Contracts or Partnerships: Contracts or Partnerships ... · Ghana and one in Nepal. WaterAid...

Contracts or Partnerships: Working through local NGOs in Ghana and Nepal

1A WaterAid report written by Andrew Clayton

Contracts or Partnerships:Working through local NGOs in Ghana and Nepal


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WaterAidPrince Consort House27-29 Albert EmbankmentLondon SE1 7UB

Telephone: 0171 793 4500Fax: 0171 793 4545Website: www.wateraid.org.uk

Charity Reg No 288701

Published by WaterAid,London.November 1999ISBN 0 9513466 8 7

All rights reserved.

SUMMARY

This is the fourth in a series of reportswhich analyse WaterAid’s experience inintegrated water, sanitation, and hygieneeducation projects in developingcountries.

Cover Photos: WaterAid/Caroline Penn

• There are two main approaches to working with local non-

government organisations (NGOs) in the implementation of rural

water projects. First, a funding organisation can enter into a long-term

partnership with local NGOs, building their capacity to develop and

implement water projects. Second, a funding organisation can enter into

a contractual relationship with local NGOs in which they are paid a

fixed amount for the provision of a specified number of outputs over a

defined time period.

• WaterAid has developed strong partnerships with eight NGOs in

Ghana and one in Nepal. WaterAid provides funding and technical

assistance whereas the partner NGOs are responsible for

implementation. These partnerships are characterised by long-term

commitment, strong inter-personal relationships, policy dialogue, trust,

mutual learning and financial transparency. They are dynamic and

evolve as organisations change, mature and become stronger. WaterAid

invests considerable resources into building the capacity of its partners,

in order that they can both deliver high quality community projects and

play an active role in civil society in their countries.

• In both Ghana and Nepal, there are major World Bank-funded

initiatives that shift implementation away from governments and

contract out rural water supply projects to NGOs and the private

sector. While both initiatives have certain strengths, there are four major

difficulties with the contracting approach. Firstly, the contracts are rigid,

output-orientated and prescribe a standardised approach to

implementation at the community level. They restrict NGOs from using

approaches to suit local conditions and needs. Second, this standardised

approach and the contract requirements work against providing services

to poorer communities. These communities are often located farther

from water sources, have little ability to pay, and are more vulnerable,

therefore requiring more investments in time and money beyond what

contractual agreements allow. Thirdly, NGOs are used as service

providers and implementers of objectives and policies determined by

donors. Their ability to influence policy, advocate and support the most

marginalised people is stymied by their contract obligations. Fourthly,

although contracts contribute to the expansion in the number of NGOs,

they weaken the NGO sector as a whole. They do not adequately

respond to needs of individual NGOs to strengthen their capacities and

contribute to undermining NGO’s role as an independent commentator

on sector development policies.

• The report argues that the current approach to contracting is

inappropriate for community development interventions and for

building a strong, independent NGO sector. There is much that the

contracting approach could learn from WaterAid’s experiences of

working in partnership with local NGOs.


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Contents

Introduction 4

Ghana 5WaterAid’s Ghana Programme – Towards Partnership 5Key Features of Partnership 5Challenges of Working in Partnership 7Community Water and Sanitation in Ghana 8Conclusion 12

Nepal 14WaterAid and NEWAH 14The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation FundDevelopment Board 15The Fund Board and Contracting NGOs 16Conclusion 18

The Impact of Contracting on the NGO Sector 20

Conclusion: Lessons from Partnership 22

Boxes and TablesThe three main phases in WaterAid’s programme 6Okroasi village 8Lessons from the community 19Table of comparative costs per capita 22

Acknowledgements 23

A WaterAid Report

Written by Andrew Clayton

Edited by Diana Evans and Belinda Calaguas

November 1999

Contracts or Partnerships:Working through local NGOs inGhana and Nepal

How local NGOs have been engaged inthe provision of rural water and sanitationat community level in Ghana and Nepal


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TIntroduction

This report focuses on twocountries – Ghana and Nepal – inwhich national programmes arecurrently being implemented whichgive primary responsibility forcommunity water delivery to theprivate sector and NGOs.

In both countries, the World Bankhas been a driving force behindthese programmes. Local NGOs areheavily involved in both throughcompeting for contracts forundertaking community water andsanitation projects.

WaterAid is also working throughlocal NGOs in Ghana and Nepal.In neither country is WaterAid adirect implementer but channelsfunding through eight NGOs in

his report examines theissue of how to engagelocal non-government

organisations (NGOs) in theprovision of rural water andsanitation at the community level.Until the late 1980s, this wasprimarily a concern forinternational NGOs who supportedlocal NGOs in the implementationof development projects. Now,however, this is a major issue forgovernments and donors who areincreasingly using NGOs as agentsfor the delivery of public services.Whereas in the past the state wasseen as responsible for theprovision of services – notablyeducation, health and water supply– this is no longer the case.

Ghana and one NGO in Nepal,which in turn supports around 50smaller NGOs. WaterAid hasbeen working with these NGOsover a long period and has builtup strong relationships withthem such that they now see eachother as ‘partners’. Thepartnership approach followed inWaterAid’s programmes inGhana and Nepal represent avery different way of workingthrough local NGOs to thecontractual approach. Thepurpose of this report is toexplore these differences anddraw out lessons fromWaterAid’s experience on how towork effectively with localNGOs.

It should be noted that the use ofthe term partnership in the contextof relationships between Northernand Southern NGOs is open to awide number of interpretationsand is not a concept that can beprecisely defined. Some feel that itis inappropriate to use it forrelationships that involve thetransfer of resources – the termitself implies equality yet is usedto mask basic imbalances in powerbetween the funder and recipient.Others feel that, despite theselimitations, the notion ofpartnership is valuable fordescribing the relationshipsbetween Northern and SouthernNGOs. This is the approach takenin this report and is based on theviews of WaterAid’s partners inGhana and Nepal on what they seeas the essential characteristics andbenefits of working in partnership.

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Nepal: Uma Devi Pandel with one of her two children at a tapstand.


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TGhana

he rural water sector inGhana has been under-going major changes over

the last few years. These werebrought about by the introductionof the National Community Waterand Sanitation Policy by theGovernment of Ghana in 1994. Thischapter examines the new policyfrom the perspective of NGOs.Specifically, it compares thegovernment’s new approach toworking with NGOs with theapproach taken by WaterAid inGhana. It argues that there aremany lessons that the governmentcould learn from WaterAid’sexperience of working through localNGOs. The chapter opens with adescription of WaterAid’s Ghanaprogramme.

WaterAid’s Ghana Programme– Towards Partnership

WaterAid started working in Ghanain 1985. Initially it supported anumber of small church-runprojects in three districts, providingfunds and technical advice. By 1997,WaterAid’s programme expandedto working with eight differentpartner organisations covering 22districts. In the 1996-1997construction season alone,WaterAid’s partners constructed369 hand-dug wells and boreholes,installed 175 hand-pumps, trained1,737 village health co-ordinatorsand constructed 400 ventilatedimproved pit latrines.

Critical to the success of WaterAid’sprogramme in Ghana is itsrelationship with the local partnerorganisations that develop andimplement integrated water supply,sanitation and hygiene promotionprojects. This relationship evolvedover time; most of the partner

NGOs were small, newlyestablished organisations whenWaterAid first started working withthem. They have since grown insize and capacity and are nowamong the strongest NGOs inGhana.

Key Features of Partnership

As indicated above, partnership isa broad term that is open todifferent interpretations. For thisreason it is important to identifyhow the Ghanaian NGOssupported by WaterAid view theirrelationship with WaterAid.WaterAid’s partners speak verypositively, on the whole, about

this relationship and clearlyregard WaterAid as a ‘partner’.They compare this with otherdonors from whom they receivefunding for other projects, whoare seen simply as ‘donors’ notpartners. The distinction is madeon the basis of a number ofcharacteristics frequentlymentioned as central to theirrelationship with WaterAid butabsent from their relationshipwith other donors. These aresummarised in this section.

