continued FINANCE CIRCUIT Appendix A Khaleeji Capital ...978-0-230-11960-4/1.pdf · Appendix A...
72
Appendix A Khaleeji Capital Conglomerates CONGLOMERATE PRODUCTIVE CIRCUIT COMMODITY CIRCUIT FINANCE CIRCUIT SAUDI ARABIA KINGDOM Owned by Prince Alwaleed bin Talal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, richest Arab in the world. Tasnee Petrochemicals; Savola, (edible oils, dairy products, sugar, and packaging); runs a private hospital and school for 4,000 students, news- paper and media conglomerate; agricultural company in Egypt; private domestic airline in Saudi Arabia; Dana Gas, the largest private gas project in the Middle East. Savola, (supermarkets and hypermarkets); Herfy’s fast food; Licensee of SAKS Inc (handbags, jewelry, cosmetics including Dior, Cartier, Prada, Roberto Cavali, and Valentino). SAMBA; Citigroup; Industry and Commercial Bank of China, and the Bank of China; Banks in Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Senegal; PADICO and APIC; 1% or more of total shares in Ford, Eastman Kodak, Hewlett Packard, Motorola, Pepsico, Procter and Gamble, Walt Disney, E-Bay, Amazon.com; Azizia Commercial Investment Company. AL RAJHI Owned by Al Rajhi family, an old merchant family that established the first foreign exchange agency for pilgrims to Mecca and Medina. Arabian Cement Company, Al-Yamama Saudi Cement Co., the Yanbu Cement Co., the Southern Province Cement Co., Raysut Cement Co., and the Saudi Cement Co. Owns cement factories in Sudan, Syria, and Jordan; manufac- tures water coolers and air conditioning units, carpets, and fabrics in Saudi Arabia; Al Arrab Contracting Company; Al Rajhi Steel factories; largest poultry farm in the Middle East. Tabuk Agriculture and Development Co.; National Agricultural Development Co. producing wheat, dairy, fruits, and dates; transport fleet with over 1,000 trucks; Advanced Polypropylene Co.; SIPCHEM (The Saudi International Petrochemical Co.; Dana Gas; ACWA Power Projects; board of Saudi Telecom Company. 50% stake in the UAE-based Tameer Holdings. Through Tameer, al Rajhi has very extensive interests in shopping malls and commercial districts; Imports and distributes building materials such as steel beams, wood, steel pipes; Travel agency Fursan Travel; Agency for Emerson Motor Technologies (water coolers, air condition- ers, and refrigerators). Al Rajhi Bank, Bank Al Bilad, and the Arab Banking Corporation; Al Baraka Banking Group; Jadwa Investments; Tameer Holdings (UAE). (continued )
Transcript of continued FINANCE CIRCUIT Appendix A Khaleeji Capital ...978-0-230-11960-4/1.pdf · Appendix A...
App
endi
x A
K
hale
eji C
apita
l Con
glom
erat
es
CO
NG
LOM
ERAT
EPR
OD
UC
TIV
E C
IRC
UIT
CO
MM
OD
ITY
CIR
CU
ITFI
NA
NC
E C
IRC
UIT
SAU
DI
AR
AB
IA
KIN
GD
OM
Ow
ned
by P
rinc
e A
lwal
eed
bin
Tala
l bi
n A
bdul
aziz
Al
Saud
, ri
ches
t A
rab
in t
he
wor
ld.
Tasn
ee P
etro
chem
ical
s; S
avol
a, (
edib
le o
ils,
dair
y pr
oduc
ts,
suga
r, an
d pa
ckag
ing)
; ru
ns a
pri
vate
ho
spit
al a
nd s
choo
l fo
r 4,
000
stud
ents
, ne
ws-
pape
r an
d m
edia
con
glom
erat
e; a
gric
ultu
ral
com
pany
in
Egy
pt;
priv
ate
dom
esti
c ai
rlin
e in
Sa
udi
Ara
bia;
Dan
a G
as,
the
larg
est
priv
ate
gas
proj
ect
in t
he M
iddl
e E
ast.
Savo
la,
(sup
erm
arke
ts a
nd h
yper
mar
kets
);
Her
fy’s
fast
foo
d; L
icen
see
of S
AK
S In
c (h
andb
ags,
jew
elry
, co
smet
ics
incl
udin
g D
ior,
Car
tier
, Pr
ada,
Rob
erto
Cav
ali,
and
Val
enti
no).
SAM
BA
; C
itig
roup
; In
dust
ry a
nd
Com
mer
cial
Ban
k of
Chi
na,
and
the
Ban
k of
Chi
na;
Ban
ks i
n G
hana
, N
iger
ia, T
ogo,
Sen
egal
; PA
DIC
O a
nd A
PIC
; 1%
or
mor
e of
tot
al s
hare
s in
For
d, E
astm
an
Kod
ak,
Hew
lett
Pac
kard
, M
otor
ola,
Pe
psic
o, P
roct
er a
nd G
ambl
e, W
alt
Dis
ney,
E-B
ay,
Am
azon
.com
; A
zizi
a C
omm
erci
al I
nves
tmen
t C
ompa
ny.
AL
RA
JHI
Ow
ned
by A
l R
ajhi
fam
ily,
an o
ld
mer
chan
t fa
mily
tha
t es
tabl
ishe
d th
e fi r
st f
orei
gn e
xcha
nge
agen
cy f
or
pilg
rim
s to
Mec
ca a
nd M
edin
a.
Ara
bian
Cem
ent
Com
pany
, A
l-Ya
mam
a Sa
udi
Cem
ent
Co.
, th
e Ya
nbu
Cem
ent
Co.
, th
e So
uthe
rn P
rovi
nce
Cem
ent
Co.
, R
aysu
t C
emen
t C
o.,
and
the
Saud
i C
emen
t C
o. O
wns
cem
ent
fact
orie
s in
Sud
an,
Syri
a, a
nd J
orda
n; m
anuf
ac-
ture
s w
ater
coo
lers
and
air
con
diti
onin
g un
its,
ca
rpet
s, a
nd f
abri
cs i
n Sa
udi
Ara
bia;
Al
Arr
ab
Con
trac
ting
Com
pany
; A
l R
ajhi
Ste
el f
acto
ries
; la
rges
t po
ultr
y fa
rm i
n th
e M
iddl
e E
ast.
Tabu
k A
gric
ultu
re a
nd D
evel
opm
ent
Co.
; N
atio
nal
Agr
icul
tura
l D
evel
opm
ent
Co.
pro
duci
ng w
heat
, da
iry,
fru
its,
and
dat
es;
tran
spor
t fl e
et w
ith
over
1,
000
truc
ks;
Adv
ance
d Po
lypr
opyl
ene
Co.
; SI
PCH
EM
(T
he S
audi
Int
erna
tion
al
Petr
oche
mic
al C
o.;
Dan
a G
as;
AC
WA
Pow
er
Proj
ects
; bo
ard
of S
audi
Tel
ecom
Com
pany
.
50%
sta
ke i
n th
e U
AE
-bas
ed T
amee
r H
oldi
ngs.
Thr
ough
Tam
eer,
al R
ajhi
has
ve
ry e
xten
sive
int
eres
ts i
n sh
oppi
ng m
alls
an
d co
mm
erci
al d
istr
icts
; Im
port
s an
d di
stri
bute
s bu
ildin
g m
ater
ials
suc
h as
ste
el
beam
s, w
ood,
ste
el p
ipes
; Tra
vel
agen
cy
Furs
an T
rave
l; A
genc
y fo
r E
mer
son
Mot
or
Tech
nolo
gies
(w
ater
coo
lers
, ai
r co
ndit
ion-
ers,
and
ref
rige
rato
rs).
Al
Raj
hi B
ank,
Ban
k A
l B
ilad,
and
th
e A
rab
Ban
king
Cor
pora
tion
; A
l B
arak
a B
anki
ng G
roup
; Ja
dwa
Inve
stm
ents
; Tam
eer
Hol
ding
s (U
AE
).
(con
tinue
d)
CO
NG
LOM
ERAT
EPR
OD
UC
TIV
E C
IRC
UIT
CO
MM
OD
ITY
CIR
CU
ITFI
NA
NC
E C
IRC
UIT
AL
GO
SAIB
I
Est
ablis
hed
in t
he 1
940s
as
a tr
adin
g an
d m
oney
exc
hang
e fi r
m i
n th
e gr
owin
g oi
l-ri
ch c
ity
of A
l K
hoba
r as
A
ram
co w
as g
row
ing
in t
he a
rea.
Was
an
ear
ly c
lient
of
Kin
g A
bdul
aziz
.
Saud
i In
dust
rial
Inv
estm
ents
Gro
up (
SIIG
);
Zam
il In
dust
rial
Inv
estm
ents
Cor
pora
tion
; So
ft
drin
k m
anuf
actu
re,
can
man
ufac
turi
ng,
corr
osio
n po
wde
r m
anuf
actu
ring
; oi
lfi el
d ch
emic
als;
pip
e co
atin
g; c
ork;
pap
er;
snac
k fo
od a
nd f
erti
lizer
pr
oduc
tion
; Sa
udi
Cem
ent;
Savo
la;
Saud
i C
onso
lidat
ed E
lect
ric
Co.
, th
e fi r
st p
ower
pla
nt
in S
audi
Ara
bia.
Nat
iona
l B
ottli
ng C
ompa
ny (
bott
les
Peps
ico
beve
rage
s in
Sau
di A
rabi
a);
Dis
trib
utio
n an
d ag
ency
rig
hts
for
Am
eric
an E
xpre
ss,
Sum
itom
o of
Jap
an,
Jeum
ont
of F
ranc
e, M
irrl
ees
Bla
ckst
one
of
the
Uni
ted
Kin
gdom
, A
lsto
m a
nd t
he U
S-ba
sed
Shaw
Cor
.
Inte
rnat
iona
l B
anki
ng C
orpo
rati
on;
SAM
BA
; Sa
udi
Bri
tish
Ban
k, A
rab
Nat
iona
l B
ank,
Dar
Alm
aal
Alis
lam
i G
enev
a, I
FA B
anqu
e Pa
ris,
and
the
Sa
udi
Uni
ted
Ban
k.
ZA
MIL
Beg
an a
s a
trad
ing
fi rm
inv
olve
d in
foo
d an
d te
xtile
s in
Bah
rain
. La
ter
expa
nded
in
to r
eal
esta
te a
nd i
ndus
tria
l fi r
ms.
Stee
l m
anuf
actu
ring
, ai
r co
ndit
ioni
ng,
glas
s,
bric
ks,
bloc
ks,
fenc
ing,
pai
nt,
auto
mat
ic d
oors
, pa
ckag
ing
mat
eria
ls,
and
ladd
ers;
Sau
di C
emen
t; SI
PCH
EM
; Sa
hara
Pet
roch
emic
als;
the
Nam
a Pe
troc
hem
ical
com
pany
; C
hem
anol
and
oth
ers;
N
atio
nal
Pow
er C
ompa
ny;
Prod
ucti
on o
f da
iry
and
mea
t pr
oduc
ts;
Ship
bui
ldin
g an
d re
pair,
and
to
uris
m.
Impo
rts
froz
en f
oods
; ex
clus
ive
licen
see
of
man
ufac
turi
ng t
echn
ique
s in
the
gla
ss a
nd
cera
mic
sec
tors
; lic
ense
to
man
ufac
ture
and
di
stri
bute
Gen
eral
Ele
ctri
c br
and
air
cond
itio
ners
; jo
int
vent
ure
wit
h M
orri
s C
rane
s to
man
ufac
ture
and
dis
trib
ute
unde
r th
e na
me
in S
audi
Ara
bia;
lic
ense
fr
om t
he C
anad
ian
Can
am M
anac
Gro
up
(CM
G)
to p
rodu
ce a
nd d
istr
ibut
e st
eel
jois
ts a
nd f
ram
es i
n Sa
udi
Ara
bia
Inve
stco
rp;
Sham
l B
ank;
Bah
rain
Is
lam
ic B
ank,
Arc
apit
a; J
adw
a In
vest
men
ts,
Cap
ital
Man
agem
ent
Hou
se,
a le
adin
g pr
ivat
e eq
uity
fi r
m
base
d in
Bah
rain
; B
ank
al B
ilad.
