Contribution of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to IACRNE

Presented at the International Conference

on Global Emergency Preparedness and Response

19-23 October 2015 at the IAEA’s Headquarter in Vienna

Martin Kalinowski

Head, Scientific Methods Unit, International Data Centre Division

Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)

Vienna International Centre, P.O. Box 1200, A-1400 Vienna, Austria

I. Introduction to the CTBT

II.Observations of atmospheric radioactivity

from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power

plant accident in March 2011

III. Role of the CTBTO in IACRNE

Overview

I. Introduction to the CTBT

CTBT today183 signatures, 164 ratifications

8 ratifications missing for Entry into Force

Elements of the CTBT Verification Regime

International

Monitoring

System

321 stations:

seismic,

hydro-acoustic,

infrasound,

radionuclide

IDC&GCI

Consultation

and

Clarification

Right to clarify

matters indicating

possible

non-compliance

On-Site

Inspection

Conduct of

on-site

verification

activities

Confidence

Building

Measures

Large chemical

Explosions:

Prevent

misinterpretations

and calibrate seismic

IMS component

IFE = Integrated

Field Experiment

3 November -

9 December 2014

The complete International Monitoring System: 337Incl. 80 Radionuclide Stations and 16 Radionuclide Labs

Seismic Primary Array

Seismic Primary 3-comp Station

Seismic Auxiliary Array

Seismic Auxiliary 3-comp Station

Hydroacoustic (hydrophone) Station

Hydroacoustic (T-phase) Station

Infrasound Station

Radionuclide

Station

Radionuclide Lab

Seismic Primary Array

Seismic Primary 3-comp Station

Seismic Auxiliary Array

Seismic Auxiliary 3-comp Station

Hydroacoustic (hydrophone) Station

Hydroacoustic (T-phase) Station

Infrasound Station

Radionuclide

Station

Radionuclide Lab

Seismic Primary Array

Seismic Primary 3-comp Station

Seismic Auxiliary Array

Seismic Auxiliary 3-comp Station

Hydroacoustic (hydrophone) Station

Hydroacoustic (T-phase) Station

Infrasound Station

Radionuclide

Station

Radionuclide Lab

Demonstrated effectiveness of the

International Monitoring System

• Xenon-131m and xenon-133

• Detected at Takasaki, Japan, and

Ussuriysk, Russia

• Estimated date of fission coincides

with 12 February 2013

• DPRK site identified as possible

source using ATM

Error Ellipses for 2006, 2009 and

2013 DPRK Announced Nuclear

Tests

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The purpose of the CTBT verification regime is to verify

compliance with the Treaty effectively.

The data of the International Monitoring System (IMS) and the

products generated by the International Data Centre (IDC) are

confidential. Access is given to authorized users either designated

by the State Signatories or covered under special arrangements

for civil and scientific applications.

In addition to the primary Treaty monitoring purpose, a range of

useful civil and scientific applications can contribute to

sustainable development and human welfare.

In return, experts using IMS data contribute to scientific advances

of analysis methodologies that will be of benefit for nuclear

explosion monitoring.

Data purpose and confidentiality

Civil and Scientific Applications

International Monitoring System data can be applied for

Tsunami warning

Sumatra

December

2004

Aviation hazards

Eyjafjallajokul

March 2010

Urals

February 2013

MeteoritesFukushima

March 2011

Radiation releases

Earthquake

monitoring

IMS Data / IDC Products

• 10 GB Daily

• ~40 TB Archived

International Monitoring System Network

Usersin State Signatories

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Scientists with zero-

cost contract

Tsunami warning centers

with agreements

Authorized users

Test ban monitoring

Civil applications Scientific use

Data archiving and distribution

Radiolog. and nuclear

emergencies (IACRNE)

II. Observations of atmospheric

radioactivity from the Fukushima

Daiichi nuclear power plant

accident in March 2011

Stations detected radioactivityoriginating from Fukushima

Network availability 85-90%.

All these stations detected at least radioactive Xe-133

end of March to the middle of April 2011.

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Noble gas network detections

Situation at the end of May, more than 40 stations have detected the event and

all but closest station (Takasaki, Japan) are back to normal background radiation.

More than 1600 samples contained radiation originating from Fukushima NPP.

Network availability 90-95%.

All these stations detected at least radioactive

iodine end of March to the middle of April 2011.

Particulate network detections

Detections at stationJPP38, Takasaki, Japan

The station is 200 km SW from Fukushima. The radiation levels detected are low in the global scale.

Provisional Technical Secretariat Page 11

Cs-134 to Cs-137 is behaving

smoothly: predominantly

same type of source material.

Cs-136 to Cs-137 ratio has

some variation, this may

indicate that source material

has a mixture of different

irradiated batches of fuel.

Isotope activity concentrations Isotopic activity ratios

Public Website

www.ctbto.org

High-level

information

http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/the-11-march-japan-disaster/

http://www.ctbto.org/?id=3234/

III. Role of the CTBTO in IACRNE

• On 13 March 2011, first traces of radionuclides had been detected by the IMS

and shared with all Member States.

• On 15 March 2011, first briefing to Member States including atmospheric

transport simulations.

• Since 17 March 2011, the PTS shares atmospheric radionuclide observations

with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World

Meteorological Organization (WMO).

International Cooperation:

CTBTO role in IACRNE

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• Since 11 April 2011, CTBTO

participated in meetings of IACRNE

(Inter-Agency Committee on

Radiological and Nuclear

Emergencies) and in March 2012

became a formal member among 16

participating organizations (members)

plus few corresponding (observers)

organizations.

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• IACRNE (Inter-Agency Committee on

Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies)

• IAEA provides the secretariat for IACRNE

• Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan

(JPlan)

• Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs),

including sharing of information and public

communication

International Cooperation:

CTBTO role in IACRNE

CTBTO key elements for emergency preparedness

and response according to the JPlan:

• Continuously gathers real-time particulate and

noble gas monitoring data at 80/40 sites of the

International Monitoring System.

• The critical response tasks during an emergency

phase is to provide real-time particulate and

noble gas monitoring data including

confirmation of no detection. In the post-

emergency phase to provide results on

radionuclide air concentrations from global

monitoring network.

• Provides global monitoring results (radionuclide

air concentrations) and related expertise.

• Advice on atmospheric transport and dispersion

predictions.

Summary

• CTBTO operates a unique global network of highly-

sensitive detectors of atmospheric radioactivity.

• Purpose: Nuclear explosion monitoring.

• Confidentiality: Access restricted to authorized users of

State Signatories.

• High-level information available on public web site.

• Participation in the Inter-Agency Committee on

Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE) to

monitor the effects of nuclear accidents.

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THANK YOU