I

U.S. Marines from Pohang to No Name Lineby Lieutenant Colonel Ronaldj Brown, USMCR (Ret)

t Hungnam, the 1stMarine Division, fol-lowing the with-drawal from theChosin Reservoir,

embarked all of its equipment andpersonnel in record time andsailed for Pusan. The trip south forthe half-starved, half-frozen Mar-ines was uneventful except for thenever-closed chow lines, salt-watershowers, a complete change ofclothes, and a widespread Out-break of colds or mild cases ofpneumonia. "For the first time inweeks we felt clean," wrote oneMarine, "and our lice were goneforever—washed down a drain-hole into the cold Sea of Japan."In addition to a scrub down andnew dungarees, there was a gooddeal of conjecture and discussionon the possible employment of thedivision; many hoped that insteadof landing at Pusan, the convoywould proceed directly to Japan orthe United States and relief by the2d Marine Division. Both officersand enlisted men alike held that itwas impossible to visualize theemployment of the division in thenear future and that rest, reorgani-zation, and rehabilitation was anabsolute necessity. Then, too,there were those who had fought

ON THE COVER: Marines arecrouched and ready to move again asfire slackens near Wonju. NationalArchives Photo (USMC) 1 27-N-A6630

AT LEFT: Marine riflemen hug theground as they advance under fireduring Operation Ripper. NationalArchives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6862

around the Pusan Perimeter andwere "not too happy or not tooeager to see the dreadful countrythey had fought over." Regardlessof the speculation, the convoysteamed on, and on 16 Decemberarrived at Pusan. Although severaltank landing ships sailed pastPusan and put in at Masan, amajority of the division's Marinestraveled by rail and road fromPusan 40 miles west to their newarea outside the small seaportuntouched by war.

In an area previously occupiedby the 1st Provisional MarineBrigade, a tent city quickly sprangup—pyramidal tents for all mem-bers of the command and squadtents for each battalion. Hospitaltents and mess halls were erectedand with the help of Korean labor-ers mess tables and other improve-ments soon began to appear. Alarge barracks in the outskirts ofMasan served as the administrativeheadquarters for the regiments,while the division's service andsupport units occupied areas nearthe docks and south of town. Themen observed the division's firstChristmas in Korea with a memo-rable display of holiday spiritdespite a chilling drizzle. A choirfrom the 5th Marines serenadedthe division headquarters with car-ols, many attended a series ofshows put on by troupes of U.S.Army and Korean entertainers, andthe U.S. Navy sent Christmas treesand decorations. It was not only atime to be thankful, but also aperiod of rapid recuperation fromfatigue and nervous tension.

1

As 1950 drew to a close the mil-itary situation in Korea was sobleak American policy makerswere seriously contemplating theevacuation of U.S. forces from thatembattled country, and Americanmilitary leaders had already formu-lated secret contingency plans todo so. The Korean Conflict hadbeen raging for six months duringwhich time the fighting seesawedup and down the 600-mile lengthof the mountainous peninsula with

Gen Douglas MacArthur, America'slongest -serving soldier, was Corn -mander in Chief Far East, and alsocommanded the multinational UnitedNations forces in Korea. Although thesituation appeared ominous in early1951, MacArthur later said he nevercontemplated withdrawal and "madeno plans to that effect."Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC362863

V

Korea1O() (1T'

I\flIfl7 kuigu

1'I'ungnam

NORTH KOREAKoreaBaj'

(I1Iflh1tI1 .IIIg Sea ofJapan

•SJliV.oiic

( t1\ flFlu .u/u,,, N.. erz'oIr

_____________________________

38

,tnJiii ijongh5' hUlkhofl '\KangfluI1g. IIongctu)n \

.-lsau Bay "' 'Seou •ll..eng'ong \SarnchoL

. •Siioii•Osan SOUTH KOREA

/( lionan.

Ye/lou' SeaAndong

• 'k,)fl(li)kTaejon

KunsILIiI*I1,)I1 \ .icgwtii PoIi.ing

4, o \ongcli iiO(honju ,. Taegu

C'r

OKwangju %tas.ni

Pusan

;:o Tsushima/ JAPAN

Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, to rallyhis troops just as the outlook wasdarkest. This fortuitous eventbegan a dramatic reversal of for-tunes, a turnaround so startlingthat within six months it was theCommunists who were on theropes.

The combined NKPA and CCFarmies had more than a half mil-lion men inside Korea while theUnited Nations Command num-bered only about two-thirds thatmany. The U.N. commander wasAmerican General of the ArmyDouglas MacArthur who was con-currently Commander in Chief, FarEast. The major Service compo-nents of the Far East Commandwere the Eighth Army, the Fifth AirForce, and elements of the SeventhFleet. Recently appointed Lieuten-

first one side and then the otheralternately holding the upperhand. With 1951 only a few daysaway the Communist forces—con-sisting of the North KoreanPeople's Army (NKPA) reinforcedby "volunteers" from the People'sRepublic of China, known as theCommunist Chinese Forces(CCF)—appeared on the verge ofvictory. In a series of stunning

blows that began the previousNovember, the United States-ledUnited Nations Command hadbeen pushed back from the YaluRiver at the North Korean-Chineseborder all the way south of the38th Parallel, which divided Northand South Korea. A momentary lullin the action, however, allowed theenergetic new United Nations fieldcommander, Lieutenant General

2

ant General Ridgway commandedthe Eighth Army; Major GeneralEarl E. Partridge, USAF, the FifthAir Force; and Vice Admiral ArthurD. Struble, USN, the Seventh Fleet.Major General Oliver P. "0. P."

