Coping with Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

8/6/2019 Coping with Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

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Coping with Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian ConflictA Policy Document

Prof. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov,The Hebrew University and the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies

Prepared for the President's Conference

This document is a policy document and was written following the publishing of the

book: Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict1 published by the Jerusalem

Institute for Israel Studies in cooperation with the Adenauer Stiftung. This document has

two objectives: (1) to shortly introduce the barriers to peace in the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict which prevent or hinder its resolution through examining the relative

profoundness and difficulty of these barriers, (2) to suggest strategies for coping with

these barriers and to examine the measure of their ability to indeed overcome barriers in

the current conditions.

Barriers to Peace

The reasons for Oslo Accords failure and the outbreak of the violent Israeli-

Palestinian confrontation in September 2000, were vastly discussed in the memoirs

written by the peace process participants and were analyzed through many academic

researches. Some presented the characteristics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an

intractable, uncontrollable and unresolvable. Others claimed that the failure was due to

the unwillingness of the parties to make the required concessions for conflict resolution,

due to poor negotiation management, to focusing on an interim agreement instead of on

a final settlement, to ignoring the national narratives of the parties and issues of justice

and fairness, and due to the failure of leaderships to form a clear and well-arranged

1Yaacov Bar-Siman- Tov (ed.),Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict(Jerusalem: The

Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2010)


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peace-strategy and to recruit public support of the peace process. There were also some

who focused on the inefficiency of the American mediator.

Since the Taba Summit, which took place in January 2001, no political process was

managed until 2008, although various suggestions for resolving the conflict were

brought up during this period- including the Arab Peace Initiative, Bush Initiative, the

Peace Roadmap, The Peoples Voice, The Geneva Initiative, and the Annapolis

Conference. Although the different peace plans took some of the barriers which led to

the political process failure into account, and even made an attempt to somewhat deal

with them, they did not examine them profoundly. They also did not examine concrete

strategies to neutralizethem, in order to enable a peaceful conflict resolution. Followingthe Annapolis Conference the political process was managed on two tracks: Olmert-

Abu-Mazen and Livni-Abu-Alaa, the difficulty of renewing it in the past two years only

demonstrates the difficulty of this particular conflict resolution. Not only that most of

the barriers which prevented its resolution in the past still stand, but they also grew

significantly stronger since and this due to the Oslo Accords failure and the violent

confrontation in the years 2000-2004. The forces which rule out conflict resolution grew

stronger on both sides, as well as the forces which doubt its chances of success but

continue managing it anyhow, either willingly or for lack of choice.

The barriers which prevent the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or

make its achievement more difficult are of various kinds: real, identity-related, structural

and psychological.

The real barriers are the opposite interests of the sides within the conflict,

especially on the core issues: Jerusalem, borders, Jewish settlements, refugees, and

security. The core issues are conceived by both parties as realistic assets they find hard

giving up or compromising on. The issues of Jerusalem and the refugees are even


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defined by both sides as unique basic values, values sacred and protected of any

negotiation, bargain, compromise and concessions. The protected values draw their

validity from the historical narratives, and they are the sources of the identity related

barriers.

The identity-related barriers refer to the differences and contrasts between the

identities of the parties in the conflict, including the historical narratives, the myths and

ethos regarding the origins of the conflict, its development, management and resolution,

and the perceptions of justice, injustice and the victimization on both sides. These

differences and contrasts are not the source of the conflict but enhance it nevertheless,

for they add religious, spiritual, cultural and ideological dimensions to it. The identity

related barriers provide the conflict with symbolic dimensions which anchor the

positions of the sides in the conflict and help holding them preserved and unchanging,

extremely limiting the sides willingness to make the required concessions in order to

resolve the conflict.

The structural barriers relate to the political and social structures of the sides

which are characterized by deep splitting, especially with relation to the willingness to

reach a peace agreement and to pay the necessary price. While the Palestinian side is

facing a new and unique historical reality, the existence of two separate Palestinian

entities (in the West Bank and in Gaza), which disagree on the actual willingness to

resolve the conflict, the Israeli side is also divided, especially on the basis of peace price.

