ART 125EDMUNDO S. ALBERTO, Provincial Fiscal and BONIFACIO C. INTIA 1st Asst. Provincial Fiscal, both of Camarines Sur,petitioners,vs.HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the CFI of Camarines Sur and ELIGIO ORBITA,respondents.CONCEPCION,J.:Petition forcertiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminay injunction, to annul and set aside the order of the respondent Judge, dated January 26, 1970, directing the petitioners, Provincial Fiscal and Assitant Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur, to amend the information filed in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of CamarinesSur, entitled: "The People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Eligio Orbita, accused," so as to include, as defendants, Governor Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial warden of Camarines Sur; as well as the order dated February 18, 1970, denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said order.In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Eligio Orbita, a Provincial guard, is prosecuted for the crime of Infedelity in the Custody of Prisoner, defined and punished under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code, committed, as follows:That on or about the 12th day of September. 1968, in the barrio of Taculod, municipality of Canaman, province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a member of the Provincial Guard of Camarines Sur and specially charged with the duty of keeping under custody and vigilance detention prisoner Pablo Denaque, did then and there with great carelessness and unjustifiable negligence leave the latter unguarded while in said barrio, thereby giving him the opportunity to run away and escape, as in fact said detention prisoner Pablo Denaque did run away and escape from the custody of the said accused.1In the course of the trial thereof, or more particularly during the cross-examination of prosecution witness Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial warden of Camarines Sur, the defense brought forht and confronted the witness with a note, marked as exhibit, purportedly written by Gov. Armando Cledera, asking Jose Esmeralda to send five men to work in the construction of a fence at his house at Taculod, Canaman, Camarines Sur, then leased by the province and used as an official guest house. Jose Esmeralda, declared, however, that he could not remember who ahnded the note for him; that he was not sure as to genuineness of the signature appearing therein and that he was not preszent when the note was made and signed by Gov. Cledera.2Beleiving that the escape of Pablo Denaque was made possible by the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda and that Cledera and Esmeralda are equally guilty of the offense for which tha accused Eligio Orbita had been charged, the defense cousel filed a motion in court seeking the amendment of the information so as to include Gov. cledera and Jose Esmeralda as defendants therein.3Acting upon said motion, as well as the opposition of the prosecution officers4and finding that "the court cannot grant the motion or order the inclusion of Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda at this stage unless an investigation is made," the respondent Judge directed the Fiscals office, within 15 days from date, to cause the further investigation of the case, taking into consideration the provisions of Article 156 in relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Revised Penal Code in order to determine once and for all whether the Governor as jailer of the Province and his assistant have any criminatory participation in the circumstances of Pablo Denaque's escape from judicial custody.5In compliance with said order, the Fiscal set the reinvestigation of the case for December 19, 1969. Summonses were issued to Gov. Cledera Jose Esmeralda, Lorenzo Padua, the provincial warden, and the accused Eligio Orbita to be present thereat.6Dr. went thereat But, on the date set for the reinvestigation of the case, only Gov. Cledera Jose Esmeralda and Lorenzo Padua appeared. The accused Eligio Orbita did not appear. Neither was the note (Exhibit 2) produced. Since no additional evidence was presented, the Fiscal manifested in Court on January 2, 1970 that "after conducting a reinvestigation of the case and after a thorough and intelligent analysis of the facts and law involved, no prima facie case against Governor Cledera and Jose Esmeralda exist, hence, they cannot be charged.7On January 19, 1970, the accused Eligio Orbita filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" praying "that the Order of this Honorable Court dated December 11, 1969 be, in that instead of ordering the Fiscal to reinvestigate this case, on the basis of the evidence already adduce during the trial of this case, he be ordered to amend the information on to include Cledera and Esmeralda it appearing the on record that their inclusion is warranted.8On January 26, 1970, the respondent Court issued the order complained of, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, in the light of the facts brought about by the prosecuting fiscal let the charges be so amended by including in the information the author or writer of Exhibit 2 and the person or persons who carried out the said orders considering the provisions of Article 156 in relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Penal Code.9The Fiscal filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order,10but the motion was denied on February 18, 1970.11Hence, the instant recourse.From the facts of the case, We are convinced that the respondent Judge committed an error in ordering the fiscal to amend the information so as to include Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda as defendants in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. It is the rule that a fiscal by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to support the allegations thereof.12Although this power and prerogative of the Fiscal, to determine whether or not the evidence at hand is sufficient to form a reasonable belief that a person committed an offense, is not absolute and subject to judicial review,13it would be embarrassing for the prosecuting attorney to be compelled to prosecute a case when he is in no position to do so because in his opinion, he does not have the necessary evidence to secure a conviction, or he is not convinced of the merits of the case. The better procedure would be to appeal the Fiscal's decision to the Ministry of Justice and/or ask for a special prosecutor.Besides, it cannot be said that the Fiscal had capriciously and whimsically refused to prosecute Cledera and Esmeralda.In his order directing the Fiscal's office to conduct a further reinvestigation of the case, the respondent Judge candidly ad. muted that without a reinvestigation of the case, he cannot determine once and for all whether or not to include Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda in the information. Pursuant thereto, a reinvestigation was conducted by the fiscals office. Summonses were issued. But, no additional fact was elicited since Eligio Orbita did not appear thereat. Neither was the note (Exh. 2) presented and produced. Gov. Cledera could not admit nor deny the genuineness of the signature appearing in the note since it was not on hand. Such being the case, the prosecuting officers had reason to refuse to amend the information filed by them after a previous pre examination and investigation.Moreover, there is no sufficient evidence in the record to show a prima facie case against Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda. The order to amend the information is based upon the following facts:1. Pablo Denaque, a detention prisoner for homicide, while working at the Guest House of Governor Cledera on September 12, 1968;2. The Governor's evidence at that time is being rented by the province and its maintenance and upkeep is shouldered by the province of Camarines Sur,3. That neither Governor Cledera nor Lt. Jose Esmeralda was charged or entrusted with the duty of conveying and the detainee from the jail to the residence of the governor.4. That the de worked at the Governor Is by virtue of an order of the Governor (Exhibit 2) which was tsn by Lt. Esmeralda; and5. That it was the accused Orbita who himself who handpicked the group of Prisoners to work at the Governor's on 12, 1968.14Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code provides:Art. 156.Delivering prisoners from jails. The city Of arrests mayor in its maximum period toprison correccionalin its minimum Period shall be imposed upon any person who shall remove from any jail or penal establishment t any person confined therein or shall help the escape