COVER: Marines of Company K, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, cautiously approach the Panamanian Defense Force station in Vera Cruz during a search of the town. (Photo courtesy of Sgt Robert C. Jenks).

Just Cause: Marine Operationsin Panama 1988-1990

byLieutenant Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds

U. S. Marine Corps Reserve

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

1996

Just Cause: Marine Operations

in Panama 1988-1990

by

Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas E . Reynolds

U. S . Marine Corps Reserve

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIO N

HEADQUARTERS, U .S. MARINE CORP S

WASHINGTON, D .C .

1996

PCN 190 003134 00

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16-048729-3

PCN 190 003134 00

For sale by the U .S . Government Printing OfficeSuperintendent of Documents, Mail Stop : SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16-048729-3

Foreword

The history of Marines in Panama from 1988 to 1990, the years bracketing OperationJust Cause, does not involve a great many Marines, and Marines made up only a small percent-age of the forces that went into battle during the operation itself in December 1989. But for aperiod of more than two years, the Marines in Panama were literally in foxholes on the frontlines. For the individual Marine, going to Panama meant going in harm's way. Although mostplanners thought of Panama in terms of low intensity conflict, the personal experience for manyMarines was very intense, and tested their courage, endurance, and professionalism.

One measure of the intensity of Just Cause lies in the fact that the contribution to thesuccess of the operation by Marine Forces Panama was Out of proportion to its size—that is,greater by far than for most other units of comparable size, measured in terms of prisoners cap-tured or objectives seized. At the same time, the experience in Panama yielded some interestinglessons about low intensity conflict, including lessons in mobility and patrolling that an earliergeneration of Marines who served in Central America would have understood.

To research and preserve the story of Marines in Panama, the History and MuseumsDivision deployed Benis M. Frank in the spring of 1991. Mr. Frank, who was then head of theOral History Section and is now Chief Historian in the division, walked the ground and inter-viewed Marines who participated in the operation. After his return to the United States, he con-ducted further interviews and supervised the collection of Marine Forces Panama records.

Once Mr. Frank had fulfilled the collection phase, a member of Mobilization TrainingUnit (Historical) DC-7, which supports the History and Museums Division, Lieutenant ColonelNicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR, assumed responsibility for the project, and completed the history.Lieutenant Colonel Reynolds joined the Marine Corps in 1975 after receiving a doctorate in his-tory from Oxford University, where he wrote a book on the German Army. Following active dutywith 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, he held a variety of reserve billets, including that of company com-mander at the Basic School during and after the Persian Gulf War.

In the pursuit of accuracy and objectivity, the History and Museums Division welcomescomments on this publication from interested individuals and activities.

MICHAEL F MONIGANColonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Acting Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

111

Foreword

The history of Marines in Panama from 1988 to 1990, the years bracketing Operatio n

Just Cause, does not involve a great many Marines, and Marines made up only a small percent -

age of the forces that went into battle during the operation itself in December 1989 . But for a

period of more than two years, the Marines in Panama were literally in foxholes on the fron tlines . For the individual Marine, going to Panama meant going in harm's way. Although mostplanners thought of Panama in terms of low intensity conflict, the personal experience for many

Marines was very intense, and tested their courage, endurance, and professionalism .

One measure of the intensity of just Cause lies in the fact that the contribution to th e

success of the operation by Marine Forces Panama was out of proportion to its size—that is ,

greater by far than for most other units of comparable size, measured in terms of prisoners cap-

tured or objectives seized. At the same time, the experience in Panama yielded some interestin g

lessons about low intensity conflict, including lessons in mobility and patrolling that an earlie r

generation of Marines who served in Central America would have understood .To research and preserve the story of Marines in Panama, the History and Museum s

Division deployed Benis M . Frank in the spring of 1991 . Mr. Frank, who was then head of the

Oral History Section and is now Chief Historian in the division, walked the ground and inter -viewed Marines who participated in the operation . After his return to the United States, he con-ducted further interviews and supervised the collection of Marine Forces Panama records .

Once Mr. Frank had fulfilled the collection phase, a member of Mobilization Training

Unit (Historical) DC-7, which supports the History and Museums Division, Lieutenant Colone l

Nicholas E . Reynolds, USMCR, assumed responsibility for the project, and completed the history .

Lieutenant Colonel Reynolds joined the Marine Corps in 1975 after receiving a doctorate in his-tory from Oxford University, where he wrote a book on the German Army. Following active duty

with 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, he held a variety of reserve billets, including that of company com -

mander at the Basic School during and after the Persian Gulf War .

In the pursuit of accuracy and objectivity, the History and Museums Division welcome s

comments on this publication from interested individuals and activities .

MICHAEL E MONIGA NColonel, U .S . Marine Corp s

Acting Director of Marine Corps History and Museum s

iii

Preface

This story is about the Marines who served in Panama around the time of Operation JustCause. Since the Marine forces comprised only a fraction of the troops in Panama, their contri-bution has been overlooked in some other histories. This is especially true of the Marines whoserved in Panama before and after the operation itself. Nevertheless, they faced, and met, a veryreal set of challenges of their own, and wrote one of the first chapters in the Marine Corps' his-tory of operations other than war since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Marines who patrolledthe jungles of the Canal Zone in the period before Just Cause, in what was neither peace norwar, broke new ground. So did the young officers and NCOs who, for all intents and purposes,took over the reins of municipal government after the operation.

Since Benis M. Frank, the Chief Historian in the History and Museums Division, had done athorough job of interviewing the participants and collecting documents, both in the field andfrom sources in Washington, my job was relatively easy. I was able to rely almost exclusively onwhat is now the Marine Corps Historical Center's collection on Panama, including transcripts ofMr. Frank's interviews, as well as a variety of plans, operations, and reports. I also consulted anumber of command chronologies and secondary sources, and corresponded with a few of thePanama Marines.

Throughout, I was able to rely on the support and advice of many members of the staff of theHistory and Museums Division. Both the Director, Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, and Mr.Frank himself were kind enough to read the manuscript and give me the feedback I needed.Similarly, members of other sections provided valuable assistance: Danny J. Crawford, head ofthe Reference Section; Joyce M. Conyers of the Archives Section; Evelyn A. Englander, the librar-ian;JohnT Dyer, the art curator; and Charles R. Smith of the History Writing Unit, who edited thefinal manuscript. The former Division Deputy Director, Colonel William J. Davis, gave new mean-ing to the term "brother officer." I am grateful to him and all the other Marines who helped bringthe project to completion. Nevertheless, I alone am responsible for the opinions expressed, andany errors that may appear in the text.

NICHOLAS E. REYNOLDSLieutenant Colonel

U. S. Marine Corps Reserve

V

Preface

This story is about the Marines who served in Panama around the time of Operation Jus t

Cause . Since the Marine forces comprised only a fraction of the troops in Panama, their contri-bution has been overlooked in some other histories . This is especially true of the Marines wh oserved in Panama before and after the operation itself . Nevertheless, they faced, and met, a ver yreal set of challenges of their own, and wrote one of the first chapters in the Marine Corps' his-

tory of operations other than war since the fall of the Berlin Wall . The Marines who patrolled

the jungles of the Canal Zone in the period before Just Cause, in what was neither peace no r

war, broke new ground. So did the young officers and NCOs who, for all intents and purposes ,

took over the reins of municipal government after the operation .

Since Benis M . Frank, the Chief Historian in the History and Museums Division, had done a

thorough job of interviewing the participants and collecting documents, both in the field an d

from sources in Washington, my job was relatively easy. I was able to rely almost exclusively on

what is now the Marine Corps Historical Center's collection on Panama, including transcripts of

Mr. Frank's interviews, as well as a variety of plans, operations, and reports . I also consulted anumber of command chronologies and secondary sources, and corresponded with a few of th e

Panama Marines .Throughout, I was able to rely on the support and advice of many members of the staff of th e

History and Museums Division . Both the Director, Brigadier General Edwin H . Simmons, and Mr.

Frank himself were kind enough to read the manuscript and give me the feedback I needed .

Similarly, members of other sections provided valuable assistance: Danny J. Crawford, head o f

the Reference Section; Joyce M. Conyers of the Archives Section; Evelyn A. Englander, the librar-

ian; John T. Dyer, the art curator; and Charles R . Smith of the History Writing Unit, who edited th e

final manuscript . The former Division Deputy Director, Colonel William J . Davis, gave new mean-

ing to the term "brother officer." I am grateful to him and all the other Marines who helped bring

the project to completion . Nevertheless, I alone am responsible for the opinions expressed, and

any errors that may appear in the text .

NICHOLAS E . REYNOLDS

Lieutenant Colone l

U . S . Marine Corps Reserve

v

Table of Contents

Foreword .Preface V

Table of Contents Vii

First Reinforcements 2

First Firefights 6

Recovery and Consolidation 10

Neither War Nor Peace 10

The Evolution of Training 12

The New Year 14

The October Coup and Its Aftermath 16

Setting the Stage for Just Cause 18

Combat 22

La Chorrera 26

PDF Prisoners 26

More New Responsibilities 30

Christmas Eve 32

Christmas Day and After 32

Marine Reinforcements 32

Operation Promote Liberty 35

Notes 39

Appendix A Troop List 43

Appendix B Command and Staff, Marine Forces Panama 44

Appendix C Chronology 46

Appendix D Unit Commendation 48

Index 49

vii

Table of Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Preface v

Table of Contents vi i

First Reinforcements 2

First Firefights 6

Recovery and Consolidation 1 0

Neither War Nor Peace 1 0

The Evolution of Training 1 2

The New Year 1 4

The October Coup and Its Aftermath 1 6

Setting the Stage for Just Cause 1 8

Combat 2 2

La Chorrera 26

PDF Prisoners 26

More New Responsibilities 30

Christmas Eve 3 2

Christmas Day and After 3 2

Marine Reinforcements 3 2

Operation Promote Liberty 3 5

Notes 39

Appendix A Troop List 4 3

Appendix B Command and Staff, Marine Forces Panama 44

Appendix C Chronology 46

Appendix D Unit Commendation 48

Index 49

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Just Cause: Marine Operations in Panama1988-1990

First Reinforcements — First Firefight — Recovery and Consolidation — Neither War Nor Peace —The Evolution of Training — The New Year — The October Coup and its Aftermath — Setting theStage for Just Cause — Combat — La Chorrera — PDF Prisoners — More New Responsibilities —

Christmas Eve — Christmas Day and After — Marine Reinforcements — Operation Promote Liberty

Marines first came to Panama in 1856 to protectfortune hunters on their way to California acrossthe Isthmus, and returned a number of times forbrief periods, typically to restore law and order,between 1856 and 1900. When Panama secededfrom Colombia in 1903, in large part to make itpossible for the United States to acquire the rightsfor a canal under favorable terms, the Marine Corpslanded forces under Major John A. Lejeune to guar-antee Panamanian independence. Lejeune wasone of the first to realize that the Marines hadcome to Panama to stay, and, in 1904, his troops setup a semi-permanent barracks near Panama City.Until 1911, their primary mission was to safeguardthe canal that was under construction.'

By October 1923, a permanent Marine Barracksin Panama was established at the U.S. NavalSubmarine Base, Coco Solo. Over the followingdecades, Marine forces in Panama went throughperiods of expansion and contraction, reaching apeak of 36 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 1,571enlisted men in February 1945. They also wentthrough a number of redesignations and reloca-tions. In 1943, Marines in Panama were consoli-dated under Marine Barracks, Fifteenth NavalDistrict, which was renamed Marine Barracks,Rodman, Canal Zone, in 1976. In August 1987, theofficial title was changed to Marine Corps SecurityForce (MCSF) Company, Panama. Nevertheless, thestanding complement of approximately five offi-cers and 125 Marines remained at U.S. NavalStation Panama Canal, also known as RodmanNaval Station, which was located on the westernshore of the Canal near the Pacific Ocean exit.2

The title suggested the mission. By now, the pri-mary mission of the Marines in Panama was to pro-tect local naval installations, while that of U.S.Army units in the Canal Zone was to protect theCanal itself. In 1988, Army units operated underthe umbrella of U.S. Army South (USArSo), whichwas in turn a component of Southern Command(SouthCom). Both commands had their headquar-ters in Panama.

Over the years since 1903, relations with

1

Panama, which lay on either side of the American-controlled Canal Zone, were not always amiable.Due to the location of the Canal and its control bya foreign power, Panamanian interests clashed withthose of the United States from time to time.However, the signing of the Panama Canal Treaty in1977, which provided for complete Panamaniancontrol of the Canal by the year 2000, appeared toguarantee future cooperation between the twocountries.

The prospects for good relations, however,dimmed when General Omar Torrijos, thePanamanian leader who negotiated and signed thetreaty, died in a plane crash in 1981. His deathopened the way for a troublesome successor,General Manuel Antonio Noriega, who contrived tocontrol the nation through figurehead politiciansfrom his position as head of the country's armedforces. In 1983, Noriega became head of theNational Guard, which he soon combined with theAir Force and Navy to create the PanamanianDefense Forces (PDF).

By 1988, the PDF was as much a social and polit-ical system as a military force. It was a conglomer-ate of police, military, and paramilitary organiza-tions with a total strength in the neighborhood of15,000. However, it could only field some 3,000 to3,500 combat troops, largely trained and equippedby the U.S.Army. On the ground, the PDF had twobattalions in each of the country's 13 militaryzones, in addition to 10 independent companies, acavalry squadron, and a handful of special forces.The PDF's air arm had roughly 50 aircraft, while itsnavy could deploy 12 small vessels. Complement-ing Panamanian Defense Forces were the so-called"Dignity Battalions." Supposedly created tocounter American aggression, the Dignity Battal-ions were little more than formations of laborers,many of whom were unemployed, with an overlayof military discipline. There were 14 such battal-ions, each of which could deploy some 200 to 250members.

Although Noriega had a history of cooperatingwith American intelligence agencies, his involve-

Just Cause : Marine Operations in Panam a1988-1990

First Reinforcements — First Firefight — Recovery and Consolidation — Neither War Nor Peace —The Evolution of Training — The New Year — The October Coup and its Aftermath — Setting th e

Stage for Just Cause — Combat — La Chorrera — PDF Prisoners — More New Responsibilities —Christmas Eve — Christmas Day and After — Marine Reinforcements — Operation Promote Liberty

Marines first came to Panama in 1856 to protectfortune hunters on their way to California acros sthe Isthmus, and returned a number of times forbrief periods, typically to restore law and order ,between 1856 and 1900 . When Panama secededfrom Colombia in 1903, in large part to make i tpossible for the United States to acquire the rightsfor a canal under favorable terms, the Marine Corp slanded forces under Major John A . Lejeune to guar-antee Panamanian independence. Lejeune wasone of the first to realize that the Marines ha dcome to Panama to stay, and, in 1904, his troops se tup a semi-permanent barracks near Panama City .Until 1911, their primary mission was to safeguardthe canal that was under construction . '

By October 1923, a permanent Marine Barracksin Panama was established at the U.S . NavalSubmarine Base, Coco Solo . Over the followingdecades, Marine forces in Panama went throug hperiods of expansion and contraction, reaching apeak of 36 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 1,57 1enlisted men in February 1945. They also wentthrough a number of redesignations and reloca-tions . In 1943, Marines in Panama were consoli-dated under Marine Barracks, Fifteenth Nava lDistrict, which was renamed Marine Barracks ,Rodman, Canal Zone, in 1976. In August 1987, theofficial title was changed to Marine Corps Securit yForce (MCSF) Company, Panama . Nevertheless, thestanding complement of approximately five offi-cers and 125 Marines remained at U .S . NavalStation Panama Canal, also known as RodmanNaval Station, which was located on the westernshore of the Canal near the Pacific Ocean exit . '

The title suggested the mission . By now, the pri-mary mission of the Marines in Panama was to pro-tect local naval installations, while that of U.S .Army units in the Canal Zone was to protect theCanal itself. In 1988, Army units operated underthe umbrella of U .S . Army South (USArSo), whichwas in turn a component of Southern Command(SouthCom) . Both commands had their headquar-ters in Panama .

Over the years since 1903, relations with

Panama, which lay on either side of the American-controlled Canal Zone, were not always amiable .Due to the location of the Canal and its control bya foreign power, Panamanian interests clashed withthose of the United States from time to time .However, the signing of the Panama Canal Treaty in1977, which provided for complete Panamaniancontrol of the Canal by the year 2000, appeared toguarantee future cooperation between the twocountries .

The prospects for good relations, however ,dimmed when General Omar Torrijos, thePanamanian leader who negotiated and signed th etreaty, died in a plane crash in 1981 . His death

opened the way for a troublesome successor,

General Manuel Antonio Noriega, who contrived tocontrol the nation through figurehead politiciansfrom his position as head of the country's arme dforces . In 1983, Noriega became head of th eNational Guard, which he soon combined with theAir Force and Navy to create the PanamanianDefense Forces (PDF) .

By 1988, the PDF was as much a social and polit-ical system as a military force . It was a conglomer-ate of police, military, and paramilitary organiza-tions with a total strength in the neighborhood of15,000. However, it could only field some 3,000 t o3,500 combat troops, largely trained and equippe dby the U .S .Army. On the ground, the PDF had tw obattalions in each of the country's 13 militar yzones, in addition to 10 independent companies, acavalry squadron, and a handful of special forces .The PDF's air arm had roughly 50 aircraft, while it snavy could deploy 12 small vessels . Complement-ing Panamanian Defense Forces were the so-called"Dignity Battalions ." Supposedly created tocounter American aggression, the Dignity Battal-ions were little more than formations of laborers ,many of whom were unemployed, with an overlayof military discipline . There were 14 such battal-ions, each of which could deploy some 200 to 25 0members .

