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Theredweb:thestrugglebetweenRussia’sdigitaldictatorsandthenewonlinerevolutionaries/AndreiSoldatovandIrinaBorogan.

—FirstEdition.pagescm

Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.ISBN97811-61039157418(electronic)

1.Internet—Politicalaspects—Russia(Federation) 2.Informationsociety—Politicalaspects—Russia(Federation) 3.Internet—Accesscontrol—Russia(Federation) 4.Electronic

surveillance—Russia(Federation) 5.Freedomofinformation—Russia(Federation) 6.Russia(Federation)—Politicsandgovernment—1991–

I.Borogan,I.(Irina) II.Title.JN6695.A55A8592015303.48’330947—dc23

2015015850

FirstEdition

10987654321

“Informationwantstobefree.”

—FuturistStewartBrand

“Thisisnotaphoneconversation.”

—aRussianexpressionmeaningawishtodiscusssomethinginpersonbecause

somebodyelsemightbelistening

OChapter13.TheBigRedButton

nFebruary23,2014,thedaytheSochiOlympicsended,Putinwasnotentirelyhappy.Oneofhisguests,acloseally,whowaswithhimattheopening ceremony of the games had gonemissing from Sochi. Viktor

Yanukovych, theUkrainian president, had disappeared fromhis capital,Kiev, aday before. After months of protests against Yanukovych on the Maidan, thecentral square ofKiev, no one knewwhere the president had gone. Televisionbroadcasts showed that some government buildings in the capital had beenabandoned; the headquarters of theUkranian secret policewas also empty, andpolicewerenowheretobeseen.ProtestershadpulleddownamonumenttoLenin.The demonstrations and the sudden dissolution of Yanukovych’s presidencyappearedtoPutintobefarmoreseriousthanthepublicuprisingsknownas“colorrevolutions”overthepreviousdecadeinUkraineandGeorgia,and,beginningin2010, theArabSpring; this time it lookedmore likeAugust of 1991,when theSovietUnionteeteredontheabyss.ForPutin,theeventsinUkrainesuggestedthattheelitesofthecountryhadsplit,andsomeofthemhadbetrayedYanukovych,afrightening prospect for the Russian president. Putin had invested his personalprestige in Yanukovych and sent his intelligence officers to Kiev under theguidanceofacolonelgeneraloftheFSBtoshowhissupport.WhenYanukovychfled, Putin saw it as proof of a conspiracy by theWest to undermine Russia’ssphereofinfluence,which,inhismind,includedUkraine.1

In aweek theRussianmilitary transportedYanukovych toRostov-on-DonandunmarkedRussiantroopsoccupiedCrimea,whichhadbeenpartofUkraine.OnMarch1Putin obtainedpermission from the cheeringRussianparliament touse troops in Ukraine as well.2 They unleashed an unprecedented campaign ofpropaganda,callingtheUkrainianprotesters“fascists”andwarningthatRussiansliving ineasternUkrainewere threatened.3Thiswas the start of amajor armedconflict that engulfed eastern Ukraine in the months ahead as Russian-backedseparatistsbattledUkrainian troops forcontrolof severalprovinces.Thousands

ofpeoplewerekilledandinjuredinthewar,incitingsharpprotestsandWesternsanctionsimposedonRussia.

As soon as the crisis began, the Russian authorities tightened control ofinformation online. Since 2012 the Kremlin had been actively buildingmechanismsandtoolsofcontroloftheInternet,andnowthemomentcametotesttheireffectiveness.OnMarch3Roskomnadzorrushedtoblockthirteenpagesofgroups linked to the Ukrainian protest movement on the Russian-based socialnetworkVKontakte.4

OnMarch 8 pro-Kremlin activists launched a newwebsite that pointed afingerat“nationaltraitors.”Itwasestablishedonthedomainpredatel.net,wherepredatelstandsforatraitor,anddomainextension.netfornyet,orno:notraitors.It sought togather thepublic statementsof liberalsdeemedunpatriotic and thenthreaten them. The first name on the listwasNavalny, and it also included theopposition leader Boris Nemtsov, journalist Sergei Parkhomenko, artists andwriters,andsomecivilactivistsandjournalistswhotookpartinMoscowprotestsin2011–2012.