of such person, by means of violence, intimidation, or bribery.If other means are used the penalty ofarresto mayorshall be imposed. If the escape of the prisoner shall take place outside of said establishments by taking the guards by surprise, the same penalties shall be imposed in their minimum period.The offenders may be committed in two ways: (1) by removing a person confined in any jail or penal establishment; and (2) by helping such a person to escape. To remove means to take away a person from the place of his confinement, with or without the active compensation of the person released To help in the escape of a Person confined in any jail or penal institution means to furnished that person with the material means such as a file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitate his escape.15The offenders under this article is usually committed by an outsider who removes from jail any person therein confined or helps him escape. If the offender is a public officer who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and penalty under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera as governor, is the jailer of the province,16and Jose Esmeralda is the assistant provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the escape Of Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code. There is likewise no sufficient evidence to warrant their prosecution under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads, as follows:ART. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. Any Public officer who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge, shall be punished1. Byprision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods and temporary disqualification in its minimum period to perpetual special disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been sentenced by final judgment to any penalty.2. Byprision correccionalin its minimum period and temporary special disqualification, in case the fugitive shall not have been finally convicted but only held as a detention prisoner for any crime or violation of law or municipal ordinance.In order to be guilty under the aforequoted provisions of the Penal Code, it is necessary that the public officer had consented to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner under his custody or charge. Connivance in the escape of a prisoner on the part of the person in charge is an essential condition in the commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody of the prisoner. If the public officer charged with the duty of guarding him does not connive with the fugitive, then he has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime.17For sure no connivance in the escape of Pablo Denaque from the custody of the accused Eligio Orbita can be deduced from the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda asking for five men to work in the guest house, it appearing that the notes does not mention the names of the prisoners to be brought to the guest house; and that it was the accused Eligio Orbita who picked the men to compose the work party.Neither is there evidence to warrant the prosecution of Cledera and Esmeralda under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code. This article punishes the public officer in whose custody or charge a prisoner has escaped by reason of his negligence resulting in evasion is definite amounting to deliberate non- performance of duty.18In the constant case, the respondent Judge said:We cannot, for the present be reconciled with the Idea that the escape. of Denaque was facilitated by the Governor's or . his assistants negligence. According to law, if there is any negligence committed it must be the officer who is charged with the custody and guarding of the ...19We find no reason to set aside such findings.WHEREFORE, the orders issued on January 26, and February 18, 1970 in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, entitled:"The People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Eligio Orbita,accused are hereby annulled and set aside. The respondent Judge or any other judge acting in his stead is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Without costs.SO ORDERED.

ART. 127FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS. JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA,petitioners,vs.HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively,respondents.R E S O L U T I O NEN BANC:In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said:In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide. [Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.]On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising the following major arguments:1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily; and3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Thus, petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider its decision, order respondents to issue the necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the Philippines, and enjoin respondents from implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return of the remains of Mr. Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that the motion for reconsideration is moot and academic as to the deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that "the 'formal' rights being invoked by the Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including the label 'return of Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize the country, a 'right' to hide the Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization." [Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit.We deny the motion for reconsideration.1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is upon the movants, petitioner herein, to show that there are compelling reasons to reconsider the decision of the Court.2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for reconsideration, the Court is of the view that no compelling reasons have been established by petitioners to warrant a reconsideration of the Court's decision.The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the basis for the decision to bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and declared that the matter "should be brought to all the courts of the world." [Comment, p. 1;Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.]3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, butnot a diminution of the general grant of executive power.That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new. This is recognized under the U.S. Constitution from which we have patterned the distribution of governmental powers among three (3) separate branches.Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." In Alexander Hamilton's widely accepted view, this statement cannot be read as mere shorthand for the specific executive authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton stressed the difference between the sweeping language of article II, section 1, and the conditional language of article I, [section] 1: "All legislative Powersherein grantedshall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . ." Hamilton submitted that "[t]he [article III enumeration [in sections 2 and 31 ought therefore to be considered, as intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in the definition of execution power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power, interpreted in confomity with other parts of the Constitution...InMyers v. United States,the Supreme Court accepted Hamilton's proposition, concluding that the federal executive, unlike the Congress, could exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the constitutional text: the executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed. . ." The language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers makes clear that the constitutional concept of inherent power is not a synonym for power without limit; rather, the concept suggests only that not all powers granted in the Constitution are themselves exhausted by internal enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly regarded as one of "executive' power, authority is implied unless there or elsewhere expressly limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-159 (1978).]And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's implied or residual powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained analogy, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6 which provides:Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever theinterimBatasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land,There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of thespecific power of legislation.4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."