Although Noriega had a history of cooperatin gwith American intelligence agencies, his involve-

1

Canal Zone.ment in the drug trade eventually made it impossi-ble for the U.S. Government to continue to workwith him. Relations between the two countriesworsened markedly when, in February 1988, twoFlorida federal grand juries indicted him oncharges of racketeering and trafficking in nar-cotics. Due in part to the indictments, PanamanianPresident Eric Arturo Delvalle attempted to deposeNoriega, but without success. Instead Noriegaengineered Delvalle's dismissal. The result was fur-ther civil disorder and both implicit and explicitthreats to American lives and property, includingincursions into U.S. Navy installations.

First Reinforcements

The United States reacted to the heightened ten-sions first by updating contingency plans forPanama and then by sending reinforcements to theCanal Zone. The plans included provisions for aMarine Expeditionary Brigade to deploy to Panamaas part of Operation Elaborate Maze. But the

Pentagon was not ready for Elaborate Maze, and thefirst contingent of Marine reinforcements was agreat deal smaller, intended only to strengthenMarine security forces. The initial contingent wasa platoon from Fleet Anti-Terrorist Security Team(FAST) Company, Marine Corps Security ForceBattalion, Atlantic, based in Norfolk, Virginia. Akind of military SWAT team, the FAST platoon wastrained in close-quarter battle techniques. Arrivingin Panama on 14 March, the platoon was placedunder the operational control of the MCSE

Major Eddie A. Keith, the security forces com-manding officer, decided to use the platoon to pro-tect the Naval Stations Arraijan Tank Farm (ATF),where fuel was stored in 37 underground tanks foruse by all American forces in Panama. The tankfarm covered approximately two square kilome-ters of rolling grassland, apparently designed toresemble a golf course from the air, but was sur-rounded by dense jungle, which provided excel-lent avenues of approach both to the storage tanksand to Howard Air Force Base to the south. In the

Watercolor by Anthony F. Stadler

Referred to as the "Big House," the headquarters building of Marine Barracks,Panama, was built in 1965. Although headquartered at Rodman Naval Station,the barracks included a number of separate detachments scattered throughout the

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Watercolor by Anthony F. Stadler

Referred to as the "Big House," the headquarters building of Marine Barracks,Panama, was built in 1965 . Although headquartered at Rodman Naval Station,the barracks included a number of separate detachments scattered throughout theCanal Zone.

ment in the drug trade eventually made it impossi-ble for the U.S . Government to continue to workwith him. Relations between the two countrie sworsened markedly when, in February 1988, twoFlorida federal grand juries indicted him o ncharges of racketeering and trafficking in nar-cotics . Due in part to the indictments, Panamania nPresident Eric Arturo Delvalle attempted to depos eNoriega, but without success . Instead Norieg aengineered Delvalle's dismissal . The result was fur-ther civil disorder and both implicit and explici tthreats to American lives and property, includin gincursions into U .S . Navy installations .

First Reinforcements

The United States reacted to the heightened ten-sions first by updating contingency plans fo rPanama and then by sending reinforcements to theCanal Zone . The plans included provisions for aMarine Expeditionary Brigade to deploy to Panam aas part of Operation Elaborate Maze . But the

Pentagon was not ready for Elaborate Maze, and th efirst contingent of Marine reinforcements was agreat deal smaller, intended only to strengthe nMarine security forces . The initial contingent wasa platoon from Fleet Anti-Terrorist Security Team(FAST) Company, Marine Corps Security Forc eBattalion, Atlantic, based in Norfolk, Virginia . Akind of military SWAT team, the FAST platoon wa strained in close-quarter battle techniques . Arrivingin Panama on 14 March, the platoon was place dunder the operational control of the MCS E

Major Eddie A. Keith, the security force's com-manding officer, decided to use the platoon to pro-tect the Naval Station's Arraijan Tank Farm (ATF) ,where fuel was stored in 37 underground tanks foruse by all American forces in Panama. The tan kfarm covered approximately two square kilome-ters of rolling grassland, apparently designed toresemble a golf course from the air, but was sur-rounded by dense jungle, which provided excel-lent avenues of approach both to the storage tank sand to Howard Air Force Base to the south . In the

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jungle, visibility was limited to a few feet, even byday, and movement was slow and exhausting. Therule of thumb was that a patrol could cover nomore than 500 meters in one hour. The ATF wasbounded on the north by the Naval AmmunitionDepot, or ammunition supply point (ASP), whichwas fenced. But for the most part the tank farmwas not fenced as it bordered the Pan-American, orThatcher, Highway, the best high-speed avenue ofapproach in the country Under the circumstances,it was nearly impossible for Marine security forces,with their limited resources, to guard the tank farmproperly, let alone both the fuel and ammunitionstorage facilities.

Soon after its deployment to the Arraijan TankFarm, the platoon reported the presence of intrud-ers, usually at night. The Marines described theintruders as individuals wearing black camouflageuniforms, carrying weapons and night visiondevices. Daily patrols found freshly dug fightingholes. When the security force reported its find-

ings through the chain of command, the standardresponse was that Panamanian Defense Forces didnot have night vision devices and that U.S. Armyunits had dug the holes during training exercises.However, the Marines conducted further research,and discovered that no Army units had trained inthe vicinity in recent months, and that the Armyhad sold night vision devices to Panama during thepast decade.3

While the FAST platoon patrolled the ATF, thepolitical climate continued to worsen and the 6thMarine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) staff at CampLejeune, North Carolina, prepared for possibledeployment to Panama in accordance with contin-gency plan Elaborate Maze. Although SouthernCommand showed little, if any, enthusiasm for fur-ther Marine reinforcements, 6th MEB plannersassumed an all or nothing" approach. Should rein-forcements be ordered, the brigade was preparedto deploy most of its strength, to include twoinfantry battalions, a reinforced helicopter

Marines patrol up a small stream in the jungle surrounding the Arrajan TankFarm. The terrain provided intruders with good cover and avenues of approachboth to the fuel storage facility and Howard Air Force Base.

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jungle, visibility was limited to a few feet, even byday, and movement was slow and exhausting . Therule of thumb was that a patrol could cover nomore than 500 meters in one hour. The ATF wa sbounded on the north by the Naval Ammunition

Depot, or ammunition supply point (ASP), whic hwas fenced . But for the most part the tank farmwas not fenced as it bordered the Pan-American, o r

Thatcher, Highway, the best high-speed avenue ofapproach in the country. Under the circumstances ,it was nearly impossible for Marine security forces ,with their limited resources, to guard the tank far mproperly, let alone both the fuel and ammunitionstorage facilities .

Soon after its deployment to the Arraijan TankFarm, the platoon reported the presence of intrud-ers, usually at night . The Marines described theintruders as individuals wearing black camouflageuniforms, carrying weapons and night visiondevices . Daily patrols found freshly dug fightingholes . When the security force reported its find-

ings through the chain of command, the standar d

response was that Panamanian Defense Forces di d

not have night vision devices and that U .S . Army

units had dug the holes during training exercises .However, the Marines conducted further research ,and discovered that no Army units had trained i n

the vicinity in recent months, and that the Armyhad sold night vision devices to Panama during the

past decade . 'While the FAST platoon patrolled the ATF, the

political climate continued to worsen and the 6t h

Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) staff at CampLejeune, North Carolina, prepared for possibledeployment to Panama in accordance with contin-gency plan Elaborate Maze . Although Souther nCommand showed little, if any, enthusiasm for fur -ther Marine reinforcements, 6th MEB plannersassumed an all or nothing" approach. Should rein-forcements be ordered, the brigade was preparedto deploy most of its strength, to include twoinfantry battalions, a reinforced helicopte r

Marines patrol up a small stream in the jungle surrounding the Arraijan TankFarm. The terrain provided intruders with good cover and avenues of approac hboth to the fuel storage facility and Howard Air Force Base.

4

Watercolor byAnttsony F Stadler

A panoramic view of Rodman Naval Station reveals its situation on the northernshore of Balboa Harbo from where it controlled the Pacific entrance to the Canal.

squadron, and a detachment of OV-10 Bronco air-craft. On 31 March, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic(FMFLant), ordered the MEB to deploy in accor-dance with a Joint Chiefs of Staff directive. The fol-lowing day, an advance party of three brigade staffofficers flew to Panama to coordinate the move-ment of forces.4

On 1 April, the Pentagon formally announcedthat 1,300 additional U.S. troops would be sent toPanama, including 300 Marines, once again simplyto enhance security in view of the growing tensionand unrest. Since the full strength of the brigadewould not be needed, FMFLant, nevertheless,decided that the 300 Marines would deploy as aprovisional Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)built around a reinforced rifle company under theadministrative control of 6th MEB. The idea was forthe MAGTF to serve as cadre for the eventualdeployment of the entire brigade. For that reason,the MEB supplied the command element, while 2dMarine Division provided a rifle company and 2dForce Service Support Group, a group of 40Marines, to form Brigade Service Support Group 6

5

(BSSG-6) SouthCom's commander, GeneralFrederick F Woerner, USA, decided that the pres-ence of a large number of Army and Air Force air-craft in Panama precluded the need for any Marineair assets. The MAGTF, therefore, was not a true'air-ground" task force, a fact which some Marinecommanders, wholeheartedly committed to theMAGTF concept, regretted despite the fact that theMarines in Panama were more of a security forcethan a maneuver element.5

Marine reinforcements began flowing intoPanama on 6 April, under the command of thebrigade's chief of staff, Colonel William J. Conley,the senior officer present. Colonel Conley arrivedin Panama to facilitate the movement of thebrigade, not to command. However, sinceSouthern Command did not see the need for addi-tional Marine forces beyond the reinforced riflecompany, and since the Pentagon decided to stopwell short of executing Elaborate Maze, the MEBcommander never deployed, and Colonel Conleyassumed command.

The provisional MAGTF initially came under the

4

-a

yWatercolor byAnthony F. Stadler

A panoramic view of Rodman Naval Station reveals its situation on the northernshore of Balboa Harbor, from where it controlled the Pacific entrance to the Canal.

squadron, and a detachment of OV-10 Bronco air -craft . On 31 March, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic

(FMFLant), ordered the MEB to deploy in accor-dance with a Joint Chiefs of Staff directive . The fol-lowing day, an advance party of three brigade staff

officers flew to Panama to coordinate the move-ment of forces . '

On 1 April, the Pentagon formally announcedthat 1,300 additional U .S . troops would be sent toPanama, including 300 Marines, once again simplyto enhance security in view of the growing tensio n

and unrest . Since the full strength of the brigadewould not be needed, FMFLant, nevertheless ,decided that the 300 Marines would deploy as aprovisional Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF )built around a reinforced rifle company under th eadministrative control of 6th MEB . The idea was forthe MAGTF to serve as cadre for the eventua ldeployment of the entire brigade . For that reason ,the MEB supplied the command element, while 2 dMarine Division provided a rifle company and 2 dForce Service Support Group, a group of 4 0Marines, to form Brigade Service Support Group 6

(BSSG-6) SouthCom's commander, Genera l

Frederick F. Woerner, USA, decided that the pres-ence of a large number of Army and Air Force air-

craft in Panama precluded the need for any Marin e

air assets . The MAGTF, therefore, was not a true

"air-ground" task force, a fact which some Marin ecommanders, wholeheartedly committed to theMAGTF concept, regretted despite the fact that theMarines in Panama were more of a security forc ethan a maneuver element. '

Marine reinforcements began flowing int oPanama on 6 April, under the command of thebrigade's chief of staff, Colonel William J. Conley,the senior officer present . Colonel Conley arrive d

in Panama to facilitate the movement of th e

brigade, not to command. However, since

Southern Command did not see the need for addi-tional Marine forces beyond the reinforced rifle

company, and since the Pentagon decided to stop

well short of executing Elaborate Maze, the ME B

commander never deployed, and Colonel Conley

assumed command .The provisional MAGTF initially came under the

5

operational control of U.S. Navy South (USNavS0),and the rifle company, Company I, 3d Battalion, 4thMarines, began to operate in direct support of thecommander of Rodman Naval Station, where theMAGTF planted its flag. Soon thereafter, an agree-ment was reached between Colonel Conley andRear Admiral Jerry G. Gnecknow, USN, USNavSocommander, that he, Colonel Conley, would assumecontrol of all Marine ground forces in the event ofan emergency. The understanding formed the basisfor the eventual establishment of Marine ForcesPanama (MarForPM), whereby Colonel Conleyassumed operational control of all Marine forces incountry. Neither the agreement betweenGnecknow and Conley nor the mission ofCompany I changed when, on 9 April, operationalcontrol of Marine Forces Panama shifted from U.S.Navy South to the newly established Joint TaskForce Panama UTF Panama).6

First Firefights

Company I was chosen to deploy to Panama inlarge part because it was available and because itwas on air alert. The Company was well trained,having recently cycled through a combined armsexercise at Twentynine Palms, California; coldweather training a Bridgeport, California, and FortMcCoy,Wisconsin; and jungle training on Okinawa,as well as a Marine Corps Combat ReadinessEvaluation. Most recently, its parent battalion hadrehearsed for the Panama contingency, practicingmissions such as defending a fuel farm or antennasite and dealing with intruders. Much of the train-ing was on company commander's time, forcingcommanders to rely on their own judgment andgiving them the opportunity to mold their compa-flies into cohesive, professional forces.7

Before deploying, the company was reinforcedby an 81mm mortar section of two mortars, a sur-veillance and target acquisition (STA) platoon, acounter-intelligence team, and a squad of engi-neers. Arriving in country, the Marines made them-selves as comfortable as possible in the Rodmangymnasium, while their commander, CaptainJoseph P Valore, conferred with Major Keith, thesecurity force commander. Since it appeared thatthe company would deploy to the tank farm,Valorethen conducted a reconnaissance of the area anddebriefed members of the FAST platoon. On 7April, Colonel Conley gave Captain Valore a rough

6

operations order for the defense of the tank farm,as well as other nearby installations.8

Captain Valore used the information he obtainedto analyze the situation and the mission. He real-ized that he would need to plan carefully, since hismission was ambitious for a reinforced rifle com-pany, given the terrain and the threat. He conclud-ed that the best way to cover the terrain and tominimize the threat to his Marines was to usepatrolling techniques, as opposed to manning fixedpositions. He knew that the "old" way, oncedescribed as "one man standing post in a littleshack underneath a light surrounded by jungle,"was a thing of the past.9 Initially, he planned to usea system of patrol bases, whose locations wouldchange at regular intervals. However, he soondecided that, rather than waste time and effortmoving command posts and communicationsequipment, it would be more efficient to find andimprove one set of good positions. Accordingly,Captain Valore divided the tank farm into twozones, and assigned each zone to one platoon as atactical area of responsibility. '°

Before deploying his Marines, Valore had toaddress a critical issue—weapons policy. Securityforce policy prohibited Marines from having around in the chamber under routine conditions.Concerned for the safety of his Marines, and deter-mined to demonstrate his trust in their judgment,Valore raised the issue with Colonel Conley.Conley agreed to permit Valore's Marines to patrolwith a loaded magazine in their weapons and around in the chamber. Valore's policy made sense.Under then-current rules of engagement, Marineswere permitted to return fire, but if they did nothave a magazine in the weapon and a round in thechamber, they might not live to return fire.

The Marines' weapons policy was a highlycharged issue. Although Valore focussed more onthe immediate threat than on the past, a number ofmore senior Marine officers, including LieutenantGeneral Ernest T Cook, Commanding General,FMFLant, remembered the 1983 tragedy at MarineAmphibious Unit Headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon.Then, a restrictive weapons policy was one of thecontributing factors which made it impossible forsentries to stop the truck bomb which took thelives of 241 Marines, sailors, and soldiers.Determined not to get "stung" twice, Cook and hisstaff endorsed more aggressive and forward-lean-ing policies as that of Captain Valore, both in the

operational control of U.S . Navy . South (USNavSo) ,and the rifle company, Company I, 3d Battalion, 4t h

Marines, began to operate in direct support of the

commander of Rodman Naval Station, where theMAGTF planted its flag . Soon thereafter, an agree-ment was reached between Colonel Conley an d

Rear Admiral Jerry G. Gnecknow, USN, USNavS ocommander, that he, Colonel Conley, would assumecontrol of all Marine ground forces in the event o fan emergency. The understanding formed the basisfor the eventual establishment of Marine ForcesPanama (MarForPM), whereby Colonel Conle y

assumed operational control of all Marine forces i ncountry. Neither the agreement betwee nGnecknow and Conley nor the mission o fCompany I changed when, on 9 April, operationa lcontrol of Marine Forces Panama shifted from U .S .Navy South to the newly established Joint Tas kForce Panama (jTF Panama) .

