Contributing Factors to North Korea's Different Treatment of 2006 and 2009 Missile Launches

8/14/2019 Contributing Factors to North Korea's Different Treatment of 2006 and 2009 Missile Launches

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Monday, 11 May 2009

Contributing Factors to North Koreas Different Treatment of 2006 and 2009

Taepo Dong-2 Missile Launches

Mr. Lance K. Nakayama, CIV; MAJ Steve S. Sin, USA

Summary: Following the failed 2006 Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) missile launch, North Korean media

remained quiet, which the Open Source Center (OSC) assessed as normal North Korean

behavior. According to the OSC, Pyongyang has a long record of delaying official

pronouncements on a variety of sensitive topics, particularly those that involve the US. For

example, when North Korea launched its TD-1 on 31 Aug 98, it issued a low-level, tacit

admission two days after the launch followed by its official policy pronouncement four days later,

which characterized the event primarily as S&T related with the potential for military

application.

In stark contrast, North Korea touted its 2009 launch on the same day with North Korean medialabeling it as a successful satellite launch. Equally unusual was North Koreas first

announcement of a planned launch approximately 1 1/2 months prior to the actual event an

unprecedented occurrence. Continuing its unprecedented behavior, North Korea formally

notified the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization

on 12 Mar it would launch a satellite between 04 08 Apr, and submitted two closure areas that

corresponded to potential 1 st and 2 nd stage impact areas. Following the 05 Apr launch, it also

reported on Kim Jong-ils visit to the launch site and released photos of the visit on 06 Apr.

We assess Kim Jong-ils assessment of the international security environment, domestic

political agenda, and Kim Jong-ils health, were all factors contributing to the Norths openness

in the press regarding last months TD-2 launch.

Please direct your questions and comments to USFK J2 / JIOC-K Open Source

Intelligence Branch . Phone: DSN: (315) 723-2558, Commercial: 82-2-7913-2558

Information contained in this document is entirely derived from unclassified, open source, information. This product is basedexclusively on the content and behavior of selected media and has not been coordinated with other US Government components.This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

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Introduction: Following the failed 2006 Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) missile launch, North Korean

media remained quiet, which the Open Source Center (OSC) assessed as normal North Korean

behavior. According to the OSC, Pyongyang has a long record of delaying official

pronouncements on a variety of sensitive topics, particularly those that involve the US. For

example, when North Korea launched its TD-1 on 31 Aug 98, it issued a low-level, tacitadmission two days after the launch followed by its official policy pronouncement four days later,

which characterized the event primarily as S&T related with the potential for military application.

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In stark contrast, North Korea touted its 2009 launch on

the same day with North Korean media labeling it as a

successful satellite launch. Equally unusual was North

Koreas first announcement of a planned launch

approximately 1 1/2 months prior to the actual event an

unprecedented occurrence. Continuing its

unprecedented behavior, North Korea formally notified

the International Maritime Organization and the

International Civil Aviation Organization on 12 Mar it

would launch a satellite between 04 08 Apr, and

submitted two closure areas that corresponded to

potential 1 st and 2 nd stage impact areas. Following the

05 Apr launch, it also reported on Kim Jong-ils visit to the

launch site and released photos of the visit on 06 Apr.

Factors such as regional and international security environment; and North Korean internal

political environment may have all contributed to the difference in North Koreas treatment of the

2006 and 2009 launches.

North Korean behavior prior to and after the 2006 TD-2 Launch was within historical

norms.

North Korea launched the TD-2 on 05 Jul 06 (KST) without formal pre-launch

announcements or warnings.

On 06 Jul 06, a day after the launch, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-kwan

reportedly warned that North Korea could launch more missiles. Kim reportedly made


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the comment in Pyongyang during a meeting with Professor Robert Scalapino of the

University of California at Berkeley who was an invited guest of North Korea from 04 to

07 Jul 06.

On the same day, North Koreas Foreign Ministry released a statement claiming that themissile launches were part of military exercises and that North Korea would take strong

actions if the international community continued to pressure it again warning of further

missile launches.

No further official comment was made until 16 Jul 06, when North Korea issued a strong

statement in response the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution. According to OSC

analysis, the statement denounced the US heinous hostile policy and said North

Korea would not be boundin the least to the resolution. The statement also made

reference to the Norths deterrent against US aggression which is a euphemism for its

nuclear program.

The North again went silent until 24 Jul 06 when KCNA reported that its missile launch

was completely safe. According to KCNA, "The DPRK launched missiles only after

airspace, land, and waters of the sea had been confirmed to be completely safe. Their

launches, therefore, hurt neither ships nor civilian planes, nor anyone."

