Craig Calhoum_Habitus Field and Capital_Bourdieu Critical Perspectives

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CRAIG CALHOUN teaches sociology at the University of North Carolinaat Chapel Hill; EDWARD LI PUMA teaches anthropology at theUniversity of Miami; and MOISHE POSTONE teaches sociology at theUniversity of Chicago.

Contents

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers

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The Authors

Acknowledgments

Introduction: Bourdieu and Social TheoryMoishe Postone, EdwardLiPuma, an d Craig Calhoun

Culture an d the Concept of Culture in a Theory of PracticeEdwardLiPuma

2 Can there be a Science of Existential Structure and SocialMeaning?Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow

3 To Follow a Rule . . .Charles Taylor

4 Habitus, Field, and Capital: The Ques t ion of HistoricalSpecificityCraig Calhoun

5 Aspec ts of Struc tura l and Processua lTheories ofKnowledgeAaron v: Cicoure1

6 Determination and Contradiction: An Appreciation andCritique of the Work of Pierre Bourdieu on Language andEducationJames Collins 116

Cataloging-in-publication data are available from the Library of Congress,Washington, DC 20540.

Copyright This collection Polity Press 1993Written in association with the Center for Psychosocial StudiesEach individual chapter the authorAll rights reserved. Published 1993Printed in Great Britain02 01 00 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 1 2 3 4 5ISBN: 0-226-09092-2 (cloth); 0-226-09093--0 (paper)

This book isprinted on acid-free paper

7 Notes on Semantics in Linguistic PracticeWil1iam F. Hanks 139


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concreteness of actual human social life. Pierre Bourdieu has t ried in thestrongest terms to d is tinguish his work from t he t ra di ti on f or w hi chHabermas speaks, seeking to do theory primari ly in concrete, empiricalanalyses and to oppose t he an tinomy of form and content (among manyother antinomies). Yet, he is hard to place among the postmodernists(though like many he might be considered a "p o ststructuralist"). Hi s

quest for another path is valuable and will be supported in this essay. Ye tI will also argue that because of a lack of clarity on one issue dividing socalled modernists and postrnodernists - universalism versus historicalspecificity - Bourdieu 's posi tion is more ambiguous than at first appearsand hence more problematic.

Overall, the d eb at e b et we en s el f- de cla re d modernists and postmodernists seems to echo the inconclus ive debate on rat iona li ty andcross-cultural analysis which was s pa rk ed off by Winch's (1958)Wittgensteinian argument for a contextualization of knowledge so radicalthat i t seemed to make cross-cultural understanding an impossible goal(see the anthologies by Wilson (1970) and Hollis and Lukes (1982)). Thatdebate generated a variety of interesting arguments but, ultimately, wascarried ou t at such a remove f rom t he empirical work of most socialscientists (and the practical concerns of most political activists) that itwas unable to effect m uc h r ef or m of ou r understanding. In theposrmodernist/modernist debate as well, sensible t h ird pa ths seem hardto identify, since the pos it ions are rhe to rica lly overdrawn, in partbecause the y t end to be presented in great abs trac tion from actualanalysis and social practice. Th e apparent exceptions, like Foucault andBourdieu, are in fact no t protagonists of the debate. Though Foucault 'swork is no w c en tr al to it, this was no t his main f rame of d iscourse . Heoffe red a c ri tique of modernity, to be sure, bu t no argument forpostmodernism as cul tural form or social reality.

In the present essay, which I am afraid is fairly abstract itself, I want topose the question of whether Pierre Bourdieu 's work might offer somesuggest ions as to such a sensible t hi rd p a th between universalism andparticularism, rationalism an d relativism, modernism and postmodernism - the whole linked series of problematic dichotomies. I do n o t w antto set it up as an argument of the same sort, in part because I th ink thatBourdieu has admirably stayed away from such absolute c la ims as aremade on both sides of those d iv ides ; his call for heterodoxy in socialscience strikes me as eminently sound (Bourdieu 1988f and, in a s imilarvein, Bourdieu and Passeron 1967). But Bourdieu's work has substantialsimilarities to both sides of the current discourse, even while it is sharplydistinct. It shares with what on the American side of the Atlantic is often

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Habitus, Field, an d Capital 63

labeled "poststructuralism" or "postrnodernism" both structuralist rootsand a recognition that structuralists were wrong to rejec t all c ri tica linquiry into basic categories of knowledge as ne ces sar il y ba se d on aphilosophy of the subjec t. Like Derrida an d Foucault, Bourdieu hascarried ou t significant critical, epistemological inquiries without embracing traditional philosophy of consciousness or subjectivity. Yet Bourdieu

is unlike these other "poststructuralists" in his more agonistic (thoughstill deep) relationship to Heidegger (Bourdieu 1988d), in his determination to develop a genuinely critical theory (in a sense that I shall developmore below), an d in his emphasis on the material practicality of socialconcerns, even in the realm of culture. He has also sharply rejected thesubstitution of quasi-poetic discourse "which becomes its ow n end [and]opens th e door to a form of thinly-veiled nihilistic relativism .. . thats ta nd s as the polar opposite to a truly reflexive social science" (inWacquant 1989: 35).2

This sort of argument places Bourdieu somewhat closer to Habermas.:'Both, I would suggest, are heirs to the tradition of critical theory, no t just

in the Frankfurt school bu t extending back to Marx, an d both proposeprojects that s ub st an ti al ly r ef or mu la te t he f ou nd at io ns for c ri tica ltheory. It may be somewhat surprising to place Bourdieu in the camp ofc ri tic al t he or is ts , so let me defend that fo r a moment. It is t ru e t ha tBourdieu follows th e lead of the older generation of Frankfur t schooltheorists - Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse - much less closely thandoes Habermas. Moreover, he is grea tly indebted to other traditionswhich have l it tle resonance in Frankfurt school thought - notably thephenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Levi-Straussian structuralism.Nonetheless, to restrict th e label "critical theory" to f ol low er s of theFrankfurt school is to make it, unreasonably, into a kind of proprietorialclaim an d to lose sight of core features that give it me aning an dsignificance today. We might understand critical theory, I think, as the I

Jproj ect of social t he or y t ha t undertakes simultaneously crit ique ofreceived categories, critique of theoretical practice, and critical substantive analysis of social life in terms of the possible, n ot j us t t he actual. Allthree moments are i mp or ta nt , a nd B ou rd ie u shares all thr ee withHorkheirner and Adorno, even though his t he or et ic al s tyle an dsubstantive analyses differ.

