Caucasus Edition (e-journal), December 1, 2012

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Conventional arms control measures: could they mitigate tensions

around Nagorno-Karabakh?

Tabib Huseynov, Caucasus Programme Manager, Saferworld, Tbilisi1

Originally published in Caucasus Edition (e-journal), December 1, 2012

Introduction

Can conventional arms control (CAC) measures between Armenia and Azerbaijan be effective

prior to the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict? Or is a political settlement a

prerequisite for the successful implementation of such measures? Or perhaps, this is a false

choice and we can think of the CAC measures, as part of broader confidence- and security-

building measures (CSBMs), which could be advanced together with the progress in the peace

talks in a parallel and mutually reinforcing manner?

Today the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the only conflict in the region, which has a real risk of

escalating into an all-out war in the foreseeable future. Compared to Georgia-Russia standoff

over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the conflict in Transnistria, the situation is least

predictable in Nagorno-Karabakh today. It has characteristics of “hot conflict”, which is absent

from other regional conflicts. These characteristics include a sniper warfare, which is the

cause of most of the casualties; a latent but dangerous “trench war”, whereby both Armenian

and Azerbaijani troops gradually move their trenches closer to each other; and frequent “tit-

for-tat” attacks and incursions into each other’s positions.

The challenge the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict poses to the regional security is arguably of

even greater extent than the one posed by the August 2008 war in Georgia. The biggest risk,

as Crisis Group warned in 2011, is that in case of a new war, regional powers, Russia and

NATO member Turkey in particular, would be pressured to become directly involved contrary

to their larger foreign policy interests.2

Major CAC instruments and Armenian and Azerbaijani adherence to them

The presence of unresolved conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has resulted in an on-

going arms race in the region and has yielded most of the CSBMs, including CAC measures,

ineffective.

Armenia and Azerbaijan are parties to major CAC agreements in Europe – the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Vienna Document on confidence and

1 The views expressed in this paper reflect the personal opinion of the author and do not necessarily represent

the views of the organisation he is affiliated with. This paper was delivered at the Wilton Park Conference “Conventional arms control and the Euro-Atlantic security environment” on 12 October 2012 | WP1208 2 See, for details, Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War, Crisis Group Europe Briefing N°60, 8 February 2011

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security-building measures. They have not acceded, however, to the Open Skies Treaty, the

Mine Ban (Ottawa) Treaty, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and Convention on

Cluster Munitions citing the existence of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have failed to comply with the CFE Treaty obligations ever since

their accession to this treaty in early 1990s. They do provide data on equipment and host on-

site inspections, as required by the Treaty; however, because of the conflict they exceed their

quotas, do not provide complete equipment declarations and timely notification of new

equipment acquisition, as required by the Treaty.

Armenia accuses Azerbaijan of starting an arms race. In a recent interview, Armenian

president Serzh Sargsyan said Azerbaijan buys “terrifying quantities” of weapons exceeding its

CFE quotas. Armenia considers Azerbaijan’s arms acquisitions as a sign of its preparation for a

new war.

Azerbaijan similarly accuses Armenia of storing its excess treaty-limited weaponry in the

occupied territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, out of reach of the CFE inspections. Azerbaijan has

also provided evidence of Armenia moving accounted for and registered military equipment

from its territory to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, thus accusing it of continuing

military build-up in its occupied territories. 3

Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan accepts that it is exceeding its quota on some of the treaty-limited

weaponry, but maintains that it cannot carry out some Treaty obligations so long as the

conflict with Armenia is unresolved and its territory remains occupied.4

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan do not report fully on the entry into force of various treaty-

limited equipment. The regular Russian arms transfers to Armenia have not been officially

reported in line with CFE procedures either. Armenia has not declared any new acquisitions to

the UN Register since 2004, and Azerbaijan’s last submission was in 2009. Armenia’s and

Azerbaijan’s respective submissions show quite clearly how much both of them under-report

their military acquisitions. The data on Armenia also completely omits Russian arms transfers.

Graph (below): Armenian and Azerbaijani reported arms imports between 1992 and 2010.

Comparisons between self-reporting and references in third-party reports.

