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8/19/2019 Creativity, Causality, And the Separation of Personality and Cognition. Runco, (1993).
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COMMENTARIES
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Creativity Causality and the Separation o Personality and Cognition
Mark A. Runco
California State University, Fullerton
Eysenck' s argument hinges
on
the distinction be
tween (a) creativity, or originality, as a dispositional
traitor cognitive style, measurable by means
of
psycho
metric tests, normally distributed in the population, and
general in its application and
(b)
creativity defined by
exceptional achievement. Clearly, this distinction is
very important for those studying creativity, and, al
though potential and actual performance have been
conceptually extricated before (e.g., MacKinnon,
1965; Maslow, 1971), Eysenck has done a remarkable
job of
it. I am especially taken by his integration
of
such
varied lines
of
research and
am
particularly grateful that
be has brought biological and genetic research into his
theory. Clearly, the field
of
creativity research is in need
of such integrative efforts.
Difficulties naturally arise when integrations are at
tempted, and several are apparent in Eysenck's work.
In this commentary, I focus on Eysenck's assump
tions-at least those I noted and
question-and
some
research findings he overlooked. I
do
not itemize the
stronger points ofEysenck's argument. He presents his
argument quite well, and there is
of
course no need for
me to reiterate. The most troubling assumptions con
cern causality, the separation ofpersonality and cogni
tion, and the role
of
problem solving in creativity. I also
mention his less significant assumptions about diver
gent thinking, verbal processes, and the distribution
of
creative potential.
Causality
One
of
the most critical
of
Eysenck's assumptions
concerns the direction
of
effect. Consider Eysenck's
suggestion that what may be happening is that high P
[psychoticism] is necessary for high creativity. Later
be writes that it appears to be psychoticism
in
the
absence
of
psychosis that is the vital element in trans
lating the trait of creativity (originality) from potential
into actual achievement, and later still he explicitly
refers to creativity as an outcome. The notion about
affinities with schizophrenia and psychotic disorders
may help explain the oft-cited association between
creativity and psychopathology (e.g., Becker, 1978;
Richards, 1981), but the emphasis on one direction of
effect is disturbing because there are other possibilities
(Richards, 1990). Put very simply, creativity might lead
or contribute to what appears to be a disorder (most
likely a bipolar affective disorder), or the disorder
might somehow allow creative insights. A third possi
bility is that creativity and disorder are associated only
because they both share some underlying tendency.
(This third variable may very well be what Eysenck
refers to as
overinclusive thinking.
I am not suggesting
that Eysenck is wrong about psychoticism but rather
that his theory might not help
us
understand the other
important possibilities, such as when creativity leads to
anxiety, alcoholism, and depression (Richards, 1990;
Rothenberg, 1990).
Eysenck does recognize that there is an optimal level
ofpsychoticism (or, more accurately, that psychoticism
is by definition moderate), beyond which psychopa
thology and creativity are independent. This is entirely
consistent with work by Bowden (in press) and Rich
ards (1990) in that it is Bipolar II and III (not the
schizoaffective Bipolar I) that seem to be associated
with creativity. According to Bowden and Richards,
creativity may be associated with mood swings, but the
disorders are of subclinical levels. In fact, there are
some creative individuals who want
to
avoid clinical
22
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COMMENTARIES
treatment precisely because it may interfere with their
productive periods (Bowden, in press; Rothenberg,
1990).
The Creative Personality
n
several places, Eysenck offers what strikes me as
an either/or description
of
personality and cognition.
For example, he writes how "Spearman (1923, 1927)
suggested that creativity might be a personality charac
teristic rather than a cognitive characteristic [and] H. J.
Eysenck (1983) gave some evidence to support this
notion." The problem is the implication that creativity
is either
a
personality characteristic" or a cognitive
characteristic." Surely it is both What is really needed
to understand creativity is the recognition of an inter
play between cognitive
and
extracognitive factors
(Runco, in press-a; Russ, 1993; Shaw & Runco, in
press).
1
As a matter
of
fact, the extracognitive and cognitive
factors might very well be inextricable. Lazarus (1991)
reviewed evidence for this, but I will give the example
wherein an individual cannot be interested in solving a
problem
or
working productively without recognizing
that there is a
problem-that
is, without a cognitive
appraisal
of
the situation as a problem and deserving
of
his or her effort (Runco, in press-a). Simply put, the
cognitive appraisal is necessary for the affective inter
est. Granted, my example relies on what is usually
called intrinsi
motivation
but that is often included in
descriptions
of
the creative personality (Barron Har
rington, 1981), and my point is that any either/or argu
ment is unrealistic.