There are other important similarities between Bourdieu and Habermas. Both strive to maintain an analytic focus on agents or agency, whileavoiding the philosophy of the subject." Both are engaged in pro jectsintended to overcome, or enable one to overcome, the traditional

opposition of theory to practice. Both derive significant insights from

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Weber 's account of Weste rn rat iona liza tion as well as from Marxism(though they do quite different things with these insights in theirrespective theories).

The differences from Habermas are many also. They start, perhaps,with Bourdieu's opposit ion to theoretical system building, to what hehas called "theoretical theory" (in Wacquant 1989: 50), the developmentof conce ptual schemes divorce d from c oncre te analytic obje cts or

projects.? On e may evaluate this negatively, pointing ou t that Bourdieuengages in a good deal of generalization even while he declines to workou t a full theoretical basis for it, or positively, noting how he avoids thecharge of arbitrary formalism which has been leveled at Habermas. Inany case, the difference is significant. So is t ha t w hic h ste ms f ro mBourdieu's focus on the relationships of power that constitute and shapesocial fields (on fields, see 1990e, 1984: 113-20, 1988b, 1987b). Power isalways fundamental to Bourd ieu, and it involves dominat ion and/ordifferential distribution. Fo r Bourdieu, in other words, power is alwaysused, if sometimes unconsciously; it is not simply and impersonallysystemic." Haberrnas's theory, like Parsons's, allows both relational anddistributive understandings of power to take a back seat to power

understood asa steering mechanism and a general social capacity.In short , there is reason to think that Bourdieu is engaged in a projectof critical theory similar to Haberrnas's, bu t that his work is much moreopen to the kind of pos it ive insigh ts tha t have been offe red by the socalled poststructuralists (some of which, like the imbrication ofknowledge in relations of power, he pu t forward at least as early as thosepoststructuralists wh o became famously assoc ia ted with them). Hiswork is essentially c on te mp or ar y w ith these ot he rs (for example,Foucault and Derrida) and of comparable scope, though it has been lesswidely read in the English-language world. I want here to explore theidea that i t might suggest ways ou t of what is increasingly becoming asterile and boring impasse between Habermas and the postmodernists. I

will no t make any effor t to summarize tha t debate , though it forms myframe (see Calhoun 1989, 1991). And I will take up o nly one th re ad ofthe dispute. This is the issue of difference. Some postmodernists makesuch a fetish of attention to difference that they are prepared to embracea thoroughgoing rela tiv ism, which Bourd ieu has sharp ly opposed .Habermas, on the other hand, is sufficiently rigid in his universalism(even though he distinguishes his ow n as lower-case u, compared toKant's capital U; see Habermas 1989) and his separat ion of form fromcontent tha t he seems unable to offer much more than lip service to theimportance of difference, to the idea that social and cultural differencesmight be positively desirable, not merely tolerable on liberal grounds.

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Difference as such is no t a central theme of Bourdieu's. I am no t surethat it is even a peripheral theme. In at least one way his theory isweakened by inattention to this issue: he offers an inadequate account ofhow to address the most basic categor ia l di fferences among epochs,societies, and cultures and corresponding differences in ho w his analytictools fit or work in historically or culturally distinct instances. Despitethis, I will argue that Bourdieu's work gives us extremely useful ways of

approaching par ts of this issue and tha t it thereby contr ibutes importantly to getting contemporary theoretical discourse ou t of the rut ofpostmodernist versus modernist.

Th e issue of ho w to understand differences in societal types, epochs,civil izations, or cultures is a central one for social theory. It figures atleast implicitly in the modernist/postmodernist debate as the question ofwhether the contemporary era is,or is about to become, distinct in somebasic categorial wa y from tha t of the last three hundred or more years.The very idea of modernity, of course, posits a break with the premodern(usually conceived of as the medieval European and /o r as a c at ego rywhich collapses and obscures the wide range of variation in non-Westernsocieties). Some such idea of the distinctiveness of the modern West hasinformed anthropology and soc io logy f rom the ir inception , despi terecur rent c rit ic ism of various specific formulat ions : Gemeinschaft/Gesellscbaft, t raditional/modern, folk/urban, and so forth. Th e dualmessages of anthropology (to which I a lluded at the beginning) have inp ar t to do with effor ts on the one hand to show that "primitive" peopleare rat iona l, desp ite the manifes t confl ic ts between the ir beliefs andprac tices and what we "know" to be true, and on the other hand tomaintain the otherness of the people studied, either ou t of respect fortheir concrete way of life or as a mirror for ou r own. The post-Winchrationality debates were about just these issues: for example, about ho wwe can determine whether or no t the people of a d iffe rent cul ture are"rational".

It seems to me that Bourdieu's work both reveals the genera lambivalence about this issue and suggests a way of grappling with part ofit. I will tr y to demonst ra te the lat te r by deve loping an account of thet ransformat ion of the workings of the habitus involved in movementfrom a minimally codified "traditional" social organization towards, onthe one hand, more complex civil izations outside the modern Westerna mbi t and, on the ot he r, capitalist states in the m od er n West. Morebriefly, and with more attention to problems, I will look at Bourdieu'slater argument regarding multiform and convertible capital. At stake is


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w he th er we s ho ul d underst and Bourd ieu 's analytic a ppa ratus - hisconceptual tools like habitus, field, and capital- as applying universally,without modification, or as situationally specific. Moreover, in eithercase, we want to know whether they help us to make sense of differencesamong situations, no t just their commonalities. Bourdieu is concernedwith both sides of this:

There are general laws of fields: even such different fields as the field ofpolitics,the field of philosophy, and the field of religion have functionallyinvariantlaws(it's becauseof this factthat theproject of a generaltheory isnot senseless, and that, therefore, one can make use of what oneunderstands of the functioning of each particular field to interrogate andinterpret other fields, thereby getting past the mortal antinomy betweenidiographic monographs and formal and empty theory). (Bourdieu 1984:113, allemphasesin quotations original)

The issue is not, as critics have sometimes charged, whether Bourdieuneglects change or s truggle; he does not, bu t rather pays attention to

both." The issue is ho w to d es cr ibe a c ha ng e so basic that it calls fordifferent categories of analysis. In his early work, Bourdieu contrastedKabylia with France, the traditional with the modern. Start ing in the1960s, he embarked on a long-range trajectory of studies of France whichused the categories he had developed in studying Kabylia and arguedsubstan tial ly for the s imilar ity of the basic soc ia l issues across cases. s

Bourdieu does no t decide the issue for us. He has described his project as"uncovering some of the universal laws that tendentially regulate thefun cti oni ng of all fie lds" (in Wacquant 1989: 36). Bu t in the sameinterview, he also uses more qualified expressions: "One of the purposesof the analysis is to uncover transhistorical invariants, or sets of relationsbetween structures that persist within a c lear ly c ircumscr ibed bu trelatively long historical period" (ibid.).