DialoguePartners attach great value to theopen and frank dialogue that theyhave with WaterAid. Even in the

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Phase 1, 1987-94

This initial phase of the programme was characterised by tight control ofall partner projects by WaterAid. Some of the partners were not at this stageregistered as independent NGOs but rather grew out of church-leddevelopment projects. Financial management was conducted through theWaterAid country office. Partners were required to produce detailed workprogrammes with budgets, and there was little flexibility for them to deviatefrom these. At this time, WaterAid was very output-orientated, with a majorfocus on reaching the annual targets for hand-dug well construction. Duringthis period, quarterly meetings were held for all partners in order to discussthe programme with WaterAid. The Integrated Social Development Centre(ISODEC) provided programme support after 1990.

Phase 2, 1994-97

WaterAid increased its support for training and capacity building of itspartner organisations. Responsibility for this was given to a localorganisation called ProNet. WaterAid assisted in setting up ProNet as anindependent NGO in 1994. ProNet also undertook monitoring of partnerson behalf of WaterAid. During this period, most of WaterAid’s partnersbecame formally registered as NGOs with the government. Moreresponsibility for financial management was handed over to partnersalthough detailed plans and budgets still had to be approved by WaterAidand adhered to. WaterAid also appointed a Ghanaian Deputy CountryRepresentative to oversee its programme in Northern Ghana. The quarterlymeetings with partners continued as before.

Phase 3, 1997 onwards

Three major changes took place in 1997, which have had profoundimplications for the relationship between WaterAid and its partners.

1 With partners reaching greater organisational maturity, there was aneed for a new relationship with WaterAid. This new relationshipcame about through a change in personnel for the new post. Theemployment of a new person, a Ghanaian, into the job of CountryCo-ordinator bolstered partners’ confidence about challengingWaterAid. This was previously difficult since the previous CountryRepresentative had been a driving force behind establishing theprogramme and building partners’ capacities.

2 The quarterly meetings with partners were institutionalised as thePartner Roundtable (PRT). Partners used the PRT as a forum formaking WaterAid accountable for the way it provided support to itspartners. It was chaired by one of the chairpersons of the partners,not by the WaterAid Country Co-ordinator. Previously, the WaterAidCountry Representative chaired the quarterly meetings.

3 A new approach to project planning and funding was introducedreplacing previous arrangements whereby WaterAid dictated howfunds were to be used. Under the new approach, WaterAid informedeach of its partners how much funding it would receive in thefollowing construction year. It was the responsibility of the partner todecide how they wished to use it and justify their plans to WaterAid.

THE THREE MAIN PHASES IN WATERAID’S PROGRAMME early days of the countryprogramme when WaterAidmaintained tighter control thannow, there was still room fordiscussion and debate. Thesediscussions were institutionalisedin the quarterly meetings, whichhave allowed partners to speakcollectively to WaterAid and alsoexchange information with eachother. The development of stronginter-personal relationshipsbetween WaterAid staff andpartners was also crucial forcreating an open environment.

AccountabilityThe open dialogue between bothparties enables partners andWaterAid to be accountable to eachother for the programme in Ghana.The Partner Roundtable’s newaccountability role is particularlywelcomed. All of WaterAid’spartners have independent boardswith voluntary members drawnfrom professionals and leaders inGhanaian civil society. Theseboards play important roles indiscussions with WaterAid,criticising it when they need to.The replacement of the expatriateCountry Representative with aGhanaian is also felt to havefacilitated more open debate onissues.

TrustPartners see the trust builtbetween WaterAid and them overa long period of time as crucial.The relationship has evolved.When the partner NGOs wereyoung, WaterAid was heavilyinvolved in project planning andfinancial management as well ascapacity building these NGOs. Asthe capacity of the partners grewand trust between themstrengthened, WaterAid was ableto take a more hands-off approach.Long term commitment from allpartners and from WaterAid was


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essential to the development of therelationship.

Capacity buildingWaterAid works through localorganisations for two mainreasons. First, local NGOs withstrong community links are themost effective means of deliveringappropriate water, sanitation andhygiene promotion at thecommunity level. Second, workingthrough local NGOs helps to buildthe NGO sector in Ghana. In otherwords, WaterAid does not regardits partner NGOs simply asimplementing agents, butrecognises their status asindependent NGOs with animportant role to play in Ghanaiancivil society. Thus part ofprogramme funding is specificallyfor capacity building. WaterAidfunds one organisation – ProNet –to have a specialist role in buildingthe capacity of partnerorganisations.

FlexibilityIn the early years of its Ghanaprogramme, WaterAid washardware-focused and output-orientated. This changed torecognition of the importance ofthe social aspects of the work, suchas community participation. Theprimary objective of WaterAid’sprogramme evolved into bringingabout qualitative change incommunities rather than simplyreaching physical output targets.This required a more flexibleapproach to project planning andimplementation. For example, itmay take longer to complete aprocess of community mobilisationthan originally envisaged. Partnerswere given more opportunities torevise agreed programmes ordeviate from their originalproposal as long as reasons weresound and to allow for unforeseencircumstances arising.

ExperimentationPartners are free to experiment withnew approaches and methods.WaterAid recognises the need forpartners to innovate and take risks,and supports them in doing so, inorder to improve on their existingapproaches. The main condition isthat partners discuss new approacheswith WaterAid. Support fordeveloping new approaches isprovided by ProNet.

NetworkingPartners feel that the two forumsfacilitated by WaterAid fornetworking are extremely valuablefor their own development. ThePartner Roundtable provides animportant opportunity for partnersto meet regularly, share ideas andseek solutions to problems anddifficulties. The Mole ConferenceSeries, supported by WaterAidannually since 1989, provides aforum for policy makers,practitioners from government,NGOs and donors, and academicsto discuss the water and sanitationsector in Ghana. The annualconference is organised by ProNet.The Mole Conferences have becomea key annual forum for debatewithin the water sector.

Memorandum of UnderstandingThere is a formal, legally-bindingagreement between WaterAid andeach partner which is called theMemorandum of Understanding.This states the obligations of eachparty and extends for three years.There is a commitment by bothparties to working together, but theactual level of funding is agreed ona yearly basis and is not part of theformal agreement. This differs froma standard commercial contract thatstates clearly which activitiesshould be carried out and howmuch they will cost. With WaterAidand its partners, the relationship isbased on a longer-term

commitment to working together –the written agreement itself does notdefine the relationship betweenthem. WaterAid’s partners feel thatthis gives them more flexibility tonegotiate with WaterAid than theywould have with a formal contract.Detailed work plans and budgetsare agreed on an annual basis butare not made into separatecontracts.

Challenges of Working inPartnership

Partnerships are dynamic, evolvingrelationships. This is particularly thecase with WaterAid and its Ghanapartners. Arrangements that wereappropriate in the past, when theNGO partners were new, had tochange to be acceptable to maturingpartners.

EquipmentAn example of this concerns thearrangements for project equipment.Due to WaterAid’s agreement withthe Ghana government, it retainsownership over all equipmentprovided to partners, such asvehicles, office equipment,compressors, etc. If WaterAiddecided not to renew itsMemorandum of Understandingwith a partner, it could ask for all itsequipment to be returned. While

Jennifer Amwabre, health educationsupervisor, helps at a health educationsession in Pwaluga, Bolgotanga.

WaterA

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partners were happy to accept thisarrangement in the early days oftheir relationship with WaterAid,they now feel vulnerable over theirlack of rights over equipment.Consequently, they want to own theequipment themselves especiallysince they have proven theircapacity to use these wisely.

The Country Co-ordinator recognisedthe strength of feeling amongpartners on this issue and has nowinitiated procedures to revise theagreement between WaterAid and thegovernment to allow equipment to behanded over to partners withoutthem incurring duties.

Differentiation among PartnersWaterAid’s partners are atdifferent stages of organisationaldevelopment and differ widely interms of size, age and capacity. Yeta common complaint amongpartners is that WaterAid uses thesame basic approach with all ofthem. The larger, more confidentpartners want more autonomy anddo not feel dependent onWaterAid funding for theirsurvival. On the other hand,smaller NGOs feel morevulnerable and are very concernedabout the withdrawal of WaterAidsupport. They are not pushing formore autonomy.

