Contributions of Contingencies in Modern Societies to‘‘Privacy’’ in the Behavioral Relations of

Cognition and Emotion

Emmanuel Zagury Tourinho, Aecio Borba, Christian Vichi, andFelipe Lustosa Leite

Universidade Federal do Para, Brazil

The aim of this paper is to examine specific features of modern individualistic societies thatcontribute to ‘‘emotions’’ and ‘‘cognitions’’ becoming a matter of privacy. Although somebehavior analysts identify emotions and cognitions as ‘‘private events,’’ we argue with Skinner(1945) that cognitions and emotions are relations among events and that their origin is in publicevents in the contingencies of reinforcement maintained by other people. Guided by Elias (1939/1996), we suggest that the shift from feudal economies to market economies involved theincreasing individualization of society’s members. This individualizing process includes thesocially maintained contingencies that bring some verbal responses under control of privatestimulation and reduce the magnitude of some verbal responses to a covert level. Behavioralrelations in which either stimuli or responses (or both) cannot be observed by others set the stagefor a concept of ‘‘privacy.’’ Changes in societal contingencies that gave rise to individualizationand the attribution of privacy to cognitions and emotions are suggested to include the following:(a) increasing frequency of individual consequences that have no apparent or direct relevance tothe group; (b) increasing numbers of concurrent contingencies and choice requirements; (c)conflicts between immediate and delayed consequences for the individual; and (d) conflictsbetween consequences for the individual and for the group.

Key words: private events, cognitions, emotions, cultural contingencies

Ever since Skinner’s 1945 analysisof the phenomena that underliepsychological terms, behavior ana-lysts have examined the role ofprivate events in operant contingen-cies (e.g., Anderson, Hawkins, Free-man, & Scotti, 2000; Anderson,Hawkins, & Scotti, 1997; Friman,Hayes, & Wilson, 1998; Moore,2000). This movement represents therealization of Skinner’s (1945) aim tomake behavior analysis a version ofbehaviorism that explains ‘‘emo-tions’’ and ‘‘cognitions,’’ not as‘‘mental’’ phenomena but rather asrelations between stimuli and re-sponses, some of which may beinaccessible to outside observers. In

that 1945 article, Skinner suggestedseveral ways that verbal communitiescan arrange contingencies of rein-forcement that (a) bring verbal re-sponses under control of stimulationthat occurs beneath the skin of thespeaker and (b) account for thereduction in magnitude of respondingto a level at which the responses areno longer observable to outsiders.Only when people can talk aboutcovert stimuli and responses (i.e.,when such tacting relations occur)does the concept of privacy arise.

It has been suggested that thenotion of emotions and cognitionsas internal or private phenomena is aproduct of modern societies charac-terized by market economies (Elias,1939/1996). In this paper, we considerthe conditions that could have givenrise to those social contingencies,maintained by verbal communities,that result in the modern view ofcognition and emotion as internaland private. First, we emphasize theimportance of cognitions and emo-

The writing of this paper was supported bygrants from the Conselho Nacional de De-senvolvimento Cientıfico e Tecnologico andCoordenacao de Aperfeicoamento de Pessoaldo Ensino Superior, Brazil. Parts of the paperwere presented at the 33rd annual conventionof the International Association for BehaviorAnalysis, San Diego, 2007.

Correspondence should be sent to the firstauthor (e-mail: eztourinho@gmail.com).

The Behavior Analyst 2011, 34, 171–180 No. 2 (Fall)

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tions as behavioral relations in whichall events are originally public. Sec-ond, we consider individualizing pro-cesses that arose in the context ofmarket economies and contributedto the ‘‘privatization’’ of some eventsin cognitive and emotional relations.Third, we suggest several changes inthe nature of social contingenciesthat occurred in the shift from feudalto market economies and contributedto that privatization. Finally, weconclude that the work of somesociologists can provide historicalcontext for understanding the partic-ulars of the behavioral contingenciesthat account for the concept ofprivacy in modern societies.

PRIVATE EVENTS ANDBEHAVIORAL RELATIONS

We consider the concept of behav-ioral relation to be synonymous withthat of behavior, by which we meanthe relations between acts of organ-isms and events in the world that arefunctionally related to those acts. Wethus avoid any confusion that mayarise between behavior (understoodas the relations between stimuli andresponses) and responses (the actionof the organism observed indepen-dent of its context). To the behavioranalyst, environmental events thathave function with respect to acts oforganisms may originate in either thenonsocial or the social world, andmay occur either inside or outside theskin. What is important is not thesource of the stimulation but the rolethe event plays with respect toresponses of the organism.