OL
AY
AN
Beg
an a
s a
truc
king
and
tra
nspo
rtat
ion
cont
ract
or f
or A
ram
co a
nd B
echt
el i
n 19
47.
In 1
954,
lau
nche
d fo
od a
nd
cons
umer
tra
ding
bus
ines
s, a
nd l
ater
in
sura
nce
fi rm
in
Saud
i A
rabi
a.
SIPC
HE
M;
Saud
i C
emen
t; O
laya
n D
esco
n,
cons
truc
tion
and
eng
inee
ring
ser
vice
s fo
r re
fi ner
y an
d pe
troc
hem
ical
ind
ustr
ies;
ass
embl
e so
lar
cells
fo
r en
ergy
com
pani
es o
pera
ting
in
rem
ote
area
s;
can
man
ufac
turi
ng p
lant
; jo
int
vent
ure
wit
h K
imbe
rly-
Cla
rk a
nd S
PIM
AC
O t
o pr
oduc
e su
rgic
al g
owns
, dr
apes
, an
d ot
her
oper
atin
g ro
om
acce
ssor
ies;
Dan
a G
as.
Age
ncy
and
dist
ribu
tion
rig
hts
for
Coc
a-C
ola,
Kra
ft F
oods
, N
estlé
, K
imbe
rly-
Cla
rk,
Col
gate
-Pal
mol
ive,
Aus
tral
ian
Ric
e G
row
ers,
Nab
isco
, Po
laro
id,
Pills
bury
, an
d ot
hers
; B
urge
r K
ing
fran
chis
ee f
or t
he
Mid
dle
Eas
t; ag
ent
for
Xer
ox a
nd T
oshi
ba;
Dis
trib
utor
and
dea
ler
of S
cani
a tr
ucks
, C
umm
ins
Pow
er G
ener
atio
n an
d Po
wer
R
enta
l, K
enw
orth
tru
cks,
and
Am
co V
eba
truc
k cr
anes
; C
arre
four
hyp
erm
arke
t fr
anch
ise.
Saud
i H
olla
ndi
Ban
k; S
audi
Bri
tish
B
ank
(SA
BB
); L
ease
Plan
, th
e w
orld
’s bi
gges
t ve
hicl
e m
anag
emen
t an
d le
asin
g pr
ovid
er;
foun
ded
the
Ara
b C
omm
erci
al E
nter
pris
es (
AC
E),
the
la
rges
t lo
cal
insu
ranc
e an
d re
insu
r-an
ce b
roke
r in
the
Mid
dle
Eas
t; re
pres
ente
d on
the
boa
rd o
f M
orga
n St
anle
y.
App
endi
x A
C
onti
nued
188
DA
LLA
H A
L B
AR
AK
A
Foun
ded
by S
aleh
Kam
el a
s a
cont
ract
or
to t
he S
audi
gov
ernm
ent
in t
he 1
960s
.
Con
stru
cts
airc
raft
han
gars
and
spa
re p
arts
sto
res;
fo
od s
uppl
y, m
aint
enan
ce,
and
oper
atio
n se
rvic
es
at a
irpo
rts,
mili
tary
bas
es,
and
hosp
ital
s; c
ontr
act
to c
lean
and
mai
ntai
n th
e M
uslim
hol
y ci
ties
of
Mec
ca a
nd M
edin
a; p
rodu
ctio
n of
dai
ry a
nd
mea
t pr
oduc
ts,
swee
ts,
ice
crea
m,
juic
es,
edib
le
oils
, gr
ains
and
spi
ces,
and
hon
ey;
larg
est
juic
e m
anuf
act
urer
in
the
Mid
dle
Eas
t; m
anuf
actu
re
and
dist
ribu
tion
of
cem
ent;
prod
ucti
on o
f ca
bles
, pi
pes,
and
wir
e th
roug
h it
s 41
% s
take
in
Ara
bian
St
eel
Pipe
s M
anuf
actu
ring
Co.
; ow
ns A
rab
Rad
io
and
Tele
visi
on N
etw
ork
(AR
T),
one
of
the
larg
est
med
ia c
ongl
omer
ates
in
the
Mid
dle
Eas
t.
Impo
rts
of p
aper
, el
ectr
ical
app
lianc
es,
and
mac
hine
ry;
oper
ates
an
adve
rtis
ing
com
pany
tha
t so
licit
s ad
vert
isin
g fo
r it
s m
edia
net
wor
k.
Alb
arak
a B
anki
ng G
roup
; 14
oth
er
subs
idia
ry o
r af
fi lia
te b
anks
in
coun
trie
s su
ch a
s Su
dan,
Sou
th
Afr
ica,
Kaz
akhs
tan,
Yem
en,
Ban
glad
esh,
Mau
rita
nia,
Mal
aysi
a,
Alb
ania
, an
d Pa
kist
an;
Ban
k A
l Ja
zira
; on
e of
the
lar
gest
sha
re-
hold
ers
in T
amlik
, a
maj
or r
eal
esta
te d
evel
oper
in
Saud
i A
rabi
a.
AL
TU
RK
I
Foun
ded
in t
he 1
950s
as
a su
pplie
r of
re
tail
good
s fo
r fo
reig
ners
wor
king
in
the
Saud
i oi
l in
dust
ry.
SIPC
HE
M;
man
ufac
ture
s st
atio
nery
pro
duct
s,
cust
omiz
ed p
anel
boa
rds,
sur
face
tre
atm
ents
, ad
hesi
ves,
gro
uts,
rep
air
com
poun
ds,
seal
ants
, an
d ot
her
cons
truc
tion
-rel
ated
mat
eria
l; ci
vil
engi
neer
ing
and
cont
ract
ing
com
pany
; w
aste
m
anag
emen
t se
rvic
es;
port
s m
anag
emen
t se
rvic
es;
oper
ates
Sau
di A
ram
co’s
priv
ate
port
mar
ine
serv
ices
; pr
ovid
es s
ervi
ces
such
as
drill
ing,
co
ntra
ctin
g, s
ervi
cing
, an
d eq
uipm
ent
and
tool
su
pply
for
oil
and
gas
sect
or.
Age
nts
for
3M,
AB
B,
AR
W T
rans
form
ers,
A
XIS
, A
dobe
, A
llen
Bra
dley
, A
pple
, A
reva
, B
aile
y B
irke
tt,
Ban
tex,
Bea
mex
, B
ently
N
evad
a, B
royc
e C
ontr
ol,
Car
boni
, C
avan
In
dust
ries
, C
hem
shir
e, C
lave
d, C
lipsa
l, D
odge
Mec
hani
cal
Pow
er T
rans
mis
sion
, D
urab
le,
Eps
on,
Gen
eral
Ele
ctri
c, G
enis
ys
Ent
erpr
ise
Solu
tion
s, H
P, H
oney
wel
l In
tern
atio
nal,
IBM
, J.
S.
Hum
idifi
ers,
K
appa
, K
lein
Too
ls,
Max
Tub
e, O
sram
, Pr
osof
t Te
chno
logy
, R
ockw
ell
Aut
omat
ion,
Si
nope
c, T
. D
. W
illia
mso
n, a
nd W
eed
Inst
rum
ents
.
Abr
aaj
Cap
ital
; In
vest
corp
, Z
ara
Inve
stm
ent
Hol
ding
(Jo
rdan
); A
rab
Inve
stm
ent
Co.
(E
gypt
); A
l Sa
gr
Saud
i In
sura
nce
Co.
(con
tinue
d)
189
CO
NG
LOM
ERAT
EPR
OD
UC
TIV
E C
IRC
UIT
CO
MM
OD
ITY
CIR
CU
ITFI
NA
NC
E C
IRC
UIT
AL
JOM
AIH
Est
ablis
hed
in 1
936
as a
foo
dstu
ffs
and
text
ile t
radi
ng c
ompa
ny i
n M
ecca
. W
as
the
groc
er t
o K
ing
Abd
ulaz
iz a
nd l
ater
ex
pand
ed t
o ho
ld a
genc
ies
for
key
fore
ign
fi rm
s.
Dan
a G
as;
maj
or s
hare
hold
er o
f Pa
kist
an’s
rece
ntly
pri
vati
zed
elec
tric
com
pany
, K
arac
hi
Ele
ctri
c Su
pply
Com
pany
; re
pres
ente
d on
the
bo
ard
of d
irec
tors
of
the
Bah
rain
Fer
ro A
lloy
Co.
; bo
ttle
s Pe
psi
soft
dri
nks
and
juic
es a
nd
man
ufac
ture
s ca
ns i
n Sa
udi
Ara
bia;
Mob
ily,
seco
nd-l
arge
st c
ell-
phon
e co
mpa
ny i
n Sa
udi
Ara
bia.
Larg
est
dist
ribu
tor
of G
M i
n th
e M
iddl
e E
ast;
sole
dis
trib
utor
of
Cad
illac
, H
umm
er,
Saab
, an
d O
pel
in S
audi
Ara
bia;
hol
ds
agen
cy r
ight
s fo
r Pe
psi,
Shel
l, Yo
koha
ma,
an
d Fi
at.
Ban
k A
l B
ilad;
Arc
apit
a; f
ound
er o
f B
riti
sh I
slam
ic I
nsur
ance
Hol
ding
s;
foun
ding
sha
reho
lder
of
the
Ara
b Pa
lest
inia
n In
vest
men
t C
ompa
ny
(API
C).
ALI
RE
ZA
An
old
mer
chan
t tr
adin
g ho
use
that
gr
ew t
hrou
gh t
he 1
920s
and
won
di
stri
buti
on a
nd a
genc
y ri
ghts
for
a
num
ber
of k
ey fi
rm
s. W
as a
n ea
rly
clie
nt o
f K
ing
Abd
ulaz
iz.
Des
igns
and
ins
talls
rad
io b
road
cast
ing,
mili
tary
co
mm
unic
atio
n ne
twor
ks,
and
secu
rity
sys
tem
s;
cons
truc
tion
and
con
trac
ting
com
pany
; m
anu-
fact
ures
tin
, pl
asti
c, a
nd c
ompo
site
con
tain
ers;
ow
ns,
man
ages
, an
d re
pres
ents
shi
ppin
g lin
es i
n th
e Je
ddah
and
Dam
mam
are
as;
owns
a l
ubri
-ca
ting
oil
faci
lity;
des
igns
, m
anuf
actu
res,
and
di
stri
bute
s sp
orti
ng,
leis
ure
faci
litie
s su
ch a
s po
ols,
spa
s, s
auna
s, a
nd t
enni
s co
urts
; m
ajor
sh
areh
olde
r in
the
agr
icul
tura
l co
mpa
ny,
SAV
OL
A.
Ope
rate
s th
e M
cDon
alds
fra
nchi
se f
or t
he
wes
tern
are
a of
Sau
di A
rabi
a; e
xclu
sive
re
pres
enta
tive
and
dis
trib
utor
in
Saud
i A
rabi
a of
Ast
on M
arti
n, F
ord
(Mer
cury
),
Maz
da,
KIA
, an
d M
AN
Tru
ck;
one
of t
he
larg
est
chem
ical
im
port
ers
and
dist
ribu
tors
th
roug
hout
the
Mid
dle
Eas
t fr
om B
ayer
, E
xxon
Mob
il, a
nd o
ther
s; i
mpo
rts
and
dist
ribu
tes
sani
tary
pro
duct
s fo
r th
e he
alth
care
, fo
od p
roce
ssin
g, c
ater
ing,
foo
d re
tail,
and
agr
icul
tura
l se
ctor
s; h
olds
ag
enci
es f
or s
port
ing
equi
pmen
t su
ch a
s Pr
ince
, B
enet
ton,
Adi
das,
Roo
ler
Bla
de,
Nor
dic
Trac
k, L
ife F
itne
ss,
York
Bar
bell,
C
ybex
, an
d ot
hers
.
SAM
BA
; In
vest
corp
.
EL
SEIF
Est
ablis
hed
in 1
951
as a
tra
ding
and
tr
ansp
ort
com
pany
for
the
oil
indu
stry
.
