Country Report DR of CONGO

8/2/2019 Country Report DR of CONGO

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Country ReportsKabila is Dead - Long Live Kabila?Prospects for Stability and Recovery in the DRC

Cou ntry Report No, 7

The South AfricanInstitute ofInternational AffairsEstablished 1934


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Kabila is Dead Long Live Kabila?Prospects for Stabilityand Recovery in the D RCGreg Mills


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Kabila is Dead Long Live Kabila?Prospects for Stabilityand Recovery in the D RC


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Copyright SAIIA, February 2002

All rights reserved

THE SOU TH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERN ATIONAL AFFAIRS

ISBN: 1-919810-41-2

SAIIA Country Report No.7

SAIIA National Office BearersFred PhaswanaElisabeth Bradley Moeletsi Mbeki

Brian Haw ksworth AlecPienaarDr Greg Mills


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Kabila is DeadLong Live Kabila?Prospects for Stabilityand Recovery in the DRCGreg Mills'

[I]f I were asked whether I think there is any figure in the Congo whocould become a national leader, I would not be able to answer to theaffirmative...The only man who has genuine qualities of a mass leaderis , in my view, Kabila...But I will make so bold as to say, in this text thatwill see the light of day only after many years have passed, that I havevery grave doubts about his ability to overcome his defects in theenvironment in which he operates. The other well-known Congoleseleaders will all be swept away by events.

Ernesto Che Guevara, 19652

1 DR GREG MILLS is the national director of the South African Institute ofInternational Affairs (SAIIA), based at the University of the Witwatersrand,Johannesburg. He is the author/editor of over 20 books including, m ost recently,The Wired Model: South Africa, Foreign Policy and Globalisation. Cape Town: Tafelb2000. He can be contacted on: 160tnig(a)cosmos. wits.ac.za. This SAIIA C ountry Reportis based partly on a series of interviews and research ga thered du ring a visit to theDemocratic Republic of Congo in January 2002. Appreciation is expressed toAmbassador Sisa Ngombane and David Wiid of the South African embassy inKinshasa, and Colonel Thinus van S taden, Lt.-Colonel Jakes Jacobs and LieutenantJacques Botha of the South African MONUC contingent for their assistance infacilitating my visit, and to Markus-Alexander Antonietti and Colonel PeterWilliams for their insightful comments. Please note that the views expressed hereare, however, the author's alone.2 Che G uevara E, The African Dream: The Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the CoLondon: Harvill Press, 2000, p.244.

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General Mobutu has planted well in a num ber of areas, bu t none of hisefforts seem more important than those to expand and diversify theZairean economy. National Geographic, March 1973Rebuilding the Congo is more of a bet rather than something aboutwhich the re are clear projections. Michel Losembe, Citibank3

The Heart of AfricaIn January 2002, one yea r after the inaugura tion of Joseph Kabila as p reside ntof the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (who succeeded his father hadbee n assassinated), the volcano in the eastern town of Goma eru pted. In thesam e m onth , the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) scheduled to take place inSouth Africa was postpo ned due to a lack of funding and difficulties over theregistration process.

At the same time, the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom and France,Jack Straw and Hubert Vedrine, were on a whistle-stop tour of the DRC,Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda joining forces in an attempt to convinceKampala and Kigali to withdraw their armies from the DRC, therebyhopefully establishing the conditions for long-term peace. The swimmingpool at the Grand (formerly Inter-Continental) Hotel in Kinshasa,imm ortalised in Michela W rong's account of the M obutu years In the Footstepsof Mr Kurtz, was once again surrounded by a mix of expatriates includingNorwegian and Dutch aid workers, Ukrainian, Russian and South Africanpilots, Zimbabwean and Angolan military officers, members of theinternational media, World Bank officials, and members of the Congoleseelite. The levels of poverty in the chaotic, decaying streets of Kinshasa outsidethe insulated hotel also suggested that little had improved since Laurent-Desire Kabila took power from Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997. Indeed, grossdomestic product in the DRC had slipped to under $80 by 2002.

Discussion, Kinshasa, 27 January 2002.


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At the heart of Africa, Congo is the continent's second most populous andsecond-largest state. It is one -quarter the size of the US, com prises 50 millionpeople in more than 200 tribes, and is bordered by nine countriesCongo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda,Bu rundi, Tanzania, Zambia and Angola. It is also one of the richest countries,yet its people remain among the poorest and its leaders, for the most part,have been more concerned with ensuring their own wea lth and survival thanthe well-being of Congo's diverse popu lation. It is, in the wo rds of the WorldBank representative, 'One of the five poorest countries in the world, butprobably one of the ten richest resource countries world-wide'.4 It has ahydro-electric potential estimated at 100,000MW, sufficient to meet at least allof Southern African needs; oil reserves of 180 million barrels; and hasenormous wealth in other natural and mineral resources including 65% of thewo rld's cobalt reserves.5 The Congo is emblematic, in this w ay, of all that isgood and bad in Africa, contrasting huge economic potential andopportunities with the challenges of dealing with corruption and venality,providing governance, ensuring state capacity and institutionalisingdemocracy.War, instability and misrule have been a characteristic of the Congo sincecolonial times. The brutal history of colonial exploitation was followed bydecades of turbulent government and poor governance under PresidentMobutu.6 The end of the Cold War and later.the end of Mobutu's ruleheralded brighter prospects, but these have yet to be realised. An invasionfrom the country's east by the Alliance of Dem ocratic Forces for the Liberation

Interview, Kinshasa, 26 January 2002.For details, see http://zuiuio.cia.gov. The DRC's main exports include diamonds,copper, coffee, cobalt, coltan and crude oil, totalling an estimated $960 million in1999. The country 's ma in export pa rtners in 1999 were: Benelux (62%), US (18%),South Africa, Finland and Italy. The main imports in 1999 (totalling $660 million)were foodstuffs, m inin gand other mach inery, transport eq uip ment, and fuels. Thecoun try's main im port par tners in 1999 were : South Africa (28%), Benelux (14%),Nigeria (9%), Kenya (7%) and China.See, for example, Hochschild A, King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Creed, Terror, anHeroism in Colonial Africa. New York: Mariner, 1999; and W rong M, In the Footstepof Mr Kurtz. Lond on: Fourth Estate, 2000.


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of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) put paid to Mobutu's regime in May 1997 andinstalled in its place that of Lauren t Kabila. Hope th at Kabila's rule would leadto a more prosperous and stable period in the Congo's history turned quicklysour as his own regime was characterised by large-scale corruption, humanrights abuses and a renewed round of warfare as Kabila's former Rwandanand Ug anda n allies turned against him and he sough t new external pa rtners.The latest round of conflict, lasting from August 1998 until today, has beentermed 'Africa's first world war' drawing combatants from almost all thesur rou nd ing countries, including Angolan, Zimbabwean, Namibian, Ugand anand Rw and an troops as well as mercenaries. At the heart of the war (and thesubse quen t peace process) costing an estimated three million lives has bee nthe very future of Congo as a state. At the time of the U N-sponsored Lusakacease-fire in mid-1999, Kinshasa's remit covered roughly 40% of the overallterritory in the western sector of the country while foreign troops andguerrilla gro ups occupy the rem ainderm ostly in the eastern half.W hile UN troops and observers are charged w ith monitoring the settlementu n d e r t h e Mission de Vobservation des Nations au Congo (M ON UC ), i t is by nomeans clear that the formal cease-fire will lead to the withdrawal of troopsand the retu rn to a Congo un de r single political leadership . This is to a greatexten t dep en de nt on the success of the Inter-Congolese D ialogue process andon the role of external (mainly neighbouring) powers.This SAllA Country Report examines the p rospects for recovery in the C ongoin three sections: First, a background to the current situation in the Congo, including anexamination of the period of colonial rule and the Mobutu years, the firststage of Laurent Kabila's rulefrom August 1997 until the fallout with hisRwandese and Ugandan supporters in 1998, the second stage of Kabila'srulefrom 1998 until his dea th in January 2001, and the period of the ruleof Joseph Kabila. Second, it provides a snap shot of the current economic env ironment andreform efforts in the Congo. Third, it will examine the likelihood of political stability, economicrecovery, investment and trade in the country.


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1884190830 June 1960

11 July 1960February 19611964October 196524 No vem ber 19651966

24 April 1990August 1991December 1992January 1993

March 1993

October 1993January 2994June 1994

Congo timelineKing Leopold II's personal sovereign ty over Congo isrecognised at the Berlin Conference.Congo ceases to be the personal property of KingLeopold and is transferred to Belgium.