Emotions and cognitions, then,cannot be viewed as stimuli or re-sponses but rather as relations be-tween stimuli and responses. Weillustrate this affirmation by address-ing two concepts: happiness as anexample of a basic, or primary, emo-tion (cf. Zelenski & Larsen, 2000), andproblem solving as an example of whatis considered to be cognition (cf.Kutnick & Kington, 2005).

An adult’s happiness about a newjob might include, for example, (a) aresponse of shouting, evoked by theannouncement that he or she is beinghired; (b) responses of purchasinggifts for family members; (c) self-descriptions of happiness under thecontrol of social stimuli or bodilyconditions; (d) cancellation of pre-scriptions for antidepressants underthe control of self-descriptions ofhappiness, and so on. Given theidiosyncratic environmental historiesof individuals, the particulars of therelations that define happiness varyfrom person to person and time totime.

Of course, bodily changes occuralong with the relations that defineone’s happiness, just as they occurwhen one is playing soccer, watchinga movie, or teaching a class. Thesechanges in themselves do not defineone’s happiness unless or until thebodily condition acquires a stimulusfunction in a relation identified ashappiness. The private stimulus isthus not itself the emotion of happi-ness, because it does not participatein a behavioral relation.

Cognition requires a somewhatdifferent analysis, explored by Skin-ner (1966/1969) in his discussion ofproblem solving. One is faced with aproblem when a response that mayproduce reinforcement cannot cur-rently be emitted. Solving the prob-lem consists of emitting precurrentresponses that change the organismor the situation until a reinforceableresponse occurs. ‘‘The behaviorwhich brings about the change [inthe behaver himself or the situation]is properly called problem solvingand the response it promotes [iscalled] a solution’’ (Skinner, 1966/1969, p. 133). Skinner added thatprecurrent responses may be covert,that is, may ‘‘not have public mani-festations’’ (p. 124).

In everyday life we are faced withmany kinds of problems that evokeprecurrent responses. For example,we are faced with a problem when

172 EMMANUEL ZAGURY TOURINHO et al.

calling a friend is likely to providereinforcement, but we cannot recallhis number. Looking for the numberin a phone book is a precurrentresponse that makes possible theresponse of calling. This does notmean (a) that a precurrent responsenecessarily makes the consummatoryresponse possible (sometimes we fail);(b) that a precurrent response isalways covert (in the example above,it is overt); or (c) that a givenresponse (e.g., looking for the num-ber in the phone book) is a precurrentresponse in all possible contexts.

As behavioral phenomena, then,problem solving and happiness areneither private stimuli nor covertresponses, but relations or sets ofrelations that may include a privatestimulus or a covert response (cf.Tourinho, 2006). It should be notedthat people are more likely toidentify emotions with internal bodi-ly conditions and cognitions asmental events. Similarly, behavioranalysts may tend to identify emo-tions with private stimuli and cog-nitions with covert responses. Inother words, it is not unusual tosee happiness defined as a privatestimulus or problem solving as acovert response.

Moore (2001) distinguished Skin-ner’s analysis of the language ofemotions and cognitions from theviews on privacy of Wittgenstein(1953/1988) and Ryle (1949/1984) asfollows:

Behavior analysis does agree with [Ryle’s]conceptual analysis and Wittgenstein thatverbal behavior cannot originate under thecontrol of private stimuli. Indeed, to so allowwould be a hallmark of dualism. However,behavior analysis argues that verbal behaviorcan originate under the control of publiccircumstances and control can then transferto private stimuli, such that in specificinstances, the verbal behavior in questioncan come to be occasioned by private stimuli.But the distinction between public and privatein behavior analysis is at heart not anontological distinction between physical andmental. Rather, it is distinction of access.(p. 177)

When a verbal response remainsunder the control of public stimuli,we have a verbal or linguistic phe-nomenon of the type described byWittgenstein (1953/1988) and Ryle(1949/1984), one that does not re-quire the analytic category of privacy.Skinner affirms that, once learnedunder the control of public events, averbal response describing an emo-tion can be emitted under the dis-criminative control of an interocep-tive or proprioceptive (i.e., private)stimulus. The discriminative controlof a public event over a verbalresponse may or may not transferautomatically to private stimuli. Asimilar argument applies to Skinner’s(1945) approach to covert responses.Any response may (or may not)recede to a covert level. The fact,for instance, that one person cansolve a mathematical problem covert-ly does not mean that he or she cansolve all math problems covertly, northat all people can solve mathemat-ical problems covertly.