MARCOS VS MANGLAPUSPosted by kaye lee on 1:16 PMG.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989 FACTS:Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.RULING:YesAccording to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing power (Section 23).The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

ART 128THE UNITED STATES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.VALERIANO DE LOS REYES and GABRIELA ESGUERRA,defendants-appellants.Ellsworth E. Zook, for appellants.Attorney General Villamort, for appellee.MORELAND,J.:This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the Hon. Charles S. Lobingier presiding, convicting each of the appellants of a violation of section 31 of Act No. 1761 and sentencing each of them to six month's imprisonment and to pay the costs of the action.It appears that a few days prior to the 5th of November, 1910, the appellant Gabriela Esguerra, who lived in San Miguel de Mayumo, being a friend of the family of the other appellant, Valeriano de los Reyes, came to visit him and his wife at their home in the city of Manila; that on the said 5th day of November, and while Gabriela was still there, certain revenue officials went to the house of the accused Valeriano to search for opium; that having arrived there they were refused admission to the house by Valeriano upon the ground that they were not authorized to search his premises, they having no search warrant authorizing them to do so; that, after a few moments' conversation, and upon their assertion that they were officers of the law, while not consenting, he offered no physical resistance to their entry, and the search for the drug began; that while some of the officers were in the house prosecuting the search therein, others were on the outside watching to see that no one left the house; that during the progress of the search in the front part of the house one of the officers outside saw the accused Gabriela throw a package from the window of the kitchen into the grass behind the house; that upon recovering the package it was found to contained a considerable quantity of morphine.It is concede in this case that at the time the drug was discovered the defendant Valeriano was in the front part of the house, while the accused Gabriela was in a room in the rear used as a kitchen; that there is no direct evidence of any kind showing that the accused Valeriano had any knowledge whatever of the fact that the accused Gabriela had possession of the drug. It is substantially admitted by the court in its opinion convicting Valeriano that the only evidence relative to his knowledge that the opium was in his house is derived from the fact that he refused permission to the officials to search his premises, the inference being drawn from such refusal that the accused had knowledge of the fact that the contraband drug was located in his house, otherwise he would have offered no objection to the search. The trial court says:Counsel for the defense does not deny that if the Government's evidence is accepted as true the opium in question was in the woman's possession, but he denies that it was in the man's also. But under the law his "knowingly having on his premises any opium" (Act No. 1761, sec. 31). The man admitted (p. 18) on the stand that the house was his; and that he knew that the opium was there seems clear from the fact the he endeavored to prevent the search of the premises.This is all that the trial court has to say with reference to the evidence which supports the conviction of the accused Valeriano. We do not believe that this is sufficient. The accused Gabriela was only a visitor in the house of Valeriano. She had been there but a short time. At the time of the search the morphine was found exclusively in her possession and under her control. It nowhere appears that any member of the family of Valeriano had the slightest knowledge of its existence. It was only when the accused herself was about to be searched that she relinquished possession and control of the drug in an effort to protect herself against the consequences of the search. Rather than indicate that anyone else had knowledge of her possession of the drug, the proofs seem to suggest that it was her effort to keep knowledge of such possession from every other person, including Valeriano and his family.The fact that Valeriano refused the officers permission to search his house for opium can not be taken against him. No public official or other person in any country where that portion of the Constitution of the United States against searches and seizures or similar provisions is in force, has the right to enter the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search or seizure without first being provided with the proper search warrant for the purpose, obtained in the manner provided by law. (Sec. 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902; secs. 95, 96, 97, and 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.) Judge Cooley, in his constitutional Limitations, sixth edition, says at page 364 and following pages:Near in importance to exemption from any arbitrary control of the person is that maxim of the common law which secures to the citizen immunity in his home against the prying eyes of the government, and protection in person, property, and papers against even process of the law, except in a few specified cases. The maxim that "every man's house is his castle," is made a part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and has always been looked upon as of high value to the citizen.If in English history we inquire into the original occasion for these constitutional provisions, we shall probably find it in the abuse of executive agents into the houses and among the private papers of individuals, in order to obtain evidence of political offenses either committed or designed. . . . .The history of this controversy should be read in connection with that in America immediately previous to the American Revolution, in regard to writs of assistance issued by the courts to the revenue officers, empowering them, in their discretion, to search suspected places for smuggled goods, and which of his pronounced "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book;" since they placed "the liberty of every men in the hands of every petty officer." All these matters are now a long way in the past; but it has not been deemed unwise to repeat in the State constitutions, as well as in the Constitution of the United States, the principles already settled in the common law upon this vital point in civil liberty.For the service of criminal process, the houses of private parties are subject to be broken and entered under circumstances which are fully explained in the works on criminal law, and need not be enumerated here. And there are also cases where search-warrants are allowed to be issued, under which an officer may be protected in the like action. But as search-warrants are a species of process exceedingly arbitrary in character, and which ought not to be resorted to except for every urgent and satisfactorily reasons, the rules of law which pertain to them are of more than ordinary strictness; and if the party acting under them expects legal protection, it is essential that these rules be carefully observed.xxx xxx xxxThe warrant is not allowed for the purpose of obtaining evidence of an intended crime; but only after lawful evidence of an offense actually committed. Nor even then is it allowable to invade one's privacy