Partners also have differentattitudes to the centralised

OKROASI VILLAGE

WASHT, one of WaterAid’s partners, has been working in Okroasi villagein Ashanti Region for five months. They constructed a hand dug well forthe village and are now focusing on health promotion. In this village,WASHT experimented with a new approach to health promotion. Ratherthan WASHT staff doing health promotion themselves, WASHT trainedone of the villagers to undertake the health promotion. The villager wasprovided with a small allowance and a bicycle. The WASHT team visits thevillage regularly to observe the progress of the village health promoter.They think the approach is proving a very successful method for healthpromotion in this village and would replicate it elsewhere. The flexibilityof their agreement with WaterAid has allowed them this opportunity totry out an alternative approach.

approach to providing programmesupport, a role given to ProNet.Some feel that they are being heldback through WaterAid’s insistencethat all training and hygieneeducation material be provided byProNet. This is seen as stifling localinitiative. They would be muchhappier if they were given a budgetto produce their own materials andorganise their own training. Othersgreatly value the support providedby ProNet and have no desire tochange this set up.

It is clear that in a countryprogramme involving a largenumber of partners, there must begreater allowance made for the factthat the partners themselves havedifferent needs and objectives.While a common centralisedapproach may be necessary at theearly stages of a programme, achallenge for the Ghana programmeis to accommodate the differentorganisational development needsof partners.

Community Water andSanitation in Ghana

The National PolicyIn 1994, the Government of Ghanaadopted a national policy for thecommunity water and sanitationsector. This represented a boldinitiative to co-ordinate theactivities of all stakeholders

operating in the sector and ensuredthat they all use a common basicapproach. The World Bank was amajor force behind the formation ofthe policy and restructuring of therural water sector in Ghana. Amajor strategy of the new policy,which the World Bank haspromoted elsewhere, is that theprivate sector should be givenprimary responsibility forimplementation. Contracts forimplementation were to be awardedon a competitive bidding basis. Therole of government by contrastshifted from that of directimplementer to one of facilitator.The policy rests on a number ofstated principles:

• Ownership and control offacilities by the communitiessince the thrust of the policy andstrategy is to ensuresustainability of facilities,

• Involvement of women in themanagement of facilitiesprovided,

• Selection of service level by thecommunities consistent with feltneeds and available human andfinancial resources to ensuresustainability,

• Contribution by the communitiestowards capital cost of thefacilities,

• Establishment of a local levelinstitution (committee or board)entrusted with the managementof the facilities,

• Community responsibility foroperation and maintenance offacilities provided,

• The private sector, includingNGOs, undertaking servicedelivery and involved in themaintenance of facilities,

• Continuing technical andorganisation support to thecommunities,


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• Central role for the districtassemblies in supportingcommunity management,

• The Government to step out ofthe service provider role andestablish a facilitative body,

• The Government to have amonitoring role, performed bythe Ministry of Works andHousing.

An institutional framework wasestablished for the implementation ofthis policy. The Community Waterand Sanitation Division (CWSD) wascreated to be the lead agency forpolicy. This was originally within theGhana Water and SewageCorporation under the Ministry ofWorks and Housing. Towards theend of 1998 the government passed abill to make the CWSD agovernment-funded agency with anindependent board, and its name waschanged to the Community Waterand Sanitation Agency (CWSA).CWSA is responsible for monitoring,evaluating and managing the sector.CWSA is multi-disciplinary,containing specialists in engineering,hydrogeology, planning,management, training andaccounting. It has its headquarters inAccra and in each region it has aRegional Water and Sanitation Team(RWST).

Each district assembly isresponsible for establishing aDistrict Water and Sanitation Team(DWST). The team usually has threemembers: a specialist in communitydevelopment, one in hygieneeducation and one in engineering.The role of the DWST is to co-ordinate and monitor, not toimplement. NGOs and privatecontractors carry out actualimplementation.

There are two main types ofcontracts. First, there are ‘PartnerOrganisation’ (PO) contracts forundertaking the social aspects of

implementation – communitymobilisation, participatory planningand hygiene education. These gomainly to district-based NGOs.Second, there are contracts for theconstruction of facilities – hand-dugwells, boreholes and ventilatedimproved pit latrines. These go togovernment-registered privatecontractors. In addition, in eachregion one organisation has thecontract as the ‘Small BusinessDevelopment Unit’ (SBDU) forwhich they have to provide trainingto the POs and contractors. SBDUcontracts have been awarded toboth NGOs and private consultancyfirms.

So far, only the World Bank haschannelled funding directlythrough CWSA. This is through theBank-funded Community Waterand Sanitation Project (CWSP)introduced in four regions: Ashanti,BrongAhafo, Northern and Westernregions. There are a number ofbilateral agencies operating andmanaging their own rural waterand sanitation programmes in otherregions in Ghana. These agenciesaccept many of the broad principlesof the policy but have their ownarrangements for implementation.

However, the Government ofGhana and the World Bank want toestablish a national sectorinvestment programme toimplement the policy. This wouldinvolve all donors channellingmoney for rural water developmentthrough the CWSA. The CWSAwould then disburse funding forimplementation through the RWSTand District Assemblies. Yet anumber of major problems havearisen in the implementation of thepolicy in the four regions coveredby the CWSP. These are discussedin the following section and raisecritical issues that must beaddressed before the policy can beimplemented more widely.

It should be noted that the newnational policy contains manyprinciples that are also central toWaterAid’s work. These include theemphasis on communityparticipation and contribution tocapital costs, the promotion ofwomen and the integration ofhygiene education into waterprovision. There are also parallels inthe roles of different actors:government, like WaterAid, fundsand facilitates rather than directlyimplements projects. Even the term‘Partner Organisation’ echoesWaterAid’s use of the term ‘DirectImplementing Partner’; and the ideaof the SBDU as a supportorganisation for the POs parallelsthe role of ProNet as the programmesupport unit for WaterAid’spartners. Nonetheless, there arefundamental differences betweenthe two programmes withimplications both for communitiesand NGOs. These are examined inthe following section.

Separation of Social Animation andConstructionThe national policy separatesimplementation of social animationfrom implementation ofconstruction. PO contracts for socialanimation go to NGOs, whileconstruction contracts go togovernment registered privateconstruction contractors. As aconsequence, two very differentorganisations are involved inworking with each community. Withpost-construction monitoring theresponsibility of the DWST,communities then have to liaisewith three different actors.

This has created a number ofproblems of co-ordination andapproach. For example, whereasPOs are supposed to useparticipatory approaches, thecontractors often have little interestin involving the communities.Expectations can be raised by the


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POs, which are ignored by thecontractors. Delays are also aproblem. According to the nationalpolicy, the PO completes its tasksand then the constructioncontractors move in. Often this isbadly co-ordinated and delays of sixmonths to a year before theconstruction work begins are notuncommon. This can result indemoralisation amongst thecommunity – much of the workdone by the PO in mobilising thecommunity, setting up the Waterand Sanitation Committee (Watsan)and hygiene education can beundone and momentum lost.

Furthermore, POs must wait untilthe construction is completed andchecked by DWST before theyreceive their final 10 per cent. Thiscan be difficult for small and bigNGOs, as they then have to absorbthe cost of delays.

Although insisting that onlyregistered private contractors couldbid for contracts is a safeguardagainst companies with noconstruction experience gettingcontracts, this policy also effectivelyexcludes NGOs from constructioncontracts. This is despite the factthat many have developed muchexpertise in this area of work.

In WaterAid’s programme, whichconcentrates on hand-dug wells, thepartner manages the whole process,and they employ both communitydevelopment staff and technicaladvisors. This helps to ensuregreater co-ordination and maintaina common approach to workingwith communities. Theseexperiences suggest that CWSAneeds to consider a more integratedapproach to the implementation ofthe national strategy that does notso clearly divorce the social sidefrom the construction.

Prescriptive Approach to Workingwith CommunitiesIt is important to distinguishbetween the objectives for the PO asset out in the contract and the actualwork programme for achievingthem as prescribed in the contract.The stated objectives represent amajor shift in the Government ofGhana’s thinking about rural watersupply. They are ambitious andinclude mobilising communities,undertaking participatory planning,training WATSAN committees andempowering women. The problemwith the contracts are not theobjectives but rather that theresources allocated for achievingthem are inadequate and themethods to be used are toorestrictive and prescriptive.

