Copyright by Abby Michelle Attia 2020
99
Copyright by Abby Michelle Attia 2020
Transcript of Copyright by Abby Michelle Attia 2020
Copyright
by
Abby Michelle Attia
2020
The Report Committee for Abby Michelle Attia Certifies that this is the approved
version of the following Report:
25 Years of Gender Mainstreaming in Jordan: Evolution and Progress
Committee:
Faegheh Shirazi, Supervisor
Jenny Knowles Morrison
25 Years of Gender Mainstreaming in Jordan: Evolution and Progress
by
Abby Michelle Attia
Report
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Global Policy Studies
And
Master of Arts
The University of Texas at Austin
May 2020
Dedication
This treatise is dedicated to all of the Jordanian women whose strength, generosity,
wisdom, kindness, and faith inspire me to challenge and push myself. In spite of wars,
economic collapses, displacement, and poverty, Jordanian women from all walks of life
have shown me that Arab women have and will make a way for our voices to be heard.
v
Acknowledgements
Firstly, I would like to thank my family, Fawzy, Linda, Amy, and Andrew Attia,
whose love, support, and sacrificial generosity enabled me to write this document.
My incredible supervisor, Faegheh Shirzai, took a chance on working with me on
this research and I am deeply grateful for her patience and kindness with me as we
navigated finishing this project in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic. I am very
thankful for the other half of my committee, Jenny Knowles Morrison, whose
encouragement and guidance in my career has pushed me to keep pursuing my research
passions.
Lastly, I would be remiss without thanking all of my peers and colleagues at the
LBJ School and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies who humor, brilliance, and kindness
kept me pushing though each semester.
vi
Abstract
25 Years of Gender Mainstreaming in Jordan: Evolution and Progress
Abby M. Attia, MGPS, MA
The University of Texas at Austin, 2020
Supervisor: Faegheh Shirazi
Since the Beijing Platform for Action in 1995, countries have taken many
approaches to gender mainstreaming. Gender mainstreaming policies were created to be
context specific to account for the variety of ways that policy can promote gender equality.
However, the variety of gender mainstreaming approaches today limits researchers and
practitioners’ ability to measure or compare their impact. Governments’ gender
mainstreaming policies have evolved as policy makers learn from the best practices of other
countries. This requires in-depth case studies on their program’s implementation and
impacts. This case study on Jordan’s gender mainstreaming policies and its evolution in
the last 25 years explores how Jordan’s gender policies were impacted by the Beijing
Platform and have evolved since then. Although Jordanian women have made remarkable
gains in their life expectancies and education statuses in the last 25 years, their participation
in public life continues to be limited. In this paper I use primary source analysis of Jordan’s
gender mainstreaming policies, its program records, and historical research of Jordanian
feminist organizations to understand how the Jordanian government has negotiated its
gender mainstreaming policies to address the demands of different sectors of society.
Although Jordan is a monarchy, Royal family must still negotiate the demands of the
vii
parliament, tribes, Islamic political parties, and the military. The Royal family’s patronage
of gender mainstreaming policies has often pitted them against those interests. This paper
explores how gender mainstreaming policies have been shaped by those domestic interests
as well as pressure from international donors and feminist organizations. I argue that these
competing interests have led to gender mainstreaming policies that are gender aware and
targeted but have yet to be transformative. This paper offers analysis of how Jordan can
continue its progress and transformation in gender policies in the next 25 years.
viii
Table of Contents
List of Tables .................................................................................................................... xi
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. xii
Chapter 1: Introduction .......................................................................................................1
Jordanian Feminism and Gender Mainstreaming .......................................................2
Chapter 2: Literature Review ..............................................................................................5
State Feminism and Gender Mainstreaming ...............................................................6
Setting the Standards of Gender Mainstreaming .......................................................9
Women's Rights and Policies in Jordan ...................................................................14
Conclusion ...............................................................................................................20
Chapter 3: Jordanian State Feminism...............................................................................23
Gender and Nationalism ...........................................................................................24
Nationalizing Gender ...............................................................................................29
Nationalized Labor and Women's Policies ...................................................29
Islamic Women's Mobilizations ...................................................................34
International Feminism .............................................................................................37
The Golden Years of Jordanian Feminism ...................................................37
The Jordanian National Commission for Women ........................................38
Conclusion ................................................................................................................41
Chapter 4: The Evolution of Gender Mainstreaming ........................................................43
Gender at Work Analytical Framework ....................................................................44
The First National Strategy for Women in Jordan, 1992-2006 ................................46
The Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW) ..........................46
ix
JNCW and the Beijing Platform ..................................................................47
Quadrant One -- Consciousness and Awareness .........................................50
Quadrant Two -- Rescources for Equality and Justice ................................51
Quadrant Three -- Formal Policies, Laws, and Institutional
Arrangements .........................................................................................53
Quadrant Four -- Informal Norms and Deep Structures ..............................54
Reception and Impact of the First National Strategy for Women in
Jordan .....................................................................................................55
A New National Strategy Women's Strategy, 2006-2010 ........................................57
Quadrant One -- Consciousness and Awareness .........................................58
Quadrant Two -- Rescources for Equality and Justice ................................59
Quadrant Three -- Formal Policies, Laws, and Institutional
Arrangements .........................................................................................60
Quadrant Four -- Informal Norms and Deep Structures ..............................60
Reception and Impact of the Second National Strategy for Women in
Jordan .....................................................................................................61
The National Strategy for Women, 2013-2017 .......................................................64
Quadrant One -- Consciousness and Awareness .........................................65
Quadrant Two -- Rescources for Equality and Justice ................................66
Quadrant Three -- Formal Policies, Laws, and Institutional
Arrangements .........................................................................................66
Quadrant Four -- Informal Norms and Deep Structures ..............................67
Reception and Impact of the Current National Strategy for Women ..........68
Conclusion ................................................................................................................70
Chapter 5: Conclusion ......................................................................................................73
Influence of International Agreements and Donors .................................................74
x
Lack of Funding and Economic Rescources .............................................................75
The Monarchy's Relationship with Women's Right's Activists ................................77
Political Oppositon from Conservative Groups ........................................................78
Entrenched Gender Norms in Households ................................................................78
Where Does Gender Mainstreaming in Jordan Go From Here? ..............................80
Appendix ............................................................................................................................81
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................83
xi
List of Tables
Table 1: Sustainable Development Goal 5: Achieve Gender Equality and
Empower All Women and Girls ....................................................................81
xii
List of Figures
Figure 1: Gender at Work Framework, Rao, A., Sandler, J., Kelleher, D., Miller,
C. (2016). Gender at Work ...........................................................................46
1
Chapter 1: Introduction
This September marks the 25th anniversary of the Beijing Platform for Action which
has been the blueprint for international women’s rights advancement. In September 1995,
after two weeks for intense debate, 189 countries signed onto the Beijing Platform which
mandated gender mainstreaming as the strategic approach for achieving women’s
empowerment at all levels of development. Along with the United Nations entities, the
international development community, and civil society actors, UN member states also
committed to “promote[ing] an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender
perspective.”1 The strategy of mainstreaming a gender perspective in national policies
quickly became referred to as gender mainstreaming. In 1997, the concept of gender
mainstreaming was defined as:
Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for
women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs,
in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's
concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation,
monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and
societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not
perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.2
Over the last 25 years, the language of gender mainstreaming has become
ubiquitous in national and international development policies. However, the
implementation and observation of results has been inconsistent. Countries have
implemented gender mainstreaming in a variety of ways and have defined its success or
limitations in many ways. In this paper, I hope to add to the literature on gender
1UN Economic and Social Council. “Gender Mainstreaming.” Report Of the Economic And Social Council
For 1997. September 1997. 2Ibid
2
mainstreaming by giving a case study on its implementation in Jordan since 1992. Instead
of narrowly looking at how gender mainstreaming has been implemented, I will be looking
at how it has shaped the women’s rights debates and outcomes in Jordan in the last 25
years. Gender mainstreaming is not just an isolated set of technical practices. How
countries choose to implement gender mainstreaming is intimately tied to the way that the
regime and society values men and women. The type and framing of gender sensitive
policies is critical to how transformational gender mainstreaming will be. In order to
understand how gender mainstreaming is framed and implemented, it is important to
understand the country-specific context of women’s rights and activism.
Gender mainstreaming policies cannot simply be transplanted from one country to
another. States have responded to this expansive role with a variety of programs and
strategies of gender mainstreaming to promote gender equality. Due to the proliferation of
gender mainstreaming strategies and the specific needs of each society, comparing results
and measuring the effectiveness of gender mainstreaming policies is a challenge. In
addition, it is difficult to parse out gender mainstreaming strategies from other gender
equality strategies such as broad equal treatment laws that do not specifically target
women. Individual and regional case studies are the most common method for
understanding a state’s gender mainstreaming policies.
JORDANIAN FEMINISM AND GENDER MAINSTREAMING
In 1955, the Jordanian Women’s Alliance led the first national women’s movement
for political rights under the banner, “Equal rights – Equal responsibilities.”3 Over the last
sixty-five years, Jordanian women have won the right to vote, run for parliament, inherit
3 Lowrance, Sherry R., “After Beijing: Political Liberalization and the Women's Movement in Jordan,”
Middle Eastern Studies 34, no. 3 (June 1998): 90.
3
property, pursue higher education, and equal pay for equal work. Under the leadership of
the Hashemite Royal family, women’s empowerment has also become a national
development priority. Yet, Jordan still has one of the highest gaps between men and
women’s economic outcomes. Out of 152 countries in the 2020 Global Gender Gap Report,
Jordan ranks at 145 for equal women’s economic opportunity and participation. Women’s
incomes are only 20 percent of men’s incomes.4 Jordanian women’s education
achievements and human development scores match or exceed men’s achievements.
International reports consistently report an inverted relationship between women’s
education and health scores and their economic participation. This “puzzle” or “gender
paradox” is a consistent theme in the literature on Jordan as well as the other Arab states.5
Proposed solutions to this puzzle generally address cultural and market barriers to women’s
labor force participation. The actor responsible for addressing those barriers has
increasingly become the Jordanian government. The state’s role in promoting gender
equality spans from addressing formal rules and policies to informal social norms and
perceptions. In addition, states are responsible for addressing structural barriers to
resources and opportunities as well as individual’s barriers to reaching their full capacities.
Previous case studies on gender mainstreaming in Jordan have only addressed their
current national strategies or have only focused on one aspect of gender mainstreaming. In
this case study on Jordan, I will provide an in-depth case study on the evolution of Jordan’s
4 World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2020, (Geneva, 2019),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf 5 Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, “Jordan Country Gender Assessment: Economic Participation, Agency
and Access to Justice in Jordan,” Amman (2013),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/503361468038992583/text/ACS51580WP0P130ox0379850B0
0PUBLIC0.txt
World Bank, Opening Doors : Gender Equality and Development in the Middle East and North
Africa. MENA Development Report;. (Washington, DC., 2013),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/12552.”
4
gender mainstreaming strategies and their whole of government approach. A longitudinal
analysis of Jordan’s women’s policies pre-Beijing platform and their gender
mainstreaming strategies since then offers a more complete picture of how their strategies
have been negotiated and evolved over time. The Jordanian government’s women’s
policies have been shaped by their relationships with domestic coalitions of women as well
as nationalist and Muslim political groups. In addition to domestic pressures, Jordan’s
women’s policies have been cut back due to regional economic and political instability.
The language and strategies in Jordan’s policies also reflect changes in international gender
mainstreaming standards and expectations. Jordan’s current gender mainstreaming policies
have emerged out of the government’s continued efforts to maintain stability amidst a
divided society, regional instability, and international donor pressure.
In the first chapter I discuss the Jordanian government’s early women’s policies
and their interactions with women’s organizations. The Hashemite Royal family
involvement in women’s organizations and their relationship with political parties have a
major role in how Jordan’s gender mainstreaming policies and its mechanism, the
Jordanian National Women’s Committee (JNCW), was formed. This chapter frames
Jordan’s response to the UN Women’s conferences during the 1970’s-1990’s which
culminated in the Beijing Conference. The second chapter discusses Jordan’s participation
in the Beijing Platform for Action and the three national women’s strategies that came out
of this agreement. Each of the national gender mainstreaming strategies are analyzed using
the Gender at Work Framework to understand how they address different barrier to change.
The conclusion discusses the main themes that emerged across each of these strategies and
gives a vision for how gender mainstreaming can move forward in the next 25 years.
5
Chapter 2: Literature Review
This September 2020 marks the 25th anniversary of the Beijing Platform for Action
which has been the blueprint for international women’s rights advancement. In September
1995, after two weeks for intense debate, 189 countries, including Jordan, signed onto the
Beijing Platform which mandated gender mainstreaming as the strategic approach for
achieving women’s empowerment at all levels of development. Along with the United
Nations entities, the international development community, and civil society actors, UN
member states also committed to “promote[ing] an active and visible policy of
mainstreaming a gender perspective.”6 The strategy of mainstreaming a gender perspective
in national policies quickly became referred to as gender mainstreaming. In 1997, the
concept of gender mainstreaming was defined as:
Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications
for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or
programs, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well
as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all
political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally
and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.7
Over the last 25 years, the language of gender mainstreaming has become
ubiquitous in national and international development policies. However, the
implementation and observation of results has been inconsistent and poor. Countries have
implemented gender mainstreaming in a variety of ways and have defined its success or
limitations in many ways. In this paper, I hope to add to the literature on gender
6 UN Economic and Social Council, “Gender Mainstreaming,” in Report Of the Economic And Social
Council For 1997. (Geneva: The United Nations, 1997),
https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/GMS.PDF 7 Ibid
6
mainstreaming by giving a case study on its implementation in Jordan. Instead of narrowly
looking at how gender mainstreaming has been implemented, I will be looking at how it
has shaped the women’s rights debates and outcomes in Jordan in the last 25 years. Gender
mainstreaming is not just an isolated set of technical practices. How countries choose to
implement gender mainstreaming is intimately tied to the way that the regime and society
values women. The type and framing of gender sensitive policies is critical to how
transformational gender mainstreaming will be.
STATE FEMINISM AND GENDER MAINSTREAMING
A central pillar of the UN’s gender mainstreaming policy is state’s adopting a
gender lens to analyzing all programs, policies, and legislation. This definition stands out
for its ambitious goals as well as the central role that it gives the state in integrating
women’s interests in the policies at every level of government. Although states have a long
history of using policies and legislation to address women’s issues and concerns, the view
of the state as the central space for gender policy is a relatively recent and important shift
in women and gender policies. It is also important to separate the concept of state feminism
from the existence of women’s national agencies. In the early nineteenth century, several
national women’s policy agencies, primarily in Western countries, were established to
address women’s issues and conditions with a focus on employment.8 It was not until 1975
during the UN Women’s Conference in Mexico City that delegates agree that all
governments should have agencies dedicated to promoting gender equality as well as the
8 Dorothy E. McBride, and Amy G. Mazur, “Women’s Policy Agencies and State Feminism,” in The
Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics, ed. Georgina Waylen, (Oxford University Press, 2013).
https://search.lib.utexas.edu/permalink/01UTAU_INST/1ilchdf/alma991057928369606011
7
status and conditions of women.9 Out of this conferenced emerged the concept of “national
machineries” for promoting gender equality. Two decades later that idea would be central
to the Beijing platform’s call for gender mainstreaming. However, the promotion of
national women’s agencies did not always agree with feminist theories and researchers’
ideas of the state’s role in promoting gender equality.