One
of
the
thre
e la
rges
t co
nstr
ucti
on c
ompa
nies
in
Sau
di A
rabi
a; o
wns
and
ope
rate
s on
e of
the
la
rges
t pr
ivat
e ho
spit
al n
etw
orks
in
the
Mid
dle
Eas
t an
d th
e U
K;
owns
50%
of
the
Nat
iona
l Po
wer
Com
pany
(th
e re
mai
ning
50%
is
owne
d by
the
Zam
il G
roup
).
Sole
age
nt f
or a
num
ber
of m
edic
al a
nd
phar
mac
euti
cal
prod
ucts
in
Saud
i A
rabi
a.
The
se i
nclu
de B
eckm
an,
Gen
eral
Ele
ctri
c M
edic
al S
yste
ms,
Mer
ck S
harp
and
D
ohm
e, a
nd V
aria
n.
Cap
ital
Ban
k of
Jor
dan;
Azi
zia
Com
mer
cial
Inv
estm
ent
Com
pany
; st
rate
gic
inve
stor
in
the
Mer
chan
tBri
dge’s
Ira
q R
econ
stru
ctio
n Fu
nd,
a fu
nd s
et u
p to
bid
for
pro
ject
s in
Ira
q af
ter
2003
.
App
endi
x A
C
onti
nued
190
HO
KA
IR
Est
ablis
hed
in 1
965
as a
tou
rism
and
de
velo
pmen
t co
mpa
ny.
Exp
ande
d in
to
real
est
ate
and
reta
il ac
tivi
ties
in
subs
e-qu
ent
deca
des.
Eng
inee
ring
, pr
ocur
emen
t, an
d co
nstr
ucti
on
wor
k in
the
oil
and
gas,
pet
roch
emic
al,
and
pow
er s
ecto
rs;
build
ing
fi ve
priv
ate
hosp
ital
s,
500
phar
mac
ies,
and
50
med
ical
cen
ters
to
beco
me
oper
atio
nal
over
the
nex
t se
ven
year
s.
600
outle
ts r
epre
sent
ing
mor
e th
an 4
0 in
tern
atio
nal
bran
ds:
Acc
esso
rize
, A
dam
s K
ids,
Ald
o, A
nn H
arve
y, B
ersh
ka,
Bon
ita,
B
oost
er J
uice
, C
amai
eu’s,
Cin
nabo
n,
Col
ony,
Du
Pare
il au
Mem
e, E
lvi,
Exi
t, Fo
schi
ni,
Gra
ndO
ptic
al,
Jack
and
Jon
es,
Jenn
yfer
, Jo
e B
logg
s, K
ekos
, K
iabi
, La
Se
nza,
La
Senz
a E
xpre
ss,
La S
enza
Gir
l, La
Se
nza
Spri
t, Le
Cha
teau
, Lo
ndon
Dai
ry,
Mar
ks a
nd S
penc
er’s,
Mas
sim
o D
utti
, M
onso
on,
Nin
e W
est,
Ors
ay,
Oys
ho,
Pric
eLes
s, S
eatt
le’s
Bes
t C
offe
e, S
port
s C
ity,
Sp
ring
, Sw
ense
n’s,
Tap
e A
L’o
eil,
The
Piz
za
Com
pany
, Thy
me
Mat
erni
ty,
Ver
o M
oda,
W
allis
, Z
ara;
Six
mal
ls,
incl
udin
g: M
all
of
Dha
hran
(30
0+ s
hops
), A
ziz
Mal
l (2
28),
K
hura
is P
laza
(17
5),
Mal
l of
Ara
bia
Jedd
ah,
Sala
am M
all
(100
+),
Saha
ra P
laza
(5
5);
fran
chis
e ri
ghts
for
Gea
nt
Hyp
erm
arke
t in
Sau
di A
rabi
a; d
istr
ibut
es
the
Chi
nese
aut
omob
ile,
the
Che
ry,
in
Saud
i A
rabi
a; o
pera
tes
four
lux
ury
hote
ls
unde
r th
e M
arri
ott
nam
e.
Man
ar F
inan
cial
Inv
estm
ent
Serv
ices
; op
erat
es a
n in
sura
nce
(life
an
d no
nlife
) co
mpa
ny i
n a
join
t ve
ntur
e w
ith
two
Indi
an fi
rm
s;
foun
ding
sha
reho
lder
of
Inve
stat
e,
an i
nves
tmen
t ba
nk o
pera
ting
in
Bah
rain
.
(con
tinue
d)
191
CO
NG
LOM
ERAT
EPR
OD
UC
TIV
E C
IRC
UIT
CO
MM
OD
ITY
CIR
CU
ITFI
NA
NC
E C
IRC
UIT
KU
WA
IT
AL
GH
AN
IM
The
tw
o ke
y ho
ldin
g co
mpa
nies
in
thi
s gr
oup
are
Al
Gha
nim
In
dust
ries
and
You
sef
Al
Gha
nim
an
d So
ns. T
he A
l G
hani
m a
re
one
of t
he o
rigi
nal
mer
chan
t fa
mili
es o
f K
uwai
t.
Man
ufac
ture
s fi b
ergl
ass
insu
lati
on,
pref
abri
cate
d st
eel
build
ings
and
str
uctu
res;
inv
olve
d in
des
ign,
sup
ply,
in
stal
lati
on,
and
mai
nten
ance
ser
vice
s fo
r H
VA
C,
elec
tric
al,
plum
bing
, fi r
e fi g
htin
g, a
nd t
echn
olog
y sy
stem
s; r
uns
one
of t
he l
arge
st f
reig
ht c
ompa
nies
in
the
Mid
dle
Eas
t, pr
ovid
ing
air
and
ocea
n sh
ippi
ng,
cust
oms
clea
ranc
e, p
acki
ng s
ervi
ces,
ove
rlan
d tr
ansp
ort,
and
war
ehou
sing
.
Firs
t di
stri
buto
rs o
f G
ener
al M
otor
s in
the
G
CC
and
con
tinu
e to
rep
rese
nt t
hem
in
Kuw
ait.
The
com
pany
is
sole
age
nt f
or
Che
vrol
et,
SAB
B,
Hum
mer
, an
d B
P Lu
bric
ants
; la
rges
t co
nsum
er e
lect
roni
cs
reta
iler
in t
he M
iddl
e E
ast.
It h
as e
xclu
sive
re
pres
enta
tion
rig
hts
in K
uwai
t fo
r To
shib
a,
Phili
ps,
Dae
woo
, K
onka
, Fr
igid
aire
, W
hirl
pool
, E
lect
rolu
x, A
man
a, L
ager
m
ania
, Tec
hno
gas,
Ter
im,
Hit
achi
, M
inol
ta,
and
also
dis
trib
utes
oth
er b
rand
s;
impo
rts
Hit
achi
air
con
diti
oner
s as
the
ex
clus
ive
agen
t; ag
ents
for
Kra
ft F
oods
, M
ars,
Col
gate
-Pal
mol
ive,
Nab
isco
; re
pre-
sent
s B
riti
sh A
irw
ays,
Gul
f A
ir, C
atha
y Pa
cifi c
, Q
anta
s, A
ir A
rabi
a, C
unar
d, a
nd
the
Aus
tral
ian
Gov
ernm
ent
for
visa
s to
A
ustr
alia
; th
e la
rges
t im
port
er o
f C
hine
se
prod
ucts
in
the
Mid
dle
Eas
t.
Nat
iona
l B
ank
of K
uwai
t; ow
ns t
he
larg
est
stak
e in
the
Gul
f B
ank;
fo
undi
ng s
hare
hold
er o
f Pe
rella
W
einb
erg
Part
ners
, a
priv
atel
y ow
ned
fi nan
cial
ser
vice
s fi r
m;
mem
ber
of t
he K
uwai
t C
hina
In
vest
men
t Fu
nd i
n In
dia
and
Chi
na;
runs
a c
onsu
mer
cre
dit
serv
ice
inte
grat
ed w
ith
its
reta
il ou
tlets
; ow
ns a
n in
sura
nce
com
-pa
ny;
maj
or s
hare
hold
er a
nd
repr
esen
ted
on t
he b
oard
of
Shua
a C
apit
al.
App
endi
x A
C
onti
nued
192
KH
AR
AFI
Ori
gina
l m
erch
ant
fam
ily i
n K
uwai
t an
d on
e of
the
fou
nder
s of
the
Nat
iona
l B
ank
of K
uwai
t. C
lose
ly r
elat
ed t
o th
e K
uwai
ti
stat
e (o
ne o
f th
e fa
mily
mem
bers
is
the
Spe
aker
of
the
Kuw
ait
Nat
iona
l A
ssem
bly)
.
Port
land
Cem
ent
Com
pany
; th
e U
nite
d St
ainl
ess
Stee
l C
ompa
ny;
poul
try
and
mea
t pr
oces
sing
pla
nts
in
Kuw
ait,
Saud
i A
rabi
a, a
nd E
gypt
; m
aint
enan
ce,
serv
icin
g, a
nd p
roje
ct m
anag
emen
t of
refi
ner
ies,
pi
pelin
es,
pow
er s
tati
ons,
wat
er t
reat
men
t pl
ants
, an
d ot
her
civi
l en
gine
erin
g pr
ojec
ts;
man
ufac
ture
s in
sula
tion
m
ater
ials
, al
umin
um a
rchi
tect
ural
pro
duct
s, s
teel
pr
oduc
ts,
pipe
s, m
obile
hom
es,
glas
s, a
nd p
last
ic
prod
ucts
; la
rges
t pa
per
mill
in
the
Mid
dle
Eas
t; C
onst
ruct
ion
com
pany
wit
h br
anch
es i
n Sa
udi
Ara
bia,
th
e U
AE
, Ye
men
, E
gypt
, K
enya
, an
d el
sew
here
bui
ld-
ing
airp
orts
, pi
pelin
es,
hote
ls,
road
s, p
ower
pla
nts,
pe
troc
hem
ical
fac
iliti
es,
hosp
ital
s, a
nd s
ewag
e tr
eatm
ent
plan
ts;
desi
gns
and
cons
truc
ts o
il an
d ga
s fa
cilit
ies,
re
fi ner
ies,
pip
elin
es,
and
othe
r in
dust
rial
wor
k; m
ajor
sh
ipbu
ilder
and
rep
aire
r in
Kuw
ait;
man
ufac
ture
s an
d in
stal
ls o
il pi
pes;
rep
rese
nted
on
the
boar
d of
the
N
atio
nal
Indu
stri
es G
roup
.
Age
ncie
s fo
r: K
FC,
Pizz
a H
ut,
Har
dee’s
, T
GI
Frid
ay’s,
Tik
ka,
Fish
Mar
ket,
Sain
t C
inna
mon
, C
osta
Cof
fee,
Gra
nd C
afé,
B
aski
n R
obbi
ns S
amad
i, K
risp
y K
rem
e’s,
Am
eric
ana
Mea
t, A
mer
ican
a C
ake,
Kok
i C
hick
en,
Cal
iforn
ia G
arde
ns,
Farm
Fri
tes,
H
einz
, an
d C
adbu
ry;
oper
ates
ove
r 60
0 br
and
nam
e re
stau
rant
s in
ele
ven
Ara
b co
untr
ies
incl
udin
g K
uwai
t, B
ahra
in,
Qat
ar,
Egy
pt,
Saud
i A
rabi
a, O
man
, Jo
rdan
, an
d Le
bano
n; i
mpo
rts
and
acts
as
agen
ts f
or
com
puti
ng,
prin
ting
, an
d of
fi ce
equi
pmen
t in
clud
ing
the
bran
ds K
inko
s, K
odak
, D
anka
, Sc
reen
, an
d R
eeve
s; o
pera
tes
Sher
aton
Hot
els
in S
outh
Afr
ica
and
Syri
a.
Ow
ns a
ppro
xim
atel
y 16
% o
f th
e N
atio
nal
Ban
k of
Kuw
ait;
Glo
bal
Inve
stm
ent
Hou
se;
larg
est
shar
e-ho
lder
in
Al
Mal
Inv
estm
ent
com
pany
and
cha
irs
the
boar
d.