Organisations with PO contractsfind it very difficult to achieve theobjectives of the contract. Forexample, in Ashanti Region, thestandard PO has a contract thatonly pays for 17 visits to eachcommunity. Each visit is for oneday only and covers 2.5 staffsalaries. These visits are brokendown as follows:

• Community mobilisation

• Participatory planning to preparefacility management plan

• WATSAN training

• Community support forconstruction of hand-dug wells

• Follow-up period (usereducation and monitoring)

• Latrine promotion

While the 17-visit programme is auseful broad guideline, it is used ina highly prescriptive manner. Insome cases this number of visits issufficient, in other cases it is not.The PO contract does not take intoaccount wide differences betweencommunities and the highlyunpredictable nature of communitywork. Critics argue that the

problems are with the POs beinginefficient. Yet so many delays anddifficulties are beyond the control ofthe PO. For example, thecommunity mobilisation work maybring to light various conflictswithin the community or withneighbouring communities. The POteam will need to spend time andresources helping to resolve thesebefore continuing.

In the current situation, POs arefaced with two highlyunsatisfactory options. Either theystick by the terms of the contracteven though this doesn’t produceadequate results, or do more thanwhat they are contracted for toensure the task is done well.

They can only do this byunderpaying staff, or in some casesthrough subsidising the CWSAwork with funds from otherprogrammes they may be engagedin. Clearly, there is an urgent needto allow for much greater flexibilityin PO contracts and for the CWSAto set aside a reserve fund to coverunforeseen circumstances.

Community ContributionsThe lack of flexibility within theCWSA approach also applies to thepolicy on community contributions.Communities have to pay five percent of the capital costs of thescheme before construction can takeplace. No allowance is made forcommunities that find it difficult toraise this amount of cash. InWaterAid-funded projects both cashand in-kind contributions areexpected but exact amounts are notprescribed. There is a flexibleapproach to the actual sum any onecommunity should pay, which islinked to their ability to pay.

Capacity BuildingThe new policy provided anenvironment for the formation ofnew organisations that then becamePO contractors. The 1997 evaluation


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of the NWSP found that 80 per centof POs worked only on CWSAcontracts and nearly 50 per centwere formed after the nationalpolicy was adopted. The neworganisations are completelydependent on the contracts andhave no other sources of funding,making them very vulnerable. ThePO contracts allow no overhead fortheir own capacity building. Thisproblem is further compounded bythe fact that PO contracts areawarded on a yearly basis. Long-term planning and organisationaldevelopment are therefore difficultsince future funding is so uncertain.Furthermore, even if theorganisation is awarded a contractfor the following year, there is oftena significant gap between the end ofone contract and the start of thenew contract. Consequently, projectstaff are laid off and then re-employed once the new contractstarts.

The training and support providedby the SBDU towards buildingcapacity is greatly valued, but muchmore is needed. This is recognised bythe SBDUs themselves who feel thattheir own contracts are too limitingand that there is far more that theywould like to do with the POs,especially the new ones, if greaterresources were allocated for this.

There is a sense among new andmature NGOs of being exploited byCWSA, who rely on theircommitment to communitydevelopment but are unwilling torecognise their organisationalneeds. From CWSA’s point of view,they are private sector serviceproviders who competed forcontracts on a commercial basis.Their concern is that the NGOsfulfil the requirements set out in thePO contracts, not with theircapacity building. There is norecognition in the national policy ofthe role of NGOs within civilsociety.

NGO Size and AutonomyThere is a relationship between thesize and capacity of an NGO on theone hand and its ability to maintainits independence while undertakingpublic service contracts.

Larger NGOs in Ghana who have amore diverse funding base than thenewly formed PO contractors aremore likely to be able to maintaintheir independence whileundertaking contracts. They mayhave a contract as an SBDU or PO,but may also have grant assistancefrom Northern NGOs to undertakeother activities such as advocacy orsocial research. The critical issueseems to be one of balance betweencontracts and grants. Contractsprovide large NGOs withalternative funding sources forscaling up tried and testedapproaches, while grants allowthem to maintain their commitmentto social justice and provide anindependent voice on policy issues.By contrast those NGOs which justundertake contracts, even if fromvarious sources, have found thatthe demands of fulfilling thecontracts are such that theyeffectively operate as privateconsultancy firms and they havenot been effective in undertakingpolicy advocacy.

Resources at District LevelThe national policy gives the DWSTresponsibility for monitoring theactivities of POs and contractors,and for follow up visits withcommunities. However, there aresimply not enough resources andstaff at the district level to enablethe DWST to perform these duties.For example, in one district a DWSThas to cover 250 water facilities.They are unable to devote muchtime to monitoring or follow-upvisits in communities where waterfacilities have already beenconstructed. They do not haveenough time for resolving any

problems or conflicts that may havearisen during the implementation ofthe scheme.

The DWST is itself in an ambiguousposition institutionally. In theory it isformed by and falls under theauthority of the district assembly.However, all the funding andtechnical support comes from theRWST. The District Assembly doesnot have the resources to providefurther support to the DWSTs.Decentralisation in Ghana has givenmuch greater responsibilities toDistrict Assemblies, but resourceshave not been increased sufficientlyto enable them to undertake theseresponsibilities. DWST members arenot even employees of the DistrictAssembly but are seconded by lineministries such as health andcommunity development with theresult that they have splitallegiances. Staff motivation can below due to poor resources and thefact that career development forDWST members is dependent ontheir superiors in their lineministries, not the District Assembly.

The implementation of the nationalcommunity water and sanitationpolicy hinges on the ability of theDistrict Assembly to provideleadership and resources for theDWSTs. Yet the capacity of DistrictAssemblies is weak not just in termsof resources, but also in staffnumbers and skills. AlthoughCWSA has provided some capacitybuilding in the form of training forDWSTs much more attention andresources need to be channelledinto supporting the DWSTs if theyare to be able to undertake theirresponsibilities.

AccountabilityThe contract approach makes POsand contractors primarilyaccountable to the CWSA; there isno direct accountability to thecommunity. The former are paid forfulfilling the formal programme of


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activities as laid out in the contract– undertaking a number ofprescribed activities – rather thanfor the actual impact on thecommunity. POs must send regularreports to CWSA with details ofvisits and activities undertaken. Intheory, these reports are thenchecked by the DWST who alsomake sure that real progress hasbeen made in communitymobilisation and planning and thatthe hygiene education messageshave made an impact on behaviour.But, as was shown in the lastsection, the DWST does not havethe capacity to undertake thisfunction.

The accountability of NGOs tocommunities is always problematicand is largely dependent on thewillingness of NGOs to listen andrespond to community demands.Some NGOs are more accountableto the communities they serve,others are not. Nonetheless, whenNGOs have to work in acommunity on the basis of a verytight contract they become even lessable to respond to requests from thecommunity.

What is essential is to institutemechanisms to make POs andconstruction contractors moreaccountable both to localcommunities and to localauthorities.

Conclusion

This chapter highlighted some ofthe key shortcomings of theapproach to engaging NGOs thathas been adopted by CWSA. Itargued that WaterAid’s approachhas the flexibility to meet better theparticular needs of individualcommunities as well asstrengthening the capacity of thelocal NGOs. The question is: CanWaterAid’s partnership approachbe used for purposes of achievingnational coverage, which after all, isthe aim of the national policy? Is itpossible to apply the principles onwhich WaterAid built uppartnerships with local NGOs –long term commitment, trust and

William Abugre Azoah, senior wells supervisor, discusses the site of a new well with villagers from Duusi Bolgatanga.

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dialogue, shared policy making –on a national scale?

WaterAid believe this is possible, bystrengthening the involvement andcapacity of local government in theimplementation of the policy.

One of the long-term aims of thenational policy is for DistrictAssemblies to play a key role inmanaging the relationships withPOs and contractors. This has notbeen achieved because of districts’lack of capacity and reluctance ofthe CWSA at regional level to handover control and resources.Nonetheless there is much potentialthere. District Assemblies provideboth permanency and localaccountability. Their responsibilitiesand roles may change according togovernment policies, but presenceis continuous. There is anopportunity for District Assembliesin Ghana to build up long-termrelationships with local NGOs. Inparticular strong inter-personalcontacts, which are so vital to thepartnership approach, can be

developed between NGO staff,assemblymen and women anddistrict assembly staff.

Although local governments aresubject to multiple accountabilities– central government controls theirbudgets, local elite can dominatelocal politics, they are directlyaccountable to the electorate –nonetheless in Ghana the LocalGovernment Act of 1993 has givenconsiderable powers to the DistrictAssemblies. Through engaging withthe state at the local level, NGOscan become more accountable tolocal citizens. The majority ofassemblymen and women areelected by communities andprovide a potential channel forcomplaints against POs and privatecontractors. Effective monitoring ofNGO activities is an essential partof achieving this accountability tocommunities as well as upwardaccountability towards CWSA. Thepolicy for this is in place but thecapacity and resources available atthe district level are not yetsufficient for fulfilling this function.

