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Public Choice 111: 259–283, 2002.

© 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.259

Are government employees more likely to vote?: An analysis of

turnout in the 1996 U.S. National Election ∗

ELIZABETH C. COREY1 & JAMES C. GARAND2

Department of Political Science, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana

70803-5433, U.S.A.; e-mail: [email protected]; 2 [email protected]

Accepted 15 August 2000

Abstract. In this paper we develop and test a model of voter turnout that permits us to

differentiate turnout rates for government employees and other citizens, controlling for the

effects of a wide range of other variables relating to turnout. Using 1996 ANES data, we find

that there is a significant difference in turnout rates for bureaucrats and nonbureaucrats, both

in simple bivariate analyses and in a full multivariate model. The magnitude and significance

of the coefficient for government employment, even in the face of controls, suggests there is

something about government employment per se that has an effect on turnout.

1. Introduction

For the past three decades scholars have paid significant attention to the bur-eaucratic theory of government growth. This theory, in its most basic form,holds that the self-interested actions of bureaucrats are related to an expansionin the size of government. The actions of government bureaucrats have two

basic ends: (1) to maximize the output of their bureaus, and (2) to increasepersonal wealth, in the form of leisure, perquisites, and power. Implicit inthis account is the idea that in their political activity bureaucrats will belikely to support “liberal” candidates who advocate an expanded public sec-

tor. Scholar’s have hypothesized that bureaucrats are significantly differentfrom the rest of the general public in their political attitudes as well as intheir voting choice and turnout behavior (Lewis, 1990; Blais and Dion, 1991;Blais, Blake, and Dion, 1997; Garand, Parkhurst, and Seoud, 1991).

William Niskanen (1971) has argued persuasively that bureaucrats arelikely to act in their own personal interests and in the interests of their bureaus

∗ An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1999 annual meeting of the Southern

Political Science Association, Savannah, Georgia. The data utilized in this paper were made

available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data for

the 1998 American National Election study were originally collected by Warren E. Miller and

the National Election Studies. Neither the collector of the original data nor the Consortium

bears any responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented herein.



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when they attempt to maximize their budgets. In more recent works, Niskanen(1991) has revised his theory in order to emphasize that bureaucrats act tomaximize their discretionary budget. However, although scholars continue to

debate the particulars of the theory, the general conception of the “budget-maximizing bureaucrat” forms the central assumption of the bureaucratictheory of government growth. This theory raises several normative questionsrelevant to American politics. First, there is the basic question of whether

an expanded public sector (i.e., a larger government) is a good to be soughtor an evil to be avoided. Certainly, throughout the 1980s there was sentimentamong a substantial portion of the American public that a smaller governmentis a better government. But there is ample evidence that the question has notyet been definitively decided. Many citizens support the expansion of various

government programs offering goods and services to those in need (Gilens,1999; Jacoby, 1994). If President Clinton’s 1993 universal health care initiat-ive had succeeded, for instance, it would have vastly increased the size and

power of the public sector. Similarly, some environmental and labor groupsin the 1990s continue to argue for greater regulation of business and industry.But any such increase in bureaucratic activity means that the staff, resources,and possibly the authority of the bureau must also increase. In large measure,this debate over government growth takes place along traditional partisan and

ideological lines: conservatives and Republicans favor a smaller public sectorwhile liberals and Democrats favor a larger one, at least in certain areas.Thus, the partisan identification and ideological orientation of bureaucratsis an important and defining characteristic in the debate.

A second normative question arises out of discussions of political ac-countability. To whom are bureaus accountable? This has been discussed

extensively in the bureaucratic politics literature regarding principal-agenttheory and the limits of bureau independence (Wood, 1988; Wood and Water-

man, 1991). Though there is debate over the precise degree of independencepossessed by different bureaus, it is clear that if a bureau is primarily anautonomous entity, it can wield an enormous amount of unchecked power.Since bureaucrats are not accountable to an electorate, they are able to imple-

ment policies in ways that an elected politician would not dare. Theoretically,if bureaucrats wish to expand the scope of government, they can do so first bymeans of their political power (i.e., they can help to elect candidates who sup-port an expanded public sector) and then by using administrative discretion

to direct the resulting policies to their benefit. One may reasonably questionwhether or not such actions accurately reflect the interests and preferences of

the general public or whether they represent only the interests and preferencesof bureaucrats.



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The third question raised by this theory of government growth is whetherbureaucrats exercise a disproportionate amount of influence over electionoutcomes. This question may not intuitively jump to mind upon an initial

consideration of the problem, for one might reason that bureaucrats surelydo not comprise a majority of voters in the United States. However, the cru-cial question concerns not the proportion of bureaucrats in the population asa whole, but the proportion of bureaucrats in the voting population. If the

turnout rates of bureaucrats are significantly higher than the turnout ratesof nonbureaucrats, then it is likely that they may exercise considerable andrelatively disproportionate influence over election outcomes.

However, it should be noted that the rate of turnout among bureaucratsis not in itself cause for concern. If bureaucrats are found to be no different

than other citizens in terms of their attitudes, preferences, and behaviors, theirhigher rates of turnout are unimportant. However, as noted above, the bureau-cratic theory of government growth assumes that the attitudes and behavior of

bureaucrats are in fact significantly different from the rest,of the population,and there is some empirical evidence of such differences (Blais and Dion,1990; Garand, Parkhurst, and Seoud, 1991).

This brief sketch of the bureaucratic theory of government growth formsthe context for our central research question. Since the fundamental premise

of this theory is that bureaucrats exert a disproportionate influence in politics,one must first establish empirically whether or not their rates of politicalparticipation are higher than those of nonbureaucrats. We utilize data fromthe 1996 American National Election Study to explore the degree to which

this is the case. Specifically, we hypothesize that bureaucrats turn out in sig-nificantly greater numbers than those in the private sector. We further suggest

that differences between bureaucrats and other citizens will be maintainedeven in the face of controls for other variables thought to be related to voter

turnout. We recognize, however, that the effect of government employment onturnout is likely to decrease after we control for the effects of other variables,but we use this information to explore why government employees are morelikely to turn out than other citizens.