In summary, the stimuli and theresponses in the behavioral relationscalled emotion and cognition areoriginally public. Events in thoserelations may later be all public, allprivate, or a mixture of public andprivate, but in all cases their origin isin the reinforcement contingenciesarranged by verbal communities andin which all stimuli and responses arepublicly observable events. In thenext section we consider the culturalconditions under which behavioralrelations that involve private stimuliand covert responses became increas-ingly common in human societies,and which resulted in the concept ofprivacy gaining social importance.

CULTURAL CONTINGENCIESUNDER WHICH COGNITIVE

AND EMOTIONALPHENOMENA BECOMERELATED TO PRIVACY

Understanding the behavior ofhumans often requires a consider-

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ation of the kinds of cultural contin-gencies to which they have beenexposed. This is the reason why, aspointed out by Andery, Micheletto,and Serio (2005), behavior analysismust include cultural phenomena inits subject matter. The conceptualand analytical strategies that enablebehavior analysis to provide anunderstanding of cultural phenomenaare under development (see Anderyet al., 2005; Biglan, 1995; Glenn,1988, 1991, 2003, 2004; Lamal,1991). It is not, however, the aim ofthis paper to discuss or apply theseconceptual tools to the analysis ofprivacy-related cultural contingen-cies. Rather, our aim is to use thesociological perspective of Elias(1939/1996, 1987/2001) to elucidatethe nature of the contingencies inmodern societies that contribute tothe common view of emotions andcognitions as private, mental events.

Norbert Elias (1897–1990) was aGerman sociologist who discussedhow, in western societies, the rise ofmarket economies led to an increasein the complexity of society and tochanges in the everyday behavior aswell as the self-images of its citizens.Elias’s approach is not aligned withthe schools of sociology that rely onthe development of an ideologicaltheory prior to the investigation ofphenomena, nor with the historicalanalyses based on the simple accu-mulation of data and lack a theoret-ical framework. Elias provides sys-tematic empirical investigation and acareful interpretation of historicalfacts. This approach, combined withhis preoccupation with explainingbehavior as a function of events inthe social environment rather than ofideas, values, or any other internalexplanations, makes his work usefulto behavior analysts interested inhow emotions and cognitions becomeequated with privacy in modernsocieties.

Elias (e.g., 1939/1996, 1987/2001)developed an extensive and criticalanalysis of the modern concept of the

individual, coming to a view ofhumans that is broadly compatiblewith that of behavior analysis. Ac-cording to Elias (1987/2001), thecitizens of a market society have suchdiffering functions in society thatthere is no apparent similarity intheir behavior or in the contingenciesthat support their behavior as indi-viduals. By contrast, in the feudalsocieties that predated market econ-omies, the majority of people workedin the fields, hunted, and producedall the tools needed for doing theirown work. Further, individuals inter-acted repeatedly with one anotherthroughout their lives, and the rela-tionships of dependence were welldefined.

In a market society, towns aremuch larger than feudal villages andpermit the development of differenti-ated roles (e.g., farmers, traders,soldiers, physicians, craftsmen, art-ists) with many individuals carryingout each function. The loss of oneperson’s work becomes less critical tothe general welfare when other indi-viduals can replace him or her assupplier, physician, craftsman, and soon. Each worker (along with his orher dependents) was left more ‘‘on hisor her own’’ as the interdependenciesamong them became increasingly lessapparent.

Elias (1987/2001) suggested that associal functions became more numer-ous, specialized, and differentiated ina given society, individuals oftenbenefitted by avoiding public displayof emotions and thoughts. The ar-chetypical example is the selling–buying negotiation. If the buyershows too much interest in an item,the seller can set a high price,predicting that the buyer is likely topay more for the item. Conversely, ifthe seller appears eager to sell theitem, the buyer can offer less and geta better deal.

These changes in social contingen-cies in developing market economiesled individuals to display overt be-havior that was not necessarily con-

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sistent with the stimuli and responsesthat participate in emotional andcognitive relations. To the extent thatthose stimuli and responses wereprivate, conditions were in place todistinguish between acting (publiclyobservable) and thinking or feeling(privately observable). Driven by thechanging social contingencies associ-ated with changing economic contin-gencies, the distinction between pub-lic and private behavioral relationsestablished a boundary between selfand others. This, in turn, contributedfurther to the individualization thatcharacterizes market economies.However, ‘‘the intuition of a wall,of something ‘inside’ man, separatedfrom the ‘outside’ world, howevergenuine it may be as an intuition,corresponds to nothing in man hav-ing the character of a real wall’’(Elias, 1939/1996, p. 212).

