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Transcript of Cooperating in the Commons
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Michel CAMES
MA in Development Studies
Rural Development
University of Leeds
Essay - Semester 2
1995/96
Cooperating in the commons: an urgency for the poor
In this essay, I shall aim to discuss the truism that resources held in
common are prone to overexploitation. It has been claimed that the only
escape from the dilemma of common pool resources - referred to as the
tragedy of the commons by the seminal article of Hardin (1968) - could be
found either in privatization of the resources or in converting them into state
property. However this conventional wisdom has been challenged since.
Hardins model fails to take into account the self-regulating capabilities ofusers assuming that users are unable to limit access or institute rules to
regulate use. It confuses the open access with common property in which
the individual interest is constrained by existing institutional arrangements.
So if the adoption of the model relying overly sanguine on the option of
privatization of common property resources is generally not more efficient
and clearly less equitable, and the variant option of government control hasbeen unable to replace traditional communal controls with an effective
alternative system, why, I refer to Milton M. R. Freeman (1989:92), is more
effort not directed to re-establishing traditionally-based local-level
management systems which much empirical evidence now suggests to be
often more effective?
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After attempting to answer this question, I will proceed to shed light on the
causes for a gradual decline of common-property systems by using
contemporary evidence from drought-prone areas of India. Next I will
highlight why it is important to sustain such systems especially in regard ofthe rural poor. Pointing towards possible solutions to reinstate appropriate
management systems allowing more ecological and social sustainable
development will conclude this essay emphasizing that sustainable resource
management is not intrinsically associated with any particular property-
rights regime and a combination of conventional and traditional or neo-
traditional regimes may in many cases be more advantageous.
The Debate around the Maintenance of the Commons
Since time immemorial, the structure and functioning of resource-regulating
institutions has been based on customs, taboos and kinship. These informal
regulations have been based on the principle of equity to its members
generally at the expense of exclusion of others. Common property resources
(CPRs) have been open for its users through an essentially closed mode of
access to these resources.
According to Runge, these arrangements closely resemble those that
dominated the early stages of European economic development. With the
forced enclosure movements of the 15th and 16th centuries, the common
property typical of Western Europe declined. However, as he continues,
recent research on the common field systems replaced by 18th-century
enclosures continues to break down the conventional wisdom that enclosure
was a prerequisite to the adoption of advanced agricultural methods. It
would conclude that the major economic consequence of the enclosure was
to redistribute the existing agricultural income and not to create additional
income by increasing efficiency (Runge, 1986:623,632). Ciriacy-Wantrup
and Bishop assert that overgrazing was not a cause for the historical
reduction of the commons in Great Britain. One important factor was the
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increased profitability for the feudal lord of grazing sheep for commercial
wool production. They argue that, as forest lands on the European continent
became increasingly profitable as sources of timber for sale vis--vis their
traditional role as sources of subsistence, the feudal lords changed fromadministrators to profit-seeking entrepreneurs. As they concisely point out,
this has been the true tragedy of the commons: the peasant was
transformed from a co-equal owner on the commons with secure tenure to a
landless worker on the feudal estate (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop,
1975:719-20).
It has been a tragic truism to equate the dismantling of the commons withprogress and efficiency. It is Boulding who claims that:
It is one of the great ironies of the French revolution that the egalite,
which really meant equal distribution of estates among children and
the abolition of primogeniture along with other hallmarks of
aristocracy, is a sure recipe for equality of misery (...) (Boulding,
1977:285).
The solution to the tragedy of the commons would, according to Boulding,
not lie in the adoption of equity principles as propagated by the French
revolution, but in the acknowledgement of Malthus remedy of the great
miserific vision:
The answer is the segregation of misery through a class structure. (...)
If we privatize the commons, we will create an upper class who owns
and administers it. It will be administered well. There will be no
overgrazing. (...) If the class structure can be preserved, if the fences
hold through a combination of the threat system, the police and the
military, and the opiates of religion, nationalism, and ideology, the
system is pretty stable. Up to now one can almost say that this has
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been the only successful answer to the tragedy of the commons
(Boulding, 1977:285-86).