Source: The UN Register of Conventional Arms

http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx

3 Thus, for example, types of new weaponry displayed in military parades held in Nagorno-Karabakh were

identical to the ones acquired by Armenia. “Letter dated 8 June 2012 from the Permanent Representative of

Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General”, A/66/829–S/2012/427, http://www.un.int/azerbaijan/pdf/Updates/Letter%20to%20UNSG%20on%20parade%20in%20NK%20A-66-829%20Eng.pdf 4 In its data as of January 1, 2012, Azerbaijan declared equipment totals that exceeded its overall limits by over

390 pieces of treaty-limited equipment (over 160 tanks and about 230 artillery pieces in excess of Azerbaijan’s limits). http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/197082.htm

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In addition to the non-compliance by Armenia and Azerbaijan, the CFE has objective

limitations in its verification mechanisms vis-à-vis these countries. Thus, Nagorno-Karabakh is

beyond the reach of the CFE inspections, which gives Armenia opportunity to station as many

troops and equipment as it wants out of reach of the CFE inspections and claim that these are

the “Nagorno-Karabakh Army” troops and equipment. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan station

troops and equipment in forward positions which for security reasons cannot be always

inspected by CFE inspectors. Both nations have a number of militarised units, in addition to

army, which can perform combat duties in case of war, and since technically are not

considered an army, operate outside of the CFE provisions. In Azerbaijan, for example, there

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are seven additional militarised forces (interior troops, state border service, special units of

the national security, justice, emergency situations and defence industry ministries, as well as

the state protection service and national guard under the president.5

Armenia and Azerbaijan are parties to the Vienna Document, which means that they provide

information to other signatory states on their military forces, weapons systems and plans for

their deployment, invite representatives of signatory states to visit military facilities and so

on. But most of the Vienna Document thresholds are designed for larger military powers,

reflecting the original goal of preventing tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (and

later, Russia). As such, these high thresholds are unsuitable to prevent violent conflict

between states with small armed forces or reduce tensions.6

Armenia and Azerbaijan do not accept mutual evaluation visits. The CFE and Vienna

Document allow signatory states to inspect each other's compliance with the arms ceilings

and other treaty provisions through random visits to their military facilities. But upon

accession to CFE in early 1990s, Armenia and Azerbaijan have reached a gentlemen’s

agreement to avoid sending each other’s military to view each other’s assets.

The unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has effectively blocked Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s

accession to a number of other important CAC instruments, such as Open Skies Treaty, the

Mine Ban (Ottawa) Treaty, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and Convention on

Cluster Munitions.

Armenia’s position on these treaties is that it cannot sign up to them unless Azerbaijan agrees

to do so too. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, argues that it cannot accede to these instruments

without settlement of the conflict with Armenia. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan view

landmines planted along the frontline around Nagorno-Karabakh and on the Armenia-

Azerbaijan international border, as essential to their defence and will not remove them unless

peace is achieved. Azerbaijan says that while it cannot sign up to the mine ban treaty, it in

practice fulfils all the obligations prescribed by the treaty, including on ban on producing,

planting or exporting these mines.

International leverage on Armenia and Azerbaijan in terms of CAC measures

There are no binding UN Security Council Resolution on arms embargo against Armenia and

Azerbaijan. Neither there are specific EU Regulations or Common Positions on this matter.

There are, however, non-binding embargoes which have been adhered by the US and the EU.

5 For more on that, see, Azerbaijan: Defence Sector Management and Reform, Crisis Group Europe Briefing N°50

, 29 Oct 2008 66

For example, military activities only have to be notified starting at division size (9,000 men), observed starting at corps size (13,000 men) and are limited at corps and army size. Below that threshold the military activities can be subject to notification and observation on a voluntary basis, but this is unfeasible in case of political tensions. Hans-Joachim Schmidt, Military Confidence Building and Arms Control in Unresolved Territorial Conflicts, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2009, p. 18-19; http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2730/pdf/prif89.pdf

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In February 1992, the OSCE requested that all OSCE participating states should introduce an

embargo on “all deliveries of weapons and munitions to forces engaged in combat in the

Nagorno-Karabakh area.” In July 1993 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 853

condemning the seizure of Azerbaijan’s Agdam district and urged States “to refrain from the

supply of any weapons and munitions which might lead to an intensification of the conflict or

the continued occupation of territory”.