Smith's 1st Marine Division andMajor General Field Harris' 1stMarine Aircraft Wing were the twomajor Marine units in Korea.Unlike today's expeditionary forcestructure, at that time there was noMarine component headquartersso the non-Marine theater com-mander was the only commonsuperior officer for both the divi-sion and aircraft wing in Korea.The nearest senior Marine wasLieutenant General Lemuel C.Shepherd, Jr., Commanding Gen-eral, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, inHawaii, who was responsible forthe logistical support of both thedivision and wing. Despite the factthat no official direct commandlink existed between Marine airand ground units in Korea, therespective Marine commandersmaintained close liaison and care-fully coordinated their actions.

Several important new corn-

The Masaii Bean Patch

mand relationships developedafter the Marines' fighting with-drawal from the Chosin (Changjin)Reservoir. Marine aircraft, whichhad provided superb close air sup-port for Marine ground units forthe previous five months, wouldno longer be on direct call.Instead, the potent Marine air-ground team was broken up soland-based aircraft of the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing could beincorporated into the Fifth AirForce. The U.N. ground commandalso underwent some changes. The1st Marine Division passed from XCorps to Eighth Army control inmid-December 1950, just about a

week before the tough and ener-getic Army paratrooper, GeneralRidgway, was named Eighth Armycommander after his predecessor,Lieutenant General Walton H.Walker, USA, was killed in a trafficaccident.

After the ordeal at the ChosinReservoir, the 1st Marine Divisionmoved to Masan in southern Koreawhere it became part of EighthArmy reserve. Concurrently, the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing was flyingfrom aircraft carriers and airfieldsin Korea but was about to tem-

porarily deploy to Japan. On thehome front, three replacementdrafts (the 3d, 4th, and 5th) wereeither already enroute or werepreparing to ship out. Hopefully,their arrival would bring thedepleted Marine ranks in Koreaback up to strength before the nextround of combat began.

The battered 1st Marine Divisionspent two weeks licking itswounds in a rest area known asthe "Bean Patch" about 200 milessouth of the main line of resis-tance. Its three rifle regiments,each of which was led by a futurelieutenant general, occupied theagricultural flat lands on the north-

The general staff of the 1st Marine Division assembled for aninformal photograph shortly after the New Year. Picturedfrom left are. Capt Eugene R. Hering, USN, DivisionSurgeon; Col Alpha L. Bowser, Jr., G-3; Col Bankston THolcomb, Jr., G-2, MajGen Oliver P. Smith, Commanding

General; Maj Donald W Sherman, Assistant G-1; BGenEdward A. Craig, Assistant Division Commander, ColEdward W. Snedekei Chief of Staff and Col Francis M.McAlister, G-4.

3

, I l'Il( )t()

James H. Brower, was evacuatedfrom the Chosin Reservoir inNovember. Almost two decades

the Pusan Perimeter four months earlier.

em outskirts of Masan, which gavethe area its name. Division head-quarters and most of the combatsupport and service elements,including the helicopters andobservation aircraft of MajorVincent J. Gottschalk's MarineObservation Squadron 6 (VMO-6),were located nearby. The 1stMarine Division was in very goodhands. Devout, pipe-smoking,white-haired 0. P. Smith was talland thin with a scholarly manner,factors that led some observers toremark that he looked more like apreacher than a Marine general.Fortunately, appearances can bedeceiving. Smith's performance asa commander thus far in Korea hadbeen outstanding. A respected mil-itary analyst studying the Chosincampaign noted that Smith was acareful planner and superb tacti-cian who repeatedly resisted pres-sure to execute rash orders issuedby his corps commander, actionsthat probably saved the 1st MarineDivision from piecemeal destruc-tion.

The 1st Marine Division wasalso blessed with four of the finestregimental commanders in Korea.The 1st Marines was led by leg-

endary Colonel Lewis B. "Chesty"Puller, whom General Ridgwayproudly lauded as "a man ofindomitable spirit . . . the officerwith the most combat experiencein Korea." The 5th Marines com-mander was lanky LieutenantColonel Raymond L. Murray,another seasoned combat veteran.An "Old China Hand" who foughtat Guadalcanal, Tarawa, andSaipan during World War II,Murray brought the 5th Marinesashore in August 1950, and ablyled his regiment through everyMarine engagement in Korea thusfar. He would later gain some liter-ary notoriety as the role model forthe fictional "High Pockets" Huxleyin Leon Uris' best selling novelBattle Ciy. Colorful, fiery-tem-pered, hard-driving ColonelHomer L. Litzenberg, Jr., com-manded the 7th Marines.

Lieutenant Colonel Carl A.

Youngdale led the division'sartillery regiment. Youngdaleserved with the 14th Marines of the4th Marine Division throughoutWorld War II. In 1950, he came toKorea as the 11th Marines' execu-tive officer and then took over theunit when its commander, Colonel

4

later Major General Youngdalewould command the 1st MarineDivision in Vietnam.

On New Year's Eve theCommunists opened their ThirdPhase Offensive. This massiveattack pushed overextended U.N.lines back under heavy pressure,and the United Nations Commandwas forced to cede the SouthKorean capital city of Seoul to theenemy for a second time. But thisfighting withdrawal was not at alllike the helter-skelter retreats fol-lowing the North Korean invasionof June 1950. This time the EighthArmy fell back in good order to aseries of preplanned defensivelines, the last of which would he, ifneeded, just outside the port ofPusan much farther back than theoriginal Pusan Perimeter. Americanunits traded ground for time whileinflicting maximum casualtiesupon their advancing foe. In short,the U.N. lines were bending butnot breaking, and there was nosense of panic. "We came backfast," General Ridgway admitted,"but as a fighting army, not as arunning mob. We brought ourdead and wounded with us, andour guns, and our will to fight."