Bourd ieu is s imply unc lear as to ho w historically and comparativelyspecific his conceptual frameworks and analytic strategies are meant tobe. He has no t done much systematic comparative or historical analysisthat would indicate ho w - or indeed, whether - he would make criticaldistinctions among epochs or types of societies or cultures. Hi sconceptual development is generally couched in the context of concreteanalysis - part of his opposition to "theoretical theory"; this makes foran element of contextual specificity to his terms. On the other hand, itleaves the historical and comparative frame for such specificity relativelyunexamined. Bourdieu's predominant presentation tends towards atrans-historical conceptual framework and ana ly tic approach which


p ar ti al ly o bs cur es the s pe cif ic it y of e po chs and ty pe s of s oc iety orculture. At the same time, much of his c on ce pt ua l a ppa ra tus can beemployed in an analytic approach which does a bet te r job of achievingh is to rica l and cul tu ra l and soc ia l o rgan izat iona l speci fici ty. In otherw ords , we can use B ou rd ie u' s c once ptual appara tus to develop anaccount of breaks that so distinguish social arrangements and culturesthat different issues arise and different analytic categories and strategiesbecome appropriate.

Some of Bourdieu's categories may readily fit all social settings; forexample, I would th ink that no one cou ld be without a habitus. Othersare trickier. Is the notion of capital altogether trans-historical? The issueis muddied by divergent readings of Marx and some ambiguity asto ho wc lose ly related to Marx Bourdieu me ans his c on ce pt io n to be. This isworth exploring in some detail.

Bourdieu appears to begin his analyses of capital with Marx very much inmind. In one major essay, for example, he introduces this definition inthe first paragraph: "Capital is accumulated labor (in its mater ia lizedform or its 'incorporated,' embodied form) which, when appropriated ona private, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables themto appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor" (1986b:241). Bourdieu i nt en ds to take q ui te s er io us ly this v er si on of a l abortheory of capital , describing the social world as "accumulated history"and going on to argue that we can analyze th e various forms of capital interms of the different means w he re by t he y are a cc umul at ed andtransmitted to succeeding generations. "The universal equivalent, themeasure of a ll equ ivalences, is nothing other than labor-time (in thewidest sense); and the conservation of social energy through all its conversions is verified if, in each case, one takes into account both the labort ime a cc umu la te d in the f or m of c apit al and the l ab or-t im e nee de d tot ransform it from one type i nt o ano th er " (1986b: 253). Bourdieu'squalifier about the widest sense of labor-time is appropriate, for, unlikeMarx, Bourdieu does no t examine the historically specific conditionsunder which labor is abstracted into temporal units of measurement. Asthis passage makes clear, Bourd ieu means by "labor-time" simply theamount of work. Fo r a universal equivalent, this is somewhatproblematic. We m us t w o nd er h ow the various concrete forms of workinvolved in the reproduction or production of c apita l are in fact madeequivalent to each other where a process of abstraction (for example, intocommodified labor) is lacking. Bourdieu 's account works well to s ho who w qua li ta tive ly d iffe rent forms of work may contribute to the


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70 Craig Calhounsocial powers are, according to my empir ical invest igat ions , f irst lyeconomic capital, in its various kinds; secondly cultural capital or better,informationalcapital, againin its different kinds; and thirdly two forms ofcapital that are very strongly correlated, social capital, which consists ofresources based on connections and group membership, and symboliccapital, which is the form the different types of capital take once they are

perceivedand recognized aslegitimate. (1987f: 3--4)

Economic capital is essentially that which is " immediate ly and direct lyconvertible into money" (1986b: 243), unl ike educat ional credent ia ls(cultural capital) or social connect ions ( social cap it al ). The mostinteres ting parts of Bourdieu's work in this area are his t rea tm en ts ofcultural capital. He has made part icular s t rides by recognizing ho w muchof cul tural capital presupposes embodiment of d is tinc tive and d is tinguishing sensibilities and characteristic modes of action. Thus it i s that heis able to show ho w the labor of paren ts is t rans la table into the" statusattainment" of their children in ways no t directly dependent on financialinheritance or even on better schools . Such parenta l labor depends on theavailabil ity of t ime free from paid employment , however, which showsthe dep enden ce of the other forms of capital on economic capital(p. 253).11 The importance of this sort of cul tu ra l cap it al i s g reates t,moreove r, whe re for some reason it is advan tageous to deny or disguisethe inheritability of position (p. 246). Bourdieu does no t directly explorethe social c on di ti on s and h ist or ie s which ma ke su ch "str ategi es ofreproduction" particularly advantageous.