The current contracting approach isbased on a centrally formulatedapproach to projectimplementation. If districtassemblies were given morefreedom to negotiate directly withNGOs and respond to local needsand variations, then there is thepotential to develop a more open,flexible approach to contracts.

This case study from Ghana hasimportant lessons for the currentdonor interest in sector wideapproaches. While there is much tobe recommended about the nationalcommunity water and sanitationpolicy in Ghana and the movetowards establishing a national, co-ordinated framework for ruralwater supply, getting the broadpolicy right is not, in itself,sufficient. More attention needs tobe given to how resources areallocated and used at the districtlevel and below, and to theimplications of sector wideapproaches on local NGOs andcommunities.


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INepal

n Nepal, there has also been amajor water programme thathas engaged NGOs on a

contractual basis to implementrural water projects. As withGhana, there has been muchconcern from NGOs about theimpact of this programme on theNGO sector. By contrast WaterAidhas worked closely with one majorlocal NGO, NEWAH, in Nepal, andboth parties feel that they form astrong partnership.

WaterAid and NEWAH

WaterAid started working in Nepalin 1986. Initially it worked with theWater Decade Cell of the SocialServices National Co-ordinatingCouncil (SSNCC) on a joint projectto assist local NGOs implementdrinking water and sanitationschemes. A resident engineer wasalso appointed to work with theAgricultural Development Bank ofNepal (ADB-N) on its SmallFarmers Development Project.

UNICEF funded this project aimedat helping farmers’ co-operativesundertake water and sanitationprojects.

In 1991, WaterAid took the decisionto transfer its funding to a localNGO. The transition to multi-partydemocracy in Nepal in 1990 gavenew political space to NGOs andWaterAid wanted to support theemerging sector. WaterAid alsoencountered bureaucratic problemswith its existing partners – SSNCCand ADB-N – which precludedfurther growth of its countryprogramme. In order to build onexisting experience, the Nepalproject staff working for SSNCCand ADB-N formed an independentNGO called Nepal Water for Health(NEWAH). WaterAid has workedvery closely with NEWAH and hashelped NEWAH become the largestNGO in Nepal specialising in waterand sanitation. By 1997 it had fourregional offices and employed over100 people.

NEWAH itself works with localNGOs or community-basedorganisations in projectimplementation and providesfunding and technical support onall aspects of the project. Most ofthe NGOs with whom NEWAHworks are very new andinexperienced, especially inrelation to water supplyconstruction. A major aim ofNEWAH is to strengthen theseemerging organisations. ANEWAH staff member is residentin the community while a schemeis being implemented, providingsupport to the local organisation.NEWAH thus works very closelywith local NGOs and communitiesand does not simply contract outproject implementation.

The roles and responsibilities ofWaterAid and NEWAH havechanged since 1992. As thecapacity of NEWAH increased,and trust deepened, NEWAHassumed more and moreindependence from WaterAid.Nowadays NEWAH has fullautonomy for policy making andoperations. Initially WaterAidmaintained tight control overNEWAH through preparation ofdetailed budgets and stringentreporting requirements. By 1998,WaterAid had moved towardsfunding NEWAH according totheir strategic framework withinagreed cost per capita guidelines.Beyond that, WaterAid does notheavily prescribe what activitiesshould be carried out in the fieldwhich gives NEWAH considerablefreedom to decide how to useWaterAid’s funds. Quarterlyreports and independent audits ofNEWAH provide the financialaccountability of NEWAH toWaterAid. There is also now a

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commitment to process rather thanoutput-orientated projects, whichallows NEWAH to work underflexible timeframes to suit the needsof different communities.

WaterAid believes that itsrelationship with NEWAH hasbecome a very successfulpartnership. WaterAid has a long-term commitment to supportNEWAH. As a consequence of this,NEWAH in turn is able to developlong term relationships with manyof its own NGO partners in Nepal.

NEWAH has identified a number offactors that they regard as central totheir partnership with WaterAid:

ConsultationThere is widespread consultationbetween NEWAH and WaterAidduring the formulation of policy andprocedures. For example, bothconsulted with each other during thepreparation of their own Five-YearStrategic Plans. Such consultationswere helpful in ensuring that thepartner’s views were considered andreflected in policies and procedures,and also in allowing each partner toknow about the other’s plans for thefuture.

Interpersonal RelationsThe good interpersonalrelationships between NEWAH andWaterAid staff have establishedtrust and understanding betweenboth partners. This is considered offar more importance than formal,written procedures for workingtogether.

Mutual LearningBoth NEWAH and WaterAid areopen to learning from each other’sexperiences. The relationship isfounded on mutual co-operationand mutual advancement, ratherthan one way transfer ofknowledge. NEWAH benefits fromWaterAid’s wide range ofexperiences in different situations

around the world. Similarly,NEWAH has experiences thatWaterAid has learnt from anddisseminated to other parts of theworld, such as its hygieneeducation programme.

Diversification of FundingIn order to increase NEWAH’sindependence, WaterAid has alsobeen assisting NEWAH withdiversifying its funding sources.WaterAid make linkages with otheragencies like UNICEF and DFID,thus helping NEWAH to expandtheir boundaries.

Shared AccountabilityAlthough they have different rolesand responsibilities, bothorganisations seek to share theaccountability for both thesuccesses and failures of the Nepalprogramme. When things gowrong, rather than attaching blame,both work together to findsolutions.

Policy IndependenceThough consultation takes place,each organisation has its ownindependent policy. Although thereis overlap, not all of WaterAid’spolicies are incorporated intoNEWAH’s policy and vice versa.

For example, WaterAid has a policyto work in urban slums whereasNEWAH’s policy is to work only inrural areas.

Financial TransparencyBoth NEWAH and WaterAid’sNepal office allow each partner toexamine their accounts. Thefinancial transparency of WaterAid(at the country level) is regarded asan important feature of thepartnership and one that few otherinternational NGOs permit.

WaterAid views the institutionaldevelopment of NEWAH as themost important investment it canmake in the rural water sector in

Nepal. The ultimate goal will be toensure that NEWAH has a diverse,sustainable funding base and is nolonger dependent on WaterAid’ssupport. This will still take sometime to achieve – in 1997 about two-thirds of NEWAH’s income camefrom WaterAid – but it has begun todiversify and attract funding fromother donors. The move to greaterautonomy also means that NEWAHwill have to become more heavilyinvolved in functions that arecurrently handled by WaterAid.Currently, WaterAid’s mainfunction in the partnership, inaddition to providing funding, is toundertake advocacy and facilitateNEWAH’s introduction to otherdonors. While this was anappropriate division of duties in thepast, NEWAH is now developinggreater capacity to manage itsexternal relations both with otherstakeholders in Nepal andinternationally.

The Rural Water Supply andSanitation Fund DevelopmentBoard

The Rural Water Supply andSanitation Fund DevelopmentBoard was created in 1996, underthe Development Board Act of 1996,with a stated objective of promotingsustainable and cost effectivedemand-led rural water supply andsanitation services. The Fund Boarditself funds NGOs and communitiesto undertake rural water andsanitation projects and does notdirectly implement projects. TheFund Board has full operationalautonomy from the establishedgovernment body responsible forrural water supply – theDepartment of Water Supply andSewerage. Seven board members,four of whom are from keygovernment ministries, two fromthe NGO sector and one from theprivate sector manage it. The NGOrepresentatives were selected and


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appointed by government ratherthan nominated by the institutionsthey claim to represent. This raisesquestions about their eventualaccountability. The Fund Boardtoday is one of the major actors incommunity level water supplyprogramme in the country.

The formulation, establishmentand funding of the Fund Board arevery much World Bank initiatives.The Fund Board was based on apilot project know as JAKPASwhich was managed by the WorldBank between 1993-96. Theexpansion of this project throughthe institution of the Fund Boardreflects the Bank’s objective oftransferring responsibility forcommunity water and sanitationfrom the government to the NGOand private sector. The decision toby-pass the government wasbroadly welcomed by many peopleinvolved in the water sector inNepal. The Department of WaterSupply and Sewerage has abureaucratic operating style and itwas felt that an alternativeapproach is needed to stimulatethe rural water sector.