First Firefights

Company I was chosen to deploy to Panama inlarge part because it was available and because i twas on air alert . The Company was well trained ,

having recently cycled through a combined arm sexercise at Twentynine Palms, California ; coldweather training at Bridgeport, California, and For tMcCoy,Wisconsin ; and jungle training on Okinawa ,as well as a Marine Corps Combat ReadinessEvaluation . Most recently, its parent battalion hadrehearsed for the Panama contingency, practicingmissions such as defending a fuel farm or antennasite and dealing with intruders . Much of the train-ing was on company commander's time, forcingcommanders to rely on their own judgment an dgiving them the opportunity to mold their compa-

nies into cohesive, professional forces . 'Before deploying, the company was reinforce d

by an 81mm mortar section of two mortars, a sur-veillance and target acquisition (STA) platoon, acounter-intelligence team, and a squad of engi-neers . Arriving in country, the Marines made them-selves as comfortable as possible in the Rodma ngymnasium, while their commander, CaptainJoseph P. Valore, conferred with Major Keith, thesecurity force commander. Since it appeared thatthe company would deploy to the tank farm,Valorethen conducted a reconnaissance of the area an ddebriefed members of the FAST platoon. On 7April, Colonel Conley gave Captain Valore a rough

operations order for the defense of the tank farm,

as well as other nearby installations ."Captain Valore used the information he obtained

to analyze the situation and the mission . He real-

ized that he would need to plan carefully, since hi smission was ambitious for a reinforced rifle com-pany, given the terrain and the threat . He conclud-

ed that the best way to cover the terrain and tominimize the threat to his Marines was to us epatrolling techniques, as opposed to manning fixed

positions . He knew that the "old" way, onc edescribed as "one man standing post in a littleshack underneath a light surrounded by jungle, "

was a thing of the past . 9 Initially, he planned to usea system of patrol bases, whose locations wouldchange at regular intervals . However, he soondecided that, rather than waste time and effortmoving command posts and communications

equipment, it would be more efficient to find andimprove one set of good positions. Accordingly,Captain Valore divided the tank farm into twozones, and assigned each zone to one platoon as a

tactical area of responsibility. '°Before deploying his Marines, Valore had to

address a critical issue–weapons policy. Security

force policy prohibited Marines from having around in the chamber under routine conditions .Concerned for the safety of his Marines, and deter -mined to demonstrate his trust in their judgment ,Valore raised the issue with Colonel Conley.Conley agreed to permit Valore's Marines to patro lwith a loaded magazine in their weapons and around in the chamber. Valore's policy made sense .Under then-current rules of engagement, Marine swere permitted to return fire, but if they did no thave a magazine in the weapon and a round in th e

chamber, they might not live to return fire . "The Marines' weapons policy was a highly

charged issue . Although Valore focussed more onthe immediate threat than on the past, a number o fmore senior Marine officers, including Lieutenan tGeneral Ernest T Cook, Commanding General ,FMFLant, remembered the 1983 tragedy at Marin eAmphibious Unit Headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon .Then, a restrictive weapons policy was one of th econtributing factors which made it impossible fo rsentries to stop the truck bomb which took thelives of 241 Marines, sailors, and soldiers .Determined not to get "stung" twice, Cook and hi sstaff endorsed more aggressive and forward-lean-ing policies as that of Captain Valore, both in th e

6

field and around Marine offices and housing onRodman.'2

Southern Command viewed the policy differ-ently General Woerner was under orders fromWashington both to protect American interests andnot to exacerbate the situation. It was a delicateand difficult balance. At the same time, long-timemembers of the U.S. military community in Panamaargued that the Marines were over-reacting to thethreat and that their aggressiveness could provokea response in kind from the PDE Marine comman-ders defended their policy by pointing out thatthey occupied exposed positions in the jungle,where they faced a threat from intruders whichpredated their weapons policy. The Marines, theypointed out, were responding to an old threat, notcreating a new one.

In one form or another, the dispute continuedthroughout the existence of Marine ForcesPanama. Whatever the merits on either side of theargument, it was understandable that there wouldbe cultural differences between the Marines andthe other Southern Command troops. Unlike mostof their American counterparts in Panama, theMarines were combat troops on unaccompanied90-day tours, except for Colonel Conley and prin-cipal members of his staff, who were on 180-day

7

tours. As opposed to living in base housing andhaving the freedom of the city, the Marines workedlong hours, usually under field conditions, for up totwo weeks at a time. The two weeks of duty typi-cally were followed by a two-day rest period,which might include some base liberty but neverinvolved liberty off base, a precaution to preventincidents between Panamanian Defense Forces andindividual Marines.

Events soon transpired to test the assumptionsof the Marines' weapons policy. On 9 and lOApril,shortly after the two platoons from Company Irelieved the FAST platoon at the tank farm,unknown intruders began to probe their lines. Onthe night of 11 April, a squad-sized Marine patrol inthe vicinity of "K tank in the northeast sector ofthe farm made contact. The patrol split into twogroups in an attempt to trap the intruders. When aflare misfired, igniting with a pop" like a gunshot,one element opened fire with M-16 rifles, mistak-ing the flare for an intruder's weapon.Unfortunately, they fired in the direction of theother element, mortally wounding CorporalRicardo M. Villahermosa, the patrol leader.Villahermosa was evacuated to Gorgas ArmyCommunity Hospital, where he died in the earlymorning hours of 12 April.13

field and around Marine offices and housing o nRodman . ' Z

Southern Command viewed the policy differ-

ently. General Woerner was under orders from

Washington both to protect American interests an d

not to exacerbate the situation . It was a delicate

and difficult balance . At the same time, long-timemembers of the U .S . military community in Panam aargued that the Marines were over-reacting to thethreat and that their aggressiveness could provoke

a response in kind from the PDE Marine comman-ders defended their policy by pointing out thatthey occupied exposed positions in the jungle ,where they faced a threat from intruders whic hpredated their weapons policy. The Marines, theypointed out, were responding to an old threat, notcreating a new one .

In one form or another, the dispute continue dthroughout the existence of Marine Force sPanama. Whatever the merits on either side of th eargument, it was understandable that there wouldbe cultural differences between the Marines andthe other Southern Command troops. Unlike most

of their American counterparts in Panama, th eMarines were combat troops on unaccompanie d

90-day tours, except for Colonel Conley and prin-cipal members of his staff, who were on 180-day

tours. As opposed to living in base housing and

having the freedom of the city, the Marines worked

long hours, usually under field conditions, for up t otwo weeks at a time. The two weeks of duty typi-cally were followed by a two-day rest period ,which might include some base liberty but neverinvolved liberty off base, a precaution to preven tincidents between Panamanian Defense Forces an d

individual Marines .Events soon transpired to test the assumptions

of the Marines' weapons policy. On 9 and 10 April ,

shortly after the two platoons from Company Irelieved the FAST platoon at the tank farm ,unknown intruders began to probe their lines . Onthe night of 11 April, a squad-sized Marine patrol inthe vicinity of "K" tank in the northeast sector ofthe farm made contact . The patrol split into twogroups in an attempt to trap the intruders . When aflare misfired, igniting with a "pop" like a gunshot ,one element opened fire with M-16 rifles, mistak-ing the flare for an intruder's weapon.Unfortunately, they fired in the direction of theother element, mortally wounding Corpora lRicardo M. Villahermosa, the patrol leader.Villahermosa was evacuated to Gorgas ArmyCommunity Hospital, where he died in the earl y

morning hours of 12 April .' '

7

The incident renewed the debate over theweapons policy among Marine and Army groundcommanders. At a meeting on the 12th with theJoint Task Force commander, Major GeneralBernard Loefike, USA, whose primary duty wascommander of U.S. Army South, the only Marinepresent, Major Alfred F Clarkson of the MEB staff,vigorously defended the Marine policy, citing guid-ance from the Commandant of the Marine Corpsand adding his own view that it was morally wrongto send Marines in harm's way without fully loadedweapons. Colonel Conley fully supportedClarkson's position, and made certain that Marinecommanders had the authority they needed toimplement the right weapons policy for the con-ditions they faced.14

The average Marine rifleman, whose morale wasalready shaken by Villahermosa's death, had muchthe same worry-that he would now be orderedback into the jungle without a loaded weapon.Captain Valore put that worry to rest by visitingthe line platoons and telling his Marines that thepolicy had not changed. As he had in the past, hemade it clear that he had full confidence in theirjudgment and professionalism. Valore's actions didmuch to restore morale and re-energize the com-pany.15

At dusk on the 12th, U.S. Army remote battle-field sensors on loan to the Marines detectedmovement by approximately 40 persons whoappeared to be approaching the tank farm fromthe direction of the Pan-American Highway. Thesensor activation was confirmed by the detach-ment of surveillance and target acquisitionMarines from 3d Battalion, 4th Marines.* Thedetachment, in place at listening posts in the west-ern sector of the ATF approximately 700 metersfrom the company command post, reported byradio that they had seen and heard intruders. Aspecially-equipped Air Force AC-i 30 Specter orbit-ing the area also confirmed the sightings.'6

Captain Valore left his position in order to inves-tigate the reports, and spotted approximately 12intruders between the highway and the tank farm.At that point, he decided to begin consolidating hisforces in the center of the ATE Soon thereafter, his

*The Army's remote battlefield sensor system apparentlywas operated by a detachment of Sensor Control andManagement Platoon (SCAiMP) Marines from the 2d MarineDivision which deployed with Captain Valore's company.

8

Marines received and returned fire, aiming downthe line of tracers that came at them. The 13-mansurveillance 'detachment, still in position to thewest of the company, reported that the intruderswere probing their positions, and Sergeant MichaelA. Cooper, the noncommissioned officer in charge,immediately requested illumination.. Eighty-onemillimeter mortars near the company commandpost fired the mission. Putting the illumination togood use, Cooper reported that he could see thatthe intruders were armed and well-equipped, andthat they moved like professional soldiers. Whenthe intruders continued to advance despite theillumination rounds, he urgently called for the mor-tars to drop high-explosive rounds on pre-plottedtargets near his position. Knowing that Cooperwas a professional who would not overreact,Captain Valore authorized the fire missions, andthe mortars fired 16 high-explosive rounds in addi-tion to the 98 rounds of illumination they hadalready fired. He also authorized Cooper's Marinesto return fire. Valore could hear the results, heavyfiring, almost immediately.'7

A few minutes later, around 1930, the companyitself took fire from a ravine to its front. Valoredirected company First Sergeant Alexander J.Nevgloski to return fire with a Mark 19 chain gun,which then fired a total of 222 40mm rounds.Within minutes, the fire from the Mark 19 alongwith the fire from the mortars effectively sup-pressed the threat, and firing died down.'8

Sometime after 2200, General Loefike arrivedon scene, wearing civilian clothes and wanting toknow what happened. After being briefed byCaptain Valore, he ordered the company to ceasefire and not to reengage unless fired upon. He alsoordered the Marines to remain in place and to per-mit any intruders to leave the area. Loefike saidthat he was in touch with the PDF, whose com-manders had assured him that they did not haveany troops in the area. Captain Moises Cortizo, anEnglish-speaking PDF officer, stood next to GeneralLoefflce, and restated the Panamanian position.'9

After receiving General Loeffke's order, Valorepulled back Cooper's detachment from the west-ern sector of the tank farm while the rest of hisMarines held their positions. Using night visiondevices they watched as a number of the intrudersapparently received first aid, and saw others, eitherwounded or dead, being evacuated. Sensor activa-tions confirmed their sightings. There was further

The incident renewed the debate over theweapons policy among Marine and Army groun dcommanders . At a meeting on the 12th with theJoint Task Force commander, Major GeneralBernard Loeffke, USA, whose primary duty wa scommander of U.S . Army South, the only Marinepresent, Major Alfred F. Clarkson of the MEB staff,vigorously defended the Marine policy, citing guid-ance from the Commandant of the Marine Corp sand adding his own view that it was morally wron g

to send Marines in harm's way without fully loade dweapons . Colonel Conley fully supportedClarkson's position, and made certain that Marin ecommanders had the authority they needed toimplement the right weapons policy for the con-ditions they faced . 7 4

The average Marine rifleman, whose morale wa salready shaken by Villahermosa's death, had muchthe same worry-that he would now be orderedback into the jungle without a loaded weapon .Captain Valore put that worry to rest by visitin gthe line platoons and telling his Marines that th epolicy had not changed. As he had in the past, hemade it clear that he had full confidence in thei rjudgment and professionalism . Valore's actions didmuch to restore morale and re-energize the com-pany ' '

At dusk on the 12th, U.S . Army remote battle -field sensors on loan to the Marines detecte dmovement by approximately 40 persons wh oappeared to be approaching the tank farm fro mthe direction of the Pan-American Highway . Thesensor activation was confirmed by the detach-ment of surveillance and target acquisitionMarines from 3d Battalion, 4th Marines . * Thedetachment, in place at listening posts in the west -ern sector of the ATF approximately 700 meter sfrom the company command post, reported byradio that they had seen and heard intruders . Aspecially-equipped Air Force AC-130 Specter orbit-ing the area also confirmed the sightings . "

Captain Valore left his position in order to inves-tigate the reports, and spotted approximately 1 2intruders between the highway and the tank farm .At that point, he decided to begin consolidating hi sforces in the center of the ATE. Soon thereafter, hi s

*The Army's remote battlefield sensor system apparentl ywas operated by a detachment of Sensor Control andManagement Platoon (SCAMP) Marines from the 2d Marin eDivision which deployed with Captain Valore's company.

Marines received and returned fire, aiming down

the line of tracers that came at them. The 13-mansurveillance detachment, still in position to thewest of the company, reported that the intruder swere probing their positions, and Sergeant Michae l

A. Cooper, the noncommissioned officer in charge ,immediately requested illumination . . Eighty-on emillimeter mortars near the company comman dpost fired the mission . Putting the illumination t ogood use, Cooper reported that he could see tha t

the intruders were armed and well-equipped, an dthat they moved like professional soldiers . Whenthe intruders continued to advance despite theillumination rounds, he urgently called for the mor-tars to drop high-explosive rounds on pre-plotte dtargets near his position . Knowing that Coope rwas a professional who would not overreact ,Captain Valore authorized the fire missions, an dthe mortars fired 16 high-explosive rounds in addi-

tion to the 98 rounds of illumination they ha dalready fired . He also authorized Cooper's Marinesto return fire . Valore could hear the results, heavyfiring, almost immediately. "

A few minutes later, around 1930, the companyitself took fire from a ravine to its front . Valoredirected company First Sergeant Alexander J .Nevgloski to return fire with a Mark 19 chain gun ,which then fired a total of 222 40mm rounds .Within minutes, the fire from the Mark 19 along

with the fire from the mortars effectively sup-pressed the threat, and firing died down . '

Sometime after 2200, General Loeffke arrive don scene, wearing civilian clothes and wanting t oknow what happened. After being briefed byCaptain Valore, he ordered the company to ceas efire and not to reengage unless fired upon . He alsoordered the Marines to remain in place and to per-mit any intruders to leave the area . Loeffke saidthat he was in touch with the PDF, whose com-manders had assured him that they did not haveany troops in the area . Captain Moises Cortizo, a nEnglish-speaking PDF officer, stood next to Genera lLoeffke, and restated the Panamanian position . 1 9

After receiving General Loeffke's order, Valor epulled back Cooper's detachment from the west -ern sector of the tank farm while the rest of hi sMarines held their positions . Using night visio ndevices they watched as a number of the intruder sapparently received first aid, and saw others, eithe rwounded or dead, being evacuated . Sensor activa-tions confirmed their sightings . There was further

8

corroboration. Security force Marines, who hadmanned a roadblock on the highway to preventPanamanian reinforcements from reaching thetank farm, witnessed the evacpation of woundedby blacked-out ambulances.20* /

At dawn, teams of Marines Iwept the area, look-ing for evidence to confirm the presence of theintruders. They did not fmd much. There weresigns that bodies had been dragged through thearea, and there was debris such as fresh, foreign-made battle dressings, scraps of camouflage utilityuniforms, and chemical light sticks. But there wereneither bodies nor spent ammunition shells.However, Marines later learned that the automaticweapons carried by some Panamanian soldierswere equipped with brass-catchers.2'

During the next several days, Captain Valore andhis Marines were debriefed extensively by ColonelConley's staff, by Naval Investigative Serviceagents, and by Army intelligence specialists. Manyof these official visitors also walked the groundover which the fight had occurred, repeating ques-tions that had been asked by others. There waseven an order from U.S. Army South for theMarines who fought in the jungle that night to sub-mit to a urinalysis, which they did, with negativeresults.22

What the Marines told the debriefers was consis-tent, and detailed. Some of their testimony wasalso graphic. For example, when one of Cooper'sMarines described his experiences during the fire-fight, he began by telling the debriefer how he had"gone to ground," and tried to make himself invisi-ble. Nevertheless, one of the passing intrudersspotted him at a distance of 8 to 10 feet away Asthe intruder began to swing his weapon towardsthe Marine, the Marine shot him twice in the chestwith his M-16. Upon impact, the intruder fell backand hit the ground so hard that "his legs flopped inthe air."23

Even after the debriefings, doubts persisted.Some members of the joint task force staffacknowledged the threat, but wondered if theMarines had overreacted. More frustrating for theMarines were lingering questions about the facts.

*Valore remarked to another Marine officer that, just beforeGeneral Loeffke's arrival, he had ordered his reserve to flankthe intruders. This movement did not take place due toLoeffke's intervention. (Maj William J. Philbin intvw with author,23Jun94.)

9

Matters took a turn for the worse when SouthernCommand's Public Affairs Officer failed to rejectsuggestions that the Marines had fired at shadows.Noriega exploited the opportunity, using his pro-paganda machine to plant stories about drug abuseamong the Marines, implying that the events of 11and 12 April were drug-induced hallucinations.24

Marine Forces Panama overcame the challenge toits credibility and professionalism. Colonel Conleyand Captain Valore closed ranks behind theirMarines, who reciprocated in kind. On the night of13 April, when Captain Valore walked into one ofthe clubs at Rodman, all of the Marines presentcheered him. He later said that this was one of thehighlights of his career, and that he was moved bythe bonding and mutual trust among men whowere now combat veterans:

The [pre-combat] tension was there; it was released. I[had] gained their credibility. They knew I was going tostand behind them, whatever it took... They coulddepend on me to look out for them, [and] not play poli-tics or worry about other things... You have a mission toaccomplish: you've got to take care of your Marines.5*

Valore's Marines stood down from the tank farmfor a few days of rest and recreation at Rodman. Areinforced Army battalion took their place. On 14April, Army sentries guarding the ammunition sup-ply point challenged a small group of intruders,who responded with gunfire, and a patrol from the3d Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, operatingwest of Howard Air Force Base engaged anothergroup of well-disciplined intruders. It was nowclear that the Marines were not the only Americansoldiers to encounter intruders and to defendthemselves.26

In the months that followed, there were occa-sional incidents, but nothing on the scale of the 12April firefight. In retrospect, the aggressive Marineresponse appeared to have had the desired effect;the Marines had recognized the threat andresponded accordingly. Information obtained fromPanamanian officers following Operation Just

*Marine Forces Panama officially reported that, despite thechallenge to Marine credibility, morale was excellent.Headquarters Marine Corps took note of Valore's andNevgloski's performance, awarding both the Bronze Star Medalwith Combat "V." Sergeant Cooper received the NavyCommendation Medal. All of the Marines involved were award-ed the combat action ribbon. (Maj Joseph P Valore ltr to author,Nov93)

corroboration . Security force Marines, who ha dmanned a roadblock on the highway to prevent

Panamanian reinforcements from reaching the

tank farm, witnessed the evacuation of wounde dby blacked-out ambulances.Z°*

r~!

