Country Report IndonesiaV-Dem Data Brief Indonesia 4 In the first half of the century, when...

I N S T I T U T E

COUNTRY BRIEFINDONESIA

Valeriya MechkovaMarina Povitkina

Country BriefSERIES 2016:06

THE VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE

May 2016

Please address comments and/or queries for information to:

V-Dem Institute

Department of Political Science

University of Gothenburg

Sprängkullsgatan 19, PO Box 711

SE 40530 Gothenburg

Sweden

E-mail: [email protected]

V-Dem Country Briefs are available in electronic format at www.v-dem.net.

Copyright © 2016 University of Gothenburg, V-Dem Institute. All rights reserved.

V-Dem Data Brief Indonesia

1

About V-Dem Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to conceptualizing andmeasuringdemocracy. V-Dem’smultidimensional and disaggregated approach acknowledges thecomplexityof the conceptofdemocracy. TheV-Demprojectdistinguishesamong fivehigh-level principles of democracy: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, andegalitarian, which are disaggregated into lower-level components and specificindicators.

KeyfeaturesofV-Dem:

• Provides reliable data on five high-level principles and 22 lower-levelcomponentsofdemocracysuchasregularelections,judicialindependence,directdemocracy,andgenderequality,consistingofmorethan400distinctandpreciseindicators;

• Covers all countries and dependent territories from 1900 to the present andprovidesanestimateofmeasurementreliabilityforeachrating;

• Makesallratingspublic,freeofcharge,throughauser-friendlyinterface.

With four Principal Investigators, two Project Coordinators, fifteen Project Managers,morethanthirtyRegionalManagers,almost200CountryCoordinators,severalAssistantResearchers,andapproximately2,600CountryExperts,theV-Demprojectisoneofthelargest-ever social science data collection projectswith a database of over 15milliondata points. The database makes highly detailed analysis of virtually all aspects ofdemocracy in a country, while also allowing for summary comparisons betweencountries based on aggregated indices for different dimensions of democracy. UsersfromanywhereareabletousetheV-Demonlineanalysistoolswhichcanbefoundattheproject’swebsite.Governments,developmentagencies,andNGOscanbenefit fromthenuanced comparative and historical data when informing critical decisions such asselectingcountryprogrampriorities,informingprogramdesignsandmonitoringimpactoftheirprograms.Methodology: Unlikeextantdatacollectionprojects,whichtypicallyuseasmallgroupofexpertswhorate all countries or ask a single expert to code one country, the V-Dem project hasrecruitedover2,500 localandcross-nationalexperts toprovide judgmentsonvariousindicators about democracy. The V-Dem dataset is created by combining factualinformation from existing data sources about constitutional regulations and de juresituationwithexpert codingfor questions that require evaluation.Experts’ratingsareaggregated through an advanced statistical model that takes into account thepossibilities that expertsmaymakemistakes and have different scales inmindwhencoding.Inaddition,bridge-coders-expertswhocodemultiplecountries-arerecruitedtocalibratethescalesofestimatescross-nationally1.

1ForfurtherdetailsandinformationabouttheV-Demmethodology,seehttp://v-dem.net


2

Indonesia

Introduction ThisV-DemdatabriefillustratesthedemocraticdevelopmentofIndonesiafrom1900to2014.The purpose is to provide a concise overview of the V-Demdata collected for Indonesia. ThehistoricaldevelopmentofthefiveV-Demprinciplesofdemocracy-electoral,liberal,egalitarian,deliberative and participatory – is analyzed, accompanied by an overview of the femaleempowerment index. In addition, the brief delves further into the different components anddetailedindicatorsofthemainprinciplesofdemocracy2.Weanticipatethatthisbriefwillbeausefulresourceforpolicy-makers,practitionersandcitizen-leddemocracyassessments.

IndonesiawasaDutchcolonybeforeWorldWarIIandaJapanesecolonyduringthewarfrom1942to1945.Thecountrygainedindependencein1945andadoptedaconstitutionduringthesameyear.However,until1949thecountrywasstillinconflictwiththeDutch,whoattemptedtoreclaimtheirformerterritories.

The first general elections to the Indonesian legislaturewere held in 1955. However, shortlyafter, in 1957president Sukarnodeclaredmartial law and institutedwhatwas called “guideddemocracy.” The “Indonesian killings” of 1965-66, during which, according to differentestimates,around500,000peoplewerekilledinananti-communistpurge,ledtotheremovalofSukarno from power and the rise of the “New Order” regime under President Suharto whogoverned the country from 1967 until 1998. After Suharto’s resignation, gradualdemocratization processes began and the first direct presidential elections in Indonesia tookplace in2004.Today, Indonesia isaunitaryrepublicwithperiodicpresidentialand legislativeelections.

Principles of Democracy The radar chart in Figure 1 gives an overview of the five V-Dem indices of democracy forIndonesiaat fourdifferentpoints intime:1905,1950,1995and2014.All indices inthefigurerangefrom0to1,whereascoreof0suggeststhatacountrydidnotevincethecharacteristicsofdemocracyrelevanttothisparticularindexatthispointintime,while1correspondstothebestpossiblesituationforthisindex,accordingtotheV-Demmeasures.

In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, the electoral component of democracy is fundamental andunderstoodasanessentialelementoftheotherprinciplesofrepresentativedemocracy–liberal,participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian; without it, we cannot call a regime “democratic”.However, we recognize that countries can have “democratic qualities”, without beingdemocracies. As a result, the aggregation formulae for all high-level principles of democracyincludethemeasureofelectoraldemocracy.Thus, forexample, “ParticipatoryDemocracy” isacompositescoreoftheelectoralandtheparticipatorycomponents.

2AllindicatorsandindicescanbefoundinGlossaryofTermsinAppendixI.Foranoverviewofthestructureofthe

indices,pleaseseeAppendixII.


3

Figure 1. Principles of Democracy Indices

DuringthefirstthreeyearsexploredinFigure1:1905,1950and1995,IndonesiareceivesverylowscoresonallV-Demdemocracyindices,asreflectedbythelinesinFigure1gatheringintheverycenterofthechart.

Itisinterestingtonotethattheliberalandparticipatorydimensionsofdemocracyarereducedin1995 when Indonesia is under Sukarno’s regime compared to the earlier years of Dutchoccupation.Thissuggeststhatindividualandminorityrightsareprotectedtoalesserextentin1995comparedto1905and1950. Italsosuggests thatdirectruleandcitizenparticipation inthe electoral and non-electoral political processes are less prominent features of Indonesianpolitics.Electoral andegalitariandemocracy showmarginal improvement for the sameperiodbut,overall,thescoresin1995attesttoaverymodestdemocraticdevelopment.

Thechartalsoindicatesthat,in2014,Indonesiahasexperiencedsubstantivepositivechangesinallaspectsofdemocracy,asthepurplelineshows.However,Indonesiacrossesthemiddleofthescaleonlyonelectoralanddeliberativedemocracy.Thisindicatesthat,overall,citizensonlyholdrulers minimally responsible through electoral competition. Some degree of deliberation iscommonwhenimportantpolicy-changesarebeingconsidered.

Liberal,egalitarianandparticipatoryaspectsofdemocracyhavedevelopedtoapproximatelythesamelevel,reachingascoreofaround.4,whichindicatesthattheseaspectsofdemocracyhaveonlybeendevelopedtoasmallextent.

InFigure2below,welookfurtherintotheaforementionedindicesandgraphthecomponentsthat go into the five higher level principles indices of democracy: the electoral, liberal,egalitarian, participatory and deliberative aspects. The figure illustrates the development ofthese democratic aspects and the progress of female rights3 in Indonesia overmore than onehundredyears.

3Thescaleofeachindexandindicatorisspecifiedwithinparenthesesinthelegendofeachfigure.Inallindicatorsandindicesgraphed,alowerscorecorrespondstoalowerdemocraticlevel,whileahigherscoresuggestsagreaterlevelofdemocracy.PleaseseeAppendixIformoreinformationoneachoftheindicatorsandindices.

00,20,40,60,81

ElectoralDemocracy

LiberalDemocracy

ParticipatoryDemocracy

DeliberativeDemocracy

EgalitarianDemocracy

1905

1950

1995

2014


4

Inthefirsthalfofthecentury,whenIndonesiawasaDutchcolony,thecountryreceivedminimalscores on all democracy components in Figure 2. After gaining independence, Indonesiaexperiencedarapiddemocraticdevelopment,whichisreflectedinanincreaseinallmeasures.Thegreatestchangehappensinthedeliberativecomponentofdemocracy,whichreachesalmost.9onascaleof0to1,implyingthat,toalargeextent,openandpublicdialoguewhichisfocusedonthecommongoodmotivatespoliticaldecisions.

Most other indicators, apart from the electoral component, first increase in 1945 and thensubsequently in 1949, when the Netherlands acknowledged Indonesian independence. Theincreaseintheelectoralprincipleofdemocracyhappensin1955whenIndonesiaholdsitsfirstparliamentaryelections.ThelineforIndonesiathenreaches .7onascaleof0to1.After1955,however, Indonesia experiences a rapid decline in all aspects of democracy, which continuesuntilthefallofSukarno’sauthoritarianregimein1998.

Although generally the scores after 1955 show negative developmental trends, severalindicators show upward trends, as well. For example, the deliberative component index risesafterthekillingsin1965-1966,anddecreasessubsequentlyinthebeginningofthe70s.Aslightincrease in the electoral component index can be seen around 1970which coincideswith theestablishment of the Act of Free Choice in 1969. This involved setting voting procedures inWesternNewGuinea,andthesecondlegislativeelectionsin1971.ThemostrestrictedaspectsofdemocracyduringSukarno’sregimeareliberaldemocracy,definedasachievingconstitutionallyprotected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and participatorydemocracy,whichcapturestheengagementofcivilsocietyorganizations,directdemocracy,andsubnationalelectedbodiesinpoliticallife.

The only component in which Indonesia does not experience a decrease after 1966 is theegalitariancomponent.Thereisagradual increaseuntilpresentday, implyingthatthecountryhas been steadilyworking on improving equality in the distribution of political power acrosssocialgroups,i.e.,groupsdefinedbyclass,sex,religion,andethnicity.