2. Bureaucrats and political participation

Virtually all studies of bureaucratic political participation focus on the centralpolitical act of citizens in a democracy: voting. Indeed, voter turnout serves as

the dependent variable of the present analysis as well. However, in reviewingthe literature concerning the voting behavior of bureaucrats, it is important toremember that voting is but one method of influencing the political process.For instance, although they note that bureaucrats do vote at a significantly



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higher rate than private citizens, Frey and Pommerehne (1982) also find thatbureaucratic participation in other phases of the political process may have asignificant impact on outcomes. They point out that some bureaucrats have

the ability to influence legislation through taking part in collective decision-making, agenda-setting, and implementation of legislation. Such activity,unobserved by most citizens, may yield considerable benefits to the bureau-crat and his/her bureau. Although this behind-the-scenes manipulation may

be undertaken in the public interest, it nonetheless recalls the problem of accountability as discussed above.

The more standard studies of bureaucratic participation do, however, focuson voting. Furthermore, the one point on which all scholars agree is that bur-eaucrats vote at significantly higher rates than private citizens. Yet these same

scholars, observing similar phenomena, come to vastly different conclusionsabout the meaning of their data. Some believe that this higher turnout ratehas serious implications for a democratic polity, while others argue that its

impact is marginal to nonexistent. Before discussing these findings in detail,however, it is essential to lay out the theoretical context in which the impactof bureaucratic voting is usually assessed.

The bureaucratic theory of government growth emerges out of the contextof rational choice theory. A “rational choice”, according to Anthony Downs

(1957), is made by assessing the benefits and costs of an action through thefollowing equation:

U = PB− C,

where U = the expected utility of an action, P = the probability of an actionhaving a significant effect, B = expected benefit, and C = the costs of the ac-

tion. Of course, no one would argue that individuals literally insert values intoan equation of this type; however, many believe that this forms the primaryconceptual framework for political and economic decision-making.

For bureaucrats, political participation has a significantly higher expectedbenefit and significantly lower costs than it does for private citizens. Bureau-crats can reasonably expect that their votes may contribute to an increasedlevel of personal and bureau benefits, while their costs of voting are greatlyreduced. The costs of voting include the effort required to gather information

and the task of voting itself. Within a bureau the cost of gathering informationmay be extremely low, since such political information is often a part of theday-to-day functioning of the bureau itself. Furthermore, the cost of voting

is also low, because public employees are often given time off with pay sothat they may cast their votes on election day. As Bennett and Orzechowski(1983) have noted, such considerations make the “rational ignorance” of theprivate citizen less rational for the bureaucrat. Moreover, they also note that



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the exercise of “civic responsibility” through voting is encouraged by a bur-eaucratic self-interest in increased economic benefits. This expected benefitderived from voting increases still further when bureaucrats participate as

a group, since their influence as a bloc of voter’s far outstrips their actualnumbers.

Several scholars have explained this phenomenon of disproportionate bur-eaucratic voting influence by means of the “vote power index” devised by

Borcherding, Busch, and Spann (1977), which is expressed as follows:

P =1

1+ VNB

VB(1/G− 1)

whereVB = voting participation rate of bureaucrats

VNB = voting participation rate of nonbureaucrats, and

G = percent of bureaucrats in the labor forceGiven the assumptions of VB = .90 and VNB = .50, Bush and Denzau

(1977) show that if bureaucrats make up 5% of the population, their impacton the total vote is 8%. If they make up 10% of the population, their impact

is 16%. If bureaucrats make up 40% of the population, their impact is as if they were 51%. Thus one can see how a minority can become a majority.Bureaucrats have power greater than their numbers because they consistentlyparticipate at higher rates than nonbureaucrats and, hence, constitute a higher

proportion of the electorate.Students of bureaucratic politics differ over the implications of the higher

turnout rates of bureaucrats. Some, arguing that higher turnout will only in-fluence state and local elections that are decided by a small margin, assert

that the effects of higher turnout are relatively insignificant (Gramlich andRubinfeld, 1982). Others, however, have come to the opposite conclusion,claiming that the public/private cleavage is substantial, and that bureaucratshave the ability to exert disproportionate influences on election outcomes(Bennett and Orzechowski, 1983; Blais, Blake, and Dion, 1990; Blais andDion, 1991; Garand, Parkhurst, and Seoud, 1991). However, all are careful tostate the tentative nature of their conclusions. The effect of a public/privatecleavage clearly varies across elections and across time (Blais, Blake, and

Dion, 1990; Blais and Dion, 1991; Garand, Parkhurst, and Seoud, 1991).Some of the most interesting work to emerge from this theoretical frame-

work involves the study of the attitudes of bureaucrats in comparison to those

of nonbureaucrats. Given that bureaucrats are consistently found to turn outto vote at higher levels, what attitudes might explain this phenomenon? Dobureaucrats’ attitudes differ significantly from those of the general public?Although the bureau voting hypothesis (detailed below) takes attitudinal dif-



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ferences as a fundamental premise, there is considerable disagreement overwhether the empirical evidence supports such an assumption. One scholar,finding few differences between bureaucrats and “ordinary people”, con-

cludes that while bureaucrats seem to support certain individual rights, theydo not support an expanded role for government (Lewis, 1990). Clearly, thesefindings run directly counter to the image of pro-government, self-interestedbureaucrats as posited by rational choice theorists.