CHANGES IN CONTINGENCIESASSOCIATED WITH THE SHIFT

TO MARKET ECONOMIES

In the following sections, weidentify and discuss four distinctcharacteristics of social contingen-cies in modern societies that con-tribute to the individuation of per-sons and the correlated view ofcognitions and emotions as internal,private and, ultimately, nonphysicalevents (rather than relations betweenpublic and private stimuli and re-sponses).

Increasing Frequency of IndividualConsequences That Have No Apparentor Direct Relevance to the Group

The idea that the individual is anautonomous entity has been called anillusion both by psychologists (e.g.,Skinner, 1971/2002), and sociologists(e.g., Elias, 1939/1996, 1987/2001). Inevery social group in every domain ofdaily life, there is a high degree ofinterdependence among group mem-bers. In preindustrial societies, how-ever, that interdependence was farmore evident than it is to the people

who live in the advanced marketeconomies of today.

Elias (1939/1996, 1987/2001) ar-gued that interdependence is mosteasily recognized when the responsesof each individual have consequencesthat quickly affect not only thatindividual but also other peoplewho are members of their society.In subsistence economies, for exam-ple, survival depends on productionof the crops that sustain the wholegroup, which creates immediatelyevident interdependence among thecontingencies involved in plantingand harvesting crops.

Skinner (1987) discussed some ofthe cultural practices in the westernworld that have ‘‘eroded contingen-cies of reinforcement’’ (p. 18).Among problems he identified wasthe alienation of workers. He attrib-uted that alienation to specializationin work functions and the resultingrepetitiveness of work.

Alienation of the worker is inevitable if theworld is to profit from specialization anddivision of labor. … There is no question ofthe gain from such specialization, but theinevitable consequence is that a person spendsa greater amount of time doing only one kindof thing. Every one knows what it means to betired of doing too often the things one enjoys,and that is another reason why industries turnto essentially aversive measures to maintainbehavior of their workers. (Skinner, 1987,p. 20)

The behavioral consequences thatmaintain work in modern societiesoften are not work products at all,but rather are salaries. If salarieshave any reinforcement function,they reinforce the behavior of indi-viduals who receive them and haveno function with respect to thebehavior of other contributors tothe work product. Even thoughspecialization means that keepingone’s job (and salary) depends onthe work of others, a worker seldominteracts with those who producedthe goods and instruments used in ajob, or those who bring them to theworkplace, or the workers involved

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in other steps of production, or of thefunction of their work products in thelarger production process. By con-trast,

In the Middle Ages, as in any societies inwhich the state is weak or plays only asymbolic role, the individual depended forprotection upon a community or patron. Aperson had nothing that he or she could callhis or her own—not even his or her own body.Everything was in jeopardy, and only willing-ness to accept dependency ensured survival.(Aries, 1986/2003, p. 9)

In the transition from the MiddleAges to modern societies, interper-sonal relationships shifted from acondition in which decisions, plan-ning, problem solving, and so on,were collective actions to one inwhich they have become individualactions. When problem solving hasconsequences of immediate relevanceonly to the individual behaving, thatbehavior is of little importance toothers. Under such conditions, verbalproblem solving may become aversiveto others, eventually becoming covertto avoid others’ suppressive measures.Skinner (1957/1992) noted this type ofproblem when discussing verbal be-havior. He stated that ‘‘verbal behav-ior is frequently punished. Audiblebehavior in the child is reinforced andtolerated up to a point; then itbecomes annoying, and the child ispunished for speaking. Comparableaversive consequences continue intothe adult years’’ (p. 436).

In addition, competitive contingen-cies in market economics tend todrive the responses involved in prob-lem solving to the covert level.Alerting competitors to identifiedproblems or to solutions can becounterproductive. Thus, social con-tingencies in modern cultures havechanged to favor the emission ofresponses in a covert form undersome conditions. The self-observa-tion of covert responses contributesto the attribution of autonomy andcausality to those private eventsbecause individuals who observe their

own covert responses rarely candescribe their origins in social con-tingencies in which both stimuli andresponses were overt.