The issue is an important one. Bourdieu r ep ea te dl y u rge s us to seeh is to ry and s oc io lo gy as i ns ep ar ab ly l in ke d ( fo r e xa mp le , 1990d: 42;Wacquant 1989: 37; and Bourdieu and Wacquan t 1992; 90-99), bu t hissociology does no t offer much purchase on the transformation of socialsys tems . It is gea red towards accounts of their internal operation. Th eissue is no t simply whether Bourdieu offers a "motor of history" in thecrude Marxist sense. Rather it is that his account s of the general sys temof social and cultural organization always render it as e ss en ti al lyconservative; they suggest no reasons wh y a logic of reproduction wouldnot work. There is nothing in his theory like the notion of contradictionsin Marx' s (or Hegel 's ). Bourd ieu' s theory does imp ly dynamism; but,crucially, it does so at the level of the str at egi c a ct or (i ndivi dual orcollective or , in those wri tings where he is more attent ive to the problemsof r oo ti ng his analysis in any p os it in g of a ct or s as f un da me nt al , at thelevel of the strategy itself). That is, the m ot iv e f or ce of soc ia l life is the

pursuit of distinction, profit, power, w ea lt h, and so on . Bourdieu'saccount o f capital i s an account of the resou rces that p eo pl e use in s uc h

Habitus, Field,and Capital 71

pursuit. In this sense, despite his disclaimers, Bourdieu does indeed sharea good deal with Gary Becker a nd o th er rat ional choice theoris ts .Bourdieu sharply, and probably rightly, rejects the charge of economism;he is no t assuming that the "interests" w hi ch are f un da me nt al arebasically "economic." He deals less with the cha rge that he fails toconsider action which is no t consciously or unconsciously strategic. Heaccep ts the notion of interest, albeit as part of a "deliberate andprovisional reductionism," in order to be able to show that culturalactivity is not" disinterested," as Western thought has often implied sincethe development of the modern ideology of art is tic production.V He isquick an d forceful in po in t ing ou t that

the concept of interest as I construe i t has nothing in common with thenaturalistic, transhistorical, and universal interest of utilitarian theory . . . .Far from being an anthropological invariant, interest is a historical ar-bitrary, a historical construction that can be known only throughhistorical analysis, ex post, through empirical observation, and not deduceda priori from some fictitious - and so naively Eurocentric - conception of"Man." (Wacquant 1989: 41-2)

Quite so; bu t then we must ask wh y th is part icular concept of interesta rose h is to ri ca lly and gained special power in both lay and academicanalyses of human act ion in the present epoch. In any case , this recourseto empiricism rather than naturalism is not so problematic for economicor rat ional choice theoris ts as Bourdieu believes. "Revealed preference,"they can r ep ly. There are cer ta in ly important differences betweenBourdieu's theory of practice and rational choice t he o ry.P But thoughBourdieu points ou t the historical particularity of all int eres ts , he doesno t deny the universal i ty of interes ted act ion. Implic it ly, a t least , he goesfurther, beyond t rea t ing all act ion simply as i nt er es te d - w hi ch is l itt lemore than saying "motivated". He t reat s all int eres ts , h is to ri ca llyparticular though their contents may be, as for mally similar in th eirimplicat ion of s trategies designed to advance some manner of acquisitionof power or wealth. Bourdieu is saying something more trans-historicaland anthropological ly invar iant a bo ut h um an actors than he lets on,especially in his accounts of capital.

Bourdieu 's theory is social in a powerful sense in which rational choicetheory is not. His conception of stra tegy in th e idea of an intersubjectivehabitus conditioned by "objective" situations gives a much lessreductionistic and more useful sense of human act ion. Bourdieu 's

so ci ol ogy p ro vi de s for effective ac co un ts of the influences whichobjective circumstances, historical patterns of d is tr ib ut io n of va ri ou s

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Talk of rules, a euphemized form of legalism, is never more fallacious thanwhen applied to the most homogenous societies (or the least codified areasof differentiated societies) where most practices, including those seeminglymost r itua lized, can be abandoned to the orchestrated improvisation ofcommon disposi tions: the ru le i s never, in this case, more than a secondbest i nt en de d to make g oo d the o cc as io na l misfirings of the c ol le ct iv ee nt erpr is e of i nc ul ca ti on t en di ng to p ro du ce h ab it us t ha t are c ap ab le ofgenerating practices regulated without express re gu lat ion or any institutionalized call to order. (Bourdieu 1977c: 17)

Th e last part of this quotation poses an essen tial issue: ho w is thecoordination of actions to be achieved without either external determinat ion (or, what amounts to almost the same thing, reference to theu nc ons cio us as an eq ual ly u nw ill ed i nte rn al d et er mi na ti on ) or theissuance of some formal rule or communica tion involving a dec is ionprocess (and hence the sel f- imposi tion of a rule)? Objec tivi st s e ithersimply record regularit ies without exp laini ng t he m or reify va ri ou sanalytic notions such as "culture," "structures," or "modes of produc-

t ion" and imagine that they exist as such in the world, external to actors,constraining them towards regularity. Bourdieu's a ttack on this objectivism was powerful, bu t it is worth noting that it did no t involvesystematic attention to differences among societies in the extent to whichf or mal rules are issued or to which act ion appears to actors as reifiedexternal determination. 14

In Outline, Bourdieu's argument was a imed par ticu la rly at Frenchs truc tura li st s, and he adopted the language of economizing s trateg ies(from a mainly A nglo-Saxon discourse) largely to challenge thestructuralist elimination of agents, of practices. But even here, he wascareful to show t ha t the e co no mi zin g was no t tha t of ind iv idua ls

understood discretely, bu t i nh er ed in the h ab it us as a social cr eat io n.Bourdieu was careful to distinguish his position also from a subjectivismwhich imagined that agents were no t overwhelmingly products of the irbackgrounds and situations or that their actions simply originated withtheir choices among abstractly conceived possibili ties. Sartre was theparticular subjectivist he had most in mind, and Bourdieu pointed pre-cisely to the problem t ha t S art re creat ed for himself by re fu si ng torecognize anything resembling durable dispositions. He thereby madeeach action into "a sort of unprecedented confrontation between thesubject and the world" (Bourdieu 1977c: 73). In so doing, he made socialrea li ty inexplicably volunta ry and ult imately, there fore , a rb it ra ry.Against this view, Bourd ieu argued tha t agents acted within soc ia lly

72 Craig Calhoun

resources, and the trajectories of different actors through social fields allhave on power relat ions. I t rel ies l it tle on any notion of creativity. Mostcentrally, it gives an account of the various socially determined interestspeople may p ur su e and the w ay s in w hi ch social s tr uc tu re s c on st ra insuch action, b ut n ot of any interna l tendencies of those s truc tures tochange in particular directions. Bourdieu's theory is at its best, therefore,as a theory of reproduction, and at its weakest as a theory oftransformation. In this it shows its structuralist (perhaps even functionalist) roots.