Others, however, have found that the attitudes predicted in the bureau vot-ing hypothesis are supported by the data. As explained by Garand, Parkhurst,and Seoud (1991), the bureau voting hypothesis – part of the bureaucratic the-ory of government growth – is built on three propositions. First, bureaucratshold attitudes that support government spending more than do nonbureau-

crats. Second, government employees are more likely to turn out to votethan nongovernment employees. Third, as rational voters, bureaucrats willbe more likely to vote for candidates who support their pro-spending bias,

and these candidates will be advantaged electorally by the support of thishigh-turnout group. These hypothesized attitudes and behaviors are central tothe bureau voting hypothesis as well as to the larger theory of governmentgrowth. Although there are not significant differences between bureaucratsand nonbureaucrats in every variable tested, one study finds at least “moder-

ate” support for the attitudinal component of the bureaucratic voting (Garand,Parkhurst, and Seoud, 1991). Similarly, in another attitudinal study concernedwith such issues as tolerance, knowledge, political efficacy, and politicalactivity, Blair and Garand (1995) find that public-sector employees exhibit

differences in some political attitudes, though not in others. Again, they findsome support for the bureau voting hypothesis, but emphasize the moderate

nature of this support.In supporting the theory that bureaucratic attitudes are different than those

of the general public, Blais, Blake, and Dion (1997) find that the Democraticparty is far more favorable to the interests of public sector employees than isthe Republican party. They (1997: 87) conclude that “party in Congress” doessignificantly affect “the number of federal employees and pay raises”. Gov-

ernment employees thus have a clear reason to support the Democratic party.In an analysis of various sectors of the work force in several countries, Blake(1991) finds that there is some support for a general difference in politicalviews between public and private sector employees, while Garand, Parkhurst,

and Seoud (1991) observe similar differences in the United States. Finally,Blair and Garand (1997) find that members of Congress are very responsive

in their roll-call behavior to the proportion of government employees in theirdistricts. Blair and Garand find that House members who represent districtwith large proportions of government employees support enhanced spending



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more than other members. While these findings do not say anything directlyabout the attitudes and behaviors of government employees, it seems that U.S.House members behave as if they believe that government employees support

greater spending on average, are more likely to cast votes on election day, andare willing to vote for congressional candidates who support an enhancedpublic sector.

In view of the moderate but consistent support discovered by some schol-

ars, it is clear that more research on this topic is needed. We contribute tothis effort by testing the effects of government employment on voter turnout.Furthermore, we consider the possibility that these differences are due atleast in part to a range of other variables, including demographic character-istics, partisan identification, ideological identification, political knowledge,

political efficacy, and political trust.

3. Data, methods, and variables

In order to test for differences in turnout rates for bureaucrats and nonbur-eaucrats, we rely on data from the 1996 American National Election Study

(ANES), which is gathered by the Survey Research Center (SRC) at theUniversity of Michigan. The ANES surveys, conducted on a biennial basis,provide individual-level data about a variety of topics ranging from politicalknowledge to media exposure to religious beliefs.

We propose a rather straightforward, two-part model. First, we exam-ine the simple bivariate relationship for turnout (the dependent variable)and government employment (an independent variable) in order to estim-ate the simple turnout difference between bureaucrats and nonbureaucrats.

We hypothesize that turnout will be significantly higher among public-sectoremployees than among their private-sector counterparts. Assuming this tobe the case, we then construct and test a multivariate logit model designedto estimate the effects of government employment while controlling for theeffects of other variables that are expected to explain some of the variance inturnout. We hypothesize that a large part of the turnout difference betweengovernment employees and other citizens is explained by other variables butthat, in and of itself, government employment significantly affects turnout.

These other independent variables include various demographic and polit-ical attitude measures. For demographic variables, we consider the effectsof age, race, gender, education, family income, marital status, union mem-

bership, urban residence, homeowner status, and residential mobility. Wemeasure politically relevant attitudinal variables by constructing measuresof political efficacy, political trust, political knowledge, partisan and ideolo-gical intensity, satisfaction with the workings of democracy, social capital,



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and support for the public-sector activity over the free-market activity tosolve problems. We also include in our model variables representing per-ceptions of party policy polarization and electoral competition, as well as

exposure to television and newspaper news. We hypothesize that these vari-ables will have significant effects on turnout. In the final part of our analysiswe investigate the demographic and attitudinal bases for turnout differencesbetween government and nongovernment employees. Specifically, do public-

and private-sector employees differ in their values on important predictors of turnout?

3.1. Dependent variable: Turnout

The key dependent variable in this study is individuals’ self-reports of voterturnout. In order to measure turnout, interviewers simply asked survey re-spondents whether or not they voted in the November 1996 election. Their

responses are coded 1 if they report having voted and 0 if they do not. It isnoteworthy that we rely on self-reports of turnout rather than on validated

turnout. Unfortunately, the 1996 ANES survey does not include validatedturnout data, so we are limited to respondents’ self reports. As we will see,this means that turnout levels among survey respondents will be considerablyhigher than actual turnout, a problem that has gotten worse in ANES surveys

in recent years (Burden, 1999).

3.2. Independent variable: Government employment

The most important independent variable in this study is government em-

ployment. Since the bureaucratic theory of government growth rests on anassumption that public-sector employment has some impact on the behaviorof citizens, it is essential to obtain an accurate measure of whether or notan individual is or has been a government employee. The ANES studies

contain a stacked measure of government employment that asks respondentswho are currently working, retired, unemployed, or disabled whether theycurrently work or have ever worked for a federal, state, or local government.Responses are coded 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. As noted above, we expect govern-

ment employees to exhibit significantly higher turnout than nongovernmentemployees in the cross-tabulation and a smaller margin of difference in themultivariate model.1

3.3. Independent variables: Demographic characteristics

The first of the variables used in the multivariate logit model is a simplemeasure of age. Age is coded by year from 18–97, with 97 representing



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those aged 97 years or more. In general, we expect that as age increases,turnout will increase.2 Second, we include variables for race, hypothesizingthat black and Hispanic respondents will be less likely to turn out than whites.

The “black” and “Hispanic” variables are each coded 1 for black or Hispanic(respectively), and 0 otherwise. The gender variable is similarly dichotomous,coded 1 for women and 0 for men. Women have been more likely to turn outthan men in recent elections, so we expect this pattern to persist in the 1996

election.Education, family income, marital status, and union membership are in-

cluded as variables intended to measure the benefits and costs of voting, aswell as “lifestyle” characteristics of respondents. Education, measured as thehighest level of schooling completed, is coded 1–7, with 1 representing 8

grades or less and 7 representing an advanced degree. In previous researcheducation has been found to be strongly related to turnout (cf. Wolfinger andRosenstone, 1980), and we suspect that this study will confirm the pattern.