This line of thought has also been justified by Hardin (1968) and Baden(1977). Hardin, who popularized the concept of the tragedy of the
commons claims that if the commons can be justifiable at all, then only
under conditions of low-population density (Hardin, 1968:1248) assuming
that otherwise it is impossible to upkeep or institute CPR management
systems. Baden, who argues that discussions involving the management of
common pool resources often resemble religious arguments conducted by
nontheologians, sees government action as a requirement in themanagement of common pool resources in the absence of collective
management (Baden, 1977:138-39, emphasis added). However he
obviously does not take this restriction seriously into account as no reference
to action with collective management is given which could be an obstacle to
the free-rider phenomenon. This ideology of resigning CPRs to private or
state control as a panacea for the tragedy of the commons reflects,
according to Grima and Berkes, the assumption of market-oriented societies
of Western industrial nations that all valuable resources are individually
owned, fully mobile and exchangeable in small increments in well-
functioning markets (Grima and Berkes, 1989:37, quoting Bromley, 1985).
Grima and Berkes argue that in many Western societies, the individual self-
interest is seen as supreme. This could however not be extrapolated to many
other societies where the individual is not the dominant locus of choice and
the community is the relevant decision-making unit (Grima and Berkes,
1989:37).
Berkes assumes that where societies are fluid, with large numbers of
individuals only in casual contact, all having access to the commons, the
tragedy is relatively likely.
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together with Western culture tending to emphasize competition as opposed
to cooperation, would have nurtured Western ecologists to be overly
indulgent with the concepts of competition, predation and parasitism, as
opposed to positive ecological interactions such as cooperation,commensalism and mutualism (Berkes, 1989a:72,85).
But besides this cultural bias against common-property regimes, other
obstacles remain.
According to Gibbs and Bromley, common-property regimes imply an
acceptance of participatory approaches to resource management and more
decentralized administration. This however would involve a major shift in therole of resource-management agencies and bureaucracies unaccustomed to
sharing power (Gibbs and Bromley, 1989:31).
Also the inherence of empirically derived indirect measures of stock
circumstances adopted by many tradition-based local common-property
systems to ascertain catch limits in fishing and hunting as being inferior and
non-scientific compared to science-based rational management techniques
constitutes an impediment to the introduction of more effective management
institutions. As Freeman points out, an intuitive management approach
based on feedback of information and learning does not require knowing
various stock parameters nor undertaking complex modelling exercises, but
determines new harvest levels by modification of an earlier empirically
derived value.
However, as he proceeds, until public awareness of the efficacy of traditional
systems of management becomes widespread, public policy will continue to
favour a conservative approach towards resource management, ensuring
continuation of orthodox science-based approaches (Freeman, 1989:104-
06).
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The lack of commitment to establish or reinstate traditional or neo-
traditional local-level management systems however can be sought only to
some extent in the zeal of resource managers to privatize or nationalize
CPRs having in mind the tragedy of the commons. Other causes, among thestrong resistance of authoritarian regimes and urban elites to relinquish
political power to local institutions (Ruttan, 1984:399) and the urge of
modernization by any possible means making societies throw overboard
management practices in use since centuries contributes to the
transformation of sustainably managed resource systems into open-access
spheres attractive to free-riders.
The answer to inefficient management of resources however does not lie in
removing common-property systems - this only will throw out the baby with
the bathwater - but in attempting to seek for solutions which can overcome
constraints of these systems if they do not have to be re-created anew
altogether.
Causes of the decline of CPRs: indian evidence
Common-property resources are often in decline for the regime managing
them is dwindling or disappearing altogether. Jodha argues that increased
marketability and value of products lead to enhanced profitability which
becomes the guiding force behind the choice of enterprises and usage
patterns of CPRs rather than the concern for their upkeep. He further points
out that technological innovation often makes it physically easier to
overexploit natural resources (Jodha, 1985:259-60).