Bourdieu has rightly protested that his work is by no means bracketableas a t he or y of reproduction tout court (1990d: 46 and Wacquant 1989).But he is centrally concerned w ith h ow the various practical projects ofdifferent people, the struggles in which they engage, and the relat ions ofpower which push and pull t he m n on et he le ss r ep ro du ce the field ofrelat ions of which they are a part. "The source resides in the actions andreactions of agents who, unless they exclude themselves from the game,

have no other choice t ha n to st rug gle to m ai nt ai n or improve theirp os it io n in the field, thus help ing to b ri ng to bear on all the o th er s theweight of the constraints, often experienced as intolerable, which stemfrom antagonistic coexistence" (1990d: 193). In Homo Academicus andLa noblesse d'Etat, Bourdieu reports that he is impressed by the stabili tyof the basic field of relations even while incumbents change and strugglescontinue. In his work on K aby lia (for example, 1977c), r up tu re s intraditional practices always appear as the result of exogenous influences.

When Bourdieu approached the idea of reproduct ion, a key under-lying co nce rn was to o ver co me the antinomy between structure andaction (1990d: 9-17, 34, 46). He wanted to show ho w patterns of sociall ife could be maintained over time without this either being specificallywilled by agents or the resul t of externa l fac tors beyond the r eac h ofagents' wills. That is ,he wanted to show that reproduction was the resultof what people did, intentionally and rationally, even when reproductionwas not itself their intention: "Each agent, wittingly or unwittingly, willynilly, is a producer and reproducer of objective meaning. Because hisactions and works are the product of a modus operandi of which he is no tthe producer and has no consc ious mas te ry, they conta in an 'ob ject iveintention', as the Scholastics pu t it, which always outruns his consciousintentions" (Bourdieu 1977c: 79). Th e practice which the habitus makespossible is not merely a determined result of the antecedent conditions;neither is i t the sort of intentional action which many theories conceive

of asaction following a rule.

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constructed ranges of possibilities durably inscribed wi th in them (evenin the ir b od ie s) as well as wi th in the social world in which they moved.Moreover, the relat ion between agent and social world is a re lati onbetween tw o dimensions of the social, n ot t w o separate sorts of being.

The source of his torical act ion, that of the artist , the scientis t, or the

memberof government just asmuch asthat of the worker or the petty civilservant, is not an activesubject confronting society as if that society werean object constituted externally. The source resides neither in consciousnessnor in things but in the relationship between two stages of the social,that is, between the history objectified in things, in the form of institutions, and the history incarnated in bodies, in the form of that system ofenduring dispositions which I call habitus. (1990d:190)

Against some of the cruder forms of economistic choice theory,Bourdieu held that agents ' use of the possibilities available to them, whiles tr ateg ic in a sense, was often no t strictly speaking calculation becauseno t discursive. The e co no mi zi ng or calcu la tion was b ui lt into the

practical play of the game. An analyst might, thus , see ho w a course ofbehavior effectively achieved some end , whi le the actor engaged in thebehavior believed that she was merely b ei ng a good friend or wife ord au gh te r. It was e ss en tia l to some strategies t ha t t he y could only becarried ou t b y people wh o misrecognized them. Above all else, it wascrucial to grasp, Bourdieu argued, that agents did no t generally adopt thetheoretical attitude of seeing action as a choice among all objectivepossibilities; they usually saw only one or a few possibi li ties . "Theh ab it us is the source of these series of mov es which are objectivelyorganized as strategies without being the p rod u ct o f a genuine strategicintention - which would presuppose at least t ha t t he y are perceived asone strategy among o ther possible strategies" (Bourdieu 1977c: 73).

Bourdieu's concern was (and to a large extent still is) w it h h ow thecoordination of s ocia l activ ities is ac hiev ed. Hi s rip os te to bothobjectivism and subjectivism was to stress practical mastery, a sense ofplaying the game which was at once active and nondiscursive. "We shallescape from the ritu al either! or choice between objectivism andsubjectivism in which the socia l sciences have so far a llowed themselvesto be trapped only if we are prepared to inquire into the mode ofp ro du ct io n a nd functioning of the practical m as te ry w hi ch makespossible both an objectively intelligible practice and also an objectivelyenchanted experience of that practice" (Bourdieu 1977c: 4). Bourdieustressed that this was no t simply a matter of phenomenologicallyreconstructing lived experience. It was necessary that a theory of practice

Habitus, Field, and Capital 75

give a g oo d a c co un t of the limits of a wa re ne ss in vol ved in livedexperience, including both misrecognition an d nonrecognition, aswell asshow the kind of genuine k no wl ed ge w hi ch was inv olve d, o ft enn on discur sive ly, in p ract ic e. Moreover, there was struggle overknowledge, including the prelinguistic:

The individual or collective classification struggles aimed at transformingthe categories of perception and appreciation of the social world and,through this, the social world itself, are indeed a forgotten dimension ofthe class s truggle . But one only has to realize that the class if icatoryschemes which underlie agents' practical relationship to their conditionand the representation they have of it are themselves the product of thatcondition, in order to see the limits of this autonomy. (1984: 483---4)

Thus c rit ic s ( fo r e xamp le, G ar nh am a nd Will iams 1980) haveoverstated the extent to which Bourdieu's account focused on reproduc-tion at the exp en se of o pening s to the p ossibi li ti es for act io n to c reate anew an d different world - for e xa mp le , to revolutionary struggle. Bour-

dieu's emphasis on reproduction did not foreclose contrary action,though neither d id it i nt ro du ce a ny n ot io n of systematic pressures forsuch action. Bourdieu add re ssed the issue of revolutionary collectiveactions direc t ly, a lt ho ug h v er y briefly, an d argued t ha t th ey wereimbricated within conjunctures and still crucially dependent on the samehabitus which had h i therto o rganized reproduc tion . In other words,revolut ion did no t mark a break with the habitus, bu t was based on it,even though it broke the pat tern of stable reproduction:

It is just as true and just as untrue to say that collectiveactions producethe event or that they are its product. The conjuncture capable oftransforming practices objectively coordinated because subordinated to

partially or wholly identical objective necessities into collective action(e.g., revolutionary action) is constituted in the dialectical relationshipbetween, on the one hand, a habitus, understood as a system of lasting,transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences,functions atevery moment asa matrix of perceptions, and actions and makes possiblethe achievement of infinitely diversified tasks . . . and an objective eventwhich exerts its action of conditional stimulation callingfor or demandinga determinate response, only on those who are disposed to constitute it assuch because they are endowed with a determinate type of dispositions.(1977c: 82-3)