The level of family income, like education, is also a standard predictor of turnout. Generally, as family income increases an individual is more likely tovote. This variable is coded by means of a 24-point scale representing increas-ing levels of yearly income, with 1 representing income below $3,000 and 24representing incomes of $105,000 and over. We have also included a variable

that represents respondents’ marital status, coded 1 for individuals who arecurrently married, and 0 otherwise. Following previous cross-sectional re-search, we expect that married individuals will be more likely to turn out thanother citizens. Finally, union membership is a similar dichotomous variable,

coded 1 for union members or those with a family member who belongs toa union, and 0 otherwise. We hypothesize that union membership will be

correlated with higher levels of turnout, since members of unions are morelikely to be exposed to mobilization efforts, have an informational advantage,

and receive more direct incentives to vote.We have also included measures of the types of environments in which

respondents live. These variables include residential mobility, home own-ership, and urbanization. Residential mobility reflects the number of years

that respondents have lived in their current residence, and is coded from 0 to90. Based on the work of Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass (1987) and Timpone(1998). among others, we hypothesize that those who have moved recentlywill be less likely to turn out to vote. Because the registration process may

be time-consuming and difficult, many may choose to postpone registeringor avoid it altogether when moving to a new home. Therefore, the longer

individuals have lived in their current home, the less likely they are to havedealt with registration difficulties and the more likely they will be to vote.Home ownership is a dichotomous variable in which homeowners are coded



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I and all others 0. We hypothesize that those who own their own homeswill tend to believe they have a greater stake in government, and thereforewill be more likely to vote. Finally, we have included a variable designed to

measure urbanization; this variable is coded as a six-point scale, ranging from0 (respondent lives in a rural area) to 5 (respondent lives in a central city).We expect residents of urban areas to have higher exposure to mobilizationefforts, and hence we hypothesize that urban dwellers are more likely to turn

out than other citizens.

3.4. Independent variables: News sources and political perceptions

Our multivariate logit model also contains several variables designed tomeasure respondents’ amount of news exposure and their perceptions of their political environment. These variables include television news exposure,newspaper news exposure, perceptions of party ideological polarization, and

perceived closeness of the election. Both television news and newspaper newsare coded from 0 to 7, depending upon how many days per week respondentsreported that they watched television or read the newspaper, respectively. Wehypothesize that those who are regularly exposed to television and (espe-

cially) newspaper news are more likely to vote, since they have invested timein gathering information about politics. Party polarization (coded 0–6) is ameasure of a respondent’s perception of the difference between the ideolo-gical positions of the two parties. The higher the score, the more differencea respondent sees between Republicans and Democrats. We expect that thosewho see a significant difference between the two parties will be more likelyto vote, since they may perceive that there is a significant choice to be madebetween the two parties. Individuals who see few differences between the two

parties – i.e., those who see the parties as “Tweedledee” and “Tweedledum"– will be less likely to vote. Finally, the perceived closeness of the election ismeasured dichotomously, with 1 representing the perception that the election“will be close” and 0 the idea that one candidate will “win by quite a bit.”Presumably, those who perceive the election as “close” will be more likely

to vote, since they are more likely to perceive their participation as having apotential (though, admittedly, still negligible) impact on the election outcome.

3.5. Independent variables: Attitudes and characteristics

The other variables included in the multivariate logit analysis are those

measuring various political attitudes deemed relevant to voter turnout. As dis-cussed above, the bureaucratic theory of government growth is based on thehypothesis that government employees will support more liberal policy posi-tions, typically associated in the American system with the Democratic party.



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However, since our multivariate model attempts to explain turnout across theentire population of the United States (and not just the turnout of governmentemployees), it is necessary to take a broader view of partisanship and ideo-

logical self-identification. In his study of partisanship and voting behavior,Aldrich (1995) discusses the link between strong partisanship and high ratesof participation, noting that strong partisans exhibit consistently high ratesof turnout. Other scholars have also noted the strong relationship between

strength of partisanship and turnout (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Giventhis, we hypothesize that citizens who identify themselves as strong partisans(whether Democrats or Republicans) will be more likely to turn out thanindependents or only weak partisans. Such strong partisans will be likely tohave an informational advantage over weak partisans or independents, since a

natural part of strong partisanship is keeping abreast of issues and candidates.Closely linked to partisanship is the concept of ideological identification,

since strong Democrats or Republicans are often strong liberals or conservat-

ives, respectively. In general, those with well-defined ideologies are also morelikely to gather relevant information about politics and to be politically active.Since we do not wish to capture only one end of the political spectrum, wehave adjusted standard seven-point scales to create “folded” scales of identifi-cation for both partisanship and ideology. Data for each variable occur within

a seven-point range, from “strong liberal or Democrat” (0) to “strong conser-vative or Republican” (6). These “folded” scales range from 0 to 3, with pureindependents/non-ideologues coded as 0, 1 for leaning partisan/ideologicalidentifiers, 2 for weak partisan/ideological identifiers, and 3 for strong partis-

ans/strong ideological identifiers. For both of these variables (folded partisanidentification and folded ideological identification) we hypothesize that the

higher the score, the more likely the respondent is to vote.In the foregoing discussion we have referred to an “informational advant-

age” that may be enjoyed by some citizens. The theory behind the idea of suchan informational advantage is that those with more information are in a betterposition to participate in politics. But if, as Anthony Downs (1957) argues,information is costly to acquire, it is possible that some citizens might gain an

“unfair” advantage over their fellow citizens because of their low informationcosts. In the bureau-voting hypothesis, this manifests itself in the ease withwhich bureaucrats may acquire information about politics by virtue of theinnate political nature of their jobs. However, the information thesis does not

apply only to bureaucrats. In fact, it is to be expected that any citizen whoexhibits a high level of information about politics will be more likely to vote.