(Al
Mal
, in
tur
n, h
as 2
5% o
f a
join
t ve
ntur
e ca
lled
Dili
genc
e M
iddl
e E
ast
that
was
fou
nded
by
form
er
mem
bers
of
the
CIA
and
MI5
In
telli
genc
e. D
ilige
nce
is c
hair
ed b
y W
illia
m W
ebst
er,
form
er D
irec
tor
of
the
CIA
and
the
FB
I, a
nd i
s he
avily
in
volv
ed i
n se
curi
ty a
nd i
ntel
ligen
ce
gath
erin
g in
Ira
q.)
BA
BT
AIN
Foun
ded
in 1
948
by a
n im
por-
tant
mer
chan
t fa
mily
. La
ter
won
th
e ag
ency
rig
hts
for
a nu
mbe
r of
Ja
pane
se a
nd E
urop
ean
auto
mo-
bile
com
pani
es.
IT,
soft
war
e de
sign
, ne
twor
ks,
GIS
, C
AD
, tr
aini
ng e
t ce
tera
thr
ough
its
sub
sidi
ary
Nat
iona
l C
ompu
ter
Serv
ices
; ow
ns t
he K
uwai
t Pa
int
com
pany
; pr
oduc
es
shop
ping
bag
s, g
arba
ge b
ags,
pac
king
, la
undr
y ba
gs,
disp
osab
le g
love
s, a
nd p
acki
ng t
ape;
pro
duce
s tr
ansp
ort
trai
lers
.
Sole
dis
trib
utor
of
Nis
san,
Ren
ault,
C
itro
en,
CM
C,
and
JMC
mot
or v
ehic
les;
ho
lds
agen
cy a
nd d
istr
ibut
ion
righ
ts f
or:
Che
ng S
hin
Tyre
s, D
acia
Aut
omob
iles,
D
unlo
p Ty
res,
Far
abi T
echn
olog
ies,
GS
Stor
age
Bat
tery
, H
ewle
tt P
acka
rd,
Hol
ts
Lloy
d, J
iang
ling
Mot
ors,
Leg
ato,
Mas
tek,
N
GK
Spa
rk P
lugs
, N
etw
ork
App
lianc
e,
Ora
cle,
Cit
roën
, C
hina
Mot
ors.
Foun
ding
sha
reho
lder
s of
Z
umor
roda
Inv
estm
ent
Com
pany
, a
larg
e K
uwai
ti p
riva
te i
nves
tmen
t fi r
m.
Zum
orro
da c
ontr
ols
35%
of
the
Iraq
Hol
ding
Com
pany
, w
hich
, in
tur
n, i
s on
e of
the
tw
o m
ain
owne
rs o
f th
e B
ank
of B
aghd
ad.
Zum
orro
da a
lso
hold
s a
sign
ifi ca
nt
stak
e in
the
Ban
k of
Bah
rain
and
K
uwai
t, an
d th
e G
ulf
Ban
k.
Zum
orro
da a
lso
owns
11.
37%
of
Kuw
aiti
mor
tgag
e fi r
m H
ousi
ng
Fina
nce.
(con
tinue
d)
193
CO
NG
LOM
ERAT
EPR
OD
UC
TIV
E C
IRC
UIT
CO
MM
OD
ITY
CIR
CU
ITFI
NA
NC
E C
IRC
UIT
ESS
A (
SULT
AN
GR
OU
P)
Beg
an a
s a
priv
ate
groc
ery
chai
n in
Kuw
ait,
late
r ex
pand
ed i
nto
logi
stic
s, r
eal
esta
te,
and
fi nan
ce.
Run
s a
secu
rity
and
lab
or s
ervi
ces
com
pany
; pr
ovid
es
tele
com
mun
icat
ions
and
fi b
er o
ptic
s in
stal
lati
on
thro
ugh
seve
ral
com
pani
es;
maj
or s
take
in
Alp
ha
Ene
rgy
Com
pany
(20
%),
whi
ch i
s in
volv
ed i
n oi
l ex
plor
atio
n, d
rilli
ng,
and
serv
ices
in
the
oil
and
petr
oche
mic
al i
ndus
try;
ow
ns 3
0% o
f th
e N
atio
nal
Rea
l E
stat
e C
ompa
ny,
the
four
th-l
arge
st r
eal
esta
te c
ompa
ny
in K
uwai
t.
Ow
ns t
he m
ajor
Kuw
aiti
sup
erm
arke
t ch
ain,
Sul
tan
Cen
ter;
hol
ds f
ranc
hise
s fo
r C
hi-C
hi’s
and
Tum
blew
eeds
res
taur
ants
and
a
rang
e of
int
erna
tion
al f
ashi
on l
abel
s;
Run
s th
e la
rges
t G
CC
log
isti
cs c
ompa
ny,
Agi
lity.
Ow
ns a
n in
vest
men
t co
mpa
ny,
Uni
ted
Cap
ital
Gro
up;
on t
he b
oard
of
the
Gul
f B
ank
of K
uwai
t; on
the
bo
ard
of B
ayan
Inv
estm
ent
Com
pany
.
SHA
YA
Larg
e m
erch
ant
fam
ily w
ith
a hi
stor
y st
retc
hing
bac
k to
189
0.
Now
run
s on
e of
the
lar
gest
ret
ail
chai
ns a
cros
s th
e M
iddl
e E
ast.
Gen
eral
con
trac
t w
ork
spec
ializ
ing
in c
onst
ruct
ion
usin
g pr
ecas
t co
ncre
te s
yste
ms,
fab
rica
tion
, an
d er
ecti
on
of s
teel
ite
ms
and
cons
truc
tion
of
build
ings
, sh
ow
room
s, m
arke
ts,
and
com
mer
cial
com
plex
es;
a le
adin
g el
ectr
omec
hani
cal
cont
ract
or;
inve
sted
in
the
Kuw
ait
Foun
dry
Com
pany
, an
d si
ts o
n th
e co
mpa
ny b
oard
. K
FH i
s en
gage
d in
cas
ting
iro
n an
d ot
her
met
als;
m
anuf
actu
ring
san
itar
y it
ems
and
acce
ssor
ies
for
sew
erag
e sy
stem
s, a
nd m
anuf
actu
ring
cas
ting
joi
nts
for
pipe
s, w
ater
val
ves,
and
pum
ps,
elec
tric
al c
able
joi
nts,
el
ectr
ic f
use
boxe
s, a
nd o
ther
rel
ated
pro
duct
s.
One
of
the
larg
est
reta
ilers
in
the
Mid
dle
Eas
t w
ith
over
40
fran
chis
es r
epre
sent
ed i
n ov
er 1
,300
sto
res
in 1
3 co
untr
ies
in t
he
Mid
dle
Eas
t an
d E
aste
rn E
urop
e. S
ome
of
thes
e fr
anch
ises
inc
lude
: A
ram
is,
Ash
as,
Bhs
, B
oots
, C
lair
e’s,
Clin
ique
, C
oast
, D
eben
ham
s, D
orot
hy P
erki
ns,
Ele
na M
iro,
E
stee
Lau
der,
Evan
s, F
aith
, Fo
ot L
ocke
r, H
enne
s an
d M
auri
tz,
Jack
and
Jon
es,
Le
Pain
Quo
tidi
en,
Lim
ited
Too
, M
AC
, M
azda
, M
ilano
, M
othe
rcar
e, M
otiv
i, N
ext,
Noo
dle
Fact
ory,
Oas
is,
Oltr
e, P
eaco
cks,
Pe
arle
Opt
icia
ns,
Peug
eot,
Pizz
a E
xpre
ss,
Prin
cipl
es,
Riv
er I
slan
d, S
ambo
sa,
Sara
i, So
lari
s, S
tarb
ucks
, St
ride
Rit
e, T
hai
Chi
, T
he B
ody
Shop
, The
Gau
cho
Gri
ll, T
op
Shop
/Top
Man
, Tot
ally
Fis
h, V
avav
oom
, V
ero
Mod
a, V
isio
n E
xpre
ss,
Wal
lis;
cont
rols
th
e la
rges
t m
all
in K
uwai
t, A
venu
es M
all;
excl
usiv
e de
aler
of
Maz
da a
nd P
euge
ot i
n K
uwai
t, as
wel
l as
a M
iche
lin t
ire
and
Mob
il lu
bric
ant
dist
ribu
tion
; ru
ns t
he
Sher
aton
Kuw
ait
and
the
Med
ina
Obe
roi
Hot
el i
n Sa
udi
Ara
bia.
Rep
rese
nted
on
the
boar
d of
Gul
f B
ank;
one
of
the
top
fi ve
shar
ehol
d-er
s an
d re
pres
ente
d on
the
boa
rd o
f di
rect
ors
of t
he G
ulf
Fina
nce
Hou
se;
cont
rolli
ng s
hare
hold
er o
f In
jazz
at R
eal
Est
ate
Com
pany
, w
hose
inv
estm
ents
inc
lude
lan
d in
vest
men
ts,
offi c
e to
wer
dev
elop
-m
ents
, ow
ned
and
oper
ated
res
iden
-ti
al p
rope
rtie
s, r
etai
l de
velo
pmen
ts,
mix
ed-u
se c
omm
erci
al d
evel
op-
men
ts,
build
-ope
rate
-tra
nsfe
r pr
ojec
ts,
and
hosp
ital
ity
and
ente
rtai
nmen
t pr
oper
ties
; re
pre-
sent
ed o
n th
e bo
ard
of t
he B
ahra
in
Fina
ncia
l H
arbo
ur,
a re
al e
stat
e pr
ojec
t in
Bah
rain
des
igne
d to
be
com
e th
e ne
w fi
nan
cial
cen
ter
of
the
coun
try;
hol
ds t
he l
arge
st
priv
ate
stak
e in
the
Sec
urit
ies
Hou
se,
one
of t
he m
ost
impo
rtan
t in
vest
men
t fi r
ms
in K
uwai
t.
App
endi
x A
C
onti
nued
194
UN
ITE
D A
RA
B E
MIR
ATE
S
GU
RG
Mer
chan
t fa
mily
fro
m F
ujai
rah,
w
hich
hel
d m
any
of t
he fi
rst
ag
enci
es f
or t
he r
egio
n. T
he
grou
p’s
foun
der
is t
he U
AE
A
mba
ssad
or t
o th
e R
epub
lic o
f Ir
elan
d.
Man
ufac
ture
s pa
ints
and
fi n
ishi
ng p
rodu
cts;
ste
el
rein
forc
emen
ts f
or c
oncr
ete
and
stee
l ba
rs;
build
ing
chem
ical
s an
d w
ater
-pro
ofi n
g co
mpo
unds
; m
echa
nica
l en
gine
erin
g un
it a
nd f
abri
cati
on s
hop;
aut
omot
ive
repa
ir a
nd m
aint
enan
ce w
orks
hop;
man
ufac
ture
s,
supp
lies
and
inst
alls
doo
rs a
nd w
indo
ws,
kit
chen
ca
bine
ts,
war
drob
es,
exte
rior
woo
den
item
s lik
e pe
rgo-
las,
and
woo
den
stru
ctur
es f
or c
omm
erci
al a
nd r
esid
en-
tial
com
plex
es;
indu
stri
al e
xplo
sive
s fo
r ci
vil,
min
ing,
qu
arry
ing,
sei
smic
, on
shor
e an
d of
fsho
re d
rilli
ng
proj
ects
.
Age
nt f
or B
riti
sh A
mer
ican
Tob
acco
, U
nile
ver,
Ben
etto
n, S
iem
ens,
Osr
am,
Arm
itag
e Sh
anks
, St
anto
n, C
atni
c,
York
shir
e C
oppe
r Tu
bes,
Dun
lop,
Dul
ux,
Ele
ctro
lux,
Fis
her
& P
ayke
l, Fo
rbes
and
X
enic
and
man
y ot
hers
; im
port
s an
d di
stri
bute
s bu
ildin
g an
d pl
umbi
ng-r
elat
ed
prod
ucts
, ar
chit
ectu
ral
fi nis
hing
pro
duct
s,
wat
er h
eate
rs,
pipe
s, t
iling
, ki
tche
n ac
ces-
sori
es a
nd c
eram
ics;
dis
trib
utes
sta
tion
ery
and
offi c
e pr
oduc
ts;
hold
s fr
anch
ises
for
3M
& N
CR
of
USA
, E
lfen
from
Tha
iland
, R
exel
of
UK
, N
ight
inga
le o
f In
dia
and
Dur
able
, E
lba
& P
elik
an f
rom
Ger
man
y.