This, Bourdieu s ug ges ts , is the s ou rc e of "the frequently observedincapacity to think his torica l crises in categories of perception and


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The habitus, on Bourdieu 's account, works to shape this process evenwhile itprovidesthe regulated source of improvisations - indeed, preciselybecause it does. On e of the crucial features of Bourdieu 's account of thehabitus is that it allows for a process of continual correction andadjustment: "The habitus . . . makes possible the achievement ofinfinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes per-

m it ti ng the s ol ut io n of s imi la rl y s ha pe d p ro bl em s, and t ha nk s to theunceas ing correct ions of the resul ts obtained" (Bourdieu 1977c: 83).Most tradition is no t passed down in situations - for example, ritual per-formances or s ch ool s - in w hi ch t ha t passing down is i ts el f the m ai nmanifest project. On the contrary, most pas sin g on and subsequentaff irmations of cul tu re take p lace in the course of interes ted act ions inwhich people pursue a variety of ends, both conscious and unconscious.As people succeed or fail, meet with approval or disapproval, in trying tocarry ou t their manifold projects of daily life, t he y m ay adjust slightlythe traditional information that they have received from various others inthe course of previous interactions. A basketball player, to return to thatexample, may imitate - or be explicitly taught - another's shot technique;bu t he learns to adjust the velocity to compensate for his ow n height orto add s pin because it makes a favorable b ou nc e m or e likely. Theadjustments may be unconscious or conscious and in either casemandated by the recurrent evaluation of each shot as a success or afailure. Bu t the example is imperfect ; for the baske tbal l p layer, we mayassume, at least knows that he is playing basketball. Or does he? Mightthis be a l im it ed perception of what is in fact a more complex s trategy;ach ieving success in on e field which seems relatively open whileminimizing investment in another - say school - which seems closed,while half-consciously or even unconsciously engaging in strategies forachieving a sense of personal autonomy or perhaps escaping a ghetto andgaining a better standard of living?

Regardless, the baske tbal l p layer i llus trates the possibi li ty of con-tinued correction or adjus tment in the passing on of t radi tion . This maybe a crucial element of traditionality, of the extent to which tradition canactually serve to coordinate social activity, in many settings. I f traditionwere rigid, it would soon meet with disastrous consequences and proveitself an extremely inefficient means of coordinating action. It ispreciselybecause it can be adjusted with (often unconscious) regard to the successor failure of various practical projects that the t radit ion embodied in thehabitus can be supple enough to change with other aspects of a society.

More complex soc ie ties never lose this e lement of t radi tion , but itcomes to organize somewhat less of what goes on and is often

compartmentalized within speci fic spheres or at leas t at the local level.-e

~ '


Thus, in classical I nd ia and C hi na , tradition of this kind took placeconstantly, resulting in a variety of local adaptations and idiosyncrasies.At the same t ime, the passing on of information - still tradition and stillwith an a tt itude of prese rvat ion no t innovation - took place throughother, especially textual means. These other means int roduced a newinstitutional dimension - the role of authorized arbiters of correctness.

This, I take it, is what B ou rd ie u refer s to when he speaks of the"codification" of culture.

The extent to which the schemes of the habitus are objectified in codifiedk no wl ed ge , t ra nsmi tt ed as such, varied g re at ly b et we en one area ofpract ice and another. Th e relative frequency of sayings, prohibit ions,proverbs and strongly regulated rites declines as one moves from practiceslinked to or directly associated with agricultural activity, such as weaving,pottery and cuisine, t owards the divisions of the day or the momen ts ofhuman l ife, no t to mention areas apparen tly abandoned to arb it rariness ,such as the inter nal orga ni zat ion of the hou se, the pa rt s of the body,colours or animals. Although they are among the most codified aspects ofthe cul tu ra l t radi tion , the precepts of custom which govern the tempora ldistribution of activit ies vary greatly from place to place and, in the sameplace, f ro m one official i nforma nt to a no th er. We find here again theopposition between official knowledge .. . and all k inds of unoffic ia l orsecret, even clandestine, knowledge and practices which, though they arethe product of the same generative schemes, obey a different logic. (1990e:333--4)

In C hi na , I nd ia, much of Islamic civilization, and, indeed, medievalEurope at leas t for a t ime, the operation of these more codified modes oftransmission did no t imperialistically challenge the simultaneous operation of more informal t radit ion within personal interaction. On e of thedistinctive features of the modern Wes t may be the e xt ent to which thetransmission of "official" information through authoritative channels hasin fact been destructive of the transmission of information through directinterpersonal relationships.'?

Linked to this is the problematization of the i nf or ma l t ra di ti onthrough diffe rent ia tion of fields , inc reas ing con tact with people ofdifferent cultures, and increasing exercise of individual choice. The first, Ithink, is clear enough to need l it tle comment. As various fields becomedifferentiated, the information which can be passed on informally as partof the ordinary round of daily life becomes segmented. If more generalinformation is called for, i t is increasingly likely to be passed on throughcodified, authoritative means. An d i t isl ikely that, at the very least, those

in power will find it necessary that some such information - say, about

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the v ir tues of the ir rule - be passed on. Information of this sort may stillbe traditional in the colloquial and/or Weberian sense that it embodies anattitude of deference for "what has always been" (whether o r n ot it is infact ancient being a matter quite secondary to whether it is believed to beso). This atti tude is more l ikely to be ruptured when people are broughtin to r ou ti ne co nt act w it h other s quite different from themselves,especially under a common rule (whichprevents them from treating theirfellow-subject as quite radically other). Bourdieu addresses this point

through his notion of a passage from the "doxic" attitude of notcons idering an other form of existence or belief to the "orthodox"attitude of correctness with regard to authoritative standards of belief(1977c, 1990e). The next step is b ro ug ht abo ut by the increase inapparently independent decision making (either by individuals or bygr ou ps ) wh ich pos es the challenge of h et er od ox y. What apparentindependence means is no t just not following traditional rules, bu t actingin a hab itus which is no t highly congruent with those of o thers in one'sfields. 20

