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COORDINATING GOVERNMENT SECTORS: A TYPOLOGY FOR PRODUCTION OF

INTEGRATED POLICIES FROM “BOLSA FAMÍLIA” PROGRAM CASE (BRAZIL)

LUCAS AMBRÓZIO LOPES DA SILVA

PHD student of Public Administration and Government – Business Administration School

of São Paulo, Fundação Getúlio Vargas (EAESP/FGV), Brazil

E-mail: lucasambrozio@yahoo.com.br

Palavras-chave: Intersectoriality, Bolsa Família

Program,

SÃO PAULO

2013

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ABSTRACT: The recent social development policies made by governments of

many developing countries are marked by great challenges and have strained the state

structure to design new arrangements, requiring processes of institutional experimentation

and new forms of coordination between government sectors. This context allows the

hypothesis formation: the intersectoriality has been disseminated as a shared task

between subnational governments and enabling new forms of government coordination,

with the aim of co-production of public services. Offering policies that are able to tackle

structural problems, as is the issue of poverty in Latin American countries.

The objective of this paper is to develop a typology of governmental coordination to

analyze efforts of coordination between government sectors for integrated policies

production, which go beyond traditional forms of tight and fragmented production of public

policies. The method used was a case study of “Bolsa Família” Program (policy of

conditional income transfer). We mapped forms of intersectoriality developed from

organizational and documental analysis, and qualitative interviews. The results point to

presence of important mechanisms of political leadership (President and Ministers) and

institutional leadership (role played by the “Ministry of Social Development and Fight

against Hunger” and his team of civil servers). The typology developed considers options

for support intersectoriality, which can be mobilized at different times and for different

purposes. The types of mechanisms designed for the construction of intersectional

analysis are: 1) Collegiate Agencies (which are good starters, but have low materiality); 2)

Empowerment of bureaucracy and their networks (which have high efficacy and

materiality, but it incurs risks oligarchization bureaucracy); 3) Creation of Intermediate

Agencies of Coordination (enable greater agility to the joints, but can lead to conflicts

between organizational structures).

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1. INTRODUCTION

Recent social development policies made by governments in several developing

countries are marked by great challenges and have strained state structure to respond

according to new arrangements, processes requiring institutional experimentation and new

forms of coordination between government sectors. This context allows the formulation of

the hypothesis: the intersectionality has been disseminated as a shared task between

subnational governments and enabling new forms of government coordination, with the

aim of co-production of public services.Offering policies that successfully attack structural

problems, as is the issue of poverty in Latin American countries.

The objective of this paper is to develop a typology of government coordination to

analyze the efforts of coordination between government sectors for the production of

integrated policies that overcome traditional forms of production watertight and fragmented

public policy. The method used was the case study of Brazil's Bolsa Família Program

(national policy of conditional cash transfer). Mapped forms of intersectionality developed

from organizational analysis and documentation, as well as qualitative interviews.

In Brazil, with democracy and the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, and the

fiscal crisis of the 90s, social policies began to answer new demands and operate

according to a logic complex, which has brought new issues to the government

agenda. Simon Schwartzman (Schwartzman, 2004) develops the idea of three generations

of social policies. The first would be linked to the expansion and extension of social rights

and benefits, and is initiated in Brazil in the 30s1, consolidating itself only with the

Constitution of 1988, when there was the consecration of a broad set of social rights. The

second generation, which emerges from the agenda of the FHC and Lula, seek to

rationalize and redistribute resources in social spending in order to balance social

spending and financially correct its regressivity (RIBEIRO, 2010). Finally, the third

generation of policies would be those beyond the concerns of the previous generation, had

as its central objective the quality of services, seeking to respond fully to social problems,

from the integration and coordination between the various public policies. This third

generation, according to Schwartzman, would be the great challenge of social policies,

1 On the composition of social rights in Brazil occurred in the '30s, José Murilo de Carvalho (Carvalho, 2001)

points out that this process occurred in authoritarian and exclusionary, since it would have been an imposition of Getúlio Vargas government and not an achievement of citizens . So José Murilo draws on the concept of widespread Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos (SANTOS, 1970): "regulated citizenship" to characterize this process, since these social rights would also be restricted to unionized workers, thus excluding the majority of the population the time (farm workers, domestic workers, unemployed, etc.), and the relationship between trade unions and employers to be mediated by government agents, compounding pejoratively called scab unionism. The author also maintains that in Brazil the process of succession in the conquest of rights followed sequence distinct from that observed in developed countries, described by T. H. Marshall (Marshall, 1967), which began with the conquest of civil rights, then political rights and finally social rights, respectively in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

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since it does not state categorically that we are now witnessing, and not even the second

generation has already been completed. Thus, it is visible in social policies and

institutional changes in its central objectives, that changed: structures, divisions of

responsibilities and intervention practices.

