Creating Jobs and Rebuilding Livelihoods in Post-Conflict Situations October 26-29, 2008 Workshop...

8/11/2019 Creating Jobs and Rebuilding Livelihoods in Post-Conflict Situations October 26-29, 2008 Workshop Report

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ABOUT THIS EVENTThe Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies held its rsteconomic recovery workshop, Creat ing Jobs and Rebuil ding Liveli hoods

in Post-Con i c t Si t ua t ions , from October 26-29, 2008, in Monterey,California. The interactive workshop, which was designed and facilitatedby Dr. Nat J. Colletta and Dr. Sophal Ear, brought together 40 practitionersfrom the different groups of actors charged with rebuilding fragile states.Participants discussed the challenges and trade-offs of various economicrecovery priorities and strategies, explored best practices and lessonslearned from past initiatives, and crafted possible job creation solutionsfor different countries in crisis.

The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) is a teaching institute which develops and hostseducational programs for stabilization and reconstructionpractitioners, including representatives from US and

international nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations,government civilian agencies, and the armed forces. Established by the NavalPostgraduate School in 2004 through the vision and congressional support ofRepresentative Sam Farr (CA-17), CSRS creates a wide array of programs tofoster dialogue among practitioners, as well as to help them develop newstrategies and re ne best practices to improve the effectiveness of theirimportant global work.

Located at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, CSRS alsocontributes to the universitys research and graduate degree programs. Formore information about CSRS, its philosophy, and programs, please visitwww.csrs-nps.org.

Creating Jobs

and RebuildingLivelihoods inPost-ConictSituationsOctober 26-29, 2008

Writing and editing by Holly Larson. Event content synopses provided byBen Oppenheim. Cover design by Jesse Darling. Report layout and graphics byDavid Bilotto. Photography by Nico Mavris. Copyright 2009 Center for Stabilizationand Reconstruction Studies. All rights reserved. The opinions, conclusions, andrecommendations expressed or implied herein are those of the contributors and donot necessarily reect the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the US Navy,US Defense Department, or any other agency or organization.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 The Con ict Environment

10 Reintegrating theFARC: A Case Stu dy

13 Best Practices andResources forJob Creation

17 Moving into the

Recovery Phase21 Conclusion

22 Endnotes

24 Event Speakers andParticipants


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Leading scholars have aptlydocumented the havoc that extendedcon ict wreaks on countries. Whilethe political and social injusticesperpetuated by elites are myriad,the destruction and depletion of acountrys economic, social, and humancapital often leaves the longest-lasting effects. As elites cement theirgrasp on power, they typically seizenatural resources and other assets,destroy critical infrastructures,neglect public services, and forceknowledge workers to ee. Valuableresources, such as oil, narcotics, or

diamonds, can extend a civil war bya decade or more, providing eliteswith the means and motivation to nance ongoing military operations orbuy cooperation. The costs of long-term con ict are high. By the end ofa civil war, a countrys economy canplummet by 15% or more, and it couldtake a nation a full 21 years to returnto the economic level it would haveachieved without war. 1

If con ict is so costly, whydoes it occur? asked Dr. RobertMcNabb, Associate Professor ofNaval Economics at the NavalPostgraduate School, a speakerat Creating Jobs and RebuildingLivelihoods in Post-Con ictSituations , the workshop co-hostedby the Center for Stabilization andReconstruction Studies and Global

The Con ictEnvironment

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If you are poor it is very dif cult to conductan insurgency. People are economic

agents and respond to incentives. Dr. Robert McNabb, Naval Postgraduate School

Breakout groups afforded participants witha forum for brainstorming innovative jobcreation strategies for a wide array of post-con ict environments.


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Majority in Monterey, Californiafrom October 26-29, 2008. Thecommon wisdom is that civil war

results from political or religiousgrievances. If you are poor,however, it is very dif cult toconduct an insurgency. People areeconomic agents and respond toincentives, said Dr. McNabb.

Using Rwanda and Iraq as casestudies, Dr. McNabb discussed therole of resource scarcity, economicincentives provided by elites, andsocial conditions in both instigatingand perpetuating violence. Scarcityalone is not suf cient cause forviolence, said Dr. McNabb, but whencombined with other factors it canprove to be a powerful catalyst.In Rwanda, a land redistributionsystem that enabled Hutus totake free and clear title to Tutsiland, provided that all claimantswere dead, helped motivatewidespread genocide. And in Iraq,a sheiks edict provided MahdiArmy members with the religioussanction they needed to con scateSunni property. As actors designinterventionary efforts to stabilizeand then rebuild failed states, theyshould ensure that their effortsreduce these powerful economicincentives, while strengthening tiesbetween states and their citizens.

The years following a civil warare extremely precarious, asnoted scholar Dr. Paul Collier hasdemonstrated in his extensive

research on economic developmentand con ict in fragile states.Colliers research has found that42.1% of countries with stagnanteconomies lapse back into con ictwithin a decade, but those ableto achieve economic growth of10% annually can reduce this riskto 26.9%. 2 Given that so many ofthe initiatives stabilization andreconstruction (S&R) actors execute rebuilding public infrastructures,transforming institutions, promotingdemocracy take years or evendecades to implement and sustain,how can practitioners help strugglingcountries make short-term gains thatwill shore up a fragile peace, buyingtime and goodwill for these longer-

term initiatives to take root?

Numerous scholars and developmentorganizations have argued thatpromoting economic recovery isthe single most important task S&Ractors can accomplish to forestalla return to con ict and allow localcommunities to reap the bene t ofa peace dividend. And given thatcivil wars and their aftermath createdisenfranchised populations ex-combatants, internally displacedpersons, con ict victims, and youthamong them job creation programsare a logical rst line of defense.Whether they take the form oftraining programs, apprenticeships,or direct employment, job creationprograms bolster fragile economieswhile putting at-risk populations

to work. Employing ex-militants isespecially critical. If there are nojobs, ex-militants will turn to whatthey know best, which is rent-seeking at the barrel of a gun, saidDr. Colletta, a workshop facilitatorwho has helped spearhead the WorldBanks peacebuilding and S&R workaround the globe for the past severaldecades. S&R actors know that toeradicate the economic incentivesthat helped fuel con ict, theymust create new, more egalitarian

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If there are no jobs, ex-militants will turn towhat they know best, which is rent-seekingat the barrel of a gun. Dr. Nat J. Colletta, workshop

co-facilitator and S&R practitioner

THE CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

Source: Tjip Walker and Melissa Brown, US Agency for International Development. Dr.Sophal Ear stressed that states can slip and out of vulnerability and crisis, just as individualsmove in and out of poverty.

Fragile States: A Visualization

TransformationalDevelopmentStates

Failed States?

Fragile States


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incentives that address the needsof peace spoilers, while creatinga broader range of sustainable

employment and livelihoodopportunities for local populations.