After the resignation of authoritarian leader Sukarno in 1998, a significant positive change isreflectedinallindicators.Indonesia’sdeliberativecomponentnearlyreachesthehighestpossiblescore, implying that respectful dialogue is present at all levels—frompreference formation tofinaldecision. TheFemale rights index isnot farbehind, achievingavalueof .8,whichmeansthat women can openly discuss political issues, participate in civil society organizations,


5

experiencethefreedomofmovement,therighttoprivateproperty,accesstojustice,afreedomfromforced labor, representation in theranksof journalists,andanequalshare in theoveralldistributionofpower.Ascoreof.8isachievedfortheelectoralcomponent,butthenlosesgroundshortlybefore2010.The liberal and egalitarian components converge around a score of .7 on a scale of 0 to 1,suggesting that there is still room for improvement within these aspects of democracy.Participatory aspects have been among those historically least developed in Indonesia.Indonesia crosses the middle of the scale after the first presidential elections in 2004. Thissituationwithparticipatoryaspectsofdemocracygenerallyreflectsaglobaltrend.Inordertounderstandmorespecificaspectswithinthesevariousdemocraticdevelopments,wefurtherexploreeachof the six componentsofdemocracy in the followingsection,providingacloserlookattheindicatorsandindiceswhichcomposethem.

The Electoral Component The V-Dem electoral democracy component index measures the core value of making rulersresponsive to citizens through competition for the approval of a broad electorate duringperiodicelections;whetherpoliticalandcivilsocietyorganizationscanoperatefreely;whetherelectionsarecleanandnotmarredbyfraudorsystematicirregularities;andthechiefexecutiveofacountryisselected(directlyorindirectly)throughelections.Figure3displaysthefoursub-indicesthatconstitutetheelectoralcomponentindex.

Indonesiastartswithverylowscoresonallelectoraldemocracyindicators inthebeginningofthe century;however, it experiences significant improvements afterWorldWar II. Theperiodafter the parliamentary elections in 1955 is characterized first by a downturn inmost of theindicators,butthenfollowedbysubstantialimprovementatdifferentpointsintime.

After independence is gained in 1945, Indonesia experiences a sharp positive change in thefreedomofassociation,indicatingthatparties,includingoppositionparties,areallowedtoformand participate in elections, and that civil society organizations are free to form and operate.However,aftertheelectionsin1955,therighttoassociatebecomesincreasinglysuppresseduptothefalloftheauthoritarianregimein1998.Asapartofthedemocratizationprocessafterthe


6

regime change, parties andCSOs in the country are again able to formandoperate to a largeextent.

Theelectedexecutiveindexshowsthatthechiefexecutivehasbeenappointedthroughpopularelections (direct or indirect) since the parliamentary elections in 1955. In 1965-66 after thefailedcoupandpoliticalpurge, thesituationchanged for fiveyears,but then improvedduringthenextlegislativeelectionsin1971andhasremainedstablesincethen.Universalsuffragewasintroducedin1955,asreflectedbythegreenlineonshareofpopulationwithsuffrageinFigure3.

TheorangelineforthecleanelectionsindexshowsthatthepracticeofelectionsinIndonesiahasbeenquitedifferentthroughoutitshistory.Thefirst legislativeelectionswerenotentirelyfreeand fair,and thesituationbecamegraduallyworseuntil theauthoritarianregime fell in1998.The elections during that period were largely characterized by irregularities, election fraud,government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and/or election violence. Thepresidentialelectionsin2004wererelativelyclean,butnotentirelyfreefromirregularities,andhavebeenfollowedbyaworryingdownwardtrendinrecentyears.

The Liberal Component The liberal dimension of democracy embodies the intrinsic value of protecting individual andminorityrightsagainstapotentialtyrannyofthestate.Thisisachievedthroughconstitutionallyprotectedcivillibertiesandstrongruleoflaw,andeffectivechecksandbalancesbythejudiciaryand the legislaturewhich limit theuseof executivepower.Theseaspects are capturedby thethreeindicesthatconstitutetheV-Demliberalcomponent.Figure4showsthedevelopmentofthesethreeindicesovertimeinIndonesia.

Changes in the liberal aspects of democracy throughout Indonesian history, as displayed inFigure 4, resemble developmental patterns of electoral democracy indicators. All indicatorsstart at low values in the colonial times (apart from legislative constraints on the executivewhich are non-existent before independence), increase after independence, regress after thefirstelectionsareheldin1955orthecoupin1965and,finally,improveagainafterthefalloftheauthoritarianregimein1998.

ThescoresforEqualitybeforethelawandindividuallibertyreachavalueof.7after1998,whichimplies that laws in Indonesia are more or less transparent and enforced, that public


7

administration is relatively impartial and that people enjoy access to justice, secure propertyrights,afreedomfromforcedlabor,freedomofmovement,physicalintegrityrightsandfreedomofreligion,toacertainextent.However,thereisroomforimprovementinthisaspect.

Thesecondsub-indexinthefigure, legislativeconstraintsontheexecutive,measurestheextenttowhichthelegislatureandgovernmentagenciesarecapableofquestioning,investigating,andexercisingoversightover theexecutive.As indicated inFigure4 this formofconstraintontheexecutiveonlyappearsafterindependencewhenthefirstIndonesianlegislatureiscreated.Withtheconstitutionalreformin1959legislativeconstraintsbecomesubstantiallyweakerandonlyregaintheirstrengthagainaftertheresignationoftheleaderin1998.

Asomewhatdifferentdevelopmentisfollowedforthejudicialconstraintsontheexecutive.From1966until the resignation of Sukarno, judicial independence is evenmore suppressed than itwasduringcolonialtimes,whileafter1998thevaluesfortheindexonlyreachthelevelachievedin1945withoutshowingmuchadditionalimprovement.Thescoreofaround.5in2014impliesthat, to a moderate extent, the executive respects the constitution and complies with courtrulings,whilethejudiciarymightnotbefullyfreetoactinanindependentfashion.

The Participatory Component The participatory dimension of democracy embodies the values of direct rule and activeparticipationbycitizensinallpoliticalprocesses;itemphasizesnon-electoralformsofpoliticalparticipation such as through such channels as civil society organizations and through themechanisms of direct democracy. Figure 5 displays the four sub-indices that compose theparticipatorydemocracycomponent.

Figure5 displays the indices that go into theparticipatorydemocracy component.The figureshowsthattheV-Demmeasuredirectpopularvote,whichcaptureshoweasyitistoinitiateandapproveadirectpopularvoteandhowconsequentialthatvoteis,receivesthelowestscoresinIndonesiathroughouttheentireperiodgraphed.

Similarly, in termsof independenceofelected localand regionalgovernment,quite lowscoresareshownduringmostoftheperiodexaminedinthisbrief.Steadyimprovementsarecapturedinthedataafter independence,withasharppositive increaseafterthechanges inthecountry


8

which took place in 1998. Scores of .5 and .7 respectively for the recent years suggest thatregional and local governments exist, but that they are not able to operate freely and aresubordinatetounelectedofficialsappointedbythecentralgovernment.Asseenfromthefigure,regionalgovernment ismoredevelopedthanlocalgovernment inIndonesia;however, there isroomforimprovementinbothaspects.

Bycontrast,theV-Demmeasureforcivilsocietyparticipation,capturedbythegreenline,showshighscoresafterindependencein1945,butthisaspectisincrementallyconstrainedandreachesthecolonialeralevelsagainin1975.However,inrecentyearsthecivilsocietyparticipationindexreaches close to top scores, indicating that Indonesian citizens are actively involved in thepoliticallifeoftheircountrythroughactivelyparticipatingincivilsocietyorganizations(CSOs),bytheroutineconsultationofpolicymakerswiththeseorganizations,andthroughpoliticalpartynominationsbeinghighlydecentralized.

The Deliberative Component The deliberative component of democracy captures the core value that political decisions areguidedbythepursuitof thepublicgoodandshouldbe informedbyrespectfulandreasonabledialogueatalllevelsratherthanbyemotionalappeals,solidaryattachments,parochialinterests,orcoercion.

Note, that the indicators displayed in Figures 6, 7 and 8 have different scales, which arespecifiedinparenthesesinthelegendofeachfigure.

Figure6showsthatchangeswithintheindicatorsgoingintothedeliberativecomponentoccursimultaneously and follow a similar pattern. On most indicators (apart from common good)Indonesiabeginswithlowvaluesduringthecolonialperiodandsubstantial improvementsareshowninthedataafterindependencein1945.Thecommontrendofthedatashowsthatinthelate1950spublicdeliberationinIndonesiaissuppressed,whileslightimprovementsoccurforashortperiodat theendof the1960s.After thepoliticalchangeswhich tookplace in1998, thehigherscoresonallindicatorswhichconstitutetheV-Demdeliberativecomponentsuggestthatsignificant improvements have occurred in Indonesiawith severalmeasures achieving nearlythehighestpossiblescores.


9

Forexample, Indonesia gets amaximumscore for the indicatorcommongood (purple line) in1945 after independence and then sustains this high level afterwardswith a .5 drop in 1960.This means that justifications of important policy changes are, for the most part, based onexplicit statements of the common good for society. This can be understood either as thegreatestgoodforthegreatestnumberofpeople,orashelpingtheleastadvantagedinasociety.Between1960and1998,however,thedatasuggestthatonoccasion,theelitemakesreferencestoconstituency/party/groupinterests.

Fortheindicatorreasonedjustification(rangingfrom0to3,greenline),Indonesiareceivesclosetotopscoresafter independence,experiencesaslightdrop inthe late50sandthenreturnstohighlevelsafter1998.Thisvariablemeasurestheextenttowhichpoliticalelitesgivepublicandreasonable justifications for their positions when important policy changes are beingconsidered. Indonesia’s score indicates that sophisticated justification has taken place since1945,meaning that elites tend tooffer complex, nuanced and complete justifications for theirpositiononaparticularissue.

Holdingwideandindependentpublicdeliberationsonimportantpoliciesplaysacentralroleindeliberative democracy. The extent towhich this is achieved in a country ismeasured by theindicatorengagedsociety(blueline).Indonesia’sscoresfluctuatearoundthemiddleofthescaleuntil the fall of theauthoritarian regime in1998, atwhichpoint it almost reaches thehighestpossiblescore.Thismeansthatinthefirstdecadeofthe21stcentury,engagementfromsocietybecomesfrequentandprominent.

