Crime-Terrorism-Insurgency Nexus in the Philippines

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CRIME-TERRORISM-INSURGENCY NEXUS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Rommel C. Banlaoi

Chairman of the Board and Executive Director Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research

Email: [email protected] Presented at the International Conference on National and Regional Security: Countering Organized Crime and Terrorism in the ASEAN Political Security and Community (APSC) organized by the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG), Faculty of Law, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand on 19-20 September 2012. Please check against delivery. I am truly honored to stand before you to candidly discuss the issue of crime-‐terrorism-‐insurgency nexus in the Philippines. This presentation is based on the various scholarly research works I conducted on the topic over a span of eleven years after September 11, 2001 (9/11).

In my various publications, I have always argued that terrorist threats in the Philippines cannot be fully understood if not analyzed in the context of a larger environment in which we find ourselves. Terrorism in the Philippines has always been inextricably linked with crime and insurgency problems. In fact, terrorism, crime and insurgency threats are also deeply enmeshed in panoply of other related internal security concerns associated with warlordism, violent entrepreneurship, clan warfare, revenge killing, personal vendetta, and local political dynamics.

So-‐called terrorist groups in the Philippines are not only parts of larger insurgency movements from the Moro and Communist fronts. They are also tightly woven in a complex network of organized criminal activities like trafficking/smuggling of arms, drugs and humans as well extortion, car napping, kidnapping operations and even illegal logging. Complicating this dreadful situation is the depressing reality that these terrorist groups not only have tactical alliances with each other but also have some “violent entrepreneurial relations” with some corrupt elected local officials and with a few misfits in the police and the military sectors. These armed groups and individuals create and perpetuate the violent economy of Mindanao where guns and goons rule in a semi-‐anarchic society.

PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH 2nd Floor, CPDRI Room, Asian Institute of Tourism, University of the Philippines

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www.pipvtr.com

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Without a nuanced knowledge of the whole gamut of these issues, crime-‐terrorism-‐insurgency nexus in the Philippines, therefore, will be very difficult to subdue. The involvement of children and young people in this nexus exacerbate this bewildering problem.

In the Philippines, it is common to refer to the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) when talking about terrorist threats.

There is a debate on whether the ASG is a rebel, terrorist or a mere bandit group.1 Some carelessly describe the ASG as the Frankenstein monster of the Philippine military. The media interchangeably describes the ASG as a bandit and a terrorist group. But the United States decisively classifies the ASG as a foreign terrorist organization.

In my continuing study of the ASG for more than 15 years, I have learned that the ASG has evolved into a non-‐state armed group with multiple personalities involved in various acts of violence.2

When Abdurajak Janjalani formed the group in 1989, his original intention was to bridge the divide between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) of Nur Misuari and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) of the late Hashim Salamat. Thus, Abdurajak recruited followers from the MNLF and the MILF.

But when he died in 1998, the ASG rapidly degenerated into a bandit group engaged in kidnapping, extortion and smuggling activities under the leadership of his brother, Khadaffy Janjalani.

At present, the ASG has adopted a cellular-‐type structure led by commanders in their respective geographical turfs. With many commanders at the helm of a single group, the ASG has already evolved into a highly promiscuous armed group linked with other armed groups engaged in terrorism, insurgency, banditry and other violent acts. It has also become a very resilient armed group having been protected by some corrupt local politicians and a few scalawags in uniform who benefit from ASG’s violent activities.3 Some ASG members even serve as private armed escorts of a few local politicians in Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-‐Tawi, particularly during elections.

1Soliman M. Santos, Jr. and Octavio A. Dinampo. “Abu Sayyaf Reloaded: Rebels, Agents, Bandits, Terrorists (Case Study) in Soliman Santos, et, al. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), pp. 115-‐138.

2For my most updated publication on the ASG, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group, 3rd edition (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, 2012).

3Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Sources of Abu Sayyaf Resilience in the Southern Philippines”. CTC Sentinel (3 May 2010).

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Thus, the ASG of the late 80’s is no longer the ASG of today. In fact, some armed men who claim to be followers of the ASG are also claiming to be followers of the MNLF and the MILF, depending on the situation. Current remnants still prefer to use the name, ASG, as it has become a very convenient trademark for their violent activities. Ustadj Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the real person whom this trademark is based, is very displeased to see his name being used in the Philippines for violent purposes. Since the global war on terrorism in 2001, the Philippine government has already put to justice many ASG members for committing various crimes associated with terrorism. But the ASG threat persists because the ASG has a survival instinct that is also shared by some likeminded groups abroad. ASG’s staying power comes from the continuous supply of illiterate and out-‐of-‐school youth in Mindanao joining the group for a variety of reasons from personal, economic, social, and political.4 In fact, the ASG’s rank-‐and-‐file is composed of some young orphans being abused by old commanders to mount various kidnap-‐for-‐ransom and extortion activities. The Philippine military says that the ASG has around 400-‐armed members as of 2010.5 Most of its members operate mainly in Basilan, Sulu, Zamboaga Sibugay and Tawi-‐Tawi. But there are also sightings of ASG followers in Metro Manila. During the first semester of 2012, the Philippine government says that the ASG membership has declined to around 350. My independent research on the ASG, however, indicates that the ASG has only around 100 regular followers serving six major commanders lording over in only three major provinces in Mindanao: Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-‐Tawi (BASULTA). In Sulu, which is the epicenter of ASG activities, there are three major commanders: Commander Radullan Sahiron, Commander Yassir Igasan, and Commander Hajan Sawadjaan. Sahiron has only around 30 regular armed followers. He is the recognized over-‐all operational commander of the ASG. Igasan, who has been rumored to be the over-‐all Amir of the ASG, only has around 5 regular armed followers. Sawadjaan only has around 10 regular armed followers.

4Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Pull of Terrorism: A Philippine Case Study”. Youth and Terrorism: A Selection of Articles (Kuala Lumpur: Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Counter-‐ Terrorism, 2011), pp. 39-‐50.

5General Headquarters of the AFP, Internal Peace and Security Plan, Bayanihan (Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines Headquarters, 2010), p. 12.

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In Basilan, there are also three major commanders: Commander Isnilon Hapilon, Commander Khair Mundos, and Commander Puruji Indama. Hapinol has only around 20 regular armed followers. Mundos has only around 15 regular armed followers while Indama has only around 15 regular armed followers. In Tawi-‐Tawi, the recognized ASG commander in the area is Jul Asman Sawadjaan, the brother of Hajan Sawadjaan. He is believed to have at least 10 regular armed followers. There is an emerging young commander of the ASG by the name of Nadzmir Alih. He is an adopted son of ASG founder, Abdurajak Janjalani. In his mid-‐30s, Nadzmir Alih operates in Basilan as a military protégé of Isnilon Hapilon and in Sulu as spiritual mentee of Yassir Igasan. Nadzmir Allih has around 10 regular armed young followers associated with another group called Anak Ilo or orphaned sons. His group is responsible for a spate of “small-‐to-‐medium-‐scale” kidnap-‐for-‐ransom activities in Sulu and Basilan. Thus, the ASG is only a very miniscule armed group. But the ASG threat looms large because it wields tremendous strength from its superb ability to network with countless armed groups in Mindanao engaged in various criminal, terrorist, insurgent and even partisan political activities. While a few ASG commanders still embrace an Islamic ideology that aims to promote the establishment of a Islamic State in Mindanao, most followers have become violent entrepreneurs engaged in predatory economic activities such as kidnapping, extortion and smuggling of arms and drugs. These violent entrepreneurs have skills in jungle and urban warfare. Worse, they have the ability to manufacture improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that they use for criminal, terrorist and insurgent activities. Based on our independent investigative research aided by seasoned intelligence officers, we discovered that almost 90% of the funds of the ASG are derived from illicit activities, mainly from kidnap-‐for-‐ransom and extortion.6 As a violent group, the ASG has also demonstrated its inherent capability to conduct acts of piracy for economic reasons and maritime terrorism for political reasons.7 6Rodolfo B. Mendoza, Jr., “The Evolution of Terrorist Financing in the Philippines” (Paper presented at the International Conference in Countering the Financing of Terrorism at the Sulu Hotel, Philippines, 7-‐8 July 2008).

7Rommel C. Banlaoi. “The Abu Sayyaf Group: Threat of Maritime Piracy and Terrorism in Peter Lehr (ed), Violence at Sea. Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 121-‐138.

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The Philippine government has declared a policy of crushing the ASG through combined police and military efforts.

But it recognizes difficulties in doing so because of the ASG’s complex links with other armed groups like the lawless elements of the MILF, rouge factions of the MNLF, remnants of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Mindanao and other violent groups such as the Al Khobar Group (AKG), the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and even the New People’s Army (NPA).

The ASG’s links with some local warlords, government militias, and local communities confound the already convoluted threat it poses to Philippine internal security.

In other words, the ASG has become “complex adaptive system” with a superb survival instinct. This instinct to survive is reinforced by their complex linkages with one another as well as with ordinary organized crimes groups and partisan armed movements. Underlying issues of abject poverty, inefficient governance, ethnic conflict, clan feuding and religious/ideological intolerance, among others, also fuel the staying power of the ASG. As such, the U.S. Department of State claims that the Philippines remains as a “terrorist safe haven” in its Country Reports on Terrorism published in July 2012.8 It even warns that through the ASG and the country’s porous border, the Southern Philippines can be used to transport weapons of mass destruction (WMD).9 Allow me to conclude by stressing that the ASG is an excellent example of the nexus of crime, terrorism and insurgency. Countering the threat posed by the ASG is a formidable challenge not only for law enforcement and other concerned government agencies but also for the wider society of citizens who are often times victims, casualties, and collateral damages of criminal, terrorist and insurgent activities. Thank you very much for your attention.

8US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 (Washington DC: Bureau of Counterterrorism, July 2012), p. 181.

9Ibid.

Crime-Terrorism-Insurgency Nexus in the Philippines

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