Creating Jobs and RebuildingLivelihoods helped participants,who included 40 representativesfrom both US and internationalnongovernmental organizations(NGOs), intergovernmentalorganizations (IGOs), governmentcivilian agencies, and the armedforces, explore the full range ofissues involved with rebuildingthe economies of post-con ictstates. Dr. Colletta and Dr. Earbrought eld-tested frameworksand resources, best practices, andacademic and practitioner insightsto their role as co-facilitators ofthe workshop. Dr. Colletta and Dr.Ear used individual presentations,group discussions, and case studiesto help participants explorenew concepts and brainstormtargeted approaches to solvingjob creation challenges in post-con ict environments as variousas Afghanistan, Colombia, Kosovo,Liberia, Timor-Leste, and Uganda.

CSRS provides cross-communitylearning opportunities for S&Rpractitioners, who bring a wealthof experience to share with theirpeers. CSRS designs interactiveworkshops across ve educationalthemes: health and humanitarianaffairs, institution building and

security sector reform, stabilizationand reconstruction skills and tools,economic recovery, and maritimeand naval affairs. Creating Jobs andRebuilding Livelihoods served asthe inaugural event for CSRSs neweconomic recovery theme.

Participants use CSRS events toincrease their cognitive learning,enhance critical skills, and broadenprofessional networks they canleverage in the future. CSRS works

hard to create a place and processwhere S&R practitioners can turnexperience into expertise, saidMatthew Vaccaro, Program Director.

WORKSHOP THEMESNumerous speakers from academia,NGOs, IGOs, and government civilianagencies shared frameworks toincrease practitioners understandingof post-con ict environments andtheir economic complexity andintroduce new frameworks theycould use to assess on-the-ground

conditions and customize theirown approaches. In addition, theydiscussed successes and failuresfrom past and current jobs creationprograms around the world. Keythemes that emerged from the multi-day workshop included the followingeconomic recovery imperatives:

Performing a Conict Analysis As they move into diverse post-

con ict environments, S&R actors

should perform a detailed study ofthe social and political conditionsthey face on the ground. Dr.Colletta shared a framework hehad helped to develop at theWorld Bank that evaluated suchvariables as social and ethnicrelations, governance and politicalinstitutions, human rights andsecurity, economic structure andperformance, the environment andnatural resources, and externalforces. Organizations that provide acon ict analysis are able to develophighly customized programs that

meet communities real needs andaspirations, said Dr. Colletta.

Being Sensitive to ContextS&R practitioners should ensurethat their programs address hostgovernment priorities and nottry to force- t initiatives thathave worked well elsewhere.Speakers cited numerous examplesof S&R experts proposing orimplementing actions that

Learning Objectives

Creating Jobs and Rebuilding Livelihoods was designed tohelp participants achieve the following learning objectives:

Develop a deeper understanding of post-conict economic forcesthat inuence stability, the rebuilding of livelihoods, and job creation

Gain familiarity with operational tools for designing livelihoodand job creation programs

Explore a range of policy and programmatic approaches torebuilding livelihoods and promoting job creation and economicrecovery in countries emerging from armed conict

Enhance their understanding of and professional networksamong the other communities involved in post-conictreconstruction operations


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CSRS hosts several events a year to help S&R practitioners deepen their understanding ofcomplex issues, improve their skills, and expand their professional networks.

were immediately rejected byimportant stakeholders, such asrebel leaders or host government

personnel, because they violatedcultural mores or tried to replacelocal structures with Westernideals. For example, Ms. ClareLockhart of the Institute for StateEffectiveness cited an anecdotewhere an American expertdeveloped a new tax law for theGovernment of Afghanistan whenthere was already a functioningone in place. And Dr. Colletta,who has worked with theGovernment of the Philippinesand separatist Moro IslamicLiberation Front organizationto craft a peace agreement,described how critical failures,such as negotiators refusalto address ancestral domainand requirements that theMoros, an arms-bearing culture,disarm, doomed peace talks.In such a scenario, It maynot be appropriate to startwith a disarmament-led DDR*process, said Dr. Colletta.Instead, it may be better tostart with a reintegration-ledprocess. It is important not totake a prescriptive approach,but instead study the localenvironment and design programsthat meet critical communityneeds and objectives.

Reducing Conict Drivers Economic recovery programs

should address and reduce theconditions that led to violenceto reduce the chance of itsresurgence. Chief among them:economic drivers that favor onegroup over another, resourcescarcity, and perverse socialcapital. Ethnic differences, whichare often singled out as a keyfactor in precipitating violence,typically are not the linchpin, but

instead are a tool elites use tomotivate and mobilize disaffectedcitizens experiencing scarcity.

Promoting Good GovernanceGovernance is inextricablyintertwined with stateeffectiveness and economicdevelopment, a fact which hostgovernments are usually wellaware of. A country that canimprove its governance capacityreaps a 300% dividend in per-

capita income growth over the

Upcoming CSRS Events


ALL EVENTS ARE HELD IN MONTEREY, CA

FOR MORE INFORMATION ON CSRS EVENTS VISIT WWW.CSRS-NPS.ORG .

Security Sector Reform: The Art ofAssessmentMarch 23-27, 2009

Gender Consideration inDisarmament, Demobilization,and Reintegration

June 21-24, 2009 Creating Jobs and Enhancing

LivelihoodsApril 26-29, 2009

Working in the Same SpaceSeptember 20-24, 2009(tentative)

*Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration


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long-term. 3 However, very fewcountries educate citizens on keygovernance issues, such as the

mission of state institutions andthe reasons behind importantcivil processes. Said an NGOrepresentative: When wespeak with government andmilitary of cials in post-con ictenvironments, we ask them whatthey see is the most signi cantthreat to security. They usuallysay poor governance or themismanagement of public goods.While it can be dif cult andperhaps inadvisable for externalactors to build state authority,they can foster dialogue overpolicy goals and help educatelocal populations on theimportance of good governanceand how their states policies,institutions, and processesin uence and protect their lives and livelihoods.

UnderstandingCultural NarrativesIndividuals are part of a larger-scale cultural and historicalnarrative. Seminal events, suchas 9/11 or the destruction ofSamarras golden mosque, canserve as collective traumas andreshape narratives, casting onepeople group as victims andanother as perpetrators. Trappedwithin their own narratives,

people may respond to culturalcues or stories that seem credibleto them, rather than rationallycalculate the cost-bene t ratio ofparticipating in violence. Effectiveeconomic recovery programsshould include a social componentthat evaluates individual and grouplevel motivations and tracks howthey shift over time in response topolitical and cultural changes.