Indeed, the knowledge variable fits neatly into the “informed partisan” model,since a major component of partisanship is awareness of political issues andpersonalities. To measure the political knowledge variable, we have used a



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simple additive scale of four items from the 1996 ANES survey. The scaleis constructed from the following questions: What job/political office does[Al Gore, William Rehnquist, Boris Yeltsin, Newt Gingrich] now hold? Each

correct answer to a question is coded 1, and each incorrect or incompleteanswer is coded 0. This scale ranges from 0 (for no political knowledge) to 4(for a high level of political knowledge).

We have included several variables designed to measure attitudes to-

ward government in general. These measure respondents’ satisfaction withdemocracy, interest in politics, and positive feelings toward government. Re-spondents were asked to answer the question of whether or not they weresatisfied with the way democracy works in the United States, and their re-sponses are coded from 1 (not at all satisfied) to 4 (satisfied). We expect

that those who are generally positive toward American democracy will bemore likely to vote than those who are more negative. Interest in governmentis measured on a scale from 0 to 2, with 0 representing not much interest

and 2 representing a high level of interest. As is the case in the previousvariable, we expect that those with high levels of interest will be more likelyto turn out. We also include in our model a government activity scale thatrepresents individuals’ support for government activity over private-sectoror free-market activity. Our argument is that citizens who support an active

government are more likely to see their votes as relevant and hence are morelikely to participate in the political process. This scale is based on a factoranalysis of three items: (1) support for government doing more vs. govern-ment doing less; (2) support for the free market handling complex economic

problems vs. strong government handling those problems; and (3) govern-ment has become bigger over the years because it is involved in things that

people should do themselves vs. government has gotten bigger because theproblems we face have become bigger. A single factor emerges from a factor

analysis (eigenvalue = 1.367, variance explained = 0.502).We have created two additional attitudinal variables, political efficacy and

political trust. We hypothesize that high levels of efficacy and trust will leadto high turnout. Efficacy can be defined as the degree to which individuals

believe that their actions may significantly affect the political system. Indi-viduals who perceive the political system as being responsive to them maybe more likely to vote. On the other hand, individuals who perceive that thepolitical system is unresponsive are likely to view their participation in the

political process as a waste of time and, hence, will be less likely to vote.We also speculate that trust will be related to turnout. Individuals who exhibit

high levels of trust in government are likely to believe that government isusing its resources responsibly and that politicians generally act in the interest



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of their constituents. We hypothesize, therefore, that those with high levels of trust will be more likely to vote.

We have formed the efficacy scale by using factor analysis to combine

several efficacy items in the ANES surveys. In 1996, respondents were askedto rate their level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:(1) How much attention do you feel the government pays to what people think when it decides what to do? (2) How much do you feel that having elections

makes the government pay attention to what the people think? In additionto these questions, respondents are asked to rate their level of agreement ordisagreement with the following statements: (3) Public officials don’t caremuch what people like me think. (4) People like me don’t have any say aboutwhat the government does. Thus, the factor analysis consists of responses

to these queries, appropriately weighted. For 1996, a single factor emerges(eigenvalue = 1.248).

The political trust variables are formed in a similar manner, with responses

to the following questions combined through factor analysis to form a polit-ical trust scale. In 1996 respondents were asked the following four questions:(1) How much of the time do you think you can trust the government inWashington to do what is right? (2) Do you think that people in governmentwaste a lot/some/not very much of the money we pay in taxes? (3) Would

you say that the government is pretty much run by a few big interests lookingout for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? (4) Doyou think that quite a few/not very many/hardly any of the people running thegovernment are crooked? Here again, a single factor emerges (eigenvalue =

1.13).Our final variable is designed to measure respondents’ levels of “social

capital.” Social capital, broadly defined, is a concept that captures the de-gree to which citizens engage in relationships with others in order to solve

community problems. High levels of social capital reflect high levels of in-terpersonal and civic engagement among members of a community. Scholarshave argued that levels of social capital have significant implications for thepolity, particularly in terms of citizens’ confidence in the institutions of their

governments (Brehm and Rahn, 1997). Those with higher levels of “socialcapital” tend to be more confident in their own, as well as the government’s,ability to solve problems. Thus, since social capital reflects a willingness toengage in collective action (such as voting), we hypothesize that high levels

of social capital will lead to high levels of turnout. We have formed oursocial capital variable by constructing a simple additive scale based on the

following four questions: (1) Were you able to devote any time to volunteerwork in the last 12 months? (2) Do you have any neighbors that you knowand talk to regularly? (3) If you were selected to serve on a jury, would you



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be happy to do so or would you rather not serve? (4) In the last 12 months,have you worked with others or joined an organization in your community todo something about some community problem? Each “yes” answer is coded

1; each “no” is coded 0. Thus, the scale ranges from 0 (no social capital) to 4(a high level of social capital).

In summary, we have created a model that should account for a significantamount of the variance between turnout rates for bureaucrats and nonbureau-

crats. Government employment should remain a significant determinant of turnout even after a number of these control variables have been added to themodel. Furthermore, we speculate that public-sector employees will differsystematically from other citizens on a number of the independent variablesrelated to turnout, suggesting that at least part of the effect of government

employment an turnout is due to the effects of these other variables.

4. Empirical results

4.1. Bivariate analysis

We begin with a brief discussion of the simple differences in turnout betweengovernment employees and other citizens. Table 1 reports the turnout ratesfor these two groups, and the results are not surprising. In 1996 there is a

12.41% difference between bureaucrats and nonbureaucrats in turnout rates.Nonbureaucrats vote at a rate of 74.03% while bureaucrats vote at 86.44%.However, without control variables we can make no firm assertions about thetrue effect of government employment on turnout, since other factors may

account for part or all of this difference. Nonetheless, these differences arequite stark, and they are of a magnitude that is consistent with those found inprevious work (Garand, Parkhurst, and Seoud, 1991; Blair and Garand, 1995).Clearly, government employees were more likely than other citizens to vote

in the 1996 election, and these results suggest that government employeesconstitute a higher proportion of the electorate than is suggested by theirproportions of the population.