for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence against him, except in a few special cases where that which is the subject of the crime is supposed to be concealed, and the public or the complainant has an interest in it for in its destruction. Those special cases are familiar, and well understood in the law. Search-warrants have heretofore been allowed to search for stolen goods, for goods supposed to have been smuggled into the country in violation of the revenue laws, for implements of gaming or counterfeiting, for lottery tickets or prohibited liquors kept for sale contrary to law, for obscene books and papers kept for sale or circulation, and for powder or other explosive and dangerous material so kept as to endanger the public safety. A statute which should permit the breaking and entering a man's house, and the examination of books and papers with a view to discover the evidence of crime, might possibly not be void on constitutional grounds in some other cases; but the power of the legislature to auhorize a resort to this process is one which can properly be exercised only in extreme cases, and it is better often times that crimes should go unpunished than that the citizen should be liable to have his premises invaded, his desks broken open, his private books, letters, and papers exposed to prying curiosity, and to the misconstruction of ignorant and suspicious persons, and all this under the direction of a mere ministerial officer, who brings with him such assistants as he pleases, and who will select them more often with reference to physical strength and courage than to their sensitive regard to the rights and feelings of others. To incline against the enactment of such laws is to incline to the side of safety. In principle they are objectionable; in the mode of execution they are necessarily odious; and they tend to invite abuse and to cover the commission of crime. We think it would generally be safe for the legislature to regard all those searches and seizures "unreasonable" which have hitherto been unknown to the law, and on that account to abstrain from authorizing them, leaving parties and the public to the accustomed remedies.We have said that if the officer follows the command of his warrant, he is protected; and this is so even when the complaint proves to have been unfounded. But if he exceed the commands by searching in places not described therein, or by seizing persons or articles not commanded, he is not protected by the warrant, and can only justify himself as in other cases where he assumes to act without process. Obeying strictly the command of his warrant, he may break open outer or inner doors, and his justification does not depend upon his discovering that for which he is to make search.In other cases than those to which we have referred, and subject to the general police power of the State, the law favors the complete and undisturbed dominion of every man over his own premises, and protects him therein with such jealousy that he may defend his possession against intruders, in person or by his servants or guests, even to the extent of taking the life of the intruder, if that seem essential to the defense.Judge Cooley in a note quotes the eloquent passage from Chatham's speech on General Warrants as follows (p. 364):The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.In the case ofMcClurg vs. Brenton(123 Iowa, 368), the court, speaking of the right of an officer to enter a private house to search for stolen goods, said:The right of the citizen to occupy and enjoy his home, however mean or humble, free from arbitrary invasion and search, has for centuries been protected with the most solicitous care by every court in the England-speaking world, from Magna Charta down to the present, and is embodied in every bill of rights defining the limits of governmental power in our republic.The mere fact that a man is an officer, whether of high or low degree, gives him no more right than is possessed by the ordinary private citizen to break in upon the privacy of a home and subject its occupants to the indignity of a search for the evidence of crime, without a legal warrant procured for that purpose. No amount of incriminating evidence, whatever its source, will supply the place of such warrant. At the closed door of the home, be it palace or hovel, even blood-hounds must wait till the law, by authoritative process, bids it open. Even with a warrant, the law of this state forbids a search in the nighttime, save upon a showing therefor, and upon special authority expressed in the writ. (Code, sec. 5555.) A right thus carefully guarded by the statute as well as by the common law is not to be lightly disregarded.In the case ofBailey vs. Ragatz(50 Wis., 554), the court said:It is very questionable whether the defendant would, by virtue of his office as policeman, be justified in demanding an entrance into the plaintiff's house in the nighttime, and after the family had retired, even though the boy he claims he was looking for had been there. Having no warrant or authority for his arrest, we think he would not have been justified in going further than making a proper inquiry upon the subject, and requesting, in proper manner, to be permitted to enter the house to make search. He was not in a position to demand an entrance. And as there is evidence tending to prove that the defendant demanded an entrance into the house, and that he entered against the will of the plaintiff, the court was not justified in saying, as a matter of law, that the defendant lawfully entered the house of the plaintiff.Article 205 of the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands reads as follows:The penalties of suspension in its minimum and medium degrees and a fine of not less than 325 and not more than 3,250 pesetas shall be imposed upon the following persons:1. Any public officer, other than a judicial officer, who, in the absence of the authority referred to in article 200 shall enter the dwelling of a Spaniard or a foreigner without his consent.2. Any public officer, other than a judicial officer, who, without authority of law or of some general regulation in force in the Philippine Islands, shall search the papers and effects in the dwelling of a Spaniard or of a foreigner, unless the owner shall have given his consent thereto.If the papers and good searched are not restored to their owner immediately thereafter, the penalty shall be that next higher in degree.If the offense penalized in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article be committed in the nighttime, the penalty shall be suspension in its medium and maximum degrees and a fine of not less than 625 and not more than 6,250 pesetas;Provided, however, That in cases falling within the second subdivision of paragraph two the penalty shall be that next higher in degree than the penalties designated in said paragraphs one and two.Commenting on this article, Viada, in his Treatise on the Spanish Penal Code, says (vol. 2, p. 130, etc):Article 5 of the constitution of 1869 provided that no one should enter the domicile of a Spaniard or of a foreigner residing in Spain without his consent except in urgent cases of fire, flood, or some other similar danger, or in case of unlawful aggression proceeding from within, or for the purpose of rendering assistance to a person calling for help. Outside of these cases the entrance into the domicile of a Spaniard or of a foreigner could only be authorized by a competent judge and it could only beeffected in the daytime. However, when