Both societies are also characterized by leaderships lacking the perception of peace as a

prime value, and are uninterested or unable to motivate a sincere peace process. The two

societies lack broad public legitimacy for the concessions required to establish peace and

are also characterized by the existence of societal and diplomatic factors which


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politically or ideologically object to the establishment of peace or to the compromises it

requires (peace spoilers and deniers).

The psychological barriers are of three types: cognitive, emotional and

motivational. These barriers prevent or complicate the changing of beliefs and attitudes

in the conflict. They affect the information procession and interpretation according to

beliefs on both sides, including discarding historical opportunities to resolve it. They

create an atmosphere of over confidence regarding the desired direction of conflict

development, including over estimation of the amount of success in achieving goals

through the process, including the belief that time is on their side. The psychological

barriers tend to make the concessions of the other side seem fewer than they are, they

enhance concerns and fear of the other side and increase hatred, loathing and distrust.

They also contribute to focusing the conflict on national narratives and perceptions of

justice and injustice and to defining the core issues of the conflict as protected values.

The psychological barriers, like the identity-related ones are not the source of the

conflict, but they tend to increase it and to hinder its resolution.

The Oslo Accords failure and the violent confrontation which began in

September 2000 increased the measures of the above mentioned barriers significantly.

They focused and reframed the real barriers as protected values which cannot be

compromised on. They also intensified the identity-related barriers and created new

historical narratives concerning the Oslo Accords failure, which show the readiness of

each side for conflict resolution and blame the other side for the process failure. They

intensified the structural barriers , which manifested in the increasing power and

weight of forces objecting conflict resolution and/or its price. For instance, Hamas

electoral victory in 2006 and its control of Gaza, as well as the right wings rise to power


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in Israel. They also intensified the psychological barriers on both societies which

mainly showed in: considering peace process and possibility hopeless, devaluation of

peace, believing that violence could lead to realization of national goals (Palestinians),

preferring to manage the conflict rather than resolve it (Israel), increasing distrust on

both sides, unrecognizing the other side as a partner for peace and doubting its

willingness/ability to resolve the conflict and make the required concessions.

The main conclusion rising from discussing these barriers is that the real

barriers and the main core issues in particular: the historical basin of Jerusalem and the

refugees are the main factors which prevent conflict resolution. Framing these two core

issues as protected values increases the solidity of these barriers and actually prevents a

possibility of negotiation, compromises and concessions on these issues. Due to the

intensity and centrality of these barriers, the chances of resolving the conflict are

currently very slim. Without tackling this high wall of obstructions, any effort to conflict

resolution at this point is not only useless, but might also increase desperation and even

bring to the reoccurrence of violent confrontations. Unless the conditions which enable

tackling these barriers efficiently are right, the resolution of the conflict remains in

doubt. Both parties and potential mediators must take these barriers into account and

tackle them in a new innovative way.

Coping with the Barriers

It seems that in the current situation it is easier to describe and explain the

barriers to peace rather than answer the question how to overcome them. The laying of

finds of this document is that despite the centrality of the barriers on the way to peace,


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we should examine ways of tackling them in order to enable conflict resolution. The

laying of finds of this document is that the current situation, though conceived as

allegedly stable, is not necessarily so, and carries a cargo of high explosiveness which

can trigger a new wave of violence. Without an active political initiative for conflict

resolution, a dead end might appear which might encourage the search for violent ways

to changing it and damage the objectives and basic needs of both sides involved, and

that time is not necessarily on either side.

The ways of coping with the barriers to conflict resolution are: a peace

forthcoming leadership, broad legitimacy for peace, instigating beliefs development,

defining conflict resolution as a top national interest, the need for a painful value

compromise, the need to break free from the chains of the past, a formula compromising

between justice and peace, focusing on the consequences of the 1967 war, broadening

the activity of meetings and dialogues between civil society organizations of both sides,

the need for an effective mediator, and an Arab legitimacy for peace policy.

1. A peace forthcoming leadership- a leadership which sees peace as a primevalue and goal in its foreign policy is a central and essential condition to the

promotion of peace process and agreement. A peace forthcoming leadership

which recognizes peace-making as its historical role is essential and without it

the possibility of making peace is in doubt. Such leadership must develop an

organized peace concept which presents the visions and goals of peace and the

required strategy for their realization, and it must also recruit the required

legitimacy to support peace policy. Such leadership must present the chances and

risks of peace policy and the ways to handle them in a realistic, rational way.