4.2. Multivariate logit analysis

Table 2 reports the results for our multivariate logit model of voter turnout.The coefficient for government employment is positive and significant (b =

0.6442, t = 2.070), indicating that public-sector employees are more likely tocast a vote in this election, even controlling for the effects of other variables.The coefficient for the government employment variable is also positive andhighly significant in a simple bivariate logit model (b = 0.804, t = 4.554,



273

Table 1. Simple comparison of 1996 turnout rates for government

and nongovernment employees, without control variables

Government Other All

employees citizens citizens

Voted 86.44% 74.03% 76.60%

(274) (901) (1175)

Did not vote 13.56% 25.97% 23.40%

(43) (316) (359)

N = 1534.

Note. Numbers in parentheses represent cell frequencies.

results not shown), but it is noteworthy that the magnitude of the government

employment coefficient is attenuated only slightly (about 20%) by the inclu-sion of a wide range of control variables normally thought to be related toturnout. Apparently, there is something about government employment perse that affected turnout during the 1996 election.

The coefficients for many of the demographic and attitudinal variables aresignificant and in the expected direction. Among the demographic variables,age, gender, education, married status, home ownership, and urbanizationare, as expected, positively and significantly related to turnout. Exposure

to newspaper news also has a significant positive impact on turnout (b =0.0863, t = 2.174), though the effect of television news exposure is onlyweakly related to turnout. Moreover, a number of the attitudinal variableshave strong, significant impacts on turnout. Partisan (b = 0.4362, t = 3.522)

and ideological (b = 0.4382, t = 3.524) identification, political interest (b =0.8471, t = 5.061), satisfaction with democracy (b = 0.3353, t = 2.174), andsocial capital (b = 0.5032, t = 4.716) all are strongly and positively related toturnout. These results suggest that individuals who have strong attachmentsto and knowledge of the political system, who see it as responsive to them,and who have strong partisan and ideological views, and who are satisfiedwith the workings of democracy are more likely to vote than other citizens.Among the attitudinal variables, it is surprising to note that political trust

and political efficacy – usual stalwarts in models of turnout – are unrelatedto turnout, as is the government activity scale. Overall, it appears that theeffects of government employment on turnout are sustained, even in the face

of strong effects of other variables on turnout.What are the implications of these results? The bivariate analyses reveal

that turnout levels among government employees is significantly higher thanthose for the rest of the voting-age population. Although the bivariate analysis



274

Table 2. Parameter estimates for 1996 turnout model, with government employment

and various control variables

Variable b se t-ratio Prob.

Government employment 0.6442 0.3112 2.070∗∗ 0.019

Demographic variables

Age 0.0199 0.0076 2.621 0.005

Black –0.1587 0.3837 –0.414 0.340

Hispanic –0.2051 0.3860 –0.531 0.298

Gender 0.3584 0.2175 1.848∗∗ 0.050

Education 0.1571 0.0524 2.996∗∗∗ 0.002

Family income 0.0106 0.0204 0.518 0.302

Married 0.7520 0.2405 3.126∗∗∗ 0.001

Union member 0.1602 0.2773 0.578 0.282

Residential mobility –0.0076 0.0078 –0.963 0.168Homeowner 0.6025 0.2511 2.400∗∗∗ 0.008

Urban 0.2154 0.0787 2.736∗∗∗ 0.003

News sources and political perceptions

Newspaper news 0.0863 0.0397 2.174∗∗ 0.015

Television news 0.0577 0.0435 1.324∗ 0.093

Party polarization –0.0204 0.0749 –0.272 0.393

Closeness of election 0.2294 0.2108 1.088 0.138

Political attitudes and characteristics

Ideological identification (Fold) 0.4382 0.1243 3.524∗∗∗ 0.000

Partisan identification (Fold) 0.4362 0.1239 3.522∗∗∗ 0.000

Political knowledge 0.1625 0.1138 1.428∗ 0.077

Satisfaction with democracy 0.3353 0.1542 2.174∗∗ 0.015

Interest in politics 0.8471 0.1674 5.061 0.000

Pro-government 0.0469 0.1449 0.324 0.373

Political efficacy 0.1099 0.1587 0.692 0.245

Political trust –0.0116 0.1589 –0.073 0.471

Social capital 0.5032 0.1067 4.716∗∗∗ 0.000

Constant –7.6145 0.9624 –7.912 0.000

N = 982.

Pseudo-R2 = 0.3234.∗∗∗prob. < 0.01, one-tailed test, with coefficient in expected direction.∗∗prob. < 0.05, one-tailed test, with coefficient in expected direction.∗prob. < 0. 10, one-tailed test, with coefficient in expected direction.



275

has no control variables, the fact that simple cross-tabulations and bivariatelogit models reveal significant differences between the turnout of bureaucratsand nonbureaucrats makes clear that there is some disparity between the

two groups. It is most telling that, when a full range of control variablesis included in a multivariate model, the effect of public-sector employmenton turnout remains positive and significant. At least some of the effect of government employment is due to the effects of other variables and the fact

that government employees differ from other citizens on those control vari-ables, but most of the bivariate effect of government employment is due tosomething intrinsic about working in the public sector. Evidently, bureaucratsderive greater benefits from political participation than do nonbureaucrats.Whether these benefits are financial, political, or psychological cannot be

determined directly from our multivariate models.Yet the data from these models do provide bits of tantalizing evidence

about the particular characteristics of people who are more likely to turn

out to vote, notably those with high income, high levels of education, strongpartisanship and interest, and high levels of social capital. These demographicand attitudinal characteristics may be especially strong in bureaucrats, whichcould account for the fact that government employment seems to have such astrong effect in bivariate models but that this effect is moderately attenuated

when other variables are included as predictors of turnout.Our next step is an investigation of the relationship between the other

independent variables in our models and government employment itself.A study of these individual variables will begin to pinpoint the particular

characteristics that may make government employees different from othercitizens.