an offender was caught inflagrante delictoand was pursued by the authorities or their agents and he took refuge in his own domicile, the authorities or their agents could enter the premises for the sole purpose of arresting him; and if he should seek refuge in the domicile of another, it was necessary to first make a demand upon the occupant of the house.That inviolability of the domicile, as provided in the aforesaid article of the constitution, is what paragraph 1 of the said article came to protect by means of its penal sanction.The constitution of 1876, now in force, provided, in regard to the inviolability of the domicile, only that: "No one shall enter the domicile of a Spaniard or of a foreigner residing in Spain without his consent,except in the cases and in the manner expressly provided by law."We find the same principle quotedad pedem literatein article 545 of the Code of Criminal Procedure now in force, article 550 of which has in part modified the provisions of the constitution of 1869 upon the subject by providing that the judge or tribunal taking cognizance of the cause may decree the entrance into and search of any closed building or place, or any part thereof, constituting the domicile of any Spaniard or foreigner residing in Spain, either during the day or thenighttime, if the urgency of the case should so require, in the cases enumerated in article 546, that is to say, when there is reason to believe that either the offender of the instrument of the crime, books papers, or any other things which may serve as a clue to the discovery of the crime, might be found therein; but this, provided the interested party consents thereto as stated in article 6 of the constitution; or, in the absence of his consent, by virtue of an order of the court which must be immediately served upon the party affected thereby, within the twenty-four hours at most after the issuance of such order. The order shall set out the grounds thereof and the judge must expressly state therein the particular building or place to be entered or search and whether the entrance and search is to be made during the day or the nighttime, and the name of the officer or official who shall execute the order. (Art. 558 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.) It should be also borne in mind that according to article 553 of the said code, police officials may now, ontheir own authorityand, therefore, without the necessity of a special order of the court, make any search and, hence, enter any inhabited place when a warrant has been issued for the arrest of any person and his capture is sought; and also when a person is caught inflagrante delicto, or when an offender who is closely pursued by the agents of the authorities, should seek to conceal himself, or seek refuge, in a private house. In all these cases the entrance of a public official into the domicile of another no longer constitutes the crime penalized in paragraph 1 of this section. (2 Viada, Penal Code, pp. 130-132.)Groizard in his work on the Penal Code of Spain, commenting on articles 215, 217 thereof, says:In the early history of most peoples we find beliefs and traditions which bear witness to the ancient respect for man's home.We should not be surprised at this, for religion, under which primitive families were constituted, gathered under the same roof all of the members thereof to worship their protecting gods, at the same time, with the same prayers, and in accordance with the same rites. Eneas, when he abandoned Troy, did not save from the conflagration and take with him the gods of the city, but its Lares and Penates. The Hebrews themselves, a happy exception in ancient history, the only worshippers of the true God, the creator of heaven and earth, invoked him by the names of God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob.Thehouse of manwas the firsthouse of God:the home the primitive altar. Family worship preceded public worship; the sanctity of the home preceded that of the temple.In Rome the home of the citizen was a safe refuge, a sacred asylum. Its inviolability was at once proclaimed, both by the jurists and by the laws. Cicero exclaimed: "Quid est sanctius, quid omni religione munitius quam uni-uscujusque civium domus? Hoc perfugium est ita sanctum omnibus, ut inde abripi neminem fas sit." Any acts of violence which resulted in an invasion thereof were anathematized and were likened to similar acts committed against the person. The right to bring persons before tribunals and magistrates, however expeditious, absolute and securely protected by the laws, did not prevail over the inviolability of the domicile. "De domo sua nemo extrahi debet," says with eloquent laconism one of the ancient laws. Another law provided that: "Plerique putaverunt nullum de domo sua in jus vocari licere, quia domus tutiissimum cuique refugium at que receptaculum sit, eumque qui inde in jus vocaret vim inferre videri."During the earliest ceturies of the middle ages, the religious sentiment, which was so greatly encouraged and revived by the church, placed the temples and cloisters beyond the possibility of any violent attacks. But the security of the domicile, as well as personal security, sought its own defense in the only effective protection of the citizen's rights existing during those turbulent times, to wit force. The home was converted into a castle, the fields bristled with fortresses, and the towns were surrounded by walls. The sentiment of individual liberty which, with the barbarians, made its noisy entrance in history, impressed every one most strongly with the right which he had, by himself, and with the assistance of his relatives and friends to protect the entrance to his domicile, meeting force with force, and opposing to the unjust violence of aggression the just violence of resistance.When monarchy triumphed over the more real than apparent anarchy wherein all of the elements which were to serve later as the foundation of the great modern nations were purified through struggle, the protection of the person and the domicile were placed in the hands of the king as the representative of all social forces. "In the name of the king," shouted the magistrates and their agents when pursuing an alleged offender in order to arrest him, and it was only by invoking the name of the king that the doors of a private house could be opened whenever they had to perform any functions or acts therein in the discharged of their duties.What religion did among primitive peoples, and individual sentiment in the middle ages and the royal authority in despotic governments, in defense of the domicile, should be accomplished through the laws in those countries governed by a constitution.Unfortunately the political disturbances which have agitated almost all those countries which have passed from a regime of absolutism to liberty, and particularly our country, Spain, have been the cause of the inviolability of the domicile having been very little respected in practice.Some progress, however, has been made in the right direction. Victory seems assured in the field of legislation. All that is necessary is that it take root in the customs of the people. The English subject says with pride, "My home is my castle." Would to God that the Spaniard could rightfully say the same thing!The constitution of 1869 proclaimed the following principles as to the domicile:No one shall enter the domicile of a Spaniard, or of a foreigner residing in Spain, without his consent, except in the urgent cases of