; Congo becomes independent. Joseph Kasavubu is; appo inted preside nt and Patrice Lum umb a is! app ointed prime minister.j Moise Tshombe declares Katanga ind ep en de nt.! Patrice Lumum ba is assassinated.| Tshombe becomes prime minister in the Kasavubu| government.Kasavubu dismisses Tshom be.Joseph Desire Mobutu takes over in military coup.! Mobutu creates a single-party called the Mouvement

populaire de la revolution (MPR). He is electedunopposed to seven year terms in 1970, 1977 and1984.Mobutu unveils a political reform programme.A constitutional conference commences.A transitional legislature, Haut conseil de la Republique(HCR), elects Etienne Tshisekedi p rim e minister.Soldiers riot and pillage in protest at being paid innew bank notes which were declared illegal byTshisekedi.M obutu dismisses Tshisekedi, appo inting FaustinBirindwa as prime minister. This results in twoparliaments and two governments.The two parliaments agree to merger into the HCR-Parlcnicnt de la transition (HCR-PT).Mobutu dismisses both Tshisekedi and Birindwa.Leon Kengo \va Don do is elected prim e minister. Thetransition is extended until 1997.


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October 199616 May 1997

June 1998August 1998

July 1999January 2000

June 2000

16 January 2001March 200126 May 2001October 2001Janu ary 2002

Congo timeline (continued)Sup ported by Rw anda and Ug anda, Congo leseBanyamulenge Tutsis commence a military campaignresisting persecution.Kinshasa falls to the Alliance des forces democratisms pour laliberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) under Laurent Desire. Kabila. Mobutu flees into exile where he dies of prostate'. cancer four months later.

i Kabila replaces high-ranking Tutsis in the government, and the army.Rwanda and Ug anda interven e ag ain, backing theRassemblement congolais pour la democratic (RCD). Thei campaign is halted by the intervention of Zimbabw ean,Sudanese , Angolan, Chadian and N amibian forces. RebelI forces are left in control of most of eas tern Congo.: The Lusaka Peace Agreem ent is signed.The UN Security Council passes a resolution for the] deployment of 500 observers and 5,000 troops in thej Congo.[ Kabila creates the Assem blee constituante et legislative-Parlement de transition (ACL-PT), a national transitionParliament, with 240 of 300 deputies selected by agovernment panel.Laurent Kabila is assassinated in Kinshasa.

UN (MONUC) troops an d observers comm encedeployment.An economic liberalisation prog ramme is launched .The inter-Congolese Dialogue comm ences in AddisAbaba, but ends in failure.The inter-Congolese D ialogue scheduled to take place inSouth Africa is postponed due to a lack of funding. It isre-scheduled for February 2002.


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Plus ga Change?A h istory and backgroundOn e week after his inauguration on 26 January 2001, Joseph Kabila attendeda prayer breakfast at the White House hosted by Presiden t G eorge W Bush.In the course of four days in the US, France and Belgium, he met with theSouth African pre sident, Thabo Mbeki, the French president, Jacques Chirac,the president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, the Belgian prime minister, GuyVerhofstadt, the US secretary of state, Colin Powell, and the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan. He addressed the UN Security Council, attended ameeting of the influential US Corporate Council for Africa, and met with theWorld Bank p residen t James Wolfensohn.Justover a decade earlier, President George Bush had welcom ed Mobutu SeseSeko on the lawns of the White House as a friend of the United States. It isestimated that Za ire was loaned around $4 billion be tween 1982 and 1991 asMobutu astutely played on the US' fears of Soviet expansionism in Africa,money mostly squand ered on white elephant projects rather than allocatedto development. He was also an important conduit for links and militarys u p p o r t to Jonas Savimbi 's Angolan Uniao Nagbnal para a Independenqia Totald'Angola (UNITA) movem ent during the 1980s a favourite of the Reagan andBush I adm inistrations and, in doing so , provided a m ethod of contact andco-operation with apartheid South Africa.Just as Mobutu hadoffered to align the then Zaire to the West and sought toallay Washington's security concerns, at the Corporate Council meetingPresident Joseph Kabila promised to make the DRC safe for investors.In reality, how ever, the Congo is a collapsed, divided and dysfunctional state,one that can currently no more promise to provide security to foreigninvestors than it can provide for its own citizens. It has shifted from being theplayground for colonial in te rests in the 19lh century, to a strategic prizeforthesuperpowers in the second half of the 20"1 century, once described as


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'Organised pillage for the profit of the foreigner and his intermediaries'.7 Atthe start of the 21sl cen tury, following the implosion and eventua l collapse ofM obutu's Zaire, the Congo is a focus of regional African rivalries, venality an dsecurity interests. At the heart of Africa, it symbolises the continent's corechallenges of leadership, state capacity, governance and nation-building.But if this is the current reality, what do es the future offer?

CAMEROON

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 1}'-, ANGOLA

From Leopold to LeopardIn 1876, King Leopold II ofBelgium formed an international group to'de ve lop ' the Congo region. The outcome of the Conference of Berlin in 1885

Pastoral letter cited in Young C & T Tower, The Rise and Decline of the Zairean State.Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983.


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organised the Congo Free State with Leopold as both king and owner. InOctober 1908, the private colony reverted to the Belgian state and becameknown as the Belgian Congo. Even after indepen den ce on 30 June 1960, theCongo became a battleground of international and regional interests. Thecou ntry fell into essentially four squabbling entities: the central g overnmentin the old capital or Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), a rebel movement in theeastern capital of Stanleyville (now K isangani), the inde pe nd en t repub lic ofKasai in the south-west, and an independent Katanga (Shaba) in the southwith the capital at Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi).UN troops, deployed in a peacekeeping capacity, succeeded in quash ing theKatangese secession which was led by Moise Tshom be, later to become primeminister of a united Congo and who led the defeat of the so-called Sinibarebels in eastern Congo in the mid-1960s. However, in 1966,1967,1977 and1978 the Katangese again revolted, and this was only suppressed afterexternal (French Foreign Legion) intervention. Patrice L umum ba, who hadwon the first general elections on 31 May 1960, was murdered in February1961 hav ing been removed from pow er the previous September after the UNintervention had attem pted to halt widesp read violence against white settlers.In Septem ber 1964, leftist rebel elements established a Peop le's Republic inStanleyville. This rebellion was suppressed by July 1965 with the assistance offoreign mercenaries (most notably those of Five Commando under Colonel'Mad' Mike Hoare8), while Belgian paratroopers rescued hu nd red s of trappedsettlers. In 1965, Colonel Joseph-Desire Mobutu was named presidentafterwh ich Zaire (as the country w as renam ed in 1971) began a precipitous slideinto decay and economic collapse.Indeed, the overall long-term trend in the Congo has, since independence,been towards continued state fragmentation and disintegration whatever theshort-term prospects of peace. Such is the colonial legacy and the effect ofMobutu's 35-year rule.

For a detailed account of the activities of these mercenary troops , see Colonel JerryPuren as told to Brian Pottinger, in Pottinger B, Mercenary Commander. Alberton:Calngo, 1986.


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Mobutu destroyed any semblance of viability of his inheritance in an attem ptto kee p the Congolese state together throug h a mixture of repression, the useof a personality cult verging on voodoo, a far-reaching Africanisationprogramme of retour a lauthenticitc, an d, critically, making use of patronageand turning a blind-eye to, and even encouraging, corruption. Mobutupresented the radical Zairianisation prog ram me as an offset to the impact ofcolonialism, though it was implicitly focused on consolidating his politicalsup po rt: 'To perpetua te the exploitation of the black man by the white', hesaid, 'the colonisers systematically wiped out African traditions, languagesand cultu re. In short, totally negating the black, man so that he think s, eats,dresses, laughs and b reathes in the m anner of the w hite man'.9 W hatever therationale, the effect of Mobutu's programme was, however, somewhatdifferent. As Alec Russell notes:1"

In good revolutionary style, Monsieur and Madame gave way to dtoyenand Citoyenne, the necktie to the loose African shirt, and the riverCongo , like the country, was renamed Zaire. In practice it becam e clearto all but the most star-struck or self-interested Mobutuists thatauthcnticite, like everything else Mobutu d id, was ab out mak ing m oneyand entren ching his position and cult.The raping of the state mining goose, Gecamines, created out of thenationa lisation in 1967 of the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga, which accountedfor 70% of export receipts, ultimately undercut Mobutu's rule. Contrary topopular belief, however, while much was spent on the trappings of M obutu'spower includ ing real estate in Belgium, Switzerland, France and Cape Town,much more was expend ed on buying off supp orters. By the turn of the 21stcentury, Leopold's 'magnificent African cake' had only a few crumbs left,mainly in the mining and energy sectors, though copper production levelswere less than one-tenth of what they were at their peak . As Russell writes:"

Taken from the video, Mobutu: King of Zaire.'The King of Kleptocrncy' in Russell A, Big Men, Little People: Encounters in Africa.Lo nd on : Pan, 2000, p .14.Ibid, p.13.