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2. Broad legitimacy for peace policy- peace policy in a split society divided onthe basis of actual peace-making or expectancy as well as the required price must

have the broad support of the ruling elites, the competing elites, interest groups,

and the public in general. The more support peace policy has, the more the policy

formers sense the partnership of a larger population in the actual peace

perception and they find it easier to deal with the chances for peace and the risks

that come with it. It is the peace forthcoming leaderships duty to constantly

work toward the broadening of legitimacy base for peace policy. Unless there is

broad legitimacy for peace policy, it is doubtful whether such policy could be

promoted.

3. Instigating beliefs developmentA main way of handling suggested in this document is to not stagnate and lose hope

in the chance of reaching agreement altogether. We must keep on bringing up

creative new ideas which are not in line with the common opinions and beliefs which

determine that the conflict is unavoidable and there is no chance of resolving it.

These new ideas, which can also be called instigating beliefs, must contradict the

old, deep-rooted beliefs. Even if the idea seems nave, unrealistic and hopeless,

ending this conflict in peaceful ways must be set as a national interest and central

value in a society which has been experiencing a long, uncompromising conflict:

the instigating belief that fuels the motivation towards flexibility is based upon

recognition of the incompatibility between the desired future, on the one hand, and

the emergent future, the current state, and/or the perceived past, on the other hand."2

This approach is basically rational; it forces the parties to analyze the costs of the

2Eran Halperin, Neta Oren, and Daniel Bar-Tal, "Socio-Psychological Barriers to Resolving the Israeli-

Palestinian Conflict: An Analysis of Jewish Israeli Society." InBarriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict(ed.), Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institute fo r Israel Studies,

2010), pp. 63-64.


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situation and deterioration continuance realistically and take a sober look at the risk

potential existing in the lack of agreement. For the costs of conflict continuance

might be heavier than the costs of compromise required for peace, and the awareness

of this fact is the one that should motivate peace process and promote it. Not only

that: but the continuance of current situation and its deterioration might also greatly

damage what the parties define as protected values and deepen the abyss between

them. Even if the process seems particularly hard in the beginning and is not

supported by many, there is need for persistence, determination and active

involvement in endowing the motivating belief to many.

4. Defining conflict resolution as top national interestResolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be defined on both sides as a top

national interest, act for your benefit, if not for theirs. Resolving the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict and the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside with Israel

is the clear interest of any Jew who supports the existence of Israel as the national

state of the Jewish people. For unless it chooses the solution of two states for two

peoples, Israel might find itself as the one state of two peoples, lose its uniqueness

as the state of the Jewish people or turn into an apartheid state- which will

contradict its democratic character. The danger which hovers over the moral and

Jewish identity of Israel without an agreement and the fear of worldwide de-

legitimacy of Israel must urge on peace aspiration and intensify the motivation for

reaching an agreement with the Palestinians. It seems that in this case fearing the

lack of agreement can overcome the fear of the agreement itself. Resolving the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the clear interest of every Palestinian who wishes to

end the Israeli occupation and the continuous Palestinian suffering and to fulfill the

Palestinian aspiration for an independent state. Unless the Israeli-Palestinian


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conflict is resolved, it is doubtful whether Israel would agree to the establishment of

a Palestinian state. Even if the General Assembly or the Security Council of the

United Nations announces the establishment of a Palestinian state, it is doubtful

whether the fulfillment of such announcement could occur without conflict

resolution.

5. The need for painful value compromise- both sides must understand thatresolving the conflict requires a hard, painful moral compromise. Resolving the

conflict requires the dealing of both parties with their own protected values by a

mutual adoption of tragic deal-making strategies which require mutual

concessions on this matter. Although both parties are not ready at this point for a

mutual renunciation of protected values, it is important that they are aware of the

possibility of a tragic deal which will include renouncing one protected value in

order to save the other, in other words: framing the compromise as a value dilemma.