Addressing theConsequences of ConictThe physical short- and long-termdimensions of con ict are readilyapparent, from the destructionof physical infrastructure andan aid-dependent culture, toreduced economic growth anddepleted resources. However, thepsychological manifestations ofviolence may be more subtle andoften arent adequately addressedby donors. In the aftermath of

con ict, local populations maybe extremely myopic in theirthinking and focus only on theirindividual gains, whereas overthe longer-term they may adopta fatalistic attitude towardviolence or perceive greater riskthan actually exists. In countrieswhere violence has become partof the culture, such as Colombia,successful programs address the


Government and military of cials inpost-con ict environments typically citepoor governance or the mismanagement ofpublic goods as the biggest threat tostate security. NGO Representative

Dr. Sophal Ear (left) and Dr. Nat J. Colletta (right) created and taught the workshop curricula.Ben Oppenheim (center) of the University of California at Berkeley provided daily synopses tohelp participants digest and retain the workshops robust content.

Workshop Facilitators

Dr. Nat J. Colletta was the founding manager of the World Banks Con ictPrevention and Post Con ict Reconstruction Unit. He now teaches at NewCollege and works with a number of multilateral and bilateral agenciesand governments, advising organizations extensively on con ict, security,and development matters. Dr. Sophal Ear , an assistant professor in theNational Security Affairs Department of the Naval Postgraduate School,has more than a decade of experience in development consulting, witha focus on Southeast Asia. His work experience including stints withthe United Nations Development Programme in East Timor, the AsianDevelopment Bank, and the World Bank.


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psychological needs of vulnerablepopulations, who need helpadapting to changed gender,

familial, and societal roles. Inaddition, these programs provideat-risk populations with morepositive outlets for expressingnegative emotion, as well as thetools to manage it.

Changing Social Capital In post-con ict environments,

people typically embrace bonding,or inward-looking social capital,that favors primary group familyover secondary group communityidenti cation. This type of socialcapital can be bene cial forsurvival in times of dire crisis, butover the medium- to long-term itforestalls societal progress. As aconsequence, S&R actors need topromote more outward-reaching,bridging social capital, whichcuts across ethnic, religious, andother divides and provides the risktaking, networked relationships,and incentives people need toinvest in progress and build a newfuture. In addition, it is importantthat the state strengthen verticalsocial capital with communities,providing inclusive voice andchoice and building a socialcompact of legitimacy and trustwith its citizens. (See graphic onpage 7.)

Balancing Short-term Goals with Sustainability

Most job creation efforts areshort-term in focus, as donorsseek to jumpstart the localeconomy with a combinationof cash for work, micro nancegrants, apprenticeships, and othertools. As they design programs,S&R actors need to evaluate howthey can build host governmentcapacity to transition successfullyfrom stabilization to recovery. Inaddition, they should carefullyconsider unintended impacts theirinterventionary efforts may create.For example, building pavedroads, high-tech bridges, or state-of-the-art facilities may not be

sustainable if local populations donot adopt them or cannot sustainthem. Donors often dont providemaintenance budgets or expertise,and thus new infrastructuresquickly fall into disrepair.

Bolstering, Not DistortingThe Local Economy

Numerous workshop participantsdiscussed how donors can disruptthe local economy by setting highwage scales or bringing an in uxof aid workers into the area.When this happens, highly skilledworkers leave the host governmentor other institutions to work fordonors. Hence, the stereotype of

doctors, who could help rebuildthe health services infrastructure,driving taxis for donors becausethey are better compensated,is a reality that has numerousnegative long-term implications.These issues can be mitigated by

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Pictured in foreground: Lieutenant Colonel Miemie Byrd, US Army, of the US Asia Paci cCenter for Security Studies.

It is important that the state strengthenvertical social capital with communities,providing inclusive voice and choice andbuilding a social compact of legitimacyand trust with its citizens.



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involving local organizations inthe training and hiring of staff

and outsourcing as much work aspossible to local organizations.Whatever their approach, actorsshould take care not to setunrealistic expectations or createa shadow economy that willdisappear when aid dollars dry up.

FIXING FAILED STATESMs. Lockhart, who was part ofa small cadre of actors involvedwith planning for a post-TalibanAfghanistan, offered a birds-eyeview on the successes and failuresof the US Government and otheractors work to create a legitimatestate. Successes included creatinga simple framework of highpriority objectives through theBonn Agreement, involving Afghantraders in converting the currencysystem, contracting directly withtelecommunications providers tospur mass adoption of cell phones,and creating transparent mechanismsfor dispersing cash grants to villages.

However, Ms. Lockhart also citednumerous failures, includingpolicy decisions that resulted inunplanned and severe economicconsequences. Among them: notconsidering the economy fully instabilization planning or developingan effective transition budget; notallocating enough money to payAfghanistans 240,000 civil servants,

which caused a huge exodus ofhighly skilled workers from thegovernment; and not ensuringtransparency around resource andcontract disbursement.

Ms. Lockhart teamed with Mr.Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistans former

nance minister, to cofound theInstitute for State Effectivenessand study how countries tacklethe challenges of statebuilding.

Evaluating countries and regionsfrom Singapore, Spain, Ireland,and the United Arab Emirates, tothe American South to researchtheir book Fixing Failed States , Ms.Lockhart and Mr. Ghani pinpointedkey success factors, including:

Leveraging a team of leaders andmanagers who have vision and

exibility and are committed tothe statebuilding process, ratherthan depending upon a singleleader or personality to galvanize

consensus for the path forward.

Creating a compact between thestate and its citizens, not justbetween the state and internationalactors and ensuring that the state,rather than external actors, ownsthe statebuilding process.

Maintaining integrity andtransparency in managing public nance and using as muchlocal labor as possible, rather

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Different Types of Social Capitaland Their Impacts on States

THE STATETHE STATE

INDIVIDUALS / COMMUNITIESINDIVIDUALS / COMMUNITIES

ASSOCIATIVE NETWORKED ASSOCIATIVE / NETWORKEDBridging Social Capital

Growth-Oriented Markets

KIN ORIENTEDKIN-ORIENTEDBonding Social Capital

Inclusion Rule of Law Open Media Effective, Engaging

Non-Corrupt Government

Exclusion Authoritarian State Oppression Inequality / Inequity

LOW SOCIAL COHESION HIGH CONFLICT

HIGH SOCIAL COHESION LOW CONFLICT

V E R T I C A L S O C I A L C A P I T A L

Civil SocietyCivil Society

HORIZONTAL SOCIAL CAPITAL

Source: Dr. Colletta, workshop presentation.


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than siphoning off assets, usingfavored vendors, and paying forincomplete work.

Making massive investments ineducation and technical skillsdevelopment, rather than spendingmonies on technical assistanceor succumbing to donor-driveninvestment fads.

Creating the infrastructure neededto develop markets and enter newindustries, while fully utilizing coreassets such as fuel licenses andmineral resources.

Promoting the middle class, bybuilding housing and industrycenters for workers, rather thanmarginalizing key groups, suchas youth, who can become avaluable part of the workforce.