A similar oversimplification arises when Eysenck
discusses the importance
of
relevance. I think he is
correct in questioning the blind or stochastic aspects of
the creative process, and
he
argues convincingly that
cognitive searches are directed and selective.
2
Individ
uals usually consider only information they believe to
be in some way relevant or meaningful. My concern is
with the manner in which the concepts of "relevance"
and "horizons" are used to distinguish between creative
1
Eysenck himsel f calls for work on the cognition-affect interac
tions.
n
particular, he notes the need for research
on
"creative
tension," and this assumes a cognitive appraisal (Runco, in press-a).
Moreover, both Eysenck and Runco cite Rutter's (1985) theory of
resilience--Eysenck asking for research on "protective factors,"
Runco using it to explain the steeling of creative individuals.
1'hls is entirely consistent with the appraisals already mentioned.
However, Eysenck does seem to follow the idea
of
relevance into one
dubious alley. I am referring here to his discussion of "delusional
beliefs, thought disorders, hallucinations, and the like ... [which] ...
mightbe considered 'creative.'"This seems at odds with his criticism
of blind factors, for it suggests that purpose is necessary, whereas
hallucinations and delusions surely lack creative intent. Granted,
there is some controversy in
this
regard, with Mednick (1962) recog
nizing serendipitous associations and others discounting any "cre
ativity'' that lacks purpose (Gruber, 1988; Wolf Larson, 1981 ).
and uncreative persons. I suppose Eysenck's idea is
simply that there are individual differences, but at this
point, his discussion seems a bit like a rigid trait
view
that is, one downplaying the impact of situations and
intrapersonal variability.
Eysenck's trait view is even clearer when discussing
psychoticism, for there he is explicit that it was not
psychosis (i.e., a psychopathological state) that was
related to creative genius, but psychoticism (i.e., a
dispositional trait
...
)." Eysenck does definepsy hoti -
ism in terms of susceptibility, but he could bring the
possible variations more clearly into his model. There
is an implied connection between "environmental vari
ables" and "creative achievement," but what about
specific differences between situations and domains
(Csikszentrnihalyi, 1990; Gruber, 1988)? Presumably
an individual can have a wide horizon in one domain
(e.g., music) but a narrow one in another (e.g., chess).
The impact or relevance of specific problem types
might also be recognized, especially those found be
tween verbal and nonverbal tasks. Empirical evidence
suggests that associative patterns differ when an indi
vidual reacts to nonverbal rather than verbal stimuli
(Guilford, 1968; Richardson, 1986; Runco, 1986).
Part
of
the problem may be Eysenck's reliance
on
problem solving. A great deal
of
the work he cites-es
pecially in his discussion
of
intelligence and again
when reviewing the research on overinclusive think
ing-is specifically on problem solving. This may be
misleading; creativity should not be too closely tied to
problem solving. There are several reasons for this,
including (a) the difficulties involved in definingprob
lems
such that artistic creativity
or
everyday creativity
can be explained (Dudek & Cote, in press) and (b) the
separation between problem finding and problem solv
ing. The former is more closely tied to creativity than
the latter (Mumford, Reiter-Palmon, Redmond, in
press; Okuda, Runco, Berger, 1991; Wakefield, in
press).
Verbal Processes
and
Divergent
Thinking
One reason I appreciate Eysenck's argument about
relevance is that it highlights the importance
of
selec
tive and evaluative processes. Just as originali ty does
not guarantee creative performance, so too is creativity
not solely a divergent, intuitive, generative process.
Selective, evaluative, and valuative processes are nec
essary. Here I am only disappointed that Eysenck limits
himself to what he calls linguistic evidence. There is
other evidence. The evaluative process
of
ideational
creativity has been studied in several recent investiga
tions (Runco, 1991b; Runco & Chand, in press; Runco
& Smith, 1992), and although these are just initial and
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COMMENTARIES
perhaps even crude attempts at isolating selective and
evaluative tendencies, at least they are not limited to
verbal stimuli or associations (see Runco Vega,
1990). This inclusion
of
nonverbal material is a virtue,
given what was said earlier about associative tenden
cies differing when elicited by verbal or nonverbal
stimuli and when following familiar or unfamiliar stim
uli (Guilford, 1968; Mednick, 1962; Richardson, 1986;
Runco, 1986; Runco & Albert, 1985). Admittedly, my
own work on evaluative processes bas its limitations,
but the focus on ideational data seems reasonable given
the evidence for the predictive validity
of
such mea
sures (Milgram, 1990; Okuda et al., 1991) and because
there is an extremely large literature (reviewed by
Runco, 1991a, 1992) to assist with interpretations.