At dawn, teams of Marines swept the area, look-ing for evidence to confirm the presence of th e

intruders . They did not find much . There were

signs that bodies had been dragged through the

area, and there was debris such as fresh, foreign-

made battle dressings, scraps of camouflage utility

uniforms, and chemical light sticks . But there were

neither bodies nor spent ammunition shells .

However, Marines later learned that the automatic

weapons carried by some Panamanian soldier s

were equipped with brass-catchers .' '

During the next several days, Captain Valore an d

his Marines were debriefed extensively by Colone l

Conley's staff, by Naval Investigative Servic eagents, and by Army intelligence specialists . Manyof these official visitors also walked the groun dover which the fight had occurred, repeating ques-tions that had been asked by others . There was

even an order from U .S. Army South for the

Marines who fought in the jungle that night to sub-mit to a urinalysis, which they did, with negative

results . 2 2

What the Marines told the debriefers was consis-

tent, and detailed . Some of their testimony wa s

also graphic. For example, when one of Cooper' s

Marines described his experiences during the fire -

fight, he began by telling the debriefer how he ha d

"gone to ground," and tried to make himself invisi-

ble . Nevertheless, one of the passing intruder sspotted him at a distance of 8 to 10 feet away. Asthe intruder began to swing his weapon toward sthe Marine, the Marine shot him twice in the ches t

with his M-16 . Upon impact, the intruder fell back

and hit the ground so hard that "his legs flopped i n

the air. " 2 3Even after the debriefings, doubts persisted .

Some members of the joint task force staff

acknowledged the threat, but wondered if the

Marines had overreacted . More frustrating for the

Marines were lingering questions about the facts .

* Valore remarked to another Marine officer that, just before

General Loeffke's arrival, he had ordered his reserve to flank

the intruders . This movement did not take place due t o

Loeffke's intervention . (Maj William J . Philbin intvw with author,

23Jun94 .)

Matters took a turn for the worse when Souther nCommand's Public Affairs Officer failed to rejectsuggestions that the Marines had fired at shadows .Noriega exploited the opportunity, using his pro-

paganda machine to plant stories about drug abuse

among the Marines, implying that the events of 1 1

and 12 April were drug-induced hallucinations . 24Marine Forces Panama overcame the challenge t o

its credibility and professionalism . Colonel Conleyand Captain Valore closed ranks behind thei rMarines, who reciprocated in kind . On the night of

13 April, when Captain Valore walked into one o f

the clubs at Rodman, all of the Marines present

cheered him. He later said that this was one of th e

highlights of his career, and that he was moved b ythe bonding and mutual trust among men who

were now combat veterans :

The [pre-combat] tension was there ; it was released . I

[had] gained their credibility. They knew I was going t o

stand behind them, whatever it took . . . They coul d

depend on me to look out for them, [and] not play poli-

tics or worry about other things . . . You have a mission t o

accomplish: you've got to take care of your Marines ." *

Valore's Marines stood down from the tank farm

for a few days of rest and recreation at Rodman . A

reinforced Army battalion took their place . On 1 4

April, Army sentries guarding the ammunition sup-

ply point challenged a small group of intruders ,

who responded with gunfire, and a patrol from th e3d Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, operating

west of Howard Air Force Base engaged another

group of well-disciplined intruders . It was now

clear that the Marines were not the only America n

soldiers to encounter intruders and to defend

themselves . "In the months that followed, there were occa-

sional incidents, but nothing on the scale of the 1 2

April firelight . In retrospect, the aggressive Marin eresponse appeared to have had the desired effect ;the Marines had recognized the threat and

responded accordingly. Information obtained fromPanamanian officers following Operation Jus t

* Marine Forces Panama officially reported that, despite th e

challenge to Marine credibility, morale was excellent .

Headquarters Marine Corps took note of Valore's and

Nevgloski's performance, awarding both the Bronze Star Medal

with Combat "V." Sergeant Cooper received the Navy

Commendation Medal . All of the Marines involved were award-

ed the combat action ribbon . (Maj Joseph P. Valore ltr to author,

Nov93)

9

Cause, executed 20 months later in December1989, confirmed what the Marines had said aboutthe 12 April engagement. The intruders werealmost certainly troops from the 7th RifleCompany known as the "Macho de Monte," one ofthe few elite formations in the PDF, possibly rein-forced by a few members of the Special Anti-ter-rorist Security Unit, the Panamanian equivalent ofDelta Force. There is some evidence that one ormore Cuban advisors may have accompanied the'Macho de Monte' on their 12 April sortie.27

Why did the intruders attack the fuel storagearea? It is unlikely that the tanks themselves werethe targets. Even when protected by a company ofMarines, many of the tanks remained vulnerable, asdid pipelines and other peripheral installations. Ifsabotage had been the mission, the intruders prob-ably could have succeeded. Far more likely, con-sidering the timing of the attack, a few days afterthe arrival of Marine reinforcements in-country,and supported by documents seized in December1989, is the conclusion that the Marines them-selves were the main target. The object was toembarrass and harass while testing the virility andcompetence of the Panamanian military elite. Theanti-Marine propaganda campaign in the press hadonly just begun, and, as Noriega himself later com-mented: "Never before has there been a moreeffective laboratory for armed men. Nor has theopportunity [ever] been so propitious for trainingin low intensity conflict, as that which exists todayin Panama."28

Recovery and Consolidation

The month that followed was a period of relativecalm. It was one of diplomatic, rather than militaryactivity, which gave Southern Command and theMarines an opportunity to prepare for future intru-sions. The events of mid-April demonstrated theneed to resolve ambiguities in the system of com-mand and control. On 25 April, SouthCom activat-ed Area of Operation Pacific West, and formalizedthe arrangement whereby Colonel Conley becamethe commander of all of the Marines in-country, aswell as temporary attachments from the U.S. Army,including 293 soldiers of the 519th Military PoliceBattalion and Company B, 1st Battalion, 508thInfantry Regiment. Marine Forces Panamaremained under the operational control of thejoint task force, which meant that Colonel Conley

10

would continue to report to General Loeffke, eventhough the normal chain of command would havehad him to report to Admiral Gnecknow.29

In the meantime, Marines in the intelligencefield analyzed the threat, and generated a collec-tion plan in an attempt to predict future incur-sions, and the routes that they would take.Company I, after its two days of rest, went back online for another 14 days. In addition to routinepatrolling, day and night, the company improvedand hardened six observation and listening postsin both the tank farm and ammunition supplypoint.* Throughout the period, the Marine forcesconducted training exercises. First there were all-Marine, in-house exercises in the deployment ofmobile reaction forces to trouble spots. The reac-tion forces included jeep-like HMMWVs carryingheavy machine guns and TOW missiles, a signifi-cant increment in the kind of firepower which hadbeen used to good effect to suppress enemy fireon 12 April. Then there were a series of exerciseswith other services, codenamed Purple Storni foroffensive evolutions and Purple Blitz for defensiveevolutions and casualty evacuations.3

Not content with routine exercises and coun-termeasures, the Marines experimented with othermeans of accomplishing their mission. Air Forceand Navy dog teams regularly joined the Marineson patrol. Army specialists helped the Marines setup a speaker system which, when triggered,informed intruders in Spanish that they were onU.S. Government property and that it was in theirbest interest to return to where they had comefrom. At night, the Air Force continued to fly AC-130 Specter missions in support of the Marines,using beacons and infrared devices to search forintruders. There also were attempts to interceptradio transmissions between groups of intruders.However, these attempts were unsuccessful, appar-ently because the intruders relied mainly on othermeans of communication.3'

Neither War Nor Peace

The period of relative calm came to an endaround 1900 on 19 July, when sensor activationsalerted the Marines of Company L, 3d Battalion, 4th

* The ammunition supply point remained a Marine respon-sibility even though it was often patrolled by Army infantryattached to Marine Forces Panama.

Cause, executed 20 months later in December1989, confirmed what the Marines had said abou tthe 12 April engagement . The intruders werealmost certainly troops from the 7th Rifl eCompany, known as the "Macho de Monte," one o fthe few elite formations in the PDF, possibly rein -forced by a few members of the Special Anti-ter-rorist Security Unit, the Panamanian equivalent ofDelta Force . There is some evidence that one o rmore Cuban advisors may have accompanied th e"Macho de Monte" on their 12 April sortie . 27

Why did the intruders attack the fuel storag earea? It is unlikely that the tanks themselves wer ethe targets . Even when protected by a company ofMarines, many of the tanks remained vulnerable, asdid pipelines and other peripheral installations . Ifsabotage had been the mission, the intruders prob-ably could have succeeded. Far more likely, con-sidering the timing of the attack, a few days afterthe arrival of Marine reinforcements in-country,and supported by documents seized in December1989, is the conclusion that the Marines them -selves were the main target . The object was toembarrass and harass while testing the virility andcompetence of the Panamanian military elite . Theanti-Marine propaganda campaign in the press ha donly just begun, and, as Noriega himself later com-mented: "Never before has there been a mor eeffective laboratory for armed men . Nor has theopportunity [ever] been so propitious for trainingin low intensity conflict, as that which exists toda yin Panama ."2 8

Recovery and Consolidation

The month that followed was a period of relativecalm. It was one of diplomatic, rather than militar yactivity, which gave Southern Command and th eMarines an opportunity to prepare for future intru-sions . The events of mid-April demonstrated th eneed to resolve ambiguities in the system of com-mand and control. On 25 April, SouthCom activat-ed Area of Operation Pacific West, and formalize dthe arrangement whereby Colonel Conley becamethe commander of all of the Marines in-country, aswell as temporary attachments from the U .S . Army,including 293 soldiers of the 519th Military Polic eBattalion and Company B, 1st Battalion, 508thInfantry Regiment. Marine Forces Panamaremained under the operational control of th ejoint task force, which meant that Colonel Conley

would continue to report to General Loeffke, eve n

though the normal chain of command would havehad him to report to Admiral Gnecknow. 29

In the meantime, Marines in the intelligenc efield analyzed the threat, and generated a collec-

tion plan in an attempt to predict future incur-sions, and the routes that they would take .Company I, after its two days of rest, went back o n

line for another 14 days . In addition to routinepatrolling, day and night, the company improve dand hardened six observation and listening post sin both the tank farm and ammunition supplypoint . * Throughout the period, the Marine forcesconducted training exercises . First there were all-Marine, in-house exercises in the deployment ofmobile reaction forces to trouble spots . The reac-tion forces included jeep-like HMMWVs carryin gheavy machine guns and TOW missiles, a signifi-cant increment in the kind of firepower which hadbeen used to good effect to suppress enemy fireon 12 April . Then there were a series of exerciseswith other services, codenamed Purple Storm foroffensive evolutions and Purple Blitz for defensiveevolutions and casualty evacuations ." '

Not content with routine exercises and coun-termeasures, the Marines experimented with othermeans of accomplishing their mission . Air Forc eand Navy dog teams regularly joined the Marine son patrol . Army specialists helped the Marines se tup a speaker system which, when triggered ,informed intruders in Spanish that they were o nU .S . Government property and that it was in theirbest interest to return to where they had comefrom. At night, the Air Force continued to fly AC -130 Specter missions in support of the Marines ,using beacons and infrared devices to search forintruders . There also were attempts to intercep tradio transmissions between groups of intruders .However, these attempts were unsuccessful, appar -ently because the intruders relied mainly on othe rmeans of communication . "

Neither War Nor Peace

The period of relative calm came to an endaround 1900 on 19 July, when sensor activationsalerted the Marines of Company L, 3d Battalion, 4t h

* The ammunition supply point remained a Marine respon-sibility even though it was often patrolled by Army infantr yattached to Marine Forces Panama .

10

Marines, which had relieved Company I in June.The sensors indicated a group of roughly 20intruders, apparently gathering at a rallying pointin the tank farm. Marine Forces Panama requestedand received permission from the joint task forceto insert blocking forces and capture the intruders.Accordingly, a Marine unit, which included the sol-diers from Company B, 1st Battalion, 508thInfantry, began to move into place during thenight—a tortuously slow proposition in the jungleunder any conditions, and doubly so at night.32

Once again, Marine forces came away empty-handed. At first light, the appearance of an ArmyUH-1 Huey command helicopter apparently alert-ed the intruders to the risk of capture before all ofthe blocking forces were in place. The helicoptercircled in the vicinity of the rallying point, enablingGeneral Loeffke to monitor the operation. Theintruders reacted by slipping out of the area bytwos and threes. The only contact was a brief fire-fight between a Marine patrol and some of theintruders.33

The pattern of events in August and Septemberwas similar but less dramatic, with a number ofsporadic sightings and brief firefights in both thetank farm and ammunition depot. Frustrations andtensions persisted. There were still no confirmeddead, and very little hard evidence to prove whothe intruders were. It appeared to the Marines thatmany of their counterparts in the other servicescontinued to doubt that the intruders were pro-fessionals.

In order to put the doubts to rest, and in gener-al to bridge the cultural gap between the Marinesand members of the other services at all levels,Colonel Conley developed an orientation programfor Army and Air Force staff officers. He arrangedfor them to fire Marine weapons on the range andinvited them to walk the lines in the tank farm atnight, which usually included spending some timein a fighting hole watching and waiting. The reac-tion was positive, and helped to achieve Conley'sgoal. The visitors saw that the Marines were livingin the field, under near combat conditions. Sand-bags and gun pits reminded them of Vietnam.34

*A similar initiative, aimed at maintaining the morale ofMarines on the line, was "Staff and Officer Appreciation Day,"when staff officers and non-commissioned officers would leavetheir desks and wield machetes to help clear vegetation hi thetank farm. (Col Thomas W. Roberts intvw, 30Mar90, p. 38 [OralHistory Collection, MCHC,Washington, D.C.])

11

But not everyone was convinced. For example,during the month of September, the Marines wereable to capture on tape thermal images of theintruders by means of the UAS-1 1. The imagesclearly showed a number of individuals carryingAK-47s and wearing load-bearing equipment. Butsome officers at joint task force headquartersclaimed that the images were not distinct enoughto constitute proof.35

On 31 October, there was another major fire-fight, much like that of 12 April. Over a period ofroughly two and one-half hours, there were sevenseparate incidents throughout the Arraijan TankFarm. In five of the incidents, the intruders firedfirst, but did not hit any Marines. In the other twoengagements, Marines from Company M, 3dBattalion, 8th Marines, which had replacedCompany L, fired first with unknown results. Afterthe last of the incidents, the outcome was stillunclear. Reconstructing the chain of events in thelight of day, the Marines developed two possiblescenarios. The first assumed that a PanamanianDefense Force patrol had penetrated the depot,bumped into one observation post, and then, on itsway out, run into another. One or morePanamanian patrols may have come to the rescueof the first patrol. The second was that thePanamanians had deployed a number of smallpatrols from the beginning. But, once again therewere neither bodies nor spent shells.36

The repercussions of the October firefightswere predictable. The Panamanian press exploitedthe Halloween theme, showing cartoons ofMarines shooting at witches flying through thepalm trees. For its part, Southern Command direct-ed the joint task force to place limits on nighttimepatrolling and the deployment of observation andlistening posts in the jungle. The Marines had tocount the number of rounds they fired, and then toaccount for them during lengthy debriefings.Limits also were placed on the number of Marinespermitted in the tank farm at any one time. Thisoften meant that there was only a reinforced pla-toon in Arraijan Tank Farm, leaving one platoon topatrol the ammunition depot and one in reserve,which gave the Marines an opportunity to rest andtrain. Later, the Marines were informed that, hence-forth, their primary duty was to conduct training,and that their missions in the storage facilitieswere secondary. The theory behind the changeswas that Marines attracted intruders. Therefore, if

Marines, which had relieved Company I in June .

The sensors indicated a group of roughly 20intruders, apparently gathering at a rallying poin tin the tank farm. Marine Forces Panama requested

and received permission from the joint task forc eto insert blocking forces and capture the intruders.Accordingly, a Marine unit, which included the sol-diers from Company B, 1st Battalion, 508t hInfantry, began to move into place during th e

night–a tortuously slow proposition in the jungl e

under any conditions, and doubly so at night . 3 2Once again, Marine forces came away empty -

handed. At first light, the appearance of an ArmyUH-1 Huey command helicopter apparently alert-

ed the intruders to the risk of capture before all of

the blocking forces were in place . The helicopte rcircled in the vicinity of the rallying point, enablingGeneral Loeffke to monitor the operation . The

intruders reacted by slipping out of the area bytwos and threes . The only contact was a brief fire -fight between a Marine patrol and some of th eintruders . 3 3

The pattern of events in August and Septembe r

was similar but less dramatic, with a number o fsporadic sightings and brief firefights in both th etank farm and ammunition depot . Frustrations and

tensions persisted. There were still no confirmed

dead, and very little hard evidence to prove who

the intruders were . It appeared to the Marines that

many of their counterparts in the other servicescontinued to doubt that the intruders were pro-

fessionals .In order to put the doubts to rest, and in gener-

al to bridge the cultural gap between the Marine s

and members of the other services at all levels,

Colonel Conley developed an orientation program

for Army and Air Force staff officers . He arrangedfor them to fire Marine weapons on the range an dinvited them to walk the lines in the tank farm a tnight, which usually included spending some timein a fighting hole watching and waiting . The reac-tion was positive, and helped to achieve Conley' s

goal . The visitors saw that the Marines were livin gin the field, under near combat conditions . Sand-bags and gun pits reminded them of Vietnam . 3 4

*A similar initiative, aimed at maintaining the morale of

Marines on the line, was "Staff and Officer Appreciation Day,"

when staff officers and non-commissioned officers would leav e

their desks and wield machetes to help clear vegetation in the

tank farm . (Col Thomas W. Roberts intvw, 30Mar90, p . 38 [Oral

History Collection, MCHC,Washington, D .C .])