Fortunately, the United NationsCommand stemmed the oncomingtide so the 1st Marine Divisionnever had to assume the role ofrear guard. Instead, the divisionrested, rehabilitated, restored bro-ken equipment, rearmed, andabsorbed almost 3,000 replace-ments during the last days of 1950,most filling shortages in theinfantry and artillery regiments.Daily security patrols were mount-ed with the purpose of making areconnaissance of roads and ques-tioning Korean civilians about thenature of guerrilla activity in thearea, but no enemy were encoun-

Marines encamped near Masan in the wake of their return from the ChosinReservoir. The area had been a rest area when the 5th Marines fought to save

tered and there was no evidence ofany inclination on the part of theenemy or guerrillas to harass thedivision.

There were many high-level vis-itors at Masan during the division'sbrief stay. General Ridgwaydropped in to inspect the Marinesand observe field training. "Hefully expected to find a divisionwhich was so weary and so beaten

up, and perhaps even with a

defeatist attitude after all he'd readand heard about the ChosinReservoir," as Colonel Alpha L.

Bowser, the division's assistantchief of staff for operations, laternoted. But "much to his surprisethe thing that impressed him most,everywhere he went in the divi-sion, and everybody he talked to,[was] their attitude about what they

5

were doing to get themselves backin shape to get back into the bat-tle." Very satisfied with what hesaw, he complimented GeneralSmith for the division's quickrecovery. Although it was short ofmen and equipment, Ridgway stilldeemed the 1st Marine Division hismost effective combat unit. Hewas, in fact, holding the Marines inreserve in case the pending crisisin the north worsened. Should theU.N. lines break, Ridgway wantedthe 1st Marine Division to holdopen a corridor to the port ofPusan and then act as a rear guardto cover the U.N. evacuation.Ridgway "gave the impression tous that he was a commander, withplenty on the ball, who had com-bat experience and the will tofight," recalled Brigadier GeneralEdward A. Craig, the assistant divi-sion commander.

Among other noteworthy visi-tors was Captain John Ford, USNR,the famous motion picture director,who had been recalled to activeduty by Rear Admiral Arthur W.Radford, commanding the PacificFleet, who felt the Navy andMarine Corps had not receivedenough war coverage. Ford gath-ered background for a documen-tary he was filming, and some filmclips shot at Masan were later usedin the feature film "Retreat Hell."Also on hand was military histori-an Colonel Samuel L. A. Marshall,USAR, who interviewed numerousMarines for a classified reportabout infantry combat in Korea,portions of which were later pub-lished in his book Battle at Best.The most welcomed visitors, how-ever, were entertainer Bob Hopeand his traveling USO show. TheMarines at Masan thoroughlyenjoyed a chance to laugh heartily,and many of them stared in awe atthe first American women they hadseen in months.

Sleep, sports, and good chow

\itiniI AR hi C. Photo (I S\IC ) 12 N—A II

communications equipment whenthe call to return to action finallycame.

were the watchwords at Masan. AsLieutenant Colonel Francis F. Parry,3d Battalion, 11th Marines' com-manding officer, remarked: "Wehad so much turkey it was comingout of our ears." Impromptu soft-ball, basketball, touch football, andvolleyball games became daily rit-uals, and these were occasionallyfollowed by a well appreciated,albeit limited, beer ration.Weapons familiarization and smallunit tactics dominated the trainingschedule. And as was done prior tothe trek down from Hagaru-ri, thedivision's medical staff examinedall personnel, surveying the menfor those who, noted LieutenantColonel Parry, might have "hiddenthe fact that they were frostbittenor didn't consider it was worthy ofnote till we got down to Masan."The serious cases were evacuated.Although the men eventually wereallowed go into town, visit thestores, and purchase a lot of use-less things, such as artificial flow-ers and non-regulation fur hats,"there was no liberty," Parryrecalled. "A few troops got drunkon native brew and went blind anda few of them caught a venerealdisease, but there was no liberty toamount to anything, no recreation

that could properly let the troopsrelax and enjoy themselves for awhile, such as could have beenobtained in Japan." Despite a fort-night's respite and frantic efforts tobring the 1st Marine Division backup to full strength, General Smithwas still short of men, tanks, and

Notwithstanding the short peri-od of recuperation, fatigue amongthe officers and men of the divi-sion was apparent after more thanfour months of combat. Con-cerned, General Smith told his Unitcommanders that "we had to getour men in hand, do everythingwe could for them, but not letthem begin to feel sorry for them-selves." Some of the officers andmen, primarily the commandingofficers, noted Lieutenant ColonelParry, "started to lose a little oftheir zip and hard-charging quali-ties. Some of the battalion com-manders of the 5th who had beenthrough three campaigns were get-ting to be pretty sick men. Theyweren't charging up hills the sameway they had when they first gotthere."

In early January, the Com-munist's strategic goal was to

During the brief stay at Masan, Marines rested, gained back some of their lostweight, and found time to engage in an impromptu volleyball game. Despite theefforts of Fleet Marine Force, Pacf Ic, to scrape the bottom of the manpower bar-rel, the division was still short more than 3,500 officers and men.

Veterans of the exhausting Chosin Reservoir campaign used their time at theMasan to hone basic military skills. Here Marines review marksmanship tech-niques under the watchful eye of a noncommissioned officer.

6

i)tptiuneiU 01 I)ctciie I'Iiutu \l(

Lieutenant General Matthew Bunker Ridgway, USAieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway was calledsuddenly to Korea to take over the Eighth U.S. Armyfollowing the death of its previous commander,

Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker. When Ridgwayarrived the Eighth Army was in disarray, its morale shat-tered by heavy losses suffered during the longest with-drawal in American military history. The new Eighth Armycommander promptly engineered, to use the words ofGeneral of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, "a battlefield turnaround unlike anywithin American History." Within four months the UnitedNations Command had regained all lost territory south ofthe 38th Parallel. As military historian Colonel Harry G.Summers, a veteran of Korea, noted: "Under Ridgway theEighth Army toughened up and became as good a fightingforce as this country has ever fielded." Just as his troopswere about to reenter North Korea, General Ridgway wasagain unexpectedly thrust into higher command when hereplaced General Douglas MacArthur as commander ofUnited Nations forces in April 1951.

