7/31/2019 Counter-Insurency in My Perspective

1/4

Counter-Insurgency in my perspective by: P/Dir. Leocadio SC Santiago Jr.

Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors goto war first and then seek to win. Sun Tzu

Thirty plus years ago, I donned the uniform of a soldier and that decision transformed myperspective of the society not only where I belong, move but also as a whole. From the veryfirst day in the Philippine Military Academy until I graduated as a 2 nd Lieutenant with theformer Philippine Constabulary, what was impounded to my mind were discipline and that Iwas a warrior and I will fight any enemy of the Philippines be it from internal or external. Thefocus of my service was centered on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, even when Ibecame a police officer in the Philippine National Police, these two are my theaters and Itreated my police operations based on the principles of these two parameters. Now, as Iprepare to bow-out of the service, there are realities of the past that I learned.

I stepped out of the Academy with a mind-set of finding and defeating the insurgents and the

terrorists. Mortal combat was my driving force not realizing that it is the least effectiveweapon in the arsenals to fight the insurgents and the terrorists. I was led to believe that theinsurgents and the terrorists were recruited because they are hungry and wanted to just havewhat a hard working person has by use of force. This belief stayed with me until I met theformer chief of staff of the NPA founder Jomma Sison and who opened the NPA guerilla frontin the Bicol Region (my apologies for not naming him for his security). That person alsobecame one of my mentors in political analysis and this was what he said that I cannot forgetsince: People are recruited into the ranks of the NPAs not because they are hungry or have nothing materially, they are recruited and joined the NPAs because they wereabused, taken advantage of and the NPAs took advantage of these thinking fueling their feelings of being disenfranchised. In Tagalog dahil sila ay inapi. That truth made me

realized that there are basically three stages in fighting in the theaters of counter-insurgencyand counter-terrorism. These three stages are: 1) Force against Force (Insurgents/Terroristsagainst the Armed Forces), 2) Force against Force with Law Enforcement(Insurgents/Terrorist against the Armed Forces with Law Enforcers) and 3) Force againstLocal Government Unit with Law Enforcement.

1

Force vs. Force(Insurgency/Terrorist vs. ArmedForces)

Force vs. Force w/ Law EnforcementForce vs. Armed Forces w/ Law Enforcement

Force vs. Local Government Unit w/ LawEnforcement

1 st Stage

2 nd Stage

3 rd Stage

http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/s/suntzu387509.htmlhttp://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/s/suntzu387509.html

7/31/2019 Counter-Insurency in My Perspective

2/4

7/31/2019 Counter-Insurency in My Perspective

3/4

Enforcement to take the lead in the sustainment of stability.

The completion of Stage 3 however was not attained. Politics reared its ugly head and as aresult, the core root cause of rebellion was not totally eradicated. The Hukbalahap campaignhowever remains one of the ideal models for counter-insurgency/ terrorism.

Outside the Philippines, another counter-insurgency/terrorism campaign reflects the threestages of counter-terrorism. That was the Malaysian Emergency that at least 85% or morewas similar to the Hukbalahap campaign. The similarities are:

1) The campaign was placed under one unified command and singleaccountability at all stages. There was only one man running the campaignand he has total control of all instruments that will be utilized to conduct thecounter-insurgency/terrorism.

2) In Stage 1 (Force against Force), both campaigns streamlined its armedforces to be the spearhead of the campaign. Both used all the tacticaldoctrines in the armed forces arsenal. Psychological operations were

utilized extensively in both campaigns.

3) In Stage 2 (Force against Force with Law Enforcement), the campaignmakes the community feel that the government is there to stay. It is at thisstage that the campaign shows the people that the government respects thelaw and though armed, they are there to insure the legal rights of thecommunity. It is also emphasized in this campaign that the law enforcers arepart of their community and will not leave them to the retaliations of theinsurgent/terrorists. Limited development is introduced, only those that the

Armed Forces/ Law Enforcers are capable of delivering.

4) In Stage 3 (Force against Local Government Unit/ Law Enforcement), onlythe Malaysian Emergency could be said to fully accomplish this phase. As toafter the British left Malaysia was another matter but as far as the MalaysianCampaign was concerned, during the closing period, Stage 3 was beingimplemented and exercised. As to the Anti-Hukbalahap campaign, thePhilippines was then in the verge of Stage 3 but election followed and theCampaign Commander ran and won the Presidential election.

After more than 30 years of campaigning, there were a lot of ups and downs in the counter-insurgency/terrorism that I participated. Majority of these sadly to say was in Stage 1 (Forceagainst Force). For one reason or another, when we are at the verge of Stage 2 (Force

against Force with Law Enforcement), things bogged down. And the succeedingadministration starts of with the counter-insurgency/ terrorism campaign at Stage 1 (Forceagainst Force).

The taking into the helm of Presidency by His Excellency President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, the counter-insurgency/ terrorism campaign was at Stage 1 downgraded fromStage 2 which suffered a set back at the latter part of former President Gloria Macapagal

Arroyos administration when the latter rescinded the operation of Inter-Agency Legal Action

3

7/31/2019 Counter-Insurency in My Perspective

4/4

Group. I am however highly encouraged and very optimistic when HE President Aquino, astrong advocate of human rights and justice declared that under His administration, ALLOUT JUSTICE will be the motto of the uniformed service. The marching orders He gave theChief of the Philippine National Police, the Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines andall uniformed service was straight forward, BE THE GUARDIAN AND PARTNER OF THE FILIPINO NATION .

Immediately, the PNP and the AFP set into action the orders of HE President Aquino. Therewas an immediate synergy of the PNP and the AFP in the operational aspects specially atthe tactical level which the insurgency/ terrorism affected areas felt. The Joint PNP/AFPPublic Safety Coordinating Center became the spearhead in the actualization of thePresidents marching order. With the active implementation of the JPSCC protocols, thecounter-insurgency/ terrorism reached Stage 2. Successes of the JPSCC Task Forces in thefield are all highlighted by success stories. These successes ranges form counter-insurgency/ terrorism, anti-drug, anti-kidnapping and anti-criminality operations.

It is my belief that expanding, funding and institutionalizing the JPSCC Task Forces will pavethe way for the counter-insurgency/ terrorism campaign reach Stage 3 (Force against Local

Government Unit with Law Enforcement). The reason I believe this can be done under theadministration of HE President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III is simple, He showed and tookaction showing that He can go after anybody He thinks has done wrong regardless of position or political party affiliation.

It is a period in time that the uniformed service specially the Philippine National Police andthe Armed Forces of the Philippines should take into heart the marching orders of no lessthan the Commander in Chief, HE President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III. After all, it is us inthe uniformed service that bled and when gods of fortune are not with us dies in the field sothat the Filipino Nation enjoys the fruit of their labors and attain their dreams of a sunny life.

4