In Frances Hasso’s work on state feminism in the Middle East, she has described
the dynamic between feminists and the state as a “devil’s bargain.”10 In exchange for states’
power to redefine gendered and inequitable power relations, individuals give states
authority over their intimate domains. This new authority gives states the power to regulate
individual’s religious, sexual, and reproductive rights. Since Muslim states have begun
following the Western model of state feminism, liberal secular as well as conservative
activists have pushed back against their policies. In 2017, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi
called for an ending of verbal divorces, talaq, to stem the rising trends of divorce. Sisi
framed it as the solution for supporting divorced women who are left with the burden of
caring for their children alone.11 Scholars at Al-Azhar University, known for its
conservative views on Sunni Islam, pushed back against this statement by accusing him of
directly contradicting Sharia. Liberal feminist activists argued that instead of ending talaq,
the government should lower barriers to women-initiated divorce.12 Both conservative
Muslim scholars and liberal secular activists saw the repeal of talaq as the state infringing
9 Jacqui True, and Michael Mintrom, “Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender
Mainstreaming,” International Studies Quarterly 45, no.1 (March 2001): 30. https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-
8833.00181 10 Frances Susan, Hasso, Consuming Desires : Family Crisis and the State in the Middle East. (Stanford,
Calif: Stanford University Press, 2011). 11 Lolwa Reda, “On Marriage and Divorce in Egypt,” Egypt Today. February 21, 2019,
https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/6/66379/On-Marriage-and-Divorce-in-Egypt 12 Ahmed Al-Bahady, “Text of the Senior Scholars' Statement on Talaq,” Egypt Today, May 5, 2017, https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/1084514
8
on individual’s rights and intimate lives. For conservatives, it infringed on their religious
rights. For secular liberals it was a matter of ensuring that the state did not limit women
from the same rights as men. Although Muslim states implement different gender policies
than non-Muslim states, they face similar backlash from conservative, religious, and
secular groups for trying to control individual citizen’s individual spaces. The state’s
increasing involvement in citizen’s lives and restructuring of gender dynamics reflects
changes in the feminist movement’s views during the second wave of feminism.
The idea of state feminism first emerged in the early 1980s in reaction to the first
wave of feminism in Western Europe and North America. Feminist activists and theorists
during the second wave of feminism blamed the state for the lack of change in gender
power dynamics.13 A prominent feminist theorist at this time, Catharine MacKinnon,
argued in Towards a Feminist Theory of the State that the state was in its essence male.
MacKinnon held that the law, the foundation of the modern state, “sees and treats women
the way men see and treat women. The liberal state coercively and authoritatively
constitutes the social order in the interests of men as a gender—through its legitimating
norms, forms, relation to society, and substantive policies.”14 MacKinnon’s radical views
of the state portrayed it as a monolithic institution that was inseparable from the patriarchy.
In this view, empowering women and reaching gender equality must come from the work
of individual feminist activists and groups working outside the state structures and
institutions.15
13 A. Mazur, and D. McBride, “State Feminism since the 1980s: From Loose Notion to Operationalized
Concept,” Politics & Gender 3, no.4 (2007): 501-513. doi:10.1017/S1743923X07000359 14 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1989). 15 Dorothy E McBride, and Amy G. Mazur, “Women’s Policy Agencies and State Feminism.” The Oxford
Handbook of Gender and Politics, (Oxford University Press, 2013),
http://oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199751457.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199751457-
e-26.
9
In contrast to this monolithic view of the state, Australian and Nordic feminist
theorist began to take a more differentiated view of the state as a neutral and potentially
positive instrument for social change and gender equality. Helga Hernes coined the term
“state feminism” in 1987 to describe “the variety of public policies and organizational
measures, designed partly to solve general social and economic problems, partly to respond
to women’s demands.”16 In the Nordic research they focused on the interactions between
individual feminists within and outside the state and their impact on feminist policies as
well as separate government agencies abilities to promote gender equality. Although this
concept of state feminist was still rough, it is still part of our current understandings of state
feminism.17 Australian theorists built upon those Nordic concepts and argue that feminists
could not only interact with the state, but operate within arenas of the state in order to
transform the state’s patriarchal process and policies. The Australian and Nordic scholar’s
work shifted feminist researchers’ views of the state to becoming more favorable and as an
important mechanism for feminist action. These feminists’ ideas of transforming gender
power dynamics throughout the state, not just in separate agencies or dedicated “national
machineries”, had a large impact on international policy makers who began to take more
expansive approaches to gender equality.
SETTING THE STANDARDS OF GENDER MAINSTREAMING
The Nordic and Australian feminist theorists’ work on state feminism that emerged
in the 1990’s and coincided with international policy makers views on government
women’s agencies. A growing interest in women’s policy agencies and process led to a
16 Helga Hernes. Welfare State and Woman Power: Essays in State Feminism. (Oslo: Norwegian
University Press, 1987). 17 A. Mazur, and D. McBride, 505.
10
flurry of international comparative research on women’s policies and the UN women’s
policy conferences. The International Women’s Policy Conferences mobilized feminists
and international development researches around the issues of state feminism. The focus
of these United Nation (UN) conferences was on the states’ women’s policy agencies and
the individual states’ responsibilities to oversee feminist policies.18 This idea was
articulated in the fourth UN World Conference on Women in Beijing with the Beijing
Platform for action. At the conference 189 countries committed to achieving women’s
empowerment and gender equality through “mainstreaming a gender perspective” in the
planning of their policies, legislation, and process.19 Rather than have separate agencies
responsible for women’s conditions and equality, a gender equality approach would be
applied to all policies at every level of government. Although these is some variation in the
definition of gender mainstreaming, the most accepted definition is the one previously
given from the UN Economic and Social Council.
In the definition of gender mainstreaming, it states that the “ultimate goal is to
achieve gender equality.”20 Gender equality is defined by the UN as:
The concept that all human beings, both women and men, are free to
develop their personal abilities and make choices without the limitations
set by stereotypes, rigid gender roles or prejudices. Gender equality means
that the different behaviors, aspirations and needs of women and men are
considered, valued and favored equally.21
18 Ibid 19 UN Economic and Social Council, 2. 20 Ibid 21 UN Women, UN Gender Mainstreaming in Development Program, 2014, (New York: United Nations
Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, 2015). https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-
library/publications/2015/02/gender-mainstreaming-issues
11
Gender equality is the central purpose of gender mainstreaming as well as a stand
along UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) with its own goals and programs.
According to the SDG Global Indicator framework adopted in 2016, progress toward
achieving gender equality is evaluated according to nine targets with fourteen indicators
that accompany them. These targets (provided in Appendix 1) address social, economic,
political, and cultural barriers to gender equality at the local and systemic levels. Gender
mainstreaming is explicitly included in the SDG’s gender equality targets by stating the
need to “adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion
of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels,” which is
measured by the proportion of countries with “systems to track and make public allocations
for gender equality and women’s empowerment.”22 The SDGs do not give a narrow
definition for what those systems, policies, and legislation should compose of. This
intentional ambiguity reflects the UN and international development community’s lack of
consensus on what types of characteristics are essential to gender mainstreaming policies.
Over the twenty-five years since the Beijing platform, activists, researchers, policy
makers have assembled a number of approaches, tools, and best practices for implementing
gender mainstreaming. In a survey of international development organizations, states, bi-
lateral donors, international financial institutions, and NGOs.23 Caroline Moser and
Annalise Moser found that the majority of gender mainstreaming policies at international
organizations shared six key characteristics: “A dual strategy of mainstreaming gender
combined with targeted actions for gender equality; gender analysis; a combined approach
to responsibilities, where all staff share responsibility, but are supported by gender
22 The United Nations, “Sustainable Development Goal 5: Achieve Gender Equality and Empower All
Women and Girls,” Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform, January 21, 2020,
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg5 23 A non-governmental organization that can be either international, multinational, or domestic.
12
specialists; gender training; and support to women's decision making and empowerment.”24
These six broad characteristics of gender mainstreaming policies show the adoption of
flexible approaches to reach the goal of gender equality. However, broad interpretations of
gender mainstreaming policies have made them difficult to implement, understand, or
compare outcomes across countries and programs.
Flexibility is both the biggest obstacle for implementing gender mainstreaming
principles as well as one of its greatest advantages. The lack of a one-size fits all approach
makes it easy for organizations and governments to adopt the policies to suit their needs.
This flexibility was critical in gathering international support for agreements or treaties like
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). Today, there are 99 states that are signatories to the convention. But, of those
99 countries 48 have made reservations to parts of the treaties. Many of the majority
Muslim countries have made reservations to articles of CEDAW that are viewed as
incompatible with Sharia.25 The reservations to CEDAW gave many countries the
flexibility to ratify it even though it would be politically unpopular with their citizens. Yet,
the reservations also allow some countries to play by a different set of expectations from
the other countries. Some countries have gradually removed their reservations to CEDAW.
The ratification of CEDAW set the bar for global norms on gender policies. However, it is
also an example of how weakly enforced treaties that allow reservations can perpetuate
discrimination and inequality.
24 Caroline Moser and Annalise Moser, “Gender mainstreaming since Beijing: A review of success and
limitations in international institutions,” Gender & Development 13, no. 2, (2005): 11-
22, DOI: 10.1080/13552070512331332283 25 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Signed at New York 18
December 1979 (No. 20378), United Nations Treaty Series 1249 (1981): 13.
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&clang=_en
13
The diversity of gender inclusive policies also makes it difficult to compare
mainstreaming strategies and measure results across countries. The malleability of gender
mainstreaming and its use has also created confusion among stakeholders as to how it
should be implemented in practice. In interviews with gender mainstreaming stakeholders
in the Sweden, the majority of respondents stated that gender mainstreaming was “essential
for democracy and any type of social justice.” But, that the policy was “hard to
communicate”, “not successful”, “problematic in practice”, and that they were “skeptical
that it is the only strategy for achieving equality.”26 Their responses show another key
characteristic of gender mainstreaming. Despite broad recognition for the need for gender
mainstreaming policies, stakeholders still have deep skepticism in gender mainstreaming’s
implementation and success.
In response to the need for further clarity and direction in gender mainstreaming
policies, the UN and international development academics have sought to give more
guidance and clarity to implementation of gender mainstreaming policies. In 2014, UN
Women published a guidance note for countries to apply the policy in their development
programs. The guidance note advocated for multiple, complementary strategies for gender
mainstreaming that combines long-term integration of gender perspectives in policy
making with shorter-term gender-targeted approaches.27 Collecting quality gender
disaggregated information and conducting gender analysis is the foundation for the multi-
track gender mainstreaming strategy they advocate. In addition to analytical tools, the
guidebook also advocates for building domestic coalitions with gender equality experts and
advocates across government sectors and in civil society. The UN’s guidance on gender
26 Joan Eveline, and Carol Bacchi, “What Are We Mainstreaming When We Mainstream
Gender?” International Feminist Journal of Politics 7, no. 4 (2005): 496-
512, DOI: 10.1080/14616740500284417 27 UN Gender Mainstreaming in Development Practices, 17.
14
mainstreaming is ambitious in its call for cross-sectoral gender equality analysis and
monitoring. However, like many other gender mainstreaming strategies, the guidance note
leaves considerable room for each country to develop their own interpretations and ways
of applying gender mainstreaming policies, hence this is one major point that affects a
practical change for women to benefit from it.
Despite the lack of a unitary model for gender mainstreaming, there is strong global
consensus behind idea of the state feminism. Questions of women’s empowerment and
gender equality are still hotly debated and contested by feminist scholars and activists. But
the state has taken on a much larger role in the determining gender equality and women’s
empowerment systems. International organization’s focus on the state as the primary actor
for advocating for and encouraging gender equality through policies and legislation is still
a highly contested question. After twenty-five years of mixed results in gender
mainstreaming polices, many scholars, policy makers, and advocates question the ability
of the state to create transformative gender power relations in society.
WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND POLICIES IN JORDAN
In the last several decades, international agreements have had a major impact on
women’s activism and gender equality efforts in the Middle East North Africa. However,
each country’s political, social, and historic contexts play an important role in the ways
that gender mainstreaming policies are adopted and integrated into the country’s laws and
programs. Women’s statuses and relationships with the state in Jordan are strongly tied to
their rights expressed in the constitution and legal codes. The ways women have been
represented and granted rights in Jordan’s laws also follows the historic debates on women
in society and gender equality. Modern Jordanian legal development has gone through
three important phases – the codification of Sharia (Islamic law) under the Ottoman
15
Empire, national codification, and family law reform movements. Each of these phases
played an important role in how women’s rights and advocacy developed in the country.
This survey of Jordan’s legal codification and women’s rights reform gives the historical
and political context for the interpretation and adoption of gender mainstreaming practices
today.
Today, very few Islamic countries still apply pure Sharia. However, principles of
Sharia continue to be a central tenant of the legal systems across the Arab world, as well
as a number of Muslim majority nations that have secular laws. While many Muslim
countries adopted secular civil, commercial, and criminal laws early nineteenth century,
laws governing the family, also referred to as personal status laws or Milli laws, remained
independent of the government control late into the nineteenth century. The Muslim,
Christian, and Jewish religious establishments kept their own court systems that newly
independent Muslim states gradually nationalized into state family courts.28 Nationalized
family law courts retained patriarchal interpretations of Sharia, Christian, and Jewish that
became implemented by regimes driven by the desire to create gendered national
identities.29 Due to this, family courts across the Middle East and North Africa have become
the primary area of attention for women’s and human rights activists.
Prior to the Ottoman codification of law in 1829, Sharia was governed by different
legal schools with their own traditions of legal interpretation that was carried out by
individual jurists. Sharia was applied to each legal case according to the jurist’s
28 Nathan J. Brown, The Rule of Law in the Arab World : Courts in Egypt and the Gulf, Cambridge Middle East Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 257,
http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=54474&site=eh
ost-live. 29 Frances S. Hasso, “Bargaining with the Devil: States and Intimate Life,” Journal of Middle East
Women's Studies 10, no. 2 (July 2014): 107–134,
doi: https://doiorg.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/10.2979/jmiddeastwomstud.10.2.107
16
interpretation from their various Islamic legal schools they adhered to. The lack of legal
codification gave the jurists freedom to consider the individual aspects of each case.
However, it also meant that there was inconsistency with the laws application and made it
difficult for states to govern and regulate their citizen’s personal, commercial, and public
behaviors.30 The Ottoman Empire’s codification of Sharia into the Majalla, a multi-volume
compendium of laws, in 1869 marked a pivotal moment in Middle Eastern and North
African history. In order to govern the increasing complexity of their empire, the Ottoman
authorities borrowed aspects of French commercial and penal codes to create a modern,
Islamic legal code.31 Although there were aspects of European law in the Majalla, the legal
code itself was written and assembled by top Sharia legal scholars from within the Sunni
Hanafi School of Law and retained many characteristics of that legal school.
As a part of the greater Syrian province of the Ottoman Empire from the fourteenth
century until the end of World War I, the Majalla was Jordan’s first codified law.32 The
Majalla efforts to modernize Sharia pitted it against many traditional legal practices that
local jurists had applied.33 The narrative of Arab leaders implementing top-down legal
modernization with Western influence still dominates in anti-reform debates that call for a
return to traditional Sharia. The persistence of honor killing laws in Jordan today is an
example of how women’s statuses are still shaped by the Ottoman codification of Sharia
and their methods of borrowing aspects of the European penal codes. Without the
30 L. Welchman, Women and Muslim Family Laws in Arab States: A Comparative Overview of Textual
Development and Advocacy. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007): 20 31 Samy Ayoub, “The Mecelle, Sharia, and the Ottoman State: Fashioning and Refashioning of Islamic
Law in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association
2, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 121-146. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/jottturstuass.2.1.121 32 Ferris K. Neshwiwat, "Honor Crimes in Jordan: Their Treatment under Islamic and Jordanian Criminal
Laws," Penn State International Law Review 23, no. 2 (2004). http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol23/iss2/2 33 Ayoub, 30.