From the analysis of some studies involving the theme of intersectionality, and

government coordination (as Bakvis, 2004; Carneiro, 2010; Cunill Grau, 2005; Guirado,

2008; Martins, 2005; Peters, 1998; Repetto, 2009; Serra, 2004) and with the knowledge

that "a finite set of concepts will never be able to capture what is, in principle, an infinite set

of possible observations" (Davis, 2005: 29), we developed a new concept for the

unpretentious term intersectionality: "set of formal drawings and practices that provide

synergy and complementarity between different sectors responsible for public policies

(such as administrative, the budget, the planning, human resources, etc..), but also their

own specific areas of policy social, as social assistance, education, health, etc ". Thus, in

our analysis intersectoriality not restricted to a merely administrative or territorial, but

encompasses multidimensional approaches, comprehensive responses and overcoming

sectoral interventions specialized and fragmented, with low level of dialogue in the search

for solutions to common problems and / or inter -related, guided by some exercise of

governmental coordination, especially intragovernmental. Which brings us to the need to

think of an entire issue of governance and performance of public bureaucracies.

With this order of conceptualization, Cunill Grau (2005) classifies existing studies on

intersectoral based on the source of justification proposed by them (more political or more

technical). The more political premise is that the integration between sectors enables the

search for comprehensive solutions to social problems and translates into an assumption

that all public policies that pursue global strategies of development, such as improving the

quality of life of the population, must be planned and executed intersectorally. Already the

premise more technical concentrates its focus on efficiency analysis, stating that the

integration between sectors allows the differences between them can be used productively

in addressing social problems by creating solutions that best sectoriality, as it allows to

share resources (not only economic, but the most distinct orders) that are specific to each

sector. Thus intersectoral gains prominence to overcome what Martins (2005) describes as

the existence of a "theory of fragmentation" in relation to the formulation / implementation

of public policies.

The historical trajectory of social policy in Brazil shows that p hear little social

policies began to be perceived values of universality since mechanisms for equity. The

programs of conditional cash transfer began to gain highlights the government agenda in

Brazil, while other Latin American government followed the same paths. And recently the

development strategy has brought a new look, promoting a social agenda increasingly a

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priority, integrated and positive, as a way to respond to old and old issues of Brazilian

society (Smith, 2013).

Recently social development policies in Brazil have emerged linking development

strategies with social policies. Such guidance has brought strong challenges for the

Brazilian State. The Bolsa Familia synthesize these trends and the ways that the state has

acted to give more dynamism to public policies. Intersectoriality emerging principle would

be given guidelines and recent political scenario fragmentation of state action and its

institutions, leading to a disjointed set of public policies. Intersectoriality is therefore a

principle as necessary as this emerging convergence of economic and social strategies

(Silva, 2013).

2. The BOLSA FAMILIA PROGRAM AS A CONDITIONAL

TRANSFER PROGRAM INCOME

The Bolsa Família Program was created in 2003 from the unification of the Bolsa

Escola Program, Bolsa Alimentação Program, Food Card and Gas Voucher as a way of

implementing a body of highly redistributive social policies and targeted (Carneiro, 2010;

NERI, 2008) . It is a program of direct income transfer to conditionalities education, health

and social care. The amounts transferred are defined based on the per capita monthly

income of the family and also in the number of children and adolescents under 17

years. The single record was created as an instrument of program management. It

manages a decentralized diverse socioeconomic information of families enrolled.

The Bolsa Familia Program can be included in a series of programs with similar

configurations, called Programs Conditional Cash Transfer, they are all characterized by

mechanisms targeting of beneficiaries, transfers and demand / stimulus actions by parties

by thereof. This range of programs today is widespread in Latin America (Kliksberg, 2006;

Marquionni & Conconi, 2008) and elsewhere, especially in developing

countries. Conditionalities being a key feature of the BFP, we highlight the following:

Conditionalities health were established by a joint regulation of the Ministry of

Health with the MDS (Ordinance joint MS / MDS 2509 November 2004), which consists of

families with children under 7 years must commit to keep up the vaccination schedule and

checks of height and weight (important items of policy to combat child malnutrition) and

pregnant women must undergo medical and educational prior and subsequent to the birth

of the child. The regulations define control functions and management of the health

conditionality for the municipal and state of health, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry

of Social Development. All this is important to transform the conditionality of a levy for

families with a commitment by the minimum health conditions among federal entities and

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society, trying to accomplish here, the three basic principles of program management:

intersectionality, decentralization and social participation.

With regard to education, the joint decree of the Ministry of Education with the

Ministry of Social Development (Ordinance MEC / MDS 3789 November 2004) establishes

a minimum attendance of 85% in all months for children between 6 and 15 years and 75%

for children between 16 and 17 years. As with the regulation of health is defined

assignment for all federal entities and is the recommended practices of social participation

in the management of municipal education systems effectively in order to make that social

participation in these instances is the school management fact and not just in law, the

same happens with regard to health.