A week later a popular Russian news site, Lenta.ru, suddenly faced thetraditionalmethodsofintimidationbytheauthorities.OnthemorningofMarch12Roskomnadzor issued the website a warning for publishing material of an“extremist nature,” citing an interview with one of the leaders of the far rightUkrainian party, Pravy Sector. The interview was conducted by Ilya Azar, thereporter who had exposed the carousel voting fraud during the Russianparliamentaryelections inDecember2012.On the samedayas thewarning theowner of Lenta.ru,AlexanderMamut, called the editor,Galina Timchenko, anddemanded Azar be fired. Timchenko refused, so Mamut immediately firedTimchenko.All thirty-nine journalists ofLenta.ru left the publication in protest,alongwithTimchenko.5

On March 16 a hurried referendum in Crimea resulted in a call to joinRussia.TwodayslaterPutinsummonedbothhousesoftheRussianparliamenttothe Kremlin for what was to be one of his most memorable and emotionalspeeches celebrating the taking of Crimea, with its big Russian-speakingpopulation,fromUkraine.ToeffusiveapplausePutinspokeemotionallyaboutthe

destiny of Russia.And then, finally, he turned to theWest, noting that Russia’sactionshadalreadydrawnthreatsofsanctionsthatmightcausedisruptioninsideRussia.Hepausedandthenaskedominously,“Iwouldliketoknowwhatitistheyhaveinmindexactly:actionbythefifthcolumn,thisdisparatebunchof‘nationaltraitors,’oraretheyhopingtoputusinaworseningsocialandeconomicsituationsoastoprovokepublicdiscontent?”Hepromisedto“respondaccordingly.”6

Earlier, on March 13, Roskomnadzor had blocked three independentoppositionnewsmedia—Kasparov.ru,Ej.ru,andGrani.ru—alongwithNavalny’sblog on LiveJournal.com.7 Maxim Ksenzov from Roskomnadzor was quick toexplain that the siteswere blocked because of “extremist calls.”He added thatNavalnywasnolongerallowedtousecommunicationsandpostanythingon theInternet: “Wherever the materials appear under his name—there will beblocking.”8

The political commentary site Ej.ru represents Ezhednevny Journal, orDailyJournal,andwaslaunchedin2005inadesperateattempttosaveateamofjournalists thrown out of Itogimagazine during the annihilation of Gusinsky’smediaempire.Withasimpledesign,itpublishedthreestoriesperdayalongwithsome short news items. Along with Grani.ru, it was a platform for prominentliberalcommentatorsinthecountry,fromsatiristViktorShenderovich,tomilitaryexpertsandpoliticalanalystsexpelled from traditionalmedia in the2000s.Thesiteenjoyedpopularityamongtheliberal-mindedintelligentsia.

SinceFebruaryEj.ruhadcomeunder fierceattack fromPutin’ssupportersafterithadpublishedacolumnbyShenderovichinwhichhequestionedthewholewave of intense patriotism ignited by theSochiOlympics.9 Despite the attacks,Ej.rucontinuedfunctioning,andonthisdayithadastorythatdissectedRussianpropagandaand the televisedeuphoria surrounding theannexationofCrimeabyRussia.ThatsamedayNavalnypostedtheresultsofphonepollsconductedbyhisactivists about Crimea and Ukraine, revealing that Russians’ attitudes weredramatically contrary to the propaganda.Navalny said his surveys showed that84.5percentofthoseaskedviewedUkraineasafriendlycountry.

From thisdayonwardall three sites andablogwereblockedonRussiansoil.

T

henightofPutin’sspeech,worriedjournalistsoftheliberalandindependentmedia arranged an urgent meeting. They chose to meet at the Sakharov

Center,thevenueofhumanrightsorganizations,namedaftertheSovietdissidentAndreiSakharov,onThursday,March21.Thecenteroccupiestwobuildings—atwo-storymansionanda tinyexpositionhallon theembankmentof theMoscowRiver. It was given the premises in the early 1990s by the first Russiangovernment,whichfeltinsomedebttoSovietdissidents,andforyearsthecenterwasusedtohosttalksanddebatesonhumanrightsissues.