17
integration of those laws into Jordan’s legal system, honor killings would not have been
legally protected by the government.
The origins of current honor killing laws are in Majalla’s exceptions for crimes of
passion, which does not have a Qur’anic source, but has a tribal and cultural strong hold.
Article 188 and from Ottoman criminal code was directly borrowed from French laws
protecting men who kill or injure their wife or female relatives for committing sexual
crimes. The article states that:
He who has seen his wife or any of his female unlawful with another in a
state of ugly adultery and then beat, injured, or killed one or both of them
will be exempt from penalty. And he who has seen his wife or one of his
female unlawful with another in an unlawful bed and then beat, injured or
killed one or both of them, will be excused.34
In the second phase of legal development after World War I, greater Syria was
divided into Transjordan, Syria, and Lebanon under the British and French mandates.
Jordan’s first national legal code in 1936 kept the laws protecting crimes of passion and a
slightly adapted working of the Majalla’s Article 188 in the Jordanian Penal Code’s Article
340 that states:
1. He who surprises his wife, or one of his female relatives committing
adultery with somebody and kills, wounds, or injures one or both of them
shall be exempt from penalty.
2. He who surprises his wife, or one of his female ascendants or
descendants or sisters with another man in an unlawful bed, and he kills,
wounds or injures one or both of them, shall be eligible for a reduction in
penalty.35
34 Lama Abu-Odeh, “Crimes of Honour and the Construction of Gender in Arab Societies,” Feminism and
Islam: Legal and Literary Perspectives 141, no. 157 (1996): 34.
35 Neshwiwat, 45.
18
In 2001, the newly crowned King Abdullah II passed a temporary law amending
Article 340 while the lower house of Parliament was suspended. The amendment included
gender neutral language which stated that husbands and wives could no longer be
exonerated for murdering unfaithful wives and husbands. But, that their spouse’s fidelity
could be considered as a mitigating circumstance when determining the guilty party’s
punishment.36 This temporary law was passed into permanent law by the upper house, but
later repealed by the lower house of Parliament when it was in session. In response to
several accusation from human rights advocates, the Jordanian officials have defended the
laws by stating that “a crime considered in some parts of the world to be a crime of passion
was deemed an honor killing in other parts…the perpetrators of honor killings did not
remain unpunished in Jordan, even if some sentences were reduced in certain
circumstances.”37 The Jordanian spokesperson is not incorrect. Other countries in Europe,
North America and East Asian have also conceptualized honor killings as crimes as passion
to reduce punishment sentences.38
In addition to the honor killing laws, the Ottoman legal system’s enduring influence
on Jordanian laws can be seen in the Ottoman millet (Turkish nation) system that
established separate family, or personal status, courts for Muslims, Jews, and Christians.
Muslims personal status laws are tried in special Sharia courts that are separate from civil
courts.39 Family courts which have jurisdiction over inheritance, divorce, marriage, and
custody are the focus of Jordanian women’s rights activism and gender equality reforms.
36 Kathleen Peratis, “Honoring the Killers: Justice Denied for ‘Honor’ Crimes in Jordan.” Human Rights
Watch. April 24, 2004. https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/04/19/honoring-killers/justice-denied-honor-
crimes-jordan 37 Katya Luopajärvi, “Honour Killings as Human Rights Violations,” Institute for Human Rights (Åbo
Akademi University, Finland, 2004): 34-35.
http://www.abo.fi/instut/imr/norfa/Katja%20Luopa%20honour%20killings.pdf 38 Ibid. 39 Welchman, 20.
19
Article 6 of the Jordanian constitution in 1952 gives all Jordanians equality before
the law. However, this guarantee is not upheld in numerous legal codes and policies that
discriminate against women. The discrepancy between the constitution and the legal codes
has never been resolved due to the lack of a constitutional court to resolve the issue.40 In
the Jordanian legal system women are discriminated against in both the codified laws as
well as the court system. In the Jordanian Nationality Law, only Jordanian men can pass
citizenship and the benefits of being a national to their children. Similar to many countries
in the region, Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians may keep their citizenship, but
they cannot pass it to their children. This law is defended as a way to discourage women
from marrying outside their tribes, regions, religions, or nationalities.
A central tension in Jordanian women’s rights is between women’s autonomy and
their familial obligations. The law gives women the freedom to choose their own
physicians, make health care appointments, and aspects of their health care. However,
according to customs, women, especially if they are unmarried, will only attend doctor’s
appointments if they are accompanied.41 Women may get their own health insurance
through their employment. But, due to the low employment among women, most rely on
their father’s or husband’s insurance. In addition to these social restrictions, abortion is
illegal, except in circumstances where it is necessary to preserve the mother’s life. Social
restrictions, and the lack of access to legal abortions limit Jordanian women’s freedoms
over their own bodies.
The Jordanian constitution grants men and women equality, but women’s legal
statuses are undermined in civil and family law in multiple ways. In the civil courts, women
40 Rana Husseini, “Jordan” in Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa, ed. Sanja Kelly and
Julia Breslin (Freedom House: New York): 196. 41 Ibid.
20
can serve as judges, lawyers, defendants and witnesses. However, in the family courts, the
testimony of who women is required to equal that of one man. In addition, Jordan’s
guardianship system grants male relatives the authority to act on behalf of minors or any
other person with limited legal capacities. Unmarried women under the age of 40 are
considered under the guardianship of their closest male relative and can lose any financial
support if they rebel against their guardians. Jordan’s official marriage age is 18 for men
and women. However, judges can grant permission for girls as young as 15 if it is deemed
in their best interest. Women are entitled to make stipulations in their marriage contracts;
however, it is not a common practice in lower- or middle-class families. Because religious
is passed down through the father, Muslim women are not permitted to marry non-Muslims
unless he converts to Islam at the time of marriage. These laws are only a sample of all the
Jordanian laws that systematically undermine women’s legal and social statuses against
women.42
CONCLUSION
Jordanian women face many barriers to equality with men and independence.
However, Jordanian women are not passive victims of the law. Jordan has a long history
of feminist movements and women’s groups that have been active politically. The
Jordanian Women’s Union was established in 1945 and was influential in pushing for
women’s suffrage which they gained in 1955.43 Jordanian women’s activism has had
periods of success followed by serious setbacks. But, feminist debates and women’s rights
have played a central role in the country and region’s political discourse. After
independence many of the Arab country’s national identities began to coalesce and become
42 Ibid. 43 Ibid.
21
contested. Women’s rights, reform, and empowerment debates in the region became
proxies for social conflict over who has the authority to define a nation’s identity and
religious orthodoxy. The newly created national governments, the religious establishments,
and nationalist political parties each tried to influence society though women’s bodies,
roles in society, and legal rights. The current rights Jordanian women have over their
bodies, work, and independence that were discussed previously in this section are the
results of decades of international and domestic pressure from women’s rights activists.
The first chapter discusses how Jordanian women’s groups began to engage politically and
negotiate with the government for further rights and liberties.
Although women’s rights advocates in Jordan today have more tools at their
disposal though the internet and social media. The dynamic of the debate over women’s
roles in society and gender equality have not changed little since the 1950’s when the
country became independent. The state and religious authorities continue to dominate the
conversations on women’s empowerment while secular groups are seen as Western
puppets. Increasing international influence on Jordanian society and politics has only
intensified the debates and raised their importance for the future of the country.
In order to understand how gender mainstreaming is framed and implemented, it is
important to understand the country-specific context of women’s rights and activism.
Ignoring the political, historic, and cultural context of women’s rights limits the impact of
international development policies for women’s empowerment. Understanding the
translation and instrumentalization of international development policies in Jordan is
critical to the relevance, sustainability, and impact of gender policies in the region more
broadly. Although each country in the Arab world has unique political, social, and
economic histories, the conversations on women’s rights, empowerment, and gender
equality are interconnected. Shifting the power dynamics between genders is not only a
22
social change, it is a political change as well. The Arab monarchies and semi-authoritarian
countries rely on a patrimonial system with strong male dominated militaries. Including
women equally in the countries’ political, economic, and social spheres would destabilize
the delicate political balances in each of the countries. As Hillary Clinton famously stated
at the Beijing Conference, “Women’s rights are human rights.” Arab feminist activists are
not only fighting for more open, inclusive societies for women, but also for the rest of
society. In a region with limited democratic reforms, women’s rights are a volatile issue
that the state must monitor to maintain the political and social equilibrium. Gender
mainstreaming policies should continue to be implemented according to their country-
specific contexts, but they cannot be fully understood without the regional context of
human rights.
23
Chapter 3: Jordanian State Feminism
Like feminists across the world, Jordanian feminists still face the fundamental
question of what the role of the state should have in promoting and advocating for women’s
equality and empowerment. Underlying liberal ideas of state feminism and gender
mainstreaming is the assumption, or hope, that the state will have a level of autonomy from
the patriarchy. With that separation and autonomy, the state can take responsibility for
advocating women’s interests and can intervene on behalf of women against men’s misuse
of power in personal as well as public spaces.44 This underlying theory for state feminism
expands the state’s authority to intervene in its citizen’s lives and to shape gender roles in
society. Many feminists globally have raised the concern that states will co-opt gender
equality agendas with their own policies and soften gender empowerment’s radical edges.
However, states are not monolithic. Within the fractured terrain of the Jordanian
government women’s activists and feminists have to navigate different agendas and engage
in complex negotiations and bargains. The question of whether the Jordanian state can
represent, and advance women’s interests is contingent on internal and external state
accountability that requires civil society participation in gender mainstreaming policies.
Given the slow and disjointed progress towards democratic governance and women’s
political inclusion, understanding the current internal and external accountability over
Jordanian gender policies is more critical than ever. In order to understand current
accountability mechanism, it is important to understand the history of how the state and
44 Shirin Rai, “Institutional Mechanism for the Advancement of Women: Mainstreaming women,
democratizing the state?” In Mainstreaming Gender, Democratizing the State: Institutional Mechanisms for
the Advancement of Women. Ed. Shirin Rai. (United Nations. Manchester, UK, 2018):16.
24
feminist women’s rights advocates have negotiated their current positions, understood their
roles, and strategically advanced the agenda of women’s rights.
The development of state feminism in Jordan can be broken up into three phases.
The first phase of women’s activism from the 1940’s- 1957 was sparked by nationalist
movements and the Arab-Israeli war and driven by concerns over political representation.
During the second phase from 1957-1989 the political shutdown limited women’s
organizations but the government began targeting women’s issues in labor policies that
gave women the opportunities to work outside the home. During this phase, women in the
Muslim Brotherhood also began to use their religious and charitable work as a platform to
become publicly active politically. In the current phase, third phase, began in 1989,
political groups and activism is once again permitted. However, the Royal Family and
semi-government agencies control the agenda for women’s rights and independent
women’s activist groups have made slow progress in pushing for more radical policies.
GENDER AND NATIONALISM
Prior to the influence of state feminism, the Jordanian government preferred to
indirectly intervene into citizens’ private lives through the personal status laws that were
administered by religious courts. With a majority Sunni Muslim population, the jurists in
the Sharia courts held the most powerful role in interpreting and applying religious and
government laws concerning women and gender roles in society.45 As a wave of nationalist
movements spread from Egypt to the rest of the region, Jordanian women’s roles in society
and politics began to change. National women’s movements and organizations formed to
45 Welchman, L. Women and Muslim Family Laws in Arab States: a Comparative Overview of Textual
Development and Advocacy. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007): 13
25
demand suffrage and legal reform. Although those movements were cut off by conflicts
and political crackdowns, they formed the foundation and model for future women’s
political action in Jordan. A distinguishing characteristic of women’s activism in Jordan is
the Hashemite Royal Family’s heavy engagement and the absence of women’s interests in
the dominant political groups. A second important characteristic of women’s policy in
Jordan until the Beijing Platform in 1995 was its focus on women’s labor participation.
When the British Empire gave the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan its
independence in 1946 there were no state elementary or secondary schools for women in
the primarily rural country. Families that could afford private elementary schooling for
their daughters had to send them overseas for secondary education.46 Women’s
organizations and public involvement centered around religious and social work. During
the 1940’s several women’s charitable were established and primarily focused on
improving motherhood education and childcare. Many of these organization were
patronized by the Royal family or women from wealthy Jordanian families. Queen Misbah,
the wife of King Abdullah I and mother of King Talal, was the President of the first
Jordanian women’s organization, the Women’s Solidarity Society (WSS) which was
founded in 1944. During a visit to King Abdullah I, Huda Sha’rawi, a prominent Egyptian
women’s activist, requested permission to establish a women’s union in Jordan similar to
those in Egypt. The following year in 1945, the Jordan Women’s Union (JWU) was created
46 Sherry R. Lowrance, “After Beijing: Political Liberalization and the Women's Movement in Jordan,”
Middle Eastern Studies 34, No. 3 (Jul., 1998): 89. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4283953
26
with Princess Zein al Sharaf as the president.47 The union was primarily concerned with
social welfare activities but, it later included “raising the status of women in Jordan” as
one of its missions.48 Under the guidance of the Royal Family, the majority of WSS and
JWU’s work was focused on social work not political action.
It was not until Transjordan’s independence and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War that
women began getting involved in political organizations.49 Prior to 1948, Jordanian
women’s public life was limited to volunteering in charities that focused on improving
motherhood education and childcare.50 The arrival of tens of thousands of Palestinians to
Jordan, following the war had a large impact on women and the political landscape. The
work of charities grew, and women joined them to help address the needs of the refugees.
The 1950’s was also a period of political openness in Jordan where political parties had a
relatively large amount of freedom and influence.51 It was out of this period of political
openness and women’s public engagement that the first Jordanian women’s political
organization, the Jordanian Women’s Alliance (JWA) was founded in 1954 by Emily
47 Marta Pietrobelli, “In whose interests?: the politics of gender equality in Jordan.”( Ph.D Thesis. SOAS,
University of London, 2013): 90.
Ibtesam Al-Atiyeh, “The Women’s Movement in Jordan: Activism, Discourses, and Strategies,” (PhD
Dissertation, Freie Universitat Berlin, 2003): 55.
Nicola Pratt, “A History of Women’s Activism in Jordan 1946-1989,” Hiber. May 26, 2015,
https://www.7iber.com/society/a-history-of-womens-activism-in-jordan-1946-1989/
48 Rana Husseini, 193. 49 Pietrobelli, 89. 50 Sherry R. Lowrance, “After Beijing: Political Liberalization and the Women's Movement in Jordan,”
Middle Eastern Studies 34, No. 3 (Jul., 1998): 89. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4283953 51 Al-Atiyeh, 57.
27
Bisharat52. Under Bisharat’s leadership, the JWA focused on attaining women’s political
rights and their suffrage. With the slogan “Equal rights - Equal responsibilities - Total Arab
Unity”, the JWA waged a campaign for women to vote and to stand for Parliamentary
elections.53 After a year, the government decided that women with primary educations
would be allowed to vote but not run for any political offices. Allowing women to vote but
not run for office reflected the government’s avoidance of making dramatic political
changes. To preserve political stability, the government chose to compromise by giving
into the women’s suffrage demands. But, allowing women to run for office would have
alienated many of the monarchy’s loyalists in the tribes and military who felt entitled to
positions in the parliament and ministry leadership.
The JWA rejected this decision and released a petition with hundreds of illiterate
women’s thumbprints which stated that: “We (female) Jordanian citizens have been
deprived by difficult economic conditions and tradition from education; thus we demand
our complete right to vote equal to our illiterate brothers and our educated sisters, because
fundamental rights cannot be divided.”54 The JWA continued to press for women’s full
political rights until 1957 when the government dissolved all political parties and the JWA
was shut down. From 1957 until 1974 women’s organizations had to work in secret or
through small charitable societies.55
52 Emily Bisharat was the first female lawyer in Jordan and is credited with starting the first feminist
organizations in Jordan. She would lead Jordanian women’s rights efforts from the mid 1940’s till the
1980’s. 53 Lowrance, 90. 54 Ibid. 55 Pietrobelli, 57.
