Court of Common Pleas order: Stephen R. Reed

8/17/2019 Court of Common Pleas order: Stephen R. Reed

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DA

LE

E.

K

LElN

CLERKOF

1

HE COUR

T

DAU

P

HIN COUNTY

COURT

OF

COl\ofMON

PLEAS

Clerk

of

the Court

o Common Pleas

Date S l

~

FROM

\ J ~

Clerk o Courts

101

Market Street

Harr

i

sburg

,

PA

171

1

Phone: (717) 780-6530

Fax: (717) 7 8 6 4 7 2

Dauphin County

No. 84

8

1

DAU

PHI

NCOUNTYCOURTHOUSF.

SECOND

JILOOR

R

OOM202

101 MARKE J

l

HARR I

SBURG

PA 17101

(117)

780-6530


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May

. 16 2 16 1

:22M/

No.

8482 P 2

ORIGIN L

.

I • . .

COMMONWEALTH

: IN THE

COURT

OF COMMON

PLEAS

: DAUPHIN COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA

vs.

: CRIMINAL DIVISION

STEPHEN

R.

REED

:

CP

-

22-CR-5068-2015

OPINION

AND

ORDER

Hess,

S.J., May

4

,

2016

Before this Court is the Omnibus

P r e ~

Trial Motion ofthe Defendant Stephen

R.

Reed .

The Motion seeks dismissal

o he

charges on

two

grounds. First,

the

Defendant contends that

the

applicable statute o limitation bars

the

majority

o

the charges. Secondly,

the

Defendant

contends that the

information is

facially

defective

because while

it

charges crimes it does

not

allege any

acts

which are in fact

c

riminal. The

procedural

and

factual

background

o

this case

is as follows:

The

Defendant, Stephen R.

Reed

, is the former mayor o the capital city o Harri

sb

urg.

He was

first elected

to

office in 1981 and

was

reelected

every

four

years until May

of2009. At

that

time

he lost

the Democratic

primary and left office on January

4 20 10. In 20 15

, the Office

o

he Attorney General convened a Statewide Investigating Grand Jury. Following the

.issuance

o a presentment by the Grand

Jury

the Attorney General s Office filed a criminal complaint.

The complaint was filed on July 14, 2015. On N

ovem

her

16

2015. the Office

o

he Attorney

General filed an Information which

like

the criminal complaint, relied on the

Grand Jury

pr

esentment in terms

o

setting forth the sp

ecifics

of the criminal acts alleged. information

I


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No. 8482 D 3

contains

449

counts which

focus,

inter alia, on certain activities of

the

Defendant in his capacity

as

the

mayor

o

Harrisburg.

In his

Omnibus

Pre-Trial Motion, the Defendant alleges that many o the activities n

ow

deemed to

be

criminal were carried out in a

o n ~

secretive fashion and occurred with the appJOval

o other

parts

ofHarrisb\U g government. As previously noted, the

Omnibus

Pre-Trial Motion

goes on to assert that

the presentment

does

not

describe

specific acts which

are

elements

o

crime. The

Office

o

he Attorney

General vehemently contends

the opposite.

We do

not reach

this issue

with

respect

to

at least

305

o

the

counts because we

believe they

are

clearly barred

by

the statute

o

limitations.

The Defendant has

been charged with numerous offenses,

including Dealing

in

Proceeds

o Unlawful Activities, Bribery, Theft by Deception, Deceptive Business Practices Cr

iminal

Solicitation Theft byReceiving Stolen Property

etc.

The offenses implicated by

the

statute o

limita

tions are

alleged to have been committed

as

early

as

September

2003 and no

later than

January

2010.

The statute

o f l i m i t t i o n ~

for all

o

hese offenses

is eithe

r

two

or

five years.

Thus for offenses committed in January of2010 the statute oflimitations

wou

ld expire in either

January of2012 or January of2015. In cases involving offenses committed by a public officer,

such as

the

mayor

o

a major city there is

however,

a

prov

ision

o

he

law

which potentially

extends

the

applicable statute

o

imitations by

an

additional eight years. This provision o the

l

aw can be found

at

42

P

a.C.S.A. § 5552(c)(2).

In

fact,

there is

no

dispute between the parties

that this statutory provision is applicable

to

this case. It

reads:

(c)

Exceptions.-Ifthe

period pr·escribed

...has

exp

ired a prosecution

rnay

nevertheless

be commenced for:

2


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No 8482 P 4

(2) any offense committed by a

pubJic

officer or employee in the course of or in

connection with

his

office or employment at

any

time

when

the defendant is in

public office or employment or within

five years

thereafter, but in

no

case shall

this paragraph extend the period o imitation otherwise applicable

by more than

eight

years.

The

Commonwealth

construes

this

statute

to

mean that in prosecutions involving public

officials,

where the

statute

o

limitations is

five years

, this section operates

to

exte

nd the

statute

o

lim

itations

to

thirteen years

regardles

s

o

the time

which has

elapsed

since

the

offici

al left

office. This is

not

what Section

5552 c) 2)

says.

t says that in

order for

there

to be an extension

o the period o he statute o limitations, the prosecution must

be

commenced,


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8482 P 5

by virtue of what we regard as the clear language o he sta

tut

e. there is no triggering o an

extension o he period o limitation in this

case.