But not everyone was convinced . For example ,

during the month of September, the Marines wer eable to capture on tape thermal images of th eintruders by means of the UAS-11 . The image s

clearly showed a number of individuals carryin g

AK-47s and wearing load-bearing equipment . Butsome officers at joint task force headquarter sclaimed that the images were not distinct enoug hto constitute proof. 35

On 31 October, there was another major fire -fight, much like that of 12 April . Over a period of

roughly two and one-half hours, there were seve n

separate incidents throughout the Arraijan Tan k

Farm. In five of the incidents, the intruders fire dfirst, but did not hit any Marines . In the other two

engagements, Marines from Company M, 3 d

Battalion, 8th Marines, which had replace d

Company L, fired first with unknown results . Afte r

the last of the incidents, the outcome was stil l

unclear. Reconstructing the chain of events in thelight of day, the Marines developed two possible

scenarios . The first assumed that a Panamania nDefense Force patrol had penetrated the depot ,bumped into one observation post, and then, on its

way out, run into another. One or more

Panamanian patrols may have come to the rescue

of the first patrol . The second was that the

Panamanians had deployed a number of smallpatrols from the beginning . But, once again therewere neither bodies nor spent shells . 36

The repercussions of the October firefight s

were predictable . The Panamanian press exploited

the Halloween theme, showing cartoons of

Marines shooting at witches flying through th e

palm trees . For its part, Southern Command direct-

ed the joint task force to place limits on nighttim e

patrolling and the deployment of observation and

listening posts in the jungle . The Marines had tocount the number of rounds they fired, and then t oaccount for them during lengthy debriefings .Limits also were placed on the number of Marine spermitted in the tank farm at any one time . Thisoften meant that there was only a reinforced pla-toon in Arraijan Tank Farm, leaving one platoon t opatrol the ammunition depot and one in reserve ,which gave the Marines an opportunity to rest an d

train. Later, the Marines were informed that, hence -forth, their primary duty was to conduct training ,and that their missions in the storage facilitie swere secondary. The theory behind the changes

was that Marines attracted intruders . Therefore, i f

11

fewer Marines deployed, there would be fewerintruders and fewer incidents. It was almost anargument for leaving the tank farm and the ammu-nition supply point unguarded, which no one wasprepared to do.37

The changes exacerbated the existing frictionbetween Marine and Army commanders, each ofwhom had different concerns. The more seniorArmy commanders obeyed political dictates inorder to minimize confrontation, while conditionson the ground dominated the thinking of Marinecommanders, who never stopped pressing formore tactical freedom. Another result of therestrictions was, almost literally, a bunker mentali-ty. Since the Marines could not go to the enemy,they had to wait for him to come to them. Oncehe appeared in front of their positions, the rules ofengagement were such that the Marines either hadto warn the intruder or leave it to him to initiatehostilities. One Marine officer remembered whatit was like for the rifleman at his post:

[The intruder] would come towards the position, anda Marine might lock on to (the intruder].., with hisnight vision system.... [B]ut the Marine... had to chal-lenge the aggressor. So the agressor suddenly had theupper hand . . . because the aggressor knew that theMarines.., were so well disciplined that... They wouldnot open up unless the PDF.. violated one of the rulesof engagement.... [Tlhen this bad guy shoots at you...,the blast from the enemy muzzle is going to momentar-ily... blind you and then... [you have] lost that opportu-nity because the aggressors are well trained and they hitthe deck and back Out of there....

Under the circumstances, many Marines felt thatthe best way to protect themselves was to improvetheir positions, which became ever more elabo-rate. By now, there was a system of bunkers andtrench lines that covered parts of the tank farmand, to a lesser extent, the ammunition supplypoint. Finally it was clear that the pendulum hadswung too far, and the new commander of MarineForces Panama, Colonel Thomas W. Roberts,ordered virtually all of the positions in the fuelstorage area razed. The joint task force concurredin the decision, as well as its corollary, that Marinesreturn to light infantry tactics in both the tankfarm and the ammunition depot.39

Roberts' reasoning was that the change wouldmake life more risky for the intruder. Since mostof the Marines would not be in fixed positions butpatrolling or lying in ambush, the intruder would

12

never know when or where he might encounterthem. Roberts shared the JTF Panama's assump-tion that the Panamanian Defense Forces wantedto cause embarrassing incidents, but came to a dif-ferent conclusion. If defense force commandershad to think twice before entering the storagefacilities, there would not be many incidents.Colonel Roberts appeared to have been right; thenet result of the change in tactics was a sharpdecrease in the number of incidents.40

Operation Rabbit Hunt, which was launched inthe ammunition depot in December, apparentlyhad the same kind of deterrent effect. In what wasessentially a cordon and search operation, MarineForces Panama, accompanied by an entire Army air-borne infantry battalion, the 1st Battalion, 508thInfantry, swept through the ammunition supplypoint during the early morning hours of 19December, while Army military police and engi-neers patrolled the perimeter. No intruders werecaptured, due perhaps to possible security leaksfrom a joint command that was, not unnaturally,closely intertwined with Panamanian society. But,as were many of the other Marine initiatives, it wasnot a failure in that it helped to deter intruders,which remained as much a part of the mission askilling or catching them.4'

Another significant event in December was thevisit of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,Admiral William J. Crowe, USN, who toured theArraijan Tank Farm and expressed shock at its sizeand dense vegetation. He found the lack of visibil-ity troubling, noting that an intruder couldapproach unseen to within five yards of Marinepositions. "I thought it was bad being inside a sub-marine," he said, "[but] [t]his is [really] horrible!"42

The Evolution of Training

As the months progressed, the training packageinstituted by Marine Forces Panama evolved tomeet the demands of the situation. As most of theinfantrymen who were destined to be deployed toPanama would be drawn from the 6th Marines,they were required to attend a tailored course ofinstruction before deploying. The course wasapproximately 38 days long. It stressed small unitleadership, patrolling, night fighting, and combatfiring, day and night. Through trial and error,Marines learned that, when firing at night, morewas not better. Results improved when they fired

fewer Marines deployed, there would be fewer

intruders and fewer incidents . It was almost an

argument for leaving the tank farm and the ammu-nition supply point unguarded, which no one wasprepared to do . "

The changes exacerbated the existing friction

between Marine and Army commanders, each o fwhom had different concerns . The more seniorArmy commanders obeyed political dictates in

order to minimize confrontation, while condition son the ground dominated the thinking of Marin ecommanders, who never stopped pressing fo r

more tactical freedom . Another result of therestrictions was, almost literally, a bunker mentali-ty. Since the Marines could not go to the enemy,they had to wait for him to come to them . Oncehe appeared in front of their positions, the rules of

engagement were such that the Marines either ha dto warn the intruder or leave it to him to initiat ehostilities . One Marine officer remembered whatit was like for the rifleman at his post:

[The intruder] would come towards the position, and

a Marine might lock on to [the intruder] . . . with his

night vision system . . . . [B]ut the Marine . . . had to chal-

lenge the aggressor. So the agressor suddenly had the

upper hand . . . because the aggressor knew that the

Marines . . . were so well disciplined that . . . They would

not open up unless the PDF . . .violated one of the rules

of engagement . . . . [T]hen this bad guy shoots at you . . . ,

the blast from the enemy muzzle is going to momentar-

ily. . . blind you and then . . . [you have] lost that opportu-

nity because the aggressors are well trained and they hi t

the deck and back out of there . . . .'"

Under the circumstances, many Marines felt tha tthe best way to protect themselves was to improvetheir positions, which became ever more elabo-rate . By now, there was a system of bunkers andtrench lines that covered parts of the tank far mand, to a lesser extent, the ammunition supplypoint. Finally it was clear that the pendulum hadswung too far, and the new commander of Marin eForces Panama, Colonel Thomas W. Roberts ,ordered virtually all of the positions in the fue lstorage area razed . The joint task force concurredin the decision, as well as its corollary, that Marine sreturn to light infantry tactics in both the tankfarm and the ammunition depot . 3 9

Roberts' reasoning was that the change woul dmake life more risky for the intruder. Since mostof the Marines would not be in fixed positions bu tpatrolling or lying in ambush, the intruder would

never know when or where he might encounte r

them. Roberts shared the JTF Panama's assump-tion that the Panamanian Defense Forces wante d

to cause embarrassing incidents, but came to a dif-

ferent conclusion . If defense force commandershad to think twice before entering the storage

facilities, there would not be many incidents .

Colonel Roberts appeared to have been right ; thenet result of the change in tactics was a shar pdecrease in the number of incidents . 41

Operation Rabbit Hunt, which was launched i n

the ammunition depot in December, apparently

had the same kind of deterrent effect . In what wasessentially a cordon and search operation, MarineForces Panama, accompanied by an entire Army air -borne infantry battalion, the 1st Battalion, 508t hInfantry, swept through the ammunition supply

point during the early morning hours of 1 9

December, while Army military police and engi-neers patrolled the perimeter. No intruders werecaptured, due perhaps to possible security leak s

from a joint command that was, not unnaturally,

closely intertwined with Panamanian society. But ,as were many of the other Marine initiatives, it wa snot a failure in that it helped to deter intruders ,which remained as much a part of the mission a skilling or catching them .4 1

Another significant event in December was th evisit of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,Admiral William J . Crowe, USN, who toured th eArraijan Tank Farm and expressed shock at its sizeand dense vegetation . He found the lack of visibil-ity troubling, noting that an intruder coul dapproach unseen to within five yards of Marinepositions . "I thought it was bad being inside a sub -marine," he said, "[but] [t]his is [really] horrible!" 4 Z

The Evolution of Training

As the months progressed, the training packageinstituted by Marine Forces Panama evolved tomeet the demands of the situation . As most of theinfantrymen who were destined to be deployed toPanama would be drawn from the 6th Marines ,they were required to attend a tailored course ofinstruction before deploying . The course wa sapproximately 38 days long . It stressed small uni tleadership, patrolling, night fighting, and comba tfiring, day and night . Through trial and error,Marines learned that, when firing at night, morewas not better. Results improved when they fired

12

one or two shots, evaluated the strike of therounds, and made corrections. Finally, there wereseemingly endless drills on the rules of engage-ment.43

The course was a success due in large part tothe foresight and initiative of the regimental com-mander, Colonel Russell H. Sutton, who under-stood the need for constant, near real-time feed-back from Panama to make the training fit thesituation. To get that feedback, Colonel Sutton orone of his principal staff officers travelled toPanama on a regular basis.44

Training did not stop after the Marine arrived inPanama. First, everyone received a week of indoc-trination and orientation at the Jungle WarfareTraining Center at Fort Sherman in the Canal Zone.Then, even during the execution phase of the mis-sion, there was more training. As often as everyother night, front-line Marines cycled throughthree stations where they practiced using nightvision goggles and combat firing techniques,before running through rules of engagement drills.During one training exercise, Marines moved tacti-cally down an 800-meter jungle trail where theyhad to make split second "shoot or don't shoot"decisions while "minimizing" their own positions.Pop-up targets and flashbangs added realism. In

other scenarios, Marines practiced firing at silhou-ettes at night. At the night vision station, trainerspresented Marines with different scenarios, askingthem to describe what they saw while wearingtheir goggles. The procedure at the rules ofengagement station was similar. There were morethan two dozen scenarios, requiring responses inSpanish and English. Over the course of time, mostMarines internalized the rules, which changedsomewhat over time but consistently directedMarines to use the minimum force necessary tocounter threats. Under most circumstances duringthe deployment of Marine Forces Panama, if intrud-ers were spotted, the Marines had to challengethem, and could take action only if the intrudercommitted a hostile act, which was defined aspointing a weapon at a Marine or attempting toflank his position.45

There was even a combat pistol course forMarines armed with the weapon, importantbecause many of them had only fired their pistolsat stationary targets at known distances in order toqualify. The course consisted of 10 rounds fired ateight targets, while kneeling and standing, withboth strong and weak hands, as well as frombehind a low wall, a high wall, through a window,and at point-blank range. To add stress, Marines

When not on patrol, Marines honed their battle skills in live night-fire training. Thetraining was aimed at creating a highly disciplined and technically proficient force.

13

*4

When not on patrol, Marines honed their battle skills in live night-fire training. The

training was aimed at creating a highly disciplined and technically proficient force .

one or two shots, evaluated the strike of therounds, and made corrections . Finally, there wereseemingly endless drills on the rules of engage-

ment . 4 3The course was a success due in large part t o

the foresight and initiative of the regimental com-mander, Colonel Russell H . Sutton, who under-stood the need for constant, near real-time feed -back from Panama to make the training fit the

situation . To get that feedback, Colonel Sutton o rone of his principal staff officers travelled t o

Panama on a regular basis . 44

Training did not stop after the Marine arrived inPanama. First, everyone received a week of indoc-trination and orientation at the Jungle WarfareTraining Center at Fort Sherman in the Canal Zone .Then, even during the execution phase of the mis-sion, there was more training . As often as everyother night, front-line Marines cycled throughthree stations where they practiced using nigh tvision goggles and combat firing techniques ,before running through rules of engagement drills .During one training exercise, Marines moved tacti-cally down an 800-meter jungle trail where the y

had to make split second "shoot or don't shoot"decisions while "minimizing" their own positions .

Pop-up targets and flashbangs added realism . In

other scenarios, Marines practiced firing at silhou-

ettes at night . At the night vision station, trainer s

presented Marines with different scenarios, askin g

them to describe what they saw while wearin g

their goggles . The procedure at the rules o f

engagement station was similar. There were morethan two dozen scenarios, requiring responses in

Spanish and English . Over the course of time, mos tMarines internalized the rules, which change d

somewhat over time but consistently directe dMarines to use the minimum force necessary to

counter threats . Under most circumstances duringthe deployment of Marine Forces Panama, if intrud -ers were spotted, the Marines had to challengethem, and could take action only if the intrude r

committed a hostile act, which was defined aspointing a weapon at a Marine or attempting toflank his position . 4 5

There was even a combat pistol course fo rMarines armed with the weapon, importantbecause many of them had only fired their pistol sat stationary targets at known distances in order toqualify. The course consisted of 10 rounds fired a teight targets, while kneeling and standing, wit h

both strong and weak hands, as well as frombehind a low wall, a high wall, through a window,

and at point-blank range . To add stress, Marine s

13

had to complete the course in less than oneminute. Every "pistol carrier had to fire, or refire,the course before going to the field. To make surethat skills were not lost, the pistol carrier" also hadto fire a few rounds for familiarization almost everyday.46

Most Marines became extremely proficient atshooting at night, far more so than their opponentswho failed to wound or kill a Marine in the tankfarm or ammunition supply point. On the otherhand, Marines scored numerous hits on their oppo-nents, not to mention the targets on the range,where nighttime scores of 15 out of 20 were thenorm.47

Apart from the training in battle skills, there wascontinuing education for officers and staff non-commissioned officers. To develop a commonvocabulary and to exercise tactical judgment, theyconducted sand table exercises, many of thembased on scenarios generated by Dr. WilliamRobertson's Korean War classic, Counterattack onthe Nakong, 1950.48

The result of the training was a highly disci-plined and tactically and technically proficientforce. Despite the restrictions, which were frus-trating at times, there was painstaking adherenceto the rules of engagement, which came easierbecause the Marines were confident in their ownabilities. They knew that they could face most ofthe challenges that they were likely to encounterin Panama, which was not just another trainingarea. Staying ready to execute a tangible missionhelped to keep morale high, which in turn meantthat the number of office hours to enforce disci-pline under the Uniform Code of Military Justicewas very low.49

The New Year

Although there were incidents in January 1989,especially in the ammunition storage depotbetween the 6th and the 24th, the new yearbrought a period of relative calm, and then a virtu-al end to confrontation at both facilities. The situ-ation was so quiet that a rumor that the Marineswere going home in February made the rounds.However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided theywere still needed in Panama, and the execute ordernever came.5°

The reason why it was so quiet on the tank farmfront was that the focus of activity had shifted to

14

preparations for the election that Noriega had topermit in May. This meant that the PDF spent moreof its energy on the streets and highways, which inturn created a new set of issues, that of freedom ofmovement. The problem was that the Panamaniangovernment began to restrict the ownership of pri-vate vehicles by members of Southern Command,and to harass both individuals and convoys at road-blocks and checkpoints. One consequence of theshift in defense force tactics was that, among theircounterparts in Southern Command, there wasnow more understanding and sympathy for whatthe Marines had endured.

Despite Noriega's best efforts, the ticket whichhe endorsed lost the 7 May election. Noriega'sresponse was to send the paramilitary DignityBattalions into the streets to attack his opponents,including the winning candidates for Presidentand Vice President. The 10 May attack on VicePresident-elect Guillermo Ford was immortalizedby a press photographer who produced asequence of photographs of Noriegas enforcersstriking the defenseless politician with sticks, leav-ing him bleeding profusely onto his white shirt.

Overall, the period was similar to that of theprevious March, and evoked a like response fromAmerican policy-makers. Within days of the elec-tion, additional Army and Marine reinforcementswere on their way to Panama. Since freedom ofmovement was now one of the central issues,General Woerner wanted mobile forces that suitedthe terrain and the situation. He needed the kindof light armored vehicles (LAVs) available only inthe Marine Corps inventory. The LAV was the state-of-the-art vehicle in its class, faster and moremaneuverable than most of the alternatives. It wasalso formidable-looking, standing high on a eight-wheel chassis topped by a chiselled turret. The tur-ret housed a 25mm "Bushmaster" chain gun and7.62mm machine gun. Depending on its configu-ration, most vehicles could also carry eightinfantrymen.