28
Prior to the UN Decade of Women in 1975, King Hussein published a royal decree
on March 5, 1974 which granted all women suffrage and the right to run for parliament
(although there would not be any elections for another ten years).56 To organize the
celebrations for the upcoming International Women’s Day and the UN Decade of Women,
Bisharat along with other former members of the JWA were given permission to re-
establish their organization with a new name the Jordanian Women’s Union (JWU).57
Within a year, the JWU had over a thousand members and within a couple years it had over
three-thousand members with branches across the country. Due to their popularity and
outspoken political demands, the leaders of JWU were under intense government scrutiny
and the Ministry of Interior attempted to shut them down in 1981. After the government
confiscated the JWU leaders’ passports and they were put under tighter security measures,
they were forced to shut down the organization.58
The Jordanian government’s relationship with the JWU shows the state’s tendency
to allow women’s organizations that align with their political agendas but, undermine any
organizations that gain enough credibility to make more radical political demands. The
Jordanian government only allowed Basharat to re-establish the JWU to prepare for the
UN Decade of Women and International Women’s Day. Partnering with Basharat for those
events helped King Hussein signal to the UN and his Western allies that he was promoting
women’s rights while not actually granting women the right to vote or run for elections
56 Al-Husseini, 193. 57 Al-Atiyat, 56. 58 Lowrance, 91.
29
until 1985. Despite their limited mandate, Basharat and the JWU did not back away from
pressing for further women’s rights and allowing political parties. The JWU was also an
outspoken advocate for Palestinian’s Rights in Israel, an issue that was particularly
sensitive for the government. Given the lack of political parties at this time, the JWU’s
popular support and large membership posed a political threat to the government. To avoid
public backlash, the government did not shut them down outright, but implemented policies
designed to pressure JWU’s leaders to close the organization. JWU’s fate also became an
example for other independent feminist organizations that refusing to align with the
government’s policies would be costly.
NATIONALIZING GENDER
Nationalized Labor and Women’s Policies
The 1970s-1990s marked a dramatic shift in Jordan’s policies towards women and
the integration of women in the work force, politics, as well as policy making. Rather than
reacting to the demands of women’s groups, the Jordanian government took proactive steps
to address women’s issues. In addition to political pressure, labor shortages created a need
for more women to work outside the home. To address these economic and political issues,
Jordan began creating dedicated departments and ministries that were focused on women’s
issues. This segmented approach to women’s policy formed the basis for Jordan’s adoption
of comprehensive gender mainstreaming policies in the 1990s.
It was not until the 1950’s that Jordanian women began entering into wage earning
jobs due to an increasing demand for office work and higher levels of women’s education.
30
However, women’s participation in the non-agricultural labor force was only 5.3 percent
in 1961. Rising oil prices in the early 1970’s created a large demand for labor that attracted
many Jordanian and Palestinian men in search of higher paying jobs. Due to this, Jordan
went from having high unemployment rates, 14 percent in 1973, to low unemployment
rates, 2 percent in 1975, and large shortages in many sectors of the economy.59 This turning
point in Jordan’s economy led to major changes in Jordan’s labor market and created an
opening for women to work outside the home. The Jordanian government was ill equipped
to address many of these changes and began to large initiatives to modernize their labor
codes to meet the needs to women.
However, at the peak of the oil boom in 1976, still only 11.8 percent of Jordanian
women worked.60 Compared to global standards at the time, Jordanian women also had
high wages in relation to men. In 1975, the government reported that Jordanian women’s
salaries were almost 85 percent of men’s salaries for similar jobs.61 Women’s slow
integration into the workplace can be partially explained by social norms around women’s
roles in the family. During the 1970’s, the majority of working women were singe with
only 4 percent of working women that were married. Educations, job opportunities, and
good wages, were not sufficient factors to motivate married women to work. Nadia Hijab
observes that at this time in Jordan female education was “pursued on an ‘in case’ basis: it
broadened women’s horizons, produced better wives and mothers, and was there ‘in case’
59 Nadia Hijab, Womenpower: The Arab Debate on Women at Work, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988): 95. 60 Ibid, 97 61 Samira Harfoush, “Nontraditional Training for Women in the Arab World.” Africa Report 26, no. 2
(March 1, 1981): 52. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1304057586/.
31
a marriage ended in widowhood or divorce and the woman had to support herself.”62
Moghadam also argues that Jordanian wives did not need to work with their husbands
earning extremely high wages in the Gulf Countries.63 Although norms around women
working outside the home had changed, expectations for married women inside the home
stayed the same.
As Jordan tried to encourage women to join the workforce, the government began
focusing on modernizing their labor standards. In 1976, the Ministry of Labor held a
symposium dedicated to the role of Jordanian women. During the symposium, they adopted
55 resolutions to modernize legislation, enforce universal and compulsory education,
create more work opportunities for women, increase trainings and placement services, and
enforce equal pay for equal work. In addition to these resolutions they also emphasized the
need for more women involved in policy making.64 A year later in 1977, In’am Mufi was
appointed to the Ministry of Labor’s newly created Directorate of Women’s Affairs. Within
two years, the Ministry of Social Development was created in 1979 to increase the
government’s capacity to integrate women into the economy and address lagging economic
development. Jordan appointed its first female minister, In’am al-Mufti, to lead the new
ministry.
With a larger mandate and more resources at its disposal, the Ministry of Social
Development and the Ministry of Labor created a series of policies that successfully
62 Hijab, 96 63 Valentine M. Moghadam, "Women's Economic Participation in the Middle East: What Difference Has
the Neoliberal Policy Turn Made?" Journal of Middle East Women's Studies 1, no. 1 (2005): 110-46.
Accessed February 17, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/40326851. 64 Hijab, 98
32
increased women’s workforce participation through the 1980’s. Even as the economy
began to slow, women’s labor participation rates remained high. New government policies
incentivized working women by extending their maternity leave from six to ten week,
increasing pay levels during maternity leave, and requiring employers with a minimum
number of women to provide a day-care center. 65 Hijab also argues that women and
employer’s attitudes towards women’s employment changed due to large government
public awareness campaigns. Government agencies hosted regular seminars, workshops,
and trainings on issues relating to working women. The Royal Family attended awards
ceremonies to recognize women’s contributions to the public and the economy. The state-
owned media outlets were also deployed to celebrate women’s achievements, Mother’s
Day celebrations, and International Women’s Day.66 These public campaigns altered the
public’s awareness and acceptance of women in the public life.
However, the government’s programs for working women sharply declined during
an economic recession in the mid-1980’s. To cope with the recession, Jordan agreed to
structural adjustment policies that cut its public sector, the primary employer of women.
The structural adjustment policies disproportionality impacted women and unemployment
rates soared from 3.5% in 1980, 6% in 1985 and 8.9% in 1988 to 17.1% in 1991.67 The
government’s focus on expanding the private sector, where it was more difficult for women
to find work, further lowered women’s participation rates. In 1996, Jordan had the lowest
65 Rebecca, Miles. “Employment and Unemployment in Jordan: The Importance of the Gender System.”
World Development 30, no. 3 (2002): 414. 66 Hijab, 103. 67 Miles, 415.
33
women’s labor participation rates in the MENA region at 12.6 percent, the same rate that
it had in 1976.68 Through their focus on addressing women and gender issues, the Ministry
of Social Development played a large role in transforming Jordanian women’s roles outside
the home.
In addition to their impact on women’s labor, the Ministry of Social Development
was also a major catalyst for women’s political engagement. When it was created in 1979,
the ministry was tasked with bringing private political and charitable organizations under
its umbrella. This new mandate marked the government’s increasing involvement in social
issues, which it had previously been content to leave in the domain of international and
domestic private organizations. As the JWU’s popularity was growing, Minister Mufi was
appointed to address their demands and check the JWU’s power the sole voice for women.
In 1981, Mufi created the first women’s governmental organization the General Federation
for Jordanian Women (GFJW). The GFJW was meant to create a pro-government rival for
JWU and to become an umbrella organization for all women’s organizations, including the
JWU.69 After the JWU closed, the GFJW became the dominant influence in women’s
politics until the early 1990’s. As a semi-governmental organization, the GFJW could bar
any women’s membership for having a history of oppositional politics. Several women’s
organizations refused to register or send delegates. Over the years, the membership of the
GFJW became increasingly based on individual membership rather than organizations. The
largest group of individual members were women affiliated with Islamic organizations.
68 Moghadam, 122. 69 Al-Atiyat, 61.
34
Islamic Women’s Mobilization
Parallel to the nationalization and feminization of the Jordanian political space was
the Jordanian Islamic movement’s Islamizing of social and moral issues. In the 1950’s the
Muslim Brotherhood and its political affiliate the Islamic Action Front played a small role
in politics compared to the large nationalist movements. However, because it was never an
official political party, the Muslim Brotherhood remained openly active after the
government banned the other parties. As an official Islamic charity, it became one of the
largest and most influential organizations in the country.70 The Muslim Brotherhood’s
theology promoted the goal of establishing an Islamic order rather than poverty alleviation
or social justice issues. Their work in Jordan was heavily focused on creating a broad
network of middle class and professional members as well as the poor.71 Building their
coalition around the broad idea of creating an Islamic order meant that the Muslim
Brotherhood lacked a clear agenda for women. Lisa Taraki observes that in their discourses
“there is little evidence that the Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood] have carried out any serious
reformations of classical conservative and Islamist thinking on women.” However, their
practices reveal that their stances towards women are “in a state of negotiation,
renegotiation, and redefinition.”72
70 Ellen M. Lust-Okar. “The Decline of Jordanian Political Parties: Myth or Reality?” International
Journal of Middle East Studies, 33 (2001): 558.
72 Lisa, Taraki, “Jordanian Islamists and the Agenda for Women: Between Discourse and Practice,” Middle
Eastern Studies, 32, no. 1 (Jan.,1996):140-158. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4283779
35
In Islamic books, press, lectures, and activities for women, the ideal Muslim woman
is presented as being faithful to their home, husband, and children over working or going
to school. Their modesty in clothing and conduct in public is held higher than their
individual ideas or desires. However, in practice, women where at the forefront of the
Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s political and social activities. Muslim women were
heavily involved in the Islamic public charities and worked outside the home so long as
the spaces were sex-segregated.73 Although it was a secular organization, Muslim women
joined the GFJW in large numbers and attempted to gain political control over different
student and professional associations, unions and other representative bodies in Jordan.74
When King Hussein called for parliamentary elections in 1989 and ended the ban on
political parties, Jordanian women were prepared to mobilized their networks in support of
the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidates. In 1992, when the Muslim Brotherhood formed the
Islamic Action Front as their official political party, 11 women were among its 353
founding members.75 Although the Muslim Brotherhood’s stance on women in society
lacks internal cohesion, Islamic women have established an strong opposing narrative to
nationalist, feminists, and official views on women. With Muslim women’s increasing
influence in government, politics, and social organizations, the government must balance
their views with international women’s rights norms.
73 Ibid. 155 74 Lowrance, 92. 75 Jillian Schewedler, “Jordan: the Quiescent Opposition,” The Wilson Center, Published on August 27,
2015. Access February 17, 2020. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/jordan-the-quiescent-opposition
36
Currently, Jordan’s parliament is still only 15.4 percent women. Many of the women in
Jordan’s last parliament election in 2016 faced the same political and societal obstacles
they did forty years ago when Emily Bisharat and the JWU tried to establish an independent
political voice for women. Due to gender quotas, 25 percent of all seats on municipal
councils are reserved for women. However, a report from the JNCW shows that women
were prevented from taking any leadership positions on the councils or chairing any
committees.76 Women make up 35 percent of political parties in Jordan. Yet, only three
women hold the position of the party secretary-general. In the elections, 37 percent of
women were nominated due to their tribe’s consensus and 34 percent of nominated women
reported being pressured by their tribe or family to drop out in favor of a male candidate.
Women’s fight for political representation in Jordan is still hindered by societal
expectations of women. Societal norms on gender roles still hold women back from
leadership positions and women are expected to comply with their tribe’s or family’s
wishes in their political careers. Jordan has made remarkable progress in changing the
government policies and institutions to become more gender sensitive. But, similar to
Western countries, women in politics still face discrimination in public leadership roles.
76 The Jordanian National Commission for Women. “Comprehensive National Review of the Progress in
the Implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 25 Years On.” UN Women (April
2019): 5. https://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/csw/64/national-
reviews/jordan-en.pdf?la=en&vs=710
37
INTERNATIONAL FEMINISM
The Golden Years of Jordanian Feminism
With the re-establishment of Jordan’s Parliament in 1989, the political space opened up
and independent women’s organizations re-emerged to call for widespread legal, social,
and political reforms. Although no women won seats in parliament in 1989, it was the first
time that all women had the opportunity to vote and run for office. For many Jordanian
feminists, the 1990’s are seen as the Golden Age of Feminism.77 The Jordanian Women’s
Union was re-established and led other women’s organizations in petitioning the
government to address domestic abuse issues, nationality laws, honor killings, and abortion
rights. The proliferation of independent women’s organizations led to stiff competition for
funding, support, and projects amongst themselves and with Islamic women’s
organizations and governmental women’s organizations like GFJW. In addition to GFJW,
several royal NGOs like the Noor al-Hussein Foundation and the Queen Alia Fund entered
into space and focused on development projects for women.78 Internationally, Jordan was
also actively engaged in women’s rights issues and sent delegations to each of the UN
Women’s conferences. In 1992, Jordan ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all
forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). It was ratified it with reservations on
Articles 9.2, 15.4 and 16 which are related to women passing their citizenship to husband
and children (9.2), housing and women’s mobility (15.4) and marriage and family relations
77 Abeer Bashier Dababneh, “Jordanian Women’s Political Participation: Legislative Status and Structural
Challenges,” European Journal of Social Sciences 27, no. 2 (2012): 214. 78 Lowrance, 94.
38
(16).79 Despite the reservations, its ratification of CEDAW raised Jordan’s international
and domestic standing among women’s rights activists.
The Jordanian National Commission for Women
With strong domestic and national momentum pushing to advance women’s interests
and gender issues further, the Jordanian royal cabinet formed the Jordanian National
Commission for Women (JNCW) to replace the GFJW. Princess Basma bint Talal, King
Hussein’s sister, initiated and leads the JNCW. Although it is a semi-governmental
organization, it was given the authority to represent the Kingdom at all international and
regional issues relating to women. In addition to its international role, the JNCW is
responsible for coordinating and guiding all women’s organizations in the country;
monitoring issues of discrimination against women, evaluating their statuses, and
following up on progress towards achieving equality and equal opportunities. Finally, the
JNCW serves as the “reference body entrusted with drawing up general policies and
identifying the priorities of women in Jordan.”80
The JNCW’s first major task was to write and publish the first National Strategy
for Women in preparation for the UN Women’s conference in Beijing in 1995. The JNCW
collaborated with men and women across the government and private sectors to draft a
modest strategy. Princess Basma’s leadership of the JNCW made it easier for them to build
alliances with more traditional tribal and Islamic leaders that controlled the political space.
79 Ibtesam al-Atiyat and Hassan Barari, “Liberating Women with Islam? The Islamists and Women’s
Issues in Jordan,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 11, no. 3–4 (2010): 359–378. 80 Pietrobelli, 92.