conflagration, flood, or some other similar danger, or in case of unlawful aggression proceeding from within, or in order to render assistance to someone calling for such assistance.Except in these cases, the entrance into the domicile of a Spaniard or of a foreigner residing in Spain, and the searching of his papers and effects, can only be decreed by a competent judge, and must be done in the daytime.The search for papers and effects shall always be made in the presence of the interested party, or of some member of his family, and, in the absence of either, of two witnesses, residents of the same town.However, when a offender is caught in flagrante delicto and is pursued by the authorities or their agents, and he should seek refuge in his own domicile, said authorities or their agents may enter therein for the sole purpose of arresting him. If he should seek refuge in the domicile of another, it will be necessary to first inform the occupant of the premises.It is the purpose of the three sections which precede these commentaries to protect these rights by penal sanction.The first thing to be ascertained is whether they have been repealed, either in whole or in part, by the constitution of 1876.The constitution provides: No one shall enter the domicile of a Spaniard, or of foreigner residing in Spain, without his consent, except in the cases and in the manner expressly provided by law.The search for papers and effects shall always take place in the presence of the interested party, or of some member of his family, and, in the absence of either, of two witnesses, residents of the same town.The difference between these two fundamental laws is that the former announces the principle and determines the rights which are a consequence thereof, whereas the latter merely announces the principle, leaving the matter of its application to be provided for in subsequent legislation.The logical deduction from this is that the sections of the code still preserve their full force and vigor, either because the constitution contains no provision in conflict therewith, or because they, being a integral part of the law, have to be enforced until they are repealed, in conformity with the constitution itself, which declaresthat no one can enter the domicile of a Spaniard, or of a foreigner residing in Spain, without his consent, except in the cases and in the manner expressly prescribed by law.To distinguish them and to avoid any confusion as to whether the entrance constitutes a mere abuse or an act performed by the authorities in the discharge of their duties, the first thing to be taken into consideration is whether or not constitutional guaranties have been suspended. If they have, the inviolability of the domicile disappears and, therefore, the official who, without the consent of the occupant of the house, enters the same in the discharge of his duties commits no crime.In this delicate matter, we must also distinguish authorities from authorities. The administrative authorities and their agents, when the provisions of the constitution are in full force and operation, can, without any responsibility whatsoever, enter the domicile of another only in the urgent cases of conflagration, flood, or similar danger, or in case of unlawful aggression proceeding from within the premises, or for the purpose of rendering assistance to a person calling for help, or in the pursuit of an offender who, having been caught inflagrante delicto, should seek refuge in his own domicile, for the sole purpose of his arrest.Judicial authorities, however, have only one prohibition, to wit, that they can only act in the daytime, but even this does not apply to the cases of alarming urgency above enumerated.The code has endeavored to avoid, if not in whole at least in part, in a very ingenious manner, without detriment whatsoever to the constitutional provision, the great inconvenience which in the prosecution of crimes and the punishment of criminals may result from the absolute prohibition imposed upon judicial authorities to enter in the nighttime the domicile of a citizen, without the latter's consent. The method adopted by the code has been to judicial authorities the necessary permission to enter his premises in the nighttime for the purpose of arresting an offender shall be considered an accessory after the fact in relation to the crime committed.In other respects, the penalties provided by the code are adequate for the abuses which are sought to be corrected. The administrative official who, in the daytime, invades the domicile of a person, is punished with suspension in its minimum and medium degrees and a fine of from 125 to 1,250 pesetas. If the invasion takes place in the nighttime, and greater alarm is thereby created, the suspension is increased to the medium and maximum degrees and the fine to from 250 to 2,500 pesetas. The judicial authority who shall commit the same act shall be punished with suspension in the minimum and medium degrees and by a fine of from 125 to 1,250 pesetas. (Groizard, vol. 3, Commentaries on the Spanish Penal Code, pp. 327-331.)In Alcubilla (Dissionario de la Administracion Espaola, pp. 454-456), the following appears:Article 7 of the constitution of 1845, which corresponds to article 6 of the constitution now in force, provided, among other thins, that the domicile of a Spaniard could not be entered except in the cases and in the manner provided by law, thus announcing in a most solemn manner the principle that aman's home is his kingdom, as an eminent jurist very eloquently puts it, or, according to another jurist,the inviolable asylum of the citizen and of his family, the veil which covers the acts which outside of the home should not be published and the wall which separates one family from another and from the city.What a lofty conception! That within the limits of his home man be in certain sense emancipated from the rest of the community; that in his own house each father of a family is the chief to whom all should render the highest respect and consideration, which is not due even to the authorities themselves; that without any bolts on both in their persons and in their secrets. That is what the law contemplated when it inserted in the constitution that guaranty which we have mentioned. It commands that only in the cases and in the mannerexpressly provided by lawcan the domicile of a Spaniard or of a foreigner be entered without his consent; and hence the reason why the Penal code provides a penalty for the citizenwho enters the home of another against the will of the occupant, and the public official or judge who, taking advantage of his official position, enters the house of any person except in the cases andin the manner provided by law.But, what cases are those, we may be asked, in which the authorities may invade the home of a citizen by entering the same against his will? What formalities are necessary in order to do so? Let us see.Very limited are the cases in which the law authorizes an entrance into the domicile of a citizen and then only on account of the serious consequences which would follow if it were made absolutely inviolable. Far from accomplishing the result which, by this guaranty, the legislature contemplated, property, personal security, public order, and all other rights which are the subject of the penal laws, would, on the contrary, remain unprotected. The criminal would seek refuge in his own house, and, shielding himself with the inviolability of his domicile, would laugh and sneer at the rights of the