Given General Woerner's preference, it was nosurprise that additional Marine reinforcementswere drawn from CompanyA, 2d Light AmphibiousInfantry (LAJ) Battalion, equipped with LAVs, ortanquitos (little tanks), as the Panamanians soonlabelled them. Accompanied by a battalion com-mand group and lifted into Howard Air Force Baseby six Air Force C-141 Starlifter and three C-5Galaxy aircraft, the tanquitos of Company A arrived

had to complete the course in less than on eminute . Every "pistol carrier" had to fire, or refire ,

the course before going to the field . To make sur e

that skills were not lost, the "pistol carrier" also hadto fire a few rounds for familiarization almost ever yday. 4 C

Most Marines became extremely proficient at

shooting at night, far more so than their opponentswho failed to wound or kill a Marine in the tankfarm or ammunition supply point . On the othe rhand, Marines scored numerous hits on their oppo-nents, not to mention the targets on the range ,where nighttime scores of 15 out of 20 were th e

norm .47

Apart from the training in battle skills, there wascontinuing education for officers and staff non -commissioned officers . To develop a commo nvocabulary and to exercise tactical judgment, the yconducted sand table exercises, many of the m

based on scenarios generated by Dr. WilliamRobertson's Korean War classic, Counterattack onthe Nakong, 1950. 48

The result of the training was a highly disci-plined and tactically and technically proficien tforce. Despite the restrictions, which were frus-trating at times, there was painstaking adherenceto the rules of engagement, which came easie rbecause the Marines were confident in their ownabilities . They knew that they could face most o f

the challenges that they were likely to encounte rin Panama, which was not just another trainin garea . Staying ready to execute a tangible missio nhelped to keep morale high, which in turn mean tthat the number of office hours to enforce disci-

pline under the Uniform Code of Military Justic ewas very low. 49

The New Year

Although there were incidents in January 1989 ,especially in the ammunition storage depotbetween the 6th and the 24th, the new yearbrought a period of relative calm, and then a virtu -al end to confrontation at both facilities . The situ-ation was so quiet that a rumor that the Marine swere going home in February made the rounds .However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided theywere still needed in Panama, and the execute orde rnever came .' "

The reason why it was so quiet on the tank farmfront was that the focus of activity had shifted to

preparations for the election that Noriega had t o

permit in May. This meant that the PDF spent more

of its energy on the streets and highways, which i n

turn created a new set of issues, that of freedom of

movement. The problem was that the Panamanian

government began to restrict the ownership of pri-vate vehicles by members of Southern Command ,and to harass both individuals and convoys at road-

blocks and checkpoints . One consequence of th eshift in defense force tactics was that, among thei rcounterparts in Southern Command, there wa snow more understanding and sympathy for whatthe Marines had endured .

Despite Noriega's best efforts, the ticket whic hhe endorsed lost the 7 May election . Noriega' sresponse was to send the paramilitary Dignity

Battalions into the streets to attack his opponents ,including the winning candidates for Presidentand Vice President. The 10 May attack on Vic ePresident-elect Guillermo Ford was immortalize d

by a press photographer who produced asequence of photographs of Noriega's enforcer sstriking the defenseless politician with sticks, leav-ing him bleeding profusely onto his white shirt .

Overall, the period was similar to that of th eprevious March, and evoked a like response fro mAmerican policy-makers . Within days of the elec-tion, additional Army and Marine reinforcementswere on their way to Panama . Since freedom of

movement was now one of the central issues ,General Woerner wanted mobile forces that suite dthe terrain and the situation. He needed the kindof light armored vehicles (LAVs) available only i nthe Marine Corps inventory. The LAV was the state -of-the-art vehicle in its class, faster and moremaneuverable than most of the alternatives . It wasalso formidable-looking, standing high on a eight -wheel chassis topped by a chiselled turret . The tur-ret housed a 25mm "Bushmaster" chain gun an d7 .62mm machine gun . Depending on its configu-ration, most vehicles could also carry eigh tinfantrymen .

Given General Woerner's preference, it was nosurprise that additional Marine reinforcement swere drawn from Company A, 2d Light Amphibiou sInfantry (LAI) Battalion, equipped with LAVs, o rtanquitos (little tanks), as the Panamanians soonlabelled them . Accompanied by a battalion com-mand group and lifted into Howard Air Force Bas eby six Air Force C-141 Starlifter and three C- 5Galaxy aircraft, the tanquitos of Company A arrived

14

in country on 12 May. The contingent comprised14 light assault variants (LAV-25s), two logisticsvariants (LAV-Ls), and one command and controlvariant, as well as 10 four-man scout teams to pro-tect the LAV-25s.5'

The company's primary mission was to partici-pate in operations to ensure that U.S. forces inPanama enjoyed freedom of movement in andaround the Canal Zone, which was guaranteedunder the Carter-Torrijos Treaty in order for themto defend the Canal. The security operations wereknown as "Sand Fleas." Participation in this seriesof operations signalled a change for Marine ForcePanama, which had been largely confined to theboundaries of Rodman and neighboring militaryinstallations. It can be argued that it was the LAVsthat transformed Marine Forces Panama from areinforced security force into a maneuver force.

Within days of their arrival, the LAV5 seemed tobe everywhere at once, an intentional tacticdesigned to keep the Panamanian Defense Forcesoff balance. Their effect on the PDF was clear inincidents like that of 23 May, when Panamanianmilitary police stopped a column of LAVs return-ing to Rodman from a routine patrol, claiming thatthe LAYs were machines of war and thereforerequired an escort. The LAJ platoon commanderreplied that, by stopping his vehicles, thePanamanians had violated his right to freedom ofmovement. He gave the policemen a card whichspelled out American treaty rights and allowedthem two minutes to consult with their superiorsbefore he would "carry Out his mission." Aftermaking a show of attempting to call a superior, thePanamanian soldiers apologized before permittingthe LAYs to continue on their way.52

A few days later, in Operation Big Show, theLAVs swam the Canal from west to east in an exer-cise designed to secure U.S. housing and otherfacilities at Fort Amador. The tactic of crossing theCanal at will caught the Panamanians off guard,and was successful enough to be repeated on 20,23, and 26 June in similar operations. One monthlater, on 22 July, the company executed OperationHippocrates, designed to test their ability to createa diversion on the west bank of the Canal thatwould make it difficult for the PDF to send rein-forcements to the capital on the east bank. Thatsame day the Joint Chiefs issued National SecurityDirective 17, which formalized what was alreadyfact—giving commanders in Panama the authority

15

to conduct operations to destabilize the PDF,ensure freedom of movement for U.S. forces, andrehearse and reconnoiter for follow-on opera-tions.55

One of the more successful Sand Flea opera-tions was Westward Ho, yet another demonstrationof the LAYs usefulness in low-intensity conflicts.The operation began early on 7 August. Two pla-toons and a command element conducted a routereconnaissance along the southwestern border ofthe Canal Zone. Panamanian Defense Force ele-ments detained one of the LAVs near the town ofArraijan. A full platoon of LAYs went to the rescue,while Army helicopters monitored defense forceactivity from the air. Another platoon of LAVsstood by to block the routes along which thePanamanians could send reinforcements.Meanwhile, the command element lured a squad-sized element of the PDF onto American-con-trolled territory, where Marines detained its mem-bers and confiscated approximately one dozenweapons and thousands of rounds of ammunition.

Marine light armored vehicles cross the Bridge ofthe Americas during one of several freedom ofmovement exercises. The exercises ensured thatAmerican forces enjoyed free movement in andaround the Canal Zone and kept thePanamanian Defense Forces off balance.

4

in country on 12 May. The contingent comprise d14 light assault variants (LAV-25s), two logisticsvariants (LAV-Ls), and one command and contro lvariant, as well as 10 four-man scout teams to pro-

tect the LAV-25s . 5 'The company's primary mission was to partici-

pate in operations to ensure that U .S . forces inPanama enjoyed freedom of movement in an d

around the Canal Zone, which was guarantee d

under the Carter-Torrijos Treaty in order for the m

to defend the Canal . The security operations were

known as "Sand Fleas ." Participation in this series

of operations signalled a change for Marine Forc e

Panama, which had been largely confined to the

boundaries of Rodman and neighboring militar y

installations . It can be argued that it was the LAVs

that transformed Marine Forces Panama from a

reinforced security force into a maneuver force .Within days of their arrival, the LAVs seemed t o

be everywhere at once, an intentional tacticdesigned to keep the Panamanian Defense Force s

off balance . Their effect on the PDF was clear i n

incidents like that of 23 May, when Panamania n

military police stopped a column of LAVs return-ing to Rodman from a routine patrol, claiming that

the LAVs were machines of war and therefor e

required an escort . The LAI platoon commande r

replied that, by stopping his vehicles, th e

Panamanians had violated his right to freedom of

movement. He gave the policemen a card whic h

spelled out American treaty rights and allowe d

them two minutes to consult with their superior s

before he would "carry out his mission ." After

making a show of attempting to call a superior, th ePanamanian soldiers apologized before permittin g

the LAVs to continue on their way. 5 2A few days later, in Operation Big Show, th e

LAVs swam the Canal from west to east in an exer -

cise designed to secure U .S . housing and other

facilities at Fort Amador. The tactic of crossing the

Canal at will caught the Panamanians off guard ,

and was successful enough to be repeated on 20 ,23, and 26 June in similar operations . One monthlater, on 22 July, the company executed Operation

Hippocrates, designed to test their ability to creat e

a diversion on the west bank of the Canal that

would make it difficult for the PDF to send rein-forcements to the capital on the east bank. That

same day the Joint Chiefs issued National Securit y

Directive 17, which formalized what was already

fact—giving commanders in Panama the authority

to conduct operations to destabilize the PDF,

ensure freedom of movement for U.S . forces, and

rehearse and reconnoiter for follow-on opera-tions . 5 3

One of the more successful Sand Flea opera-tions was Westward Ho, yet another demonstrationof the LAVs usefulness in low-intensity conflicts .

The operation began early on 7 August . Two pla-

toons and a command element conducted a rout e

reconnaissance along the southwestern border o fthe Canal Zone. Panamanian Defense Force ele-ments detained one of the LAVs near the town o f

Arraijan . A full platoon of LAVs went to the rescue ,

while Army helicopters monitored defense forc e

activity from the air. Another platoon of LAVs

stood by to block the routes along which the

Panamanians could send reinforcements .

Meanwhile, the command element lured a squad-

sized element of the PDF onto American-con-trolled territory, where Marines detained its mem-bers and confiscated approximately one dozenweapons and thousands of rounds of ammunition .

Marine light armored vehicles cross the Bridge of

the Americas during one of several freedom of

movement exercises. The exercises ensured tha t

American forces enjoyed free movement in and

around the Canal Zone and kept thePanamanian Defense Forces off balance .

15

Major Manuel Sieiro, Noriega's brother-in-law, wasamong the detainees, who were released afterbeing disarmed and photographed.54

Westward Ho was a typical operation in that LAIoperations were the focus of effort for MarineForces Panama during the summer and fall of1989. It was also typical in that the PDF failed toimpede the movement of the Marine vehicles.What was less typical was the Marines' propagan-da coup. While most Sand Flea operations clearlydemonstrated the futility of harassing mobile anddisciplined troops, the detention of Noriega'sbrother-in-law and his cohorts was an unexpectedwindfall which increased Marine self-confidence.This was important in an uncertain environmentwhere it remained difficult to measure success.55

Over time, LAI operations became more ambi-tious and ranged farther afield, as in the case ofOperation Lola, a 300-kilometer motorized recon-naissance which began on 23 September, a littlemore than one month after Company B, 2d LAIBattalion replaced Company A, which rotatedhome. The operation took the company westthrough jungle and rolling terrain to the town ofArenosa. The local populace welcomed theMarines in what was generally a show of friendlycuriosity despite the open hostility of PDF"escorts," who followed the LAVs in chase cars.56

Despite the focus on mobile operations, the LAIroutine was not very different from that of the riflecompanies that continued to serve in Panama. Thecompany generally was on a schedule of three-dayrotations, with one platoon on patrol, another intraining, and the third in maintenance. Trainingemphasized 25mm gunnery, small arms marksman-ship, and rules of engagement. There were live-fireexercises virtually every day. What was somewhatdifferent from the training for infantry Marines wasthe roadblock training. While the scout platoonpracticed crowd control formations, other LAJMarines developed techniques for clearing bothhasty and deliberate roadblocks.57

The October Coup and its Aftermath

The LAI company was one of the few Marine

*The PDF was able to deploy "escorts" since advance warn-ing of impending movements generally was required by theCanal Treaty. In this instance, the PDF "escorts" did not hinderAmerican freedom of movement.

16

units which played a role in the events of 3October, when Panamanian military dissidentsunder Major Moises Giroldi attempted to over-throw Noriega, but succeeded only in holding himprisoner for a few hours in the PDFCommandancia, its headquarters in the capital.The day before, Marine Forces Panama was placedon standby, having received orders to prepare toblock the approaches to Panama City from thewest, where the 6th and 7th PDF Companies hadtheir bases. The order to execute finally camearound 1100 on the 3d, while the outcome wasstill in doubt. While other Marine units moved tostaging areas, 33 FAST Marines under FirstLieutenant Robert F Killackey responded. A

detachment of Army engineers and a reactionforce of LAJ Marines in light armored vehicles pro-vided support. Killackey's Marines established aroadblock approximately two kilometers west ofthe tank farm, where the Pan-American Highwayintersected a north-south highway. The engineersplaced obstacles, while the LAI Marines waited inreserve nearby. There was air support on station.Just to be sure, Killackey had even taken the trou-ble to plot artillery targets.58

Tension was high. The Marines knew that theycould face up to two companies of PDF soldiers,possibly supported by Cadillac Gage V-150armored cars and V-300 armored personnel carri-ers, some armed with 90mm guns. But it soonbecame clear that the greater threat was from theeast. Hundreds of civilians were fleeing the capitalon account of the coup. At times near panic, thecrowd pressed against the Marine positions. TheMarines held the crowd back as much by their pro-fessional and aggressive appearance as by theirobstacles. They did not need to fire any shots, orcome into physical contact with any of the would-be refugees.5'

Although the perimeter held, two thingsbecame clear with time. One was that, if theMarines had to open fire for any reason, civiliancasualties would be high. The second was thatPDF reinforcements were not travelling by road.Ultimately, Noriega was rescued by troops airliftedinto the capital. That being the case, Killackey'sMarines were withdrawn after being in place forapproximately two hours. Once again, restraintand common sense had served the Marines well.

The coup attempt prompted SouthernCommand and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reevalu-

Major Manuel Sieiro, Noriega's brother-in-law, wa samong the detainees, who were released afte rbeing disarmed and photographed . 54

Westward Ho was a typical operation in that LAIoperations were the focus of effort for MarineForces Panama during the summer and fall o f1989. It was also typical in that the PDF failed t oimpede the movement of the Marine vehicles .What was less typical was the Marines' propagan-da coup . While most Sand Flea operations clearlydemonstrated the futility of harassing mobile and

disciplined troops, the detention of Noriega' sbrother-in-law and his cohorts was an unexpectedwindfall which increased Marine self-confidence .This was important in an uncertain environmentwhere it remained difficult to measure success . 55

Over time, LAI operations became more ambi-tious and ranged farther afield, as in the case ofOperation Lola, a 300-kilometer motorized recon-naissance which began on 23 September, a littl emore than one month after Company B, 2d LAIBattalion replaced Company A, which rotate dhome. The operation took the company westthrough jungle and rolling terrain to the town ofArenosa. The local populace welcomed theMarines in what was generally a show of friendlycuriosity despite the open hostility of PD F"escorts," who followed the LAVs in chase cars . 5"

Despite the focus on mobile operations, the LAIroutine was not very different from that of the riflecompanies that continued to serve in Panama . Thecompany generally was on a schedule of three-dayrotations, with one platoon on patrol, another intraining, and the third in maintenance . Trainingemphasized 25mm gunnery, small arms marksman -ship, and rules of engagement . There were live-fireexercises virtually every day. What was somewha tdifferent from the training for infantry Marines wa sthe roadblock training. While the scout platoo npracticed crowd control formations, other LA IMarines developed techniques for clearing bot hhasty and deliberate roadblocks . 57

The October Coup and its Aftermath

The LAI company was one of the few Marine

* The PDF was able to deploy "escorts" since advance warn-ing of impending movements generally was required by th eCanal Treaty. In this instance, the PDF "escorts" did not hinde rAmerican freedom of movement .

units which played a role in the events of 3

October, when Panamanian military dissident sunder Major Moises Giroldi attempted to over-throw Noriega, but succeeded only in holding hi mprisoner for a few hours in the PD FCommandancia, its headquarters in the capital .

The day before, Marine Forces Panama was place don standby, having received orders to prepare t oblock the approaches to Panama City from thewest, where the 6th and 7th PDF Companies ha dtheir bases. The order to execute finally camearound 1100 on the 3d, while the outcome wasstill in doubt . While other Marine units moved t ostaging areas, 33 FAST Marines under Firs t

Lieutenant Robert F. Killackey responded . Adetachment of Army engineers and a reactionforce of LAI Marines in light armored vehicles pro-vided support . Killackey's Marines established aroadblock approximately two kilometers west o fthe tank farm, where the Pan-American Highwa yintersected a north-south highway. The engineer splaced obstacles, while the LAI Marines waited i nreserve nearby. There was air support on station.Just to be sure, Killackey had even taken the trou-ble to plot artillery targets . 5"

Tension was high . The Marines knew that the ycould face up to two companies of PDF soldiers ,possibly supported by Cadillac Gage V-15 0armored cars and V-300 armored personnel carri-ers, some armed with 90mm guns . But it soonbecame clear that the greater threat was from th eeast . Hundreds of civilians were fleeing the capita lon account of the coup . At times near panic, thecrowd pressed against the Marine positions . TheMarines held the crowd back as much by their pro -fessional and aggressive appearance as by theirobstacles . They did not need to fire any shots, orcome into physical contact with any of the would -be refugees . 5'

Although the perimeter held, two thing sbecame clear with time. One was that, if theMarines had to open fire for any reason, civiliancasualties would be high . The second was thatPDF reinforcements were not travelling by road .Ultimately, Noriega was rescued by troops airlifte dinto the capital . That being the case, Killackey' sMarines were withdrawn after being in place fo rapproximately two hours . Once again, restrain tand common sense had served the Marines well .