In rebuttal, Eysenck might criticize the use of diver
gent-thinking tasks, just as I have criticized his reliance
on verbal data.
As
a matter of fact, he specifically
dismisses divergent thinking in his article (or at least
alludes to deep-sea ted misgivings ). Something
should be said about this because, although he is right
that many researchers have given up on the Guilford
(1968) and Torrance (1974) tests, a careful reading
of
the literature suggests that the dismissal of divergent
thinking is premature (Milgram, 1990; Runco, 1991a,
1992). Most who dismiss divergent thinking have done
so because
of
dated research findings. Little if any
attention is given by the critics to research from the late
1980s or early 1990s. Divergent-thinking tests are now
administered, scored, and interpreted differently from
the way they used to be-or, at least they should be,
given recent research. Eysenck himself cites research
from before 1959 when discussing the intelligence
threshold necessary for creativity. Granted, he cites the
classic work
of
Cox and Terman, but more recent
research should also be considered (see Runco
&
Al
bert, 1986; Simonton, 1984). Eysenck 'sclaim about the
distributions of creativity as approximately normal
might similarly be questioned (Runco Albert, 1985),
as might his unqualified generalizations about the im
pact
of
political unrest (Simonton, 1990).
I am very interested in Eysenck's ideas about rele
vance but cannot help but wonder whether he will
encounter some of the same measurement difficulties I
did,
if
he conducts the actual empirical tests of his
predictions. I am referring here to the difficulties found
early in Runco and Charles's (in press) investigation of
the relation between originality and appropriateness
appropriateness
paralleling
Eysenck s relevance.
Runco and Charles designed a simple Q-sort study to
examine the accuracy of judgments of originality, ap
propriateness, and their interaction as predictors of
creativity. I naively suspected that the appropriateness
of ideas would be relatively easy to operationalize-at
least in the context of divergent thinking, where a
problem can be used as context. I soon discovered my
error and now feel that appropriateness and relevance
are even more subjective than originality. I was naive
to expect an easy operationalization of appropriateness
and have lately found several theories explaining its
subjectivity and elusive qualities (e.g., Gould, 1991;
Maslow, 1971). At least with originality, statistical
infrequency can be used (Hocevar, 1979; Runco
Albert, 1985). Appropriateness and relevance may be
much more difficult measurement targets because
of
their connection with values. Incidentally, Runco and
Charles (in press) found a strong relation between
originality and creativity and indications of an inverse
relation between appropriateness and creativity. The
expected Originality x Appropriateness interaction was
minuscule and statistically insignificant. This last find
ing is contrary to many, many theories that bring appro
priateness, fit, usefulness, and relevance into the
definition
of
creativity (e.g., MacKinnon, 1965; Mum
ford
et
al., in press;
O Quin
Besemer, 1989;
Rothenberg & Hausman, 1976).
3
Conclusion
and
Implications
Eysenck claims that he presents a model with test
able predictions. I hope what I have written will help to
modify some of those predictions. Although I question
some
of
Eysenck's assumptions, I certainly have no
desire to dismiss his model. There is much to be gained
from
it.
Indeed, I wish I had more time to discuss the
strong points
of
Eysenck's theory. As I already men
tioned, it is especially important that Eysenck has
looked to biological and genetic contributions.
t is also important that he mentions practical im
plications, such as when he describes the need for
educating ... teachers in the appreciation of the value
of originality and creativity. Here I only suggest that
his claim be changed such that it too uses the concept
of optima, as in optimal appreciation. I say this
because originality is insufficient for creativity. This is
implied by Eysenck's discussion
of
the optimal levels
of psycboticism, for too much can lead to originality
that has no relevance and that is indubitably uncreative.
Teachers might therefore sacrifice some classroom
3
Another potential measurement problem reflects the fact that
something in addition to relevance might be needed. In particular,
where does the aesthetic component of creativity fit in? I hesitate
raising this issue because it in tum leads to the difficult question,
Where do we stop? f he aesthetic component s included in models
ofcreativity, along with originality
and
relevance, the model beco mes
more complicated. tmay become more accurate with each additional
term
or
dimension, but t will probably
lso
be accurate only in certain
domains. Complicate d models often lose in generality what they gain
in accuracy (Wiggins, 1981).