Developing a well-thought-outstrategy for competing in the globalmarket and mapping goals to keyinvestments and policy decisions,rather than making short-sightedpolicy decisions.

EMPLOYMENT STRATEGIES FORTHE STABILIZATION PHASES&R practitioners shared jobcreation and livelihood development

strategies from across theircommunities. In some countries,S&R actors may simply strive to

create a holding pattern, or aninterim stabilization measure suchas job and training opportunitiesto keep ex-militants focused untilthe economy can support them. Inothers, where economic conditionsare more conducive to rapid change,actors may seek to jumpstart anonformal economy where artisansand self-employed individuals cansupport their families, even if theyare not contributing to the tax base;help at-risk populations developthe right skills to integrate into theworkforce; or become entrepreneursby training side-by-side withestablished business owners.

Job Creation: AnIGO PerspectiveMr. Donato Kiniger-Passigli of theUnited Nations (UN) InternationalLabour Organization spoke abouthis agencys work to developemployment opportunities thatintegrate the work of multiple UNagencies, much as the UNs clustersystem has done for the variousorganizations that provide disasterrelief services. There are so manyplayers. Within this sphere, we tryand homogenize or structure theinterventions of each UN agencyto maximize its comparativeadvantage, said Mr. Kiniger-Passigli.

UN programs seek to balancestability with social equity,recognizing that targeting and

empowering certain groups, suchas ex-combatants, at the expenseof others, may create distrustamong local communities. Othercritical factors to consider includesecurity challenges, a lack ofcapital, weak institutions, andhigh youth employment. The UNtypically launches three parallel,interlinked tracks within 18months of deploying personnel toaffected areas:

Stabilization, which providesimmediate income generationand emergency employmentopportunities using programssuch as cash for work, food aid,livelihood startup, and skillstraining for vulnerable populations,such as ex-combatants, returnees,and others.

Reintegration, which buildslocal employment by creatingcommunity-level infrastructuresand micro nance opportunities tosupport new businesses.

Transition, which seeks tocreate sustainable livelihoodsby developing an enablingenvironment in both the publicand private sectors and promotingcommunity ownership of economicgrowth initiatives.

Participants questioned whether

it was possible to build capacitywithin the host government andtransition programs in such a rapid

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In some countries, S&R actors mayseek to create a holding pattern withjob and training opportunities to keepex-militants focused until the economycan support them. In more conduciveconditions, actors may seek to jumpstarta nonformal economy.



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timeframe, stating that the UNmight be setting up expectationsit could not deliver on. However,

donor funding requirementsnecessarily drive how programsare structured and executed.Participants acknowledged thatdonors changing priorities orcompressed timelines can short-circuit job creation programssuccessfulness. We havechallenges getting funding for localrecovery, acknowledged an IGOmember. This is a dif culty thatwe are trying to overcome, whichis to help donors appreciate andfund this type of intervention.

Job Creation: A GovernmentCivilian Agency PerspectiveMr. David Dod spoke about theUS Agency for InternationalDevelopments (USAID) efforts tocreate jobs, using such strategiesas providing temporary employmentthrough cash for work, offeringtargeted support for livelihoods andself-employment, and rebuildingcommunity infrastructures. Mr. Dodprovided two case studies: one inTimor-Leste, where a generic jobscreation program met with limitedsuccess, and another in Liberia,where a more comprehensive,targeted approach produced longer-lasting results.

JOB CREATION CASE STUDIES FORTHE STABILIZATION PHASETimor-Leste Working in Timor-Leste in 2000,USAID sought to jumpstart thelocal economy by implementinga standard jobs creation programto bridge the gap until longer-term funding could be put inplace. The program emphasizedyouth employment and provideda simple standard package of nancial support for rebuildinglocal facilities and cash to supportlocal employment. USAID did notconduct the upfront assessmentit usually does with each mission

because of its desire to ensure thatat-risk unemployed youth wereimmediately employed. Anotherchallenge was the limited laborpool; donor competition for skilledworkers dramatically in atedwages, creating unsustainablecommunity expectations.

Liberia USAID ran a CommunityInfrastructure Project in Liberiafrom 2004-2008 that combinedan aggressive DDR program withemployment generation andtraining initiatives. The programused a single large contractorwith 38 grantees who helped to

form local NGOs. USAID provided$50 million in initial funding,with an additional $50 millionin subsequent monies allocatedto employ approximately 25,000individuals, two-thirds of whomwere ex-combatants, as wellas place 1,000 individuals inapprenticeships. Ex-combatantswere given the opportunityto resettle and register foremployment or vocational

Pictured from left to right: Dr. Bruce Tolentino, The Asia Foundation; LieutenantCommander Edward Fiorentino, US Navy; and Mr. Phillip Rush, the Bonn InternationalCenter for Conversion.

We have challenges getting funding forlocal recovery. This is a dif culty we aretrying to overcome. IGO member

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Colombia

Mr. Alejandro Eder-Garces offered

a detailed overview of theGovernment of Colombias effortsto reintegrate Fuerzas ArmadasRevolucionarias de Colombia(FARC) members and other rebelsback into society, a programspearheaded by the Of ce of theHigh Counselor for the Economicand Social Reintegration ofIllegally Armed Persons. Over thepast six years, the Government ofColombia has demobilized 48,000individuals, 37,000 of whom are in

the process of being reintegrated.If FARC members continue todemobilize at their current pacethrough the end of 2009, thegroup will be so attenuated innumbers that the government willbe able to force its leaders to thenegotiation table.

Unlike many other programs,the government itself ownsand operates the reintegrationprocess, giving it some uniqueadvantages over donor-drivenprograms: high capacity andpolitical will to sustain whatwill certainly be a decades-long process, human capitalto provide one-to-one andcommunity services, andprivate sector support tobroaden the net of job creationopportunities. Of equal

importance, the state-driveninitiative integrates moreseamlessly into the governments

peacebuilding processes thanwould donor-driven programs.Colombias demobilizationprogram includes a start-upphase of 18 months, where thestate assesses the territory forthe presence of armed groupsand the condition of the localeconomy, and then takes militarycontrol of the area. Oncesecurity has been established,the state reasserts its authority,providing essential functionssuch as policing, justice, andthe rule of law, and then beginsto build the economy and socialinstitutions. The state involveslocal communities in therecovery process to strengtheninstitutional capacity andpromote democracy. Recoveryspeed depends upon the localcontext: An urban area is mucheasier to recover than a ruralarea, where coca has been thesole source of revenue for localworkers. There is no shake-and-bake solution for peacebuildingin Colombia, warned Mr. Eder-Garces. Our startup phase is 18months, but were envisioningthat the reintegration processwill take at least a decade.

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Demobilization Rates

> 5,000 demobilized3,000 - 5,000 demobilized1,000 - 3,000 demobilized500 - 1,000 demobilized300 - 500 demobilized

Reintegrating the FARC: A Case Study Colombias Government-Owned Approach Delivers Results


Source: Mr. Alejandro Eder-Garces,workshop presentation.