The coup attempt prompted SouthernCommand and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reevalu-

16

ate existing contingency plans for Panama.Collectively known as Prayer Book, they includedplans for neutralizing the PDF, defending theCanal, and restoring law and order. But they wereprimarily defensive in nature. They lacked therange of options, specifically offensive options, thatthe new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,General Cohn L. Powell, and the new SouthComcommander, General Maxwell R.Thurman, wanted.In particular, they wanted to change Blue Spoon,the plan for neutralizing the PDF, in order to pro-vide a capability to respond virtually withoutnotice to unforeseen contingencies and to com-bine conventional and special forces, such as ArmyRangers and paratroopers, for night operations.They also wanted to be able to do more than sim-ply neutralize the PDE After 3 October it was clearthat simply eliminating Noriega and replacing himwith another Panamanian military officer wouldhave little effect on the situation. The PDF was,after all, his creature.

The need for change meant a larger role for theXVIII Airborne Corps under Lieutenant GeneralCarl W Stiner, USA. His command was the U.S.Army's crisis action team which any of the region-al commanders-in-chief could task. Able to call onsome 85,000 troops at posts throughout theUnited States, and to deploy forces on short notice,it had a large and competent operations staff, aswell as some of the best troops and equipment inthe U.S. arsenal. Stiner himself was an experiencedand aggressive field commander who already had acontingency plan for Panama on the shelf. Butnow Powell and Thurman decided to enlargeStiner's role. His staff would take the lead in plan-ning operations in Panama and, in the event of hos-tilities, he would assume overall command, becom-ing Commander-in-Chief, Joint Task Force South.

The final version of Stiners operations plan,known as XVIII Airborne Corps Op Plan 90-2,emphasized overwhelming force, maximum sur-prise, and centralized control. In line with guid-ance from Washington, it also emphasized the needfor restraint in the application of force in order tolimit collateral damage and civilian casualties. Theprincipal missions under the plan were to protectthe canal, defend treaty rights, remove Noriegafrom power, and create a substitute for the PDF toprotect a democratically-elected government inPanama.

Stiners plan of attack called for operations to

17

begin with a number of simultaneous attacksthroughout the country. The primary mission forTask Force Semper Fi, the designation given MarineForces Panama and its attached units under 90-2,was to support the attacks by defending the west-ern approaches to Panama City, including theBridge of the Americas which connected the eastand west sides of the Pan-American Highway overthe Canal. Since Marine forces were already per-fectly positioned, the planners needed only tomake it official. Although not explicit in all ver-sions of the plan, other missions assigned included:protecting U.S. facilities at Howard, Rodman, andneighboring Fort Kobbe; seizing the port of VacaMonte; and neutralizing all PDF threats in itsassigned zone, which included bases and stationsin the towns ofArraijan and Veracruz. The securityof Howard, through which troops and equipmentflowed into Panama, eventually became Marinecommand's focus of effort.6

In October and November, General Stiner andhis staff held a series of meetings in Panama withsubordinate commanders to discuss the plan. Thecommander of Marine Forces Panama, ColonelCharles E. Richardson; his operations officer,Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Franks; and liaisonofficer, Major Bron N. Madrigan, represented theMarine position with energy and imagination.They made it clear that 90-2 represented a sub-stantial change and expansion of the originalMarine mission in Panama. Under 90-2, the Marinecommand could become responsible for an areawhich embraced literally hundreds of square kilo-meters. Remembering that it had originallydeployed as the advance force for a Marine expe-ditionary brigade, and that Blue Spoon had con-tained provisions for a MEB, Franks suggested inearly October that the MEB be written into 90-2.When it became clear that this would not happen,both Richardson and Franks repeatedly requestedthat at least one Marine battalion deploy to Panamato augment the task force. Ultimately, GeneralStiner decided against deploying additional Marineforces. However, he did agree to provide a battal-ion of the 82d Airborne Division no later than 36hours after H-Hour, in addition to the 5 36thEngineer Battalion and the 534th Military PoliceCompany. Later in the planning cycle, Stiners staffdecided to substitute a battalion of the 7th InfantryDivision (Light) for the battalion of the 82dAirborne Division.6'

ate existing contingency plans for Panama .

Collectively known as Prayer Book, they include d

plans for neutralizing the PDF, defending theCanal, and restoring law and order. But they were

primarily defensive in nature. They lacked the

range of options, specifically offensive options, that

the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,General Colin L . Powell, and the new SouthCom

commander, General Maxwell R .Thurman, wanted .

In particular, they wanted to change Blue Spoon ,

the plan for neutralizing the PDF, in order to pro-vide a capability to respond virtually withoutnotice to unforeseen contingencies and to com-bine conventional and special forces, such as Arm yRangers and paratroopers, for night operations .

They also wanted to be able to do more than sim-ply neutralize the PDF. After 3 October it was clea r

that simply eliminating Noriega and replacing hi mwith another Panamanian military officer woul d

have little effect on the situation . The PDF was ,

after all, his creature .The need for change meant a larger role for th e

XVIII Airborne Corps under Lieutenant General

Carl W. Stiner, USA. His command was the U.S .

Army's crisis action team which any of the region-

al commanders-in-chief could task . Able to call on

some 85,000 troops at posts throughout th e

United States, and to deploy forces on short notice ,

it had a large and competent operations staff, a s

well as some of the best troops and equipment in

the U.S . arsenal . Stiner himself was an experienced

and aggressive field commander who already had a

contingency plan for Panama on the shelf. But

now Powell and Thurman decided to enlarge

Stiner's role . His staff would take the lead in plan-ning operations in Panama and, in the event of hos -tilities, he would assume overall command, becom-ing Commander-in-Chief, Joint Task Force South .

The final version of Stiner's operations plan ,

known as XVIII Airborne Corps Op Plan 90-2 ,

emphasized overwhelming force, maximum sur-prise, and centralized control . In line with guid-

ance from Washington, it also emphasized the nee d

for restraint in the application of force in order t o

limit collateral damage and civilian casualties . The

principal missions under the plan were to protec tthe canal, defend treaty rights, remove Noriegafrom power, and create a substitute for the PDF toprotect a democratically-elected government i n

Panama .Stiner's plan of attack called for operations to

begin with a number of simultaneous attack sthroughout the country. The primary mission forTask Force Semper Fi, the designation given Marin e

Forces Panama and its attached units under 90-2 ,

was to support the attacks by defending the west-

ern approaches to Panama City, including th eBridge of the Americas which connected the eas t

and west sides of the Pan-American Highway ove r

the Canal . Since Marine forces were already per-fectly positioned, the planners needed only tomake it official . Although not explicit in all ver-sions of the plan, other missions assigned included :

protecting U.S . facilities at Howard, Rodman, andneighboring Fort Kobbe ; seizing the port of Vaca

Monte; and neutralizing all PDF threats in its

assigned zone, which included bases and stations

in the towns of Arraijan and Veracruz . The security

of Howard, through which troops and equipmen t

flowed into Panama, eventually became Marine

command's focus of effort ." '

In October and November, General Stiner an d

his staff held a series of meetings in Panama with

subordinate commanders to discuss the plan . The

commander of Marine Forces Panama, Colone l

Charles E. Richardson ; his operations officer,

Lieutenant Colonel Michael J . Franks ; and liaison

officer, Major Bron N . Madrigan, represented theMarine position with energy and imagination .

They made it clear that 90-2 represented a sub-stantial change and expansion of the origina l

Marine mission in Panama. Under 90-2, the Marine

command could become responsible for an are a

which embraced literally hundreds of square kilo -

meters . Remembering that it had originallydeployed as the advance force for a Marine expe-

ditionary brigade, and that Blue Spoon had con-tained provisions for a MEB, Franks suggested i n

early October that the MEB be written into 90-2 .When it became clear that this would not happen ,both Richardson and Franks repeatedly requeste d

that at least one Marine battalion deploy to Panam a

to augment the task force . Ultimately, General

Stiner decided against deploying additional Marine

forces . However, he did agree to provide a battal-ion of the 82d Airborne Division no later than 3 6

hours after H-Hour, in addition to the 536t h

Engineer Battalion and the 534th Military Police

Company. Later in the planning cycle, Stiner's staff

decided to substitute a battalion of the 7th Infantr y

Division (Light) for the battalion of the 82 d

Airborne Division . "

17

In the meantime, the LA! Marines continued toconduct Sand Flea operations. Given the height-ened possibility of a large-scale operation againstNoriega and the PDF, these operations were moreimportant than ever. While Panamanian militaryresponses may have slowed somewhat due to thepurge which followed the coup attempt, therewere still difficult times. On 31 October, for exam-ple, Company B encountered a roadblock at LaChorerra, several kilometers west of the CanalZone along the Pan-American Highway, during theexecution of Operation Chisum. The Marines weredisappointed when JTF Panama ordered them toturn around rather than accept the risk of collater-al damage which attempts to breach inevitablyentailed.62

On 22 November 1989, during OperationRough Rider, matters were refreshingly differentfor the next company of LA! Marines to serve inPanama--Company D, 2d LAI Battalion, underCaptain Gerald H. Gaskins. Planned to familiarizethe fresh company with the towns of NuevoEmperador, Nuevo Guarare, Vista Allegre, andArraijan, the operation called for the deploymentof 12 LAVs and three HMMWVs, supported by anArmy psychological operations detachment andtwo treaty affairs officers, as well as an OH-58 PaveLow helicopter. On the outskirts of Vista Allegre,the leading LAY reported a crowd wavingPanamanian flags and several banners in front of aroadblock. At that point, the lead element halted75 meters from the roadblock, while the rear ele-ment set up a counterblock to prevent any sur-prise from the rear. When a shouting match erupt-ed between the treaty affairs officers and thecrowd, Captain Gaskins requested permission towarn the crowd that, in five minutes, the LAYswould breach the roadblock. Almost immediately,Marine Forces Panama granted permission. CaptainGaskins ordered the treaty affairs officers toreboard their vehicles and the company to move.He described what happened next:

The agitators realized what our intentions were, andseveral vehicles were hit by rocks. The company . . . col-lapsed into a single file except for the rear elementwhich blocked traffic until every vehicle was through.One Panamanian rammed an LAV-L with a pickup truck

[A] female agitator tried to block our movement withher body She feU backwards, feet in the air, flipping overanother . . . vehicle. The agitators were shocked, andbegan beating our vehicles with their fists, flag poles,

18

and anything else they could [lay their hands on] Onthe other side of the roadblock was another crowd, thisone friendly, cheering . . . what we had done. . .

Five minutes later the company was again mov-ing down the open road. Soon, however, it encoun-tered two more roadblocks. It breached the firstwithout stopping. The second, near the town ofRio Potrero, was built around a farmer's pickuptruck. The PDF had apparently forced him and hisneighbors to set it up. When the treaty affairs offi-cers told the farmer that the Marines had simplypushed vehicles out of their way at two previousroadblocks, he and his friends redirected theiranger at the Panamanian troops and drove the lit-tle truck away.

Block and counterblock technology continuedto evolve after Rough Rider. The Panamaniansstaged junkyard vehicles at key locations to createroadblocks, and stacked old tires in front of them,ready to set them on fire. The Marines acquiredgrappling hooks and fire extinguishers to removethe threat, and prepared for more serious threats,such as Molotov cocktails, by issuing M-14 rifles totwo trained snipers in the company.65

Setting the Stage for Just Cause

Although Sand Flea operations continuedthroughout December, the Marines spent moreand more time planning and rehearsing for contin-gencies under Plan 90-2. Marine counterintelli-gence operatives and interrogator-translators con-tinued to collect data on potential threats andtargets of all kinds, including specific buildings andindividual defense force personalities. Theirreports, often the fruit of long hours on the streetsand in the barrios around Rodman, placed a wealthof information at the disposal of ColonelRichardson's staff. With that knowledge in hand,they were able to conduct realistic planning exer-cises, and prepare for operations against a range ofpotential targets. As part of the process, operationsofficers drafted sets of orders, written for bothoffensive and defensive scenarios, which were dis-tributed to all companies. First Lieutenant KennethM. DeTreux recalled that at least once a week com-pany commanders briefed their officers on recentdevelopments and pointed out possible changes inthe orders that could result from them. Then theofficers would conduct map exercises. ColonelRichardson also conducted frequent sand table

In the meantime, the LAI Marines continued toconduct Sand Flea operations . Given the height-ened possibility of a large-scale operation agains tNoriega and the PDF, these operations were moreimportant than ever. While Panamanian militar yresponses may have slowed somewhat due to th epurge which followed the coup attempt, ther ewere still difficult times . On 31 October, for exam-ple, Company B encountered a roadblock at L aChorerra, several kilometers west of the Cana lZone along the Pan-American Highway, during th eexecution of Operation Chisum. The Marines wer edisappointed when JTF Panama ordered them t oturn around rather than accept the risk of collater-al damage which attempts to breach inevitablyentailed . G"

On 22 November 1989, during Operatio nRough Rider, matters were refreshingly differen tfor the next company of LAI Marines to serve i nPanama--Company D, 2d LAI Battalion, underCaptain Gerald H . Gaskins . Planned to familiarizethe fresh company with the towns of NuevoEmperador, Nuevo Guarare, Vista Allegre, an dArraijan, the operation called for the deploymen tof 12 LAVs and three HMMWVs, supported by a nArmy psychological operations detachment andtwo treaty affairs officers, as well as an OH-58 PaveLow helicopter. On the outskirts of Vista Allegre ,the leading LAV reported a crowd wavingPanamanian flags and several banners in front of aroadblock. At that point, the lead element halted75 meters from the roadblock, while the rear ele-ment set up a counterblock to prevent any sur-prise from the rear. When a shouting match erupt-ed between the treaty affairs officers and thecrowd, Captain Gaskins requested permission t owarn the crowd that, in five minutes, the LAVswould breach the roadblock . Almost immediately,Marine Forces Panama granted permission . CaptainGaskins ordered the treaty affairs officers t oreboard their vehicles and the company to move .He described what happened next :

The agitators realized what our intentions were, an dseveral vehicles were hit by rocks . The company . . . col-

lapsed into a single file except for the rear element

which blocked traffic until every vehicle was through .

One Panamanian rammed an LAV-L with a pickup truc k. . . . [A] female agitator tried to block our movement withher body. She fell backwards, feet in the air, flipping ove ranother . . . vehicle . The agitators were shocked, and

began beating our vehicles with their fists, flag poles,

and anything else they could [lay their hands on] . . . .O n

the other side of the roadblock was another crowd, thi s

one friendly, cheering . . . what we had done . . . ."

Five minutes later the company was again mov -

ing down the open road . Soon, however, it encoun-tered two more roadblocks . It breached the firs twithout stopping . The second, near the town o f

Rio Potrero, was built around a farmer's pickuptruck. The PDF had apparently forced him and hi sneighbors to set it up. When the treaty affairs offi-cers told the farmer that the Marines had simply

pushed vehicles out of their way at two previou sroadblocks, he and his friends redirected theiranger at the Panamanian troops and drove the lit -

tle truck away.`''Block and counterblock technology continue d

to evolve after Rough Rider. The Panamaniansstaged junkyard vehicles at key locations to createroadblocks, and stacked old tires in front of them ,ready to set them on fire . The Marines acquiredgrappling hooks and fire extinguishers to remov ethe threat, and prepared for more serious threats ,such as Molotov cocktails, by issuing M-14 rifles totwo trained snipers in the company.`5

Setting the Stage for Just Cause

Although Sand Flea operations continuedthroughout December, the Marines spent moreand more time planning and rehearsing for contin -gencies under Plan 90-2 . Marine counterintelli-gence operatives and interrogator-translators con-tinued to collect data on potential threats andtargets of all kinds, including specific buildings an dindividual defense force personalities. Theirreports, often the fruit of long hours on the street sand in the barrios around Rodman, placed a wealt hof information at the disposal of Colone lRichardson's staff. With that knowledge in hand ,they were able to conduct realistic planning exer-cises, and prepare for operations against a range ofpotential targets. As part of the process, operation sofficers drafted sets of orders, written for bot hoffensive and defensive scenarios, which were dis-tributed to all companies . First Lieutenant KennethM. DeTreux recalled that at least once a week com -pany commanders briefed their officers on recen tdevelopments and pointed out possible changes i nthe orders that could result from them . Then th eofficers would conduct map exercises . ColonelRichardson also conducted frequent sand tabl e

18

Photo by C\VO-3 Charles W. Rowe,Jr.