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Since indep endence from Belgium in I960, the state had in all bu t nam eceased to exist. More than four-fifths of the estimated 80,000 km s ofroads had been reclaimed by the bush, as had most of the railway...Thetelephone cables had long since been uproo ted...It was estimated in thelate seventies that more than two-thirds of the government's budgetnever reached its destination. By the nineties, central funding hadeffectively ceased.

Access to state power (and thus to resources) was carefully managed byMobutu, on ethnic as well as political grounds. Between 1965 and 1990, heappointed no less than 51 government teams, each with an average of 40ministerial slots, while there were more than 600,000 names on the civilservice payroll. As one diplomat who served in Kinshasa a t the time noted,'Mobutu's cabinet was like a medieval court, with rivals jockeying forpositions rather than handing out advice. Cabinet selection was like musicalchairs. W hen the m usic stopped , 20 would be ministers, 20 in jail, 20 in exileand 20 in the opposition. Then the music would start again'.12 Provincialgovernors had a free hand to extort, bu t were closely watched by M obutu lestthey should become too powerful.Following the end of the Cold War and the increased unwillingness of theWest (and th e US in particular) to supp ort a regime as obviously corrupt a ndunde m ocraticasM obutu's,a process ofdemocratisationwa's embarked upon .The national sovereign conference comm enced in August 1991, bu t collapsedas Mobutu attempted to manipulate it to his own ends. Nonetheless, itsdecisions will most likely form the basis on which a new politicaldispensationif anywill today be constructed.When his ability todeliver pa tronage started to run ou t the writing was on thewall. This was coupled, critically, with the aftermath of the Rwandangenocide which Mobutu had badly mismanaged by allowing, in the style ofvenality perfected during his reign, exploitation and the misuse of Huturefugee camps to the east. In add ition, the result of keeping his army divided,ineffectual and geared more towards self-enrichment than the business of

Discussion, Pretoria, Janu ary 2002.11


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defence, was seen in their dramatic collapse in the face of aRwandan-Ugandan-led rebel march on Kinshasa in mid-1997.Mobutu to Kabila I: Corruption and dysfunctionLa urent Kabila was at the head of the Alliance of Dem ocratic Forces for theLiberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFt)13 movement that successfully oustedM obutu from p ow er in May 1997. The m ovem ent ow ed its origins to YoweriM useveni of Uganda and Paul Kagame of Rwanda w ho , by early 1996, hadlost patience with the armed threat posed by the remnants of the RwandaHutu army and the Interahamwe militia based in the the n Zaire. The H utushad moved to eastern Zaire in 1994 following Major-General Kagame'sRw andan Patriotic Front (RPF) ove rthrow of the genocidal Hutu regime.14 In1995 and early 1996, the Hutu increased their incursions into Rwanda,affecting, too, Kigali's close ally, Ug anda . The internation al comm unity didlittle to interven e. O n the con trary, it continued to provide aid to the refugeecamps in Goma and elsewhere in the then Zaire, thereby feeding the Hutuarmy. Rwanda and Uganda therefore decided to clean up the campsthemselves with help from Zairois Banyamulenge Tutsis who had becomealienated from Kinshasa owing to a series of discriminatory laws aimed atrevoking their citizenship rights.However, the extent of the rot in the then Zaire had been unde restimated byall concerned. W hen Kinshasa's arm y the Zairean Armed Forces (FAZ)repeatedly fled (after looting the cities it was to defend), the Rwandans,Ugandans and Laurent Kabila moved forward with astonishing speed.Once hav ing taken pow er, howeve r, a num ber of things about Kabila soonbecam e clear.

For background on the formation of the AFDL, see Reed WC, 'Guerrillas in theMidst', in Clapham C (ed.), African Guerrillas. Oxford: James Currey, 1998,pp.134-154.For details, see Prunier G, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. London: Hurst,1995.

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These strains manifested themselves in the form of a Tutsi uprising againstKabila less than one year after h e took pow er.Africa's first world war17Kabila was thu s installed in Mobu tu's place largely as a result of the combinedefforts of the Rwandan, Ugandan and Angolan governments which wereconcerned abou t the rebel's use of Zairian territory to launch attacks againstthem. Kabila faced an imm ense task, one that he did not, essentially, prove tobe up to. On the one han d, he ha d to unite and govern a large and diversecou ntry im poverished bo th financially an d in terms of available go vernm entresources by Mobutu's years of kleptocracy. On the other, his erstwhilebackers expected him to keep his borders secure and deny access to Congo lesebases used by the Angolan rebel movement UNITA in the west and Hutuforces to the east.It should not be surprising, therefore, that given both the nature of hisinhe ritance and his lack of governan ce experience that he failed to bring thecou ntry together. Instead, he initially reverted to wha t was described as 'hisown domestic comfort zone' in the southern province of Katanga whileseeking, at the same time, to reduce his reliance on the locally unpopularRw andan/Tutsi forces w hich had b rough t him to power but whose brutalityagain st H utu exiles in the east of Congo brough t domestic and internationalcensure. Indeed, as many as 130,000 Hutu exiles were reportedly killed bygovernment forces in 1998.The trigger of the 1998 crisis was related to Kabila's dom estic insecurities. Ashe marched through the country, he had to make deals with a large nu mberof pow er-ho lders wh o had become accustomed to minimal interference fromthe capital. The decision to replace the Tutsi chief of staff of his armed forceswith a Katangan was followed by the expulsion of the remaining RwandanTutsi forces from the Congo at the end of July. In an address to the nation on

'' This is the term coined by former US assistant secretary of state, Susan Rice. SeeReyntjens F, 'Briefing: th e D emocratic Republic of Congo, From Kabila to Kabila',African Affairs, 100, 2001, p.311. See also Turner T, 'The Kabilas' Congo', CurrentHistory, May 2001 for a good backg round on current even ts.14


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28 July 1998, Kabila explained that this was a necessary step to create o rderlyrelations with Rw anda . Kigali claimed that the decision to withdra w had beentheir own but that they hoped 'to maintain our co-operation with theCongolese in dealing with the criminal elements in eastern Congo'.Both Rwanda and Uganda had, in turn, been coming under increasinginsurgen t p ressu re from the so-called Alliance of Dem ocratic Forces (ADF), aloose guerrilla coalition including former Mobutuists and Hutus. Operatingwith Sudanese sup port in and across the Ruw enzori mo untains into U ganda,the ADF launched a number of successful attacks into Yoweri Museveni'scountry, threatening, inter alia, the cobalt mineral investm ent at Kasese.A first Banyamulenge (Congo) Tutsi revolt in February 1998 was resolvedpeacefully. A second upris ing started at the begin nin g of Au gust 1998 withsubstantial military support from Rwanda, despite formal denials that thiswas the case. The rebels made rapid advances: on 3 August, armycommanders in Goma, Bukavu and Baraka withdrew support from Kabila.Although the rebels predicted the fall of Kinshasa to their forces before theend of August, as the Rwandan-led military campaign neared the capital,logistical problems together with a major military interv entio n principally byAngolan, Nam ibian and Zimbabw ean troops curbed their advanc e.As Herbert Weiss has a rgued:18

Perhaps this conflict betw een Kabila and his sponsors was inevitable,since any Congolese president would have sought to legitimise himselfwith the Congolese public and that would have necessitated distancin ghimself from foreign, especially militarily present, sponsors.

But it must also be said that Kabila provoked both internal and externalopposition, which was n ot inevitable: He could have streng thened his internalposition both by app lying a more pluralist policy and by acting to retain thesupport of the ADFL founders and supporters. He could have taken care totreat the FAZ soldiers sent to re-education camps in a more humane anddignified fashion (some informants claimed that they were be ing starved). He

See http://wiou\itiic^iii/depts/diploniat/ADJ*?ue*/anidipl_16/weiss/weiss_printl.htinl.IS


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could have avoided giving the impression that his intimates from Katangawere be ing favoured over people from o ther regions. In his relations abro ad,he could have avoided offending Uganda by establishing warm ties withSu dan. If it is true tha t before August 1998 he began to recruit Interahamive andarm them (there is no doubt that that was don e after that date), he could haverefrained from provoking Rw anda to the poin t of an inevitable, total enmity.And there was surely nothing to be gained by antagonising Western leaders,som etimes in a very personal m anner. Yet, all this having been said, it sho uldbe remembered that Kabila had, for decades, been a marginalised guerrillaleader with virtually no experience as a statesman. The role which historyha nd ed him was full of opportun ity, bu t it wo uld hav e been difficult to fill itunder any circumstances.This left th e country divided in two, the rebels occupying the east and no rth -west, with very restricted lines of communication between the two zones.Various efforts to end the war resu lted in the signing of the Lusaka Accord inJuly 1999. Under its terms, the six nations involved (the DRC, Angola,Nam ibia, Zimbabwe, Rw anda and Uganda) and the rebels agreed to: The creation of a joint military comm ission responsible for monitoring thepeace agreem ent in conjunction with the UN and its deploym ent. The withdrawal of all foreign troops within nine months. Th e disarm am ent and repatriation of all armed groups operating in theDRC. The holding of national dialogue to create a national govern ment. Am nesty for all rebel groups, apart from those implicated in the genocide.Althou gh fighting continued sporadically over the next 18 mo nths, the LusakaAccord is viewed by the foreign protagonists as the 'basis for a peacefulsettlement and their own (eventual) withdrawal'. iy However, itsimplem entation was held u pb y Laurent Kabila who rejected the Organisationof African Unity-nominated former president of Botswana Sir Ketumile