The conditionality of social assistance involved in the BFP comes from its

integration with the "Program for the Eradication of Child Labor" (PETI), established by

Decree 666 of December 2005, for the PBF identifies the beneficiary families, those who

are in a position of vulnerability child labor and establishes a special service to them, while

maintaining the specialties and specific objectives of each program. Thus the conditionality

of social assistance is that children and adolescents up to 15 years at risk or withdrawn

from child labor by PETI should participate in the so-called Living Services and

Strengthening Linkages with frequency of 85%.

3. ONE TYPE OF COORDINATION INTERSECTORAL: THE

BOLSA FAMILIA PROGRAM CASE

This chapter consists of the unfolding of recent research on mechanisms for

intersectoral coordination involved in the Bolsa Família Program, program structuring and

articulating the central axis of social development policy adopted by the Brazilian

government (Silva, 2013). One of the hypotheses of this research is to analyze the

program as an interesting laboratory to identify different forms and mechanisms of

coordination among government sectors. Establishing itself as a valuable case study is to

analyze possibilities and potential for horizontal articulation between public and public

bodies of the Public Administration, as discussed below. Will group the coordination efforts

of government in three different types of strategies, gleaned from the use of: 1) collegiate

bodies, 2) empowering the bureaucracy and their networks, and 3) creation of intermediary

bodies coordination.

3.1. Collegiate Agencies: initiating coordination

The establishing the Bolsa Família Program law defines intersectionality as a basic

principle, as well as community participation and social control. This definition provides a

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very clear message to other federal government federal entities, particularly municipalities,

which is the need to promote intersectoral and permeate every level of the federation.

Accordingly, and provided an inductive role of subnational units, the federal government

also established a "Interministerial Council Manager", as a product of institutional

engineering necessary to promote the start of intersectionality. This would be a significant

part of the apparatus "legal-organizational" to give support to this need for coordination of

sectors within the federal government. This advice was also established by law creative

PBF.

The Council is composed of members representing each of s and te ministries or

agencies of the Public Administration involved with the implementation of PBF. Below we

describe how each agency is involved with the management of PBF.

1) "Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger" - MDS, which holds

the presidency of the Council, is the body responsible for promoting the social welfare

policies and strategies to combat poverty, this is why, the organization responsible for

PBF. 2 ) "Ministry of Education" - MEC, which has the responsibility to develop a series of

public programs that seek to improve the education and training of the beneficiaries. 3)

"Ministry of Health" - MS, has the role of providing a service comprehensive health care to

families by establishing a strategy of interaction with families in social vulnerability and

poverty. 4) "Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management" - MPOG, whose mission is to

allocate and plan the allocation of financial and human resources required to manage the

PBF, as well as supporting the MDS in the development process management

technologies and computerized management systems deem support him. 5) "Ministry of

Finance" - MF, which should integrate the program with the strategy of economic

development and growth of government, turning it into an important part of the economic

policy of the country, since the decrease of regional economic inequalities and increase

domestic consumption but on the other hand one can not forget that it also generates

increased public spending and inflationary pressure, as side effects. 6) The House of the

Presidency of the Republic - CC, which is the body responsible for making the

coordination between ministries, is because the state agency most involved in intra-

themed joint, so committed to the challenge of increasing intersectoral government

policies, which is why the nearest Ministry of the Presidency. 7) "CEF" - CAIXA is a major

state-owned banks in Brazil and also has an important role in various federal social

programs, since as it is one of the few banks present in all Brazilian cities, plays the role of

making public resources arrived citizens, eg the politics of social welfare, housing,

microcredit and the action itself income transfer. In the case of Bolsa Família CAIXA is the

agent program operator, offering all the necessary conditions for sustaining the system of

registration of beneficiaries, called "Single Register" - CadÚnico, which is the registry

system that centralizes manages all information of the population in poverty, performing

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the functions of the organization, maintenance, systems development and preparation of

reports for monitoring by the MDS, beyond CAIXA be the financial agent responsible for

the payment of benefits.

The following table shows how each of the structures that act: either in production

program (planning and execution), is working together to guarantee the conditions.

Table 1: Other agencies of the Federal Public Administration involved in the management

of PBF

Production Program Conditionalities Program

MPOG MS

MF MEC

CC MDS

CAIXA

However the college referred to above ("Manager Ministerial Council") does not

warrant or pro moves intersectionality. Through field research, consisting of a series of

interviews with leaders and public servants involved in the construction of intersectionality,

we identified the establishment of a council manager was just the beginning of a process

of construction of intersectionality.'s quite reasonable to think that the generation of

intersectoral not be built by one or two people from each agency, but by a series of work

teams engaged in this purpose .

3.2. Empowerment bureaucracy and their networks

The engagement of all agencies involved in activities with intersectoral

coordination is essential to the success of cooperative relationships established. In public

administration, the body politic is largely responsible for the prioritization of the issue and

its spread throughout the government. It is an activity that requires political leadership and

ability to perceive the importance of this topic. Given some characteristics inherent in the

state bureaucracy, this action of engagement and politicization of work teams is not trivial

activity and demand not only formal authority, requiring a great cohesion for both the

commitment, as for the implementation of intersectoral activities.