citizen, and would with impunity challenge the whole community, which would be absolutely helpless and at the mercy of the wrongdoer.The home, therefore, can not be guaranteed as a shelter of crime and bad faith, and, for that reason, with the formalities hereinafter enumerated, the public authorities may enter the house of any citizen in the following cases:1. To arrest any person against whom a warrant of arrest has been issued.2. To capture the person of any known criminal, either because of his having been caught inflagrante delicto, or because there isreasonable ground to believe that he is guilty, although no warrant for his arrest has been actually issued.3. To prevent the consummation of a crime the commission of which is being planned of the same or has already commenced.4. To search for and seize the effects of the crime or the evidence of the commission of the same and of the identity of the guilty parties.5. To detect and seize all contraband articles which are the subject of state monopolies.6. For the purpose of attaching property.Outside of these cases we do not know of any case in which the entrance of the authorities into the domicile of a private individual, which constitutes the forcible entry of the same, may be justified, and when the entrance is at all authorized it must be upon some notoriously known facts, a mere pretext, which the penal law punishes, not being sufficient. And in all cases anorderof the court setting out the reasons therefor is necessary. (See art. 8 of the constitution.) And the judge shall expressly state in his order the particular building or place to be searched and whether the search shall take place in the daytime, and the authority or official who is to conduct the same; complying in addition thereto with the other formalities which the law, and particularly the Code of Criminal Procedure, provides so as to prevent abuses or to restrict them as much as possible.As a general rule, it may be stated that, in order to enter a house for any purpose whatever, whether to inspect the same, to arrest a person, or to attach property, it is necessary to first obtain the consent of the occupant of the same, as provided in article 6 of the constitution, and, in his absence,an order of the courtwill be required for the preliminary inquiry in each case, upon notice to the person affected thereby, either immediately or at the most within the twenty-four hours after the issuance of said order.The order need not be in the nature of a command to enter the house, but a warrant of arrest or writ of attachment will be sufficient. In other cases, however, the order must be specific, as, for instance, where the house is to be searched for the purpose of finding the effects of the crime or evidence of its commission. In this latter case the order of the court must be very plain and it should describe the premises to be searched in order to avoid any unnecessary inquiries into the family secrets of the occupants, which the law requires should be absolutely respected, provided they do not affect the interests of the public at large.When the entrance is not made personally by the judge, he must issue awrit in due form, for the inferior officials of the court can not proceeded to perform such delicate functions without said requisite. (Note 9, Title 30, Book 4, Novisima Recopilacion.)In the execution of an act so delicate as the search or inspection of a private house, in addition to the requisites hereinbefore set out, the first thing to be done is tomake demand upon the occupant to voluntarily consent to the same.This demand must be made with much prudence, as though the official was performing a very painful and unavoidable duty, and not with the arrogance which irritates and reveals an arbitrary and abusive exercise of such functions.The occupant of a house has a perfect right to demand that the authorities explain to him the reason for and the object of the search to be made therein; he has a right to present for the consideration of the authorities the reasons which he may have for objecting to the search as a whole or for requesting that the same be restricted to the necessities of the case; and if his objections should be entirely disregarded, he has the right to immediately protest against the search and to require the same be made a matter of record. He has the right to be present during the search of his house and to respectfully request the authorities that the persons assisting the latter should enter in an open manner and undisguised, so as to prevent any abuse which might otherwise result; and that in making the search they avoid any unnecessary inspections and that all necessary precautions be taken so as to avoid injuring his reputation. A public official would create a bad impression in regard to his authority if he should refuse to grant such just and due demands, his conduct being always taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the degree of any abuse in substance or form committed by him, and which the penal law would not allow to go unpunished. (See art. 299, above cited.)Here we should explain the differences which have always existed and which must necessarily exist between the forcible entry of a private house and that of a public building,the residences of ambassadors, barracks, royal palaces, the senate and congress, churches, ships, etc.; but this as well as other important matters are settled by the provisions of articles 41 to 52, inclusive, of the royal decree of June 20, 1852, relating to proceedings in matters ofcontraband and similar frauds, in the regulations of the Civil guard Corps of August 2, 1852, articles 36, 43, and 44, articles 170 to 172, inclusive, of the Internal Revenue Regulations of the 21st of June, 1889, articles 495 to 523, inclusive, of the Code of Military Justice, and articles 545 to 588, inclusive, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provide what buildings or places shall be public as regards entrance into the same, the requisites for entering royal palaces and building occupied by the legislative bodies the residences of consuls, foreign ships, etc.lawphil.netIn the case ofUnited States vs. Macaspac(9 Phil. Rep., 207), it appears that:On the morning of April 19, 1906, Atanacio Macaspac, lieutenant of the barrio, made his appearance at the gate of the yard of Apolonia Ico's house, situate in the barrio of San Antonio, town of Lubao, Pampanga, and stated that he intended to enter the house and search it. The landlady objected to such search, in the presence of one Luis and Maria de la Cruz, who were also there on that occasion, and three times repeated her objections, alleging as her reasons therefor the absence of her husband from the house. But in spite of her opposition to such search and that offered in support thereof by her said companions, the defendant, not being provided with and showing no order of court, insisted upon entering the said dwelling under a threat that he would procure a search warrant; thereupon he entered and proceeded to search the house and inspect some jars and baskets therein contained. The said inmates were not aware of what was being searched for, and the defendant was accompanied at the time by one Pedro Manalandin, Moning Sambat, Tolome Devera.The facts as above described, and which have been clearly proved in the present cause, and which have been clearly proved in the present cause, constitute the crime of forcible entry of a dwelling committed by the defendant in his official capacity as lieutenant of the barrio, as defined and penalized by article 205, No. 1, of the Penal Code, which provides as follows:The following shall incur the penalties of suspension in its minimum and medium degrees and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas:1. The public official who, not being a judicial authority nor empowered in the manner prescribed in article 200, shall enter the domicile of a Spaniard or foreigner without his consent.