For instance, the territorial compromise can be framed as means to preserve the

Jewish character of the State of Israel, or- a compromise of the right of return

realization could be framed as means for establishing the Palestinian state. Framing

the compromise as a value dilemma gains broadening support in Israel due to the

need to preserve its character of a democratic, Jewish state, but this framing does

not have broad support on the Palestinian side quite yet. Another possible way of

dealing is breaking the taboo of the protected issue, or a demystification of it. In

other words: framing these issues as interests and not as protected values. Such

framing enables to exchange the mythical discourse for a rational discourse which

will make negotiation or even compromise easier for the sides. Such process

enables defining the controversial issues in terms of interests which can be

negotiated.


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6. The need to break free from the chains of the past- the gap between the sidesnarrative is very wide at this point and cannot be bridged over. While the chance

of mediating on the meta-narrative level is very slim, the possibility of

developing a common idea frame should be examined. Such frame will be used

for discussing the different national narratives related to realizing the national

ambitions in separate policy frames, through willingness to know and study the

contrasts between them, even if they cannot be bridged over quite yet. This can

happen even now, with the initiative of the sides leaderships, the initiative of the

civil society or with an external initiative of a third party. If the parties are not

ready for such initiative, they must consider the possibility of recognizing the

fact they have different narratives which cannot be bridged over, and to agree to

postpone discussing the issue to the reconciliation stage, so that the fundamental

differences revealed on the sides narratives will not turn into barriers to conflict

resolution. The barriers to conflict resolution research shows that both sides are

very much chained to the historical narratives and have become the victims of a

past which holds them back from compromising. Although the historical

narratives are part of the national identity of each side, and protecting them is

important from the national legacy point of view, they must not chain the parties

to the past and deprive them of a better future. Moreover: the integration of the

historical narratives with the parties religious beliefs has made the compromise

a taboo and a religious felony on both sides. It is important to stress here that

concessions in favor of peace do not necessarily hurt religious beliefs

religiously/morally and do not betray the historical narratives and protected

values. On the contrary: the unwillingness to compromise for peace is the


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immoral act, for the victims of the future will not forgive for the bloody price

claimed by another war.

7. A compromising formula between justice and peace - both parties very muchdisagree as to the relation between justice and peace. Israel cannot accept the

Palestinian claims that it should recognize its responsibility for refugee problem

in the 1947-1949 war (transitional justice) and the refugees right of return into

Israel (compensatory justice). A conditional link between justice and peace,

according to Palestinian claims, was discovered to be a barrier to peace through

process and insisting on it might damage the chance for peace. Although an idea

shared by the parties which is related to the link between justice and peace is

desirable, it is doubtful whether they are ready for it. Therefore we must work

towards a reasonable compromise concerning the link between justice and peace.

A possible compromise is to separate the Palestinian claims for transitional

justice and their claims for compensating justice, for instance, an Israeli

willingness to recognize Palestinian suffering (but not hold responsibility for it)

as suggested in President Clinton parameters- may be a solution of compromise

to the transitional justice claim. Alternately, both parties could adopt a formula

which will recognize their shared responsibility for the injustices each side

caused the other during the conflict, to apologize to each other and to forgive one

another. As for the claims for compensating justice, the solution of two states

and Palestinian state establishment alongside with Israel should be seen as an

Israeli compromise and execution of the claim for compensating justice. The

Israeli and American suggestions, to send the refugees to the lands that Israel

will exchange with the Palestinians- so that they could be defined as executing

the right of return could also serve as compromise. The Palestinian claim for


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right of return realization specifically on Israeli territory contradicts the very idea

of Palestinian state establishment, for there cannot be such an establishment at

the same time with bringing the refugees back to Israel, and by that risk its status

as the national state of the Jewish people, for the Palestinian state establishment

is the rational, moral and probable solution to this problem. A Palestinian

insistence on the right of return specifically to Israel will not only prevent

reaching a peace agreement and Palestinian state establishment, but also cause

additional suffering to the refugees and the West Bank and Gaza residents and

increase the feelings of injustice. When the sides are interested in making peace

on the basis of two states for two peoples but are unable of reaching agreement

over justice, they better postpone dealing with the justice issue to the stage of

reconciliation. In this way the sides will agree within the peace agreement

framework that the issue of justice is extremely important and that peace

constructing and stabilizing could not be done before the question of relational

justice is fully attended. Moving the discussion to the stage of reconciliation will

make overcoming the justice barrier easier for the sides and will enable them to

examine this matter after the conflict between them is resolved and trust is built.

