Course: Insights from Game Theory into Social Behavior … · Course: Insights from Game Theory...
Transcript of Course: Insights from Game Theory into Social Behavior … · Course: Insights from Game Theory...
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Course:
Insights from Game Theory into Social Behavior
Instructors:
Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli
TAs:
Zoe Hitzig, Maxim Massenkoff, Jason Nemirow
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Let’s discuss some puzzles of social behavior…
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Puzzle 1:
Norm against Chemical Weapons
See The Oatmeal comic about chemical weapons.
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Why were chemical weapons the red line?
Why not 100,000 deaths?
Why not wanton murder of civilians?
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This norm reared its head many times before…
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“These flamethrowers were used to kill Japanese holed into pillboxes, buildings and caves. “ -Wiki entry for Battle of Iwo Jima
Image is in the public domain.
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Why flame throwers?
“A strong military case was made for the use of gas before America’s attack on the island of Iwo Jima; Japanese defenders in caves and tunnels would have been particularly vulnerable. Franklin Roosevelt rejected the idea.”
-The Economist, The History of Chemical Weapons
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>26,000 American casualties, Iwo Jima, WWII
Image is in the public domain.
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“Because all the civilians had been evacuated, there were no civilian casualties at Iwo Jima”
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Video Clip: Japanese Soldier Burnt Alive by Flame Thrower
Note: This video contains content that is not suitable for all ages. You must be 18 years and over to view the content.
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More humane than chemical weapon?
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Thus,
-Chemical weapons would have saved lives!
-No civilian casualties either way!
-Not obviously “more humane”
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In general:
1) Where do such inefficient norms come from?
2) What types of norms occur?
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Puzzle 2:
Apologies
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Salala Pakistan, Nov 26 2011: US accidentally killed 24 Pakistani Soldiers
Image is in the public domain.
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Pakistan closed supply routes, until we apologized
Image removed to copyright restrictions.
View a map of NATO supply routes through Pakistan.
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~$1 billion in extra shipping fees
Image courtesy of DayLove on Flickr. CC BY-NC-SA
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Until July 3 2012
“We are sorry for the losses suffered by the Pakistani military”
-Hilary Clinton
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Immediately after…
“…the ground supply lines into Afghanistan are opening”
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Why wouldn’t US just say sorry?
-mere words?
-worth a billion?
Why would Pakistan care?
-wouldn’t US “fake it”?
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More generally:
1) Why do mere words matter?
2) When do mere words matter?
3) What about other symbolic actions (e.g. coronations, graduations, handshakes, etc)?
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Puzzle 3:
Why do we consider transgressions of commission worse than those of ommission?
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“I won’t kill you…but I don’t have to save you”
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Notice:
-Batman’s intention is the same
-The outcome is the same
-But Batman (and presumably the viewer) thinks omission less bad
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1) Why is omission viewed differently from commision?
2) Is this distinction something we should legally respect or overcome?
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More generally:
1) Where do our moral intuitions come from?
2) Do they make a good basis for law?
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Puzzle 4:
Where do “rights“ come from?
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Self evident? The creator?
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights…”
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Might?
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The “state of nature”?
Image is in the public domain.
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A “social contract”?
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What does this mean?
Where DO rights come from?
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Puzzle 5:
Why do we speak indirectly?
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"So maybe the best thing to do would be to take care of that right here in Brainerd"
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1) Did this line introduce any doubt as to whether a bribe was offered?
2) Would a good cop be any less likely than a corrupt cop to “get it”?
3) Was the goal to prevent “proof” that a bribe was offered?
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More generally,
1) Why do we communicate in this inefficient way?
2) When is it important to do so?
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In this class…
We will explain such puzzles using game theory
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In this class…
We will explain such puzzles using game theory
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What is game theory?