We see in the case of PBF an important role towards presidential dissemination

of the importance of policies to combat poverty and hunger. Already in his 2002

presidential campaign, Lula insisted on calling public attention to the problem of hunger

and poverty and the need to address it through state policies strong, articulated and

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innovative. Why would you create in your first year in office the Zero Hunger program,

which would later give rise to the set of objectives pursued by the Family Allowance.

This ability to arouse the interest of society and disseminate the topic was

important and was able to pass within the government and government

bureaucracies. Increasingly, the theme has the ruling political elite for the other levels of

the public administration. The ability to mobilize popular government became capacity

politicization of the bureaucracy. Politicization this case means that "politicization may also

mean que public servants begin to take on tasks que formerly (and formally) might have

been Considered to be political." (Peters, Pierre, 2004: 3). This ability to politicization of

bureaucracy would be crucial for the involvement of the social ministries and mission of

intersectionality, especially in a context of arrival of the PT in government for the first

time. In this context the bureaucracy would, in theory, an obstacle to new working

guidelines and policies.

The bureaucrats of commitment to the values and interests of the policy area is Generally seen to just another reason for the encounter ministers que Difficulties When Attempting to manage

Their programs and Their Departments. Especially this is true for

parties que come to office after some period in opposition and find que there are working relationships in place que They Do not please. (Peters, Pierre, 2004:3)

Other studies have emphasized the importance of the leadership of President Lula

for involvement d work teams that constituted the PBF (Monteiro, 2011). The action of

creating a new organizational structure to work the theme of social development was an

option that allowed the installation of a new bureaucracy, reducing therefore the possible

cultural and business barriers to the implementation of PBF. In general, the bureaucracy

that formed in MDS has a strong commitment to the theme, which is reflected on their

performance and on their ability to intersectoral coordination. This involvement has been

repeatedly stressed in interviews. Another important element for the involvement of civil

servers is the appeal of the theme of social development, which appeared frequently in

interviews suggested as a factor of motivation and engagement, is the esquipes MDS,

whether the teams of other ministries, which favors the provision cooperation between

sectors.

This engagement of the bureaucracy is a parallel process and important to support

the materialization of intersectionality. Under the program Bolsa Família, these

relationships are established, mainly with respect to the joints between the Ministries of

Health, Education and MDS itself. Although important, the collegiate bodies, as we have

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seen, can not give materiality to intersectoral action. Shall try to describe and analyze the

process of materialization mapped intersectionality in the BFP.

Figure 1: The process of building in intersectoriality PBF Case

The process mapped by this research highlights that the starting element would be

the perception of the importance of intersectoral government (Step 1), it is very clear by

the inclusion of the principle of intersectionality in the law itself creative PBF, beyond the

establishment of a body collegiate to take it on. Step 2 would be the moment when the first

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meetings and begin initial discussions that will unfold in the establishment of a series of

commitments of the various organs, which will be carried forward in step 3, which will be

built capabilities (allocation of human and financial resources , preparation of work teams

and their work environments). Step 4 is the center of the array intersectoral created around

the PBF, since the engagement of bureaucracies organs is what will make the

intersectoral materialize daily. As important as the political will (involvement of the

president and his ministers) is the engagement of their bureaucracies medium, which will

be responsible for playing the role of agent and coordinator of relations between the

sectors (further explore best this step). From this there is an intensification of the

relationships between the bureaucracy and the arrival of the first performers to process

administrative tasks (Step 5), which will generate a series of patterns of relationships, all

grounded on informal and personal traits, given the low initial control. In step 6 would do

the work of collective learning, which would be identified in which experiences are not

working, correcting them, but mostly identified patterns of success described in step 7, in

order to map the routine relationship and try to suppress Personal brands, standardizing

them. Finally, in step 8 discussions would be made between areas to arrive at a

consensus on what can be formalized, an important step for knowledge management and

stability of horizontal cooperation.

The perceived challenge intersetoriliadade is emerging from many fronts, as we

mentioned earlier. Moreover, it is of particular importance to be an important feature of

intra-governmental coordination in a federal government that has sought to develop a

series of policies around social development as a way to give materiality to a whole

process of public debate on the agenda of growth with reduction of social inequalities,

which gained momentum during the 2002 presidential campaign, which elected President

Lula government and led to the Labor Party.

The second stage also has to do with the role of President and political group most

strongly articulated it. Overall, the leadership of the president and his speech to combat

poverty was reflected, to some degree, on the mobilization of the ministers, given that this

valuation of the subject begin to generate a more favorable environment for cooperation

and joint work. Perceives the presence of what Kingdon (1984) defines as the necessary

convergence of the three streams that will generate a Policy Window for entry of an item

on the government agenda: the flow problems(emergence of intersectionality as a key

issue in the management of public policies [Silva, 2011]), Proposals (previous experiences

and developments of the PBF management practices) andpolitics (political speech rallying

the theme of social development and the fight against poverty).