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After demobilizing from the FARCor other militias, armed personsmeet with a local prosecutor,who reviews their records to seeif there are outstanding warrants.Individuals receive a singleopportunity to confess all of theircrimes in return for a reducedsentence. While combatantswanted for a crime againsthumanity could be sentencedto a jail term of up to 60 years,through Colombias programthey will receive a reducedsentence of only 4-8 years andsubsequently be eligible toparticipate in the reintegrationprogram. However, if combatantsfail to disclose the full truth,and additional crimes arediscovered, or they then engagein additional illegal behavior,they will lose their bene tsand be incarcerated for the fulllength of the original sentence.Mr. Eder-Garces was quick to

stress that Colombias programwas not an amnesty initiative,as perpetrators of violence arerequired to serve time for theircrimes and provide nancialreparation to their victims.

Colombias program is unique inthat it provides support not just toex-combatants, but also to theirfamilies and local communities.Since most ghters were recruitedas children and have perpetratedand witnessed horri c violence,they have tremendous psychologicalissues. In addition, they may have

dif culties accepting their changedstatus and gender role, both withintheir families and communities.Ex-combatants receive monthly,in-home psychological counselingand training that is customized totheir unique needs, while theirwives receive vocational assistanceso that they can shoulder someof the familial economic burden.The Of ce of the High Counseloralso works with local communities,to ensure they can provide thesocial and educational servicesex-combatants and their familiesneed; and the private sector,to create job opportunities andprovide specialized expertiseto individuals starting theirown businesses.

When the Of ce of the HighCounselor began the program,it provided ex-combatants withseed capital to start businesses.We were trying to make

everyone an entrepreneur,said Mr. Eder-Garces. However,this approach had a highfailure rate. As a consequence,the program began providingtraining and apprenticeshipsto mainstream ex-combatantsinto the workforce, monitoringthem for psychological stabilityand employability. In addition,

the Of ce has done extensiveoutreach to the private sectorto overcome companies naturalreluctance to hire ex-combatants.

At a cost of $8,000 to $10,000 aperson, Colombias reintegrationprogram is costly, but its successin reintegrating ex-combatantsand debilitating the FARC hasproven its worth. Each combatantwho demobilizes providesvaluable intelligence, noted

Mr. Eder-Garces, including theinformation that was used torescue famed political prisoner Ms.Ingrid Betancourt. Demobilizingcombatants have proven to be themost powerful marketing tool theGovernment of Colombia needs,as they contact peers who arestill in the FARC and motivatethem to leave its fold. This is aninvestment to stop violence andgrow the economy, he said. Oureconomy is up vefold in the past

several years. The program isgovernment-funded, with abouthalf of the $600 million budgetcoming from military sourcesand the other half coming fromcivilian sources. The Of ceprovides a purely coordinativerole and receives funding solelyfor its staff.

CSRS events provide participantswith the opportunity to increase theirprofessional networks, both within andacross communities.



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training. Of the two programs,apprenticeships were far moresuccessful, as the training did

not provide ex-combatants withviable job skills and the localeconomy was not robust enoughto absorb them.

In addition, USAID providedsector-speci c assistance foragriculture, such as irrigationstructures, rubber collectiontraining, and farming support,and programs to rebuild localcommunity infrastructures in veseparate counties. Roads were atop priority: A local contractorprovided design and engineeringservices, and local laborersrebuilt rural and paved roads.However, USAID had dif cultiesusing the engineering contractor,which made a number ofmistakes. In addition, it did notallocate a budget for maintainingthe roads.

Mozambique Dr. Colletta discussed theWorld Banks efforts to employ100,000 ex-combatants who werereentering Mozambique societyin 1995. The Bank piloted threedifferent models: a trainingprogram where ex-combatantscould cash vouchers with localvendors; public vocationalschool investment; and subsidiesfor small businesses to hire

additional employees. Accordingto Dr. Colletta, the voucher systemwas a non-starter, due to itsadministrative requirements, andthe investment and timeframerequired to build and maintainpublic schools exceeded theprogram budget and timeframe.However, the apprenticeshipprogram was successful: It providedbusinesses with free labor andex-combatants with an intensiveimmersion experience into runninga local business.

Pictured above: Dr. Seth Kumi of the United Nations Mission in Sudan.

1212



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PROFILING ANDNEEDS ASSESSMENTThe World Bank has developeda sophisticated ex-combatantpro ling tool to customize itsDDR programs. The questionnairedevelops a detailed picture ofex-combatants, evaluating theirpersonal characteristics, needs,and aspirations, and leverageslocal of cials to assess marketopportunities and institutionalcapacity. The Bank also works to

develop a robust understandingof the local context, so that ithas a clear understanding ofcritical factors, including con ictdrivers, political will, communitycharacter, and governance, amongothers. It is critical to involvelocal leaders in ne-tuning surveyinstruments, so that these toolsexplore the right issues. Said anNGO member: When we weredevising our survey instrument, webrought it to our stakeholders inSouthern Sudan. There were a lotof things we didnt know, becausewe werent on the ground. Is aboma larger than a paya? How faris the village from the clinic or thepolice station? These factors areimportant to consider, when youare designing services or studyingwhere to put new infrastructure.

Best Practicesand Resources forJob Creation

13

We included local stakeholders indevising our survey instrument, so that

we considered the right factors when wedesigned services and studied where toput new infrastructures. NGO representative

Participants discussed fragile statesneeds, including security, youthand ex-combatant employment,and access to health and educationservices, among other issues.


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Dr. Heather Gregg of the Naval Postgraduate School shares insights with the UNs Mr.Donato Kiniger-Passigli.

14

Participants discussed surveyinstruments and how dif cult it isto create a questionnaire that will

accurately map the eld environment.Im really uncomfortable that weare making long, long lists aboutthe things we dont know, whenwe are trying to do an interventionfor a community group, said anNGO member. The unknownswill remain just that: unknown.Dr. Colletta agreed, but said thatthe questionnaire enabled eldstaff to have a dialogue with localstakeholders and discover criticalvariables in the process. Dontdiscount the consultative processand what you will learn from thecommunity. If you learn that 20% ofthe combatants have AIDS, then youare going to design a program that hasa health component. A governmentcivilian agency member said thatactors had to balance consultationneeds with the impetus to act,to reduce the threat of con ict.However, maintaining exibility andcoordinating with other actors anddonors was critical, so that partiescould change course if they wereheaded in the wrong direction.