Table 3 reports mean values on our independent variables, calculatedseparately for public-sector employees and other citizens. Government em-

ployees are significantly different from the rest of the population in a numberof ways. First, in terms of demographic variables, there are some clear dif-ferences between public-sector employees and other citizens. Governmentemployees are significantly older than other citizens, have higher incomes,

are more highly educated, and are more likely women and union members.Of these variables, age, gender, and education also have a significant effecton turnout (Table 1), so they are candidates for contributing to turnout differ-ences between government employees and other citizens. Given this, it would

appear likely that at least some of the differences in turnout for public- andprivate-sector employees are due to the fact that the former are older, more

highly educated, and more likely to be women.Second, public-sector employees are significantly more likely than other

citizens to watch television news, read newspapers, and perceive the pres-



276

Table 3. Difference in means for government employees and other citizens on selected

independent variables

1996 means

Variable Government Otheremployees citizens Difference t-ratio prob.

Turnout 0.864 0.740 0.124 4.675∗∗∗ 0.000

Demographic characteristics

Age 49.847 46.951 2.896 2.789∗∗∗ 0.003

Black 0.138 0.116 0.022 1.124 0.131

Hispanic 0.095 0.085 0.010 0.589 0.278

Gender 1.800 1.540 0.060 1.993∗∗ 0.023

Education 4.807 3.926 0.881 9.075∗∗∗ 0.000

Family income 15.861 14.807 1.054 2.674∗∗∗ 0.004

Married 0.539 0.544 –0.005 –0.154 0.439

Union member 0.271 0.148 0.123 5.464∗∗∗

0.000Residential mobility 12.380 11.514 0.866 0.968 0.167

Homeowner 0.704 70.878 0.026 0.912 0.181

Urban 2.464 2.495 –0.031 –0.353 0.362

News sources and political perceptions

Newspaper news 3.810 3.284 0.526 5.051∗∗∗ 0.001

Television news 3.927 3.436 0.491 2.993∗∗∗ 0.002

Party polarization 2.733 2.696 0.037 0.401 0.345

Closeness of election 0.568 0.512 0.056 1.852∗∗ 0.032

Political attitudes

Ideological identification

(Folded) 1.182 1.086 0.096 1.608∗ 0.054

Partisan identification

(Folded) 1.945 1.893 0.052 0.907 0.183

Political knowledge 2.162 1.916 0.246 3.290∗∗∗ 0.001

Satisfaction with democracy 2.133 2.037 0.096 2.065∗∗ 0.020

Interest in politics 1.130 1.017 0.113 2.649∗∗∗ 0.004

Pro-government 0.126 –0.033 0.159 3.021∗∗∗ 0.002

Political efficacy 0.123 –0.032 0.155 2.991∗∗∗ 0.002

Political trust 0.129 –0.034 0.163 3.307∗∗∗ 0.001

Social capital 2.254 1.940 0.314 4.577∗∗∗ 0.000

∗∗∗prob. < 0.01, one-tailed test, with coefficient in expected direction.∗∗prob. < 0.05, one-tailed test, with coefficient in expected direction.∗prob. < 0.10, one-tailed test, with coefficient in expected direction.



277

idential election as being dose. Exposure to newspaper news has a strongsignificant effect on turnout, while television news has only a weak effectthat is at the margins of statistical significance, so these two variables, and

especially newspaper news exposure, appear to have contributed to turnoutdifferences between public- and private-sector employees.

Among the attitudinal variables there are also considerable differencesbetween government bureaucrats and nonbureaucrats. Government employ-

ees have higher levels of ideological identification, political knowledge,satisfaction with democracy, political interest, support for government activ-ity, political efficacy, political trust, and social capital. The only attitudinalvariable on which public- and private-sector employees do not differ in asignificant way is strength of partisanship. Among the attitudinal variables

that do differentiate the two groups, several have strong direct effects onturnout. Specifically, it would appear that ideological identification, politicalknowledge, satisfaction with democracy, and social capital both differentiate

public- and private-sector employees and have a significant effect on turnout.If government employees have higher mean values on these variables thanother citizens, and if these variables are related to turnout, it follows that atleast some of the turnout differences between public-sector employees andother citizens can be attributed to the effects of these variables.

We suggest that turnout differences between government employees andother citizens may be at least partly due to attitudinal differences and, to alesser extent, differences in demographic characteristics and media exposure.We want to be clear, however, that this does not mean that government em-

ployment in and of itself does not have a direct effect on turnout, Indeed,in 1996 the government employment coefficient is positive and significant,

even after controlling for the effects of other variables. The logit coefficientfor this variable is, to be sure, somewhat attenuated in magnitude compared

to the simple bivariate logit coefficient, and this is likely due to differencesbetween government employees and other citizens on the other independentvariables. But even controlling for these other effects, there is somethingabout an individual working for the public sector that results in a higher

rate of turnout. It is difficult to make firm statements about what exactly itis about government employment that has the effect on turnout above andbeyond the effects of other variables that differentiate public, and private-sector employees and that are themselves related to turnout, Arguably, the

significant positive coefficient for the government employment variable in theface of strong statistical controls is consistent with an argument that suggests

that government employees turn out to vote because they perceive that it is intheir self-interest to do so.



278

5. Conclusion

We explore the effects of public-sector employment on turnout in the 1996

election. Using data from the 1996 ANES, we demonstrate that governmentemployees are significantly more likely than other citizens to cast votes in

this election. Based loosely on previous research on turnout that follows therational-choice tradition of Anthony Downs (1957), as well as theoreticalwork by Niskanen (1971) on the role of bureaucrats in shaping public policy,we develop and test a multivariate model in which we depict turnout as a func-

tion of government employment, demographic variables, media and politicalperception variables, and a variety of political attitudes.

Our multivariate turnout model yields the finding, as expected, that gov-ernment employment has an independent and significant effect upon turnout.In our examination of the characteristics that differentiate government em-

ployees from other citizens, we find that government employees are bettereducated, older, and wealthier than other citizens. Also, as expected, theyscore significantly higher on a number of attitudinal variables. It follows fromour theoretical discussion that higher scores on these attitudinal variables lead

to higher rates of turnout, since such scores imply interest in and attachmentto the political process.

What are we to make from these findings? Simply, we suggest that gov-ernment employment matters in a direct way for political participation.