The son of an artillery colonel and a West Point gradu-ate, Ridgway was an intellectual and diplomat as well as asuperb tactical commander. He possessed brains, courage,and decisiveness—traits that served him well in Korea. Hispeacetime military assignments included overseas stints inthe Far East, Latin America, and Europe. In 1942, he wasgiven command of the elite 82d Airborne Division and ledthe unit in operations against Axis forces in Sicily, Italy, andFrance. He was "a kick-ass man," one subordinate said,who became known among his men as "Tin-tits" becauseof the hand grenades so prominently strapped to his chest.Taking command of XVIII Airborne Corps in 1944, Ridgwayparticipated in the Battle of the Bulge and subsequent oper-ations leading to Germany's surrender in 1945. He was sew-ing as the deputy Army chief of staff for plans inWashington, D.C., when his call to Korea came.

Unlike his predecessor, General Ridgway was given afree hand in Korea. When he asked for instructions,General MacArthur simply told him: "The Eighth Army isyours, Matt. Do what you think best." Following an initialtour of the combat area, Ridgway was astonished at thedecided lack of morale and purpose, shoddy discipline, andatmosphere of defeat. Problems meant opportunity for thebattle-hardened, disciplined paratrooper. First, the men ofthe Eighth Army needed an adequate answer from theircommanding general to the question: "What are we fightingfor?" "To me the issues are clear," he wrote:

It is not a question of this or that Korean town orvillage. Real estate is, here, incidental. It is not restrict-ed to the issue of freedom for our South KoreanAllies, whose fidelity and valor under the severeststresses of battle we recognize; though that freedomis a symbol of the wider issues, and included amongthem.

7

The real issues are whether the power of Westerncivilization, as God has permitted it to flower in ourown beloved lands, shall defy and defeatCommunism; whether the rule of men who shoottheir prisoners, enslave their citizens, and deride thedignity of man, shall displace the rule of those towhom the individual and his individual rights aresacred; whether we are to survive with God's hand toguide and lead us, or to perish in the dead existenceof a Godless world.

If these be true, and to me they are, beyond anypossibility of challenge, then this has long since

\.1t1 iitI \R hi I'h 't ( L " II! 3(()O()

ceased to be a fight for freedom for our Korean Alliesalone and for their national survival. It has become,and it continues to be, a fight for our own freedom,for our own survival, in an honorable, independentnational existence.

The sacrifices we have made, and those we shallyet support, are not offered vicariously for others, butin our own direct defense.

In the final analysis, the issue now joined right herein Korea is whether Communism or individual free-dom shall prevail, and, make no mistake, whether thenext flight of fear-driven people we have just wit-nessed across the HAN, and continue to witness inother areas, shall be checked and defeated overseasor permitted, step by step, to close in on our ownhomeland and at some future time, however, distant,to engulf our own loved ones in all its misery anddespair.Ridgway not only was determined to recapture moral

leadership, but also insisted that the Eighth Army needed toreturn to infantry combat fundamentals. He sternly orderedhis corps commanders to prepare for coordinated offensiveaction, and he forcefully reminded his division and regi-mental commanders to get off the roads, to take the highground, and to use perimeter defenses. He studied previouscampaigns and recognized a pattern to Communist opera-tions; they would advance, attack, and then suddenly breakcontact until resupplied. Ridgway decided the answer wasto fall back in an orderly manner trading space to inflictcasualties then, once the Communists stopped, to attackand relentlessly pursue them. His plan proved to be verysuccessful. Ridgway's offensive, also known as the "meat-grinder" because of heavy Chinese and North Korean casu-alties, had by early spring 1951 resulted in the recapture ofSeoul and the recovery of all of South Korea by mid-April,when he left to take over as theater commander in Tokyo.

Although Marines admired General Ridgway's offensivespirit and his professionalism, they were disappointed withtwo of his high-level decisions. First, he pulled the 1stMarine Division away from the sea and began to use thathighly trained amphibious unit as just another infantry divi-

sion; second, he acquiesced to the breakup of the Marineair-ground team by allowing Marine aircraft squadrons tobe directly controlled by the Fifth Air Force. LieutenantGeneral Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., the Fleet Marine Force,Pacific, commander, viewed both of these actions as tacti-cal mistakes. Previously, General MacArthur—who hadcommanded Marine units in the Southwest Pacific duringthe World War II and fully appreciated their unique capa-bilities—always kept the veiy successful Marine air-groundteam intact, and he usually tried to keep the Marines nearthe sea as well. For a variety of reasons, Ridgway did not.

As theater commander, General Ridgway reorganized theU.S. Far East Command to make it a true joint headquarters,never meddled in the tactical handling of forces in Korea,and maintained a good relationship with his superiors inWashington. After leaving the Far East, Ridgway succeededGeneral Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Commander ofAllied Forces in Europe and in 1953 he was named Chief ofStaff of the Army. His tenure as Army Chief of Staff was aseries of bitter quarrels with what he took to he PresidentEisenhower's refusal to remember, "most of what counts inbattle is the Infantry." A few months short of mandatoryretirement, he left the Army in June 1955. He later servedas executive director of various business firms until hdeath in 1993 at the age of 93.