The group discussed donor trends,and how they can negatively impactrecovery work. Said one participant:In insecure environments, we runinto what we call the avor of themonth. Money will be available for

a certain set of priorities, and soeveryone will develop programs forthose objectives. Then two yearslater, everyone is onto somethingelse. A military of cer asked howS&R practitioners reconcile localcommunity desires and donorpriorities. Countered two governmentcivilian agency members: Its worsethan that. Its what the communitywants, what donors believe shouldbe done, what Congress is willingto fund, and what the White Housewants as policy. Actors must seekto align these different agendas,while building sustainable solutionsthat truly address community needs.A possible solution to navigatingthe maze of competing priorities?

Salesmanship, said a militaryof cer. You have to package whatthey want to hear with what theywant to get done. In addition, S&Rpractitioners may be able to usecreative approaches to implementtheir programs, while still adhering totheir organizations guidelines.

BEST PRACTICES FOR JOB CREATIONSpeakers and participants offeredan array of best practices for S&Rpractitioners seeking to designsuccessful programs for thestabilization phase, as well as avoidcommon pitfalls. Actors should beprepared to:

Monitor fragile states with watchingbriefs, so that they understand thefull range of issues these countries

BEST PRACTICES AND RESOURCES FOR JOB CREATION


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15

face and can prepare effectively fordeployment. Once on the ground,actors can use their understanding

of issues to structure effectivediscussions with local communitiesand rapidly ramp up programs.

Provide funding directly tocommunity groups to allow themto set local wages and increaselocal buy-in for the jobs creationprograms. Community groups willselect the most worthy recipientsand ensure that wage structures areappropriate for the local economy.

Keep material costs down so thatactors can maximize funding forlabor and accelerate programimplementation. The better is theenemy of the good. If you try anddo too much, you will slow thingsdown, said a government civilianagency member. From the timewe initiated a program to when weimplemented it was sometimes just72 hours.

Hire ex-combatants throughcommunity groups to helprecon gure dangerous groups,such as gangs and militias. Butactors should do due diligenceon prospective partners, as somecommunity groups may be alliedwith the very groups practitionersare trying to break and others willnot have survived the con ict.

Use apprenticeships as a low-costmodel to train ex-combatants not

only in speci c skills, but also incritical business practices. Theseopportunities should be paired withsome type of grant program, sothat graduates can apply for loansand form their own businesses.Since nine out of 10 businesses

Graphic represents a visual compositeof imagery provided by Dr. Colletta in hisworkshop presentations.


Scarcity Scarcity

Social Effects Social Effects

Conict Conict

Consequences

GoodGovernance

Social SocialStability

Security Security

EconomicRecoveryRecovery

Development Assistance & Conict: A Peacebuilding Cycle + Consequence of Conict


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in industrialized societies fail,donors should be realistic aboutpromoting entrepreneurship in

post-con ict countries. Helping at-risk populations gain the right skillsto enter the workforce will likelyyield more sustainable results.

Provide psycho-social outlets, suchas long-term counseling and sportsprograms, to offer communitiesa constructive outlet for ventinghostility, while promoting socialreconciliation. The mentalhealth issues ex-combatants andlocal populations face after asustained period of con ict canoften be quite severe. Creatingsocially acceptable outlets forex-combatants to process theiranger and frustration can keepthem focused on the future,maximizing opportunities for skilldevelopment and wage earning,while minimizing familial abuse orother ills.

Be clear about job creationprogram objectives, whetherits purpose is to regalvanizethe economy or simply createa holding pattern, movingat-risk populations into fairlycompensated training programsor apprenticeships until the localeconomy can recover enough

to absorb them. Map programobjectives to the local context,studying the labor market,the absorptive capacity of thelocal economy, and credit and nancial markets. On-the-groundrealities will necessarily shapeor potentially curtail the type ofprograms that can be launchedand sustained successfully.

Involve community groupsin designing, executing, andtransitioning job creationservices, to optimize earlyrecovery and long-termsustainability. While S&R

practitioners often providetechnical assistance to hostgovernments, consultantsincentives need to be properlyaligned with donors goals ofgrowing local capacity. Ms.Lockhart cited examples ofhow technical assistance hadbeen used improperly in thepast, with consultants ringgovernment staff to bring inother external actors, reducingthe host governments abilityto deliver essential servicesand making it ever-moredependent on foreign aid.Instead, external actors shouldhelp host governments developexpertise and resources so that

they can successfully take overactor-initiated programs.

16

Pictured from left to right: Ms Nicole Zimmerman, Monterey Institute for InternationalStudies; Colonel Mary-Ann King, US Army, 352 Civil Affairs Command; and Ms. Lejla Mulic,Sarajevo Headquarters, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.



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While a critical part of thestabilization phase, job creationprograms should not continue into theeconomic recovery phase. Actors needto avoid the temptation of treatingeconomic recovery as developmentas usual, said the USAIDs Dr. JamesSmith, as recovery requires a decade-plus commitment on the behalf ofdonors and actors to create the rightconditions that will engender long-term economic growth. Chief amongthem: creating security and addressingissues, from demining roads to endingthe political corruption that couldprecipitate a return to con ict. Inaddition, actors need to work towarddeveloping an enabling environmentby promoting policy reforms that

support business growth and reducediscrimination; and helping hostgovernments build vital administrativecapacity, including the legal, tax, andregulatory functions local governmentsneed to manage growth. Oneroustaxation or regulatory requirementscan short-circuit economic growth bydiscouraging edgling businesses frominvesting in growing their capabilitiesor con ning wage earners to theinformal economy. Dr. Colletta citedan example where Nairobi artisans

chose to work outside withoutresources, although a pristine newmarket was available, as they wouldhave had to take a days-long journeyto register at a central authority. Thegovernment lost out on valuable taxrevenues, while the artisans likelysuffered lost revenue opportunitiesdue to the insecure nature of theirworking space.

Agriculture can provide a constantsource of professional and economicopportunities, even before con ictstops, as local citizens need topurchase food and traders continueoperations even under extremeconditions, said Dr. Bruce Tolentinoof The Asia Foundation. According toDr. Tolentino, a 1% growth in farmproduction creates a corresponding1% or greater amount of growth inoff-farm and non-farm production.The entire food supply chain bene ts,as local workers create businesses tosupport the farming industry.

Actors should work with the host

government to make the rightinfrastructure investments anddecisions providing security,rebuilding roads, protectingtransportation routes, improvingirrigation, and opening public markets that allow agricultural providersto prosper. S&R actors are enablers,offering educational scholarshipsfor promising agriculture students,creating apprenticeships, and hiringlocal suppliers and craftsmen. Insteadof hiring labor directly, actors should

Moving Into theRecovery Phase

17

In post-con ict work, sequencing doesntmean phasing. We get caught up in

the idea that certain things like securityhave to be in place before we canmove on. You can provide security bycreating jobs.

Military participant


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outsource these services, contractingwith suppliers to train and qualityworkers. In addition, they should be

prepared to pay above-market ratesto support the local private sector.