According to Goodland et al, increased participation in market economies
which encourages the overexploitation for export of natural resources
previously harvested for local subsistence is one major cause of common-
property system breakdown (Goodland et al, 1989:151).
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Structural adjustment policies are just one case in point. The demand for
foreign exchange creates competition for resources among governments,
concessionaires, and rural communities as well as a pressure to redefine
property rights (Gibbs and Bromley, 1989:30).
Referring to dry regions of India, Jodha argues that the main form of decline
is the privatization of CPRs:
Under various welfare programmes [mainly land reforms in the early
1950s] CPR lands had been distributed to people for private use. CPR
lands had also been illegally appropriated often with subsequentlegalization. The stated intention of privatization of CPRs was to give
land to the poor who were landless or who had very little land. (...)
The consequent decline in the area of CPRs, and the resultant
overcrowding and degradation of CPRs have led to a considerable
reduction in the overall quantity of CPR benefits for the poor (Jodha,
1986:1178).
Ensuing breakdown of traditional value systems also contribute to the
dismantling of the commons. According to Gadgil and Iyer, small multi-caste
village communities in which the different caste groups were linked to each
other in a web of reciprocity favoured sustainable use of CPRs under
communal management. However, as they argue, they are increasingly
coming into conflict because of the destruction of traditional occupations and
the erosion of their resource base (Gadgil and Iyer, 1989:240,252).
Also the tradition of providing free inputs by common-property users and a
common revenue fund for the maintenance of CPRs has been gradually
eroded. According to Jodha, peoples contribution and common property
resource revenue generated through auctioning of trees, etc. have
disappeared and government grants or relief has proven to be a poor
substitute for these traditional sources of upkeep (Jodha, 1985:251).
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Another cause is population growth. Sustainable use of CPRs requires the
number of parties sharing access to the resource to be not too large.
However, as Jodha argues, increasing population density creates relativeresource scarcity which in turn is thought to induce privatization of resources
for reasons of efficiency and internalization of gains from resource use
(Jodha, 1985:256).
Increased differentiation of the rural community can as well cause the
management quality of CPRs to decline (Jodha, 1995:3282). Given the
complimentarity between PPRs and CPRs in the rural economy and assumingthe concentration of PPRs in a few households of a village, as is often the
case, the non-poor can reap more benefits from CPRs than the poor and
consequently only the PPR owners may participate in preserving the CPRs
primarily to reinforce their existing structure of income generation (Chopra
et al, 1989:A-192).
Investigations in a number of Karnatakan villages reveal that, according to
Pasha,
though CPRs play a crucial role in the household economy of the rural
poor, it is the non-poor who get more benefits from CPRs in absolute
terms. (...) though in relative terms the poor obtained a greater
proportion of their income from them (Pasha, 1992:2502).
Given a high ratio of income differentiation between non-poor and poor, the
non-poors share is generally considerably higher than the poors despite the
higher share in the relative income of the latter.
However, rising disparities in PPR ownership of CPR users are not only a
cause for a decline in the ability to manage CPRs sustainably, they are also
an effect of the decline.
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Consequences of the decline of CPRs
or: Why maintaining CPRs is a necessity for the rural poor
Although only limited empirical evidence exists in the Indian case, mostauthors agree that privatization has helped well-endowed land owners more
than the poor (Jodha, 1985:260). The comparison of landholding size before
and after the privatization indicates, as Jodha argues, that those who had
relatively more land also got more land.
The complete process of privatization of CPRs as it affected the rural
poor involved three stages: (i) they were deprived of their right tocollectively use the CPRs, (ii) they were given individual title to small
parts of privatized CPRs, and (iii) the circumstances disentitled them of
the newly received lands. (...)