Economist Intel l igence Unit (EIU) Country Profi le, Democratic Republic of Congo.London: E IU, 2001, p.8.16


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Masire as the facilitator of the Inter-Congolese D ialogue an d refused toguarantee the security of UN peacekeepers. Following the assassination of theincreasingly isolated Laurent Kabila in January 2001, his son, Joseph Kabila(who succeeded him) reinvigorated the peace process, authorising the UNdeployment, accepting Masire as the facilitator, and disengaging theCongolese army.Since its de ploy m en t in force in April 2001, the U N in the form of theMO NUC has played a key peacekeeping role.2"

MONUC Structure and Mandate21Headquarters Kinshasa; Democratic Republic of the Co ngo Liaison offices inAddis Ababa (Ethiopia), Bujumbura (Burundi), Harare (Zimbabwe), Kampala(Uganda), Kigali (Rwanda), Lusaka (Zambia) and W indhoek (Namibia)

DurationCom menced 30 Nov emb er 1999Authorisation15 June 2001 to 15 ]une 2002 (UN Security Council Resolution 1355,15 June2001)StrengthAuthorised strength: 5,537 military personnel, including up to 500 militaryobservers, supported by specialists in human rights, humanitarian affairs,public information, child protection, political affairs, medical andadministrative support.

Sft? litlp://iviczi>.uiLorg/Doc^/


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Strength (31 August 2001): 2,398 total uniformed personnel, including 385military ob servers and 2,013 troops; sup por ted by 475 international and 170local civilian personnel.Contributors of military personnelAlgeria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,Can ada, C hina, the Czech Republic, De nm ark, Egypt, France, Ghana , India,Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Morocco,Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland,Romania, the Russian Federation, Senegal, South Africa,22 Sweden,Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, the United K ingdom, Uruguay and Zambia.

Financial aspectsCommitment authority (six months): July-December 2001: $209.1 millionThe United Nations is now poised to implement Phase III of the MONUCplan . Phase I involved the arrival of the UN team and the stabilisation of thesecurity environment. Phase II has seen the pulling back of the warringparties to new defensive positions approxim ately 30kms apa rt according to aplan signed in February 200123 and the insertion of 54 static UN monitoringposts and 41 mobile teams.Phase III, due to be implemented by mid-2002, will attempt the voluntarydisarmament of militias in the eastthe so-called DDRRR (Disarmament,

In January 2002, the South African conting ent comprised 98 personn el ma de up ofsix aircraft handling teams of eight personnel per team (one each at Mbandaka,Comn, Kisangani, Kalemi, Kananga and Kinshasa) responsible for loading andoffloading equipment, one fire-fighting and rescue team in Kinshasa (sevenpersonn el), one medical team with six members; 24 personnel at the South Africanheadquarters at the IVECO base near Kinshasa, and eight seconded to theMONUC headquarters in the city itself.Essentially, as one M ONUC officer explained, 'ou t of artillery range'. In terview,Kinshasa, 23 Janu ary 2002.

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Demobilisation, Rep atriation, Resettlement and R e-insertion). In terms of UNSecurity Council Resolution 1376 of 2001, this involves the establishm ent offorward dep loym ent areas in Kisangani and Kindu, creating between ten andfifteen reception/assembly areas for the rebel armed gro up s. This envisagesaU N force of around 10,000 (up from the January 2002 levels of 3,500) presentfor at least two years.The UN is a critical element in the normalisation of political activity alongwith the stabilisation of the territory. If the U N can enab le, throug h Phase III,the disarmament and demobilisation of militias in the east of the country,then the Rwandans and Ugandans might be convinced to leave. As onediplomat has argued,24

While there is a certain economic incentive now for the Rwandese tostay, their presence is relatively pure, its about th eir security . If thesesecurity concerns can be m et, then Kigali has no excuse to be there, andthe international community can pressurise them to withdraw. Theyalso realise now that they can have influence without troops.The UN is not only, however, involved in monitoring the cease-fire linerunning diagonally across the DRC, but also the shifting patterns of rebelactivity and support. Below is a summary of the make-up of the rebel andgovernment-allied forces. ;

Interview, MONUC, Kinshasa, 23 January 2001.19


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Forces in the Congo conflict: T he g overn m ent side, Jan uary 2002: Angola Between 500 and 1,000 troop s, based mainly near itsown borders, and focused on denying sanctuary to: UNITA.At peak 2,000, bu t are be lieved to have left the DRCentirely possibly save for diamond mining interests; near Tshikapa and regular consultations with! government forces.

Estimated force stre ng th of 8,000, dow n from a peaki of 12,000, but provides military 'backbone' toi Kinshasa.

Forces armees congolais \ Estimated at 40-60,000 troops, including some H utu1 Interahamwe and Mai Mai militias mainly in Kivus, f o r m e r R w a n d a n A r m y (Forces armees\ rwandaises FAR ), Bu rundian H utu forces (Forces pourj la defense de democratieFDD), and ex-Mobutists.

Namibia

I Zimbabwe

AliR j Alliance of Interahamwe and ex-FAR totalling arou ndj 30-40,000. _FDD [Believed to total, at peak, arou nd 15,000, splitj between the DRC and Tanzanian refugee camps.

Forces in the C ongo conflict: T he rebel side, January 2002 BurundiRwanda

Uganda

At peak around 2,000 troops, but announced theirwithd rawal in January 2001.Rw andan Patriotic Army (RPA) strength is estimatedat 18,000. Forces in the DRC are made up of localTutsi and Hutu (ex-FAR) elem ents.Estimated 3-4,000 Ugandan People's Defence Force(UPDF) troops , based m ainly in North K ivu.

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Forces in the Congo conflict: The rebel side, January 2002 (continued)MLC Mouvement de Liberation Congolais (MLC) headed byJean-Pierre Bemba, based mainly in Equateurprovince and headquartered in Mobutu's former'pink palace' at Gbadolite. Was supp orted mainly by; Uganda, but recent tensions related apparently to; Bemba's desire to control custom s p osts on the eastern border have soured relations leading to| creation of RCD-K7ML an d RCD-K7N. Estimatedj be tween 6,500-9,000 troops.RCD-K/ML Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratic (RCD)-Kisangani/ML allied to Jean-Pierre Bemba. Wasformally kn ow n as RCD-K (see below) u nd er ErnestWamba dia Wamba, and entered in early 2000 intoan alliance with Bemba und er the terms of which theMLC transformed temporarily into the Front pour laliberation du Congo (FLC). Later broke away again, butremains close to (and is supported by) Uganda.

Headed by Mbusa Nyanwisi. Around 2,500 troops.RCD-G I RCD-Goma, sponsored by Kigali and headed byAdolphe Onasumba, a South African-educateddoctor, who replaced Emile Illunga in late-2000.Created ou t of split of the RCD in May 1999, whenWamba dia Wamba broke away to form the RCD-Kisangani supported by Uganda. Total of some117,000-20,000 troops.i RCD-K/N , RCD-Kisangani/National created in January 2002,; headed by Roger Lumbala and allegedly sponsoredby Rwanda following a fissure within the RCD-] K/ML.Although the Rwandans,Ugandans,Zimbabweans,Namibians and Angolansoriginally intervened for strategic political and security reasons, theircontinued presence has been paid for largely by extensive m ining and otherinterests.