Military historians frequently hold him up as he epitomeof the modern "soldier-statesman," but it wa he men whoserved with him in battle who had the nlust praise. As MajorWilliam L. Bates, Jr., commanding officer, WeaponsCompany, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and later operationsofficer, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, said of General Ridgwayat the time: "He is a real, down-to-earth, honest-to-God sol-dier. He is a general wio can visit a battalion, go into theattack with it, watch it operate, remain several hours, andnever try to tell you how to run your own outfit. He is per-sonally courageous and spends much of his time followingPatton's suggestion of letting the troops see you at the front.He has sound ideas on the employment of infantry troops,and he knows how to fight, small and large scale. He is, Iwould guess, the best field commander the Army has hadin a long time."

divide Korea in half, to separatethe U.S. and South Korean forces.The Chinese first carried the mainattack aimed at Seoul and Inchon.The NKPA attacked Korean-heldLine D from Hoengsong in centralKorea not long after the CCFmounted its western offensive.Farther east, North Korean com-mander General Kim Chaek want-ed to drive straight down the cen-ter of the peninsula to capture theU.N. staging area at Taegu. Hisplan was to take Wonju with a

frontal attack by Major GeneralPang Ho San's V Coips while out-flanking the U.N. lines from theeast using Lieutenant GeneralChoe Hyon's H Corps; the HI Corpswas his reserve. All went well atfirst. II Corps cracked through theSouth Korean lines and proceededdown Route 29 peeling off divi-sions to cut the U.N. line of retreat.The 27th Division investedChechon; the 31st Divisionattacked Tanyang; the 2d Divisioncut Route 29 north of Yongju; and

8

the 10th Division headed forAndong. If all went according toplan, the United Nations Commandwould lose control of its main sup-ply route and be denied passage tothe port at Pusan. This, combinedwith the loss of Seoul and Inchon,would effectively end the war.

The Third Phase Offensive pre-sented problems, but GeneralRidgway was confident his revital-ized Eighth Army could handle thesituation. Obviously, Ridgway'sfirst priority was to stop the

The Pohang Guerrilla II urnChinese, so he committed the bulkof his forces near the west coast.He knew that once the Chineseoffensive was blunted he couldsafely shift forces to central Korea.The U.S. 2d Division, the onlyAmerican unit he had available forthe Central Front, was hastily sentforward to defend Wonju.Ridgway's decisive actions set the

stage for all Marine combat opera-tions in the spring of 1951.

While the Marines were restingin the Bean Patch, the struggleshifted from Seoul to centralKorea. Fighting in knee-deep snowand bitter cold, outnumbered U.N.defenders grudgingly fell back asthe enemy poured through a gapin Republic of Korea (ROK) Army

9

lines, endangering Wonju, a vitalroad and rail junction south ofHoengsong. Responding to thisthreat, General Ridgway flashed aseries of messages to Smith's head-quarters. One of these was a warn-ing order for elements of the 1stMarine Division to be ready tomove 65 miles northeast toPohang-dong, a sleepy fishing vil-lage about a third of the way upKorea's east coast, in order to pro-tect Eighth Army lines of commu-nication and backstop some shakyKorean divisions. The Pohang areahad great strategic importancebecause it included a significantstretch of the Eighth Army mainsupply route (National Route 29),housed several key road junctions,included the only protected porton the east coast still in U.N.hands, and was the site of one ofthe few modern airfields(Yongilman, a former Japanesefighter base labeled "K-3" by theAmericans) in eastern Korea. Thismission was confirmed on 8January, but it had by then beenmodified to include the entire 1stMarine Division which was notassigned to a corps, but wouldinstead be directly under EighthArmy operational control. The divi-sion staff cut orders on the 9th,and the Marines began moving outthe next day with the maneuverelements going by truck and thesupport units by air, rail, and ship.The brief Masan interlude wasover. The 1st Marine Division washeaded back into action.

Marine activities along the eastcoast of Korea in late January andearly February of 1951 eventuallycame to be known as the "PohangGuerrilla Hunt" by the men of the.1st Marine Division. This periodbegan with a week-long move-ment from Masan to Pohang that

I

u..0 *

-.—. "I_Ic..Ip -. '.4I I1jiI )iV I IistriaI I )lIl\ 'Iu)I() "LII)I)IflIII. I i-IeI I

started with the departure of the1st Marine Division vanguard,"Chesty" Puller's 1st Marines orga-nized as a regimental combat team,on 10 January. A motor convoycarried elements of the 1stMarines; the division Reconnais-sance Company; the 2d Battalion,11th Marines; Company C, 1stEngineers; and Company D, 1stMedical Battalion, on a tedious 10-hour journey from Masan toYongchon. Upon arrival at Uisongthe next day, the regimental com-bat team, later dubbed "Task ForcePuller" by General Smith, beganpatrolling a 30-mile section ofroad. Two days later, the rein-forced 1st Battalion, commandedby Lieutenant Colonel Donald M.Schmuck, a Colorado native andPeleliu veteran, moved 15 milesnorth to occupy Andong. A keycrossroads about 40 miles inlandfrom the sea, it was the site of XCorps rear headquarters as well astwo dirt airstrips (one of whichwas long enough to handle cargoplanes, but the other able only toservice light observation aircraftand helicopters). As the 1st

Marines edged closer to Andong,Puller was convinced, despiteGeneral Ridgway's promise tokeep the division intact, that thenext step would be to attach hisunit to X Corps and he would be"off to the races again." Puller, asGeneral Smith later noted, "wasapprehensive about being put outon a limb. The basic difficulty wasthat he had no confidence in thestaying power of the Army unitsdeployed north of Andong. Puller

felt they might 'bug out' and leavehim 'holding the bag.' As far as theDivision was concerned, "RCT-1was strong enough to protect itsown withdrawal if it came to that."With the arrival of the division'stwo other regimental combatteams, soon-to-be colonel, Ray-mond Murray's 5th Marinespatrolled the coast from Pohang toYongdok and defended the mainairfield, while Colonel HomerLitzenberg's 7th Marines occupied

A 75mm recoilless rifle position covers a likely avenue of approach in the vicini-ty of Andong. Crew-served recoilless rifles were more reliable and had muchgreater range than the individually carried 3.5-inch rocket launchers.