One of the striking features of intersectionality is that it does not seek to replace the

sector, on the contrary, it strengthens the sectors, which can from her efforts and

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maximize scarce resources and promote interventions more complex and specialized. This

feature is observed in the PBF, as the Ministry of Social Development - MDS does not

remove duties of the other, and do not compete for the same resource budget, since the

budget resources allocated are independent, with the guarantee of non-impairment of

another social program . This leverages the steps 2 and 3, reducing potential conflicts and

maximizing scarce resources update. Another feature of step 3 to the case was the rapid

appointment to leadership positions in a number of MDS servers Career Specialist in

Public Policy and Government Management (Career Cross meritocratic recruitment and

technical training to a select body of servers that, depending on their degree of

politicization and alignment to the government of the day may occupy strategic positions of

directorships, call the office at DAS - Management and Advisory Superior, constituting the

high bureaucracy of the federal government).

In general, members of this career have high levels of remuneration and training, in

addition to having a high ability to articulate themselves to the implementation of public

policies, which, starting from the fact that they are in different ministries, generates a great

potential articulation between agencies and public policies.

By "Empowerment Average Bureaucracy" we mean a process in which the

bureaucracy will be recruited a group to coordinate actions, which happens to be the link

between the high bureaucracy (ministerial offices), and operating bureaucracy. Given the

fact that this bureaucracy average, in general, for our case, will be occupied by civil

servers that will be placed on the basis of leadership, this process in the Public

Administration follows a logic in different part of the logic of private management, even if

this difference is tenuous, as so significant as the management capacity is the ability of

political engagement to government strategy (politicization). Thus, this nomination process

can also be a process of cooptation of the bureaucracy, which has different effects, but

one of them is to give the organization greater cohesion therefore greater coordination

capacity (Selznick, 1978).

On the other hand, and ste empowerment process can also generate a bureaucratic

elite in post middle management. This elite, like all others, have a high level of power

(given to her by the empowerment process and the process of appointment / recruitment

to the post of head), but it would be highly homogeneous and circulation very similar

environments, which leads to greater internal cohesion. This elite set here is very similar to

the profile of elite developed and analyzed by C. Wright Mills in his book "The Power Elite"

(Mills, 1956), where the elite would be formed by a series of interlocking directorates,

strongly marked by the presence of informal networks of movement and articulation, would

come from a social class strongly homogeneous and dominate the ranks hierarchical. In

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general, all these features, as pointed out by Mills in the 50s, there was the

characterization of the elite in question, grounded in a very specific public career.

The ministries involved in horizontal issues are the most likely to be affected by the phenomenon "swim upstream", ie, the vertical structure of the preparation and reporting requirements and vertical accountability, which tend to be the norm in all ministries and other organs (ET. Bakvis,

2002). The pressure tends to be felt not at the top of the hierarchy, but in the

intermediate levels of operational management and corporate

services. Moreover, among those actually involved in horizontal projects,

one realizes that the bottlenecks are more pronounced in the intermediate

levels of the ministries. It is noticed that, in most ministries, horizontality is

not taken very seriously at the operational level. (Bakvis and Julliet, 2004:

78-79)

As highlighted in the snippet, bureaucracies, especially medium-sized, can be an

obstacle to horizontal actions. That is, there is nothing common to middle bureaucracy to

be an ally of the intersectoral effort, however, most often it will not. Our case study seems

to have conditions very close to those corresponding to a model of optimal conditions to

lead to engagement: 1) the theme is appealing and social compliance, 2) strong political

leadership is exercised; 3) the recruitment of political bureaucracies to ascend to

management positions is done with major mechanisms of politicization; 4) the budgetary

resources of the program are increased year by year, being one of the least affected by

fiscal policy; 5) the ministries do not compete for funding within the framework of

cooperation , 6) ministers recognize the importance of the program and its engagement; 7)

bureaucracies have political autonomy; 8) bureaucracies benefit from careers horizontal

and high technical strength; 9) is open to experimentation and innovation; 10 ) the

intersectoral coordinating body activity is recent, not having a strong organizational culture

as a barrier to change, etc..

On one hand incur the risk that the oligarchization bureaucracy will constitute as an

area of bureaucratic insulation may present veto point for public policy, on the other

empowerment average bureaucracy opens opportunities for innovation in the management

and intersectoral pattern developed. The creativity of the body is stimulated servers, which

is a rare value to be achieved in public bureaucracies, particularly in developing countries,

like Brazil (OECD, 2010). The creativity of the bureaucracy, the aggregate capacity of

networking, with the ability to circulate a large flow of information and knowledge, coupled

with the transfer of autonomy with accountability mechanisms are critical for the

conformation of step 5, where the servers themselves created through mutual adjustment,

a set of practices and patterns of informal and intersectoral cooperation between the

different sectors of the federal executive.