That evening Sergei Lukashevsky, the thirty-nine-year-old director of thecenterwhohadbroughthischildrentothedemonstrationonBolotnayaSquarein2012,waswaitingforthejournalistsandbloggerstogatheronthesecondflooroftheSakharovCenter,inaroomfilledwithchairssetinacircle.Alleditorsoftheblocked websites came to the meeting, including Alexander Ryklin of Ej.ru;Vladimir Korsunsky, editor of Grani.ru, and Kirill Samodurov, editor ofKasparov.ru.GalinaTimchenko,aformereditorofLenta.ru,wasamongthefirsttoarrive.AntonNossikwalkedin,followedbyGrigoryOkhotinfromOVD-Info.OlgaRomanova,fromRussiaBehindBars,whohadcollectedmoneyviaYandexMoneyfor theprotests in2011,alsoappeared.TherewasalsoNikolaiLyaskin,one ofChiefNavalny’s lieutenants, andLenaBereznitskaya-Bruni, the editor ofNewsru.comwho had helped us withstand FSB pressure in 2002. All in all,dozensofjournalistsandbloggerscamealongwithsomeliberallawyers.

Theday theyhadall fearedhadfinallyarrived.SinceNovember2012 thefilteringinRussiaexpandedtoareaswaybeyondprotectingchildrenfromharmfulcontent. ByMarch 2014Russia had four official blacklists of bannedwebsitesandpages:thefirstonetodealwithsitesdeemedextremist;thesecondtoblocksitescontainingchildpornography,suicide,anddrugs;thethirdtoblocksiteswithcopyrightproblems;andthefourth,themostrecentone,createdinFebruary2014,lists the sites blocked—without a court order—because they call fordemonstrations that had not been approved by the authorities. There is also anunofficialfifthblacklistaimednotatsitesbutathostingcompaniesbasedabroad

thatRoskomnadzorconsiderstobeuncooperativeand,thus,needtobeblocked.The fourth blacklist, which included Ej.ru,Kasparov.ru,Grani.ru, and the

Navalny blog, exists thanks to the efforts of Andrei Lugovoi, a former KGBofficerbestknownforhisinvolvementinthepoisoningofanotherformerRussiansecurity agent, Alexander Litvinenko, who fled to London in 2000 and wasassassinated in2006.TheBritishauthorities accusedLugovoiof conducting thepoisoningbyradioactivepolonium,allegationshevehementlydenied.Instead,heaccusedtheBritishintelligenceofcarryingoutthepoisoningandgotaseatintheRussianparliament.HewasmadeamemberoftheSecurityCommittee,inchargeof writing legislation for the Russian secret services, of the State Duma. PutinapprovedLugovoi’s blacklist inDecember 30, 2013, and it came into force onFebruary1,2014.

The discussion at the Sakharov Center was emotional. Roskomnadzor’sfailure to provide any reason for the blocking outraged editors of the blockedsites.In the letters theyall receivedtheyweresimplytold,withnoexplanation,that theywouldbeblocked.Korsunsky remarkeddarkly, “Websites areblockedjust because they are suppressed as enemy information sources. Putin said itopenly: ‘Theenemies.’He’sgoing to fightwith this.But legally, there is still apossibility—aslongaswebreathe,weneedtodosomething.Aswellastokeepworking.”Butheurged,“Weshouldbereadytoworkinastateofwar.”

The editors debated possible legal avenues of resistance and technicalsolutions that could bypass the blocking. The odds ofwinning in court seemedslim.Ryklinangrilysaidthateverybodyshouldfinallyunderstandthattheirsitesareblockedforever,andeven if the lawyerswouldbeable towin incourt, thenext day the General Prosecutor’s Office would find another article to use aspretextforblocking.10

Olga Pashkova from Ej.ru suggested launching a united platform for allblocked sites. Other journalists thought about posting extracts of the stories onFacebook.Nossikexclaimed,“ForgetaboutFacebook—itwouldbeblockedinamonth.WearewalkinginthedirectionofNorthKorea!”Timchenkoinsistedthatthe blocked sites should turn to socialmedia, “Launch your campaign in socialnetworks and contact the administrators of large groups, for example in

VKontakte.That’sall.Thisisaverybigresource.”Thejournaliststhoughtofsomejointactiontheymighttake,acampaignfor

theblockedwebsites,butitwasclearthiswasnotagoodoption.AneditoroftheEcho Moskvy website, which might have been counted upon to take up thecampaign, was at the meeting but was conspicuously silent. Nossik was notdiscouraged, arguing that they all have an advantage: “We allworkwith bytes,right?Andwecanallinteractwiththesamebytes.”Hesaidthattheydon’tneedto meet somewhere regularly to coordinate efforts; it’s enough to meet onFacebook.AndwhenFacebookwouldbeshutdown,somewhereelse.