Light Amphibious Infantry Battalion Marinestrain for urban warfare. In the event of conflictthe Marines were to be prepared to secure a num-ber of Panamanian Defense Force facilities.

exercises for the same purpose.Company D, 2d LAI Battalion, prepared to

secure a nearby PDF facility Directorate of Trafficand Transportation (DNTT) Station No. 2, inArraijan, and, to a limited extent, trained for mili-tary operations in urban areas. Although none ofthe Marines, either in the LAI or the infantry com-pany, received a great deal of urban training, atleast the LA! Scout platoon practiced, as a unit, foroperations that went beyond the simple mission ofeach fire team protecting its own LAy. Other LAIMarines worked with the Army's Task Force Gator,whose objective was to neutralize theCommandancia. After witnessing the accuracy ofLAy gunnery, and conducting extensive tests,including firing into windows at ranges up to2,000 meters, Army planners concluded that theLAy was the most effective weapon in the JTFPanama inventory for engaging targets inside thePDF Headquarters, a complex of 15 buildings

19

including a three-story fortress-like office building.The result was that one LA! platoon was orderedto join Task Force Gator. To prepare for anotherpossible mission in downtown Panama City FASTMarines practiced operations to reinforce thedetachment of Marine Security Guards at theAmerican Embassy, which was near theCommandancia.67

It bears emphasis that virtually all Marines wereinvolved in preparations for implementing 90-2.Colonel Richardson realized that, given the ambi-tious nature of the mission, it was likely that hewould commit Marines from administrative andcombat service support units to combat, that is,commit Marines whose primary job was to sup-port the Marines on the front lines. They practicedbasic combat skills and literally fired theirweapons day and night until he was satisfied withtheir proficiency.68

The added responsibility was especially wel-come to one Marine, Second LieutenantThomas H.Goessman, who had joined the Marine Corps tobecome an infantry officer but, by the luck of thedraw at the Basic School, became a supply officer.He was elated when it dawned on him that he waslikely to see more action than many of his brotherofficers who were serving in combat arms billetsoutside Panama. Most, if not all, Marines in Panamashared Goessman's attitude; they wanted to bethere and to share in conducting the operation.6

• The tempo of events increased significantlyafter 16 December. That day, Marine FirstLieutenant Robert Paz, who was assigned to theoperations section at SouthCorn and therefore notsubject to the precautionary Marine command reg-ulation against liberty in Panama City, drove withthree other officers to have dinner in the capital.They lost their way and found themselves at a PDFcheckpoint near the Commandancia. Panamaniansoldiers carrying AK-47 rifles shouted threats andattempted to drag them out of their car. At thatpoint, the young officers decided to drive away. Atleast one of the PDF soldiers opened fire with anAK-47, and hit the car. Paz, who was sitting in theback seat, was struck by a round which enteredthrough the trunk. He was pronounced dead a fewminutes later at Gorgas Army Community Hospital.Navy Lieutenant Adam J. Curtis and his wife,Bonnie, witnessed the incident, having beenstopped at the same checkpoint. Shortly after theshooting, they themselves were taken to the

Photo by CWO-3 Charles W. Rowe, Jr.

Light Amphibious Infantry Battalion Marines

train for urban warfare. In the event of conflict

the Marines were to be prepared to secure a num-ber of Panamanian Defense Force facilities.

exercises for the same purpose . "Company D, 2d LAI Battalion, prepared to

secure a nearby PDF facility, Directorate of Traffic

and Transportation (DNTT) Station No . 2, in

Arraijan, and, to a limited extent, trained for mili-tary operations in urban areas . Although none o f

the Marines, either in the LAI or the infantry com-pany, received a great deal of urban training, a tleast the LAI scout platoon practiced, as a unit, foroperations that went beyond the simple mission o feach fire team protecting its own LAV. Other LAIMarines worked with the Army's Task Force Gator ,whose objective was to neutralize th eCommandancia . After witnessing the accuracy ofLAV gunnery, and conducting extensive tests ,including firing into windows at ranges up to2,000 meters, Army planners concluded that theLAV was the most effective weapon in the JTFPanama inventory for engaging targets inside thePDF Headquarters, a complex of 15 buildings

including a three-story fortress-like office building .The result was that one LAI platoon was ordered

to join Task Force Gator. To prepare for anothe r

possible mission in downtown Panama City, FAS TMarines practiced operations to reinforce th edetachment of Marine Security Guards at th e

American Embassy, which was near th eCommandancia . "

It bears emphasis that virtually all Marines wereinvolved in preparations for implementing 90-2 .Colonel Richardson realized that, given the ambi-tious nature of the mission, it was likely that hewould commit Marines from administrative an d

combat service support units to combat, that is ,commit Marines whose primary job was to sup -port the Marines on the front lines . They practice dbasic combat skills and literally fired thei r

weapons day and night until he was satisfied wit h

their proficiency. "The added responsibility was especially wel-

come to one Marine, Second Lieutenant Thomas H .Goessman, who had joined the Marine Corps to

become an infantry officer but, by the luck of th e

draw at the Basic School, became a supply officer.

He was elated when it dawned on him that he wa s

likely to see more action than many of his brothe r

officers who were serving in combat arms billetsoutside Panama. Most, if not all, Marines in Panam ashared Goessman's attitude; they wanted to b ethere and to share in conducting the operation ."

The tempo of events increased significantly

after 16 December. That day, Marine First

Lieutenant Robert Paz, who was assigned to th e

operations section at SouthCom and therefore no t

subject to the precautionary Marine command reg-ulation against liberty in Panama City, drove wit hthree other officers to have dinner in the capital .

They lost their way, and found themselves at a PD F

checkpoint near the Commandancia . Panamaniansoldiers carrying AK-47 rifles shouted threats andattempted to drag them out of their car. At tha tpoint, the young officers decided to drive away. Atleast one of the PDF soldiers opened fire with anAK-47, and hit the car. Paz, who was sitting in theback seat, was struck by a round which entere dthrough the trunk. He was pronounced dead a fewminutes later at Gorgas Army Community Hospital .Navy Lieutenant Adam J. Curtis and his wife ,Bonnie, witnessed the incident, having beenstopped at the same checkpoint . Shortly after theshooting, they themselves were taken to the

19

Commandancia, where PDF soldiers beat the lieu-tenant and threatened his wife. They werereleased a few hours later.7°

American military leaders in Washington andPanama reacted strongly to the incidents, especial-ly since Noriega had declared on 15 Decemberthat a state of war existed between the UnitedStates and Panama. It now appeared that Americanservicemen were at risk in Panama, and that thePDF was Out of control. The decision was relative-ly easy To do nothing but protest was unaccept-able. To remove Noriega and leave the PDF intactwas not any more attractive now than it had beenin October, especially since the PDF appeared tohave acted more or less on its own on 16December. The only option remaining was toimplement 90-2 contingency plans against bothNoriega and the PDF, which the Joint Chiefs ofStaff discussed when they gathered at GeneralPowell's quarters in Washington on Sunday, 17December.7

During the meeting, the Commandant of theMarine Corps, General Alfred M. Gray, offered tocommit the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit(MEU), Special Operations Capable (SOC), toPanama. He pointed out that the unit, a compositeMarine Air- Ground Task Force built around a bat-talion landing team of infantry, was thoroughlytrained and ready. It was already embarked onboard ship and, unlike airborne units, carried 30days worth of supplies. Currently between Hawaiiand California, it could be off Panama within a fewdays.** However, the consensus among the JointChiefs was that the United States needed to reactas soon as possible, and that the approximately24,000 troops already earmarked for the operationunder Contingency Plan 90-2 would be more thanenough to ensure quick success. With the JointChiefs in full agreement, General Powell secured

*At least one writer has raised questions about the incident,suggesting that Lieutenant Paz and the other officers in the carmay have been on some kind of mission, possibly of their ownmaking. The driver of the vehicle, Captain Richard E. Haddad,was also a Marine Corps officer assigned to SouthernCommand. See John G. Roos,"Did President Bush jump the gunin ordering the invasion of Panama?" Armed Forces JournalInternational, Sep92, pp. 10, 14.

**Three amphibious group ships with the embarked

Marine Expeditionary Unit arrived off Camp Pendleton on 19December, while the fourth arrived in San Diego and offloadedon 22 December.

20

the President's approval to proceed. H-Hour wasset for 0100 on 20 December.

The decision to execute 90-2, now renamed JustCause by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was closely held,and even after being briefed by the current JTFPanama commander, Major General Marc A.Cisneros, USA, on the night of 18 December,Colonel Richardson could not inform his staff.Returning from the meeting, all he said to themwas that Lieutenant Paz had not died in vain, andthen set about making sure that his Marines wereas prepared as they could be without knowing theplans. This meant that 19 December became amaintenance and logistics day Captain Gaskinstold his officers that, until further notice, theirappointed place of duty was the maintenanceramp. While the LAJ officers were at the mainte-nance ramp, Colonel Richardson attended anothermeeting at JTF Panama headquarters, and receivedpermission to brief his officers at 1800, and toallow them to brief their troops three hours later.72

Even though the Marine mission did not coin-cide exactly with expectations, and even thoughthe decision to execute at night came as a surprise,the objectives and tasks were by and large familiar,ones which the Marines had anticipated in theirtraining. At 1800 on the 19th, Colonel Richardsonbriefed individual units on their assigned missions.Company D, 2d LAI Battalion (Minus) (Reinforced),was to attack and seize DN1T Station No. 2, attackand seize the PDF station in Arraijan, and screen tothe west of Arraijan. Company D's 2d Platoon wasto support Task Force Gator. Company I, 3dBattalion, 6th Marines (Reinforced), was to estab-lish a roadblock south of Howard AFB, attack andseize the PDF station in Veracruz, and maintainsecurity in the tank farm. When relieved by theMarine Security Force Company, it was to occupythe high ground west of Howard, and screen theapproaches to the airfield. The reinforced detach-ment from BSSG-6 was to form a provisional rifleplatoon, seize and hold the Bridge of the Americas,and provide combat service support to Marinecommand. The Marine Security Force Companywas to relieve Company I in the tank farm, followin trace of Company D and establish a roadblockwest of the fuel storage facility on the Pan-American Highway, and maintain security at otherU.S. Navy installations. The FAST Platoon, in addi-tion to serving as the command's reserve, wouldbe prepared, on order, to reinforce the Marine

Commandancia, where PDF soldiers beat the lieu-

tenant and threatened his wife . They werereleased a few hours later.'°

American military leaders in Washington and

Panama reacted strongly to the incidents, especial-ly since Noriega had declared on 15 Decembe rthat a state of war existed between the Unite d

States and Panama . It now appeared that America n

servicemen were at risk in Panama, and that th ePDF was out of control . The decision was relative-ly easy. To do nothing but protest was unaccept-

able . To remove Noriega and leave the PDF intac twas not any more attractive now than it had bee n

in October, especially since the PDF appeared tohave acted more or less on its own on 1 6December. The only option remaining was t oimplement 90-2 contingency plans against bot hNoriega and the PDF, which the Joint Chiefs o fStaff discussed when they gathered at Genera l

Powell's quarters in Washington on Sunday, 1 7December. "

During the meeting, the Commandant of th eMarine Corps, General Alfred M . Gray, offered t ocommit the 11th Marine Expeditionary Uni t(MEU), Special Operations Capable (SOC), t oPanama. He pointed out that the unit, a composit eMarine Air- Ground Task Force built around a bat-talion landing team of infantry, was thoroughlytrained and ready. It was already embarked onboard ship and, unlike airborne units, carried 3 0days worth of supplies . Currently between Hawai iand California, it could be off Panama within a fe wdays . ** However, the consensus among the JointChiefs was that the United States needed to reac tas soon as possible, and that the approximately24,000 troops already earmarked for the operatio nunder Contingency Plan 90-2 would be more tha nenough to ensure quick success . With the JointChiefs in full agreement, General Powell secure d

* At least one writer has raised questions about the incident ,suggesting that Lieutenant Paz and the other officers in the carmay have been on some kind of mission, possibly of their ow nmaking . The driver of the vehicle, Captain Richard E . Haddad ,was also a Marine Corps officer assigned to Souther n

Command . See John G. Roos,"Did President Bush jump the gu nin ordering the invasion of Panama?" Armed Forces Journa l

International, Sep92, pp . 10, 14 .

** Three amphibious group ships with the embarke d

Marine Expeditionary Unit arrived off Camp Pendleton on 1 9

December, while the fourth arrived in San Diego and offloade d

on 22 December.

the President's approval to proceed . H-Hour wasset for 0100 on 20 December.

The decision to execute 90-2, now renamed Just

Cause by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was closely held ,

and even after being briefed by the current JTFPanama commander, Major General Marc A .

Cisneros, USA, on the night of 18 December,

Colonel Richardson could not inform his staff .Returning from the meeting, all he said to them

was that Lieutenant Paz had not died in vain, an dthen set about making sure that his Marines wereas prepared as they could be without knowing th e

plans . This meant that 19 December became a

maintenance and logistics day. Captain Gaskin stold his officers that, until further notice, their

appointed place of duty was the maintenanceramp . While the LAI officers were at the mainte-nance ramp, Colonel Richardson attended anothe rmeeting at JTF Panama headquarters, and receivedpermission to brief his officers at 1800, and toallow them to brief their troops three hours later.' ]

Even though the Marine mission did not coin-cide exactly with expectations, and even thoug hthe decision to execute at night came as a surprise ,

the objectives and tasks were by and large familiar,

ones which the Marines had anticipated in thei rtraining . At 1800 on the 19th, Colonel Richardsonbriefed individual units on their assigned missions .Company D, 2d LAI Battalion (Minus) (Reinforced) ,was to attack and seize DNTT Station No . 2, attackand seize the PDF station in Arraijan, and screen t othe west of Arraijan . Company D's 2d Platoon wasto support Task Force Gator. Company I, 3 d

Battalion, 6th Marines (Reinforced), was to estab-lish a roadblock south of Howard AFB, attack andseize the PDF station in Veracruz, and maintai nsecurity in the tank farm. When relieved by th eMarine Security Force Company, it was to occupy

the high ground west of Howard, and screen th eapproaches to the airfield. The reinforced detach-ment from BSSG-6 was to form a provisional rifl eplatoon, seize and hold the Bridge of the Americas ,and provide combat service support to Marin ecommand. The Marine Security Force Compan ywas to relieve Company I in the tank farm, followin trace of Company D and establish a roadblockwest of the fuel storage facility on the Pan -American Highway, and maintain security at othe rU .S . Navy installations . The FAST Platoon, in addi-tion to serving as the command's reserve, woul dbe prepared, on order, to reinforce the Marin e

20

21

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21

P/3oto by Sgt Robert C.JenL's

Marine Forces commander Col Charles E. Richardson, center left, paces the floor ofthe combat operations center two hours before Operation Just Cause is launched.

Detachment at the U.S. Embassy and provide aclose-quarter battle element for Company D.

When Richardson briefed the mission, hestressed security of operations and the use of min-imum force. He told his commanders to avoiddamaging historical sites and public works, and togive the PDF the opportunity to surrender. No onewas to forget that the Panamanian people were notthe target. But he did not want anyone to neglectthe mission, concluding with the words attack alltargets, including the PDF, the traffic police, andthe Dignity Battalions.73

When Major Robert B. Neller, commander of thesecurity force since August 1988, briefed hisMarines, he spoke for many other Marine com-manders when he said that this was the moment oftruth, one for which many of them had been wait-ing. He told his Marines that it was all right to bescared; that was normal. All they had to do was todo their jobs and take care of each other. TheMarines were quiet and serious; there was nocheering. But there was commitment. For exam-ple, three Marines who had already checked out ofthe command and were waiting to fly home quiet-1)1 drew their weapons and went back to work.74

Combat

Even before H-Hour, Marines went into action.At approximately 0040, Captain Gaskins received areport that Panamanian V-300 armored personnelcarriers were on the move in the vicinity ofRodman. He assumed that they were heading forPanama City, and, mindful of his mission, orderedhis Marines to begin moving to their blocking posi-tions. At approximately 0050, 13 Company D LAVsmoved out, loaded with the scout platoon, underSergeant Thomas P. Bernius, and 17 FAST Marines.As the LAVs approached DNTT Station No. 2, thePDF opened fire with small arms from nearbybunkers. While 1st Platoon proceeded towards itsobjective at Arraijan despite the fire, 3d platoonturned its attention on the station. With roundspinging off their armor, three of its LAVs burst intothe Station compound, firing their M-60 coaxialmachine guns; they did not fire their main guns inorder to limit collateral damage. Two of the vehi-cles stopped about 20 meters from the station andcontinued to fire while Sergeant Bernius and asquad of scouts under Corporal Garreth C. Isaakdismounted and ran up to the building. Bernius

22

I -#

Photo by Sgt Robert C. Jenks

Marine Forces commander Col Charles E. Richardson, center left, paces the floor ofthe combat operations center two hours before Operation Just Cause is launched .

Detachment at the U.S . Embassy and provide aclose-quarter battle element for Company D .

When Richardson briefed the mission, h estressed security of operations and the use of min-imum force . He told his commanders to avoiddamaging historical sites and public works, and togive the PDF the opportunity to surrender. No on ewas to forget that the Panamanian people were no tthe target . But he did not want anyone to neglectthe mission, concluding with the words "attack alltargets," including the PDF, the traffic police, andthe Dignity Battalions . 73

When Major Robert B . Neller, commander of thesecurity force since August 1988, briefed hisMarines, he spoke for many other Marine com-manders when he said that this was the moment oftruth, one for which many of them had been wait-ing. He told his Marines that it was all right to b escared ; that was normal . All they had to do was todo their jobs and take care of each other. TheMarines were quiet and serious; there was nocheering . But there was commitment. For exam-ple, three Marines who had already checked out o fthe command and were waiting to fly home quiet-ly drew their weapons and went back to work . 74

Combat

Even 'before H-Hour, Marines went into action .At approximately 0040, Captain Gaskins received areport that Panamanian V-300 armored personne lcarriers were on the move in the vicinity o fRodman. He assumed that they were heading fo rPanama City, and, mindful of his mission, orderedhis Marines to begin moving to their blocking posi-tions . At approximately 0050, 13 Company D LAVsmoved out, loaded with the scout platoon, unde rSergeant Thomas P. Bernius, and 17 FAST Marines .As the LAVs approached DNTT Station No . 2, thePDF opened fire with small arms from nearbybunkers . While 1st Platoon proceeded towards it sobjective at Arraijan despite the fire, 3d platoo nturned its attention on the station. With roundspinging off their armor, three of its LAVs burst int othe station compound, firing their M-60 coaxia lmachine guns ; they did not fire their main guns inorder to limit collateral damage . Two of the vehi-cles stopped about 20 meters from the station an dcontinued to fire while Sergeant Bernius and asquad of scouts under Corporal Garreth C . Isaakdismounted and ran up to the building . Bernius

22