On 25 Jul 06 North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations, Pak Kil-yon, commentedon the launches and warned of an unspecified second round test during an interview

with the Sisa Journal . Pak also claimed that the responsibility for North Koreas missile

tests rested with the United States and its Republic-crushing policy.

Following this statement, North Korea did not make any further statements regarding its

missile launch.

On 03 Oct 06, North Korea announced its intent to conduct its first nuclear test. Six

days later, on 09 Oct 06, it did.


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North Korean behavior prior to and after the 2009 TD-2 Launch differed in various ways

and had many unprecedented firsts.

On 12 Mar, North Korea formally notified the IMO and the ICAO that it would launch a

satellite between 04 08 Apr, and submitted to the IMO and ICAO two closure areaswhere the separated rocket stages were most likely to impact.

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At 1130 hours, 05 Apr (KST), the North launched

the TD-2 (within the proposed launch window).

The North reported on the glorious success of

the satellite Kwangmyongsong-2 launch a few

hours after the launch (to have a statement

released so soon after an event such as this is

an unprecedented first). KCTV

08 April 2009

On 06 Apr, KCNA reported that Kim Jong-il visited the General Satellite Control and

Command Center to view the launch of the Kwangmyongsong-2 (another

unprecedented first).

Two days following the launch, the North resumed trade with China, indicating to both

the international and domestic audiences that everything was business as usual.

On 09 Apr, the First Session of the 12th Supreme Peoples Assembly (SPA) was held at

Mansudae Assembly Hall where Kim Jong-il was re-elected as the Chairman of the

National Defense Commission (NDC).

On 14 Apr, the Norths Foreign Ministry issued a statement rejecting the UNSCs

presidential statement, claiming that historically, the UNSC has never taken issue with

satellite launches. More significantly, the North announced that it saw no need to

participate in Six-Party Talks as they were simply a platform for infringing upon the

Norths sovereignty. In addition, the North announced it would bolster its nuclear

deterrent and restore its nuclear facilities to its original state.

Also on 14 Apr, North Korea asked the IAEA and US nuclear inspectors to leave. The

IAEA inspectors left North Korea on 16 Apr and the US inspectors followed a day later.


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On 17 Apr, North

Koreas Secretariat

of the Committee for

the Peaceful

Reunification ofKorea the state

organization that

handles inter-Korean

affairs issued a

bulletin stating that

nuclear war on the

Korean Peninsula

was only a matter of

time.

Kim Jong-il with NDC personnel and personnel involved in the 05 April

satellite launch: 1. Man who appears to be Ju Kyu Chang, 2. Jon Pyong Ho,

3. Kim Jong Il, 4. Kim Yong Chun, 5. Kim Cho'ng-kak, 6. Kim Il Chol.

(Source: KCTV, 24 April 2009)

On 19 Apr, the North

proposed the first

inter-Korean talks in

over a year. The

two sides met on 21 Apr, but the talks only lasted for 22 minutes.

On 24 Apr, the UN imposed financial sanctions on three North Korean companies - theKorea Mining Development Trading Corporation, the Korea Ryonbong General

Corporation and Tanchon Commercial Bank. In reaction, North Korea announced a day

later that it had restarted extracting plutonium from the spent fuel rods at its Yongbyon

facility.

On 29 Apr, North Korea announced that unless the UNSC issued an immediate apology

for its punitive actions regarding the satellite launch, it would conduct further nuclear and

missile tests and start building a light-water reactor and self-production of nuclear fuel

an indication that it will start a uranium enrichment program. The uncharacteristically

strong Foreign Ministry statement also claimed that the UNSC sanctions were a

declaration of war and that the armistice the UN and the US signed with North Korea

and China at the end of the Korean War was no longer effective. The UNSC

announced the next day that it will not apologize.


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Kim Jong-ils post-launch activities also differed.

Following the failed launch of the TD-2 in 2006, Kim Jong-il went into seclusion for 5 1/2

weeks. At the time, Kim had made 73 public appearances for the year, a number much

larger than the 42 from the same time period the year prior. Even more significant wasthe fact that he was not reported paying respects at the Kumsusan Memorial Palace on

08 Jul 06, the 12th anniversary of his fathers death. Kim finally made a public

appearance on 13 Aug 06 when he visited a rabbit and goat farm.

In striking contrast to the lack of activity in 2006, in the month following this years launch,

Kim Jong-il has reportedly been relentless in his public appearances. For the month

of April, Kim has made 13 public appearances 11 since 05 Apr.

o On 08 Apr, Kim Jong-il gave on-the-spot guidance to the Samilpo Special Products

Plant.

o The following day, he attended the First Session of the 12th Supreme Peoples

Assembly at the Mansudae Assembly Hall.

o Five days later, on 14 Apr, Kim Jong-il watched fireworks commemorating the 97th

birth anniversary of Kim Il-sung in Pyongyang.

o On 18 Apr, he gave on-the-spot guidance to the newly built Yongwon Power Plant.

o Three days later, on 21 Apr, Kim watched a performance by the art propaganda

squad of KPA Unit 10215.

o On 24 Apr, Kim Jong-il met with scientists and other personnel who contributed to the

05 Apr satellite launch.

o On 25 Apr, Kim inspected KPA the command of KPA Unit 851 and enjoyed a

performance given by the State Merited Chorus in conjunction with the 77th KPA

Foundation Day.