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The EconomyThere is both anecdotal and empirical evidence of economic collapse in theD R C ,asitua tionth atis fraught withstructuraldifficulty and political intrigue.According to the United Nations Developm ent Programme (UNDP),25 by 2002more than 70% of the population are living in absolute po verty . According toofficial statistics inflation was at511 % in 2000 and the economy shran kb y 11 %in that year,2" Men and w om en, old and y oun g alike, haw k every imaginableproduct in the potholed streets of Kinshasa, most w ith no jobs at all, but sometrying to supplement their meagre government salaries. Unemployment isaround 85% .The minister of the economy, finance and budget, Mbuyamu IlankirMatangulu, has said that this is the result of 'No meaningful investment ofbusiness over the last 10-15 years because of political turmoil and problems inthe area of economic management'. The minister of press andcom munication, Kikaya bin Karubi, pu t it slightly differently: 'It is difficult tohave a viable, w orking econom y in times of war'.27 As a recent Standard Bankreport notes:

The ongoing war, which broke out in August 1998, has impactednegatively on the econom y and people of the Dem ocratic Republic ofthe Congo (DRC). The war has accelerated the country's econom ic andsocial dec line. In spite of its rich n atura l resources, it remains o ne of thepoorest coun tries in the world: GDP per capita declined to $85 in 2000com pared to $380 in 1985 an d $205 in 1991. This illustrates theextremely low an d declining sta nd ard of living. The on -going conflicthas destroyed a large portion of the country's productive capacity.Infrastructure maintenance hasalsobeen inade quate. Declining ou tpu tis ev iden t in m ost sectors and industries. Between 1996 and 2000 the

Interview, Professor Munken i, UNDP, Kinshasa, 24 January 2002.These figures were supplied by the minister of economy, finance and budget,Mbuyamy Ilankir Matungulu, in an interview, Kinshasa, 5 January 2002.Interview, Kinshasa, 25 January 2002.Economic Pointer, 29 Oc tober 2001.

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primary sector declined by nearly 17%, the secondary by 37% and thetertiary by 23% . Over the same period mining declined by 20%;manu facturing by 37%; construction b y 58%, market services by 43%;and transportation and telecommunications by 35%.

Noting that the DRC's economy is dominated by primary sector activities(agriculture, forestry, livestock breeding and farming, hunting, fishing andmining) which comprises 61 % of econom ic activity, the Standard Bank repo rtsays that the low contribution of the m ining sector (6% of GDP) 'is surprising 'given the'perceived importance of copper, cobaltand diam ond mining to theeconomy'. The report suggested that this may be due to the decline in thecopper price in the early 1990s given that copper was the leading export,accounting for almost half of total export ea rnings. Also, 'since the outbreakof the war in 1998 the government has lost control over the mining andagricultural sectors. For example, 'the report noted, 'som e commodities, suchas gold are smuggled out of the DRC and exported from neighbouringcountries'. M ining, includ ing mineral processing, accounted for abou t 90% ofexport earnings and 7%of emp loym ent. Yet as an illustration of the declineof this sector, copper production has fallen from 475,000 tonnes in 1989 to20,000 tonnes today.29 Mining's contribution to GDP had already droppedfrom 24% in 1987 to 5.9% in 1994.

Interview, minister of finance, Kinshasa, 25 January 2002.2 3


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The D R C : Economic trends3'11997 1998 1999 2000 2001313 8 0 7-5.6199

- 1 0 . 8471.8

4 6 . 71.3

6 2 1 8-1.6107-6.26023

4 8 . 22.4

4 5 7 9- 1 0 . 4270-5.2 '662.9 '

4 9 . 74.5 '

4 5 4 0-11511-5.9522.2

5050

--3

1352.5--

50310

GDP current market prices ($m)Real GDP (% change)CPI (% annual average)Fiscal deficit/surplus (% of GDP)Reserves ($ m)Imports covered by reserves(weeks)Population (millions)Exchange rate (end of period) ($)

The Standard Bank report concludes that:The country's growth record is abysmal. Negative growth rates havebeen recorded for a number of years; for example, the economycontracted by 10.4% in 1999. The poor growth record in 1999 isattributable to the start of the war in August 1998, which led todeclining ou tput in virtually all economic sectors. O ther contribu tingfactors t o the overall socio-economic decline are gross mismanagem entof the economy, endem ic corruption, damage to and deterioration ofthe infrastructure and the collapse of the health and education system s.

Tw o factors dom inate the country's recent economic develo pm ent as well asits future outlook. Firstly, because the government monetised the large fiscaldeficit (in effect it printed m oney to finance the deficit), the unchecked moneycreation resulted in hyperinflation. Secondly, the country is burdened witha massive medium-and long-term external debt, equal to 2 8 0% of G D P . Thisbrands the country one of the most heavily indebted poor countries in theworld.

This is drawn froni a number of sources, including World [J.ink and governmentinterview s as well as ihe aforementioned Standard Bank repent,Hstimated figure?.

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In response to this environment, the Kabila II government has launched aseries of market reforms aimed at breaking the cycle of hyper-inflation andimproving the macro-economic environment. This has been carried out inclose consultation w ith the World Bank and the IMF, and is envisaged to takeplace over th ree stages:32 stabilisation, recovery and development.The first (IMF-supervised) stage involves the reduction of inflation and thefloating of the currency, preparing the country for the recovery phase. Thisalso involves the opening of a World Bank office in Kinshasa at the start of2002, and the disbursement of a $50 million grant for spe nd ing on institution-building and preparatory studies; and projects, notably the $15 millionreconstruction of the Kinshasa-Matadi link, HIV/Aids33 and variouscom munity-driven projects. A num ber of prepara tory dono r m eetings havealso been organised in preparation for the recovery and de velop m ent phases.O n 26 May 2001, the gov ern m ent floated the currency, allowing it to deflatefrom S1-CF50 to $l-CF330 today . The petrol price was liberalised, increasingfrom CF70 to CF255 today. In addition, the government broke a marketingmonopoly held by the Israeli IDI Diamonds firm. Inflation fell to 135% over2001, but under 10% for the second half of the yea r.The governm ent arrestedthe economic contraction, registering a 3% shrinkage for 2001. Thegovernment plans to embark on a second stage of reforms in March 2002 withthe imp lementation of an IMF and World Bank program m e to improv e levelsof efficiency in government expenditure and revenue collection, curbcorruption, embark on privatisation, and man age the $14 billion external debtpartly by obtaining eligibility for the H ighly Indebted Poor C ountries (HIPC)debt relief initiative.34 Debt repayments are estimated at more than $500million annually.

This section is based on an interview w ith the resident represen tative of the WorldBank, Kinshasa, 26 January 2002.According to UNAID5, the na tional HIV infection rate is 15% , although this isrum oured to be as high as 60% in the FAC.This figure includes arrea rs of $1.6 billion, made up of outs tand ing paym ents to theWorld Bank ($300 million), the IMF ($500 million) and the African DevelopmentBank ($800 million).

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Movement to the recovery and development phases is dependent onsufficient, tangible progress in the peace process and the 'nod of approval'from the dono r com munity. According to the governor of the Central Bank,Jean-Claude Masungu, there is an approximate amount of $850 millionwaiting in development funding to be disbursed over three years, plusaround $1 billion in bridg ing finance for ou tstan ding deb t arrears.'5Given the Congo 's we alth and related to these develop ments and the promiseof political stability, there has been increased interest from South Africanfirms. At least five South African-linked firms possess mining options (seebelow). In other sectors, Vodacom has recently won a telecommunicationslicence, Securicor Gray a security contract, Engen is involved in a joint v entu rewith Petrofina, and there is the possibility of Eskom inv olvem ent in the Ingapower-scheme and Spoornet in supplyin g wagons and engines including forthe Kisangani-Kindu link which is likely to be rehabilitated for MONUC'sPhase III.

Do ing business in the DRC: Ge tting there: SAA has twice-weekly flights to Kinshasa. These are popular! with DRC citizens travellingalso to Europe, particularly w ith the collapse ofSabena and the curtailing of that link to Brussels. The local Hewa BoraAirlines flies to Europe and internally, but their flights are reportedlyunreliable and on aircraft of dubious serviceability. Other connections existvia Air Cameroon, Air Gabon an d Kenya A irways. Air France has recentlycommenced a twice-weekly flight to Paris. Kinshasa's single arrival andde pa rtu re hall at Ndjili International Airport is something of a scrum with

nu merous checks and hurdles. Sou th African ci tizens require a visa from theDRC embassy in Pretoria (Tel: 012-342-5508; Fax: 012-342-5510).South African embassy and firms: There is an embassy but no traderepresentativ e in Kinshasa (Tel: (+243) 48287; Fax: (+243) 8804151; E-mail:Ambasud((t.ra$a.iK't). Non-m ining firms (see footnote) with DRC experienceinclude Engen, Batemans, Vodacom, Siemens, DSTV, Eskom, Spoorne t andSecuricor Gray. The only one w ith a permanent branch is Stanbic Africa (Tel:(+243) 88-41984; Fax: (+243) 88-46216; E-mail: s

Interview, Kinshasa, 27 January 2002.26


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Doing business in the DRC (continued)Where to stay and eat: Two hotels are recomm ended Hotel G rand (AvenueBatetela, Kinshasa; Tel; (+243) 33102/34542/33111/20111/2/3/4; Fax: (+243)8841500; E-mail: [email protected]; $165 per single in therecommended Tower' part of the complex) and the Hotel Memling (5Avenu e d e la Republique; Tel: (+243) 8845747; Fax: (+243) 8848284; E-mail:[email protected]; $185 per single). A 30% tax is payable on all bills.Be careful, breakfast is around $20, though nowhere is cheap to eat inKinshasa. Try La Chantilly near the 5outh African embassy for a quicksandwich, or Restaurant Al-dar on A venue 30 June (Tel: (+243) 8804134) fora recomm ended Lebanese meal. $ is the preferred ten der, thoug h CongoleseFrancs, Euros and Sterling is also accepted at the hotels above. The rate ofexchange in January 2002 was $l-CF330. Major credit cards are accepted atJhe mainhotels.Getting around: Taxis are relatively safe, but it is best to hire a 'fixer' (ataround $100 per day) to take care of these details. For example, IsaacNg wenza has worked with South Africans before and speaks fluent English,Langala and French. (E-mail: [email protected]). Taxis are expensivein Kinshasa, particularly from the international hote ls, at aro un d $10,00 peride.Do's and don'ts: Safety is a major concern, thoug h violen t crime is unusual.This is still a country at war, however, and you are advised not to takephotog raph s. For social ente rtainment, the re is a golf course a La Circle neari the graveyard off Avenue 30 June (rounds are approximately $30; clubs canj be hired ), and the nightlife in Kinshasa is (in) famous. Club 3516 also on the! main Avenue 30 June is well-known and frequented by MO NUC members.