An aerial photograph of Pohang shows the rugged, irregu-lar bill masses where North Korean guerrillas sought refuge.This village on Korea's east coast was the 1st Marine

Division base of operations in January and February1951.

10

\itun.il \'u1i_, l'hl( I! I—S(4(I)

,

centrally located Topyong-dong.The last Marine units disembarkedfrom tank landing ships at Pohangon 17 January.

Although there was some limit-ed discussion about small-scaleamphibious operations by GeneralRidgway when he visited the 1stMarine Division command post atPohang, these never came tofruition. Instead, he ordered theMarines to defend an east-west linejust north of the Andong-YongdokRoad and to simultaneously pro-tect the north-south-running EighthArmy main supply route. General0. P. Smith faced a dilemmabecause he was at first uncertainabout which of these assignmentsshould receive the highest priority.Should he deploy to guard againstan all-out attack on the main lineof resistance by Communist regularforces from the north or be pre-pared for counter-guerrilla opera-tions against small groups of infil-trators? Intelligence reports indicat-ed that the latter was the most like-ly course of action. Small enemybands had already provedextremely troublesome by intermit-

tently cutting supply lines andoccasionally attacking outpostsbetween Wonju and Taegu so con-tinued guerrilla actions were con-sidered probable. General Smithwas well aware that the Marineswould not be manning an exposedposition. Several South Koreandivisions screened the Marinenorthern flank, the Sea of Japanprotected his eastern flank, andhilly terrain made the westernapproaches inaccessible to armor.Smith, therefore, decided toemphasize mobile security opera-tions and made linear defense asecondary mission.

The enemy threatening Pohangwas believed to consist of about6,000Majorwidely respected 10th NKPADivision. (Post-war analysisrevealed that before its destructionby the 1st Marine Division, the10th Division inflicted more casu-alties and captured more equip-ment than any other North Koreanunit.) Although a division in name,the 10th was short of personneland lacked artillery, armor, and

motor transport. Its only supportweapons were a few heavy mor-tars and some heavy machineguns. These shortfalls limitedGeneral Lee's tactical options tohit-and-run raids, roadblocks, andambushes. The 10th Division was,therefore, expected to conductlow-intensity operations remainingunder cover during the day andattacking only in darkness. GeneralLee's troops seeped south througha hole in the fluid South Koreanlines east of the HwachonReservoir in central Korea duringthe U.N. retreat in late-December1950, and the division's lead ele-ments were thought to be justarriving in the Pohang area in mid-January.

The 1st Marine Division zone ofaction was roughly 40 milessquare, an area composed of 1,600square miles of extremely ruggedinterior terrain enclosed by a semi-circular road network joining thecoastal villages of Pohang andYongdok with the inland towns ofAndong and Yongchon. Seventy-five miles of the vital Eighth Armymain supply route were locatedinside the Marine zone. That partof the supply route ran north fromKyongju to Yongchon then bentabout 25 miles westward until it

once again turned north to passthrough Andong. A secondary road(Route 48) joined Andong in thenorthwest corner with centrallylocated Chinbo and Yongdok onthe coast. The valley lowlandswere dotted with small villageswhose adjoining terraced rice pad-dies edged roadways and agricul-tural flat lands. The center of theMarine area of responsibility con-sisted of snow-capped mountainstraversed only by a series of wind-ing trails and narrow pathways thatworked their way up and downthe steep ridges. The weather wasgenerally cold and often dampwith frequent snow flurries, but

light infantry troops fromGeneral Lee Ban Nam's

A Sikorsky HO3S sets down at a landing zone in the Pohang sector of operations.These utility helicopters were invaluable in providing communications in thesearch for Communist guerrillas.

11

with enemy discovered by such patrols.

with little accumulation. The occa-sional high winds and overcasthindered flight operations and lim-ited visibility.

On 16 January, General Smithopened a forward command postat Sinhung, about five miles south-east of Pohang. DivisionOperations Order 3-51 assignedthe Marines three missions. Onewas to protect the Kyongju-Pohang-Andong portion of themain supply route. A second wasto secure the village of Andongand the two nearby airstrips. Thethird mission was to prevent pene-tration in force of the Andong-Yongdok defense line. Widelyknown throughout the MarineCorps as a "by-the-book" man,Smith kept this image intact bymounting a textbook anti-guerrillacampaign. The long-service veter-ans of the 1st Marine Division werewell aware of the travails of guer-rilla warfare. A few senior officersand veteran sergeants had foughtlocal insurgents during the so-

called "Banana Wars" between theWorld Wars, some others hadfought Chinese guerrillas in NorthChina after World War II, and mostfield grade officers had closelystudied the Small Wars Manual atQuantico. These veteran cam-paigners knew that counter-guer-rilla operations were primarilysmall unit actions that tested indi-vidual stamina and required strongleadership at the fire team, squad,and platoon levels. Accordingly,General Smith decentralized oper-ations. He created five defensiveareas, formed mechanized taskforces to patrol the roads, and sat-urated the hilly terrain withinfantry patrols to keep the enemyconstantly on the move. The 1stMarines, at Andong, was assignedZone A in the northwest; the 5thMarines manned Zone B fromYongchon in the southwest quad-rant; the 7th Marines operated outof Topyong-dong in Zone C, a cen-trally located 20-by-25 mile corri-dor running north from Pohang;

12

the 11th Marines held a narrowcoastal strip north of Pohangknown as Zone D; and LieutenantColonel Harry T. Milne's 1st TankBattalion operated in Zone Esoutheast of Pohang. The light util-ity aircraft of VMO-6 were in gen-eral support.