Similarly,onthemeasureofrangeofconsultation(redline),Indonesiaalmostreachesascoreofaround4outof5afterthepresidentresignsin1998,whichsuggeststhat,whileawiderangeofsociety/labor/business representatives are included in political deliberations, certain groupsarenot.

Thevariablerespectcounterarguments(onascaleof0to5,orangeline)capturestheextenttowhich political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments when important policychanges are being considered. The Indonesian score of 4 in 2014 suggests that even thoughpoliticalelitestendtoacknowledgeopinionsdifferentfromtheirownandexplicitlyvaluethem,forthemostpart,theywillultimatelyrejectthem.

The Egalitarian Component The egalitarian idea is thatmaterial and immaterial inequalities inhibit the actual exercise offormalrightsandliberties;henceamoreequaldistributionofresources,education,andhealthacrosssocioeconomicgroupsshouldenhancepoliticalequality.


10

Figure7displaystheeightindicatorsthatcomposetheegalitariandemocracycomponent.Alloftheaspects,apartfromindicatorsrelatedtothedistributionofpublicgoodsandexpenditureson

publicpolicies,developintandemandendupclusteringbetweenscoresof2and3.

The largest change has taken place in the indicatormeans-tested vs. universalistic (light blueline),whichaimstocapturewhetherwelfareprogramsaremeans-tested(targetingthepooror

underprivilegedconstituents)orwhether theybenefitallmembersof thepolity. In theV-Dem

conceptual scheme, welfare programs that benefit everyone and do not stigmatize certain

unprivileged groups, such as poor people (e.g. education, national healthcare schemes, and

retirementprograms),aremoredemocraticfromanegalitarianperspectivethanmeans-tested

programs which target only these particular groups (e.g. cash-transfer programs). From the

beginningof the20th centuryandup till the late60salmostallof thewelfarestatepolicies in

Indonesiatargetedthepoor,needyorotherwiseunderprivilegedconstituents.Afterthecoupin

1965,thecountrymadeamovetowardsmoreuniversalisticpoliciesandin2014,mostwelfare

statepoliciescanbeconsideredtobeuniversalistic,whileaportionismeans-tested.

Aconstantscoreofaround3withaslightdecreasefromthelate1950s–thebeginningofthe

1960s is shownwith the indicatorparticularisticorpublicgoods(yellow line). It suggests thatmostsocialandinfrastructureexpendituresinIndonesiaarepublic-goodsbutthatasignificant

portionisparticularistic(suchspendingmightalsobereferredtoas“clientelistic”).

Indonesia’s scores for educational equality (dark blue line) and health equality (purple line)steadily improve throughout thewholecenturyandreacha levelofaround2after1980.This

scoreindicatesthatpeople’saccesstohigh-qualityeducationandhealthcareissomewhatequal,

but that, because of poor-quality healthcare and low-quality education, 10 to 25 percent of

citizens’abilitytoexercisetheirpoliticalrightsasadultcitizensisundermined.

Political power distribution by gender (green line), similarly increases gradually afterindependence, reaching a score of 2.5 at the beginning of the 21st century. This means that

womenonlyhaveamarginalinfluenceinpolitics.

Thecountryfollowsasimilardevelopmentintermsofpowerdistributedbysocialgroup(blackline), equality of civil liberties across social groups (orange line) and power distributed bysocioeconomicgroup (red line)with scores fluctuatingbetween2and3after independence in1945.Thescoresof3on the first two indicatorsshowthatall significantsocialgroupshavea

turnattheseatofpower,withsomegroupshavingmorepowerthanothers,andthatmembers

ofsomesocialgroupsenjoyslightlyfewercivil libertiesthanthegeneralpopulation.Thescore


11

of2.5onpowerdistributedby socioeconomicgroupsuggests that, whilepeopleofaverageandlowerincomearerepresentedpolitically,thewealthyhavesignificantlymorepoliticalpower.

Female Rights Equality betweenwomen andmen is indivisible from democracy at all levels, and is broadlyrecognizedasapre-conditionfortrulyrepresentativeandresponsivegovernments.TheV-Demfemale rights index focuses on the ability of women to participate in the open discussion ofpoliticalissues,toparticipateincivilsocietyorganizations,thefreedomofmovement,therighttoprivateproperty,theaccessto justice, thefreedomfromforcedlabor,andanequalshareinthe overall distribution of power. Figure 8 displays the seven indicators that constitute thisindex.

The figure indicates that women’s freedoms in Indonesia have been developing relativelysteadily throughout the century (with the exception ofwomen’s freedom of discussion),withsomeofthemreachingthehighestpossiblescoresduringthepasttwodecades.

Freedomofdiscussionforwomen(purpleline)becomesmoreandmoreconstrainedafter1955andbythe1966coup,itsinkstothelevelsexperiencedduringtheJapaneseoccupationinWorldWar II. However, after the change of regimes in 1998, freedom of discussion forwomen andfreedomofspeecharemostlyrespected. Itshouldbenotedthat thisvariabledoesnotseektocompare the relative freedom of men and women, thus, it is possible that the restrictionsexperiencedbymenandwomenareequal.

Themost substantial development is noted by the line for freedom from forced labor (orangeline). In the beginning of the century female servitude and other kinds of forced labor werewidespreadandaccepted.After1945thesituationchangedandforcedlaborbywomenbecamesubstantially less commonandusually actively opposedbypublic authorities.After the fall ofSukarno, the conditions forwomen improved furtherand female servitudeandotherkindsofforced laborbecame infrequentandonly found in thecriminalunderground. It isactivelyandsincerelyopposedbypublicauthorities.

According to the data, the freedom of domestic movement (black line) and CSO women’sparticipation(redline)havenotbeenrestrictedinIndonesiasincethechangeswhichtookplace


12

in1998,whilepropertyrights(yellowline)arealsoenjoyedbythevastmajorityofwomen.Inpreviousyears,theserightsandfreedomshadbeenprotectedtoamuchlesserdegree.

Thesecureandeffectiveaccesstojusticeforwomenis usuallyobserved,asindicatedbyascoreof3 for thevariableaccess to justice(green line)after themillennium.However,note that thehighest score on thismeasure is yet to be achieved,which indicates that the extent towhichwomencanbringcasesbeforethecourtswithoutrisktotheirpersonalsafetyandtheextenttowhichtrialsareconsideredtobefaircouldbefurtherimproved.

The power distributed by gender indicator, displayed in blue in this figure, shows a somewhatslower development when compared with the other indicators. Despite the overall positivetrendofimprovementintermsofprovidingequalaccesstopoliticalpower,thescoresshowthatmenstillhavesomewhatmorepoliticalpowerthanwomen,eveninthedata’smostrecentyears.

Concluding Remarks BasedontheconciseanalysisofseveralkeyV-Demindicesandindicators,thisbriefprovidesanoverview of the main democracy development trends in Indonesia. The turbulent politicalhistory of Indonesia, which went through several dramatic events such as foreign poweroccupations, authoritarian rule, coups andpolitical killings, is reflected in theV-Demdata.Allindicators have seen improvement over time since the colonial era; however, while thedevelopment of some democratic aspects has beenmore or less gradual, the development ofothershasbeencharacterizedbydistinctrisesandfalls.

Thecountryshowsconsistentlyhighscoresonanumberofmeasuresoveralongperiodoftime,as in, for example, some public deliberation aspects and the expenditures on public goods.During themostrecentyearsalldeliberativeprocesses in thecountryhavebeenstrong,whileegalitarianaspectscanbeseenas lessdeveloped.Thelevelsofdevelopmenton liberalaspectsvary by indicator. For example, legislative constraints on the executive are strong, while thejudiciary is not fully independent and has less monitoring powers over the executive. Thedifferent aspects of the participatory component show diverse trends. While civil societyparticipationinthecountryiscurrentlystrong,directpopularvoteisnotutilizedatall.Regionalandlocalgovernmentsexist,butthecentralauthoritiesdonotallowthemcompletefreedomintheiractivities.

The country experienced a long series of changes in terms of female rights fromwidespreadforcedlaborinthebeginningofthe20thcentury,andrepressionoffreedomofspeechforwomenunder the dictatorship, to being able to secure property rights, achieving the freedom ofdomestic movement as well as the freedom to participate in civil society organizations forwomenin2014.However,thedistributionofpowerbygenderstillremainsfarfromequal.


13

Appendix I. List of variables. Thisisalistofalltheindicesandindicatorsincludedinthecountrybrief.

Itcontainsthequestionandthequestionalternativesaswellasinformationofaggregation,

scale,datareleaseandcitation.ThesecanalsobefoundintheV-Demcodebook.

VariablesincludedinFigure1.

Electoraldemocracyindex(D)(v2x_polyarchy)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheidealofelectoraldemocracyinitsfullestsenseachieved?Clarifications: Theelectoralprincipleofdemocracyseekstoembodythecorevalueofmaking

rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s

approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society

organizationscanoperatefreely;electionsarecleanandnotmarredbyfraudorsystematic

irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In

between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of

presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual

scheme,electoraldemocracyisunderstoodasanessentialelementofanyotherconceptionof

(representative)democracy–liberal,participatory,deliberative,egalitarian,orsomeother.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the sum of the

indices measuring freedom of association (thick) (v2x_frassoc_thick), suffrage (v2x_suffr),

clean elections (v2xel_frefair), elected executive (de jure) (v2x_accex) and freedom of

expression (v2x_freexp_thick); and, on the other, the five-way interaction between those

indices. This is halfway between a straight average and strictmultiplication,meaning the

averageof the two. It is thusacompromisebetweenthe twomostwellknownaggregation

formulas in the literature, both allowing "compensation" in one sub-component for lack of

polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component

accordingtothe"weakestlink"argument.TheaggregationisdoneatthelevelofDahlssub-

components (with the one exception of the non-electoral component). The index is

aggregatedusingthisformula:

v2x_polyarchy=

.1*v2x_suffr + .1*v2xel_frefair + .1*v2x_accex+ .1*v2x_frassoc_thick+ .1*v2x_freexp_thick+

.5*v2x_suffr*v2xel_frefair*v2x_accex*v2x_frassoc_thick*v2x_freexp_thick.