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The steps 6 and 7 are associated with the presence of a culture of good practice to

let emerge, they are valued, since they are directed to the idea of passing the spread and

be formalized.Quality management in public administration already draws our attention to

the characteristic of standardization activity periodic and constant monitoring and analysis

of what is being done.Stimulate a public servant thinking about process standards,

drawing therefore their personal characteristics, is no easy task. Above all practices that

were happening in a context of great procedural informality and low rigidity from an

incremental approach of trial and error. Thus, step 8, standardization, has the leadership

of a very experienced server, is to know the general aspects of public policy, is well known

in his own office, and it is therefore someone who has a pragmatic and general. This

leader sets together with the servers the process of identification, selection and

standardization of good practice, conveying the teams that have the expertise to master

the laws also.

All the processes described lead to the formation and formalization of inter-sector

cooperation patterns with high standing (as formalization is ex-post and in order to set

crystallization practice) and efficacy, once arises based on actual fact, since born with

viability assured. And more importantly, the procedures and the people responsible for

them are widely known. There is no doubt also that the standardization ensures greater

stability to intersectionality formed, since it fails to bind to personal characteristics and

organizational communication channels restricted.

Anyway, intersectionality is built on a day-to-day, this dialog echelons mean

and median. The chief authorities of the main ministries were only called to

resolve a conflict or another, I think I never in the history of our relationship a

minister had to be called to mediate any deadlock situation. The thing

always did very well until the level of directors. But this requires that the

other side (other ministries) also identifies the PBF something of their own

interest. (Interview with the advisor of National Citizenship Income -

SENARC, Bruno Chamber, held in May 2012 at the headquarters of MDS in Brasilia-DF)

As we have seen and will see the leadership capacity of the body politic is crucial

for the entry of the theme of intersectionality agenda and prioritization on the part of

ministers is also essential. However, equally or even more important than the engagement

of the body politic will be the engagement of bureaucracies and the formation of cohesion

between them. The case of the BFP makes us think that such strong and frequent as the

differences between the ministries may be differences intraministeriais. The government

bureaucracy, which is not a uniform and cohesive body, also can not be at the ministerial

level. In some interviews it became clear that the difficulties of communication between

departments of the same ministry can be even larger than interministeria is.

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In fact the politicization of the bureaucracy accompanied by a process of

empowerment (appointment to senior positions) bureaucrats politically engaged with the

program values and intersectoral approach has been a success for the differential

construction and materialization of intersectionality in the BFP. Ie, the body politic has

made an important role in identification of bureaucrats, who in addition to technical,

managerial and political skills had to lead and control the process of articulation. This

process involves a clear empowerment of bureaucracies, giving them some autonomy to

experiment and to make the dialogues between folders.

The formation of bureaucracy within the SENARC (the body responsible for PBF)

can be explained by a feedback process. When building a qualified staff, politicize it,

empower it, co-opt some of them and put them in managerial positions to lead the team

wins performance. Little by little the team's performance begins to resonate in their own

success and the success of the policy, which creates even more confidence and

legitimacy of these teams work with the government and the entire public administration,

leading to an increase in membership and ministry partners intersectoral engagement. Is

formed as a structure materiality of intersectoral and shielding the possible variations of

context and policy guidance

Another important structural factor that strengthens and increases the potential for

coordination of bureaucracy linked both to the Ministry regarding the BFP is that they are

one of the federal agencies and programs that are used more Career Specialist in Public

Policy and Government Management. Treat the is the composition of a body in a

bureaucracy imbued with great technical mission (unification of transfer programs and land

cover PBF) and a high political priority (poverty agenda), it would be evident that they

could be used for another career that was not grounded in a strong technical background

and extensive knowledge of the functioning of public administration and the process of

public policy making.

Thus for sustaining strongly in this career bureaucracy in question have high

technical capacity of public policies. Besides this being one of the careers with the greatest

potential for intersectoral coordination. Members of this race have an important informal

network of liaison and dialogue between them (corporate network) and career is

undoubtedly the one that distributes and dilutes among the various organs of the Federal

Public Administration, as its members occupy positions in virtually all federal government

ministries. By having an important informal network coordinating members of this career to

bring their bodies important potential for building intersectoral public policies and

coordinates between different areas of government.

3.3. The role of intermediary bodies set up coordination

15

(...) The ministries could perhaps consider the possibility of creating special units responsible for supporting horizontal initiatives undertaken by them - support in the form of training or assistance in the use of tools and horizontal mechanisms, best practices training or assistance in creating structure horizontal for the project in question - as well as creating climate or culture

within them more favorable to the adoption of horizontal solutions. (Bakvis

and Julliet, 2004: 79)

President Dilma trying to make a statement in relation to the previous government

established during the 2010 presidential campaign the mission of eradicating extreme

poverty as one of its major goals of government. It was clear, therefore, that its strategy

would be to increase the focus of social development policies and emphasize the activities

of federal and horizontal coordination within the federal government. Upon his arrival to the

presidency, to define management as its slogan: "Brazil: the country is a rich country

without poverty," makes clear that the issue would continue to be a priority and it would not

keep advancing efforts to step-up and policies develop new plans, programs and

institutions through government attempted innovations.