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o On 27 Apr, Kim gave on-the-spot

guidance at the newly-constructed

greenhouse at the Wonsan Agricultural

College and for various sectors in

Wonsan.

o On 29 Apr, Kim gave field guidance to

Honored Red Flag Sojung Secondary

School, newly built in Nagwon County.

KCNA

30 April 2009

USFK J2 / JIOC-K Open Source Assessment. We assess Kim Jong-ils assessment of the

international security environment, domestic political agenda, and Kim Jong-ils health, were all

factors contributing to the Norths openness in the press regarding last months TD-2 launch.

Kim Jong-ils assessment of perceived international reaction, especially from the US, and

consequences were different in 2009 in comparison with 2006. In 2006, Kim Jong-il perceived

the Bush administration as immutable and hawkish. Observing the US foreign policy decisions

that were made during the Bush administration, Kim may have had concerns about his personal

safety after the TD-2 launch in 2006. Also in 2006, the UN adopted the UNSC resolution 1718,

imposing sanctions on North Korea; however, after three years of sanctions, Kim knows, better

than anyone, that the UN sanctions were largely unenforceable and ineffective. Kim also

calculated that UNSC probably could not do much more than it has already done if he were to launch another TD-2. This, coupled with perceived weakness in todays US foreign policy (at

the very least the US foreign policy under Obama seems to be more reasonable and much less

hawkish), would have formed a large basis for Kims decision to launch the missile, and his

relatively vivacious activity level after this years launch.

This years launch appears to be very closely tied to the North Korean domestic politics. The

2006 launch was meant more as a show of force to the international community to gain

leverage at the negotiation table. This years launch immediately preceded the First Session of

the 12th SPA and Kim Jong-ils re-election as Chairman of the NDC. Showing that Kim Jong-il

and those cadre of elites who are loyal to him are firmly in power to the North Korean society,

especially to those who may be considering competing for power, was a particularly crucial point

to be made this year to ensure continued political stability especially after Kim Jong-ils

supposed stroke of Aug 08 and the rumors of a North Korean power succession. In fact, the


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launch preceded the First Session of the 12th SPA by only four days during the session, the

NDC, and therefore the military, was made stronger than the Workers Party, further securing

Kim Jong-ils grip on the country. i

Kim Jong-ils health may have been a large factor in the difference in the 2009 post-launch behavior. Unlike in 2006, when Kim Jong-il went into seclusion for 5 1/2 weeks, Kim Jong-il

had 13 public appearances between 05 29 Apr, an extremely high number following a major

event such as a missile launch. Also, Kim Jong-il has made 56 public appearances between

Jan Apr 09 compared to 35, 23, and 18 during the same time periods in 2006, 2007, and 2008

respectively. Furthermore, Kim Jong-il had made 89 and 95 total public appearances in 2007

and 2008 respectively. Based on this data, Kim Jong-ils 2009 visit total is already 63% and

59% of his 2007 and 2008 totals. Kims numerous public appearances in 2009, especially in

April, seems to be designed to reassure the North Korean people that Kim Jong-il is still firmly in

control of the states affairs and that he is relentlessly continuing his revolutionary struggle

against the hegemonic imperialists, namely the United States, to protect the North Korean

people and preserve the sovereignty of North Korea.

i During the 12th SPA, the number of NDC members increased from eight to 13. According to ROK government

sources, the Operations, Research, and External Liaison Departments were moved under the control of the NDC

The Operations Department was actually moved under the Ministry of Peoples Armed Forces (MPAF), which is

subordinate to the NDC. The Operations Department is responsible for managing espionage agents, and O Kuk-ryol,

who was named a vice chairman of NDC this year, is the director of the department. The Research Department

collects intelligence on South Korea and other nations, while the External Liaison Department is responsible for

training and dispatching agents. The Unification Front Department (or United Front Department) remains within the

Korea Workers Party (KWP) to handle inter-Korean dialogue and the Norths policy on the South. South Korean

experts say that this signifies the Unification Front Department has lost much of its influence within the North Korean

power structure. Kim Jong-ils brother-in-law, Chang Song-taek (believed to be the second in command) was

appointed to the NDC. Later, Japanese press reports indicated that Kims third son, Kim Jong-un who many

believe has been named successor to Kim was assigned to a low-level post within the NDC.