Nat
iona
l B
ank
of F
ujai
rah;
Em
irat
es
Ban
king
Gro
up;
Inve
stco
rp B
ank;
D
ubai
Gro
wth
Fun
d.
GH
UR
AIR
Foun
ded
in 1
960
in D
ubai
, it
is
now
one
of
the
larg
est
priv
ate
cong
lom
erat
es i
n th
e U
AE
. The
so
n of
the
Gro
up’s
foun
der
help
ed
to e
stab
lish
Em
aar
and
is t
he
spea
ker
of t
he U
AE
Fed
eral
N
atio
nal
Cou
ncil.
Con
stru
ctio
n co
mpa
ny;
larg
est
alum
inum
ext
rusi
on
fact
ory
in t
he M
iddl
e E
ast
(Gul
f E
xtru
sion
s);
on t
he
boar
d of
Dub
alth
e w
orld
’s la
rges
t si
ngle
alu
min
um
smel
ter
site
; pa
ckag
ing
plan
t pr
oduc
ing
card
boar
d pr
oduc
ts f
or s
tora
ge a
nd s
hipp
ing
purp
oses
; m
akes
tin
ca
ns,
shee
ts,
and
can
ends
; ow
ns t
he U
AE
’s fi r
st s
teel
co
il an
d ga
lvan
izin
g pl
ant;
owns
a f
reig
ht a
nd s
hipp
ing
com
pany
; E
maa
r Pr
oper
ties
; A
dvan
ced
Poly
prop
ylen
e C
o. a
nd S
IPC
HE
M (
The
Sau
di I
nter
nati
onal
Pe
troc
hem
ical
Co.
); o
wns
the
sec
ond-
larg
est
fl our
m
illin
g co
mpa
ny i
n th
e M
iddl
e E
ast;
owns
a c
ontr
ol-
ling
stak
e in
the
Nat
iona
l C
emen
t C
o.
Age
nts
for
3D-C
lub,
Dae
woo
, E
dim
ax,
Sam
sung
, Sc
ott
Pow
er,
Vie
w S
onic
; di
stri
bute
s IT
pro
duct
s, c
ell
phon
es,
and
cons
umer
ele
ctro
nics
as
agen
ts f
or L
G,
Sam
sung
, C
reat
ive,
and
oth
er i
nter
nati
onal
co
mpa
nies
; la
rges
t tr
ader
of
dry
bulk
car
go
in t
he M
iddl
e E
ast;
owns
fou
r la
rge
mal
ls
in t
he U
AE
and
Bah
rain
: B
urju
man
Mal
l (5
00 s
hops
), A
l G
hura
ir C
ity
(209
),
Bah
rain
Mal
l (1
20),
Ree
f M
all
(94)
.
Mas
hreq
Ban
k, S
huaa
Cap
ital
; R
AK
ba
nk;
Com
mer
cial
Ban
k of
Dub
ai;
Gul
fi nan
ce;
on t
he a
dvis
ory
boar
d of
the
Dub
ai G
row
th F
und;
Am
wal
, th
e fi r
st i
nves
tmen
t fi r
m i
n Q
atar
.
195
(con
tinue
d)
196
CO
NG
LOM
ERAT
EPR
OD
UC
TIV
E C
IRC
UIT
CO
MM
OD
ITY
CIR
CU
ITFI
NA
NC
E C
IRC
UIT
MA
ZR
UI
Impo
rtan
t A
bu D
habi
-bas
ed
busi
ness
gro
up r
un b
y A
bdul
lah
Maz
rui.
The
Maz
rui
fam
ily h
as
clos
e ti
es t
o th
e N
ahya
n ru
ling
fam
ily a
nd h
as s
erve
d in
a
num
ber
of i
mpo
rtan
t go
vern
men
t po
siti
ons.
Che
man
ol (
Saud
i A
rabi
a);
Uni
ted
Gul
f St
eel
(Sau
di
Ara
bia)
; m
anuf
actu
res
stee
l pi
pes;
pro
duce
s ba
sic
chem
ical
s su
ch a
s fo
ams,
sta
biliz
ers,
and
lub
rica
nts
used
in
ind
ustr
ial
proc
esse
s in
the
Gul
f re
gion
; fr
eigh
t tr
ansp
ort
and
war
ehou
sing
div
isio
n; e
ngin
eeri
ng a
nd
cons
truc
tion
com
pany
; on
the
boa
rd o
f th
e A
bu D
habi
N
atio
nal
Indu
stri
al P
roje
cts
Co.
(A
DN
IP).
Hol
ds a
genc
y ri
ghts
for
: 3M
pai
nts,
Tek
u,
Gar
den
Lead
er,
Plas
tecn
ic,
Gru
po M
ago,
To
urne
sol,
Plan
ters
Tec
hnol
ogy,
Am
es,
Mik
skaa
r; s
ole
agen
t fo
r Sp
ies
Hec
ker
Gm
bH,
a m
anuf
actu
rer
of a
utom
otiv
e re
fi nis
hing
pai
nt s
yste
ms;
Illy
cof
fee
syst
ems;
The
One
fra
nchi
se f
or t
he U
AE
, op
erat
es s
even
dep
artm
ent
stor
es i
n th
e U
AE
and
is
agen
t fo
r C
alvi
n K
lein
, C
hloe
, E
lizab
eth
Ard
en,
May
tag,
Ken
woo
d K
itch
en A
pplia
nces
, N
ippo
n, a
nd o
ther
s. A
m
embe
r of
the
Gro
up c
hair
s th
e bo
ard
of
Jash
anm
al;
foun
ders
and
cha
ir o
f A
ram
ex,
a lo
gist
ics
com
pany
.
Inve
stba
nk;
Inve
stco
rp;
Em
irat
es
Insu
ranc
e C
o.; T
he N
atio
nal
Inve
stor
(T
NI)
.
AL
JAB
ER
Abu
Dha
bi-b
ased
gro
up f
ound
ed
in 1
970
by O
baid
Kha
leef
a Ja
ber
Al
Mur
ri w
ith
an i
niti
al f
ocus
on
the
cons
truc
tion
sec
tor.
Con
stru
ctio
n co
mpa
ny;
alum
inum
fab
rica
tion
fac
tory
; al
umin
um e
xtru
sion
pla
nt;
stee
l fa
bric
atio
n fa
ctor
y;
iron
and
ste
el f
ound
ry;
man
ufac
ture
s hi
gh p
reci
sion
en
gine
erin
g co
mpo
nent
and
uni
ts;
man
ufac
ture
s tr
affi c
, sa
fety
, co
mm
erci
al,
and
adve
rtis
ing
sign
s; o
pera
tes
a tr
ansp
ort
divi
sion
wit
h 4,
000
truc
ks,
over
100
cra
nes,
an
d a
fl eet
of
tank
er v
esse
ls;
maj
or s
hare
hold
er a
nd
vice
-cha
ir o
f th
e bo
ard
of t
he A
bu D
habi
Nat
iona
l In
dust
rial
Pro
ject
s C
o. (
AD
NIP
).
Sole
age
nt f
or K
enw
orth
tru
cks
in t
he
Uni
ted
Ara
b E
mir
ates
; so
le a
utho
rize
d di
stri
buto
r fo
r Sh
ell
lubr
ican
ts i
n th
e E
mir
ate
of A
bu D
habi
; ag
ent
for
Rei
ch
Con
cret
e pu
mps
and
mix
ers,
Bal
dwin
fi l
ters
, Sc
ope
batt
erie
s, B
rade
n w
inch
es,
and
Fuld
a ti
res;
im
port
s bu
lk b
itum
en f
rom
B
ahra
in f
or r
oad
cons
truc
tion
in
Abu
D
habi
and
nei
ghbo
ring
cou
ntri
es.
Abr
aaj
capi
tal;
The
Nat
iona
l In
vest
or (
TN
I);
Abu
Dha
bi T
akaf
ul,
an I
slam
ic i
nsur
ance
com
pany
in
the
UA
E;
Em
irat
es I
nsur
ance
C
ompa
ny.
App
endi
x A
C
onti
nued
197N
OW
AIS
Abu
Dha
bi-b
ased
fam
ily w
ith
clos
e ti
es t
o th
e U
AE
rul
ing
fam
ily i
nclu
ding
rep
rese
ntat
ion
on
the
Abu
Dha
bi C
ounc
il fo
r E
cono
mic
Dev
elop
men
t.
Mai
nten
ance
and
pro
ject
man
agem
ent
com
pany
; sc
affo
ldin
g co
mpa
ny;
desi
gns,
ins
talls
, an
d m
anag
es
loca
l/w
ide
area
net
wor
ks (
LA
N/W
AN
); m
ajor
sha
re-
hold
er a
nd o
n th
e bo
ard
of t
he A
bu D
habi
Nat
iona
l In
dust
rial
Pro
ject
s C
o. (
AD
NIP
); r
uns
a fo
od m
anu-
fact
urin
g co
mpa
ny t
hat
prod
uces
cho
cola
te,
pota
to
chip
s, a
nd o
ther
sna
cks.
Rep
rese
nts
over
100
com
pani
es i
n th
e su
pply
and
ser
vice
of
elec
trom
echa
nica
l an
d in
stru
men
tati
on e
quip
men
t; su
pplie
s fi l
ters
, ex
plos
ive-
proo
f el
ectr
ical
com
pone
nts,
and
in
dust
rial
val
ves
for
onsh
ore
and
offs
hore
ga
s an
d oi
l ac
tivi
ties
, po
wer
gen
erat
ion,
ai
rpor
ts,
and
cons
truc
tion
; di
stri
bute
s m
edic
al s
uppl
ies,
hos
pita
l eq
uipm
ent,
phar
mac
euti
cals
, an
d co
nsum
er h
ealth
pr
oduc
ts a
nd r
epre
sent
s ar
ound
30
inte
r na-
tion
al c
ompa
nies
in
this
sec
tor;
hol
ds
agen
cies
for
3C
om,
3M,
Ave
ntis
, Fu
jitsu
, D
aew
oo,
Pire
lli,
Cis
co,
Pana
soni
c,
Mit
subi
shi,
Luce
nt,
and
Alc
atel
.
Inve
stba
nk;
Shua
a C
apit
al;
Abr
aaj
Cap
ital
; W
aha
Cap
ital
.
QAT
AR
AL
FAR
DA
N
Prom
inen
t m
erch
ant
fam
ily t
hat
has
its
orig
ins
in t
he p
earl
ing
busi
ness
, ex
pand
ing
into
mon
ey
exch
ange
and
fi n
ance
in
the
1970
s.
Con
stru
ctio
n an
d D
evel
opm
ent
Com
pany
; ch
airs
the
bo
ard
of t
he U
nite
d D
evel
opm
ent
Com
pany
(U
DC
).
UD
C i
s on
e of
the
lar
gest
com
pani
es i
n Q
atar
, an
d ac
ts a
s a
hold
ing
com
pany
for
oth
er i
nves
tmen
ts. T
hese
in
clud
e so
le o
wne
rshi
p of
the
Pea
rl-Q
atar
Pro
ject
, a
mas
sive
rea
l es
tate
pro
ject
inv
olvi
ng 3
2 ki
lom
eter
s of
ne
w c
oast
line,
whi
ch w
ill h
ouse
40,
000
resi
dent
s in
m
ore
than
15,
000
dwel
lings
by
2011
. U
DC
is
also
in
volv
ed i
n th
e pr
oduc
tion
of
petr
oche
mic
als
(the
Gul
f Fo
rmal
dehy
de C
ompa
ny);
cha
irs
Qat
ar C
ool,
a co
olin
g pl
ant
that
sup
plie
s ch
illed
wat
er f
or r
efri
gera
tion
to
build
ing
and
offi c
e bl
ocks
in
Qat
ar t
hrou
gh a
net
wor
k of
und
ergr
ound
pip
es;
vice
-cha
ir o
f Q
atar
Dre
dgin
g, a
co
mpa
ny t
hat
recl
aim
s la
nd t
hrou
gh d
redg
ing
ocea
n ar
eas.