Buttheyallurgentlyneededtofindawaytobypasstheblocking.TherewasalotoftalkaboutTor,acircumventiontoolinwidespreadusearoundtheworldandessentiallyanetworkofvirtualtunnels:insteadoftakingadirectroutefromsource to destination, data packets on the Tor network take a random pathwaythroughseveralrelaysthatcoverauser’strackssonobodyatanysinglepointcantellwherethedatacamefromorwhereit’sgoing.Inthecaseoftheblockedsites,itmeant that peoplewho came to the blocked sites couldn’t be seen as comingfromRussia,thusevadingRoskomnadzor’sblocking.It’seasytouse,andtheonlyproblemwithToristhatausermustinstallTorsoftwareonthecomputertouseitsnetwork.

That posed a fundamental problem: How could they teach readers to usecircumvention tools? The blocked sites already lost thousands of readers, andalthoughacommittedaudiencewouldfindawaytogettothesites, thequestionremained:Howwouldtheyreachtherest?

NossikcameupwiththeideatopromoteTorandothercircumventiontoolsonhispageonLiveJournal.comandcalledothers to followhis example.SomesuggestedtoremembertheSovietdissidentpracticeofdisseminatinginformationoncarbon-copiedtypescriptknownassamizdat.Someofferedtoprintleaflets.

OneofthoseatthemeetingwasArtemKozlyuk,athirty-five-year-oldbornin Cherepovets in central Russia to a military family. He studied at theCherepovetsmilitary school, spent a fewyears in the army, and soonmoved toMoscow,wherehejoinedthePiratePartyin2011.TheideaofInternetcensorshipshockedhim,andthedaytheblacklistcameintoforce,onNovember1,2012,he

B

launched a project against filtering. Itwas calledRoskomsvoboda, or FreedomfromRoskomnadzor,andwasalsoknownasRublacklist.net.Onthehomepageofthewebsite there isa linkto themajor treasureof theproject—thetotalofhowmanysitesareblockedandalistofsitesblockedbymistake.

KsenzovandZharov,thebrainsbehindRoskomnadzor,hadmadetheofficialblacklist secret,ostensibly toavoidpromoting theblocked sites andpages.ThelistisavailableonlytoauthorizedISPssotheycancheckthelistsdaily.Kozlyukwascertainthattheprimitivesystemoffilteringinevitablyledtotheblockingofinnocent sites that happen to be hosted on the same IP address, so hemade hiscause to find away to check the blacklist against the real numbers of blockedsites.SomeliberalISPssharedthedatafromtheblacklists,andKozlyukwasableto check how many sites are blocked along with the sites targeted byRoskomnadzor. The difference in numbers was astonishing—whereasRoskomnadzor insisted that only a few thousand siteswere blocked,Kozlyuk’sfiguresshowedtensofthousandsofsites.Kozlyukknewbetterthananyoneintheroomhowthefilteringwasorganized,andhewashopeful.Hedescribedhowonedayhewantedtogotoaprohibitedsite,Grani.ru.Whenhedidthis,thepagewasblank—itwasblocked.ButhishomeISPhaddefiantlyputamessageontheblankpage,saying,“Tobypassthecensorship,clickhere.”Thelinkthentooktheusertoasitewitha listofcircumvention tools.Kozlyuk’spointwas thatmanyfriendlyISPs might be enlisted to help bypass the censorship. Kozlyuk’s idea drewsupport,but few in the roombelieved itwouldbeable tosolve theproblemofblocking.

utsoonatechnicalsolutionwasfound,onethatwasmuchmoreeffectiveatevadingtheblacklists.Ruslan Leviev, then twenty-seven years old, is a computer geek and a

lawyerbytraining.Shortandthin,withearringsinbothofhisearlobesandoftenwitharadicalhaircut,hewasbornintheRussianFarEast,whereheworkedforan NGO providing poor citizens with legal support in court. In 2009 Leviev

movedtoMoscow,andtwoyearslaterhejoinedtheprotestsinMoscowagainstfraud in the parliamentary elections and was detained along with hundreds ofoutragedMuscovites.Hespenttwodaysinprison,andwhenheleftthedetentioncenter,hedecidedtovolunteertohelpNavalnybuildhisonlineprojects.ThefirstwastheonlineelectionswatchdogNavalnylaunched.