39
Building those alliances gave the JNCW cultural and religious credibility with domestic
audiences who saw the UN’s agenda as contradicting cultural and Muslim values. At the
international conferences, the JNCW emphasized their commitment to cultural and
religious values by including Nawal Faouri, a female member of the Islamic Action Front,
in the Jordanian delegation.81 Representing those values in their work internationally gave
Jordan’s reservations to CEDAW and the inclusion of Shari’a wording in their National
Women’s Strategy more cultural credibility.
Joining the Beijing Platform in 1995 gave the JNCW and the Jordanian government
and international mandate to increase their roles in setting the agenda for women and
gender policies. As the national gender mainstreaming mechanism in government, the
JNCW plays a key role in influencing national social and economic development policies.
However, the JNCW still faces political and organizational limitation to their work. In
1998, women’s and human rights activists launched a national awareness campaign on
honor killings that called for the full repeal of Article 340 and 98 in the Penal Code. Even
with the Monarchy’s full support, conservative Muslim parties and tribal groups in the
Parliament’s lower house rejected their demands.
The bill to repeal Article 340 also exposed a rift within the Islamic Action Front
between those who saw honor killings as un-Islamic and a remnant of the jahiliyya (pre-
Islamic) period. The Minister of Islamic Affairs argued that instead of killing women who
81 Al-Atiyeh, 63.
40
have been committing adultery, “the Sharia is clear that they should be given 80 lashes.”82
Opponents in the Islamic Action Front argued that repealing the law would encourage
adultery and that honor killings are necessary for family and societal stability. One senator
in the Islamic Action Front stated that “female adulterers are worse than male adulterers
because they determine the family ancestry and if they bear children [out of wedlock] then
the right to inheritance would be lost.”83 Despite the late King Hussein and his wife Queen
Noor’s advocacy to abolish honor crimes, article 340 has not yet been repealed. King
Abdulla and Queen Rania have also been outspoken against the practice. Yet to maintain
balance and stability in the country’s political system, the King has not repealed the law
outright and instead has chosen to implement gradual reforms to the court system by
created oversight bodies on all honor crime cases.
After many attempts to amend parts of those laws, the only amendment that has
been fully approved by Parliament was the repeal of a clause that gave immunity to rapists
who married their victims. Other key pieces of legislation that would allow women to
initiate divorce, and to equalize inheritance laws have been blocked by the Islamic Action
Front. In addition to opposition from conservative groups in politics, the JNCW’s policy
initiatives have been limited by the country’s economic and political instability. Although
fourteen out of the nineteen members of JNCW’s committee are ministers or directors of
government or semi-government organizations, austerity measures, large influxes of
82 Fadia Faqir, "Intrafamily Femicide in Defence of Honour: The Case of Jordan," Third World
Quarterly 22, no. 1 (2001): 75. Accessed March 20, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/3993346. 83 Ibid., 75
41
refugees, and an expansion of the military have sapped efforts to expand programs for
women. Without funding, the JNCW and its members have relied on partnerships or
funding from bilateral and multilateral donors. Funding from those partners is generally
project-based which limits the scope of their work and the duration of the projects to three
to five years.
CONCLUSION
State feminism in Jordan has come a long way since Emily Basharat began her
petitions to allow women to vote. But, it is still an incomplete project and the JNCW’s role
as the gender mainstreaming mechanism is still tenuous. Islamic women’s groups see them
as corrupting Islamic and cultural values. In additon many independent women and human
rights groups resent the Royal Family’s dominant role and feel that the women’s rights
agenda has been co-opted. After failed efforts to pressure the Parliament to address their
demands, the protests during the Arab Spring in 2011 ushered in a wave of women’s rights
reforms that had been long overdue. The use of social media during and following the
protests also gave independent women’s right activists new tools to mobilize public support
and draw attention to their issues. However, the relationship between independent women’s
advocacy groups and the government has remained the same. The government and Royal
family advocate for women’s right to work, take public office, pursue educations, and
create their own organizations. Yet, issues such as inheritance laws, honor killings, and
passing on nationality remain too politically divisive issues for the Royal family and
government address head on. Their tactic in the past has been to take moderate, gradual
42
steps to reform policies while leaving amendments to the law and Sharia courts to the
parliament that has been controlled by conservative groups.
Gender mainstreaming has been central to the government’s strategies to address
gender inequality and empower women. Women’s issues first became a political
consideration in the 1940’s when women began working with the poor and with Palestinian
refugees. When women began joining the workforce in the 1950’s women’s labor policies
became an important issue in Jordan’s government. As Jordan began to implement
democratic reforms and engage in the international community, women’s policies began
to change at a rapid rate. Jordan’s participation in the UN women’s conferences and their
ratification of CEDAW and the Beijing Platform where radical steps that launched Jordan
on a mission to apply gender mainstreaming nationally. Despite political and social
constraints, for over 25 years the JNCW has maintained their mandate to incorporate
gender mainstreaming into Jordanian policies. The following chapter will look at the ways
that their strategies have evolved over 25 years and how their relationships with civil
society organizations and government ministries has impacted their work.
43
Chapter 4: The Evolution of Gender Mainstreaming in Jordan
The Fourth United Nation (UN) conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 was a
highpoint for international women’s advocacy and resulted in the Beijing Platform for
Action. Until today, the Beijing Platform remains the most complete UN policy document
that spells out what steps are needed to advance women’s rights. The Beijing Platform
filled out the international, national, and local policies needed to reach the rights enshrined
in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). If CEDAW established the global moral standards for treatment of women, the
Beijing Platform was its blueprint for action.
The Beijing Platform’s blueprint for action was the result of twenty years of
international women’s activism that shifted the dialogue from women being participants in
development as mothers, daughters, and wives to being central actors in the global
economic and social order. The previous UN Women’s Conference in Nairobi in 1985
discussed the need for structural changes to national and international systems that
furthered women’s advancement. At the conference, Letitia Shahani, the Secretary General
of the Nairobi Conference, condemned policy makers for the “paradox between the
international commitment to the advancement of women and the increasing structural
imbalance in the global economy.” To address that disconnect, the Shahani charged
national institutions and women to create strategies that address discrimination and form
local, regional, and coalitions to implement them. Jordan’s delegation to the conference
carried this charge back with them and developed the first national strategy for Jordanian
women.
The National Strategy for Women in Jordan echoed the Nairobi conference’s bold
call for structural changes. However, its broad statements also reflected the necessity to
maintain consensus between domestic factions in Jordan’s fragile political system.
44
Following the first national strategy in 1992, Jordan’s ambitious programs for women’s
empowerment were cut short by economic, political, and social upheaval. The 1998-2002
National Framework for Action applied the principles of the 1992 strategy by integrating
a gender perspective into the national economic and social development plans. However,
progress towards women’s advancement in the economy remained slow.
It was not until 2006 that Jordan updated their national women’s strategy from the
one in 1992. The National Strategy for Women 2006-2010 expanded the government’s
focus from women’s economic engagement to include political participation as well. Many
of these new initiatives echoed the recently crowned King Abdullah II’s human rights
initiatives. Following the second gender mainstreaming strategy in 2006, Jordan released
the next strategy in 2013. The National Strategy for Women 2013-2017 remains the current
national strategy for gender policy. However, the government has developed “step-up”
policies to address issues of women in conflict and security. The following chapter
discusses the types of strategies these plans adopted and how they were implemented and
negotiated by the Royal Family, parliament, government agencies, and civil society
activists. The types of gender strategies in these documents will be analyzed using the
Gender at Work analytical framework.
GENDER AT WORK ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
To analyze these texts, I will use the Gender at Work Framework to evaluate The
Jordanian National Commission for Women’s strategies for change and how they address
different political, social, and economic barriers for gender policies. The Gender at Work
Framework was developed in 2002 to understand the intersections between different areas
of change. Since then, international development organizations such as United Nations
Development Program (UNDP), Oxfam International, and the Bill and Melinda Gates
45
Foundation haves used it to build cultures of equity.84 The framework looks at how
different areas of change are hindered by embedded structures and discriminatory social
norms that are upheld by power dynamics by organizations.85 The four quadrants of change
in the framework are:
1. Consciousness and awareness: Changes that occur in women’s and men’s
consciousness, capacities and behavior.
2. Access to resources and opportunities: Changes that occur in terms of access to
resources, services and opportunities.
3. Formal policies, laws and institutional arrangements: Changes in terms of rules and
adequate and gender-equitable policies and laws, which must be in place to protect
against gender discrimination.
4. Informal cultural norms and deep structure: Changes in deep structure, implicit
norms and social values that undergird the way institutions operate, often in
invisible ways.86
Each gender mainstreaming strategy lies on spectrum between these four quadrants. The
special relationship between these variables is depicted in Figure 3.1 below. For each of
the national strategies, I will discuss how they address each of the types of change in the
framework.
84 Gender at Work, “Clients and Partners,” Gender at Work, Access February 15, 2020.
https://genderatwork.org/global-partners/ 85 A. Rao, J. Sandler, D. Kelleher, and C. Miller, Gender at Work, (London: Routledge, 2016): 9.
https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/10.4324/9781315693637 86 Independent Evaluation Office, United Nations Development Programme. Evaluation of UNDP’s
Contribution to Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment. August 2015.
http://web.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/thematic/gender.shtml
46
Figure 1: Gender at Work Framework, Rao, A., Sandler, J., Kelleher, D., Miller, C. (2016).
Gender at Work.
THE FIRST NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR WOMEN IN JORDAN, 1992-2006
The Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW)
Following the reopening of Jordan’s Parliament in 1989 and the relegalization of
political parties, King Hussein and his government had to balance their political strategies
between resurgent leftist groups and emerging Islamic parties. Women’s activist groups,
which had historically been allied with nationalist leftist groups, faced growing Islamic
women’s activism that rejected many of their secular views on women’s equality. Given
the widespread popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front’s
representation in parliament, the monarchy could not afford to jeopardize its nascent move
towards democratization. The government’s women’s policies during the 1990s attempted
to reconcile the demands of the two groups. Rather than allow one group to control the
agenda or frame the national debate, in 1992 King Hussein appointed his sister Princess
47
Basmah Bint Talal to form the National Committee for Women’s Affairs (later re-named
the Jordan National Commission for Women) which would oversee women’s policy
development and address women’s groups concerns.87
The Jordan National Commission for Women (JNCW) replaced the General
Federation for Jordanian Women (GFJW) as the government’s oversight organization for
women’s affairs. Instead of allowing individuals or organizations to become members, like
in the GFJW, the JNCW limited its membership to the heads of official ministries, royal
NGOs, and the most prominent women’s organizations at the time.88 In 1996, JNCW
would be designated by Parliament’s Cabinet as the “authority on women's issues and, in
this regard, should be consulted by all official parties before any related actions or decisions
are taken.” As a semi-government organization, the JNCW was responsible for
coordinating all national women’s policies and projects. In addition to working with each
of the ministries, JNCW also acts as a policy forum for local women’s organizations and
Jordan’s official representatives to international organizations addressing women’s issues.
JNCW and the Beijing Platform
In 1992, JNCW’s first task was to prepare for the Beijing Conference in 1995. At
the previous UN Women’s conference in Nairobi, Jordan’s delegation agreed to the 1985
Forward Looking Strategies which insisted on women’s participation in policy making as
well as in development programs.89 The Nairobi Conference’s emphasis on women being
87 Lowrance, 93. 88 The Royal NGOs are development organizations that have been founded and managed by a member of
the Hashemite Royal Family. The largest Royal NGOs in Jordan are the King Hussein Foundation, the
Queen Alia Fund, and the Noor al-Hussein Foundation. In addition to managing and patronizing charitable
organizations across the country, these NGOs also reflect the monarchy’s social and economic priorities.
Non-ministry members of the NCWA were the leadership of Jordan’s leading women’s activist and charity
organizations such as Sisterhood is Global and the Jordanian Women’s Union. 89 Judith P. Zinsser, “From Mexico to Copenhagen to Nairobi: The United Nations Decade for Women,
1975-1985,” Journal of World History 13, no.1 (Spring, 2002): 158. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20078945
48
equal and full participants at all levels of policy making led up to the formation of Jordan’s
first National Strategy for Jordanian Women in 1993. Under the patronage of Princess
Basmah, JNCW worked with men and women from regions across the country to develop
a comprehensive strategy that would satisfy both conservative and liberal groups. In the
introduction it states that the strategy is
characterized by the purity of Islamic and Arab principles, values and examples
and their strong humanistic aspects, as well as modern trends, mechanisms and
techniques to promote the Jordanian's woman status and support her role in
building the society and reinforcing its progress and development.90
Following the introduction, the first section is “Bases on Which The National
Strategy for Women Was Devised” where it gives eight sources and objectives for the
strategy. The first point states that the strategy is based on the Jordanian Constitution, the
National Charter, the principles of Sharia, and the values of Arab Islamic society. It also
affirms that one of its primarily purposes is to increase the stability and strength of the
family as the primary social unit. These broad statements in the strategy show a strong
concern for conservative groups in Jordan who worried that state policies would upend
traditional values.91 The Jordanian government is not a secular state and the strategy’s
references to Arab Islamic culture and Sharia echo similar statements in the Constitution
and National Charter.92 The strategy’s broad use of Islamic and traditional values satisfied
conservative groups in society while leaving enough room for interpretation that it was
acceptable to more liberal women’s advocates.
90 Jordanian National Committee for Women’s Affairs. “National Strategy for Women in Jordan,”
https://www.un.org/womenwatch/confer/beijing/national/jordanap.htm 91 Lowrance, 92 92 United States Department of State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2018 Report on
International Religious Freedom: Jordan. June 21, 2019.
https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/jordan/
49
The national strategy’s language in the introduction also reflects themes from the
international women’s conferences which place the state as the duty bearer for upholding
women’s rights. The strategy affirms that national and local policy changes are needed to
address discrimination against women.
The legal, political, social, and economic role and status of women emanate from
a development process at the national and local levels, which requires positive
efforts for changes that will help make women's role more effective and will
advance their status in society, and eliminate all forms of discrimination against
them.93
This strategy frames the development process as not simply gender responsive but
discusses it as a gender transformative tool for the local and national governments to use
to eliminating discrimination and shifting women’s roles in society. Rather than
responding to the ways that discrimination impact women’s lives, the national strategy is
clear that it intends to transform women’s role in society by eliminating discrimination
against them. However, the introduction remains vague by not discussing what types of
discrimination women face, changes are necessary, and who will be a part of the
development process. The strategy never explicitly mentions international human rights
agreements. But it implicitly connects its policies with them by stating vaguely that they
will be integrated into international and regional strategies.
Following the first section, the national women’s strategy is broken up into two
final sections: “the components of the national strategy for women”, and the
“implementation mechanism.” The components of the national strategy cover the
93 Jordanian National Committee for Women’s Affairs. “National Strategy for Women in Jordan,” Date
Accessed December 20, 2019. https://www.un.org/womenwatch/confer/beijing/national/jordanap.htm
50
substance of the policies in the strategy and is further divided into six types of activities
that will be implemented. The six types of activities are: legislation, political activity,
economic activity, social activity, educational activity, and health activity. Each of these
sections is divided into a section for objectives and one for measures.
Quadrant One – Consciousness and Awareness
Policies that addressed changing individual’s consciousness on women’s inclusion
were not concentrated in any of the six types of activities in the national women’s strategy.
Each of the categories of activities had a component of their objectives or measures that
included increasing awareness around women’s issues. Throughout the policies in this
quadrant, women are the primary targets of many of many of these policies. However, mass
media campaigns are also included to shift public’s perceptions on women in politics,
work, and school.
In the legislative activities section, the first objective is “Educating the society in
general and women in particular about women's legitimate and legal rights and
responsibilities and developing laws which deal with their role in the family and society.”