To differentiate itself from its predecessor and supporter, who was President Lula,

President Dilma Rousseff creates the Brazil Without Poverty Plan (PBSM)2 from June

2011. In the same period is created Special Secretariat for Super Action Extreme Poverty -

SESEP, linked to MDS and basically committed to implement the plan (PBSM). The

institutional structure of SESEP must act in order to coordinate the actions of

implementation and execution of initiatives and programs, set goals, and cons olidar

actions and monitor implementation of the goals of PBSM.

Analyses of assignments SESEP allows us to connect it to a strategy of government

actions particula r the management of President Dilma. When creating a Secretariat within

a ministry and assign it functions for monitoring and tracking of various government

programs of other ministries, as well as functions of articulation, mainly intra-(inter-

sectoral), the presidency has created an unusual. The set of functions is the same SESEP

the competence of the Civil House of the Presidency, which substantially is the body

responsible for the activities accompanying ment ment and monitors programs of different

ministries, especially the priority (as they would be related to the theme combating

poverty) and makes coordination among the different ministerial portfolios.

2 The Plan Brazil Without Poverty (PBSM) aims to eradicate extreme poverty in Brazil. The Plan consists of a

complex network of joint actions and programs in various sectors and government agencies. Understands that poverty is a structural phenomenon and multifaceted and therefore requires not only income distribution, but a series of social policies and public services that tackle the causal factors and Inter-generational poverty. The plan involves actions over eight ministries of the federal government and has great emphasis on coordination with federal state and local governments.

16

Apart from its inception to be unusual, the performance of SESEP also contradicts

the logic of power of government. It is unusual to have a body for a specific ministry

(Office) coordinating and monitoring the actions of other ministries, as this performance

counter to the formal dynamic power of government. How could a body to monitor and

coordinate programs of other agencies that are in the same hierarchical level as the body

to which it is subordinate?

The answer to this apparent inconsistency can be given from the following

analysis. Just as the Civil receive a overlegitimacy that comes from your direct link to the

Presidency, which gives greater powers in relation to other ministries, the SESEP receive

a overlegitimacy, albeit informal own presidency. To mention that the other ministers have

shown great propensity for intersectoral cooperation, is the recognition and volunteer

engagement with the mission to fight poverty, is the science of close linkage toward

presidential authority, Luciana Alves (coordinator SESEP) makes clear that for the topic in

question SESEP has a power to act superior to most other Departments.

The same till the mechanisms of action of SESEP are inspired by mechanisms

developed and tested by the Civil House of the Presidency (CC). By delegating

assignments that, in theory, would fit more to the Civil than one screen etaria s ministerial,

the President made a significant difference in the form of promotion and management of

intra-governmental coordination, mainly intersectoral policy Brazilian social development,

in particular actions related to the plan to combat poverty in the PBSM. The president

seems to draw on his long career as the Chief of Staff (2005-2010) to disseminate models

of coordination experiments by CC for the entire Federal Public Administration. It is also

clear emphasis on the sectoral coordination mechanisms as well as their addition to the

DC replication, as is the case of SESEP.

The creation of a coordination structure and their empowerment by the P resident of

the Republic would be a choice motivated by the priority of this issue and take care of one

of their biggest challenges: building solutions articulated and integrated among

government sectors . In fact, this type of mechanism tends to accelerate the engagement

of intersectoral action, there is seen the power it holds on the accession of others. By

linking the MDS SESEP the Presidency expresses its strategy to increase the powers of

the MDS, which would be the ministry with greater technical capital to coordinate policy to

combat poverty, and to have intersectoral. Thus it is clear that unlike what would be a

reasonable alternative to foster greater coordination capacity to PBSM taking him to the

Civil or directly to the Presidency, the strategy of assigning it to SESEP and link it to the

MDS took into account recognition of the skills, expertise and conditions of this range to

lead this policy.

17

I think when the President created the Brazil Without Poverty Plan, as she put the MDS central ministry and coordinator of this process, involving many other ministries, in addition to health and education (ministries traditionally

involved the action of PBF). The SESEP was established here (in MDS) for

this mission centrality given to the ministry and by the fact that only the cabinet minister would not account for this activity, in addition to being quite

SENARC already overloaded with PBF and the Single Registry. (Interview

with the advisor to the Special Secretariat for Overcoming Extreme Poverty - SESEP / MDS, Luciana Alves de Oliveira, held in May 2012 at the headquarters of MDS in Brasilia-DF).