When the law on filtering was debated in 2012, Leviev attended themeetings at Roskomnadzor as Navalny’s representative, and he got to knowKsenzov.Leviev tried to explainwhy the filteringwas such abad idea, andheinvitedKsenzov to talk to the audience ofHabrahabr, the biggest Russianwebcommunityofprogrammers,whereLevievpublished extracts ofNavalny’sblogon fighting corruption. On January 4, 2013, Ksenzov started answering theparticipants’questionsandpostedhisanswersforafewdays.Levievthoughtthiswas a very good sign—he even asked the audience to be polite with Ksenzovbecause he could not imagine an official from any other ministry departmentwillingtotalktothem.

WhenNavalny’sblogonLiveJournalwasblockedonMarch18,2014—theblog on which Leviev had worked so hard—Leviev came to realize that thecooperationwith the authoritieswas pointless.Everything seemed to change soquickly;KsenzovatoncestartedtoattackLeviev,callinghimaforeignagentandthefifthcolumnbecauseLevievhadvolunteeredforNavalny.

Leviev felt desperate, but one day a friend gave him an idea of how tobypass theblocking.When someonevisits an Internet site, such asLenta.ru, thedomainnameislinkedtooneormoreInternetprotocoladdresses,whichareasetofnumbers.Sometimestherecanbeawholelistoftheseaddresseslinkedtoonedomain. By changing the list of the Internet protocol addresses assigned to thedomainonthesiteofdomainnamesregistrationcenter,Levievfoundthathecouldtricktheblocking—evensenditoffinanotherdirectionentirely.Inanexperimenthemanipulated thenumbersso thatwhenRoskomnadzor tried toblockNavalny,they instead blocked a pro-Kremlin site called Lifenews.ru. Next he triedredirectingthecensorshiptoblockRoskomnadzor’sowninternallistofsitesthatwere currently blocked, paralyzing Roskomnadzor.11 “It was like the blacklistblockeditself,”Levievrecalled.

L

Itwas a bright victory forLeviev’s team: the systemof technical filteringhad gaps, and Leviev thought about how to exploit them, not to harassRoskomnadzorbuttokeepNavalny’sblogonline.

They set up a domain, navalny.us,with lots of subdomains—the technicalmechanismofblockingdoesnotblockallsubdomains.Levievcalledforhelp:onthe site of navalny.us he posted instructions on how tomake a subdomain, andurged people to make them and send word to Navalny. Over sixty volunteersresponded,manywith several subdomains, andLevievgot a networkof 150 to200possiblesubdomains,readytogo.

The systembecameknown as the “BigRedButtonofNavalny”—theusergetstonavalny.us,seesabigredbutton,pushesit,anditleadshimorhertooneofthesubdomains.Navalny’sblogsurvives.

NextLevievwent towar againstRoskomnadzor’s censors.He figuredouthowtoidentifywhoinsidetheagencywasresponsibleforthesearch-and-destroymissionsagainstNavalnyandothers.12InAprilLevievpublishedalargepostwitha scheme, logs, and detailed explanations of who was in charge inside ofRoskomnadzorforcheckingtheblockedsites.13Byexposingthem,hemadetheirlives difficult, often trapping them into long, pointless dead ends. When thecensors came to work and started to check whether the Navalny blog wasworking, their screens were filled with images of cats and ponies—a wickedretaliation.

Leviev was pleasantly surprised one day when Roskomnadzor officialsacknowledged to the newspaper Vedomosti that they saw a cat instead ofNavalny’sblog.14 Itwas a triumph—a rare one—for the digital revolutionaries.DespiteallofRoskomnadzor’sefforts,Navalny’sblogwasaliveandaccessible,andnooneneededspecialsoftwarelikeTortoaccessthesite.

