

(Mainly Luxembourg, Island of Man, Barbados

and Spain) Shares/bonds € 0,46 Cars (missing prices 17 %) € 4 mj Juwelry and other gadgets € 0,4 Not including the buckets full with Swarovski crystal

Proportions bank and Proportions bank and cashcash 3 % had > € 100.000 in bankaccounts

50 % of crim. account holders < € 20.000 25 % had < 3.910 Confiscated cash

50 % had < € 3.910

25 % had < € 1.305 Proportion: bank money: cash = 1,2 : 1

Do criminals like banks? Not all of them

What criminals do like banks?

Criminal bankers

Thank you for your attention