This objective complement and supports the other two objectives in this section which aim
to change laws to help eliminate discrimination against women. The political and economic
activities sections have similar objectives and measures that aim at promoting inclusion
through media campaigns, seminars, and trainings. With the absence of quotas for women’s
political participation, or affirmative action policies for employment, the policies in these
sections use less formal mechanism to persuade women and society into action. One of the
measures in the political activity section is “educating and persuading women to play an
51
effective role in political parties and trade unions so that they can exercise pressure in the
society.”
In economic and educational activities, these policies are aimed at changing girls’
views of possible careers in addition to their roles as mothers and wives. Rather than
directly challenging traditional narratives on women’s roles, the strategy of these policies
is to offer girls different alternatives and choices for their lives. In the objectives there is
also a mix of policies that view changing perceptions as an intrinsically beneficial thing for
women’s advancement like the initiative to educate women about their rights and freedoms.
For other policies, the primary motive is improving the awareness of an issue in order for
women to contribute to development in a specific way. An example of this is an initiative
to encourage girls to choose the academic and professional careers suited to their
capabilities and the labor market needs.
Quadrant Two – Resources for Equality and Justice
The policies from the national women’s strategy in this section are those that
change women’s status through providing access to additional resources, services and
opportunities. These policies are formal programs that primarily attempt to address
individual’s needs. In the national women’s strategy, the highest concentration of these
policies is in the economic activities with educational and health activities following
closely behind. The legislative and political activities section has scant policies in this
section. That absence is primarily due to the fact that policies in those sections primarily
address the structural, legal barriers to women in those activities. The proliferation of
quadrant two policies in the economic activities reflects Jordan’s longer history with
52
women’s labor policy reforms and the ability to expand upon existing programs. The
proliferation of economic, education, and health programs also reflects a larger trend in
gender mainstreaming that overlooks the range of gender constraints that hold women
back. Instead these policies promote the idea that women are just missing a key ingredient
(access to credit, education, business skills, etc.) and if it is provided, women will be
empowered.
The quadrant two policies in this strategy are ambitious in the expansions of
services for women. However, the superficial fixes they provide reflect the missing
ingredient argument. An example of this is the policy to encourage women's enrollment in
graduate studies so that they will “play a role in scientific research, join college teaching
staffs and reach leadership positions.” The lack of women in scientific research, university
faculty and leadership cannot be simplified to a lack of women’s graduate enrollment.
Women’s decisions to pursue graduate education are often determined by family
expectations and without their family’s support women cannot continue their educations.
In 2013, twenty years following this policy, 52 percent of undergraduate university
graduates are women, but only 36 percent of Ph. D degrees were given to women. Only 15
percent of academic staff at Jordanian universities are women and only 3 percent of the
universities’ boards are women.94 Although this policy in the 1993 national women’s
strategy had limited impact on women’s advancements in higher education, its strategy to
94 Saba Abu Farah, “In Jordan, Women Are Only a Tiny Minority On University Boards,” Al-Fanar
Media. December 9, 2014.
https://www.al-fanarmedia.org/2014/12/jordan-women-tiny-minority-university-boards/
53
provide the missing ingredients for women’s empowerment opened up an array of
opportunities never before available for Jordanian women.
Quadrant Three – Formal Policies, Laws and Institutional Arrangements
As well as being a formal policy document itself, the national women’s strategy
also contains policies, and institutional arrangements to provide gender-equitable policies
and laws that protect against gender discrimination. Unsurprisingly, the two sections with
the highest concentration of quadrant three policies are the legislation and economic
activities sections. In the economic activities section, the law amendments and adoptions
that are recommended focus on preventing discrimination against women, equal pay for
equal work, and work safety measures. The policies in the legislation section set out a
vision for transforming women’s policies from the top to the bottom of the Jordanian
government.
The legislative section has two themes in its legal objectives – eliminating
discrimination against women, and women’s equality under Sharia and the Jordanian
Constitution. The strategy calls for a “comprehensive study of the applicable laws and
regulations to detect those which need amendment, in order to eliminate all forms of
discrimination against women.” It lists six different legal codes for mandatory review and
revision including personal status laws which are under the purview of the religious courts.
The strategy states that Jordan should change “the Personal Status Law to protect women's
interests without prejudice to the irrefutable provisions of Islamic Law, through
jurisprudence and reference to legal opinions which conform with the requirements of
contemporary life.” The strategy affirms Sharia’s undisputable influence over Personal
Status Laws and women’s lives. In addition to Sharia’s special status, jurist’s legal opinions
are given the broad power to interpret how to conform the religious laws to contemporary
54
situations. Following this section on Sharia, the strategy specifies that Jordan will “enact
or amend any applicable laws to conform with international conventions dealing with
women's issues and rights.” The national women’s strategy maintains Sharia as the
authoritative source for law with international law as a secondary influence with agenda
setting power.
Quadrant Four—Informal Norms and Deep Structure
The final type of policy change in the national women’s strategy addresses the
changes to informal cultural norms, social values, and the structures that undergird the way
institutions operate. The entire document could be viewed as an attempt to change the
underlying structures that discriminate against women in Jordan. Although portions of the
strategy adhere to more conservative understandings of women’s roles or only offer surface
level programs, there are several places were the document explicitly addresses changes to
implicit biases, norms, and social values. The social activities sections set the tone for the
rest of the policies of this type by stating that its first objective is “strengthening women's
status and role in the family and in society and developing social concepts to bolster
women's role in social development.” This objective emphasizes the family unit in society
and vehicle for change. Emphasizing the family reflects the government’s need to maintain
traditional Jordanian values. However, feminist and conservative critics have seen this
focus on the family as trespassing into citizen’s private lives.95 Beyond women’s statuses
in the family, the strategy also discusses bolstering women’s role in social development.
In the economic, educational, and political sections they each connect their other
initiatives to changing social values. One of the objectives of the educational activities
95 Frances S. Hasso, “Bargaining with the Devil: States and Intimate Life.” Journal of Middle East
Women’s Studies 10, no. 2 (April 1, 2014): 107–134.
55
section is, “supporting the role of the educational system in fostering the positive image of
women and their status in the family and society and their contribution to social
development.” Positive imagery of women in Jordanian schools addresses the previously
implicit way that schools and society valued women’s contributions to society. Depicting
women in positive roles outside the family and contributing to development changes the
narratives on girl’s futures.
Reception and Impact of the First National Strategy for Women in Jordan
After the Jordanian delegation returned from Beijing, the First National Strategy
for Women in Jordan was overshadowed by the Jordanian government’s precarious
political and economic situation. Political liberalization had taken away some of the
monarchy’s control of parliament and Princess Basma faced resistance from traditional
tribal parties and the IAF in implementing JNCW’s mandate. In addition to political
resistance, Jordan was in the midst of its first phase of structural reform which applied strict
fiscal austerity measures on the government. Despite the political tensions and economic
crisis, within a year Princess Basma successfully negotiated a gender quota of one women
on each of the country’s 99 municipal councils.96 Over the next ten years, JNCW also
successful pushed for amendments that eliminated discrimination against women in parts
of the Labor Law, the Social Security Law, the Income Tax Law and the Civil Service
Regulations, the Civil Status Law, the Passport Law and the Elections Law, the Personal
Status Law, and the Penal Code.97 Some of these reforms were major wins of women’s
96 Assaf David and Stefanie Nanes, “The Women's Quota in Jordan's Municipal Councils: International and
Domestic Dimensions,” Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 32, no. 4 (2011): 286, DOI:
10.1080/1554477X.2011.613709 97 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, “Report on the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action
(1995) and the Outcome of the Twenty-Third Special Session of the General Assembly (2000).” UN
Women, accessed February 21, 2020, https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/Review/responses/JORDAN-
English.pdf
56
activist like the passport law that allowed women to register and hold their own passports
independently from male guardians. Other reforms were less transformative like the
changes to personal status laws regarding honor killings that activists felt gave judges more
leeway in giving minimum sentences for the killers.
In addition to lobbying for legislative changes, JNCW also began working with
each of the ministries to develop a gender mainstreamed approach. In 1996, the JNCW was
given the responsibility to implement, coordinate and advise government policies and
legislation regarding women. With this new mandate, the JNCW broadened its mission
from the national women’s strategy to one that was more in line with the Beijing Platform.
With collaboration from 19 ministries and 26 NGOs, the JNCW developed the National
Program of Action for the Advancement of Jordanian Women, 1998-2002 which proposed
over 106 projects over a five-year period. Under financial conditionalities from the World
Bank and IMF, the accomplishment of these programs was modest at best.98 However the
Program of Action set the stage for JNCW’s work integrating gender into the Economic
and Social Development Plan 1999-2003. It was the first time that any Arab country
structured their national economic plan around gender equity issues and the document
states that “women’s issues and women’s rights are as important as men’s.”99 Princess
Basma along with other members of the JNCW worked directly with the Ministry of
Planning to develop the plan and integrate gender into it. The JNCW continued their
strategy of high-level direct engagement with the ministries and began gender
98 Mieke Verloo, Anna van der Vleuten, Willy Jansen and Feride Acar. “Gender Mainstreaming in
Employment and Education,” European Training Foundation, accessed January 21, 2020,
https://www.etf.europa.eu/sites/default/files/m/C12578310056925BC12572830051F3C4_NOTE6YFEXE.
pdf 99 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, “Report on the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action
(1995) and the Outcome of the Twenty-Third Special Session of the General Assembly (2000).”
57
mainstreaming initiatives within the Civil Service Department, and the Ministry of
Agriculture.
Although the national strategy for women has mandated that JNCW create a yearly
plan, the 1993 strategy remained the guiding document for gender mainstreaming in Jordan
till 2006. The Program for Action in 1998 acted as an addendum to the strategy but was
not the official national strategy. Despite the lack of an updated strategy, Princess Basma’s
consistent leadership of the JNCW kept gender mainstreaming a political priority in Jordan
throughout the 1990s and early 2000. Upon King Abdullah’s ascension to the throne, she
was also instrumental in advising new gender initiatives.
A NEW NATIONAL WOMEN’S STRATEGY, 2006-2010
At the beginning of his reign in 1999, the King stated that “the Jordanian women’s
role has developed through their participation in numerous social, political, and economic
fields making women an essential pillar in the country’s development and construction.”
King Abdullah’s gender policies built upon JNCW’s previous work and he expanded their
role as well as the royal NGOs in women’s programs across the country. With Royally
sponsored NGOs taking on a larger presence in development policies, the Royal family
played an even more central role in setting the agenda for women’s policy and national
debates on gender equality. To this day, Princess Basma remains the president of JNCW
and the face of women’s policy in Jordan and internationally.
The National Women’s Strategy 2006-2010 reflected the JNCW’s experience in
gender mainstreaming and the King’s ambitious women’s agenda. In comparison with the
previous strategy, which was only eleven pages and covered six topics, the new strategy
was 82 pages with five general topics that include the legislative, human security and social
protection, economic empowerment, participation in public life, media and communication
58
domains. Similarly, each topic is broken down into different objectives that each have their
own measures which are loose actionable items with no specific indicators.
Quadrant One – Consciousness and awareness
A major development in this strategy from the first is its awareness measures that
are integrated into each of the policy domains. The previous strategy had standalone
policies that addressed changing individual’s consciousness on women’s inclusion in each
of the policy domains. However, each domain and the majority of sub-domains in this
strategy have a separate section detailing their research and awareness measures. These
measures complement the domain’s objectives and measures. Each of the domains uses
three main types of strategies in their research and awareness measures: surveys and
research, mass media campaigns, and engaging civil society organizations such as
mosques, schools, clubs, and the media. By collecting information on each of the domains,
it can address perceptions of gender and inclusion as well as support the implementation
of its objectives. Using the media and civil society organizations to amplify the
government’s message is a common strategy the Jordanian government has used to address
political and social issues in the past. Critics from across the political spectrum have argues
that controlling the national dialogue and framing of women’s policies and gender equity
depoliticizes and crowds out alternative views on the issues. However, depoliticizing
women’s policies puts the emphasis on the policy’s merits rather than its moral dimensions
or the underlying issues. Holding workshops for women on their rights in Sharia for
negotiating marriage contracts is less controversial than trying to regulate the tribes’
marriage practices or reforming divorce and marriage Personal Status Laws.
59
Quadrant Two – Resources for Equality and Justice
In contrast to the first national women’s strategy, the second strategy’s proposals
for increasing access to resources was much more targeted at specific groups of women
and narrower in its range. The previous strategy had a proliferation of policies that
approached women’s empowerment as simply a matter of providing women with the
missing ingredient they needed to advance. This assumed that if the government provided
resources and opportunities for women that they would be able to access them and that
providing those resources would lead to transformative changes in their lives. The second
strategy avoids this approach by addressing the different barriers women face in accessing
opportunities or resources. It emphasizes providing additional resources for women with
disabilities, elderly women, female headed households, and low-income women so that
they can access different opportunities. Recognizing the different barriers women face in
access to services is a critical step for in Jordanian women’s policies.
Another critical development in the second national strategy’s approach in this area
is its whole of government approach to rights enforcement. The strategy proposes a “multi-
institutional specialized and rights-based approach to protect women against violence.”
Rather than seeing violence against women solely as a health or social issue, the strategy
calls for ministries across the government to coordinate their information and resources to
address the problem. This approach to women’s policies provides a more wholistic
approach to ensuring that women have access to resources. However, addressing violence
against women is the only area where the strategy outlines a whole of government
approach.
60
Quadrant Three – Formal Policies, Laws and Institutional Arrangements
In contrast to the previous strategy that focused heavily on amending or eliminating
specific laws, the policies addressing legislative, policy, and institutional changes in this
strategy are minimal. The first strategy’s focused heavily on eliminating discrimination and
emphasized Sharia as the dominant law of the nation guiding all women and gender
policies. However, there is no mention of personal status laws or Sharia in this strategy.
The two objectives in the legislative domain focus on building women’s awareness of their
rights and stronger enforcement of the human rights principles in CEDAW.100 The
legislative changes that are proposed in the strategy address more narrow issues like
increasing women’s protections in the workplace, and providing women with disabilities
more legal access. Rather than focusing on broad, sweeping changes to the legal codes, the
new national strategy places the emphasis on addressing its enforcement and perceptions
among society.
Quadrant Four—Informal Norms and Deep Structure
In contrast to the previous national strategy’s emphasis on changing norms on
women’s roles in the family, this strategy focuses on changing norms around women’s
independence and decision making. Instead of focusing on the family unit as the vehicle
for change, this strategy focuses on individual women as the agents of change in society.
Throughout each of the policy domains, the strategy discusses the importance of women
challenging social practices and participating in the decision-making processes. The
strategy expands educational programs for women on issues of domestic violence, property
100 At this point in Jordan, CEDAW had been ratified but it was not yet a part of the national law. Due to
political backlash in Parliament, it would not be published in the Jordanian law until 2007 when the King
issues a declaration while Parliament was closed.
61
ownership rights, professional leadership skills, and including women in public debates on
national issues. The purpose of these educational program’s is to challenge societal norms
around women’s treatment within the home as well as their leadership abilities in public
spaces. The previous strategy addressed educational programs as a way to offer girls
alternative paths for their futures. This strategy goes beyond encouraging women to
challenge stereotypes to giving them the skills and confidence to do so. Equipping women
with knowledge about their rights, how to make decisions, and their ability to lead is
fundamental to shifting norms in deep structures in society.