Although there are no mechanisms for overseeing these non-mandatory embargoes, the

Western countries have generally refrained from arms exports and have named Armenia and

Azerbaijan as countries and destinations that are subject to stricter export controls. The

strategic goods that fall under these stricter laws include military goods, products used for

torture and repression, radioactive sources and dual-use goods - commercially available

goods that could be used for military purposes.7

Nevertheless, Armenia and Azerbaijan do receive some military training and military

assistance from the US and the EU under the existing partnership frameworks, like NATO’s

Partnership for Peace programme. The US military assistance to Azerbaijan has been mostly

confined to improving communication equipment and radar systems. The military assistance

practically does not include transfer of armaments. In 2012, the US Department of State

wanted to add Azerbaijan to the list of countries eligible to buy American military equipment,

specifically for border protection and “police-type” activities. But it shelved the plan in June,

under the pressure from the powerful pro-Armenian lobby in the Congress.8

In the absence of opportunity to buy from the Western producers, Armenia and Azerbaijan

have to rely on mostly Soviet and Russian-produced armaments. Russia has been the major

arms provider to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan also relies extensively on Ukraine and

Belarus for its arms purchases, and since recently began to develop joint production with

Turkey, and even with countries as distant as South Africa.

Russia has used its arm supplies to Armenia and Azerbaijan as a powerful political leverage.

Thus, in 2010 Russia signed an upgraded military pact with Armenia extending the lease of its

military base there till 2044 and committing in return to supplying Armenia with more

weapons. It subsequently provided Armenia with advanced “Smerch” MLRS. As a sweetener,

at around the same time in 2011, Russia sold Azerbaijan S-300 anti-aircraft systems. Such

manipulative dealings allow Russia to increase its influence on both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

But Russia uses such manipulations to also maintain military balance between the two and

thus, arguably, reduce the likelihood of hostilities, - even if, paradoxically, it comes at the cost

of encouraging arms race between the sides.

7 https://www.gov.uk/arms-embargo-on-armenia-and-azerbaijan

8 Shahla Sultanova, “US defence sale ban won’t stop Azeris arming”, IWPR, 27 July 2012; http://iwpr.net/report-

news/us-defence-sale-ban-wont-stop-azeris-arming

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What can be done?

The complexities of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict show that the CAC measures cannot be

viewed in isolation from the wider political negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Armenia would be more favourable to a stricter CAC regime, if it is convinced that such a

regime is going to consolidate the status quo, and thus, would cement its territorial

acquisitions. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, understandably will oppose any military CBMs,

including stricter CAC measures, which in its understanding would consolidate the status quo

of occupation and would not guarantee a progress in the political negotiations.

This presents a chicken-and-egg dilemma, because a political agreement is impossible without

some level of trust- and confidence-building, including in the military spheres, between the

sides. But at the same time, applied in isolation from the wider political process, the CSBMs,

including the CAC measures, may further consolidate the status quo, and thus, make the

conflict even more intractable. Therefore, a careful consideration should be given to the

context and timings within which the CAC measures could be feasibly and usefully applied to

improve security and promote peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

There are several CAC measures that need to be kept on the agenda, although they do not

seem feasible at the moment.

1. Armenia and Azerbaijan should be urged to fully report on their arms acquisitions to

the UN Register and third countries supplying these arms should similarly be urged to

fully report on these shipments;

2. CFE inspections should cover the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding

occupied territories and the armed forces deployed there should be counted under

the Armenian quota;

3. Armenia and Azerbaijan should be urged to accede to the Open Skies Treaty and

accept regular third-party over-flights to reduce tensions and for early warning

purposes. This may be extremely useful mechanism during the post-settlement stage,

as part of possible future peacekeeping operations;

4. Armenia and Azerbaijan should sign up to the Mine Ban Treaty, Convention on Certain

Conventional Weapons and Convention on Cluster Munitions.

For the CAC, and other CSBMs to succeed, we need a minimum level of political agreement

between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This minimum agreement can be achieved, if Armenia and

Azerbaijan agree on a set of basic principles, proposed by the Minsk Group mediators. These

principles would not lead to any concrete withdrawal of troops or a change of status quo on

the ground. However, it would provide a framework, or a certain “road map” for future more

substantial negotiations on both political and military confidence-building measures, and

would thus, lay a foundation of a future peace.