Scale:IntervalSources:v2x_freexp_thickv2x_EDcomp_thickDatarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Liberaldemocracyindex(D)(v2x_libdem)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheidealofliberaldemocracyachieved?Clarifications: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting

individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the

majority.Theliberalmodeltakesa“negative”viewofpoliticalpowerinsofarasitjudgesthe

qualityofdemocracybythelimitsplacedongovernment.Thisisachievedbyconstitutionally

protectedcivilliberties,strongruleoflaw,anindependentjudiciary,andeffectivechecksand

balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of

liberaldemocracy,theindexalsotakesthelevelofelectoraldemocracyintoaccount.Aggregation:Theindexisaggregatedusingthisformula:


14

v2x_libdem=.25*v2x_polyarchy^1.6+.25*v2x_liberal+.5*v2x_polyarchy^1.6*v2x_liberal

Scale:IntervalSources:v2x_liberalv2x_polyarchyDatarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Participatorydemocracyindex(D)(v2x_partipdem)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheidealofparticipatorydemocracyachieved?Clarifications: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by

citizens in all political processes, electoral andnon-electoral. It ismotivated by uneasinessabout a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives.Thus,directrulebycitizensispreferred,whereverpracticable.Thismodelofdemocracythustakes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, directdemocracy,andsubnationalelectedbodies.Tomakeitameasureofparticipatorydemocracy,theindexalsotakesthelevelofelectoraldemocracyintoaccount.

Aggregation:Theindexisaggregatedusingthisformula:v2x_partipdem=.25*v2x_polyarchy^1.6+.25*v2x_partip+.5*v2x_polyarchy^1.6*v2x_partip

Scale:IntervalSources:v2x_polyarchyv2x_partipDatarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Deliberativedemocracyindex(D)(v2x_delibdem)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheidealofdeliberativedemocracyachieved?Clarification:Thedeliberativeprincipleofdemocracyfocusesontheprocessbywhichdecisions

arereachedinapolity.Adeliberativeprocessisoneinwhichpublicreasoningfocusedonthecommongoodmotivatespoliticaldecisions—ascontrastedwithemotionalappeals,solidaryattachments,parochialinterests,orcoercion.Accordingtothisprinciple,democracyrequiresmorethananaggregationofexistingpreferences.Thereshouldalsoberespectfuldialogueatall levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competentparticipantswhoareopentopersuasion.Tomake itameasureofnotonlythedeliberativeprinciple but also of democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy intoaccount.

Aggregation:Theindexisaggregatedusingthisformula:v2x_delibdem=.25*v2x_polyarchy^1.6+.25*v2x_delib+.5*v2x_polyarchy^1.6*v2x_delib

Scale:IntervalSources:v2xdl_delibv2x_polyarchyDatarelease:4,5.Datarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)

Egalitariandemocracyindex(D)(v2x_egaldem)


15

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheidealofegalitariandemocracyachieved?Clarifications: The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political

power across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. Thisperspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civillibertiesarenotalwayssufficientforpoliticalequality.Ideally,allsocialgroupsshouldhaveapproximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection underthe law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality doesnot exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, andhealthsoastoenhancepoliticalequality.Tomakeitameasureofegalitariandemocracy,theindexalsotakesthelevelofelectoraldemocracyintoaccount.

Aggregation:Theindexisaggregatedusingthisformula:v2x_egaldem=.25*v2x_polyarchy^1.6+.25*v2x_egal+.5*v2x_polyarchy^1.6*v2x_egal

Scale:IntervalSources:v2x_egalv2x_polyarchyDatarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Femalerightsindex(D)(v2x_gender)

Projectmanager:JohnGerringQuestion:Towhatextentarewoman’spoliticalrightsprotected?Clarifications:Politicalrightsindexfocusesontheabilityofwomentoparticipateindiscussions

ofpoliticalissues,participationincivilsocietyorganizations,freedomofmovement,therighttoprivateproperty,accesstojustice,freedomfromforcedlabor,representationintheranksofjournalists,andanequalshareintheoveralldistributionofpower.

Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysismodel of the indicators for CSO women’s participation (v2csgender), female journalists(v2mefemjrn), freedom of domestic movement for women (v2cldmovew), freedom ofdiscussion for women (v2cldiscw), freedom from forced labor for women (v2clslavef),propertyrightsforwomen(v2clprptyw),accesstojusticeforwomen(v2clacjstw),andpowerdistributedbygender(v2pepwrgen).

Scale:IntervalSources: v2csgender v2mefemjrn v2cldmovew v2cldiscw v2clslavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw

v2pepwrgenDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).


Electoralcomponentindex(D)(v2x_EDcomp_thick)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheelectoralprincipleofdemocracyachieved?Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and

accountabilitybetweenleadersandcitizensthroughthemechanismofcompetitiveelections.This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil societyorganizationscanoperatefreely;electionsarecleanandnotmarredbyfraudorsystematic


16

irregularities;andthechiefexecutiveofacountryisselected(directlyorindirectly)throughelections.

Aggregation:Theelectoralcomponentindexisoperationalizedasachaindefinedbyitsweakestlinkof freedomof association, suffrage, clean elections, andelected executive.The index isthusaggregatedusingthisformula:v2x_EDcomp_thick=v2x_frassoc_thick*v2x_suffr*v2xel_frefair*v2x_accex.

Scale:IntervalSources:v2x_frassoc_thickv2x_suffrv2xel_frefairv2x_accexDatarelease:3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Participatorycomponentindex(D)(v2x_partip)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheparticipatoryprincipleachieved?Clarification: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by

citizens in all political processes, electoral andnon-electoral. It ismotivated by uneasinessabout a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives.Thus,directrulebycitizensispreferred,whereverpracticable.Thismodelofdemocracythustakes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, directdemocracy,andsubnationalelectedbodies.

Aggregation:Thisindexisformedbyaveragingthefollowingindices:civilsocietyparticipation(v2x_iccpart), direct popular vote (v2xdd_dd), elected local government power(v2xel_locelec),andelectedregionalgovernmentpower(v2xel_regelec).

Scale:IntervalSources:v2x_iccpartv2xdd_ddv2xel_locelecv2xel_regelecDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Egalitariancomponentindex(D)(v2x_egal)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheegalitarianprincipleachieved?Clarifications: The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political

power across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. Thisperspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civillibertiesarenotalwayssufficientforpoliticalequality.Ideally,allsocialgroupsshouldhaveapproximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection underthe law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality doesnot exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, andhealthsoastoenhancepoliticalequality.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysismodel including indicators of power distribution according to socioeconomic position(v2pepwrses), power distribution according to social group (v2pepwrsoc), social groupequality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp), equal access to education (v2peedueq),equalaccess tohealth (v2pehealth),powerdistributionaccording togender (v2pepwrgen),shareofbudget allocated topublic/commongoods (v2dlencmps), and the shareofwelfareprogramsthatprovideuniversalratherthanmeans-testedbenefits(v2dlunivl).

Scale:Interval


17

Sources: v2pepwrses v2pepwrsoc v2clsocgrp v2peedueq v2pehealth v2pepwrgenv2dlencmpsv2dlunivl

Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Liberalcomponentindex(D)(v2x_liberal)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheliberalprincipleofdemocracyachieved?Clarification: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting

individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the

majority.Theliberalmodeltakesa“negative”viewofpoliticalpowerinsofarasitjudgesthe

qualityofdemocracybythelimitsplacedongovernment.Thisisachievedbyconstitutionally

protectedcivilliberties,strongruleoflaw,anindependentjudiciary,andeffectivechecksand

balancesthat,together,limittheexerciseofexecutivepower.

Aggregation: This index is formedbyaveraging the following indices: equalitybefore the lawand individual liberties (v2xcl_rol), judicial constraints on the executive (v2x_jucon), and

legislativeconstraintsontheexecutive(v2xlg_legcon).

Scale:IntervalSources:v2xcl_rolv2x_juconv2xlg_legconDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Deliberativecomponentindex(D)(v2xdl_delib)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentisthedeliberativeprincipleofdemocracyachieved?Clarification:Thedeliberativeprincipleofdemocracyfocusesontheprocessbywhichdecisions

arereachedinapolity.Adeliberativeprocessisoneinwhichpublicreasoningfocusedonthe

commongoodmotivatespoliticaldecisions—ascontrastedwithemotionalappeals,solidary

attachments,parochialinterests,orcoercion.Accordingtothisprinciple,democracyrequires

morethananaggregationofexistingpreferences.Thereshouldalsoberespectfuldialogueat

all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent

participantswhoareopentopersuasion.

Tomeasurethesefeaturesofapolitywetrytodeterminetheextenttowhichpoliticalelites

givepublicjustificationsfortheirpositionsonmattersofpublicpolicy,justifytheirpositions

intermsofthepublicgood,acknowledgeandrespectcounter-arguments;andhowwidethe

rangeofconsultationisatelitelevels.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysismodelincludingthefollowingindicators:reasonedjustification(v2dlreason),commongood

justification (v2dlcommon), respect for counterarguments (v2dlcountr), range of

consultation(v2dlconslt),andengagedsociety(v2dlengage).

Scale:IntervalSources:v2dlreasonv2dlcommonv2dlcountrv2dlconsltv2dlengageDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Femalerightsindex(D)(v2x_gender)

Projectmanager:JohnGerring


18

Question:Towhatextentarewoman’spoliticalrightsprotected?Clarifications: Political rights is understood to include open discussion of political issues,

participation in civil society organizations, freedom of movement, the right to privateproperty, access to justice, freedom from forced labor, representation in the ranks ofjournalists,andanequalshareintheoveralldistributionofpower.

Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysismodel of the indicators for CSO women’s participation (v2csgender), female journalists(v2mefemjrn), freedom of domestic movement for women (v2cldmovew), freedom ofdiscussion for women (v2cldiscw), freedom from forced labor for women (v2clslavef),propertyrightsforwomen(v2clprptyw),accesstojusticeforwomen(v2clacjstw),andpowerdistributedbygender(v2pepwrgen).

Scale:IntervalSources: v2csgender v2mefemjrn v2cldmovew v2cldiscw v2clslavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw

v2pepwrgenDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).VariablesincludedinFigure3.

Freedomofassociation(thick)index(D)(v2x_frassoc_thick)

Projectmanager:AllenHicken,MichaelBernhard,JanTeorellQuestion: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to

participateinelections,andtowhatextentarecivilsocietyorganizationsabletoformandtooperatefreely?

Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysismodeloftheindicatorsforpartyban(v2psparban),barrierstoparties(v2psbars),oppositionparties autonomy (v2psoppaut), elections multiparty (v2elmulpar), CSO entry and exit(v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss). Since the multiparty elections indicator isonly observed in election years, its values have first been repeatedwithin election regimeperiods(asdefinedbyv2x_elecreg).

Scale:IntervalSources:v2psparbanv2psbarsv2psoppautv2elmulparv2cseeorgsv2csreprssDatarelease:4,5 (release1,2,and3usedadifferentaggregation formula for the thinner index

v2x_frassoc)Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Cleanelectionsindex(D)(v2xel_frefair)

Projectmanagers:StaffanLindberg,JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentareelectionsfreeandfair?Clarifications:Freeandfairconnotesanabsenceofregistrationfraud,systematicirregularities,

governmentintimidationoftheopposition,votebuying,andelectionviolence.Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysis

model of the indicators for EMB autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB capacity (v2elembcap),electionvoterregistry(v2elrgstry),electionvotebuying(v2elvotbuy),electionothervotingirregularities (v2elirreg), election government intimidation (v2elintim), election otherelectoralviolence(v2elpeace),andelectionfreeandfair(v2elfrfair).Sincethebulkoftheseindicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeatedwithinelectionregimeperiods(asdefinedbyv2x_elecreg)


19

Scale:IntervalSources:v2elembautv2elembcapv2elrgstryv2elvotbuyv2elirregv2elintimv2elpeacev2elfrfairDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Shareofpopulationwithsuffrage(D)(v2x_suffr)

Projectmanager:Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion: What share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in

nationalelections?

Clarification: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age,residence,havingbeenconvictedforcrime,orbeinglegally incompetent. Itcovers legal(dejure) restrictions, not restrictions thatmay be operative in practice (de facto). The scoresreflect de jure provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population as ofJanuary 1 in a particular year. The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined bycitizensinthecaseofindependentcountriesorthepeoplelivingintheterritorialentityinthecaseofcolonies.Universalsuffrageiscodedas100%.Universalmalesuffrageonlyiscodedas50%. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0%. The scores do notreflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions,electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scoreswereadjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other thangender apply (such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity,religion, and/or ‘economic independence’), estimates have been calculated by combininginformationontherestrictionswithdifferentkindsofstatisticalinformation(onpopulationsize,agedistribution,wealthdistribution,literacyrates,sizeofethnicgroups,etc.),secondarycountry-specificsources,and–inthecaseofverypoorinformation–theconditionsinsimilarcountriesorcolonies.

Aggregation:v2elsuffrage/100

Responses:PercentScale:IntervalSource:v2elsuffrageDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Electedexecutiveindex(dejure)(D)(v2x_accex)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion: Is the chief executive appointed through popular elections (either directly or

indirectly)?

Clarifications: This index attempts to measure whether the chief executive is elected, eitherdirectly elected through popular elections or indirectly through a popularly electedlegislaturethatthenappointsthechiefexecutive.

Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections withlimited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, “appointment” by legislature only impliesselectionand/orapproval,notthepowertodismiss.

This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not beinterpretedasanimportantelementofdemocracyinitsownright.

Aggregation: There are six different chains of appointment/selection to take into account inconstructingthisindex,allofwhicharescaledtovaryfrom0to1.First,whethertheheadofstate is directly elected (a=1) or not (a=0). Second, the extent to which the legislature is


20

popularly elected (b), measured as the proportion of legislators elected (if legislature is

unicameral), or the weighted average of the proportion elected for each house, with the

weightdefinedbywhichhouse isdominant(if legislature isbicameral).Third,whether theheadofstateisappointedbythelegislature,ortheapprovalofthelegislatureisnecessaryfor

the appointment of the head of state (c1=1, otherwise 0). Fourth, whether the head of

governmentisappointedbythelegislature,ortheapprovalofthelegislatureisnecessaryfor

theappointmentof theheadofgovernment(c2=1,otherwise0).Fifth,whether theheadofgovernmentisappointedbytheheadofstate(d=1)ornot(d=0).Sixth,whethertheheadof

governmentisdirectlyelected(e=1)ornot(e=0).Definehoswastheweightfortheheadof

state.Iftheheadofstateisalsoheadofgovernment(v2exhoshog==1),hosw=1.Iftheheadof

statehasmorepower than theheadofgovernmentover theappointmentanddismissalofcabinet ministers, then hosw=1; if the reverse is true, hosw=0. If they share equal power,

hosw=.5.Definetheweightfortheheadofgovernmentashogw=1-hosw.Theformulais:

v2x_accex=

hosw*[max(a1,b*c1)]+hogw*[max(a1*d,b*c1*d,a2,b*c2)]

Scale:Interval

Sources: v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lgdomchm v2exaphos v2expathhs v2exaphogp v2expathhg

v2exdfcbhsv2exdjcbhgv2exdfdmhsv2exdfdshgv2exhoshog

Datarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)

Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).


Equalitybeforethelawandindividuallibertyindex(D)(v2xcl_rol)

Projectmanager:JanTeorell

Question: To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public

administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure

propertyrights, freedomfromforcedlabor, freedomofmovement,physical integrityrights,

andfreedomofreligion?

Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysismodel of the indicators for rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct),

transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice formen/women (v2clacjstm, v2clacjstw), property rights for men/women (v2clprptym,

v2clprptyw),freedomfromtorture(v2cltort),freedomfrompoliticalkillings(v2clkill),from

forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clrelig),

freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmove), and freedom of domestic movement formen/women(v2cldmovem,v2cldmovew).

Scale:Interval

Sources: v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2clacjstm v2clacjstw v2clprptym v2clprptyw v2cltort v2clkill

v2clslavemv2clslavefv2clreligv2clfmovev2cldmovemv2cldmovew

Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.


Legislativeconstraintsontheexecutiveindex(D)(v2xlg_legcon)

Projectmanager:JanTeorell


21

Question: Towhatextentisthelegislatureandgovernmentagencies(e.g.,comptrollergeneral,general prosecutor, or ombudsman) capable of questioning, investigating, and exercisingoversightovertheexecutive?

Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysismodelof the indicators for legislaturequestionsofficials inpractice(v2lgqstexp),executiveoversight (v2lgotovst), legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp), and legislatureoppositionparties(v2lgoppart).

Scale:IntervalSources:v2lgqstexpv2lgotovstv2lginvstpv2lgoppartDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Judicialconstraintsontheexecutiveindex(D)(v2x_jucon)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion: Towhat extent does the executive respect the constitution and complywith court

rulings,andtowhatextentisthejudiciaryabletoactinanindependentfashion?Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysis

model of the indicators for executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), compliance withjudiciary (v2jucomp), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), high court independence(v2juhcind),andlowercourtindependence(v2juncind).

Scale:IntervalSources:v2exresconv2jucompv2juhccompv2juhcindv2juncindDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).VariablesincludedinFigure5.

Civilsocietyparticipationindex(D)(v2x_cspart)

Projectmanager:MichaelBernhardQuestion:AremajorCSOsroutinelyconsultedbypolicymaker;howlargeistheinvolvementof

people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidatenominationwithinpartyorganizationhighlydecentralizedormadethroughpartyprimaries?

Clarifications:Thesphereofcivilsocietyliesinthepublicspacebetweentheprivatesphereandthestate.Here,citizensorganizeingroupstopursuetheircollectiveinterestsandideals.Wecall these groups civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs include, but are by no meanslimitedto, interestgroups, laborunions,spiritualorganizations(iftheyareengagedincivicorpoliticalactivities),socialmovements,professionalassociations,charities,andothernon-governmentalorganizations.Thecorecivilsocietyindex(CCSI)isdesignedtoprovideameasureofarobustcivilsociety,understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely andactivelypursuetheirpoliticalandcivicgoals,howeverconceived.

Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysismodel of the indicators for candidate selection –national/local (v2pscnslnl), CSOconsultation (v2cscnsult), CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt), and CSO women’sparticipation(v2csgender).

Scale:IntervalSources:v2pscnslnlv2cscnsultv2csprtcptv2csgender


22


Localgovernment(D)(v2xel_locelec)

Projectmanagers:KellyMcMann,JanTeorellQuestion: Are there elected local governments, and –if so – towhat extent can they operate

withoutinterferencefromunelectedbodiesatthelocallevel?Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local

governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected localgovernmentsbutwherethosegovernmentsaresubordinatetounelectedofficialsatthelocallevel (perhaps appointed by a higher-level body). A high score would be accorded to acountryinwhichlocalgovernmentsareelectedandabletooperatewithoutrestrictionsfromunelected actors at the local level (with the exception of judicial bodies). (Naturally, localgovernmentsremainsubordinatetotheregionalandnationalgovernments.)

Aggregation: First, local government elected (v2ellocelc) is recoded so that 0=none elected,1=onlyexecutiveelected,2=onlyassemblyelected,and3=bothelected.Thisnewconstructisthen scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr)scaledtovaryfrom0-1.

Scale:IntervalSources:v2ellocelcv2ellocpwrDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Directpopularvoteindex(D)(v2xdd_dd)

Projectmanager:DavidAltmanQuestion:Towhatextentisthedirectpopularvoteutilized?Clarification:Directpopularvotingrefersheretoaninstitutionalizedprocessbywhichcitizens

ofaregionorcountryregistertheirchoiceoropiniononspecificissuesthroughaballot.Itisintended to embrace initiatives, referendums, and plebiscites, as those terms are usuallyunderstood.Itcapturessomeaspectsofthemoregeneralconceptofdirectdemocracy.The termdoesnot encompass recall elections,deliberativeassemblies,or settings inwhichthevoteisnotsecretorthepurviewisrestricted.Likewise,itdoesnotapplytoelectionsforrepresentatives.

Aggregation: This indexmeasureshoweasy it is to initiateandapproveadirectpopularvoteandhowconsequential thatvote is (ifapproved)?Easeof initiation ismeasuredby(a) theexistence of a direct democracy process (v2ddlegci), (b) the number of signatures needed(v2ddsigcip), (c) time-limits to circulate the signatures (v2ddgrgpci), and (d) the level ofgovernment (national and/or subnational). Ease of approval is measured by quorumspertaining to (a) participation (v2ddgrgpci), (b) approval (v2ddbindci), (c) supermajority(v2ddspmjci),and(d)districtmajority(v2dddistci).Consequencesaremeasuredby(a)thelegalstatusofthedecisionmadebycitizens(bindingormerelyconsultative)(v2ddlegci),and(b) the frequency with which direct popular votes have been approved in the past(v2ddciniyr).