(See also the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson, written as vacation judge, published in Volume V of the Official Gazette, p. 955.1)The discussion of the question in hand is so full and clear in the quotations above made that it is unnecessary to extend it further. In deciding this case we do not consider or pass upon the searches of private premises and seizures of books and papers which are made under the authority or claim of authority of the revenue laws of the United States in cases where goods have illegally evaded the payment of duties, customs or internal revenue, levied by the Government. With respect to such cases the Supreme Court of the United States seems to have laid down a doctrine by itself to which we now merely refer. Nor is there anything herein in conflict with the decision in the case of United States vs. Vallejo (11 Phil. Rep., 193), in which the court said:The defense rests upon points of law: First. That within his own house a man's person is sacred and he may conduct himself as he pleases. The inviolability of a dwelling has been well explained inUnited States vs. Arceo(3 Phil. Rep., 381), but while it may be true in general that"a man's house is his castle,"it is equally true that he may not use that castle as a citadel for aggression against his neighbors, nor can he within its walls create such disorder as to affect their peace. It is clear from the testimony that in this case the behavior of the defendant amounted to more than private misconduct and constituted a public annoyance and a breach of the peace of the neighborhood.Manifestly this case rests upon different facts from those in the case at bar.The only evidence against the defendant Valeriano being an inference drawn from the exercise of a legal right, we declare the evidence insufficient to support the conviction. We accordingly reverse the judgment below as to him and acquit him of the charge embraced in the information.As to the accused Gabriela Esguerra, we have no doubt of her guilt. The evidence clearly demonstrates her possession of the morphine and her attempt to rid herself of its possession before discovery by the officers. We have carefully examined the evidence in the case and, notwithstanding the able arguments of her counsel, we are convinced that she is guilty. It is the unanimous opinion of the court however, that the penalty imposed is to severe. We accordingly modify the judgment against her by reducing the penalty from six months' imprisonment to a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment as provided by law in case of nonpayment. Judgment is hereby entered in conformity herewith, with one-half of the costs of this appeal against the accused Gabriela Esguerra and one-halfde oficio. So ordered.

ART 129HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK,petitioners,vs.HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City,respondents.Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.CONCEPCION,C.J.:Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates,3a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court because,inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action forcertiorari, prohibition,mandamusand injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged,6(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein havenocause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contestedonlyby the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure ispurely personaland cannot be availed of by third parties.10Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongsexclusivelyto the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.11Indeed, it has been held:. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to thecorporationdid not relate to nor did it affect thepersonaldefendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of thecorporationand not the rights of theother defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raisedonlyby onewhose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of defendantswhose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights ofanother.Remus vs. United States(C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure doesnotextend to the personal defendants but embracesonlythecorporationwhose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court,12thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.tPetitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution13provides:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue butupon probablecause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shallparticularlydescribe the things to be seized.None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecificoffense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed wereabstract. As a consequence, it wasimpossiblefor the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performedparticularacts, or committedspecificomissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws orTo uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court14by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court15that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable causein connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining toall business transactionsof petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions werelegalorillegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized beparticularlydescribed as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination ofgeneralwarrants.Relying uponMoncado vs. People's Court(80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered,"16upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained,17such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this isthe only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunctionagainst unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows thatit cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is ofno value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court.20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, inMapp vs. Ohio(supra.):. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State.Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too,without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short,the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized thatthe purpose of the exclusionary rule to"is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin,we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause,we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it isnot possiblefor the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity offishingevidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility21of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States.22We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced,notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.It is so ordered.STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO CASE DIGESTFacts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.Held:Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things to be