Anti-guerrilla doctrine called forconstant vigilance by static unitsand aggressive action by mobileforces. A commander's primaryconcern was force protection, andthe best way to accomplish thatwas to keep the enemy off bal-ance. Guerrillas had to be located,engaged, rendered ineffective, andrelentlessly pursued to do this. Forlarge units (regiments or battal-ions) the favored tactics were "rak-ing" (later known in Vietnam as"search and destroy") operationsand encirclements ("cordon andsearch"). Smaller infantry unitsrelied upon saturation patrols tofind, fix, and eliminate the enemy.Most of these so-called "rice paddypatrols" consisted of fire teams andsquads operating from platoon orcompany patrol bases. The 5thMarines was particularly aggressiveand once had 29 such patrols inthe field at the same time.Ambushes were an effective wayto keep the enemy off balance byhindering movement and destroy-ing small units piecemeal. Squad-and platoon-sized ambushes set upnightly along mountain trails orfanned out to cover likely avenuesof approach to nearby villages.Motorized road patrols consisted ofmachine gun-mounted jeeps thatroved the main supply route atirregular intervals. Convoys wereescorted by gun trucks, tanks, orself-propelled guns.

The anti-guerilla campaignplaced a heavy burden on the fir-ing batteries of the 11th Marines.Once the patrols had trackeddown groups of enemy troops, theregiment's batteries had to fire on

In a long, winding, single-file column, a Marine rifle company inches its waydown a steep mountain path before assaulting a guerrilla-held village in the val-ley below. The "guerrilla hunt" was marked by numerous small-scale clashes

short notice and in any direction."It was not uncommon to see abattery sited by platoon—twoguns to the east, two to the west,and two to the south," notedLieutenant Colonel Francis Parry."Two platoons might be laid forlow-angle fire and the other forhigh-angle fire to enable it toreach over and behind a nearbyridge . . . . I doubt if field-artillerybatteries anywhere ever surpassedthe sophistication and competence

demonstrated routinely in

January and February of 1951."Although aggressive, the patrols

soon took on an air of routine,according to Private First ClassMorgan Brainard of Company A,1st Marines:

Each day was much likethe one before: we wouldboard trucks in the morningfollowing chow and in fullgear minus packs, roll out fivemiles or more to some prede-termined spot, dismount, andundertake a sweep of the

13

nearby hills and valleys, clear-ing all the villages in ourpath. And then we wouldreturn to camp in late after-noon, wash ourselves in thebattalion shower tent (a realluxury), have chow, clean ourgear, write letters and engagein bull sessions until it wastime to stand watch.The constant patrols harried the

NKPA and kept it on the run.General Lee's troops were forcedto break up into ever-shrinkinggroups just to survive. Soon, hard-pressed guerrilla bands werereduced to foraging instead offighting, and the situation was sowell in hand that the Marines couldbe relieved in order to fight else-where by mid-February.

The first contact with the enemyin the Pohang zone occurred onthe afternoon of 18 January. Apatrol from Lieutenant ColonelThomas L. Ridge's 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, discovered an unknownnumber of North Koreans east ofAndong. The enemy quickly fled,but three of their numbers werecaptured after a wild chase. Theseprisoners from the 27th Regimentconfirmed their parent unit was the10th NKPA Division and reportedthat elements of that division's25th and 29th Regiments were alsoin the area. Four days later a patrolfrom the 1st Marines discovered anestimated enemy battalion nearMukkye-dong south of Andongjust before sunset and promptlygot the best of a one-sidedexchange of small arms and mor-tars. Captain Robert P. Wray'sCompany C suffered no casualtieswhile the NKPA lost about 200killed or wounded. Unfortunately,nightfall prevented full pursuit.The enemy escaped under coverof darkness by breaking intosquad- and platoon-sized exfiltra-tion groups.

On 24 January, Colonel

Litzenberg's 7th Marines began athree-day raking operation to clearthe enemy from its zone of action.The In Mm Gun retaliated by hit-

ting the regimental command postat Topyong-dong and the 1stBattalion three miles to the north-west, but both attacks by the 25th

NKPA Regiment failed. On the26th, Major Webb D. Sawyer's 1stBattalion isolated an enemy com-pany atop Hill 466 that held theattackers at hay with mortars, smallarms, and hand grenades. TheMarines answered with their ownartillery, mortars, and automaticweapons. The outgunned enemyquickly abandoned the positionafter suffering an estimated 50dead and about twice that manywounded. That same afternoon,Lieutenant Colonel Robert L.

Bayer's 2d Battalion repulsed aNKPA counterattack and counted44 enemy dead in the aftermath.During the entire operation,Colonel Litzenberg reportedenemy losses at about 250 killedand 500 wounded with a dozenprisoners taken. These one-sidedfights left little doubt about whoheld the upper hand. Consequen-ly, General Lee ordered his troopsto cease offensive operations until

A tank-led column from company c, 1st Tank Battalion,stands by as apatrolfrom the 5th Marines searches a near-by village for guerrillas. The 90mm gun of the M-26

Pershing tank in the foreground and the 75mm gun of thefollowing M-4 Sherman tank provided the requisite fire-power.

14

Col Homer L. Litzenberg set up his command post in a ravine near Topyong-dong. The 7th Marines was assigned to the centrally located Sector D during thePohang guerrilla hunt.

'\Iti)l1.lI \iIiie ltit 1 '\l() !2—\\((

,;2

-

:

'NJIl FhLI \i'chi '\ \(

they could withdraw into themountains to regroup. "Theyappear," noted General Smith, "tobe as confused as we are."