Bourdieu does no t address this increase of independent dec is ionmaking very d irec tly in e ither Outline or The Logic of Practice. It islinked to his borrowing of ec on om izi ng language to d es cr ibe the

strategies built into the play of the habitus. We need, however, to unpackthe several dimensions of the notion of rationality. A notion ofmaximization is in fact only one possible meaning or aspect ofrationality. Bourdieu suggests that at least some sort of maximizing isuniversal, because there is always scarcity. Of course, the re may also bescarcity which is specific to various social fields, and maximizing may bein part a historically specific orientation to action. Just as maximizing isvariable, so are the other dimensions of rationality. There is, for example,the q ue st io n of how far a s trategizer extends his or her ho rizo ns ofcalculation, h o w m an y of the objectively possible courses of action andtheir potential effects he or she actually analyzes. On e of the crucialcharacteristics of the configuration of habitus and field in "traditional"societies was that they radically limited the range of options consideredby rational actors. Whether actors were maximiz ing or not , this gave amuch greater chance to traditionality as a means of coordinating action.Fo r every increase in the range of options that a decision-makerconsiders no t only increases the complexity of his or h er o wn decisionmaking bu t makes t ha t p er so n less p red ict abl e to o th er s. This loss ofpredictab il ity is apt to become part of a vicious circle, as others in adec is ion-maker' s field are led to plan on shorter and shorter timehor izons in order to a llow themselves the opportunity to adjus t to theunpredictability. This sort of attitude, this vicious circle, is antithetical to

Habitus, Field, and Capital 81

maintenance of s table t radi tional pat te rns of social relat ions . Whencoupled with increasing scale or reach of social relations, it leads to thenecessity of adopting statistical measures of the probabili ty of variouscourses of action, preferably averaged n ot o nl y o ve r time but across arange of other members of a field. At this point, we have left thecoordination of action through tradition and entered the world of at leastputatively self-regulating systems.

T he se s el f- reg ul at in g s ys tem s call for a m or e t heor et ical k in d of

understanding; the practical attitude of the habitus is less likely to be ableto attain practical mastery of relationships within them. This is no t to saytha t there is no longer any reason to talk of the hab itus as governing thegeneration of improvisational strategies for dealing with such systems. Onthe contrary, there is no conceivable point at which human beings couldbe perfect rational actors; since they always operate within various formsof bounded r at io na lit y, it will always be nec ess ar y to c on si de r thesocially produced means of generating strategies which are open to themand which reflect the organ izat ion of the fields in which they act andtheir ow n trajectories through them. An d in this sense a t heo ret icalattitude should no t be too sharp ly opposed to the notion of habitus (asB ourdieu - for example, 1977c - has sometimes implied). Rather , atheoretical attitude should be seen as a variety of habitus, itself reflectinga cer ta in social p lacement and par ticipa tion in specif ic soc ial ly constructed projects. Thus it is no t simply that "moderns" adopt theoreticalattitudes, bu t that certain members of modern societies do so with regardto certain of their practices. An economist employed by the Ministry ofFinance may rely on a theoretically informed habitus in conceptualizingthe stock market and developing his ow n practical dealings with it (or itsconsequences). At the same time, a "pit trader" may work on the f loor ofthe s tock exchange , execu ting buy and sell orders with a supremepractical mastery minimally informed by any theoretical understandingof the overall marke t ( though it is t rue tha t his or her hab itus would beunlikely to resemble the doxic complete inves tment of a member of ahighly homogenous and relatively self-contained society, fo r the f loortrader would almost certainly be aware of the availability of other waysof understanding stock markets).

In a modern society, apparently self-regulating systems like large-scalemarkets are crucial links in the r epr odu cti on of p at te rns of socialrelations. Both they and the relatively high levels of distinction amongfields encourage an atti tude of a high level of rationality (understood asselecting among a wide range of options on the basis of maximalinformation about l ikely outcomes in order to eff icien tly pursue somegoal). Therefore, even in the absence of internal contradictions which


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is distributive and/or central to relations of power. It does no t graspequally th e sense in which c a pi t al i t se l f - on an alternative r ea di ng o fMarx (such as t hat o f Lukacs 1922 o r Postone 1993) - is a form ofmed ia t io n . Bo u rd ieu (fo r example, 1983a, 1985c, 1986b) tends to reducecapital to power o r a complex n ot io n o f weal th d ef in ed as resources fo rp ow er , q ui te in contradict ion to M a r x' s a rgu m en t . More generally,Bourdieu 's work so far shows an insufficient at tention to th e n at u re o fm e di a ti o n, t he constitution of actors, and the m odes of coordinating

action in contemporary large, complex societies. This is hardly a severecriticism, fo r I do no t see Bourdieu's theory closed to t h ese co n sid erations in a ny w ay ; r at he r, it seems to me to be s im pl y a n importantd i rec t io n fo r ou r attention to turn . Th e roles of information technology,very large-scale administrative organizations, an d i m pe r so n al m a r ke t sar e all important , both in their ow n r ig ht a nd as facto rs mi l it a t in g fo rbasic changes in habitus an d fields.

NOTES

H aber mas has r ecen tly a rg ued (1989) tha t d is cour se ethics is not much

damaged by these criticisms.2 Bourdieu here is specifically cri ticizing recent trends in anthropology (e.g.

Clifford and Marcus (eds .) 1986) and the sociology of science (e.g. Latour1987).

3 My account of H aber mas' s theory here relates primari ly to his work fromthe mid-I960s to the present, especially his theory of communicative actionand his discourse ethics (Habermas 1984, 1988b).

4 See Habermas (1988a) for a suggest ion of how cen tra l a goa l this is for hisproject. See also the interviews with Bourdieu in Wacquant 1989:37.

5 More generally, Bourdieu has sharply rejected the intellectual totalism heassociates with the Frankfurt school, with Sartre, and to s ome exten t withMarxism generally. "Never bef or e, p er haps, has the re been so complete ama nifestatio n of the logic p ec uli ar to the F re nc h inte lle ctu al field th at

requires every intellectual to pronouce h imse lf tot al ly on each and everyproblem" (Bourdieu and Passeron 1967: 174; see also the preface to 1990e,1988f, and Wacqu an t 1989). Bou rd ieu sees this as a f ea tu re not o nl y ofMarxism but of an intel lectua l field in w hich M ar xi sm occup ies a cen tr alplace, obliging every intellectual to declare and explain his or her adherenceor nonadherence.