In other words, to be an intermediate structure SESEP coordination with the

function of promoting the capabilities of articulation between folders without requiring the

direct intervention of the Presidency. Such mechanisms would avoid the appearance of

conflict, given the formation of a more arena for resolving them, preventing many issues

overwhelm the work of the presidency. The SESEP therefore has very similar

characteristics to the central organs coordinating the government (in the case of federal,

Casa Civil).

About ai MPORTANCE central organs as facilitators of sectoral action, the

prevailing culture in the public service and the current accountability framework does not provide organizational environment conducive to

extensive coordination and collaboration between ministries. Consequently,

even when there is good will on the part of some leaders in key ministries, the active intervention of central agencies is generally perceived as

essential. The central bodies should play the role they have to play in at

least two levels. They have a key role to play in establishing horizontal

initiatives and should also provide direct assistance to the process of

collaboration and coordination. (Bakvis and Julliet, 2004: 62-63)

The SESEP has played an important role to give greater flexibility to the horizontal

relationships, as it has led to greater engagement of sector units. During the interviews

highlighted the role of the Secretariat as an organ of support and strengthening of sectoral

agencies since it was established as an agency with large capacities to provide technical

advice and make use of its strong power to increase coping capacities ministerial several

of his challenges. often lacking P or small things and issues specific to the problems and

ministerial coordination and coordinating bodies may be important. The real impact of

SESEP for intersectoral coordination of PBF and policies to combat poverty is still very

difficult to measure, since its activity is fairly recent (from 2011) compared to the complex

challenges which attempts to answer, in However the analysis presented here would be a

major element to the beginning of this reflection on the strategic and institutional changes.

18

Conclusions

This paper attempts to start the development of a typology, which has three basic

patterns of intra-governmental coordination, beyond the most common type would be

coordination exercised by the central organs coordinating in general ministerial

coordination offices connected directly to the chief executive. This typology is not full,

therefore, new types can be added in the future. It was just an opportunity and try to start

the development of intra-governmental coordination studies in Brazil (efforts will continue

in future research). Unlike the traditions of the international literature, we are not in the

Brazilian political science a set of solid studies on the mechanisms and relationships

developed within the executive branch.

Table 2: Typology of intra-governmental coordination

Types of Coordination (by :) Incomes

Collegiate Agencies Positives: activity quick and simple, the important early instance of the coordination process

Negatives: low materiality and difficulty of maintenance over time

Empowerment of bureaucracy Positives: High materiality; potential be Increased by the Involvement of civil careers horizontal servers

Negatives: oligarchization bureaucracy Risks

Coordination of Intermediate Agencies Positives: instance support coordination; Prevents overloading of the coordinating role of the presidency of the republic

Negative: Breaking the formal hierarchy of

the Public Administration

Central Agency of Coordination (central power)

Positives: instance with improved settling disputes; greater Cohesion with the presidential directives

Negatives: should only be used as a last necessity

One of the simplest mechanisms used in executives to provide greater coordination

are collegiate bodies. This mechanism is common in many types of organizations and

would be the most basic form of integration of sectors and solving the problems of

19

excessive specialization, typical of the literature on organizational theory (Matus,

1994). Given its feature collegiate and participation of senior leaders (such as ministers,

secretaries and executives) such a mechanism may be important for initial actions or

coordination to define their strategies, but surely becomes ineffective for materialization of

coordination, since that the agenda of senior management public has to realize many

other subjects.

The empowerment of bureaucracy can be an example of potentiating mechanism

and implementer of coordination for cases requiring rapid coordination and permanent, in

the management of intersectoral public policies, by a process of politicization of public

bureaucracies. On one hand this mechanism enables the construction of physical facilities

for government coordination, through the delegation of autonomy and provide greater

discretion to the bureaucracy, it also opens the possibility for the gentrification of the

bureaucracy and strengthening its potential corporatist, which as already highlighted by

Weber can lead to suppression brakes political control over the same.

There is also the possibility of creating the intermediate coordination. This was

inclusive of the changes in the pattern of government coordination described in the

master's research occurred when the succession by Lula and Dilma could be explained

from the understanding of the importance of the presidential profile on coordination, as

developed by Lewis (2003) . These intermediary bodies could be interesting for the

coordination around specific policies or plans, for instance mean more to conflict resolution

and compromise before the issue comes to the presidency. However, as was also

demonstrated, this mechanism breaks can mean formal hierarchies, as the agencies

would have a "supra legitimacy" since it does not have the same level of power of the

Presidency, which could lead to conflict with the organizational culture of the agencies

coordinated.

In turn, the very House of the Presidency of the Republic, the institutional

framework of the Brazilian federal government assumes the role of coordinating agencies

and sectors, often exerts its central authority and evokes other trading activity with folders

and mediation conflict. By being able to implement vertical solutions (based on his

presidential authority) its performance is extremely useful in resolving major disputes

between folders. Mainly recover the thesis has previously described Peters (2012) that

coordinate implies some degree of centralization. However, like any central authority,

should not be constantly driven, and its performance, again and again, could lead to

disincentives for voluntary cooperation between folders.

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