The actions at Pohang thus fartypified the frustrations of anti-guerrilla warfare. On every occa-sion the Marines hammered theiropponents but were unable to pindown the elusive enemy so deci-sive action could be affected. "It

became a game," ColonelLitzenberg reported. "We wouldfind them about 1400 in the after-noon, get our artillery on them, airon them, and then they would dis-appear. The next day we wouldhave to find them again." This dis-concerting pattern continuedthroughout January and February1951, much as it had in thePhilippines at the turn of the cen-tury and would again in Vietnamlittle more than a decade later. Butas Litzenburg noted, "the opera-tions in this area constituted a very,very successful field exercise from

which we derived great benefit.""It was excellent training for thenew replacements," echoedGeneral Smith's aide de camp,Major Martin J. Sexton. "It gavethem the opportunity of getting aconditioning, and an experience ofthe hardest type of warfare, moun-tainous warfare, and fast moving

situations. They also had theopportunity to utilize supportingfire of all types, including navalgunfire."

A welcome addition to the 1stMarine Division in late January wasColonel Kim Sung Eun's 1stKorean Marine Corps (KMC)Regiment. The Korean Marine reg-iment brought four rifle battalions(1st, 2d, 3d, and independent 5th).The original Korean Marines hadtrained under the tutelage of the5th Marines while enroute toInchon the previous September.They fought well beside the 1stMarine Division during the libera-tion of Seoul before beingdetached for other duties. TheKorean Marines were attachedadministratively to the 1st MarineDivision on 21 January, but werenot trucked up from Chinhae untilabout a week later. On 29 January,Marine Lieutenant Colonel CharlesW. Harrison, a veteran of pre-warservice with the 4th Marines inShanghai and now the seniorKorean Marine advisor, finallyreported that the Korean Marinecommand post was in place atYongdok. General Smith created anew sector in the northeast toaccommodate the new arrivals.This area, Zone F, included

A tired platoon patrol pushes up another hill as it pursues fleeing remnants of the10th NKPA Division. Such marches provided excellent physical conditioningwhile at the same time developing unit cohesion and tactical proficiency.

A Marine sentry and his intepreter check passes and obtain information fromKorean civilians passing through a roadblock near Andong. Far from support-ing the Communists, the inhabitants readily reported North Korean guerrillamovements to the Marines.

15

'Itiill:IJ \I Iflt, IIi I \I( I 12' N—r7& .-

\ItIofl.i .\rliie' I(I) ( I 1. !\ \()

Yongdok, Chaegok-tong, andChinandong. The 1st, 2d, and 3dBattalions patrolled subsectors inZone F while the 5th Battalionworked with the 1st Marines. TheU.S. Marines provided combat andlogistics support for their SouthKorean counterparts. The KoreanMarines acquitted themselves wellat Pohang, just as they had beforeand would again. In fact, the 1stKMC Regiment would become the1st Marine Division's fourth rifleregiment for the remainder of theKorean War. The bond betweenKorean and American Marines wasa strong one; so strong that whenasked by a reporter about the ori-ental soldiers nearby, an anony-mous U.S. Marine rendered theultimate compliment when hereplied: "They're Marines!"

It soon became obvious that theNKPA had bitten off more than itcould handle. Enemy prisonersconfirmed signal intercepts and

agent reports that the 10th NKPADivision had been ordered to leavePohang to rejoin the NKPA HCorps. Concurrently, aerial ob-servers noted a general movementto the west out of the 7th Marines'Zone C into Zones A and B (1stand 5th Marines, respectively). Theresulting attempts to slip out of theMarine noose resulted in severalvery one-sided clashes during thefirst week of February. On thenight of 31 January-i February, acompany-sized patrol from the 1stBattalion, 1st Marines, engaged anestimated enemy battalion nearSanghwa-dong. The enemy suf-fered about 50 casualties and threeNorth Koreans were capturedalong with several mortars andsmall arms. A few days laterLieutenant Colonel Allan Sutter's2d Battalion and LieutenantColonel Virgil W. Banning's 3dBattalion pushed fleeing NKPAtroops into blocking positions

16

manned by the Korean Marines'22d Company during a successful"hammer-and-anvil" combinedoperation. In the 7th Marines zoneof action, Lieutenant ColonelWilbur F. MeyerhofPs 3d Battalionkilled about 45 NKPA in a sharpaction northwest of Wolmae-dong,and Lieutenant Colonel Bayer's 2dBattalion overcame fierce resis-tance to take Hill 1123. To thesouthwest, a trap set by LieutenantColonel John W. Stevens II's 1stBattalion, 5th Marines, turned outto be a bust, but LieutenantColonel Robert D. Tapplett's 3dBattalion destroyed four road-blocks, killed 30 enemy, and cap-tured three more in the vicinity ofYongchon. Lieutenant ColonelHarold S. Roise's 2d Battalionoccupied Hill 930 after ejectingsome stubborn defenders. Alongthe northern coast, Colonel Kim'sKorean Marines took Paekcha-dong and forced its defenders toscatter. A unique approach wastried on 4 February when a loud-speaker-equipped Marine Douglas

MajGen Smith pins a single star onnewly promoted BGen Lewis B."Chesty" Puller on 2 February 1951.Not long thereafter Puller, arguably thebest-known Marine in modern history,took command of the division whenMajGen Smith temporarily took over IXCoips.

As two Marines guard a captured North Korean soldier, a corpsman administersfirst aid to him. While the number of counted enemy dead was low, there was lit-tle doubt that the total North Korean casualties were crippling.

"tiiuntI Ar !1! I'Il('k) I ) 12-\-A(1