Scale:IntervalSources: v2ddlegci v2ddsigcip v2ddgrtlci v2ddgrgpci v2ddlevci v2ddbindci v2ddthreci

v2ddspmjciv2dddistciv2ddlegciv2ddciniyrDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).


23

Regionalgovernment(D)(v2xel_regelec)

Projectmanagers:KellyMcMann,JanTeorellQuestion:Arethereelectedregionalgovernments,and–ifso–towhatextentcantheyoperate

withoutinterferencefromunelectedbodiesattheregionallevel?Clarification: The lowest scorewould be reserved for a country that has no elected regional

governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected regionalgovernments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at theregionallevel(perhapsappointedbyahigher-levelbody).Ahighscorewouldbeaccordedtoacountryinwhichregionalgovernmentsareelectedandabletooperatewithoutrestrictionsfromunelectedactorsattheregionallevel(withtheexceptionofjudicialbodies).(Naturally,regionalgovernmentsremainsubordinatetothenationalgovernment.)

Aggregation: First,regionalgovernmentelected(v2elsrgel) isrecodedsothat0=noneelected,1=onlyexecutiveelected,2=onlyassemblyelected,and3=bothelected.Thisnewconstructisthen scaled tovary from0-1andmultipliedby regionaloffices relativepower (v2elrgpwr)scaledtovaryfrom0-1.

Scale:IntervalSources:v2elsrgelv2elrgpwrDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).VariablesincludedinFigure6.

Reasonedjustification(C)(v2dlreason,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion: Whenimportantpolicychangesarebeingconsidered, i.e.beforeadecisionhasbeen

made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for theirpositions?

Clarification:Becausediscoursevariesgreatlyfrompersontoperson,baseyouransweronthestylethatismosttypicalofprominentnationalpoliticalleaders.

Responses:0:Nojustification.Elitesalmostalwaysonlydictatethatsomethingshouldorshouldnot

be done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, “We must cutspending.”

1:Inferiorjustification.Elitestendtogivereasonswhysomeoneshouldorshouldnotbefordoingornotdoingsomething,butthereasonstendtobeillogicalorfalse,althoughtheymay appeal tomany voters. For example, “Wemust cut spending. The state isinefficient.” [The inference is incompletebecauseaddressing inefficiencieswouldnotnecessarilyreducespendinganditmightundermineessentialservices.]

2: Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why theproposedpolicies contribute toordetract fromanoutcome. For example, “Wemustcutspendingbecausetaxpayerscannotaffordtopayforcurrentprograms.”

3:Sophisticatedjustification.Elitestendtooffermorethanoneormorecomplex,nuancedand complete justification. For example, “We must cut spending because taxpayerscannot afford to pay for current government programs. Raising taxes would hurteconomicgrowth,anddeficitspendingwouldleadtoinflation.”

Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem

Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.


24


Respectcounterarguments(C)(v2dlcountr,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion:Whenimportantpolicychangesarebeingconsidered,towhatextentdopoliticalelites

acknowledgeandrespectcounterarguments?

Clarification:Becausediscoursevariesgreatlyfrompersontoperson,baseyouransweronthestylethatismosttypicalofprominentnationalpoliticalleaders.

Responses:0:Counterargumentsarenotallowedorifarticulated,punished.1: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are

ignored.2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by

makinganegativestatementabout themor the individualsandgroups thatproposethem.

3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative orpositivestatementsaboutthem.

4:Elitesalmostalwaysacknowledgecounterargumentsandexplicitlyvaluethem,eveniftheyultimatelyrejectthemforthemostpart.

5: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, andfrequentlyalsoevenacceptthemandchangetheirposition.


Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Engagedsociety(C)(v2dlengage,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion:Whenimportantpolicychangesarebeingconsidered,howwideandhowindependent

arepublicdeliberations?

Clarification:Thisquestionreferstodeliberationasmanifestedindiscussion,debate,andotherpublicforumssuchaspopularmedia.

Responses:0:Publicdeliberationisnever,oralmostneverallowed.1: Some limitedpublicdeliberationsareallowedbut thepublicbelow theelite levels is

almostalwayseitherunawareofmajorpolicydebatesorunabletotakepartinthem.2: Publicdeliberation isnot repressedbutnevertheless infrequent andnon-elite actors

aretypicallycontrolledand/orconstrainedbytheelites.3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups

participate,butitisconfinedtoasmallsliceofspecializedgroupsthattendstobethesameacrossissue-areas.

4: Publicdeliberationisactivelyencouragedandarelativelybroadsegmentofnon-elitegroupsoftenparticipateandvarywithdifferentissue-areas.

5: Large numbers of non-elite groups aswell as ordinary people tend to discussmajorpoliciesamong themselves, in themedia, inassociationsorneighborhoods,or in thestreets.Grass-rootsdeliberationiscommonandunconstrained.

Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.


25

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-DemMethodology,postedatV-Dem.net).


Commongood(C)(v2dlcommon,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion:Whenimportantpolicychangesarebeingconsidered,towhatextentdopoliticalelites

justifytheirpositionsintermsofthecommongood?Clarification:Becausediscoursevariesgreatlyfrompersontoperson,baseyouransweronthe

stylethatismosttypicalofprominentnationalpoliticalleaders.Responses:

0:Littleornojustificationintermsofthecommongoodisusuallyoffered.1: Specificbusiness,geographic,group,party,orconstituency interestsare for themost

partofferedasjustifications.2:Justificationsareforthemostpartamixofspecificinterestsandthecommongoodand

itisimpossibletosaywhichjustificationismorecommonthantheother.3: Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group

interestsandonappealstothecommongood.4: Justificationsare for themostpartalmostalwaysbasedonexplicit statementsof the

common good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatestnumberorashelpingtheleastadvantagedinasociety.



Rangeofconsultation(C)(v2dlconslt,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of

consultationatelitelevels?Clarification:Becausepracticesvarygreatlyfrompolicytopolicy,baseyouransweronthestyle

thatismosttypicalofpolicymaking.Responses:

0: No consultation. The leader or a very small group (e.g. military council) makesauthoritativedecisionsontheirown.

1: Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/rulingelites.

2: Consultation includes the formerplusa largergroup that is loyal to thegovernment,suchastherulingparty’sorparties’localexecutivesand/orwomen,youthandotherbranches.

3:Consultationincludestheformerplusleadersofotherparties.4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business

representatives.5: Consultationengageselites fromessentiallyallpartsof thepoliticalspectrumandall

politicallyrelevantsectorsofsocietyandbusiness.Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.


26




Powerdistributedbysocioeconomicposition(C)(v2pepwrses,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanager:JohnGerring

Question:Ispoliticalpowerdistributedaccordingtosocioeconomicposition?Clarification: Allsocietiesarecharacterizedbysomedegreeofeconomic(wealthand income)

inequality.Insomesocieties,incomeandwealtharedistributedinagrosslyunequalfashion.Inothers, thedifferencebetweenrichandpoor isnotsogreat.Here,weareconcernednotwith the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality.Specifically,we are concernedwith the extent towhichwealth and income translates intopoliticalpower.

Responses:0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer

peoplehavealmostnoinfluence.1: Wealthypeople enjoy adominantholdonpolitical power. Peopleof average income

havelittlesay.Poorerpeoplehaveessentiallynoinfluence.2:Wealthypeoplehaveaverystrongholdonpoliticalpower.Peopleofaverageorpoorer

incomehavesomedegreeofinfluencebutonlyonissuesthatmatterlessforwealthypeople.

3: Wealthypeoplehavemorepoliticalpowerthanothers.Butpeopleofaverageincomehave almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree ofpoliticalpower.

4: Wealthy people have nomore political power than those whose economic status isaverageorpoor.Politicalpower ismoreor less equallydistributedacrosseconomicgroups.



Socialgroupequalityinrespectforcivilliberties(C)(v2clsocgrp,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanager:Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion: Doallsocialgroups,asdistinguishedbylanguage,ethnicity,religion,race,region,or

caste,enjoythesamelevelofcivilliberties,oraresomegroupsgenerallyinamorefavorableposition?

Clarification: Here, civil liberties areunderstood to includeaccess to justice, privatepropertyrights,freedomofmovement,andfreedomfromforcedlabor.

Responses:0: Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general

population.1:Membersofsomesocialgroupsenjoysubstantiallyfewercivillibertiesthanthegeneral

population.


27

2:Membersofsomesocialgroupsenjoymoderatelyfewercivillibertiesthanthegeneralpopulation.

3: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the generalpopulation.

4:Membersofallsalientsocialgroupsenjoythesamelevelofcivilliberties.Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem


Healthequality(C)(v2pehealth,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion: Towhatextentishighqualitybasichealthcareguaranteedtoall,sufficienttoenable

themtoexercisetheirbasicpoliticalrightsasadultcitizens?Clarification: Poor-qualityhealthcarecanmakecitizensunabletoexercisetheirbasicrightsas

adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that renderthemunabletowork,participateinsocialorpoliticalorganizations,orvote(wherevotingisallowed).

Responses:0:Extreme.Becauseofpoor-qualityhealthcare,atleast75percent(%)ofcitizens’ability

toexercisetheirpoliticalrightsasadultcitizensisundermined.1:Unequal.Becauseofpoor-qualityhealthcare,atleast25percent(%)ofcitizens’ability

toexercisetheirpoliticalrightsasadultcitizensisundermined.2:Somewhatequal.Becauseofpoor-qualityhealthcare,tento25percent(%)ofcitizens’

abilitytoexercisetheirpoliticalrightsasadultcitizensisundermined.3:Relativelyequal.Basichealthcareisoverallequalinqualitybutbecauseofpoor-quality

healthcare,fivetotenpercent(%)ofcitizens’abilitytoexercisetheirpoliticalrightsasadultcitizensisundermined.

4: Equal.Basichealth care is equal inquality and less than fivepercent (%)of citizenscannotexercisetheirbasicpoliticalrightsasadultcitizens.