In spite of the economic reforms, a num ber of formidable problems remain.First, and most importantly, the re are dou bts about Joseph Kabila's ability toeither deliver on promised reforms or to remain in power in the face ofpowerful, more sinister forces within or near government. There are alsoserious difficulties in the peace process, most notably concerningrepresentation in the ICD (see below).In this regard, three men are seen as having a key role in runn ing the Congo:Mwenze Kongolo, the minister of national security and public order;

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Augustine Katumba Mwanga, the minister without portfolio in thepresidency; and Didier Kazadi, the head of the Intelligence Service AgenccNationaSl dc Renseignment (ANR). Kongolo is viewed as the guardian ofZim babw ean interests,a relationsh ip formalised at the business level throughthe Senga Mines ventu re an d, more dramatically, through the role played bythe Zimbabw ean military in providin g the backbone to the Congolese Armyand assisting the presidential security force.'6Second, and related to the above,'[T]he capacity', one businessperson noted ,'for corruption is enorm ous' despite the govern me nt's rhetorical commitmentto cleaning up. This is encouraged in an environment where the 400,000-strong public service is poorly paid if they are paid at all. A high-schoolteacher will earn only $20-30 per month, where their family costs, accordingto the government, will be around $500.37 Although a number of publicsystems are now in place to address the scourge, corruptionor what iskn ow n locally as 'System D ' (Debrouillez vous'manage how you can')canultimately only be addressed thro ugh the creation of a functioning economy.This will also take a long time, given that for forty years the Congo hasoperated within this culture, where, as one foreign observer termed it, onecould 'ne ve r go to jail for stealing, but could go to jail for not sharing '.38Third,- business is made very difficult in an environment where more thanhalf the country is under rebel control, and where disruptions in the mainartery (the Congo River) have made trade and access to markets for rawmaterials impossible in some areas (for example, Kisangani).Fourth, the complex tax laws deter even local investment. Efforts are,how ever, being made to streamline these, although H9 different taxes remainin force, including one of 15% on capital investments.

Following Lauvcnt Kabila's assassination, security for the presiden t is prov ided bva mixed unit of Congolese and Zimbabwean special forces.Locally employed civilians w ith MONUC earn betw een $100-$20() which isreportedly adequate.Interview, Kinshasa, 23 Janu ary 2002.


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Fifth, the formal economy is extremely small. For example, the total balancesheet of the nine banks operating is around $150 million, abo ut the same, onebanker noted, as 'a branch in New York'. Ten years ago this was close to$lbillion. Today less than 10% of the econo my is estimated to go thro ugh thebanking system, operating for some 20-25 blue-chip Congolese companies.3''Sixth, this has not been assisted by an overall investment trend that, since1997, has been negative. As one business put it, 'Most [foreign] business isoperating he re or are here because they w ere already h ere. There are no newentran ts'. The governm ent hopes that the pending investment and miningcodes will go some way to assist, but changing the culture from one thatsoug ht to control rather than to facilitate private capital will be more difficult.Fears over the economic path and political stability have bee n com poundedby external interference in the economy, in both the rebel-held east and onthe government side notably from Zimbabwe. This, given Harare's owndifficulties an d (lack of) respect for th e rule of law, has not heartened foreigninvestors.

The new scramble for riches: Th e comm ercial conn ectionsThe UN's Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of NaturalResources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC of April 2001, ha s no te d that'The conflict in the DRC has become mainly about access, control and tradeof five key m ineral resources: coltan, diamonds, copper, cobalt and gold. Thewealth of the country is appealing and hard to resist in the context oflawlessness and the weakness of the central authority'. Put differently,minerals, along with the security concerns of Rwanda and Uganda, havereplaced the motivations of colonial imperialism and Cold War strateg ic logicas the basis for foreign intervention in the Congo. As the UN panel noted:40

The link between the exploitation of natural resources and thecontinuation of the conflict in the Dem ocratic Republic of Congo doesexist, and it is based on five factors that are not mutually exclusive.First, the capacity of countries to use their ow n resources to sustain the

Interview, Citibank, K inshasa, 26 January 2002.See http://ttntnvMn.ofg/Docs/sc/letters/Z001/357e.pdf.

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war up to a certain stage, as in the case of Angola. Second, the abilityof countries to take resources from enemies and use it to fight the so-called 'self-sustaining' war, as in the case of Rwanda . Third, the inte ntof some gov ernm ents to take adv anta ge of the war situation and use itto transfer wealth from one coun try to their national economy, as is thecase with Rwanda and Zimbabwe. Fourth, the will of private citizensand businesses who endeavo ur to sustain the w ar for political, financialor other gains; for example, generals and other top officials andunsavoury politicians (Victor Mpoyo, Gaetan Kadudji, MwenzeKongolo) in the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo.Fifth, the capacity of one of the warring parties to give incentives(mineral and others) to its allies and soldiers, for example theDem ocratic Republic of Congo .

Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe have been those who have benefited themost financially from their involvement. Despite having few mineralresources of their own, Uganda an d Rw anda's m ineral exports have increaseddramatically since 1997. Between 1996-97, Rwanda's coltan exports doubledbringing in an estimated $20 million per m onth , and its diam ond expo rts froma reported 166 carats in 1998 to 30,500 in 2000. Ug anda's diamond ex ports, too,increased over the same period from 1,500 carats to 11,300.41 PresidentMuseveni has told Parliament that Uganda exported ten tonnes of gold in2000, a substantial increase over recent years. His brother, Major-GeneralSalim Saleh, is reputed to have interests in several mining compan ies.42 Theinvolvem ent of Uganda-based gove rnm ent and private interests in exploitingthe DRC's mineral wealth led the UN panel of experts to recommendimposing sanctions on Ugandan minerals.In 1999, Zim babwe is reported to have exported 19,000 carats mainly from itsmines in Eastern Kasai. But it has also obtained a 500,000 square kmagricultural concession in Katanga reportedly to grow rice, corn, soya and

See Montague D&LY Berrigan, 'Th e Bu siness of War in the Dem ocratic Re public ofC o n g o ' , Dollar* and Sense, July/August 2001.See 'Uganda, Sanct ions and Congo-K: Who is Who in Uganda Mining', AfricaAnalysis, 5 June 2001 on httfK//wzvw.$lob


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sweet potatoes, and has effectively seized control of Gecamines despite thedep artur e of Billy R autenbach as its manager in Novem ber 1999." Althoughthe government denies that other Zimbabwean businesses exist outside ofSenga Mines,44 there is anecdotal evidence of aliuviai mining by theZimbabwean army in the Polygon area near Mbujimayi and of Angolan,Nam ibian and Zim babw ean concessions nearT shikapa in Kasai. As a recentOxfam report entitled, Poverty in the Midst of Wealth, has argu ed : 'Wealth fromnatural resources is sustaining the war and bad governance,' wh ere '[N]aturalresource exploitation has become a key factor in determining militarydep loym ent, p erpetuating the cycle of violence'.43This has largely ove rshadowed legitimate interests in the Congo's wea lth. Asis noted above, the DRC holds an estimated 80% and 60% of the world'scoltan and cobalt reserves respectively, and the world's largest supp ly of high-grade copper. Oil reserves are estimated at 180 million barrels.46 One studyestimated the valu e of the DRC's know n mineral ores at $157 billion.47 A large

See The Nnmibian o n http://the.iianubian.com.na/iictstQnes/econ lO-99hintural.html.Rautenbach was replaced by George Forrest in November \999. Under Forrest, aCongolese-born Belgian nationa l, Gecamines secured a small loan from Belgolaiseand re-established links with its international creditors.Interview, M inister of C omm unication, 25 January 2002.UN IRIN, 23 January 2002.These are being exploited by two consortia, Chevron and Union Oil andTeikoku Oil, and Belgium's Petrofina and Shell.See M ontague D & F Berrigan, op. tit.