The Commonwealth cites appellate case law, particularly court opinions

reg

arding the

called Orie sisters. The case o

Commonwealth

v.

Melv

in, 103 A.3d 1 Pa. Super. 20

14),

involved charges which were filed against Joan Orie Melvin alleging that

she

illegally used her

judicial staff in connection with the

2003

and 2009 campaigns for the Supreme Court of

Pe

rmsylvania.

The charges in the case

we

1e filed on

May

18, 2012 .

In 19

90, Ode Melvin

was

appointed to fill a vacancy on the Court o Common Pleas of Allegheny County and was elected

as

an Allegheny County judge in

1991.

In

1997,

she

was

elected as a judge on the Superior

Court o Pennsylvania and won retention in 2007 . In 2009 , she ran

for

the Supreme Court o

Pennsylvania and

was

elected to

a

ten-

yea

r term.

Thus, when

charges

were

brought, s

he

was

still

in office, clearly aBowing

for

an extension

o

he statute

o

limitations pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.

A.

§ 5552(c)

2).

In

fac

t, the lengtho the statute o limitations was not

an

issue in her case.

Instead, she argued that s

he

was not a ''public officer or e

mp

loyee but rather was, instead, a

judicial officer, The Superior Court, not surprisingly, held that a judicial officer was, in fact. a

public officer.

In

Commonwe' lth

v.

Janine Orie

2013

W.L

. 97

453

87 Pa.

Com . P.L.) (Septem

be

r

12,

2013), Allegheny

Cou

nty Judge Nauhaus applied 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§

5552(c)(2) in

a

manner which

extended the statute oflimitations for a total of thirteen years . t the time of the investigation in

her case,

Ms.

Orie

was

an employee in the office

o

her sister, Supreme

Cow1

Justice Joan Orie

Melvin. For the ten years preceding, she had been on the Judge's staffduring her term on the

We

under

stand the Com

monwealth's well con

si

d

ered argument

that if

a public

offic

ial

wete to commit

a

serio

us offense on h.is or her last

d y

o office , t

here

would be virtua

ll

y no extension of a five yea r statute

of limitations. The fact, h

owever,

that a statute presents with

an

ano

mal

y does not mean that

we ;:u e at

libe1ty to rew

rit

e it.

4


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6

Supedor

Court.

Thus, the charges were not only filed within five years

of

her employment, but

were, in fact, filed at a time when she was a public employee?

Given the foregoing disposition with respect

to 305

counts in

the

info1mation, there

remain 144 counts, ofwhich 142 are the subject

of

he Defendant's second stated ground for .

relief. This is in the form

of

a motion to quash the information. The counts at issue are charges

of

theft by receiving stolen property. The statute,

18

Pa.C.S.A. § 3925, makes it unlawful

to

receive, retain, or dispose ofproperty knowing that it has been stolen or believing that it had

probably beenstolen. It is axiomatic that a jury may find a person guilty of receiving stolen

property even though the jury is satisfied that it was the defendant, himself,

who

stole the

property. In fact, an accusation of theft may be supported by evidence that it was committed n

any manner that would be theft

..

. notwithstanding the specification of a different manner

n

the

complaint or indictment 18 Pa

.C.S.A.

§ 3902. Theft, fundamentally, is the

un

lawful taking

or exel·cising of

unlawful control over property of another with intent to deprive

him

thereof.

l8 Pa.C.S.

A.

§

3921.

The thrust of he Grand

Jury

presentment is that the Defendant, while mayor, purchased

numerous items and artifacts intending that t

he

y be eventually housed in

so

me sort

of

museum.

The presentment, m

oreo

ver,.alleges that

these

various items

were

diverted from this pur

pos

e and

were found to

be

in the possession

and

control of he Defendant. Whether the evidence

as

ultimately presented will support

con

victions

for

theft by receiving stolen property

is for

a jury to

determine.

In

the meantime, we agree with the Commonwealth that a motion to quash the

information would be improper. As the Attorney General has noted, amotion to quash an

information is neither a guilt-determining procedure nor a pre-trial means

fo

r determining the

2

We are

also mindful

of the case of ommonwealth v O Donnell, 542 A.2d 1025 (1988). That was a

case

dealing with an

earlier

version

of he

sta

tute which

allowed

a prosecution

to

be

commenced within

one year after its discovery. Issues ofdiscove1y are

not

presented

in

thi

s

case. ·

s


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8482 P 7

sufficiency ofthe

Commonwealth s

ev idence.

Commonwealth

v Meoli 452 A.2d 1032 (Pa.

Super. 1982 ,

6


8/8

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No

. 8482 P 8

COMMONWEALTH

: IN THE

COURT

OF COMMON

PLEAS

: DAUPHIN COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA

VS.

: CRIMINAL

DIVISION

STEPHEN R.

REED

: CP-22-CR-5068 -2015

IN RE:

OMNIBUS

PRE-TRIAL MOTION FOR RELIEF

OR ER

/

.

..

AND

NOW

h i s ~

day

of

May, 2016 following argument thereon, the

Omn

ibu

s Pre-Trial

Moti

on

of

heDefendant isGRANTED to the extent that Information

Counts

1 through 3 through 35 ,

56

through

82

110 through 207, 303 through 444, and

446

through

449 are

DISMISSED.

BY THE

COURT:

Distributi

on:

-sin.

If

Court of Common Pleas order: Stephen R. Reed

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