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5, 6 8, 4
3, 2 0, -3
U
D
L R
The simplest “game” can be represented by the following “payoff matrix”
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5,6 8, 4
3, 2 0, -3
U
D
L R
Player 1 chooses between two actions
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5, 6 8, 4
3, 2 0, -3
U
D
L R Player 2 simultaneously chooses between 2 actions
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5, 6 8, 4
3, 2 0, -3
U
D
L R
The payoffs to player 1 are determined by her action as well as the action of player 2
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5, 6 8, 4
3, 2 0, -3
U
D
L R
The payoffs to player 2 are determined by her action as well as the action of player 2
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5, 6 8, 4
3, 2 0, -3
U
D
L R
This game can be “solved” by finding the “Nash equilibria”
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5, 6 8, 4
3, 2 0, -3
U
D
L R
(U, L) is a Nash Equilibrium b/c neither can benefit by unilaterally deviating
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“Prediction” of game theory:
If both “expected” (U,L), both would play (U,L)!
(Nash is “self enforcing”)
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5, 6 8, 4
3, 2 0, -3
U
D
L R
(U,R) is NOT a Nash Equilibrium b/c 2 can benefit by unilaterally deviating to L
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Game theory “predicts”:
If both expected (U,R), player 2 would deviate!
(I.e. if not Nash, cannot be “stable”)
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Nash makes sense (arguably) if…
-Uber-rational
-Calculating
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Such as Auctions…
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Or Oligopolies…
Image courtesy of afagen on Flickr. CC BY NC-SA Image courtesy of longislandwins on Flickr. CC-BY
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But why would game theory matter for our puzzles?
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Norms/rights/morality are not chosen; rather…
We believe we have rights!
We feel batman would be worse if he killed
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We use an innuendo because it feels awkward to explicitly say inappropriate.
Apologies matter because recipients feel nice when they hear them
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But…
From where do these feelings/beliefs come?
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Our thesis (in a few steps):
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Thesis:
Feelings/beliefs that “do better” become “more frequent”
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Thesis:
Feelings/beliefs that “do better” become “more frequent”
Because of “evolution”
(people with certain beliefs or preferences die out?)
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Thesis:
Feelings/beliefs that “do better” become “more frequent”
Because of “selective imitation”
(people with certain beliefs or preferences are more likely to be imitated?)
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Thesis:
Feelings/beliefs that “do better” become “more frequent”
Because of “reinforcement learning”
(certain beliefs or preferences are held onto more tenaciously?)
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Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that do better become more frequent behavior ends up consistent with Nash (o.w. feelings/beliefs would change!) (even though not conscious of Nash, or of where feelings come from)
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Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that do better become more frequent behavior ends up consistent with Nash (o.w. feelings/beliefs would change!) (even though not conscious of Nash, or of where feelings come from)
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Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that do better become more frequent behavior ends up consistent with Nash (o.w. feelings/beliefs would change!) (even though not aware of game, or of where feelings/beliefs come from)
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In detail…
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What is the key assumption in evolution, imitation, reinforcement learning?
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T=0 T=1
Evolution
More successful traits reproduce faster
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T=0 T=1
Selective Imitation
More successful traits more likely to be imitated
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T=0 T=1
Reinforcement Learning
More successful behaviors held more tenaciously
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All 3 processes “optimal behaviors”!
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T=0 T=1 T=2 T=3
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Also true in a game…
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T=0 T=1
L
L
L L
L
L
L
R
R R
R R
R R
L L
More successful strategies become more frequent
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T=0 T=1 T=2 T=3
L
L
L
L L
L
L
L
R
R R
R R
R R
L
L
L
L L
L
L
L
R
R L
R R
L L
L
L
And eventually take over…
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What if beliefs/feelings are being
learned/evolving instead of “strategies”?
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Suppose BL is belief that causes action L to be taken
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T=0 T=1
BL
BL
BL
BL BL
BL
BL
BL
BR
BR BR
BR BR
BR BR
BL
Feelings/beliefs that do better become more frequent
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T=0 T=1 T=2 T=3
BL
BL
BL
BL BL
BL
BL
BL
BR
BR BR
BR BR
BR BR
BL
BL
BL
BL BL
BL
BL
BL
BL
BR BL
BR BR
BL BL
BL
BL
Behavior ends up consistent with Nash
(even though not conscious of Nash, or of where feelings come from) 78
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14.11 Insights from Game Theory into Social BehaviorFall 2013
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