The Fund Board funds NGOs on acontractual basis. The contracts areawarded after a competitive biddingprocess involving NGOs. The FundBoard’s Technical AppraisalCommittee first evaluates each NGObefore selection according to thefollowing key criteria:

• evidence of legal registration ofthe NGO;

• constitutional provision of theNGO to engage in rural watersupply and sanitation or ruraldevelopment activities;

• updated, audited and certifiedaccounts;

• proven track record of at leasttwo years in participatory ruralwater supply and sanitation orrelated activities;

• staffing capacity to carry out theproposed services.

Successful NGOs are awardedcontracts by the Fund Board to actas Support Organisations (SOs)with responsibility for mobilisingcommunities, delivering hygieneeducation and constructingcommunity water facilities.

Communities must also meetcertain criteria to be eligible for awater scheme funded by the FundBoard. These relate both to theneeds of the community and thetechnical and economic viability ofthe scheme. A key selection criteriais that the community must pay incash 2.5 per cent of the constructioncosts up front, supply all unskilledlabour, portage and local materialsand start collecting a maintenancefund which is three per cent of thetotal cost of the scheme.

For each community water schemeundertaken through the FundBoard, a three year cycle isfollowed, starting with the selectionof the SO. This includes extensivepreparatory work among thecommunity for the first two years,including feasibility studies,

community mobilisation and theformation of a Water Users’Committee and hygiene andsanitation education. The actualwater facility is constructed in thefinal year. Communities must havesuccessfully completed the earlieractivities and be prepared toparticipate in the constructionbefore the SO will actually beginconstruction.

The Fund Board andContracting NGOs

Nepal offers an interesting contrastto Ghana in relation to contractingNGOs. In Ghana, NGOs have threemajor complaints about CWSAcontracts: the process of awardingcontracts is seen as lackingtransparency; the contractsthemselves do not recognise thecomplexity of the tasks required;and there is no allowance in thecontracts for an organisationaloverhead. In Nepal, there is someimprovement on all of these. Firstly,there are fewer complaints aboutthe process of awarding contracts inNepal – this is seen as relativelytransparent and fair. Secondly, amuch longer time period is allowedfor the completion of a water

A meeting between the NGO NEWAH and the village. People present include UmeshPandy and Chhali Kumari Sharma (NGO President).

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facility – three years rather thanone. Thirdly, SOs are allowed tocharge a ten per cent overhead inthe contracts.

Additionally, the same organisationin Nepal undertakes both the socialmobilisation and hygiene educationand the construction. Althoughseparate contracts are awarded forboth phases, which can createproblems of continuity at thecommunity level, at least the sameorganisation is managing the wholeprocess.

Another area in which the FundBoard has a much better approachthan the CWSA relates toaccountability towards thecommunity. In Ghana, there is nodirect mechanism for making POsor contractors accountable tocommunities. The current systemdepends on the DWST playing amonitoring role, but lack ofresources has made this ineffective.In Nepal, on the other hand,communities keep timesheets onthe SO staff. A joint bank account isset up between the SO and WaterUsers Committee, which requiresone signatory from each party fordrawing money from the account.Some communities are alsoinvolved in selecting SOs.

Nonetheless, there is considerableconcern among the Nepal NGOcommunity about the effect theFund Board is having on the NGOsector. It is seen as turning NGOsinto service providers fulfilling thedevelopment objectives of theWorld Bank. NGOs also believecontracting undermines their roleas independent actors within civilsociety. It is important to analysethe reasons for this concern.

Lack of DialogueOnce an NGO gets a SO contract ithas little direct contact with theFund Board. Contact in the field ismainly through consultants

appointed by the Fund Board toundertake training and monitoring,not through permanent Fund Boardstaff. NGOs basically are given thecontracts and expected to get onwith fulfilling their requirements.There is no ongoing, mutualdialogue with the Fund Boardduring the implementation of thecontract.

Policy InfluenceNGOs have little influence on theobjectives or policies of the FundBoard. Although there are twoNGO representatives on the Board,this is no substitute for a more openprocess of dialogue and discussionwith NGOs.

Furthermore the two NGOrepresentatives were not nominatedby NGOs themselves but wereinvited by the Fund Board; hencethey are not seen as sufficientlyrepresentative of the NGO sector inNepal. NGOs are expected to workin participatory ways withcommunities but the Fund Boarddoes not think it necessary to usethe same participatory principles inits relationship with NGOs; NGOsare seen as a means of empoweringcommunities but are notempowered themselves. They arethus simply fulfilling the agenda ofthe Fund Board and have nofreedom or opportunity to influencethat agenda.

Lack of FlexibilityThe Fund Board is highlybureaucratic and inflexible. It hasprescribed a standardised approachto water and sanitation that doesnot take into account localconditions. SOs are not permitted toadapt their approach to meet theparticular needs of individualcommunities. This applies to boththe fixed time period for each stageof a scheme that SOs have to follow,irrespective of delays or difficulties,and the level of community

contributions. There is noopportunity for negotiation orcompromise on these rules.

For example, the Fund Boardrigidly applies the rule that it willonly support communities that cancontribute 5.5 per cent of the cost ofthe scheme (i.e., 2.5 per cent in cashup front and three per cent for themaintenance fund). Yet the abilityof communities to pay varieswidely.

Poverty-focusThe Fund Board’s policy is toachieve maximum coverage inNepal and does not explicitly targetthe poorest communities. Two keyeconomic criteria for selection ofcommunities make it difficult forpoorer communities. Firstly, ruleson community contributions to thescheme, which come to 5.5 per centof the total costs, are adhered to,irrespective of the community’sability to pay. Similarly,communities are expected toprovide local materials, such assand and stones, irrespective ofwhether or not they are availablelocally. If, for example, sand is notavailable locally then thecommunity has to cover the costs ofpurchasing and transporting it fromelsewhere, which can be a greatexpense for them.

Secondly, another criterion relatesto a benefit/cost ratio. Benefit isestimated on the basis of the valueof the average time saved each dayby the community. The actualmethods used for quantifying thisratio remains unclear but the factthat poorer groups are often thosein remoter, less accessible areasmeans that working with suchgroups is likely to be more costly.NGOs whose main activity hasbecome undertaking SO contractsmay have to compromise theircommitment to working with thepoorest people.


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Overheads and Capacity BuildingUnlike the CWSA in Ghana, theFund Board allows each SO anoverhead of ten per cent. It is forthe SO itself to decide whether ornot to use this money for its owncapacity building. This is a complexissue. On the one hand, it is to bewelcomed that the Fund Boardrecognises the organisational needsof the SOs and is prepared toprovide resources for their owninternal use, not just fund projectactivities. This gives the SOs ameans of building up theirorganisation as they wish.

But this is not enough. The NGOsector in Nepal is very young. Inrecent years, there has been anexplosion in the number of NGOs.Many of these are small NGOs runby volunteers. Even then, many ofthem have won SO contracts fromthe Fund Board. The requirementsfor on-going technical andmanagerial support to help buildthese SOs’ capacities are thereforeheavy, but it is not clear how theSOs would get the necessarysupport. Although the Fund Boardprovides training for SOs, trainingneeds to be combined with on-going support. NEWAH’s approach

to supporting its local NGOpartners in the implementation of acommunity water scheme is toprovide day-to-day support,through a staff member stationed inthe community for a whole year toprovide advice and assistance toboth the NGO and the community.While the Fund Board may not beable to provide for this level ofsupport, it is clear that a significantincrease in levels of support to thecommunities and NGOs is required.

There is some concern that thepolicy of the Fund Board hasencouraged a profit motive amongNGOs, and compromised theiroriginal commitment to socialjustice. The feeling among fieldlevel staff of other agencies is thatthe overhead allowance of the FundBoard is pitched too high for thelocal context (ten per cent of capitalcosts for each project). Something ofa ‘goldrush’ mentality has resultedwithin the NGO sector. This maydamage the quality of motivationfor involvement. Their experienceof some two hundred NGOs thatNEWAH has worked with is thatquality of motivation really doesmatter since it has a profoundbearing on how NGOs interact with

the community. This, in turn, is seento affect the sense of ownership andlong term sustainability of projectwork. It is also NEWAH’sexperience that most NGOs, evenexperienced ones, have difficultyimplementing more than twoprojects at any one time, even withthe full time support of a memberof NEWAH’s staff, whereas NGOswith Fund Board contracts oftenundertake five or six projects at thesame time. In the end, this mayeven damage the quality of theprojects themselves.