Then the parties shall be readier to approach this issue, which is so ethical and

hard to compromise on.

8. Focusing on the 1967 war consequences- the laying of finds for peace shouldbe the solution to the 1967 war and not the consequences of the 1947-1949 war.

The guiding principle should therefore be land for peace and not opening the

case of 1947-1949. The negotiation starting point will be defined upon the

parties agreement over the final negotiation goal- two states for two peoples,

within the borders of 1967, while the states exist side by side safely and


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peacefully. All of the issues will lie on the negotiation table, but its ending will

be based on the principle nothing is agreed until everything is agreed and a

possibility to discuss and agree on core issues first must be considered,

following the principle of from heavy to light negotiation management. The

negotiation timeframe to its end shall be set and agreed on by the sides in

advance.

9. Broadening meeting and dialogue activities between the sides civil societyorganizations- this activity, which has been going on for many years is unique

and essential. Despite the difficulties and the occasional feeling they are

inefficient and cannot change the situation, these meetings and dialogues are

nevertheless important to the continuance of dialogue between sides and to

public legitimacy preparation for conflict resolution. Negotiation renewal forces

the sides to mutually recognize the cultural and religious differences between

them and to make an effort to adjust to these differences not out of

condescendence or self-deprecation, but out of a sense of equity and mutual

respect. So a convenient atmosphere will be formed and will enable a more

accurate interpretation of expressions and behaviors as well as accuracy in

message delivery.

10.The need for an effective mediator- due to the gaps between the sidespositions and their mutual distrust, one could unequivocally claim that the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution is impossible without third party

involvement. Both sides need a determined American mediator, who is

particularly active and efficient and could help them overcome the barriers and

reach the required readiness to enter, manage, accomplish and fulfill negotiation.

The American mediator must put in his best efforts not only by mediation


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suggestions, but also by helping the sides as much as possible to break free from

emotional chains connected to national narratives and protected values, and form

tragic deals. This is mediation on an entirely different level which was never

experienced by the sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict before. Such level of

mediation requires the knowledge of a historian and the sensitivity of a

psychologist. It requires a sharp, precise diagnosis of conflict central problems

and of domestic difficulties both sides are facing, but it also requires security

threat reduction assistance, guarantees for threat reduction and compensating for

critical damaging of protected values, while stressing the top importance of

conflict resolution. The American mediator must be fair, use more incentives

than threats and assist both leaders in broadening their legitimacy circles for

support of peace price. The American mediator must assist the sides in framing

peace as mutual profit and not as a loss, and to thoroughly clarify that the two-

state solution is the only way out of the conflict, and there is no other. In addition

there is need for international intervention for agreement realization and

preservation. Such interference should include stationing forces for peace

protection and massive financial assistance for both sides, especially for

resolving the refugee problem on both sides.

11.Arab legitimacy for peace policy- due to the split on the Palestinian side andthe lessons of the Camp-David failure from July 2000, the Arab League

countries or Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia at least must be harnessed to the

process of negotiation and supporting peace, and this to ensure a legitimacy

agreement which will be easier for the Palestinian Authority to justify, especially

facing its possible negation by Hamas and other Palestinian organizations, as


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well as by some of the Arab countries. Such support will also assist Israel and

will enable normalization processes with other Arab countries.

In conclusion:

This document presented shortly the barriers to peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

as they were perceived by the researches in the book: Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict. However, we think that it is our duty as researches not to stagnate

and to also suggest ways of dealing these barriers, for every effort should be done in

order to end the conflict, for its continuance only makes it worse, intensifies the

difficulty to resolve it and puts the future of both peoples in great danger. We reveal

before statesmen and public the barriers preventing or hindering conflict resolution and

the ways to deal with them. The researchers who took part in writing this book are very

well aware of the difficulties, the prices and agony connected to making peace and will

prove it the analysis of barriers standing on the way to peace which was done here.

However, we accept the words of the Prime Ministers Menachem Begin R.I.P. and

Yitzhak Rabin R.I.P. who said that it is better to have the pains of peace than the

agonies of war, and that it is "better to walk the path of peace than the path or war".

Coping with Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

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