Mere distribution of land, particularly of sub-marginal land, without the
provision of necessary complementary resources was not sufficient to
develop and cultivate the land (...). Rather than sticking to a small
piece of land that could not be developed and used for want of other
resources, these households preferred to sell or mortgage the land
(...) (Jodha, 1986:1179).
On further investigation the response of the poor is quite rational. As animal
husbandry plays a very important role in the economy of small and marginal
farmers (Pasha, 1991:A-27), small pieces of marginal land are not efficient
in their agricultural and livelihood system because, as Gadgil and Iyer argue,
when the resource involved is not being produced but foraged, it entails the
use of relatively large tracts of land (Gadgil and Iyer, 1989:241).
Jodha points out that livestock, because they are mobile, are less subject to
the adverse impact of localized droughts than crops are. This advantage is
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lost however, if a farmers livestock must depend solely on his own forage
and water resources (Jodha, 1985:248).
It is this hedge against environmental uncertainty inherent in CPRmanagement, still amplified by the right to be included in a group that
provides a hedge against individual failure (Runge, 1986:632) that is
reduced or lost by the decline of the CPRs.
Through the interaction of privatization, sub-marginal CPR lands which have
only been used as pasture land so far, have been converted into croplands.
According to Jodha, in the case of the arid zone of Rajasthan, unlike thesituation in Europe following privatization of CPRs, it has invariably meant
putting the land under plow. The consequences of this practice which strains
the limited use-capability of the land are soil erosion and decline in overall
crop yields (Jodha, 1985:260).
On the other hand, due to the decline in size and the depletion of CPRs there
has been a substantial increase in the number of sheep and goats. According
to Jodha, the small ruminants could not only be sustained by degraded
CPRs, but they also fit better in the changed migration patterns:
In the context of the reduced CPRs, the migration of cattle has become
more difficult than of small ruminants. Thus the sheep and goats often
accused for destroying vegetation in the CPRs, seem to have become
more important following the degradation of CPRs rather than vice
versa (Jodha, 1990:A73-74).
However, large ruminants such as draft animals have more and more
difficulties to survive on the degraded CPRs. According to Pasha, the
population of bullocks has decreased due to the high overhead cost of
maintaining them on purchased fodder as the CPR lands have declined, or,
where they survive on degraded CPR lands, these animals are subject to
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many diseases, miscarriages, prolonged unproductive period, low growth
and low productivity (Pasha, 1991:A-28).
Jodha argues that the maintenance of such animals without the CPR facilitymeans diversion of a substantial proportion of marginal farm households
crop lands from food and cash crops to fodder crops. The alternative option,
i.e. reducing animal numbers to levels sustainable by own fodder/feed
resources, implies the loss of own farm inputs, e.g. draft power and farm-
yard manure (Jodha, 1990:A-66).
It can be concluded that in dryland areas, as privatization raises the cost oflivestock raising and erodes the regions comparative advantage (Jodha,
1985:262), it is the poor being most dependent on animal husbandry who
lose out the most.
Reinstating appropriate management systems
Recognizing that reinstating or developing CPRs is required as a strategy to
help the rural poor can lead us searching for possible approaches. As Jodha
argues, one strategy could be to develop CPRs and improve their use
through technological and institutional interventions.
However, it may be pointed out that growth in the CPR productivity
alone may prove counter-productive. At present the process of self-
selection of CPR users, tend to induce mainly the poor to depend on
these resources. CPR activities are low pay-off options. The poor
chooses them as the opportunity cost of their labour is lower than the
returns from CPR activities. An increase in CPR productivity will induce
greater demand on CPRs (Jodha, 1986:1179).
Rehabilitation of CPRs is, according to Jodha, less of an investment-cum-
technological problem and more of a resource management problem.
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In most areas, even natural regeneration itself can make CPRs more
productive, provided the regeneration is permitted, through controlled
and regulated use of resources. However, this cannot happen unlessthe CPRs are reconverted from open access resources to common
property resources. In operational terms this would mean the re-
establishment and enforcement of usage regulations and user-
obligations towards CPRs (Jodha, 1990:A-77).