Staff MotivationThe Fund Board contracts meanthat SOs have to employ staff onshort term contracts to fulfil specificactivities within the various phasesof the scheme. The lack of jobsecurity was found to have causedproblems in staff morale andcommitment and has affected thequality of work in both its socialand technical aspects. Also, due tochanges in staff, there is often lackof continuity among staff at thecommunity level. The Fund Boardprioritises the fulfilment ofimmediate objectives of the contractat minimum cost, rather thandeveloping the human resourcebase of the NGO sector or fosteringlong-term relationships betweenNGOs and communities.

Conclusion

The Fund Board represents aninitiative by the World Bank to shiftthe delivery of rural water supplyfrom the state to the NGO sector.Many commentators in Nepal see itas a more efficient means ofutilising the World Bank loan forwater provision than channelling itthrough the Department for WaterSupply and Sanitation. Much hasbeen done to develop a contractingsystem that is appropriate forengaging local NGOs inundertaking community

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Sinking a tubewell using the sludging method. The work is led by Bipta Chaudray (centre)who is the skilled labourer.


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development work. However, thereare fundamental problems with thewhole approach, both in terms of itsimpact on the NGO sector and theprovision of community watersupplies.

The lack of flexibility in the FundBoard’s approach to working withcommunities has meant that NGOshave been unable to adapt theirmethods to suit local conditions andneeds. This has discouragedcommunities from feeling a sense ofownership of the project and thismay, in turn, have implications forthe long-term sustainability of theschemes. Furthermore, the demandthat each community mustcontribute a total of 5.5 per cent ofthe capital costs of the scheme hasexcluded poorer communities.

Another major shortcoming of theFund Board is its approach toNGOs. NGOs are not granted anyopportunity to participate in policyformulation. Rather the policies andprocedures for implementation arepre-determined by the Fund Board.NGOs are valued as projectimplementers but not for providingindependent, alternativeperspectives on policy andprocedures.

Finally, the Fund Board itself is nota permanent institution. Here thereis an interesting contrast withGhana, where there is a nationalpolicy in place that is co-ordinatedby the government. In Ghana, thenational policy redefined the role ofthe state from one of directimplementer to facilitator whereasin Nepal the state has beenbypassed altogether by the WorldBank in favour of a semi-autonomous body. This response isstrange despite the fact that policyrecognised the role of thegovernment as facilitator. There arenot even any permanent FundBoard staff at the district level;instead they rely on short-term

LESSONS FROM THE COMMUNITY

This section summarises the specific findings from case studies fromTinghare and Gerkhu, two communities in which Fund Board projects arebeing implemented:

Positive Elements

The formation of users committees has demonstrated the advantage ofgetting organised. Since then, villagers have initiated other collectiveactivities such as building a road. They have also learned skills in resolvinglocal level disputes, which was particularly useful in settling claims forcompensation for land, which the new road encroached upon.

The training activities have meant that people are well informed about theobjectives of the project and especially about the sanitation and health issues.

The role of the community in monitoring the work of the SOs has beenwelcomed.

Limitations

The timetable followed in the Fund Board projects has created frustrationsamong the villagers. A major complaint was that the actual supply ofdrinking water was the last activity in these projects, and consequentlythey had to wait three years after the start of the project before actuallyhaving any water. Although, the community workers had made repeatedefforts to convince the villagers that building schemes in a short time wouldlead to unsustainable projects, villagers felt that more flexibility was neededin the approach to allow for local needs. In particular they were reluctantto follow the long process of activities set out in the development phasebut were told by the SO community workers that they had no option but tofulfil these if the Fund Board was to release further money for the project.

This and other factors result in villagers not feeling that they themselvesown the process of implementing the project. The users were not presentedwith a range of alternatives to choose from based on the level of servicesthat they wanted but rather had to accept the whole package stipulated bythe Fund Board. They were consulted, but in reality the approach to befollowed by the SO was pre-determined by the Fund Board. It remains tobe seen whether or not this will have implications for the sustainability ofthese schemes.

There was a suspicion that the SO’s promotion of community participationin project implementation was primarily to satisfy the requirements of theFund Board.

Although toilets were constructed, in one of the communities these werenot being used implying that the hygiene education messages were notfully accepted.

In both villages it was felt that political connections to members of the SOwas instrumental to the inclusion of villagers in the programme.

consultants to provide the link withSOs. In bypassing the localgovernment structures there is nopermanent body with which localNGOs can develop long-term

relationships and build up trust andunderstanding. The Fund Board hasonly one donor – once the WorldBank funding is finished, it is likelyto cease to exist as an institution.


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TThe impact of contracting on the NGO sector

he changes that have takenplace in the communitywater and sanitation sector

in both Ghana and Nepal in recentyears are the result of broaderpolicy changes in internationaldevelopment. These reflectchanging donor policies regardingthe role of the state andinvolvement of the private sector inthe provision of public services. It isimportant to understand the newapproaches to rural water provisionadopted in Nepal and Ghana withinthis context. This has profoundimplications for the future directionof the NGO sector in both of thesecountries.

In the late 1980s and 1990s, a seriesof public sector reforms began totake place in both developed anddeveloping countries, driven by theneo-liberal policies on privatisationand reduction in the role of the state.The World Bank is particularlypushing these policy developmentspromoting the privatisation of publicservice delivery.

As part of this reform process,donors are increasingly fundingNGOs to undertake contracts fordelivering public services such ashealth or rural water supply indeveloping countries. Theirexperience of community leveldevelopment make NGOs, ratherthan commercial companies, thefavoured project implementers.Some of the funding that waspreviously transferred to Southerngovernments to deliver publicservices is now being transferred tolocal NGOs. There are three mainmechanisms in which this takesplace:

• Donors fund Southern NGOsdirectly with no intermediarybody.

• Donors fund a semi-autonomoussocial fund which sub-contractsNGOs, as with the Fund Board inNepal.

• Donors channel funding througha governmental body which sub-contracts NGOs to undertakeactual implementation, as withthe CWSA in Ghana.

There are important differenceswith these mechanisms, especiallyin relation to governance andaccountability, but all represent amassive increase in the level offunding available for local NGOs.While some see this as a means ofstrengthening civil society in theSouth, others question thisassumption and find the impact onlocal NGOs to be a major cause forconcern. Although this funding hasincreased the number of NGOs andexpanded the scale of theiroperations, it is questionablewhether it has also strengthenedtheir capacity to operate asindependent actors providingalternative development policiesand initiatives to the state andinternational donors. Theexperiences from the rural watersector in Nepal and Ghana indicatethis is not the case.

Policy InfluenceIn both countries NGOs havecomplained about the fact that theyare not given an opportunity toengage in policy dialogue andadvocacy with the CWSA or FundBoard. Key policy decisions aremade between these bodies and theWorld Bank. NGOs are thenbrought in to act as implementingagents. They are valued becausethey are seen as efficient providersof services. In other words, NGOsare seen only in terms of being partof the private sector, not because

they are part of civil society withtheir independent contributions tomake in community and policydevelopment. While more fundingis available to NGOs they are notable to influence the developmentagenda. In undertaking contracts todeliver services, NGOs are meetingthe policy objectives of donoragencies, rather than developingtheir own ideas and seekingfunding for them.

DependencyThe problem of dependency oncontracts is also apparent and raisesthe question of the sustainability ofmany NGOs. In both countries,small local NGOs which wereoriginally set up on a voluntarybasis by committed individuals arenow completely absorbed inundertaking contracts for the FundBoard or CWSA. Many find themanagement procedures that haveto be followed very burdensomeand they struggle to fulfil therequirements of the contracts. Thecurrent dependency alsoencourages competition amongNGOs for contracts and downplayssolidarity and cooperation.

ConstituenciesIt is difficult for NGOs to fulfil thedemands required by contractingon the one hand whilst maintainingtheir commitment to grassrootsdevelopment and an independent,voluntary ethos on the other. Thepressure is on NGOs to becomeincreasingly commercial in order toimplement their contractsefficiently. This conflicts with theirdesire to spend time maintainingclose, long-term relationships withcommunities. It may also make itdifficult for NGOs to prioritise themost marginalised people andcommunities, given the rigid


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requirements on community cashcontributions in the contracts.