6 Even capita l b ecomes, for Bourd ieu, a mat te r p rimari ly of power (1986b:252).

7 "I t follows th at the f or m ta ke n by the s tru ct ur e of sy ste ms of religiouspractices and beliefs at a given moment in time (historical religion) can be farfrom the original content of the message and itcan be completely understood


only in reference to the complete s tructure of the relat ions of production,r ep roduct ion, c ir cu la tion , and app ro pr ia tion of the message and to thehistory of this struc ture " (1991a: 18). Bo urd ieu goes on to stress thecentrality of struggles for the monopoly of religious capital, including bothstruggles between clergy and laity and those between priestly authorities andheretical, quasi-religious or other challengers. " G ~ n e s i sand s tructure of thereligious field" has no t been widely enough recognized as Bourdieu' s key,seminal text on fields. There he s ho ws c lear ly what he means by goingbeyond the "pure" study of meaning and interaction to study the underlyingrelations of struggle which produce and shape meanings and interactions andconstitute their frame. Th e approach to religion expounded there anticipatesthat w hic h he has more rec ently b eg un to d eve lo p t ow ar ds the state (d.

Bourdieu 1989c).8 As in his study of kinship and matrimonial s trategies in his ow n village in

Beam (1990e: 249-70), Bourdieu's account revealed many commonalitieswi th what he had seen in K abyl ia and in genera l s howed tha t his app roachcould yield insights into either setting just as readily. On the other hand, i tdid not address certain basic issues of difference between the settings - e.g.,the fact that kinship is more central to the constitution of Kabylesociety thanit isto France, where it iscentral primarily to a compartmentalized local fieldb u tn o t to the s tate or the economy in general.

9 The issue is somewhat clouded because Bourdieu developed his tools as partof his continuing engagement with concrete analytic problems; so we cannotbe sure when to t re at a c on ce ptu al or analytic shift as having to do w ith achange in case (from his earlier work in Kabylia to his more recent work inFrance) and when wi th an intention to reformulate more general ly. Thus,e.g., the concept of field plays little role in the Outline of a Theory of Practice,a substantial role in The Logic o f Practice, and a central role in Bourdieu 'smor e r ecen t w ri tings on F rench academia and p ro fess ions (1984, 1987b,1989c). Is this simply theoretical advance? Or is it a r es ul t of r ef lect io n on adifferent sort of society?

10 This is evident not only in Das Kapital, bu t especially in the Grundrisse,w here the d ir ec tion of M ar x' s think ing is s omet imes c leare r becau se itsprocesses are more transparently laid out. See the forceful argument for this

reading of Marx in Postone 1993.11 Bourdieu's argument is that chi ldren gain from the added nurturance theyreceive from mothers wh o stay at h ome w ith them, s omething t ha t o nl ymothers in relatively well-off families can do. This illustrates the point well,though it is both emp iri ca lly uncer ta in and arguably b ased on sexistassumptions.

12 See Wacquant 1989:41. Bourdieu's arguments on the genesis of this notion ofa pure aesthe tics and its c onse quenc es for the analysis of c ul tu re arethemselves important; see 1980a, 1987c.

13 B ou rd ie u suggests, ind ee d, that "f ar from being the f ou nd in g m od el ,economic theory (and rat ional action theory w hich is its s oc io lo gica l


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88 Craig CalhounPostone, M. 1993. Time, Labor, and Social Domination: a reinterpretation of

Marx's criticaltheory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Shils, E. 1981: Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Simmel, G. 1903 [1971]: The metropoli s and menta l l ife. In D. N. Levine (ed .) ,

Georg' Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms, Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 324-39.-- 1967: Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations, ed. K. Wolff. Ne w York:Free Press.

Wacquant, L. 1989: Toward a reflexive soci olo gy : a worksho p with P ie rreBourdieu. Sociological Theory, 7,26-63.- - and Calhoun, C. 1989: "Interet, rationalite, et histoire: apropos d'un debarAmericain sur la theorie d'action. Actes de la recherche en sciencessociales, no.78(june), 41-60.

Weber, M. 1922 [1978): Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress.

Wilson, B. (ed.) 1970: Rationality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Winch, P. 1958: The Idea of a SocialScience. London: Routledge.

5

Aspects of Structural and ProcessualTheories of Knowledge

Aaron V. Cicourel

I N TRO D U CTI O N

This chapter has three parts. In the first, I address structural andprocessual theories of knowledge and social practice, calling attention tothe w ay t ha t each of these perspectives ignores th e ot her , as well as to anumber of methodological issues. Th e second part examines symbolic

power and the kinds of empirical difficulties that can arise in the pursuitof a structural view of p ow er. T he third part b ri ef ly b ui lds on andmod if ie s the notion of habitus by reexamining and extending itsconceptual structure and by suggest ing empir ical mater ia ls that canclarify developmental aspects of children's social knowledge, power, anddecision making, or what elsewhere (Cicourel 1974) I have g lossed as a"sense of social structure."

Throughout, I have depicted Bourdieu as a structuralist wh o is deeplysensitive to a meta-level conception of social practices. Th e use here ofthe term "structuralis t" refers to levels of theory and data which areremoved f rom the moment-to-moment interactional implementation oflocall y i ns ta nt iat ed social o rg an iz at io n. In this l oos e view of s tr uc

turalism, domination or power is inferred by reference to abstr actreports about dec is ions , the d is tr ibut ion of pos it ions and resou rces inorganizations, reports about access to persons in posi t ions of power andreports about their different ia l use of an office to control the activities ofothers. Power, therefore, is structural in this view, because its sanctioned,enforced use is no t observed in a locally managed environment accessibleto the research analyst.

The essay reflects aspects of a long-standing dialogue with Pierre Bourdieu. Thanks to BernardCone in, Paul Filmer, Hugh Mehan, Elinor Ochs, and Mel Pollner for helpful remarks on earlierdrafts and Bernard Laks for useful comments on a later draft.

Craig Calhoum_Habitus Field and Capital_Bourdieu Critical Perspectives

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