Particularisticorpublicgoods(C)(v2dlencmps)

Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion: Consideringtheprofileofsocialandinfrastructuralspendinginthenationalbudget,

how“particularistic”or“publicgoods”aremostexpenditures?Clarification: Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector,

socialgroup,region,party,orsetofconstituents.Suchspendingmaybereferredtoas“pork,”“clientelistic,”or“privategoods.”Public-goodsspendingisintendedtobenefitallcommunitieswithinasociety,thoughitmaybemeans-testedsoastotargetpoor,needy,orotherwiseunderprivilegedconstituents.Thekeypointisthatallwhosatisfythemeans-testareallowedtoreceivethebenefit.


28

Youranswershouldconsidertheentirebudgetofsocialandinfrastructuralspending.Weareinterestedintherelativevalueofparticularisticandpublic-goodsspending,notthenumberofbillsorprogramsthatfallintoeithercategory.

Responses:0:Almostallofthesocialandinfrastructureexpendituresareparticularistic.1:Mostsocialandinfrastructureexpendituresareparticularistic,butasignificantportion

(e.g.¼or1/3)ispublic-goods.2: Socialand infrastructureexpendituresareevenlydividedbetweenparticularisticand

public-goodsprograms.3: Mostsocialandinfrastructureexpendituresarepublic-goodsbutasignificantportion

(e.g.,¼or1/3)isparticularistic.4:Almostallsocialandinfrastructureexpendituresarepublic-goodsincharacter.Onlya

smallportionisparticularistic.Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem


Powerdistributedbysocialgroup(C)(v2pepwrsoc,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanager:JohnGerringQuestion:Ispoliticalpowerdistributedaccordingtosocialgroups?Clarification:Asocialgroupisdifferentiatedwithinacountrybycaste,ethnicity,language,race,

region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded insexualorientationorsocioeconomicstatus.)Socialgroupidentityiscontextuallydefinedandis likely tovaryacrosscountriesandthroughtime.Socialgroup identitiesarealso likely tocross-cut, so that a givenperson couldbedefined inmultipleways, i.e., aspartofmultiplegroups.Nonetheless,atanygivenpointintimetherearesocialgroupswithinasocietythatareunderstood-bythoseresidingwithinthatsociety–tobedifferent,inwaysthatmaybepoliticallyrelevant.

Responses:0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the

population.Thismonopolyisinstitutionalized,i.e.,notsubjecttofrequentchange.1: Politicalpower ismonopolizedbyseveral socialgroupscomprisingaminorityof the

population.Thismonopolyisinstitutionalized,i.e.,notsubjecttofrequentchange.2: Politicalpower ismonopolizedby several social groupscomprisingamajorityof the

population.Thismonopolyisinstitutionalized,i.e.,notsubjecttofrequentchange.3: Eitherallsocialgroupspossesssomepoliticalpower,withsomegroupshavingmore

power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one groupcontrollingmuchofthepoliticalpowerforaperiodoftime,followedbyanother–butallsignificantgroupshaveaturnattheseatofpower.

4:Allsocialgroupshaveroughlyequalpoliticalpowerortherearenostrongethnic,caste,linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social groupcharacteristicsarenotrelevanttopolitics.




29

Educationalequality(C)(v2peedueq,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion: Towhatextent ishighqualitybasiceducationguaranteedtoall, sufficient toenable

themtoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens?Clarification: Basic education refers to ages typically between 6 and 16 years of age but this

variesslightlyamongcountries.Responses:

0:Extreme.Provisionofhighqualitybasiceducationisextremelyunequalandatleast75percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines theirabilitytoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.

1:Unequal.Provisionofhighqualitybasiceducationisextremelyunequalandatleast25percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines theirabilitytoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.

2:Somewhatequal.Basiceducationisrelativelyequalinqualitybuttento25percent(%)ofchildrenreceivesuchlow-qualityeducationthatunderminestheirabilitytoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.

3:Relativelyequal.Basiceducationisoverallequalinqualitybutfivetotenpercent(%)ofchildrenreceivesuchlow-qualityeducationthatprobablyunderminestheirabilitytoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.

4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of childrenreceivesuchlow-qualityeducationthatprobablyunderminestheirabilitytoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.



Powerdistributedbygender(C)(v2pepwrgen,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanager:JohnGerringQuestion:Ispoliticalpowerdistributedaccordingtogender?Responses:

0:Menhaveanear-monopolyonpoliticalpower.1:Menhaveadominantholdonpoliticalpower.Womenhaveonlymarginalinfluence.2:Menhavemuchmorepoliticalpowerbutwomenhavesomeareasofinfluence.3:Menhavesomewhatmorepoliticalpowerthanwomen.4:Menandwomenhaveroughlyequalpoliticalpower.



Means-testedv.universalisticpolicy(C)(v2dlunivl,*_dos,*_ord,*_meanl)

Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion:Howmanywelfareprogramsaremeans-testedandhowmanybenefitall(orvirtually

all)membersofthepolity?


30

Clarification: A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivilegedconstituents.Cash-transferprogramsarenormallymeans-tested.A universal (non-means tested) program potentially benefits everyone. This includes freeeducation, national health care schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some maybenefitmore than others from these programs (e.g., when peoplewith higher salaries gethigherunemploymentbenefits).Thekeypointisthatpracticallyeveryoneisabeneficiary,orpotentialbeneficiary.Thepurposeofthisquestionisnottogaugethesizeofthewelfarestatebutratheritsquality.So,youranswershouldbebasedonwhateverprogramsexist.

Responses:0:Thereareno,orextremelylimited,welfarestatepolicies(education,health,retirement,

unemployment,povertyprograms).1:Almostallofthewelfarestatepoliciesaremeans-tested.2: Mostwelfare state policiesmeans-tested, but a significant portion (e.g.¼ or 1/3) is

universalisticandpotentiallybenefitseveryoneinthepopulation.3: The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and

universalistic.4: Mostwelfarestatepoliciesareuniversalistic,butasignificantportion(e.g.,¼or1/3)

aremeans-tested.5: Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion is

means-tested.Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem



CSOwomen’sparticipation(C)(v2csgender,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanager:MichaelBernhardQuestion:Arewomenpreventedfromparticipatingincivilsocietyorganizations(CSOs)?Clarification:Pleasepayattentiontoboth(A)whetherwomenarepreventedfromparticipating

incivilsocietyorganizations(CSOs)becauseoftheirgenderand(B)whetherCSOspursuingwomen’sinterestsarepreventedfromtakingpartinassociationallife.

Responses:0:Almostalways.1:Frequently.2:Abouthalfthetime.3:Rarely.4:Almostnever.



Freedomofdiscussionforwomen(C)(v2cldiscw,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)


31

Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public

spaces?Clarification: This indicatorspecifiestheextenttowhichwomenareabletoengage inprivate

discussions,particularlyonpoliticalissues,inprivatehomesandpublicspaces(restaurants,publictransportation,sportsevents,worketc.)withoutfearofharassmentbyothermembersof thepolity or thepublic authorities.Weare interested in restrictionsby the governmentand its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by othermembersofthepolity,sometimesininformalways.Thisquestiondoesnotaskyoutoassesstherelativefreedomofmenandwomen.Thus,itispossibletoassignthelowestpossiblescoretoacountryevenifmenandwomenenjoyequal–andextremelylow–rightstofreedomofdiscussion.

Responses:0:Notrespected.Hardlyanyfreedomofexpressionexistsforwomen.Womenaresubject

to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of politicalopinion.

1:Weaklyrespected.Expressionsofpoliticalopinionsbywomenarefrequentlyexposedtointerventionandharassment.

2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionallyexposedtointerventionandharassment.

3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in theprivate sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to softsanctions.Butasarulethereisnointerventionorharassmentifwomenmakepoliticalstatements.

4: Fullyrespected.Freedomofspeechbywomen in theirhomesand inpublicspaces isnotrestricted.



Propertyrightsforwomen(C)(v2clprptyw,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion:Dowomenenjoytherighttoprivateproperty?Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private

property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which maylegally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious orsocialnorms.Thisquestionconcerns the right toprivateproperty,notactualownershipofproperty.This question does not ask you to assess the relative rights ofmen andwomen. Thus, it ispossibletoassignthelowestpossiblescoretoacountryevenifmenandwomenenjoyequal–andveryminimal–propertyrights.

Responses:0:Virtuallynowomenenjoyprivatepropertyrightsofanykind.1:Somewomenenjoysomeprivatepropertyrights,butmosthavenone.2:Manywomenenjoymanyprivatepropertyrights,butasmallerproportionenjoysfew

ornone.3: More than half ofwomen enjoymost private property rights, yet a smaller share of

womenhavemuchmorerestrictedrights.


32

4:Mostwomenenjoymostprivatepropertyrightsbutasmallminoritydoesnot.5:Virtuallyallwomenenjoyall,oralmostall,propertyrights.



Powerdistributedbygender(C)(v2pepwrgen,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanager:JohnGerringQuestion:Ispoliticalpowerdistributedaccordingtogender?Responses:

0:Menhaveanear-monopolyonpoliticalpower.1:Menhaveadominantholdonpoliticalpower.Womenhaveonlymarginalinfluence.2:Menhavemuchmorepoliticalpowerbutwomenhavesomeareasofinfluence.3:Menhavesomewhatmorepoliticalpowerthanwomen.4:Menandwomenhaveroughlyequalpoliticalpower.



Freedomofdomesticmovementforwomen(C)(v2cldmovew,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion:Dowomenenjoyfreedomofmovementwithinthecountry?Clarification: Thisindicatorspecifiestheextenttowhichallwomenareabletomovefreely,in

daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and toestablishpermanentresidencywheretheywish.Notethatrestrictionsinmovementmightbeimposedby thestateand/orby informalnormsandpractices.Suchrestrictionssometimesfallonruralresidents,onspecificsocialgroups,orondissidents.Thisquestiondoesnotaskyoutoassesstherelativefreedomofmenandwomen.Thus,itispossibletoassignthelowestpossiblescoretoacountryevenifmenandwomenenjoyequal–andextremelylow–freedomofmovement.Do not consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political)criminals.Donotconsiderrestrictionsinmovementthatresultfromcrimeorunrest.

Responses:0:Virtuallynowomenenjoyfullfreedomofmovement(e.g.,NorthKoreaorAfghanistan

undertheTaliban).1: Somewomenenjoyfull freedomofmovement,butmostdonot(e.g.,ApartheidSouth

Africa).2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not.