Dis
trib
utes
Min
i an
d R
olls
Roy
ce a
nd i
s th
e so
le a
gent
of
BM
W,
Ferr
ari,
and
Land
R
over
s in
Qat
ar (
set
the
seco
nd-h
ighe
st
wor
ld r
ecor
d of
Fer
rari
s so
ld i
n 20
06);
je
wel
ry b
ranc
h is
the
age
nt f
or P
iage
t, C
orum
, C
hopa
rd,
and
Har
ry W
inst
on.
Com
mer
cial
Ban
k, t
he s
econ
d-la
rges
t ba
nk i
n Q
atar
(w
ith
stak
es i
n T
he U
nite
d A
rab
Ban
k (U
AE
) an
d th
e N
atio
nal
Ban
k of
Om
an
(Om
an);
Inv
estc
orp;
Qat
ar
Insu
ranc
e C
ompa
ny;
runs
a m
oney
ex
chan
ge b
usin
ess
and
deal
s in
pr
ecio
us m
etal
s.
(con
tinue
d)
198
CO
NG
LOM
ERAT
EPR
OD
UC
TIV
E C
IRC
UIT
CO
MM
OD
ITY
CIR
CU
ITFI
NA
NC
E C
IRC
UIT
AL
MA
NA
Foun
ded
by M
oham
med
Ham
ad
Al
Man
a fr
om t
he A
l M
ana
fam
ily.
Run
s a
larg
e en
gine
erin
g an
d co
ntra
ctin
g fi r
m;
prov
ides
cl
eani
ng a
nd s
uppo
rt s
ervi
ces
for
larg
e-sc
ale
com
pani
es,
apar
tmen
t bu
ildin
gs,
gove
rnm
ent
offi c
es;
maj
or c
on-
trac
tor
of l
abor
for
oil
and
gas
indu
stri
es;
desi
gns
and
inst
alls
air
con
diti
onin
g un
its.
Age
nts
for
Kon
ica
Min
olta
, Pr
ojec
t U
K,
Ber
tello
, Fu
rsys
, O
cé,
Rex
el U
K,
Ibic
o,
3M,
App
le,
HA
CE
R,
Hew
lett
Pac
kard
; so
le
agen
ts f
or P
hilip
s, W
hirl
pool
, D
aew
oo,
Frig
idai
re i
n Q
atar
; in
con
sum
er g
oods
, is
th
e ag
ent
for
Uni
leve
r A
rabi
a, H
indu
stan
Le
ver
Lim
ited
, G
illet
te M
iddl
e E
ast,
Pills
bury
Com
pany
, Fr
iesl
and
Cob
arco
D
airy
Pro
duct
s; r
epre
sent
s G
ulf
Air,
Air
In
dia,
P.I
.A.,
Qat
ar A
irw
ays,
Em
irat
e A
irlin
es,
Egy
pt A
ir, K
LM,
Kuw
ait
Air
way
s.
Maj
or s
hare
hold
er a
nd r
epre
sent
ed
on t
he b
oard
of
dire
ctor
s of
Qat
ar
Isla
mic
Ban
k; o
n th
e bo
ard
of
dire
ctor
s of
Sal
am I
nter
nati
onal
, a
maj
or Q
atar
i in
vest
men
t fi r
m w
ith
exte
nsiv
e in
tere
sts
in t
he G
CC
and
Pa
lest
ine;
cha
ir o
f A
l A
hli
Ban
k,
Qat
ar.
NB
K
Est
ablis
hed
in t
he e
arly
195
0s a
s a
priv
ate
cong
lom
erat
e by
Nas
ser
Bin
Kha
led
al T
hani
, m
embe
r of
th
e ru
ling
al T
hani
fam
ily.
Ow
ns o
ne o
f th
e la
rges
t co
ntra
ctin
g co
mpa
nies
in
Qat
ar a
nd h
as b
uilt
the
Kha
lifa
Spor
ts S
tadi
um,
the
Cen
tral
Ban
k of
Qat
ar,
Wes
t B
ay A
l Sa
lam
Pla
za,
Doh
a In
tern
atio
nal
Air
port
’s W
areh
ousi
ng F
acili
ties
, M
esai
d Po
lice
Dep
artm
ent,
the
Min
istr
y of
Int
erio
r; i
nsta
lls
heat
ins
ulat
ion
and
fi re-
proo
fi ng
for
fact
orie
s in
the
oil
and
gas,
pet
roch
emic
al,
basi
c m
etal
s, a
nd p
ower
ge
nera
tion
sec
tors
; ru
ns o
ne o
f th
e la
rges
t re
al e
stat
e fi r
ms
in Q
atar
and
is
build
ing
a ne
w c
ity,
Al
Waa
b C
ity,
wit
h 2,
200
resi
dent
ial
unit
s, c
omm
erci
al s
pace
, an
d a
300-
room
hot
el.
Al
Waa
b w
ill p
rovi
de h
ousi
ng
for
over
10,
000
peop
le.
Age
nt f
or M
erce
des
Ben
z, S
pyke
r Sp
ort
Car
s, M
itsub
ishi
Mot
ors,
Har
ley
Dav
idso
n,
and
Kaw
asak
i; ru
ns s
ever
al c
hain
s of
re
stau
rant
s an
d ba
keri
es i
n Q
atar
; ag
ents
for
va
riou
s IT
fi r
ms
incl
udin
g M
omen
ta a
nd
3i-I
nfot
ech;
run
s an
ext
ensi
ve s
port
ing,
hi
gh-e
nd f
ashi
on a
nd l
uxur
y go
ods
reta
il bu
sine
ss.
It i
s ag
ent
for
Qui
ksilv
er,
Ant
ik
Bat
ik,
Glo
ria
Jean
s, T
ashi
a, M
urph
y &
Nye
, La
nvin
, E
lie S
aab,
Loe
we,
Nin
a R
icci
, an
d Pa
ul S
mith
; ru
ns f
our
supe
rmar
kets
in
Qat
ar;
sits
on
the
boar
d of
Spi
nney
’s Su
perm
arke
ts,
one
of t
he l
arge
st
supe
rmar
ket
chai
ns i
n th
e M
iddl
e E
ast;
excl
usiv
e di
stri
buto
r of
Bos
ch h
ome
appl
ianc
es i
n Q
atar
; im
port
s ag
ricu
ltura
l te
stin
g eq
uipm
ent,
med
ical
sup
plie
s, a
nd
othe
r la
b m
ater
ials
for
gov
ernm
ent
and
univ
ersi
ty i
nstit
utio
ns i
n Q
atar
.
Maj
or s
hare
hold
er a
nd r
epre
sent
ed
on t
he b
oard
of
dire
ctor
s of
Abr
aaj
Cap
ital
; on
the
boa
rd o
f di
rect
ors
of
Shua
a C
apit
al;
a fo
undi
ng s
hare
-ho
lder
and
cha
irs
the
boar
d of
A
mw
al Q
atar
; ch
air
of t
he D
oha
Insu
ranc
e C
ompa
ny;
on t
he b
oard
of
dir
ecto
rs o
f Sa
lam
Int
erna
tion
al
(see
abo
ve).
App
endi
x A
C
onti
nued
199B
AH
RA
IN
MO
HA
MM
ED
JA
LA
L A
ND
SO
NS
Est
ablis
hed
afte
r W
orld
War
Tw
o as
a t
radi
ng c
ompa
ny a
nd a
gent
s fo
r a
num
ber
of i
nter
nati
onal
fi r
ms.
Con
stru
ctio
n, c
ontr
acti
ng,
and
inte
rior
des
ign;
des
ign
and
inst
alla
tion
of
larg
e ai
r co
ndit
ioni
ng s
yste
ms,
m
echa
nica
l an
d el
ectr
ical
eng
inee
ring
for
ind
ustr
ial
proj
ects
suc
h as
refi
ner
ies,
pip
elin
es,
and
petr
oche
mic
al
plan
ts;
engi
neer
ing
subs
idia
ry i
n O
man
; pr
oduc
es
min
eral
wat
er,
ice
and
wat
er d
ispe
nsin
g m
achi
nes
in
Bah
rain
; in
dust
rial
cat
erin
g to
maj
or i
ndus
trie
s,
gove
rnm
ent
bodi
es,
hosp
ital
s, a
nd a
irlin
es;
Che
man
ol
(Sau
di A
rabi
a);
Uni
ted
Pape
r In
dust
ries
.
Sole
age
nt i
n B
ahra
in f
or J
agua
r, Pr
oton
, Pe
ugeo
t, an
d Su
zuki
aut
omob
iles;
hol
ds t
he
excl
usiv
e fr
anch
ises
for
Rot
hman
s ci
ga-
rett
es,
Car
tier
, an
d Ju
bile
e in
Bah
rain
; so
le
agen
t fo
r Sc
hind
ler
lifts
, es
cala
tors
, w
alk-
way
s, a
nd c
onve
yor
syst
ems;
exc
lusi
ve
dist
ribu
tor
for
the
Tran
e co
mpa
ny,
one
of
the
wor
ld’s
larg
est
man
ufac
ture
rs o
f ai
r co
ndit
ioni
ng e
quip
men
t; la
rges
t di
stri
buto
r of
sta
tion
ery
prod
ucts
in
Bah
rain
. It
is
also
th
e ag
ent
for
a nu
mbe
r of
Eng
lish
lang
uage
pr
esse
s in
clud
ing
Mac
mill
an B
ooks
, C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity
Pres
s, a
nd O
xfor
d U
nive
rsit
y Pr
ess.
Tra
nspo
rts
bulk
, pa
cked
, he
avy
indu
stry
, an
d pe
troc
hem
ical
pro
duct
s ac
ross
the
GC
C a
nd p
rovi
des
frei
ght
forw
ardi
ng a
nd w
areh
ouse
ser
vice
s in
the
re
gion
; U
nite
d Pa
rcel
Ser
vice
s (U
PS)
in
Bah
rain
.
Al
Ahl
i U
nite
d B
ank;
Inv
estc
orp;
ow
ns 5
1% o
f Tu
llet
Libe
rty
Bah
rain
, a
subs
idia
ry o
f th
e se
cond
-la
rges
t cu
rren
cy b
roke
r in
the
wor
ld.
ZAY
AN
I
Foun
ded
by K
halid
Ras
hid
Zay
ani
in t
he 1
970s
, th
e co
mpa
ny i
s m
ainl
y or
gani
zed
thro
ugh
Al
Zay
ani
Inve
stm
ents
. The
Zay
ani
fam
ily h
as i
ts o
rigi
ns i
n a
Sunn
i m
erch
ant
fam
ily w
ith i
nter
ests
in
pear
ling.
A f
amily
dis
pute
in
the
1970
s le
d th
e or
igin
al f
amily
fi r
m
to b
e di
vide
d be
twee
n di
ffere
nt
bran
ches
of
the
fam
ily.
Ow
ns 5
0% o
f M
idal
Cab
les,
whi
ch p
rodu
ces
alum
i-nu
m r
ods,
ste
el r
einf
orce
d co
nduc
tors
, an
d po
wer
tr
ansm
issi
on l
ines
; pr
oduc
es b
ottle
cap
s; t
he c
ompa
ny
is t
he s
ingl
e la
rges
t us
er o
f al
umin
um f
rom
Alu
min
ium
B
ahra
in (
ALB
A).
Hol
ds a
genc
ies
for
Rol
ls R
oyce
, Fe
rrar
i, M
aser
ati,
MIN
I, L
and
Rov
er,
Rov
er,
MG
, M
itsu
bish
i, an
d H
yund
ai;
dist
ribu
tor
of
com
mer
cial
veh
icle
s, t
ruck
s, h
eavy
mac
hin-
ery,
gar
age
equi
pmen
t, an
d sp
are
part
s w
ith
agen
cies
for
Fre
ight
liner
, K
alm
ar,
MA
HA
, M
itsu
bish
i, N
ussb
aum
.