evievwassittingintheofficesofTVDozhdintheRedOctobercompoundwhenhetoldIrinaabouthissuccessinevadingthecensors.Leviev’ssmall

company, Newscaster, was broadcasting online from an antiwar street

demonstration inMoscowforTVDozhd.Newscasterprovided thebroadcast toTV Dozhd for free because Leviev thought its content was important. The TVDozhdpremiseswerealmostdesertedbecausethechannelwasonthemoveafterhavingcomeunderconstantpressure.Inthepatriotichystericsthatwerealreadyevident in January 2014, TV Dozhd was accused of being unpatriotic forconductingacontroversialonlinepollthataskedviewerswhetherLeningrad,nowSt. Petersburg, should have been surrendered to the Nazis in 1941 in order tospareitscitizensthemassagonyofabrutalnine-hundred-daysiege.ThepolltookplaceonSunday,January26,adaybeforetheseventiethanniversaryoftheliftingofthesiege.Pro-Kremlinbloggersimmediatelyattackedthechannel,andinthirtyminutes Ilya Klishin, now editor of the channel’s site, removed the poll andapologizedforthewording.OnMondayPutinwasinSt.Petersburgtotakepartinofficial celebrations.15 Hewas on his way to the Piskarev cemeterywhere hisbrother,whohaddiedduringtheblockade,isburied,whenhewasshowntheTVDozhdpoll.16

OnJanuary27Sindeeva,thefounderofTVDozhd,wassittinginherglassofficeatRedOctober.Shestartedgettingcallsande-mailsfromviewersthatthechannelwasgoingoff theair indifferent regions.Acableoperator,whosaid itwashispatrioticduty to throwTVDozhdoffhispackage,begantheattack,andsoonothersfollowed.17BythenTVDozhdwaspresentin18millionhomesandenjoyed amonthly audience of 12million viewers.Every day an estimated 1.1million people watched it. The audience in regions was on the rise, andSindeeva’s contacts told her that the presidential administration was worriedaboutthegrowthinviewers;TVDozhdhadceasedbeingjustaMoscowhipster’sthing. Some operators called Sindeeva and explained that they got phone callsfrom the Kremlin and could not resist the pressure.18 “It was a snowball,”Sindeeva said.When,on January29,Putin’s spokespersonDmitryPeskov said,“TV Dozhd crossed the line of the permissible,” all other cable operatorsfollowed suit and switched off TV Dozhd.19 The channel lost millions ofviewers —itslifeline.

Sindeevadesperately tried to findaway toget thechannelbackoncable.Thechannelheldapressconference,andSindeevatalkedaboutthepressure.She

O

askedforapersonalmeetingwithPutinandwas initially told thatPutinagreed.However,Volodinintervened,andthemeetingneverhappened.Journalistsofthechannelwent toPutin’spress conferences andaskedquestions about the fateofTVDozhd,andonApril17Putinsaidsomethingencouragingbutitlednowhere.20

InJuneaTVDozhdreportertriedagain,buttheresultwasthesame.Putinsimplyshrugged,“Idon’tknowwhogavethecommandtoswitchyouofffromthecable,Ididn’tgive suchacommand.”21 It looked likeadéjàvu—hiswordsechoedhismeetingwithNTVjournalistsinJanuary2001.

FromthistimeforwardTVDozhdwasavailableonlyontheInternet.Itlostmany advertisers, and Sindeeva was forced to introduce a paid model for TVDozhdcontent.

InMarchTVDozhdgot a letter from its headquarters’ landlord: in a fewmonthstheyweretobeexpelledfromitspremisesonRedOctober,thesymbolofthemodernizedhipstersofMedvedev’stime.ForsomemonthsjournalistsofTVDozhdhadtobroadcastfromtheirapartments.Buttheybroadcastnevertheless.22

nAugust2,2014,Ksenzov’sagency,Roskomnadzor, reachedanewlevel,attempting to censor the Internet beyond theRussian borders. The agency

sent a request to fourteen websites to block information about an unapprovedmarchinNovosibirsktosupportgreaterautonomyforSiberiafromtheMoscowcentralauthorities.ThemarchwasorganizedbyArtemLoskutov,atwenty- eight-year-oldperformanceartistinNovosibirskwhoplayedoutpoliticalthemesinhisart. He wanted to protest Russia’s interference in Ukraine by mimicking theKremlin’srhetoricabout“federalization”ofUkrainetojustifytheseparatists’warthere.23 The news of Loskutov’s planned demonstration went viral, and theRussianBBCinterviewedLoskutov.AtoncetheservicereceivedarequestfromRoskomnadzortoremovetheinterviewfromitssite.Ksenzovconfirmedthattherequestwasvalidbutdeclinedtoexplain.Inresponse,theBBCmadetherequestpublicandrefusedtoremovetheinterview.24Roskomnadzor threatened toblockthesitebbcrussian.comonRussiansoil,butneverfollowedthrough.