Reception and Impact of the Second National Strategy for Women
The second National Women’s Strategy in 2006 came at a high point for human
rights in Jordan. In 2006, Jordan included five different international human rights
conventions and treaties into the national legal code making them nationally enforceable.101
CDAW was ratified the following year but still contained reservations to articles relating
to women’s ability to pass nationality to their husbands and children, and equality in issues
of marriage and divorce. Ratifying these conventions in 2006 and 2007 signaled the
Jordanian government’s commitment to human rights. However, the implementation of
those agreements still remained limited. Despite JNCW’s partnerships with each of the
101 United Nations Development Programme, “Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Public
Administration: Jordan Case Study.” United Nations Development Programme, (2011),
https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/Women-
s%20Empowerment/JordanFinal%20-%20HiRes.pdf
The Jordanian law recognized the following conventions with reservations on some articles:
1. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
2. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
5. Convention on the Rights of the Child
62
ministries to implement gender mainstreaming in their policies, the National Agenda
(2006-2015) did dedicate any funding to women’s issues.102 It reaffirmed the government’s
commitment to women’s empowerment and political, economic, and social equality. Yet,
the lack of financial commitment was a major barrier to implementing national women’s
programs. In a report released by the JNCW they found that even in ministries with gender
units or departments there had been no gender budgeting.103 As a semi-governmental
agency, the majority of funding for JNCW at this time came from outside donors like
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), UN agencies, and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Despite fiscal limitation, the national strategy and JNCW made progress in
increasing women’s political participation and educational attainments. Although women
could run for office in 1989, Toujan Faisal was the only woman in parliament until 2003
when a quota was created to reserve six seats (5.5 percent of parliament). This momentum
led up to the 2007 election were 22 percent of the candidates for office were women and
Falak Jamaani became the first Jordanian woman to win a seat through direct elections
rather than the quota, making the total number of women in parliament seven. 104 That same
year, Jordan also increased their gender quota on municipal councils from one woman per
council to a quota of 20 percent women on every council.
102 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, “Jordan National Agenda (2006-2015),” Jordanian National Press
Association, accessed January 20, 2020, http://jo.one.un.org/uploaded/publications_book/1458646931.pdf 103 “USAID Takamol Gender Program,” IREX, access January 21, 2020,
https://www.irex.org/project/usaid-takamol-jordan-gender-program
“Jordan III Trust Fund,” NATO, accessed February 14, 2020, https://salw.hq.nato.int/Project/Details/tf_7 104 Jordan Times Editorial Board, “1989 marked start of women’s involvement in parliamentary life as
candidates — SIGI.” The Jordan Times, November 10, 2016,
http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/1989-marked-start-women%E2%80%99s-involvement-
parliamentary-life-candidates-%E2%80%94-sigi
63
As women made progress towards increasing political representation, women’s
educational and health outcomes began to match and exceed men’s outcomes. Since Jordan
began its development plans in the early 1980’s, they spent 10 percent of their GPD on
health and education. Women shared equally in the benefits of this investment and from
1980 to 2010 women’s literacy rated when from 55 percent to 99 percent. In addition,
women’s life expectancies increased from 66 years to 74 years in 2010.105 Yet, women’s
academic achievements did not translate into professional careers.
In 2010, women’s labor force participation was a fourth of men’s participation with
22 percent versus 87 percent. The mismatch between women’s education and employment
is one of the most striking and enduring characteristics of Jordan’s labor market. Over 70
percent of young female graduates and 50 percent of young females with post-secondary
education were unemployed according to a 2011 government report. Women’s
vulnerability rises with higher levels of education.106 Studies on this pattern point to
cultural norms or women’s roles in the family as well as highly segmented labor markets
with few women working in the private sector. In 2010, 44 percent of working women
were employed by the government with 38 and 12 percent in education and health
respectively. In the 2006 Jordanian Enterprise Survey, about 60 percent of private
companies had less than 10 percent female staff with only 12 percent that had 50 percent
or more female staff.107 Despite the governments efforts to encourage women’s work force
105 World Bank, “Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Jordan Country Gender Assessment, Economic
Participation, Agency and Access to Justice in Jordan,” (Washington D.C: The World Bank, July 2013),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/503361468038992583/text/ACS51580WP0P130ox0379850B0
0PUBLIC0.txt 106 Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, “Jordan Country Gender Assessment: Economic Participation, Agency
and Access to Justice in Jordan,” The World Bank, July 2013,
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/503361468038992583/text/ACS51580WP0P130ox0379850B0
0PUBLIC0.txt 107 Enterprise Analysis Unit - World Bank Group, “Jordan - Enterprise Survey 2006,” The World Bank,
2006, https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/jordan-enterprise-survey-2006
64
participation and eliminate gender discrimination, the majority of Jordanian women
remained excluded from the workforce. The Jordanian government’s commitment to
gender mainstreaming succeeded in creating opportunities for women in politics and
school, but women economic constraints and social norms continued to be a barrier to
women’s professional attainments.
THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR WOMEN, 2013-2017
Within the context of regional instability and economic, political, legal, and cultural
challenges domestically, women in Jordan have continued to advance their status in
society, albeit rather slowly. As Jordan was drafting their third national strategy for women,
in 2011, the Arab Spring threw the region into political turmoil. Although there were no
large anti-regime protests in Jordan, political activists across the spectrum called for
demonstrations to call for legal and political reforms. Female activist in the demonstrations
primarily called for the regime to reform the Personal Status Laws and to address
nationality laws that prevent women from passing their Jordanian nationality to their
husbands or children. The King responded to these demonstrations by forming a 53- person
National Dialogue Committee of which only four of the members were women.108 These
demonstrations in addition to a growing humanitarian crisis in Syria, delayed the
government’s next women’s strategy from being enacted until 2013.
In contrast to the previous strategies that relied on the constitution, legal codes,
broad economic trends and cultural views, the current national women’s strategy relies
heavily on statistical analysis and reports from both the government and international
agencies. The introduction states that the “new scientific methodology, tak[es] into
consideration the results of the evaluative report and detected the reality of women through
108 Muhamad Olimat, Arab Spring and Arab Women, (London: Routledge, 2013): 25.
65
wide participatory process the reality of women, her opportunities, challenges, priorities
according to visions of men and women in the field and in different governorates.” Similar
to the previous strategies Princess Basma and the JNCW meet with a coalition of
governmental institutions, and NGOs to collaborate on the new strategy’s objectives. Out
of this process and analysis, the new strategy prioritized three main issues: economic,
social, and cultural rights. Across each of these issues, the strategy outlines four cross
cutting strategies (or axes):
Axis (1): Social Culture Supporting Women Empowerment.
Axis (2): Media, Information Technology and Communications.
Axis (3): Merging gender in the national legislations, policies, plans, programs and
budgets.
Axis (4): Institutional development for organizations working in women
empowerment framework. 109
Each of the objectives in the strategy is given one to three quantifiable indicators
to track implementation and progress. Rather than adhering to a strict policy framework,
like the previous strategies, the strategy uses different methods to illustrate Jordanian
women’s accomplishments and barriers to change. In addition to integrating statistical
analyses throughout the paper, each section includes personal narratives of women in
Jordan and photographs of their achievements.
Quadrant One – Consciousness and Awareness
Similar to the previous national strategy, the government uses a cross cutting
strategy for changing societal views on women’s roles and statues. This strategy is clearly
articulated in Axis 3’s objective to change the portrayal of women in the media and
109 JNCW, “Jordan – National Strategy on Women 2013-2017,” The JNCW, accessed February 12, 2020,
http://www.women.jo/EchoBusV3.0/SystemAssets/e59a8ba3-f4a2-41d9-9cb8-5abb293d2ab3.pdf
66
government communications. The strategy does not specify who the intended audiences
are for these media initiatives. However, it does specify that they should “support women’s
economic independence, rights in ownership and work, and her role as equal partners in
rights and obligations in all domains.” These communication strategies aim to address
underlying gender stereotypes as well as education women on their rights. In one of the
objectives on women and the environment is explicitly uses this type of strategy to
empower women in protecting the environment and Jordan’s natural resources.
Quadrant Two – Resources for Equality and Justice
Across each of the three issues areas, the strategy outlines specific types of
resources needed to address each of the policy domains within in. However, there is no
mention of dedicated funding for any of these projects. Similarly, to previous strategies,
the policy domains with the most extensive concentration of resources are health care,
vocational training, and formal education. In the previous strategy, women with disabilities
and the elderly had dedicated programs to address their needs. However, this strategy does
not mention women with disabilities and focuses on providing resources for women with
low socio-economic statuses. This strategy also includes a stronger emphasis on equipping
women’s organizations with resources. One of the cross-cutting axis in the strategy is the
institutional development of organizations working in women’s empowerment. It also
specifies that the organizations will be required to invest their resources responsibly and
with a participatory approach.
Quadrant Three – Formal Policies, Laws and Institutional Arrangements
In contrast with the previous strategy, which was included minimal legislative or
legal changes, this strategy calls for policies to address women’s legal statuses and rights
67
in the home, courts, political space, and in civic engagement. In addition the document,
reaffirms Jordan’s commitment to upholding international human rights.
Although this strategy is also silent on amendments to Personal Status Law it calls
for further laws protecting women and children from physical, psychological, and social
abuse in the home.110 It also goes on to encourage local women’s organizations and
communities to uphold their national responsibilities to protect women and children from
abuse.
In addition to domestic protections, the strategy goes on to outline new laws
enforcing women’s participation in politics, the courts, and private organizations. Previous
strategies encouraged women in these roles as well. However, this strategy calls for at least
30 percent of the upper and lower chambers of parliament be women. In the government,
it calls for at least 30 percent of all decision-making bodies across every sector of the
government and its agencies. It specifies that this policy applies to the judicial system and
each of its councils, courts, and public prosecution and inspection offices. Axis 3 is a
reaffirmation of Jordan’s existing gender main streaming policies. However, it does
address the need for civil society organizations to partner with them in order to ensure
transparency, integrity, and justice in developing women’s policies.
Quadrant Four—Informal Norms and Deep Structure
There are significantly fewer policies in this strategy that address more broad social
norms and institutions. The current strategy’s pivots from the government’s previous focus
on cultural barriers to women’s advancement to narrower policies with technical
implementation and measurement. In the section on violence against women, the policy
110 Domestic abuse laws are within the civil penal codes not under the purview of the religious courts in the
Personal Status Laws. However, proof of abuse is often used as grounds for divorce in the Sharia courts
and for mothers to claim their children’s custody.
68
includes the objective to view the protection of women in the family, work, and community
as a national responsibility of citizens. Following this policy are two policies that aim to
enforce women’s protection. The sections of economic and political participation address
the need to shift perceptions of women in decision making and leadership as well as women
in all sectors of the economy. Those policies are complemented by policies that would
provide additional resources and legal rights for women in those spaces. Previous strategy
documents proposed broad social changes to address women’s empowerment yet did not
include ways to be held accountable to enforcing them or to monitoring progress towards
those goals. This strategy attempts to bridge this gap by pairing broad changes to social
norms with other narrower policy changes.
Reception and Impact of the Current National Strategy for Women
The 2013-2017 National Strategy for Women brought Jordan’s gender
mainstreaming policies closer in line with international policies that provide specific
indicators and strategies for enforcement. However, it also drew from lessons from the
previous strategies and focused on using cross cutting strategies across each of the policy
areas. Each of the axes in the strategy attempt to unify the approaches to changing gender
norms across the government ministries and at each level of society. The strategy’s primary
focus on women’s employment and political participation also echoed wider concerns in
Jordan on political and economic mobility following the Arab Spring. The strategy’s call
for a mandatory 30 percent women’s representation in the government agencies, judicial
system and parliament was a bold statement on the governments intentions to reframe
women’s roles in society.
69
This national strategy let a high mark for the Jordanian government to meet and to
be held accountable for. Since it was enacted, its progress has been limited. JNCW was
instrumental in forming the Women’s Caucus and helping them formulate legislative
agendas which a centered around eliminating discriminatory laws against women.
However, women still only make up 15 percent of both houses. On municipal and
government councils, women represent 28.8 percent of the members, which almost meets
the strategy’s goal of 30 percent. However, the women’s symbolic representation in politics
has not led to the transformative changes the strategy envisioned and the JNCW notes that,
“the women’s caucus serves as a vehicle for networking and support between female MPs,
but when it comes to clearly defined policy goals, there appears to be little traction and not
a clear consensus among members, even on issues pertaining to women’s rights.”111
Despite the lack of consensus or support for women’s rights among the female
members of parliament, 2016 was a turning point for women’s legal reform with the repeal
of the Article 308 in the Penal Code (also known as the “Marry the Rapist Law”).
Parliament still failed to address amendments to the Personal Status Laws. However, they
amended the Article 345 of the Penal Code which disqualified honor crimes from
mitigating circumstances. The King also created a judicial oversight committee dedicated
to monitoring the sentencing given to those convicted of honor crimes.112 According to the
last government report, the number of female judges increased from 176 (17 percent) in
2015 to 215 (22 percent ) in 2018 and is expected to rise to 25 percent in 2020. There are
female judges on the Court of Cassation, Judiciary Council, and the Court of Appeals.
111 MENA-OECD Governance Programme, “Women’s Political Participation in Jordan,” OECD, 2018
https://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/womens-political-participation-in-jordan.pdf 112 UN CEDAW. “Sixth Periodic Report of States Parties Due in 2016: Jordan,” UN Women, June 2015,
70
However, there are still no women in the Constitutional Court, Sharia Courts, or Church
Courts.113
Jordan’s efforts to improve women’s roles in the economy has been equally
disappointing. In 2020, Jordan is ranked 138 out of 153 countries for having the highest
gender gap between men and women’s economic outcomes. Women’s labor force
participation rate is at 15 percent compared to 67 percent for men. Less than 4 percent of
companies are owned by women and only 2.4 percent of top corporate leadership is
female.114
After a gender review of Jordan’s policies and country outcomes in 2016, UN
Women recommended that Jordan step up their commitment to closing the gender gap by
2030. Jordan agreed to their recommendations and pledged to increase JNCW’s budget
from 150,000 JDs (Jordanian Dinars) to 700,000 JDs.115 Jordan is currently in the process
of drafting a new national strategy for women that will be released later this year in
recognition of the 25th anniversary of the Beijing Platform for Action.
CONCLUSION
The Jordanian government’s understanding of gender mainstreaming, its
implementation, and its purpose had shifted dramatically from 1993 until today. Going into
the Beijing Conference in 1995, Jordan’s first national women’s strategy was a vague
113 JNCW. Comprehensive National Review of the Progress in the Implementation of the Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action 25 Years On. April 2019. 114 World Economic Forum. “Global Gender Gap Report 2020,” Geneva, 2020.
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf 115 This is approximately a change from $106,350 to $496,300.
UN Women, “Jordan pledges to align national laws with international commitments and expand support to
women and girls in many areas (updated),” New York, September 2016,
https://www.unwomen.org/en/get-involved/step-it-up/commitments/jordan
71
policy statement that reflected the government’s hesitancy to address gender roles and
women’s policy. Although the first strategy only gave vague guidance to the JNCW, soon
after retuning from Beijing they developed a program for action and began working with
one ministry at a time to integrate gender considerations into their policies. JNCW still
follows this approach of working closely with each of the ministries on gender budgeting
and conducting gender audits. They also still work closely with women’s organizations
across the country and worked with female members of parliament and municipal councils
in drafting legislation. This high level of collaboration across the political spectrum and
segments of Jordanian society would not be possible without the Royal family’s heavy
involvement in development work and women’s policies. Through sustained pressure from
Princess Basma and other members of the Royal family, Jordan has maintained its
commitment to gender mainstreaming through political, economic, and social upheavals.
Despite Jordan’s commitments to gender mainstreaming, state feminism has only
gone so far in closing the gender gap between men and women. The national strategies
avoid direct reforms to Personal Status Laws which limit women’s rights in marriage,
divorce, custody, mobility, inheritance, and citizenship. Jordanian women in Parliament
lack a meaningful role in shaping legislation for women and promoting equality. These
barriers to women’s public participation is seen in the gap between women’s educational
achievements and their professional opportunities. Women match or outpace men’s
performance academically. However, the pressure to balance a career with the traditional
role of women as wives and mothers discourages women from entering the workforce.