Increasing Numbers of ConcurrentContingencies andChoice Requirements

Individualization and the speciali-zation of social functions occur ineconomic environments that alsoprovide new instruments, goods,and services that give rise to anever-growing number of alternativeactions. In behavior-analytic terms,the process of individualization oc-curs in environments that consist ofever-increasing numbers of concur-rent contingencies of reinforcement.In such environments, the individualis often required to choose betweendifferent courses of action in theabsence of any other members oftheir society. Elias (1987/2001) arguesthat it is because the individual isfaced with a plurality of possiblecourses of action, and the relationof those actions to the larger group iscomplex and obscure, he or she willdescribe him- or herself as autono-mous. This contrasts radically withthe cultural environment typical ofsocieties in which individualizationhas not taken place. ‘‘In the earlier,closer communities, the most impor-tant factor in controlling individualbehavior is the constant presence ofothers, the knowledge of being tiedfor life to others and not least thedirect fear of others’’ (Elias, 1987/2001, p. 128). In simpler societies,there are fewer alternatives, feweropportunities for choice.

In the simplest ones, there is often only asingle, straight path before people fromchildhood on—one path for women andanother for men. Crossroads are rare, andseldom is a person placed alone before adecision. (Elias, 1987/2001, p. 131)

Exposure to concurrent contingen-cies of reinforcement and the impactof this exposure on the control of

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human behavior have been dis-cussed in the behavior-analytic liter-ature, and choice behavior underthose conditions has been the sub-ject of extensive research (e.g.,Baum, 2010; Mazur & Biondi,2011; McDowell, 1989; Pierce &Epling, 1983). In societies in whichindividualization has been underwayfor a long time, choice making is anindependent, individual action rath-er than the interdependent action ofgroup members; and to the extentthat individual choices have conflict-ing consequences for the individualand the group, they are very likelyto involve covert responses. Elias(1939/1996) developed an extensiveanalysis of how the changes hedescribed gave rise to a widespreadneed for self-observation and forprediction of the behavior of one’sself and others. Consequently, west-ern societies developed practices thatmake individuals observe their ownbodies and ‘‘control their emo-tions.’’ This control may imply thelearning of emotional behavior dis-tinct in topography from the pri-marily motor responses in emotionalrelations in preindustrial societies. Inmuch of modern society, acceptableresponses in the relations of angerare not aggressive motor responses,but rather verbal responses such as‘‘I must tell you that [what you aredoing] makes me angry [or upsets orbothers me].’’

In summary, the need for predict-able behavior in an environment thatconsists of numerous concurrent con-tingencies gives rise to cultural prac-tices that promote self-observationand verbal alternatives to motorresponses in emotional relations.From a behavior-analytic perspec-tive, the individuals in modern indi-vidualist societies are exposed tocontingencies of reinforcement thatrequire them to analyze (often co-vertly) their needs (motivational andemotional states) and their behavior-al options, and to respond under thecontrol of many social rules.

Conflicts Between Immediate andDelayed Consequences

In addition to increasing in num-ber, the concurrent contingencies ofreinforcement to which the individualis exposed in modern society alsovary greatly with respect to the delayand magnitude of the consequencesthat are contingent on each possibleresponse. In the behavior-analyticliterature, this phenomenon has beentreated in the literature on self-control (Rachlin, 1974). Self-control,in this sense, means responding thatproduces larger, delayed reinforcersrather than responding that producessmaller, immediate reinforcers (cf.Rachlin, 1974; Rachlin & Green,1972). Individuals choose betweenbuying an item at full price now, forexample, or waiting for the sale priceavailable in 1 month; or choosebetween partying tonight or studyingfor a job interview next week; orchoose between going on vacation orwriting papers for publication. Thismakes the assessment of variousconsequences much harder, and self-control needs to be taught from earlychildhood (cf. Aries, 1960/1973; Skin-ner, 1948).

Given the temporal separation ofresponses and delayed consequences,and even the possibility that a conse-quence may have lost its value whenit becomes available, Elias (1987/2001) argues that the self-controlrequired in modern societies dependson social support (i.e., reinforce-ment). Self-control was, in the visionof Elias (1939/1996, 1987/2001), theprincipal product of the social con-tingencies that also produced theconcept of an inner world. Wide-spread self-control among membersof a complex modern society isrequired when the dependenciesamong the behaviors of participantsare not immediately evident. It is notfound where members of a society arecontrolled efficiently by externalagents, or where impulsive behaviordoes not detract from social func-

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tioning. According to Elias (1987/2001):

The change in human relationships towardslarge, more centralized and specialized groupsled to a greater restraint of momentaryindividual impulses. This may have been firstimposed or maintained by the direct fear ofothers, overseers or the people nominated bythe central ruler. But slowly the element ofself-control in the harmonization of people toeach other’s activities became something moretaken for granted. An increased use of clocks,to give only one example, is a sign of this. Forwhatever their importance as instruments formeasuring non-human events, in their dailyuse by society they are primarily instrumentsfor co-ordinating at a distance the activities ofmany people who are capable of a relativelyhigh degree of self-control. (pp. 136–137)

Once again, controlling overt emo-tional responses avoids problems.For example, a public celebration ofa new position may engender enmity;public display of interest towards adesired partner may generate compe-tition; expressions of negative feelingsor thoughts may make someoneunpopular among colleagues, and soon.