Mostof the fourteen sites compliedwithRoskomnadzor’s request.AmongthemwereUkrainianwebsites.Oneof themwasthesiteTSN.ua,whoseeditorssaidtheywereacting“tomaintainaccessibilityoftheentiresitefortheRussianaudience.”25Other sites, likeobozrevatel.com,glavcom.ua, anddelo.ua, refusedtocomply,soRoskomnadzorblockedthemonRussiansoil.

On August 6 the German Internet hosting provider Hetzner Online AGreceived an e-mail from Roskomnadzor requesting they suspend hosting of thepopular Ukrainian news media site glavkom.ua. Hetzner agreed and sent awarning letter to the editors of glavkom.ua. Immediately the letter was postedonline,triggeringprotests—peoplewereoutragedthatarequestfromRussiatoafirm inGermany could take down awebsite inUkraine.Hetznerwas forced toapologize.

InDecember2014,however,RoskomnadzorsentawarningtotheAmericannewssiteBuzzFeedforpostingavideotheRussianauthoritiesdeemedextremist.ThevideowasremovednotbyBuzzFeedbutbyGoogle,whichownsYouTube.26

ThiswasanimportantvictoryforRoskomnadzor,markingthefirsttimetheagencyopenlyandshamelesslyblockedforeignwebsitesforexpressingpoliticalviewsregardingRussia.

But in late December 2014 Roskomnadzor made another move, this timeagainstFacebook.OnDecember19activistsopenedaneventgrouponFacebookinsupportofAlexeyNavalny.Navalny,alongwithhisyoungerbrother,wasfacingtrumped-up accusations of fraud. The case was used to keep Navalny underpressure as well as a pretext to keep him under house arrest for months.Prosecutorshadaskedthecourt tosentenceNavalnytotenyears injail,andtheverdict was expected in few days. The event on Facebook was actually aninvitationtogatherinthecenterofMoscowtoprotestagainsttheverdict,astherewas no doubt he would be found guilty. The prosecutor’s office immediatelyissued a request to Roskomnadzor to block the event, and Roskomnadzorforwarded the document to Facebook’s office inLondon.27 Facebook complied,blockingthegrouponDecember20.28

The outraged activists launched several new groups, and Leviev, in fewhours, added a new “big red button” on the site navalny.us that linked to the

A

current,unblockedeventgrouponFacebook.Facebook’sdecisiontocomplywiththe Russian censor triggered a great deal of outrage inMoscow and abroad.29

Followingtheoutcry,FacebookandTwitterdecidednottoblocktheeventgroupslaunchedbyNavalny’ssupporters.30

The online protest forced the authorities to change their plans: instead ofJanuary 15, the Navalny brothers’ verdict was announced on December 30.AlexeyNavalnywasgiventhreeandahalfyearsofsuspendedsentence,andhisyoungerbrother,OlegNavalny,wassenttoprisonforthreeandahalfyears.31 Ifthe authorities had hoped to discourage protesters by shifting the verdict toDecember30,thedaybeforeNewYear’sEve,theymiscalculated.Thatcoldnightthousands of Muscovites assembled on Tverskaya Street, two hundred metersfrom the Kremlin, to protest Navalny’s verdict. Navalny, who was still underhouse arrest, made it to Tverskaya but was detained shortly after he appearedalongwithsomeofhisclosesupporters.

lmosttwenty-fiveyearsprior,RelcomandDemosprogrammersdidn’twaitfor someone to tell them what to do during the putsch. Likewise, in

December 2014 activists didn’t wait for a leader’s decision—in this case,Navalny—to start launching groups to support him on Facebook. It was ahorizontal structure, a network, thatmade all of that possible. It repeated itselftimeandagain.

Although Navalny stood as a symbol ofMoscow’s protests in December2011, he was under lock and key most of December. It was activists andjournalists who took over organizing protest rallies. Three years later, inDecember 2014, Navalny was again under lock and key, placed under housearrest,andhecouldn’t takepart inorganizingefforts.Butagain itdidn’tmatter.ThegrouponFacebookwas launchedfirstbyaNavalny friend,LeonidVolkov,andwhen this firstgroupwasblocked,adozennewgroupswere launched, thistimebypeoplewithnotiestoNavalnywhoweresimplyoutragedbycensorship.

Theauthoritieswhosoughttoblock,filter,andcensorsimplydidnotknow

whattodowiththeforcesbehindthe“bigredbutton.”