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number of predominantly South African,48 Canadian44 and US companieshave exploration and concession interests. But the realisation of this promiseremains unlikely until, at least, the forthcoming investmentand miningcodeshave been passed and studied, and the country returns to stability and therule of law.

Prospects for Stability and Recovery in the CongoSince 1970, Africa has had more than 30 wars fought on its territory, the vastmajority of which have been intra-state conflicts. Fourteen of Africa's 53countries were afflicted by armed conflicts in 1966 alone. This accounted formore than half of all war-related deaths world-wide, resulting in more thaneight million refugees, returnees and displaced persons. The consequences ofthese conflicts have seriously undermined Africa's efforts to ensure long-termstability, prosperity and peace for its people.

These a re: Ruashi Mine, involving Cobalt Mining Company/East Daggafontein inGecamines with a 55%-45% share respectively; Kamoto Mine, shared 30%-70%between Kumba Resources and Gecamines; Tenke Fungunime, a joint venturebe tween BHP Billiton and Phelps Dodge with 50% each, with the two receiving55% of cash How and Gecamines 45%; Kolwezi, a joint venture between AngloAmerican and American Mineral Fields Inc with 50% each, with a 6 0% ^0 % splitbetween them and Gecamines of the cash flow; and Kalukundi, involving the HJSwanepoel Family Trust (55%) and Gecamines (45%). None of these ventures isoperational however. De Beers has a stake in the MIBA (Societe Miniere de Bnkwanga)Mine through its stake in the Belgium company Sibekan. wh ich holds 20% of MIDA.See htlp:/Mnuui.ichnid.ca/111/eng[bh/coinmdoc/publicntions/slobAfrCmnp.htnd.These companies reportedly include: America Mineral Fields Inc. (AMF1), BanroResources Corporation, International Panorama Resource Corp., International StarResources Ltd., Melkior Resources Inc., Namibian Minerals Corporation, SouthAtlantic Resources Ltd., Tenke M ining Corp., White Si van Resources inc., and WyeResources Inc. At the time of Mobutu's fall, AMF1 was widely accused ofsupporting the ADFL, both logistically with the loan of a company jet, andfinancially. Reportedly AMFI cut a $1 billion deal with Kabila Senior, withnegotiations beginning immediately after Kabila's forces had captured Coma inFebruary 1997. This deal reportedly allowed AMFI to conduc t feasibility s tud ies onreactivating the Kipushi zinc and copper m ine.


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No one not the United Nations, not the international com munity, notAfrica's leaderscan escape responsibility for the persistence of theseconflicts. Kofi Annan*'

The situation in the Congo is thus about as desperate as it can get. As morethan one minister noted during the course of a research trip to Kinshasa inJanuary 2002, 'Things have go ne dow n to the bottom . They can only go u p'.Civil servants are poorly if ever paid, most Congolese survive through theinformal economy and through subsistence agriculture, hyperinflation hasreduced living standards, the mining sector has imploded in the face ofwidespread corruption and the distribution of concessions to military allies,and, critically, the country is only emerg ing from a five-year civil wa r w ith atenuous peace. The collapse of the econom y is related to the war, poor macro-economic policies during the Mobutu and Kabila I periods, an absence ofpublic investm ent in key services and infrastructure, a haem orrh age of skilledtalent and very high economic transaction costs for the remainin g businesses.Two questions stan d o ut in conclusion: Will political stability an d security retu rn to the Congo? Will Kinshasa be able to lead a process of economic reform and recovery?The answers to the above relate to the role played by leadership, to therelationship with regional powers and the international community, to thesuccess of the peace agreement, and to the fragmented nature of theCongolese state and nation itself.

Paths for stability and security?Economic recovery and the implem entation of a donor-funded programmein the DRC are dependent on progress in (he political settlement. In thisregard, the picture is unclear. Despite progress made at various dialogueinitiatives,5' there remain problems of representation of political groupings

See http://wuno.un.org/peace/africa/SECGEN.htni.Such as that organised by the Belgian government in Brussels in January 2002.

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including rebel factions in the ICD. The government has been unwilling toentertain equal represen tation of itself and each of the rebel grou pings, andis deeply sceptical of Sir Ketumile Masire's ability to organise the ICDsuccessfully and produce a result. The success of the ICD and the progressthrough Phase III of the UN operation is critical to an increase in donorsupp or t for Kinshasa, however. Even if this ha pp en s, and sufficient progressis deemed to have occurred and despite the economic progress made throug hthe reforms instituted in May 2001, enormous economic challenges remain,not least in changing the pernicious venality of the 'business' culture in theDRC. As the minister of finance has argued:52

All of this is conditional on a number of important assumptionsunderlying our projections. First, that the political front will move tosettling of the conflict so that the country is more peaceful andattractive to investors and thatcommercial links between different partsof the country are re-established. In Kinshasa, many businesses depe ndfor their supply and inputs on resources elsewhere in the countryun de r rebel control, such as with palm oil. If we continue to have goodprospects for the settlem ent of the political situation and a continuationof good policies coupled with the IMF and World Bank programme,this will he lp us to very vigorously restart the economy.

The economic challenges can be summ arised as the need to push ahead witha liberalisation process, including privatisation. This might well threatenindiv idua l, political and related interests including ethnic links. For example,although the government Gecamines mining parastatal is costing thegovernment in financial terms, Kinshasa arguably lacksat least at thisstagethe political will that the inevitable loss of jobs and source of pa tronag ewill entail. As one analyst put it/*

To get [Gecamines] to work, the government will have to fire all ofLubumbashi'. Without an end to corruption dependent on politicalliberalisation, new mining and investment codes and other (largelyrhetorical) reforms will be, in the same analyst's words, 'Like many

Interview, Kinshasa, 25 January 2002.Interview, Kinshasa, 23 J(inuarv2l)()2,


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deckchairs on the Titanic'. The principle challenge is, in the financeminister's own words, 'to provide the good environment...in whichgrowth and investment can be provided by the private sector.

This includes end ing co rruption, wh ich could be a dang erous political movefor a politician as vulnerable as Joseph Kabila,Th e role of lea dersh ipThe Congo will require incisive, prescient and strong leadership if it is toem erge from the darkness of the M obutu and Kabila I yea rs. It is unc learwhether, for all of his youthfulness, the younger Kabila can provide this.There are two schools of thought with regard to his role one, that he is in ajob he did not w an t and a ppears incapable or unwilling to carry ou t, isolatedand threatened and influenced by powerful, sinister figures a round him. Theother is of a man p laying a difficult and possibly dangerous job the only waypossible: w ithou t fanfare, w ithou t threa tening the aforemen tioned powerfulinterests, and w ithout upsetting the delicate peace process, thereby relativelysilently usherin g in political and economic reforms. W hatever the case, he isun doub ted ly vulnerab le, and it is not exactly clear who a re his friends andwho his enemies, a fact borne out by the controversy which continues tosurround the identification of those responsible for his father's murder.M oreover, leadershipof the Congo is a near-impossible task. Mobutu is rightlycriticised for hu man rights violations, single-party rule, his destruction of theeconomy and nepotism, all of which occurred not only un de r the noses of theWest and its institutions but with their active support, in line with the ColdWar logic of the time. But it may well be asked what alternatives Mobuturealistically had given his inheritance of a territory tha t had functioned unde rthe personal control of Leopold only through extraordina ry b rutality, even bycolonial standards. The colony's purpose was to make money for the king,while the standard set for Mobutu's army and bureaucracy to forage off the

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land and prey off the Congolese was set during colonial times by the 'ForcePublique', a ragtag collection of 15,000+ mercenaries.34In this regard Mobutu and both Kabilas face similar politico-culturalchallenges. M obutu w as the first to discover that, like the former mon archs heattempted to emulate, his power was not as absolute as he envisaged.Paradoxically, surro unded by underlin gs unwillingor hesitant toshoulderresponsibility, provide reliable and accurate advice, exercise jud ge m ent andcarry through decisions, there follows a n over-centralisation of pow er an d anecessity to micromanage.As a result, there are those who call for a benign dictatorship to be re-established in the Congoa hybrid of Museveni and Lee Kuan Yew.However, this is too often used as an excuse by African leadership forundemocratic regimes intent on personal enrichment rather than effectivegovernment and good governance.Ultimately, Joseph Kabila will, how ever, have to be judge d on his record. Heis faced with trying to balance the need for economic reform with socialdelivery; build legitimacy and his own constituency th rough political reform;and keep the army and other interest happy. He is surround ed by some goodmen and many bad ones where corruption is entrenched in political cultureand economic practice. Progress has been slow, but his track record has beenimpressive given the circum stances. He came to power in difficult, if not nearimpossible conditions. He has implemented a stabilisation programmeincludingadraconian fiscal austerity programme, he has not signed a singlenew mining deal since coming to power, and has unblocked the politicallogjam. He might have don e little, bu t has done little wrong. His future in theCongo dep end s partly on the extent to which the international community isprepared to cut him some slack.