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References:

1. Attention Drawn to Kim Jong Ils Behavior Different From the 1998 Missile Crisis, Yonhap , 19 July

2006.

2. Defiant North Korea Acknowledges Tests, Radio Free Europe , 06 July 2006.

3. DPRK Envoy Comments on Missile Launches, Warns of Unspecified Second Round Test, Sisa

Journal , 25 July 2006.

4. DPRK FM Spokesman Says Reprocessing of Spent Fuel Rods Has Started, Korean Central

Broadcasting Station , 25 April 2009.

5. DPRK FM Statement on UNSC Condemning Launch, 6-Way Talks, Nuclear Deterrent, Korean

Central News Agency , 14 April 2009.

6. DPRK Foreign Ministry Clarifies Stand on New Measure to Bolster War Deterrent, Korean Central

News Agency , 03 October 2006.

7. DPRK Foreign Ministry Refutes Resolution of UN Security Council, Korean Central News Agency ,

16 July 2006.

8. DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Demands U.S. Lift of Financial Sanctions, Korean Central News

Agency , 26 August 2006.

9. DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Its Missile Launches, Korean Central News Agency , 07 July

2006.

10. DPRK Will Bolster War Deterrent with Utmost Efforts: KPA General Staff Chief, Korean Central

News Agency , 24 August 2006.

11. DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Reportedly Claims DPRK Can Launch More Missiles, Yonhap , 09 July

2006.

12. DPRKs Initial silence on Missile Launches Not Unusual, Open Source Center , 05 July 2006.


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13. First Session of 12th SPA of DPRK Held 9 April; Kim Jong-Il Present, Korean Central News Agency ,

09 April 2009.

14. FYI: Open Sources Not Observed To Carry Images of Jul 06 DPRK Missile Launches, Open Source

Center , 15 September 2006.

15. Kim Jong Il Activities 2002-2009, Open Source Center , accessed 27-29 April 2009.

16. Kim Jong-il calls regime invunerable, Korea Herald , 16 march 2009.

17. Kim Jong Il Observes Launch of Kwangmyongsong-2 Satellite 5 Apr, Korean Central News

Agency , 05 April 2009.

18. North Korea-China Border Trade Resumes After Three Day Halt, AFP , 07 April 2009.

19. N Korea Threatens stronger Measures Against S Koreans in Kaesong Complex, Yonhap , 23 April

2009.

20. N. Korea said to be preparing for rocket launch between April 4-8, Yonhap , 12 April 2009.

21. N.Korea Says It Began Reprocessing Spent Fuel Rods, Bloomberg , 25 April 2009.

22. N. Korea Says Japanese Sanctions Will Bring Disastrous Response, Voice of America , 07 July

2006.

23. N.Korea says missile launch completely safe, Reuters , 24 July 2006.

24. N. Korea holding S. Korean worker for criticizing Pyongyang regime, Yonhap , 30 March 2009.

25. N. Korea Orders U.S. Nuke Experts, IAEA Monitors in Yongbyon to Leave, Kyodo , 14 April 2009.

26. N. Korea Proposes Contact Over Important Thing, Korea Times , 19 April 2009.

27. N. Korean Leader Observes Artillery Exercise, Yonhap , 15 March 2009.


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28. N. Korea Seeks Light-Water Reactors in Exchange for Nuke verification. Kyodo , 19 March 2009.

29. N. Korea threatens nuclear, missile tests, Yonhap , 29 April 2009.

30. N.Koreas Kim appears for first time since missiles, Reuters , 13 April 2006.

31. North Korea Conducts Nuclear Test, VOA News , 09 October 2006.

32. North Korea says nuclear war only a matter of time, ITAR-TASS , 23 April 2009.

33. North Korea vows annihilating strike if attacked, Reuters , 03 July 2006.

34. Researcher Says DPRK Lacks Technology to Build Light-Water Reactors, Dong-A Ilbo , 15 April

2009.

35. ROK Says North Koreas Kim Jong Il Increases Tours Despite Health Doubts, AFP , 27 April 2009.

36. Russia has no info on preparation for N.Korea nuclear tests, RIA Novosti , 18 August 2006.

37. South, North Korea quickly end first talks in over a year without breakthrough, Yonhap , 21 April

2009.

38. UNSC Committee Imposes Sanctions on 3 DPRK Frims as Directed by UN Presidential Statement,

Yonhap , 25 April 2009.

39. U.S. Extremely Hostile Act and UN Resolution against DPRK Rejected, Korean Central News

Agency , 26 July 2006.

40. US nuclear experts depart North Korea, Associated Press , 17 April 2009.

Contributing Factors to North Korea's Different Treatment of 2006 and 2009 Missile Launches

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