Speakers offered the following bestpractices for ensuring an effectiveeconomic recovery:

Improve security by addressing thefull range of issues that led to thecon ict. Security is a prerequisitefor a healthy economy, breakingdown a culture of patronage thatfavored the few at the expenseof the many, as well as enablingrent-seeking behavior that stuntedeconomic growth.

Help host governments right-sizetheir spending, allocating moniespreviously spent on sustainingmilitary operations into rebuildingpublic infrastructure. While ndingemployment for large securityforces is a daunting challenge foractors, sustaining militaries attheir existing level can increasecommunity tension and the risk ofcon ict resurgence.

Use actionable governanceindicators (AGIs) to improve thedesign, implementation, andmeasurement of governancesystems. The World Bank is usingthese more nely grained metricsto assess the impact of institutional

reform on governance sub-systems,increasing accountability bybringing transparency to previouslyopaque processes and ensuringthat they are meeting performanceobjectives, said Dr. NaazneenBarma. One such tool, the PublicFinancial Management PerformanceMeasurement Framework, allowsusers to monitor public budgets,from their adherence to policyguidelines to their effectiveness inexecution. Another, the Civil ServiceHuman Resource ManagementDiagnostic, is designed to improveand depoliticize the hiring,management, and retention ofhighly quali ed civil servants,while creating a scally sustainable

wage bill. AGI data from hundredsof sources is available online atthe World Bank website (www.worldbank.org). AGIs can helpaddress the problem of leakage byempowering local communities withinformation on what resources theyare due.

Entice and incentivize thediaspora, with its skills, wealth,and deep knowledge of the localenvironment to return and organizethe recovery. Attract these highlyskilled professionals by providingthe infrastructure resources theyneed, such as schools for theirchildren, to encourage them toreturn and put their expertise to

work for their countries. The returnof the diaspora will help motivateothers to make important capitalinvestments in the country.

The USAIDs Dr. James Smith provided an analysis of job creation best practicesduring the economic recovery phase.

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MOVING TO THE RECOVERY PHASE


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Do not try to restore the economy,just rebuild it. The economy hasdramatically changed over the

course of the con ict: Not only isit unable to support transparenttrading and information ow,but it also cannot absorb all theinternational aid it typicallyreceives in con icts aftermath.Arguing for a slower pace ofinvestment, Dr. McNabb said thatit takes a post-con ict countrythree years to gain enough capacityto absorb international funding.As they bring new resources topost-con ict states, actors needto take care not to create unfaircompetition for local resources orto incentivize the wrong behavior.

Ensure that economic policiesaddress critical issues, such asscarcity, agricultural supply, and keyinfrastructures needed to promotegrowth. If its a choice betweenbuilding a road or a warehouse,build the road, said Dr. Tolentino,because once the road is there,private industry will come in andbuild the rest.

Clarify property rights toenable land reform, but do notexpect or require everyoneto own land. Scarcity maypreclude mass ownership, andmany individuals may preferemployment to the challengesof property management. Oneoption is to give economicallydisenfranchised individuals

shares in collective enterprises,such as rubber plantations inMalaysia or palm oil estates andprocessing plants in Colombia.In return for contributing theirlabor, shareholders receive regulardividends. However, this approachnecessitates that there is a robustinternational commodity marketfor goods that are produced andef cient market linkages, suchas transportation and a moderncommunications infrastructure.

Make sure nancing modelssupport S&R objectives. If actorsdo not require repayment, theyshould provide cash, rather thancommodity grants, to avoid theadministrative burden of settingup repayment mechanisms andenable bene ciaries to purchasewhat they truly need. Withcash, there is one transactioncost, said Dr. Colletta, so

the bene ciary gets more ofthe money. You empower themto make the right decisions.With commodities, the donorprice tag quickly accelerates asorganizations must procure, ship,store, distribute, and account forgoods, among other tasks. Formany institutions, cash transfersare becoming the norm, as itenables organizations not only toroute money to the right traders,but also to shift risk to them.

Ensure that contracted workis completed before releasingfunding, whether it is on anorganizational or an individualscale. Ms. Lockhart cited the dismalrecord of contract completion inAfghanistan under the UNs watch.Meanwhile, the Government ofColombia changed both its wagescale and disbursement modelwhen of cials realized that paying

program participants twice theminimum wage, whether ornot they completed programrequirements, demotivated themfrom ful lling their obligations.Now, ex-combatants only receiveminimum wage salaries if theycomplete key milestones, such asparticipating in training or going tocounseling sessions. Ex-combatantssalaries are direct-deposited intobank accounts that they can accesswith debit cards, so they will build

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Post-Conict EmploymentGeneration: Program Emphases

L E V E L

O F

E F F O R T

T i m e

Build Institutional CapacityBuild Institutional Capacity

Reconstruct Infrastructure andReconstruct Infrastructure andProvide Public ServicesProvide Public Services

Undertake Policy and Legal Reforms Undertake Policy and Legal Reforms

Provide Jobs Provide Jobs

Provide Humanitarian AssistanceProvide Humanitarian Assistanceand Expand Physical Securityand Expand Physical Security

Source: Dr. James Smith and Mr. David Dod, USAID, workshop presentations.


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a credit history as they work theirway through the program. Ex-combatants receive their stipend

based on their performance, saidMr. Eder-Garces, so families quicklybecome both allies and auditors,making sure participants do whatthey need to do.

Fine-tune micro nance modelsto improve their ef cacy. TheAmerican Refugee Committeeworked with West Africanbusiness owners to develop acredit history by providing lettersthat cited their loan repaymenthistories and demonstrated theircreditworthiness. If actors usemicro nance, they should protectthe up to 15 lenders who supporteach borrower. Credit defaultsnot only reduce future lendingopportunities, but also hurt existingbusinesses.

Position transformative programswithin a cultural context toincrease their cultural acceptance.For example, in Afghanistan,marketing literacy for women as atool to help infant mortality wouldlikely be more successful thanlaunching an education programfor women that serves as a frontalassault on cultural mores with itsemphasis on gender equality.

Ensure programs consider theeffect of con ict and climate

change on the ecology, in termsof reducing the amount of arableland or damaging the water

table. For example, Darfur hassustained long-term damageto the physical environmentthat program designers mustconsider when creating recoveryprograms. Local options arenecessarily more limited than ina post-con ict environment thathas sustained less environmentaldamage or has a greater range ofintact natural resources.

Foster the growth oftelecommunications sothat citizens at all levelscan contribute to providingcritical market intelligence,ensuring transparency fundingand service provision, andengage in public dialogue. Ms.Lockhart cited the Governmentof Afghanistans decision tosecure donor monies and thencontract directly with cell phoneproviders as instrumental to thetelecommunications revolutionthat has taken place there,empowering ve million Afghaniswith phone access.