In this section, we have suggestedthat the contingencies characteristicof modern societies inhibit impulsiveresponses and make likely thoseresponses designated as self-control.The socially inhibited controllingrelations still occur, however, andcan be observed by the individual asthe covert emission of responses andthe control over verbal responses byprivate bodily stimuli.

Conflicts Between the Consequencesof Behavior for the Individual versusthe Group

Another important feature of com-plex modern societies is that conse-quences that function as reinforcersfor individuals may contribute nega-tively to the larger society. Becausethe concurrent contingencies found inmodern societies are often individu-alized, and because the individualand the group sometimes have con-flicting interests, the type of self-

control found in individualized soci-eties is very often a function of socialsanctions that are contingent onresponses that have short- or long-term effects on others. For example,a teacher who is late for his classstops his car when the traffic light isred because running the red light canresult in a fine; the fine itself isimposed in societies in which thesafety of strangers is of no immediaterelevance to the individual who isfined.

In Elias’ (1939/1996) view of self-control, ‘‘rational thinking’’ or ‘‘mor-al consciousness’’ (i.e., self-statedrules) can help individuals to refrainfrom behavior that contributes nega-tively to the well-being of the largersociety. In the above example ofrunning a red light, the driver whostopped at the red light may havenever been fined. His behavior ofstopping is, rather, under control of arule. The rule may simply state thatrunning a red light risks a fine; or itmay state the relation between run-ning a red light and a risk of injuringor killing another person. Behaviorunder control of such rules exempli-fies what Skinner (1968, p. 191) called‘‘ethical self-management.’’ As sug-gested by the example, ethical self-management is the result of socialsanctions that suppress the individu-al’s impulsive responses on behalf ofothers. These sanctions are estab-lished to protect the individual fromthe aversive consequences of his orher own behavior and preserve theinterests of the group as a whole(Marchezini-Cunha, 2004).

Discussing ethical self-manage-ment, Skinner (1968) provided anexample that refers to the roles ofboth rules and emotional reactions:

The usual solution is to teach precept ratherthan practice. Rather than learning tobehave well, the child learns rules which heis to follow in order to behave well. An oldcopybook maxim will serve as an example.A culture presumably gains if its membersdo not act violently toward each other inanger. The culture cannot conveniently

178 EMMANUEL ZAGURY TOURINHO et al.

restrain all its angry members by force,however, and it will only generate otherproblems if it tries to punish violence so thatmen will either be afraid to attack eachother or will be automatically reinforcedwhen they engage in nonviolent behavior.Another possibility is to teach each child tosay to himself ‘‘Count to ten before acting inanger.’’ (p. 192)

In this context, covert responses arerelated to self-control, and self-control responses impede impulsive-ness. Thus, in both types of conse-quence conflicts (delayed vs. imme-diate consequences and individualvs. group consequences), social con-tingencies suppress the overt re-sponses of emotional and cognitiverelations. However, covert stimuliand responses in emotional andcognitive relations may remain in-tact and contribute further to the‘‘intuition of the existence of aboundary’’ that separates the indi-vidual from the rest of the worldand gives credence to the modernview of privacy.

CONCLUSION

The analysis we have developedhere highlights the cultural contextin which emotions and cognitionsbecome a matter of privacy. Wedescribed this context as an individ-ualization process that, in turn, maybe analyzed in terms of the contin-gencies of reinforcement that prevailin social environments that aretypical of market economies. Inour analysis, we drew primarily onthe works of Skinner (1945, 1948,1957/1992, 1966/1969, 1968, 1971/2002, 1987) and Elias (1939/1996,1987/2001) to show that behavioranalysis may benefit from historicaland sociological research. Such re-search can provide the facts neededto understand the contingencies thatlead modern humans to view cogni-tions and emotions as events ratherthan as relations and as private andmental rather than public and so-cially organized by contingencies ofreinforcement.

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