Government employees turn out to vote at higher rates than other citizensin part because they have demographic, attitudinal, and political character-istics that would lead any similarly-situated citizen to turn out. But this isnot the whole story. Government employees also appear to turn out as a

direct function of something intrinsic about being a government employee.One real possibility is that this direct effect of public-sector employmentis due to aspects of self-interest that are not captured in our other controlvariables. Moreover, the question exists as to whether the direct governmentemployment effect is due to a selection process, whereby individuals whoeventually become public-sector employees differ from other citizens in waysthat lead them to higher rates of turnout, or to a socialization process, whereindividuals entering government employment are socialized to higher rates of

participation in the electoral process. The selection process thesis implies thatgovernment employees may self-select to work for government because theyprefer the job security and promotion by seniority rather than by merit. This

may also help explain why government employees are inherently differentin their voting behavior. Future research should explore not only whethergovernment employment has a direct effect on turnout, but also the seeds of turnout differences between public, and private-sector employees.



279

Notes

1. We recognize, of course, that different types of government employees may be more or

less likely to cast votes on election day, and this may imply something about competing

explanations for a government employment effect. The ANES data set, however, doesnot allow us to make fine distinctions in occupation or length of service as a government

employee. Thus we have estimated several models that attempt to approximate different

characteristics of government employees. In one model, we include an interaction vari-

able for government employment and age in order to test the hypothesis that government

employees are more likely to turn out as a function of age. However, the coefficient for

the interaction variable failed to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance,

meaning that older government employees are no more or less likely to turn out than

their more junior counterparts. Similarly, we have estimated our models to include only

“current” government employees (i.e., those currently employed), but here again there are

no significant differences from the model results reported in this paper.

2. However, the relationship between age and turnout may not be as straightforward as it

might at first appear. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) have suggested that the relation-

ship between age and turnout is actually curvilinear, since turnout tends to flatten out

and even to decline among the oldest members of a population. In order to capture thiscurvilinear relationship, in several models we included a measure of age squared, designed

to represent the effect of the eventual flattening out and decline in turnout. However, the

squared term does not achieve statistical significance, so in the models we report in this

paper we include only the simple age measure.

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Appendix

Variable Description

Turnout 1 = voted; 0 = did not vote.

Government

employment

1 = government employee; 0 = all other respondents.

Age Age in years, ranging from 18–97, with 97 represent-

ing those aged 97 years more.

Black 1 = black respondent; 0 = all other respondents.

Hispanic 1 = Hispanic respondent; 0 = all other respondents.

Gender 1 = female respondent; 0 = male respondent.

Education Highest level of schooling completed, ranging from 1

(8 grades or less) to 7 (advanced degree).

Family income 24-point scale of family income, ranging from 1 (in-

come below $3000 per year) to 24 ($105,000 per year

and over).

Married 1 = currently married; 0 = all other respondents.

Union member 1 = union member (or member of family belongs to

union); 0 = all other respondents.

Residential mobility Number of years respondent has lived in current resid-

ence, ranging from 0 to 90.

Homeowner 1 = homeowner; 0 = all other respondents.

Urban Six-point scale of urbanization in respondents’ place

of residence ranging from 0 (rural) to 5 (central city).

Newspaper news Eight-point scale, ranging from 0 (did not read the

newspaper at all during the past week) to 7 (read

newspaper every day during the past week).

Television news Eight-point scale, ranging from 0 (did not watch tele-

vision news at all during the past week) to 7 (watched

television news every day during the past week).

Party polarization Seven-point scale, ranging from 0 (parties show no

difference) to 6 (parties are quite different).

Closeness of election 1 = election will be close; 0 = candidate will win by

“quite a bit”.

Ideological

identification (folded)

Four-point scale of respondent ideology, ranging from

0 (weakly ideological) to 3 (strongly ideological).

Partisan identification

(folded)

Four-point scale of respondent partisanship, ranging

from (weak partisan) to 3 (strong partisan).



282


Political knowledge Five-point measure of political knowledge, based on

an additive scale constructed from the following ques-

tions: “What job/political office does [Al Gore, Wil-

liam Rehnquist, Boris Yeltsin, Newt Gingrich] now

hold?” 0 = no political knowledge; 4 = high level of

political knowledge.

Satisfaction with demo-

cracy

Four point scale, ranging from 1 (not at all satisfied) to

4 (satisfied).

Interest in politics Three-point scale, ranging from 0 (not much interest)

to 2 (high level of interest).

Government activity

scale

Scale of support for government activity over private-

sector or market activity, based on a factor analysis of

the following items: (1) support for government doing

more vs. government doing less; (2) support for the

free market handling complex economic problems vs.strong government handling those problems; and (3)

government has become bigger over the years because

it is involved in things that people should do them-

selves vs. government has gotten bigger because the

problems we face have become bigger. (Eigenvalue =

1.367; variance explained 0.502).

Political efficacy Scale of feelings of political efficacy, based on a factor

analysis of the following items: (1) How much atten-

tion do you feel the government pays to what people

think when it decides what to do? (2) How much do

you feel that having elections makes the government

pay attention to what the people think? in addition

to these questions, respondents are asked to rate their

level of agreement or disagreement with the following

statements: (3) Public officials don’t care much what

people like me think. (4) People like me don’t have

any say about what the government does. (Eigenvalue

= 1.248).

Political trust Scale of feelings of political trust, based on a factor

analysis of the following items: (1) How much of the

time do you think you can trust the government in

Washington to do what is right? (2) Do you think that

people in government waste a lot/some/not very much

of the money we pay in taxes? (3) Would you say

that the government is pretty much run by a few biginterests looking out for themselves or that it is run

for the benefit of all the people? (4) Do you think that

quite a few/not very many/hardly any of the people

running the government are crooked? (Eigenvalue =

1.13).



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Social capital Five-point measure of political knowledge, based on

an additive scale constructed from the following ques-

tions: (1) Were you able to devote any time to volun-

teer work in the last 12 months? (2) Do you have any

neighbors that you know and talk to regularly? (3) If

you were selected to serve on a jury, would you be

happy to do so or would you rather not serve?(4) In the

last 12 months, have you worked with others or joined

an organization in your community to do something

about some community problem? 0 = no social capital;

4 = high level of political capital.

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