Help foster a business-friendlypolicy climate with minimalregulations and controls onagricultural production. Educatethe private sector about how theycan serve the worlds poor andbetter their lives, while still making

a pro t. Fortune 500 companies areincreasingly turning to Asia, Africa,India, and the Middle East, among

other geographies, to sell goods,realizing that what they do notmake in terms of margin on productsales, they make in terms of scale,due to the vast breadth of thedeveloping world and its relativelyuntapped markets.

Study existing industries foropportunities to optimize businessprocesses or grow markets. USAIDworked with Rwanda growersto improve coffee washing,introducing training, nancing, andquality control processes. Over thefour-year project span, 72 coffeewashing stations were installed, 40of which were built with projectassistance, allowing farmers tonearly double exports of a morecostly product.

Understand that donor timelinesmay not map to a countrys needsor cultural timelines. Participantsdiscussed the stabilization phase,a timeframe when donor fundingis at its highest, but also a timewhen countries may be ill-preparedto absorb and fully utilize aid.While Dr. McNabb advocated a dono harm approach with lowerlevels of investment in sustainableinfrastructures to allow fragilestates economies to recover moreorganically, other participantsstated that on-the-ground realitiesand donor priorities precluded

such an approach. In addition,participants asked whether itwas reasonable to expect jobcreation efforts to take root in the18 months to two years typicallyallotted to such programs duringthe stabilization phase.

20

If actors use micro nance, they shouldprotect the up to 15 lenders who supporteach borrower. Credit defaults not onlyreduce future lending opportunities, butalso hurt existing businesses.



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With their degraded infrastructures,depleted economies, oversizedmilitaries, and vulnerable populations,post-con ict environments presenta wide array of challenges to S&Ractors. A return to con ict is apotentially grim reality for a decadeor more, and thus the clock beginsticking on the new peace accord.As a consequence, S&R actors arewell aware that they must delivershort-term gains that communitiescan see and quantify, if they are to

buy valuable time for statebuildingand reconstruction. Researchhas documented that policy-onlyinitiatives simply do not reducecon ict risks to acceptable levels,but that job creation programs pairedwith peacekeeping forces reducecon ict risks by more than half. 4

As actors seek to design and launchprograms, they are also seekingto manage disparate tensions,consider the needs of a wide array ofstakeholders, and build sustainabilityinto their stabilization and earlyrecovery model. For not only is theclock ticking on the peace accord,it is also ticking on donor funding.The majority of monies will typicallybe spent during the rst two years,at a time when host governmentsare often ill-equipped to leverage

Conclusion

21

S&R actors must deliver short-term gainsthat communities can see and quantify

if they are to buy valuable time forstatebuilding and reconstruction.

External actors feel a sense of urgencyto create job creation programs that willbolster the economy and help prevent areturn to con ict.


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For more information about CSRS, its philosophy, and programs,please visit www.csrs-nps.org .


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Major Jack AalborgUS Air ForceNaval Postgraduate School

Ms. Demetria ArvanitisSenior Program Of cerWinrock International

Mr. Hari Chandra Aryal

Administrative Logistics Of cerCenter for International Studiesand Cooperation

HMCS Kevin AvilaUS NavyMaritime Civil Affairs Squadron One

Dr. Naazneen Barma*Public Sector SpecialistThe World Bank

Ms. Lisa BerkleyFounderJoy of Life

Lieutenant Colonel Miemie ByrdUS ArmyAssociate ProfessorUS Asia Paci c Center for Security Studies

Dr. Nat Colletta *Adjunct ProfessorNew College

Major Jeff De JoannisUS Air ForceNaval Postgraduate School

Mr. David Dod*Senior EconomistUS Agency for International Development

Dr. Sophal Ear *Assistant ProfessorNaval Postgraduate School

Mr. Alejandro Eder-Garces*Political and Strategic AdvisorOf ce of the High Counselor for theEconomic and Social Reintegration ofIllegally Armed Persons and GroupsGovernment of Colombia

Lieutenant CommanderEdward FiorentinoUS NavyMaritime Civil Affairs Squadron One

Dr. Heather GreggAssistant ProfessorNaval Postgraduate School

Colonel Mary-Ann KingUS Army352nd Civil Affairs Command

Mr. Donato Kiniger-Passigli*Senior SpecialistUnited Nations International Labor Of ce

Mr. Jeremy KonyndykSenior Policy AdvisorMercy Corps

Dr. Seth KumiHead Rumbek Of ce and Civil Affairs Of cerUnited Nations Mission in Sudan

Ms. Clare Lockhart*Cofounder and DirectorInstitute for State Effectiveness

Ms. Lana Lynn

Center for Humanitarian Cooperation

Ms. DeAnn McGrewProgram Of cerWinrock International

Dr. Robert McNabb*Assistant ProfessorNaval Postgraduate School

Mr. Douglas MannPresidentGlobal Business Assist

Ms. Jennifer MayerDisaster Operations SpecialistUS Of ce of Foreign Disaster AssistanceUS Agency for International Development

Mr. Chukwuemeka MbahResearch Of cerInstitute for Peace and Con ict Resolution

Ms. Kathleen MinerInformation Management CoordinatorUS Of ce of Foreign Disaster AssistanceUS Agency for International Development

24

Event Speakers and Participants


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Ms. Lejla MulicFinancial AdvisorSarajevo HeadquartersNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization

Mr. David OdigieNational Institute of Marketing of Nigeria

Mr. Ben Oppenheim

Research FellowUniversity of California at Berkeley

Dr. Agnieszka PaczynskaForeign Affairs Of cerOf ce of the Coordinator for Reconstructionand StabilizationUS Department of State

Major Rebecca PattersonUS ArmyUS Military Academy

Major Richard RobertsUS Air ForceNaval Postgraduate School

Mr. Philip RushAssociate Researcher/TrainerBonn International Center for Conversion

Major Aaron ScheerUS Air ForceNaval Postgraduate School

Dr. James SmithOf ce of Economic GrowthUS Agency for International Development

Major Jason SmithUS Army97th Civil Affairs Battalion

Major Sean Sutherland

US Air ForceNaval Postgraduate School

Mr. Madoua Teko-FollyMember/Board MemberGlobal Majority

Dr. Bruce Tolentino*Director/Chief EconomistThe Asia Foundation

Mr. Charles WedenSenior Field AdvisorUS Of ce of Transition InitiativesUS Agency for International Development

Mr. John ZarkowskyDirector, Future Deployable PlatformsUS Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery

Ms. Nicole ZimmermanGraduate StudentMonterey Institute for International StudiesUnited States

CSRS TEAM

Mr. David BilottoReport Designer

Mr. John ChristiansenSenior Program Advisor

Mr. Jesse DarlingMultimedia Designer

Ms. Holly LarsonReport Writer

Mr. Nico MavrisEvent Photographer

Ms. Miriam TurlingtonProgram Assistant

Mr. Nicholas TombProgram Coordinator

Mr. Matthew Vaccaro*Program Director

* Workshop speaker Workshop designer and facilitator


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