Inve
stco
rp;
Bah
rain
i Is
lam
ic B
ank;
Ta
s’hee
lat,
a cr
edit
and
ins
uran
ce
com
pany
tha
t is
the
lea
ding
pro
-vi
der
of c
onsu
mer
fi n
ance
and
loa
ns
in B
ahra
in.
(con
tinue
d)
200
CO
NG
LOM
ERAT
EPR
OD
UC
TIV
E C
IRC
UIT
CO
MM
OD
ITY
CIR
CU
ITFI
NA
NC
E C
IRC
UIT
AL
MO
AY
YE
D
Est
ablis
hed
by Y
ousu
f K
halil
A
lmoa
yyed
in
the
1940
s as
age
nts
for
Ford
and
oth
er r
etai
l go
ods.
La
ter
expa
nded
int
o co
nstr
ucti
on
and
fi nan
ce.
Al
Moa
yyed
is
a pr
omin
ent
Sunn
i m
erch
ant
fam
ily
in B
ahra
in.
Con
stru
ctio
n co
mpa
ny;
clea
ning
and
mai
nten
ance
co
mpa
ny t
hat
prov
ides
sec
urit
y gu
ards
, do
mes
tic
hous
ekee
ping
, cl
eani
ng o
f se
wag
e lin
es,
and
pest
co
ntro
l; de
sign
s an
d su
pplie
s co
mpu
ter
netw
orks
; ho
lds
vice
-cha
ir o
f A
lum
iniu
m B
ahra
in.
Bah
rain
Mar
itim
e an
d M
erca
ntile
In
tern
atio
nal
(BM
MI)
, a
maj
or r
etai
l co
mpa
ny i
n B
ahra
in t
hat
is t
he s
ole
agen
t fo
r C
olga
te-P
alm
oliv
e, H
enke
l, Ja
pan
Toba
cco,
Kel
logg
’s, K
raft
Foo
d In
tern
atio
nal,
Mas
terF
oods
, R
ed B
ull,
Yard
ley,
Sto
rck,
Jer
gens
, A
mer
ican
Gar
den,
an
d Su
e B
ee.
It a
lso
dist
ribu
tes
alco
holic
be
vera
ges
incl
udin
g H
eine
ken,
Joh
nnie
W
alke
r, Ja
ck D
anie
ls,
Smir
noff
, an
d B
ecks
; ho
lds
the
agen
cy i
n B
ahra
in f
or N
issa
n,
Ren
ault,
Infi
nit
i, Fo
rd a
utom
obile
s; h
old
the
agen
cy f
or A
kai,
Tosh
iba,
W
esti
ngho
use,
Ken
woo
d, E
lect
rolu
x, a
nd
Aki
ra;
impo
rts
bath
room
fi t
ting
s, t
iles,
pa
ints
, an
d co
nstr
ucti
on m
ater
ials
; im
port
s co
nstr
ucti
on e
quip
men
t fr
om s
uppl
iers
su
ch a
s K
enw
orth
, K
omat
su,
Ivec
o, N
issa
n di
esel
; pr
inci
pal
supp
liers
of
offi c
e eq
uip-
men
t in
Bah
rain
, an
d di
stri
buto
rs f
or
maj
or i
nter
nati
onal
com
pani
es s
uch
as
Kon
ica
Min
olta
, A
gfa,
Hit
achi
; Se
ef
prop
erti
es,
a la
rge
real
est
ate
com
pany
tha
t ow
ns s
ever
al m
alls
in
Bah
rain
.
Inve
stco
rp;
Nat
iona
l B
ank
of
Bah
rain
; TA
IB B
ank;
Alp
ine
Wea
lth
Man
agem
ent;
Nat
iona
l Fi
nanc
e H
ouse
, a
com
pany
tha
t pr
ovid
es
fi nan
cing
to
cons
umer
s fo
r au
to a
nd
othe
r re
tail
purc
hase
s, a
nd r
eal
esta
te l
oans
.
App
endi
x A
C
onti
nued
201K
AN
OO
The
gro
up w
as e
stab
lishe
d in
18
90 i
n B
ahra
in a
nd w
as i
niti
ally
in
volv
ed i
n pe
arlin
g, t
rade
, an
d fi n
ance
. D
iffer
ent
bran
ches
of
the
Kan
oo f
amily
cam
e to
be
loca
ted
in O
man
, Sa
udi
Ara
bia,
and
the
U
AE
.
Ship
ping
and
tra
vel
agen
cies
; C
hem
anol
(Sa
udi
Ara
bia)
; A
luja
in P
etro
chem
ical
Cor
pora
tion
; pr
ovid
es r
epai
r an
d m
aint
enan
ce s
ervi
ces
for
ship
s in
the
Gul
f; en
gine
erin
g co
mpa
ny f
or p
ower
pla
nt e
ngin
eeri
ng,
proj
ect
man
age-
men
t, re
pair,
and
mai
nten
ance
; tw
o fa
ctor
ies
in S
audi
A
rabi
a th
at p
rodu
ce m
arin
e pa
ints
.
Rep
rese
nts
fi rm
s su
ch a
s G
rove
, H
yste
r, Pe
rkin
s, B
obca
t, H
iab,
Mas
sey
Ferg
uson
, Li
ncol
n E
lect
ric;
pri
ncip
al a
gent
for
man
y su
pplie
rs o
f pe
troc
hem
ical
, oi
l an
d ga
s eq
uipm
ent
incl
udin
g in
stru
men
tati
on,
drill
ing
mat
eria
l, va
lves
, tu
rbin
es,
fi ltr
atio
n sy
stem
s, c
hem
ical
s, a
nd p
roce
ss c
ontr
ol
mac
hine
ry;
impo
rt a
gent
and
dis
trib
utor
fo
r B
riti
sh A
mer
ican
Tob
acco
(B
AT);
sol
e re
pres
enta
tive
of
Mae
rsk
Ship
ping
in
the
UA
E.
Run
s an
air
car
go a
nd f
reig
ht
forw
ardi
ng s
ervi
ce t
hrou
ghou
t th
e G
ulf.
Nat
iona
l B
ank
of B
ahra
in;
Inve
stco
rp;
Abr
aaj
Cap
ital
; Fi
rst
Leas
ing
Ban
k; i
nsur
ance
joi
nt
vent
ure
wit
h N
orw
ich
Uni
on;
Uni
corn
Inv
estm
ent
Ban
k; J
adw
a In
vest
men
ts.
OM
AN
ZAW
AWI
Mai
n co
mpa
nies
mak
ing
up t
he
grou
p ar
e O
mze
st,
Ala
wi
Ent
erpr
ises
, Z
awaw
i Tra
ding
C
ompa
ny,
and
Tala
l Z
awaw
i E
nter
pris
es. T
he Z
awaw
i fa
mily
ha
s he
ld p
rom
inen
t po
siti
ons
in
the
Om
ani
stat
e, a
nd t
he g
roup
’s he
ad,
Om
ar Z
awaw
i, is
con
sid-
ered
the
sec
ond-
rich
est
pers
on i
n O
man
aft
er t
he S
ulta
n.
Two
met
hano
l pl
ants
and
a f
orm
alde
hyde
pla
nt i
n th
e So
har
Indu
stri
al P
ort
area
; pr
oduc
es p
aint
, sh
oes,
boo
ts,
and
sand
als,
dis
posa
ble
baby
dia
pers
and
fem
ale
sani
tary
nap
kins
; co
nstr
ucti
on a
nd e
ngin
eeri
ng c
om-
pany
; O
man
Agr
icul
tura
l D
evel
opm
ent
Com
pany
(p
rodu
ces
milk
, yo
ghur
t, ju
ices
, an
d ve
geta
ble
crop
s);
Om
an T
exti
le M
ills
Com
pany
; A
reej
Veg
etab
le O
ils &
D
eriv
ativ
es;
larg
est
dete
rgen
t an
d so
ap m
anuf
actu
rer
in
Om
an.
Age
nt a
nd d
istr
ibut
or f
or M
erce
des
Ben
z,
Bro
ther
, O
livet
ti,
Xer
ox,
Wye
f Ph
arm
aceu
tica
ls M
aers
k Sh
ippi
ng,
Avi
s-R
ent-
a-C
ar,
Siem
ens,
GSM
han
dset
s an
d co
rdle
ss p
hone
s in
Om
an;
owns
a n
etw
ork
of 1
20 g
as s
tati
ons.
Om
an I
nter
nati
onal
Ban
k; A
rab
Inte
rnat
iona
l B
ank;
Nat
iona
l Fi
nanc
e; M
usca
t Fi
nanc
e C
ompa
ny;
Mus
cat
Nat
iona
l H
oldi
ng c
ompa
ny,
whi
ch o
wns
the
Mus
cat
Insu
ranc
e C
ompa
ny a
nd t
he M
usca
t Li
fe
Ass
uran
ce C
ompa
ny.
(con
tinue
d)
202
CO
NG
LOM
ERAT
EPR
OD
UC
TIV
E C
IRC
UIT
CO
MM
OD
ITY
CIR
CU
ITFI
NA
NC
E C
IRC
UIT
ZU
BA
IR
Mod
ern
com
pany
ori
gina
tes
in
cont
ract
ing
wor
k fo
r th
e ea
rly
Om
ani
oil
indu
stry
and
as
agen
ts
for
fore
ign
auto
mob
iles.
Mem
bers
of
the
Zub
air
fam
ily h
ave
serv
ed
as m
inis
ters
and
adv
isor
s in
the
O
man
i go
vern
men
t si
nce
the
earl
y 19
00s.
Ow
ns a
n oi
l in
dust
ries
ser
vice
com
pany
; jo
int
vent
ure
wit
h La
rsen
and
Tou
bro,
the
thi
rd-l
arge
st e
ngin
eeri
ng,
proc
urem
ent,
and
cons
truc
tion
com
pany
in
the
wor
ld;
esta
blis
hed
the
fi rst
pri
vate
sec
tor
pow
er p
roje
ct i
n th
e G
ulf,
the
Man
ah P
ower
Pro
ject
; op
erat
es a
n In
depe
nden
t Po
wer
and
Wat
er P
lant
; tw
o m
anuf
actu
r-in
g un
its
that
pro
duce
fl u
ores
cent
lig
htin
g, e
lect
rica
l po
wer
con
trol
s, m
otor
con
trol
s an
d sp
ecia
lized
ele
ctri
cal
pane
ls;
man
ufac
ture
s cu
stom
mad
e w
oode
n fu
rnit
ure,
up
hols
tere
d it
ems,
and
fi t
ted
join
ery
for
the
hosp
ital
ity
sect
or;
Dan
a G
as;
real
est
ate
divi
sion
.
Age
nt f
or A
udi,
Ben
tley,
Chr
ysle
r, M
itsu
bish
i, Pe
ugeo
t, R
olls
Roy
ce,
Vol
ksw
agen
, an
d V
olvo
in
Om
an;
dist
rib-
utes
Ban
g &
Olu
fsen
, K
enw
ood,
JB
L,
Har
man
Kar
don,
Nak
amic
hi,
Sans
ui,
Cha
ngho
ng h
ome
appl
ianc
es i
n O
man
; im
port
s an
d se
lls w
atch
es a
nd j
ewel
ry
incl
udin
g C
erru
ti,
Cor
um D
anie
l H
echt
er,
Ete
rna,
Pal
oma
Pica
sso,
and
Tiff
any
& C
o.;
has
a fu
lly o
wne
d co
mpa
ny o
pera
ting
in
the
Jebe
l A
li Fr
ee Z
one
(in
the
UA
E),
tha
t ac
ts a
s th
e ex
clus
ive
agen
t ac
ross
the
GC
C
for
inte
rnat
iona
l co
mpa
nies
inv
olve
d in
im
agin
g (P
olar
oid)
, ca
r en
tert
ainm
ent
(Aut
oson
ik,
Fusi
on),
and
hou
seho
ld
appl
ianc
es (
AFK
); o
pera
tes
a fo
ur s
tar
hote
l in
Dub
ai u
nder
the
Sha
ngri
-La
Inte
rnat
iona
l H
otel
s na
me.