AccountabilityThe contracting out of publicservices also raises difficult issuesof accountability. Public servicecontracts encourage accountabilitytowards the body that awards thecontracts – CWSA in the case ofGhana and the Fund Board inNepal – and ultimately to thedonor, in both cases the WorldBank, rather than the communityserved. The primary obligation ofthe NGOs in both countries is tofulfil the requirements of thecontract. These requirements, as hasalready been indicated, are output-orientated with little qualitativeassessment of their impact on thecommunities.

Community DevelopmentNGOs have been at the forefront ofdeveloping innovative approachesto working with communities. Theyhave a great deal of experience inusing participatory approaches,ensuring a high degree of

consultation with communities andin many cases empoweringcommunities to take responsibilityfor their own development. ManyNGOs have established closeworking relationships withcommunities, built upon good inter-personal relations between fieldstaff and villagers, long-termcommitment and mutual respect. Akey principle of such forms ofengagement is the adoption of anopen, flexible approach to projectimplementation in order to suit theneeds and demands of individualcommunities. NGOs have learntthat pre-determined plans are notthe best means of achievingsustainable communitydevelopment. A major problemwith the contracting approach isthat NGOs are given a blueprintthat they have to follow for projectimplementation at the communitylevel. This means that NGOs are notfree to adapt their approach inresponse to local situations that arenecessary to ensure local ownershipand sustainability.


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Conclusion: Lessons from Partnership

This report contrasted thecontracting approach to thepartnership approach. Two majorshortcomings of the contractingapproach have been identified:firstly it does not contribute to thestrengthening of the NGO sector;and secondly it is less effective atmeeting the needs of communities.

More specifically, in undertakingcontracts to deliver services, NGOsbecome accountable to the donoragencies whose policy objectivesthey are obliged to meet. Focussingon output-orientated activitiesrather than impact and providinglimited scope for learning or forinitiating policy ideas stifle andlimit NGO effectiveness. This inturn hampers their flexibility towork with communities towardssustainable development. In theend, this undermines communities’sense of ownership for the watersupply projects.

Dependency on contracts rendersmany NGOs insecure andunsustainable organisationsconstrained by burdensomemanagement procedures. Agrowing culture of competitionbetween NGOs is at odds with thevoluntary ethos, which is importantfor maintaining close, long-termrelationships with communities. Itencourages neglect of the mostmarginalised people andcommunities and it underminessolidarity and cooperation betweenNGOs themselves.

The pressure for both the CWSA inGhana and Fund Board in Nepal toachieve maximum coverage atminimum cost has given rise tohighly prescriptive, inflexibleapproaches to engaging localNGOs. The report argues that apartnership approach, which restson the assumption that local NGOsmust themselves be empowered ifthey are to bring about sustainable

development in communities, canovercome these problems. Such anapproach has the added advantageof strengthening civil society andthe role of NGOs as independentactors within it.

Adjustments could be made to thecontracting approach to overcomethe problems identified. Based onWaterAid’s experience ofpartnership, the changes neededwould be:

1 A change in emphasis fromshort-term contracts to longer-term commitments withindividual NGOs.

2 A change in financialarrangements to allow NGOs todevelop core staff and thereforecapacity as opposed to having torely on short-term contract staff.

3 A change in emphasis fromcapacity building approacheswhich rely primarily on fixed,

Organisation Project No of Beneficiaries Overall Cost perCost Water

Beneficiary

Water Sanitation Health US$ US$

World Bank JAKPAS rural water &sanitation project 550,000 - - 21,250,000 38.6

WaterAid Nepal rural water &sanitation programme 42,000 19,000 42,000 944,000 22.5

Notes:World Bank figures from 1993 WorldBank Staff Appraisal Report. Totalbudget of $21.25 million includes: $4.98million for establishment of FundBoard; $15.23 million for schemes witha total coverage of 550,000 people; $1.04million for Institutional Development &Studies.

WaterAid figures based on 1999/00annual fiscal plans [costs converted at£1 = $1.65]. Costs include all costs todonor, namely water, sanitation andhygiene promotion project costs plus allpartner NGO and WaterAid in-countrystaff and overhead costs.

Table of comparative costs per capita


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off-site national level trainingpackages for NGOs toapproaches which use long-term,on-site support or mentoring andconcentrate on the needs andweaknesses of the individualNGO.

4 A greater emphasis on theresponsibility of the centralagency (ie CWSA or the FundBoard) to control not only costsbut also quality. This wouldimply moving away from usingthe fairly blunt instrument ofcompetitive tendering as the onlymechanism of control (for cost)to more regular supervision ofwork (particularly with newpartners) with the potential tocontrol both cost and quality.

5 A move (at least in Ghana) torecognise the role of the NGO asimplementer and manager ofboth the ‘software’ activities(mobilisation, hygienepromotion, etc) and some of the‘hardware’ activities (watersupply construction, hand-dugwells, latrine fabrication).

Acknowledgements

Andrew Clayton, Julie Jarman andInterdisciplinary Analysts,Kathmandu collected theinformation on which this report isbased. Special thanks should bemade to WaterAid’s partners inGhana – APDO, ACDEP, BACH,NewEnergy, ORAP, ProNet, RuralAid, WASHT; to NEWAH in Nepal;to WaterAid’s staff in Ghana, Nepaland London; to other organisationsin the water sector in Ghana –CWSA, ISODEC, TREND; andfinally to the Fund Board in Nepal.

6 Alongside (4) above, a changefrom rigid output-orientatedcontracts (eg those based on afixed number of NGO person-days per community formobilisation) to more flexibleoutput and impact orientatedcontracts (eg ones based ontargets such as number of waterpoints / latrines constructed andin use, levels of hygienebehaviour change achieved, etc).These would allow flexibility torespond to the differentcircumstances encountered indifferent communities.

Such an approach need not be anexpensive option. IndeedWaterAid’s overall costs using thisapproach compared veryfavourably with World Bankpublished figures, as the table ofcosts per capita above shows.

On the other hand, the costs of notundertaking the changes suggestedhere are high: the weakening of thevery institutions relied upon todeliver water supply, sanitation and

hygiene promotion services tocommunities currently under-served. More NGOs in developingcountries are taking on more of theresponsibilities previously held bygovernments for projectimplementation in the water andsanitation sector under theapproaches prescribed by the WorldBank and other internationaldonors. It is the responsibility ofdonors promoting these approachesto ensure adequate capacitybuilding support is provided to theNGO sector for the approach to besustainable.

More importantly, the sameapproach to dealing with NGOsfails to recognise and respect thedistinct role played by NGOs asindependent commentators ondevelopment. In this capacity, theyhelp to strengthen civil society andultimately, democracy. It is theresponsibility of donors andgovernments to ensure that this roleis valued and strengthened.


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WaterAidPrince Consort House27–29 Albert EmbankmentLondon SE1 7UB

Tel: 0171 793 4500Fax: 0171 793 4545

Website: www.wateraid.org.uk

Charity Reg No 288701

Andrew Clayton is a social anthropologist whoworks for the International NGO Training andResearch Centre – INTRAC.

ISBN 0 9513466 8 7

Contracts or Partnerships: Working ThroughLocal NGOs in Ghana and Nepal is the fourth ina series of reports which analyse WaterAid’sexperience in integrated water, sanitation andhygiene promotion projects in developingcountries.

The report examines the challenge of workingthrough local NGOs for the implementation ofrural water supplies. It focuses on two countries– Ghana and Nepal – in which nationalprogrammes are currently being implementedwhich give primary responsibility for communitywater delivery to the private sector and NGOs.Local NGOs are heavily involved in bothprogrammes through competing for contractsfor under taking community water andsanitation projects.

WaterAid is also working through local NGOsin Ghana and Nepal, channelling its fundingthrough eight NGOs in Ghana and one NGO inNepal. WaterAid has been working with theseNGOs over a long period and has built up strongpartnerships with them. The partnershipapproach followed in WaterAid’s programmesin Ghana and Nepal represent a very differentway of working through local NGOs to thecontractual approach. The purpose of thisreport is to explore these differences and drawout lessons from WaterAid’s experience on howto work effectively with local NGOs.

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