Bi.uab.ific behaviour, includ ing ivuss executions ami Hie h.icking off of bod v partsWiis already perfected by this white-led force, as Michela Wrong reminds us, 'acentury before the amputations cmied ovt by Sierra Leone's rebel forces sentshudders through (he West'.


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External powersMONUC is playing a role in the Congo beyond stabilising a cease-fire line. Aswith peacekeeping operations elsewhere, it has become an importantcontributor to the economy, spe nd ing m ore than $500 million annually, someof which is spent directly in the DRC and on the Congolese. The impact ofthis contribution is all the greater in an environment where there are scanteconomic opportunities.International financial institutions and bilateral donors, as has beenhighlighted above, too, will have a role to play in moving the economybeyond stabilisation to a recovery and grow th phase, w ithou t w hich politicalstability is near impossible to achieve.The international comm unity w ill also have to come to the party by providingelectoral suppo rt witho ut w hich a nation -wide election cannot occur. Congo'sinfrastructure has declined to the point that it is non-existent in many areas.As one Congolese expert p ut it: 'town s that are 200km from Kinshasa are aworld away'.55 While it takes three days of driv ing to reach Lubumbashi fromJohannesburg , the trip from Lubumbashi to Kinshasa, wh ich is rough ly thesame distance, can take two weeks in the dry season and one month in thewet. Or as one diplom at has no ted, 'Travelling from Lubumbashi to Kinshasais like taking a car from Lisbon to Moscow with only ten bridges left'/*M ON UC could be instrum ental in providing the necessary electoral logisticsthough its observation teams and transport network and in doing so cover, byinformal U N estimates, 70%-80% of the population.57 Even if this is to occur,Robert Kaplan's advice on the value of democratisation and elections ispertinent, '[S]tates have never been formed by elections'/* Indeed, this alsodemands changing the nature of the political 'culture' in the DRC, movingaway from an environment dominated by 'sharp suits, dark glasses andcrocodile skin shoes'.

Interview, Pretoria, October 20(11.Discussion, Pretoria, January 2002.interview, Kinshasa, 23 January 2002.The Coming Anarchy. New York: Vintage, 2000, p.69.

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Internal and regional dynamicsO ne diplomat"1' has posed a key question about the Congo's curre nt securitystatus and division: Why should those in the eastern part of the cou ntry giveup their financial interests and security guaran tees for som ething less certainand probably more threatening?It is clear tha t a number of core issues m ust be add ressed if the Congo is tofunction free from external military interference and occupation. Th ere is aneed for the Rwandans and Ugandans not only to agree on the entente, butalso to convince their ow n rebel movements to participate. Splits in the rebelranks continuously threaten to derail the implementation of thecomprehensive and ambitious Lusaka peace. As one UN member noted,'Rwanda and Uganda are run by militarised, autocratic leadership whereproblems are settled by war where other nations would send huffy littlediplomatic notes to each other'.611To change the current m odus operand i, howev er, any Congolese leadersh ipstructure will have to provide the necessary reassurances to each of theneighbouring states that have a stake in developments in the DRC. ForRw anda and Uganda , it will have to offer stability in the border a reas an d thedisarming and prosecution of Interahamwc Hutu and Mai-Mai militiasanalmost impossible and inevitably bloody task. Good relations will have to bemainta ined with Angola and Congo-Brazzaville. As the May 2001 repo rt of theUN Security Council mission to the Grea t Lakes noted:61

There will be a durable peace only if all the countries of the region aresuccessful in defining am ong themselves the rules by which to promotesecurity and developm ent. W hen the time comes, a conference on theGreat Lakes region would allow for a close and continuous

Discussion, Pretoria, Octobe r 2001.Intervie w, Kinshasa, 23 Jan uary 2002.Cited in Cill iersJ & M M ilan , 'Pea cek eep ing in the DRC: MONLJC and the Roadto Pence' , ISS Monograph Number 66. Pretoria: Institu te for Security Stu die s, 2001,p.73.


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examination of these questions and would also bring togethercontributors from the donor coun tries.This is also linked to the imperative to establish parallel inclusive settlementsin the neighbouring countries m entioned above, w ithout w hich an inclusivepolitical process will be impossible in the Congo. This is very difficult toachieve in the short-term in Angola and, especially in Rwanda, given theunlikelihood that this generation of Tutsis will be prepared to be ruled byHutus after the 1994 genocide.

Conclusion : Long Live Kabila?Joseph Kabila celebrated his first anniversary as president by making anapp earan ce at the Grand Hotel. He has passed his most critical hu rdle he isstill alive and is still in power. He has also succeeded in stabilising theeconomy and in building an improved relationship with the internationaldono r com munity, a difficult task given the social conditions an d political andmilitary divisions w ithin th e Congo and the natu re of the ties with the W orldBank in particular during the Mobutu years.But arguably even more difficult tasks await him. He has to manage theparallel processes of political reform and economic liberalisation. Additionaldonor support is necessary for conditions of growth to take root and iscontingent on the former; and progress in creating an inclusive politicalsystem is linked to the relationship with his external patrons and oppo nentsand the success of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. The extension of his ownlegitimacy and the building of a power-base outside of the more sinisterelements around his government is incumbent on the establishment ofconditions of transparency and the process of democratisation. This de pend salso on the extent to which Kabila and the population canor even wanttotranslate a Congolese national identity into a nation-state.M obutu's inheritance is of a Congolese iden tity, but with few tools to feed andsatisfy this nationalism. As Athanese Matenda Kyelu, managing director:

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Congo Federation of Enterprises, put it 'Mobutu left very bad souvenirs'."Despite the facade of unity, the country was badly fragmented and theeconomy destroyed, with, for example, four different currency zones andexch ange rates ope rating in Kasai, Kinshasa, the Kivus and Katanga.Indeed, Kinshasa has not ruled large parts of its territory for a long period.The reality is that the Congo today represents little more than a rhetoricalillusion, a prize to be fought over by rival groups. The transfer of powerbetw een the Kabilas might provide an opp ortun ity to revis it the colonial follyof the Congo's borders and to match sovereign polemic with the reality of acurrently fragmented and dysfunctional state by carving it up into smaller,more m anageable and functioning state units. But there are equally a numberof reasons wh y the Congo will remain intact. Any attem pt at carving it up isunlikely to receive any support from African leaders, intent on keeping themora torium on Africa's colonial frontiersif not to maintain the illusion ofAfrican solidarity an d sovereign con trol, than for reasons of clear political self-interest.

Secessionism in the Congo , whe re it occurs, how ever, is unlikely to be of thedeclaratory type promoted by Moise Tshombe and his batch of mercenary-supported rebels in Katanga in the early 1960s, but a less public, moreinsidious fragmentation. While this may be the ambition of some warlordsand external actors and also companies w eary of Kinshasa's bloodsucking roleand reliability, legitimate interests are m ore likely to operate through Kinshasaespecially if the peace ho lds, the dialogue w orks and don ors arrive. These aream ong the challenges to be m et if, as Wron g notes, the Congo can deal w ith'that paradox of sub-Saharan Africa, which dictates that countries with thegreatest natural assets are doomed to war and stagnation'/13Two com ments stand out in conclusion when considering the stage where theCongo finds itself today and the stake South Africa lias in its peace anddeve lopm ent. The political situation is balanced on a knife-edge betw een theneed for political reform and inclusivity which is linked to improved regime

" : Intervie w, Kinshasa, 24 Jan uary 2002."' CUllers j & M M alan, op cit., pp.108

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legitimacy and external economic assistance on the one han d; and the needfor Kabila to appear personally strong enough to his rivals withingove rnment, his country and region on the other. Leadership is key. As oneobserver no ted, 'Pre side nt Kabila led us into the tun ne l; the question is nowwhether there is light at the other end'. And if Kinshasa and Kabila togethercan get things even half-right there are huge opportunities for South Africaand its businesses. As the governo r of the C ongolese Central Bank argued :'The continued growth of South Africa will rely on how much investment itmakes in the Congo'.64 Peace and stability in the Congo is in South Africa'sand the regional actors' self-interest bu t is ultimately the responsibility of theCongolese them selves.

Interview, K inshasa, 27 January 2002.41


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The South African Institute of International AffairsPO Box 31596 Braamfontein 2017 South AfricaJan Smuts House, East Cam pus,University of the WitwatersrandE-mail: [email protected]

Country Report DR of CONGO

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