Alternativelyallwomenenjoypartialfreedomofmovement.3:Mostwomenenjoyfullfreedomofmovementbutasmallminoritydoesnot.4:Virtuallyallwomenenjoyfullfreedomofmovement.

Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.


33



Freedomfromforcedlaborforwomen(C)(v2clslavef,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion:Areadultwomenfreefromservitudeandotherkindsofforcedlabor?Clarification:Involuntaryservitudeoccurswhenanadultisunabletoquitajobs/hedesiresto

leave–notbyreasonofeconomicnecessitybutratherbyreasonofemployer’scoercion.Thisincludes labor campsbutnotworkor servicewhich formspartofnormal civicobligationssuchasconscriptionoremploymentincommandeconomies.Thisquestiondoesnotaskyoutoassesstherelativefreedomofmenandwomenfromforcedlabor.Thus,acountryinwhichbothmenandwomensufferthesameconditionsofservitudemightbecodeda(0)forwomen,eventhoughthereisequalityacrossthesexes.

Responses:0: Femaleservitudeorotherkindsof forcedlabor iswidespreadandaccepted(perhaps

evenorganized)bythestate.1: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially

opposedbythepublicauthorities,thestateisunwillingorunabletoeffectivelycontainthepractice.

2:Femaleservitudeorotherkindsofforcedlaborexistsbutisnotwidespreadandusuallyactively opposedbypublic authorities, or only tolerated in someparticular areas oramongparticularsocialgroups.

3: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in thecriminalunderground.Itisactivelyandsincerelyopposedbythepublicauthorities.

4:Femaleservitudeorotherkindsofforcedlaborisvirtuallynon-existent.Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem


Accesstojusticeforwomen(C)(v2clacjstw,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion:Dowomenenjoyequal,secure,andeffectiveaccesstojustice?Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the

courtswithoutrisktotheirpersonalsafety,trialsarefair,andwomenhaveeffectiveabilitytoseekredressifpublicauthoritiesviolatetheirrights,includingtherightstocounsel,defense,andappeal.Thisquestiondoesnotaskyoutoassesstherelativeaccesstojusticemenandwomen.Thus,it ispossibletoassignthelowestpossiblescoretoacountryevenifmenandwomenenjoyequal–andextremelylimited–accesstojustice.

Responses:0:Secureandeffectiveaccesstojusticeforwomenisnon-existent.1: Secureandeffective access to justice forwomen isusuallynot establishedorwidely

respected.


34

2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minorproblems characterizemost cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts ofthecountry.

3:Secureandeffectiveaccesstojusticeforwomenisusuallyobserved.4:Secureandeffectiveaccesstojusticeforwomenisalmostalwaysobserved.




35

Appendix II. Overview of the structure of the indices.

StructureofAggregation–IndicesandIndicators DemocracyIndicesNames

Mid-LevelDemocracyandGovernanceIndicesNames

Lower-LevelDemocracyandGovernanceIndicesNames

NamesIndicators v2_tagIndicesandIndicators

ElectoralDemocracyIndex

v2x_polyarchy

Freedomofexpressionindex

v2x_freexp

Governmentcensorshipeffort-Media

v2mecenefm

Harassmentofjournalists v2meharjrn Mediaself-censorship v2meslfcen Freedomofdiscussion

formenv2cldiscm

Freedomofdiscussionforwomen

v2cldiscw

Freedomofacademicandculturalexpression

v2clacfree

Alternativesourceinformationindex

v2xme_altinf

Mediabias v2mebias Print/broadcastmedia

criticalv2mecrit

Print/broadcastmediaperspectives

v2merange

ElectoralComponentIndex

v2x_EDcomp_thick

Freedomofassociationindex(thick)

v2x_frassoc_thick

PartyBan v2psparban Barrierstoparties v2psbars Oppositionparties

autonomyv2psoppaut

Electionsmultiparty v2elmulpar CSOentryandexit v2cseeorgs CSOrepression v2csreprss Shareof

populationwithsuffrage

v2x_suffr

Percentofpopulationwithsuffrage

v2elsuffrage

Cleanelections v2xel_frefair


36

index EMBautonomy v2elembaut EMBcapacity v2elembcap Electionvoterregistry v2elrgstry Electionvotebuying v2elvotbuy Electionothervoting

irregularitiesv2elirreg

Electiongovernmentintimidation

v2elintim

Electionotherelectoralviolence

v2elpeace

Electionfreeandfair v2elfrfair Electedexecutive

index(dejure) v2x_accex

Lowerchamberelected v2lgello Upperchamberelected v2lgelecup Legislaturedominant

chamberv2lgdomchm

HOSselectionbylegislatureinpractice

v2exaphos

HOSappointmentinpractice

v2expathhs

HOGselectionbylegislatureinpractice

v2exaphogp

HOGappointmentinpractice

v2expathhg

HOSappointscabinetinpractice

v2exdfcbhs

HOGappointscabinetinpractice

v2exdjcbhg

HOSdismissesministersinpractice

v2exdfdmhs

HOGdismissesministersinpractice

v2exdfdshg

HOSappointscabinetinpractice

v2exdfcbhs

LiberalDemocracyIndex

v2x_libdem


v2x_polyarchy

LiberalComponentIndex

v2x_liberal

Equalitybeforethelawandindividuallibertyindex

v2xcl_rol

Rigorousandimpartialpublicadministration

v2clrspct

Transparentlawswithpredictableenforcement

v2cltrnslw

Accesstojusticeformen v2clacjstm


37

Accesstojusticeforwomen

v2clacjstw

Propertyrightsformen v2clprptym Propertyrightsfor

womenv2clprptyw

Freedomfromtorture v2cltort Freedomfrompolitical

killingsv2clkill

Freedomfromforcedlaborformen

v2clslavem

Freedomfromforcedlaborforwomen

v2clslavef

Freedomofreligion v2clrelig Freedomofforeign

movementv2clfmove

Freedomofdomesticmovementformen

v2cldmovem

Freedomofdomesticmovementforwomen

v2cldmovew

Judicialconstraintsontheexecutiveindex

v2x_jucon

Executiverespectsconstitution

v2exrescon

Compliancewithjudiciary

v2jucomp

Compliancewithhighcourt

v2juhccomp

Highcourtindependence v2juhcind Lowercourtindependence v2juncind Legislative

constraintsontheexecutiveindex

v2xlg_legcon

Legislaturequestionsofficialsinpractice

v2lgqstexp

Executiveoversight v2lgotovst Legislatureinvestigates

inpracticev2lginvstp

Legislatureoppositionparties

v2lgoppart

DeliberativeDemocracyIndex

v2x_delibdem


v2x_polyarchy

DeliberativeComponentIndex

v2xdl_delib

Reasonedjustification v2dlreason Commongood v2dlcommon Respect

counterargumentsv2dlcountr


38

Rangeofconsultation v2dlconslt Engagedsociety v2dlengage EgalitariandemocracyIndex

v2x_egaldem


v2x_polyarchy

EgalitarianComponentIndex

v2x_egal

Powerdistributedbysocioeconomicposition

v2pepwrses

Powerdistributedbysocialgroup

v2pepwrsoc

Socialgroupequalityinrespectforcivilliberties

v2clsocgrp

Educationalequality v2peedueq Healthequality v2pehealth Powerdistributedby

genderv2pepwrgen

Encompassing-ness v2dlencmps Means-testedvs.

universalisticv2dlunivl

ParticipatoryDemocracyIndex

v2x_partipdem


v2x_polyarchy

ParticipatoryComponentIndex

v2x_partip

Civilsocietyparticipationindex

v2x_cspart

Candidateselection--National/local

v2pscnslnl

CSOconsultation v2cscnsult CSOparticipatory

environmentv2csprtcpt

CSOwomensparticipation

v2csgender

DirectPopularVoteIndex

v2xdd_dd

Initiativespermitted v2ddlegci Initiativessignatures% v2ddsigcip Initiativessignature-

gatheringtimelimitv2ddgrtlci

Initiativessignature-gatheringperiod

v2ddgrgpci

Initiativeslevel v2ddlevci Initiativesparticipation

thresholdv2ddbindci

Initiativesapprovalthreshold

v2ddthreci


39

Initiativesadministrativethreshold

v2dddistci

Initiativessupermajority v2ddspmjci Occurrenceofcitizen-

initiativethisyearv2ddciniyr

Localgovernmentindex

v2xel_locelec

Localgovernmentelected v2ellocelc Localofficesrelative

powerv2ellocpwr

Localgovernmentexists v2ellocgov Regional

governmentindex

v2xel_regelec

Regionalgovernmentelected

v2elsrgel

Regionalofficesrelativepower

v2elrgpwr

Regionalgovernmentexists

v2elreggov

CoreCivilSociety

Index v2xcs_ccsi

CSOentryandexit v2cseeorgs CSOrepression v2csreprss CSOparticipatory

environmentv2csprtcpt

Party

Institutionalizationindex

v2xps_party

Partyorganizations v2psorgs PartyBranches v2psprbrch Partylinkages v2psprlnks Distinctpartyplatforms v2psplats Legislativeparty

cohesionv2pscohesv

Femalerightsindex v2x_gender

CSOwomensparticipation

v2csgender

Percent(%)FemaleJournalists

v2mefemjrn

Freedomofdomesticmovementforwomen

v2cldmovew

Freedomofdiscussionforwomen

v2cldiscw

Freedomfromforcedlaborforwomen

v2clslavef

Propertyrightsforwomen

v2clprptyw


40

Accesstojusticeforwomen

v2clacjstw

Powerdistributedbygender

v2pepwrgen

ElectoralRegime

Index v2x_elecreg

Legislativeorconstituentassemblyelection

v2xel_elecparl

v2eltype v2eltype_0 v2eltype v2eltype_1 v2eltype v2eltype_4 v2eltype v2eltype_5 Legislature

closeddownoraborted

v2xlg_leginter

Legislaturebicameral v2lgbicam Presidential

election v2xel_elecpres

v2eltype v2eltype_6 v2eltype v2eltype_7 Chiefexecutive

nolongerelected v2x_hosinter

HOS=HOG? v2exhoshog HOGappointmentin

practicev2expathhg

HOSappointmentinpractice

v2expathhs

Country Report IndonesiaV-Dem Data Brief Indonesia 4 In the first half of the century, when...

Documents

Transcript of Country Report IndonesiaV-Dem Data Brief Indonesia 4 In the first half of the century, when...