Re-establishment and subsequent control mechanisms represent a far
greater challenge for implementation than technological and institutionalinterventions from outsiders. While the latter necessitates merely a one-off
activity to re-establish ecological equilibrium - mostly a both costly and futile
intervention - the former implies the establishment of local institutional
arrangements of CPR user groups which can regulate sustainable use of
CPRs on a permanent basis. In the context of the current situation, this can
sound utopian. As Pasha points out, in discussions with the poor households
in villages in Karnataka, even these households largely prefer the available
CPRs to be distributed among them as PPRs. Among other reasons for this
reaction he assumes the lack through unequal distribution of CPR-based
PPRs in the past and the lack of a proper policy by the government about the
CPRs (Pasha, 1992:2503).
This reaction however could suggest that basically the poor prefer a
common-property regime provided that the principle of equity is respected
and past injustices regarding the distribution of CPR based PPRs will be
nullified - what will be unlikely to happen.
On the other hand, as already noted above, when PPR ownership is
widespread, preservation of CPRs by increasing their productivity promotes
the interests of the majority in participatory institutions (Chopra et al,
1989:A-194). To provide however an increasing population with CPR-based
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PPR land is arithmetically nonsense: all the remaining CPR land would have
to be distributed that each poor household could own a non-viable small size
of marginal land.
If however means can be found for establishing participatory institutions, the
basic pre-condition for sustainable management of common lands would be
met. A local CPR management regime could, according to Damodaran,
institute following rules:
All users have access to CPRs in their capacity as members of the
community and no individual user enjoys any preferential access to theselands by virtue of any social and economic advantages vis--vis other fellow
users. In some cases, he proceeds, restrictions are imposed on the number
of livestock grazed by a grazier which is either prohibited or discouraged by
a grazing fee by the community. The basic concept implicit in these
measures is sustainable and equitable exploitation of the common land
resources without doing away with open access to the lands bearing the
resources (Damodaran, 1991:2214).
Supporting collective action through the participation of local people in such
management regimes however requires more than populist interventions. A
collaboration of the stereotypical top-down and bottom-up approaches
(Paul, 1989:104) has to be taken into account. Paul pleads for a synergy
between governments and grassroots organizations - which have historically
been antagonists - in the fight against poverty. This potential of
collaboration would offer opportunities to the poor to participate and express
their voice effectively particularly to enhance their self confidence and self
reliance. As he argues, governments and grassroots organizations have
different strengths which are complementary. In the context of poverty
alleviation, there is a clear case for a division of labour that exploits their
comparative advantage (Paul, 1989:100,105-06).
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It is this common effort to empower the poor which could be more
successful in the attempt to sustain CPR regimes and consequently maintain
the ecological sustainability of CPRs.
As Berkes argues, even that it may not be possible in many cases to turn
back the clock, the knowledge base that would enable sustainable resource
use nevertheless remains with local users. Hence, it makes management
sense to leave as much control and responsibility as possible at the
communal level while coordinating activities of users at the government level
(Berkes, 1989b:238-239).
As Runge puts it, it is the search for appropriate institutional responses
which must respect both the traditions and the constraints of local needs in
specific choice environments. There are no universal prescriptions for
efficient and equitable resource management (Runge, 1986:633). Berkes
proposes that combinations of property-rights regimes may in many cases
work better than any single regime. The success of local-level management,
for example, often depends on its legitimization by central government,
involving the sharing of power between governments and local communities
(Berkes et al, 1989:93).
Rather than invoking the general superiority of one type of property
institution, e.g. Hardins deterministic model (Berkes et al, 1989:93), a
continuum of property rights, from pure rights of exclusion to pure rights of
inclusion, depending on the nature of resource management problems paired
with the need for more empirical research (Runge, 1986:633) may show us
the way to explain resource use in complex socio-ecologic systems with
more well-balanced models.
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