223
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COMMENTARIES
structure for divergent thinking and spontaneity; but,
given the critical roles
of
knowledge, information, and
selections or evaluations, they should only give some
of the time. I like the concept of optimal appreciation
because educators could
jump
on the creativity band
wagon and go to the extreme, allowing complete spon
taneity and individuality. This kind
of
open education
does not benefit creativity (also see Cropley, 1992;
Runco & Okuda, in press). Educational flexibility
might allow divergent thinking and self-expression, but
judgments
of
relevance require some conventional
thinking
and memorization-and
thus a dose
of
struc
tured education.
Looking back, much
of
what I have written here has
to do with how creativity is treated rather than with
what is included. Consider, for instance, my citing the
very recent research
on
the direction
of
effect between
creativity
and
psychopathology and my gripes about
the older citations for divergent thinking and the thresh
old theory. The integration
of
research is not easy-es
pecially integrations in creativity research, where there
is such a high premium placed
on
originality (Runco,
in press-b). Overall, Eysenck does remarkably well. His
article is a model
of
what needs to be done
to
keep
creativity research moving forward- -that is, to main
tain its own creativity.
Notes
I completed this Commentary while holding a Visit
ing position at the Institute for Cognitive Psychology
of
the University
of
Bergen. I thank the institute and,
in
particular, Geir Kaufmann.
MarkA. Runco, Department
of
Psychology, EC 105,
California State University, Fullerton,
CA
92634.
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Blind Variations Chance Configurations and Creative Genius
Dean Keith Simonton
University
of
California, Davis
Eysenck's target article is an exciting read. As he
points out, for some time creativity studies had shown
signs of entering the stage of a degenerative research
program. Psychoanalytic accounts
of
the creative per
son and Gestalt accounts
of
the creative process now
seem passe. Psychometric approaches to the same phe
nomena, although once the rage, have sunk into de
spondency.
And
the current activity
of
cognitive
psychologists in this area, although often provocative,
fall short
of
a comprehensive theory. Their computer
simulations, for example, concentrate on certain specif
ics
of
the creative process while utterly ignoring per
sonality and social context. What we lack are widely
accepted theoretical approaches that explain all import
ant aspects
of
creativity. Eysenck's proposed theory
tries to fill this sad gap.
As we
should expect
of
any sweeping theory,
Eysenck's model is rich in ideas. He has tried to inte
grate a vast range
of
research findings-work that
spans many decades. Therefore, I cannot possibly pro
vide a critique of
his entire scheme. Instead, I focus
on
a single
issue-the
place
of
chance in creativity. Al
though Eysenck seems to downplay the role
of
chance
in the creative process, I interpret his arguments and
data quite differently.
Let me begin by clearing up a potential source
of
confusion. Campbell (1960) termed his original model
of
creativity the
blind-variation and selective-retention
theory.
My own elaboration
of
this theory I styled the
chance-configuration theory. The rationale for the
name change was a difference in emphasis and com
plexity between the two theories. For one thing, by
introducing the concept
of
configuration, I hoped to
sprinkle a little Gestalt
on
the initial Darwinian frame-
work. The basic idea was that the mind can generate
innumerable combinations
of
concepts, but only a few
of these will coalesce into a structural
whole-a
con
figuration. To offer an everyday illustration, think what
happens when you write a sentence that you hope will
communicate a profound idea. You have at your dis
posal a host
of
words and their synonyms for each
subject, predicate, object, and other sentence compo
nent. You also have access to a variety
of
syntactical
constructions that can adjust the expression to the finest
shades
of
meaning. So, you search for that distinctive
pattern of lexical elements and syntactical structures
that convey precisely what you mean. That just-right
sentence seems to encapsulate better than its more
awkward rivals the meaning that before existed only in
imagery or intuition.
Another reason for the name change was my dissat
isfaction with Campbell's choice
of
the adjective blind.
By claiming that the ideational variations were blind,
he meant that the combinatory process lacked reason or
foresight. The more novel a problem is, the more inad
equate are the received collection
of
algorithms and
heuristics. Having nothing definite to guide the quest
for a solution, the creator must grope in the darkness.
The process is one of
cognitive trial-and-error. It seems
perfectly reasonable to style this process blind.
Unfortunately, this word choice leads to some con
fusion. For those familiar with the problem-solving
literature,
blind
often implies the same thing as
blind
search which almost everybody recognizes as the
heuristic
of
last resort.
As
Eysenck notes, a genuine
blind search very quickly encounters a combinatorial
explosion that makes it most unlikely that the venture
will converge
on
a solution. Moreover, it is evident that
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