High levels of unemployment have further given women a disadvantage in competing with
men for positions in male dominated workplaces. In the last 25 years, gender
mainstreaming principles have transformed the Jordanian government’s policies towards
gender equality and women’s empowerment. Each of the national strategies show how
72
Jordan’s gender mainstreaming approaches have shifted and learned from the previous
policies. In the next 25 years, Jordan has the opportunity to continue this momentum
towards gender equity through further political, economic, and social reforms.
73
Chapter 5: Conclusion
Since the Jordanian women’s delegation went to the Beijing conference in 1995,
gender mainstreaming in Jordan has remained a consistent part of the government’s
priorities. Although each national agenda has reflected different priorities in gender policy,
the JNCW has held the government to its commitment to promoting gender equality. The
strategies lay out a vision for addressing the individual, systemic, formal, and informal
barriers to transformative change in Jordanian society. This vision has not always been
supported by each of the ministries, parliament, or groups in society. However, given
JNCW’s limited budget and inconsistent support for their initiatives their sustained work
in gender equality has led to remarkable changes. Women’s education, health, and human
development outcomes have dramatically changed in the last twenty-five years. Despite
limited changes to Personal Status Laws, the government has changed aspects of its labor
laws, penal codes, and citizenship laws to expand women’s rights and freedoms. These
reforms and progress towards women’s equality have been the culmination of twenty-five
years of gender mainstreaming policies in addition to the Jordanian women’s activism
since the mid-1950’s. Jordanian women still face discrimination, inequality, and exclusion
in many areas of society that still need to be addresses in the next twenty-five years.
Addressing the gaps in gender equality in the next twenty-five years will require
sustained and increased engagement in gender mainstreaming. Many of the previous
women’s policies were successful at creating more opportunities for women in
development; however, they missed many transformational changes in gender dynamics.
As women’s activists, policy makers, and international organizations continue to shape
policies that will uplift women in Jordan, they should be aware of how past trends in gender
policy will impact their work. Transformation is slow in shifting gender dynamics in
society and understanding the historical context is critical to maintaining momentum and
74
understanding embedded formal and informal structures. These themes emerged out of the
analysis of Jordanian state feminism and gender mainstreaming in the last sixty-five years.
The national strategies were formal expressions of Jordan’s approach to state feminism and
these themes show dominant patterns that emerged from the formalization of Jordanian
state feminism.
In my research in the previous chapters, five different themes in Jordanian state
feminism and gender mainstreaming policies emerged that are critical to highlight. In the
following section, I will critically examine the themes that emerged in my historical and
textual analysis of Jordanian women and gender policies. The five themes to be discussed
are: (1) the influence of international agreements and donors; (2) the lack of funding and
economic recessions; (3) the relationship between the monarchy and women’s rights
activists; (4) Political opposition from influential conservative groups; (5) and entrenched
gender roles in households. Examining these themes is critical to understanding the current
and future work in development policy making in Jordan.
INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND DONORS
Jordan’s adoption of gender mainstreaming reflects their long and close
relationship with international organizations as well as a desire to maintain international
standards. Despite the ban on political parties and parliament’s suspension, King Hussein
asked for Emily Bisharat and the Jordan Women’s Union to plan the national recognition
of the UN’s newly designated Women’s Day and the UN Decade for women. Jordan sent
a delegation, often including a member of the Royal family, to each of the UN Women’s
conferences from Mexico City in 1975 to Beijing in 1995. The first national women’s
strategy in 1993 reflected the Nairobi conference’s call to include women in policy making
at every level of government and explicitly stated that it’s implementation “benefits from
75
the relevant regional and international strategies.”116 Jordan’s gender mainstreaming
policy’s close alignment with international standards and norms is also seen in the
following two strategies.
The second national strategy’s recognition on different barriers to women based on
their age, ability, and class reflected international concerns on intersectionality. Rather than
see women as a monolithic category, the national strategy lays out how the intersection
between gender and other socio-economic characteristics can impact their needs and
barriers to empowerment. This national strategy was also released in conjunction with
Jordan’s ratification of CEDAW in 2006 and integration into the national legal code giving
it the force of law. The current national plan, which was released in 2013, has a much more
technical framing of its gender mainstreaming strategy. Rather than discuss its plans in
broad sweeping terms like the previous plans, each policy initiatives as a concrete,
measurable indicator to measure its progress. The technicity of this document reflected
international donor concerns for the program’s management and accountability.
LACK OF FUNDING AND ECONOMIC RECESSIONS
Across each of the national strategies, there is no mention of delegated funding for
any of the programs. The JNCW works closely with each of the ministries to integrate
gender equality into their programing. But, the lack of dedicated budgets in the ministries
or to JNCW makes their policies less sustainable year to year and more difficult to
implement. Ministries must agree to new gender policies and divert funding from other
programs to them. The last national strategy created as step-up plan with a budget at the
116 Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, “The National Women’s Strategy, 1993,” The United
Nations, accessed January 7, 2020,
https://www.un.org/womenwatch/confer/beijing/national/jordanap.htm
76
request of the UN oversight body at CEDAW. The lack of funding and gender budgeting
is a perineal issue that JNCW faces when taking the national strategy from words to action.
Jordan’s economic instability has also played a role women’s participation in the
labor force. The only time when women where increasing their rate of labor participation
was during a labor shortage caused by the oil boom in the 1970’s. This labor shortage
coincided with higher levels of education for women and a large public sector that needed
more white-collar workers. Similarly to the United States post-WWII, women returned to
their domestic roles when the men came back from the Gulf during low oil prices and the
Gulf War. However, the preference for women working white-collar public sector jobs
became engrained in Jordanian society to this day.
Chronic high unemployment rates in Jordan though from 1995 to today have further
limited women’s opportunities.117 JNCW and other organizations have poured money and
time into professional training programs for women and loans for women’s businesses, but
these programs have not led to a sustained increase in women’s labor force participation.
Discrimination against women in the labor force is compounded by a lack of employment.
Today, women’s unemployment stands at 23 percent of the female labor force compared
to men’s unemployment at 12 percent of the male work force. In a World Bank program
for young women’s employment, private firms were given vouchers for hiring the young
women for six months at minimum wage. Given the financial incentives, women were
hired at double the rates of women without the vouchers. But they were dismissed of their
positions shortly after the six-month voucher expired.118 The private firms were willing
117 International Labor Organization, “ILOSTAT Database.” Geneva, accessed December 2019,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?contextual=aggregate&locations=JO 118 Matthew Groh, Nandini Krishnan, David McKenzie, Tara Vishwanath, Soft skills or hard cash?: the
impact of training and wage subsidy programs on female youth employment in Jordan (English), (Gender
Impact: the World Bank's Gender Impact Evaluation Database, Washington D.C.)
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/620451468038640901/Soft-skills-or-hard-cash-the-impact-of-
training-and-wage-subsidy-programs-on-female-youth-employment-in-Jordan
77
to hire the young women when given the means. However, they could not afford to keep
them on after the voucher expired. Women’s empowerment and gender equality programs
in Jordan face difficulty becoming sustainable without dedicated budgets for their
programs.
THE MONARCHY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH WOMEN’S RIGHTS ACTIVISTS
One of the most unique aspects of the Jordanian gender mainstreaming policies has
been the Royal Hashemite family’s involvement in supporting and expanding the
initiatives. Since the country’s early history, the Hashemites have played a large role in
women’s organizations and influencing the debate on Jordanian gender roles. Princess Zain
al-Sharaf was the president of the first Jordan Women’s Union in 1945 and Princess
Basmah bint Talal is the current president of the JNCW. In addition to the holding the
highest positions in national women’s organizations, the Royal family’s philanthropic
organizations gives them influence over what types of gender programs are created and
funded. Some independent activists and conservative Muslim groups have criticized the
Royal family’s outsized role in gender policies. Feminists activists complain that the Royal
family’s approach is too moderate and frames women’s policies for their utilitarian rather
than intrinsic values. Conservative groups criticize the Royal family’s stance as too
Western and for undermining traditional Muslim Arab values.119 Despite these criticisms,
there is no denying that the Royal family’s support for expanding gender mainstreaming
has allowed gender equality initiatives to stay relevant amidst the country’s tumultuous
economy and regional position. Princes Basma’s position as the King’s aunt gives her
authority to negotiate with ministers, tribal leaders, and feminists in a way that few other
119 Sherry R. Lowrance,“After Beijing: Political Liberalization and the Women's Movement in Jordan,”
Middle Eastern Studies 34, no. 3 (July, 1998): 92-93. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4283953
78
women would be able. Queen Rania has increasingly been involved in women’s
empowerment and gender equality initiatives and leading the next generation of Jordanian
women in those efforts.
POLITICAL OPPOSITION FROM CONSERVATIVE GROUPS
The first national strategy for women did not see a need to reconcile advocating for
Islamic values and Sharia with women’s empowerment and equal rights. Sharia is a part of
the Jordanian constitution as is the equal rights for all citizens. Although the subsequent
gender mainstreaming strategies were silent on Sharia law, but also did discuss the
importance of Islamic values in Jordanian society. The silence on Sharia law reflects the
politicization of Personal Status Laws in Jordan and the difficulty of reforming the religious
courts. The few times that King Abdullah has attempted to reform these laws, the lower
house of Parliament has overturned them. Opposition to changing Personal Status Laws
has stemmed from both tribal coalitions and the Islamic Action Front. The tribal leaders,
who a generally pro-monarchy, and the Islamic Action Front, the monarchy’s most
outspoken critics, reconcile their political differences to block legal changes to women’s
statuses in the Sharia courts. To maintain these group’s cooperation, the King and his
cabinet has opted for amending other areas of the law and increasing oversight over the
religious courts. Yet, very little changes have been made to the Personal Status Laws due
to those conservative factions.
ENTRENCHED GENDER ROLES IN HOUSEHOLDS
A mainstream argument in development and feminism is that encouraging access
to education will translate to professional opportunities which will lead to transformation
79
in society. The UNDP Jordan Resident Representative, Sara Ferrer Olivella, stated that “By
providing opportunities to young girls and women you do not only transform their families
but entire communities, villages and future generations.”120 This theory of transformation
is based on a vision of social justice that is linked to better access and allocation of
resources for individuals. Through increased individualism and commodification of
women’s roles in the economy and society, the market becomes the medium for social
justice and women’s empowerment. This theory of transformation does not take into
account entrenched gender roles and collective bargaining within households. Perceptions
of women working outside the home have become more positive since the 1970’s when
women first joined the labor force. However, perceptions on women’s roles in the family
and responsibilities at home have remained very traditional.
A World Bank survey on perceptions of women in the workforce found that: “90
percent of women respondents said that, in the decision to work, the views of male
household members (mostly husbands) are important or extremely important.”121 In
addition, discouragement from husbands (19 percent) was the most common reason for
women not working. Only 25 percent of women believed that they had the right to work
even if it made the men in their household uncomfortable. In addition to pressure from
member of their family to not work, women also have very little financial independence.
Of all the women respondents, working (44 percent) and non-working (90 percent), 67
percent of them did not have bank accounts.122 Although women may be earning their
120 Ewelina U. Ochab, “The UNDP Working To Empowering Women In Jordan.” Forbes. February 5,
2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2019/02/05/the-undp-working-to-empowering-women-
in-jordan/#3ac109614c77 121 Iman Kalyan Sen, Tasmia Rahman, Anoud Allouzi, and Samantha Constant, “Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan Understanding How Gender Norms in MNA Impact Female Employment Outcomes,” Middle East
and North Africa. (Washington, DC: World Bank), 2018.
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/859411541448063088/pdf/ACS25170-PUBLIC-FULL-
REPORT-Jordan-Social-Norms-June-1-2018-with-titlepg.pdf 122 Ibid.
80
own incomes, it does not guarantee that they will have control over it. For women’s
employment to have the transformational impact that international development
organizations envision, social norms and expectations will have to continue to change
positively towards gender equality.
WHERE DOES GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN JORDAN GO FROM HERE?
From the outside, it may not seem like Jordanian women have achieved high levels
of equality or rights in society. Yet, it is not fair to compare the pace or process of change
in one country to another’s. The Jordanian government’s gender mainstreaming policies
have not achieved the same level of impact as those in the Scandinavian countries. But, the
JNCW and the Jordanian government has made remarkable inroads in opening up
opportunities for women and changing the debate around women’s roles in politics and the
labor force. However, these efforts will be in vain without the engagement of civil society
groups from across the political, religious, economic, and regional spectrum. The Royal
family’s involvement in campaigning for women’s rights has challenged many perceptions
on women’s abilities. However, their top-down strategies have yet to shift many entrenched
views on women’s roles in the household. Gender mainstreaming policies in Jordan can
only begin to be transformative if the values of gender equality and women’s empowerment
are embraced at every level of society. Social values have changed in some areas, but not
all. It is up to the Jordanian government, civil society organizations, and individuals to
sustain and continue the progress of gender mainstreaming policies. The policies may have
limited initial impact, but their continued influence on Jordanian society is critical for
transforming gender roles long-term.
81
Appendix
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL 5: GENDER EQUALITY
Targets Indicators
5.1 5.1.1
End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls
everywhere
Whether or not legal frameworks are in place to promote, enforce
and monitor equality and non‑discrimination on the basis of sex
5.2 5.2.1
Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the
public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and
other types of exploitation
Proportion of ever-partnered women and girls aged 15 years and
older subjected to physical, sexual or psychological violence by a
current or former intimate partner in the previous 12 months, by
form of violence and by age
5.2.2
Proportion of women and girls aged 15 years and older subjected to
sexual violence by persons other than an intimate partner in the
previous 12 months, by age and place of occurrence
5.3 5.3.1
Eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced
marriage and female genital mutilation
Proportion of women aged 20-24 years who were married or in a
union before age 15 and before age 18
5.3.2
Proportion of girls and women aged 15-49 years who have
undergone female genital mutilation/cutting, by age
5.4 5.4.1
Recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through the
provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection
policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the
household and the family as nationally appropriate
Proportion of time spent on unpaid domestic and care work, by sex,
age and location
5.5 5.5.1
Ensure women’s full and effective participation and equal
opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in
political, economic and public life
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments and local
governments
5.5.2
Proportion of women in managerial positions
5.6 5.6.1
Ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health and
reproductive rights as agreed in accordance with the Programme
of Action of the International Conference on Population and
Development and the Beijing Platform for Action and the
outcome documents of their review conferences
Proportion of women aged 15-49 years who make their own
informed decisions regarding sexual relations, contraceptive use and
reproductive health care
5.6.2
Number of countries with laws and regulations that guarantee
women aged 15-49 years access to sexual and reproductive health
care, information and education
Table 1: Sustainable Development Goal 5: Achieve Gender Equality and Empower All
Women and Girls
82
5.A 5.A.1
Undertake reforms to give women equal rights to
economic resources, as well as access to ownership and
control over land and other forms of property, financial
services, inheritance and natural resources, in
accordance with national laws
(a) Proportion of total agricultural population with
ownership or secure rights over agricultural land, by
sex; and (b) share of women among owners or rights-
bearers of agricultural land, by type of tenure
5.A.2
Proportion of countries where the legal framework
(including customary law) guarantees women’s equal
rights to land ownership and/or control
5.B 5.B.1
Enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular
information and communications technology, to
promote the empowerment of women
Proportion of individuals who own a mobile telephone,
by sex
5.C 5.C.1
Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable
legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the
empowerment of all women and girls at all levels
Proportion of countries with systems to track and make
public allocations for gender equality and women’s
empowerment
Table 1, continued
83
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