Om
an I
nter
nati
onal
Dev
elop
men
t an
d In
vest
men
t C
ompa
ny
(Om
inve
st);
Mus
cat
Fina
nce
Com
pany
; N
atio
nal
Fina
nce
Com
pany
; O
man
Ara
b B
ank.
SULT
AN
Ori
gina
tes
in a
Bri
tish
-ow
ned
com
pany
, th
e W
. J.
Tow
ell
com
pany
, w
hich
wor
ked
as a
n im
port
er a
nd a
gent
for
Bri
tish
st
eam
ship
lin
es i
n th
e G
ulf.
Late
r ac
quir
ed b
y th
e Su
ltan
fam
ily,
whi
ch c
onti
nued
the
com
pany
’s ro
le a
s ag
ents
as
wel
l as
exp
ande
d in
to c
onst
ruct
ion
and
cont
ract
ing
wor
k.
Con
stru
ctio
n co
mpa
ny a
nd i
nter
ior
desi
gn s
ervi
ce;
chai
rs O
man
Oil
Co
(OO
C);
man
ufac
ture
s or
thop
edic
sp
ring
mat
tres
ses
and
beds
; 10
% s
hare
in
Soha
r Po
wer
; op
erat
es a
shi
ppin
g an
d ro
ad h
aula
ge j
oint
ven
ture
wit
h th
e Sw
edis
h B
arw
il G
roup
; O
man
Nat
iona
l D
airy
C
ompa
ny;
Al
Jaze
irah
Ser
vice
s (c
ater
ing,
hou
seke
epin
g,
laun
dry,
equ
ipm
ent
supp
ly,
and
rela
ted
serv
ices
);
exte
nsiv
e re
al e
stat
e ho
ldin
gs i
n O
man
.
Age
nts
for:
Nes
tle,
Bri
tish
Am
eric
an
Toba
cco,
Col
gate
-Pal
mol
ive,
Kel
logg
s,
Bri
dges
tone
Tyr
es a
nd U
nile
ver;
ope
rate
s 30
ret
ail
outle
ts a
t O
man
Oil
fuel
sta
tion
s in
the
cou
ntry
; di
stri
buto
r of
Maz
da i
n O
man
; im
port
s an
d di
stri
bute
s in
dust
rial
eq
uipm
ent
for
the
oil
and
gas
indu
stry
; su
pplie
s un
iform
s, s
tati
oner
y, g
lass
war
e,
tent
s, t
arpa
ulin
for
the
Om
ani
mili
tary
; im
port
s bu
ildin
g m
ater
ials
; di
stri
bute
s an
d m
arke
ts f
ood,
det
erge
nts,
and
per
fum
es i
n th
e U
AE
.
Nat
iona
l B
ank
of O
man
; M
usca
t Fi
nanc
e C
ompa
ny;
Shur
ooq
Inve
stm
ent
Serv
ices
Com
pany
; ru
ns
a lif
e in
sura
nce
com
pany
.
App
endi
x A
C
onti
nued
App
endi
x B
O
wne
rshi
p of
the
Larg
est G
CC
Ban
ks
Ban
kR
anki
ng i
n th
e To
p 10
0 A
rab
Ban
ks 2
007
Ow
ners
hip
Rela
tions
to
Kha
leej
i C
apita
l (e
ither
boa
rd m
embe
rshi
p or
sha
re
owne
rshi
p)
Saud
i A
rabi
a
Nat
iona
l C
omm
erci
al B
ank
1Sa
udi
gove
rnm
ent
inst
itut
ions
79%
, Pu
blic
21%
Al
Raj
hi B
ank
2Pu
blic
55%
Al
Raj
hi (
45%
)SA
MB
A 4
Saud
i go
vern
men
t in
stit
utio
ns 4
4%,
Kin
gdom
Hol
ding
Com
pany
5%
, B
ank
Mel
li Ir
an 1
.24%
, Pu
blic
46.
19%
Kin
gdom
(5%
)A
l G
osai
bi (
-)Sa
ad (
-)A
li R
eza
(boa
rd m
embe
r)R
iyad
Ban
k 5
Gov
ernm
ent
of S
audi
Ara
bia
51.3
0%,
Publ
ic 4
8.70
%R
ashe
d G
roup
(bo
ard
mem
ber)
Ban
que
Saud
i Fr
ansi
9G
roup
e C
rédi
t A
gric
ole
(Fra
nce)
31.
10%
, Pu
blic
68.
90%
R
ashe
d G
roup
(bo
ard
mem
ber)
SAB
B10
HSB
C H
oldi
ngs
(Uni
ted
Kin
gdom
) 40
%,
Saud
i In
vest
ors
(60%
)A
l G
osai
bi (
-)Sa
ad (
-)O
laya
n (b
oard
mem
ber)
Ara
b N
atio
nal
Ban
k15
Ara
b B
ank
(Jor
dan)
40%
, G
ener
al O
rgan
izat
ion
for
Soci
al I
nsur
ance
(S
audi
Ara
bia)
10.
80%
, Pu
blic
33.
33%
Ras
hed
10%
Jabr
5.9
0%A
l G
osai
bi (
-)
Saud
i H
olla
ndi
Ban
k33
AB
N A
MR
O (
Net
herl
ands
) 40
%,
Gen
eral
Org
aniz
atio
n fo
r So
cial
In
sura
nce
(Sau
di A
rabi
a) 8
.50%
, Pu
blic
31.
50%
Ola
yan
20%
Ban
k A
l-Ja
zira
34N
atio
nal
Ban
k of
Pak
ista
n 5.
83%
, Pu
blic
52.
87%
Ras
hed
22%
Dal
lah
Al
Bar
aka
Gro
up (
19%
)B
ank
Al
Bila
d41
Al
Sube
aei
Gro
up (
Saud
i A
rabi
a) 2
1.28
%,
Al
Muk
airi
n G
roup
(Sa
udi
Ara
bia)
8.5
6%,
Publ
ic 5
0%A
l R
ajhi
15%
Al
Jom
aih
(-)
Zam
il (-
)
(con
tinue
d)
204 B
ank
Ran
king
in
the
Top
100
Ara
b B
anks
200
7
Ow
ners
hip
Rela
tions
to
Kha
leej
i C
apita
l (e
ither
boa
rd m
embe
rshi
p or
sha
re
owne
rshi
p)
Bah
rain
Ara
b B
anki
ng
Cor
pora
tion
17K
uwai
t In
vest
men
t A
utho
rity
28.
61%
, C
entr
al B
ank
of L
ibya
28.
46%
, A
bu D
habi
Inv
estm
ent
Aut
hori
ty 2
6.56
%,
Nat
iona
l B
ank
of Y
emen
0.
34%
, Pu
blic
12.
03%
Al
Raj
hi—
Saud
i A
rabi
a (4
%)
Gul
f In
tern
atio
nal
Ban
k19
Saud
i A
rabi
an M
onet
ary
Age
ncy
27.5
0%,
Bah
rain
Mum
tala
kat
Hol
ding
C
ompa
ny 1
2.10
%,
Gov
ernm
ent
of K
uwai
t 12
.08%
, G
over
nmen
t of
O
man
12.
08%
, G
over
nmen
t of
Qat
ar 1
2.08
%,
Gov
ernm
ent
of S
audi
A
rabi
a 12
.08%
, G
over
nmen
t of
the
Uni
ted
Ara
b E
mir
ates
12.
08%
Zam
il G
roup
—Sa
udi
Ara
bia
(boa
rd m
embe
r)
Al
Ahl
i U
nite
d B
ank
27Pu
blic
Ins
titu
tion
for
Soc
ial
Secu
rity
20.
25%
, Tam
deen
Inv
estm
ent
Com
pany
13.
20%
, The
Pen
sion
Fun
d C
omm
issi
on 1
0.10
%,
Sale
m S
alah
A
l N
aser
Al
Saba
h (K
uwai
t) 5
.60%
, G
loba
l E
xpre
ss C
ompa
ny 5
.30%
, Pu
blic
45.
55%
Al
Gha
nim
—K
uwai
t (b
oard
m
embe
r)B
ehbe
hani
Gro
up—
Kuw
ait
(boa
rd m
embe
r)In
tern
atio
nal
Ban
king
C
orpo
rati
on
29A
l G
osai
bi G
roup
—Sa
udi
Ara
bia
(100
%)
Aw
al B
ank
36Sa
ad G
roup
—Sa
udi
Ara
bia
(100
%)
Nat
iona
l B
ank
of
Bah
rain
56B
ahra
in M
umta
laka
t H
oldi
ng C
ompa
ny 4
9%,
Publ
ic 4
9%
Kan
oo G
roup
(bo
ard
mem
ber)
Fakh
roo
Gro
up (
boar
d m
embe
r)A
l M
oayy
ed G
roup
(bo
ard
mem
ber)
Uni
ted
Gul
f B
ank
52K
uwai
t Pr
ojec
ts C
ompa
ny 8
8.30
%,
Publ
ic 1
1.70
%
Sham
il B
ank
63It
hmaa
r B
ank
(Bah
rain
) 60
%,
Bah
rain
Isl
amic
Ban
k 0.
26%
, Pu
blic
27
.67%
Saud
i B
inla
din
Gro
up (
12.0
7%)
Zam
il G
roup
—Sa
udi
Ara
bia
(boa
rd m
embe
r)
App
endi
x B
C
onti
nued
205B
ank
of B
ahra
in
and
Kuw
ait
68C
omm
erci
al B
ank
of K
uwai
t 19
.12%
, The
Pen
sion
Fun
d C
omm
issi
on
(Bah
rain
) 18
.83%
, G
ener
al O
rgan
izat
ion
for
Soci
al I
nsur
ance
(B
ahra
in)
13.3
5%,
KIP
CO
(K
uwai
t) 1
1.60
%,
Ban
k of
Kuw
ait
and
the
Mid
dle
Eas
t 6.
75%
, Se
curi
ties
Gro
up (
Kuw
ait)
4.1
5%,
Kuw
ait
Inve
stm
ent
Aut
hori
ty 3
.75%
, Z
umor
roda
Inv
estm
ent
Com
pany
(K
uwai
t) 3
.07%
Al
Gha
nim
Gro
up—
Kuw
ait
(boa
rd m
embe
r)
Kha
leej
i C
omm
erci
al B
ank
87G
ulf
Fina
nce
Hou
se (
Bah
rain
) 40
%,
Em
irat
es I
slam
ic B
ank
(UA
E)
10%
, Q
atar
Isl
amic
Ban
k (Q
atar
) 4.
24%
, M
EN
A R
eal
Est
ate
Com
pany
(K
uwai
t) 3
.75%
, A
wqa
f an
d M
inor
s A
ffai
rs F
ound
atio
n (U
AE
) 3%
, B
ahra
in I
slam
ic B
ank
(Bah
rain
) 2.
50%
Al
Jabr
Gro
up—
Saud
i A
rabi
a (b
oard
mem
ber)
Bah
rain
i Sa
udi
Ban
k99
The
Pen
sion
Fun
d C
omm
issi
on (
Bah
rain
) 10
%,
Moh
amm
ed B
in F
ahed
B
in A
bdul
aziz
(Sa
udi
Ara
bia)
8.2
7%,
Ibra
him
Jab
er H
usse
in A
l A
hmad
i (S
audi
Ara
bia)
5.8
2%,
Al
Fata
h In
vest
men
t (B
ahra
in)
5.50
%,
Fahe
d M
oham
med
Al
Ade
l (S
audi
Ara
bia)
5.3
8%,
Cap
ital
Fin
ance
Inv
estm
ent
(Bah
rain
) 5.
25%
, A
wal
Gro
up (
Bah
rain
) 5%
, Pu
blic
54.
78%
Zay
ani
Gro
up (
boar
d m
embe
r)
UA
E
Abu
Dha
bi
Com
mer
cial
Ban
k 7
Abu
Dha
bi I
nves
tmen
t C
ounc
il 64
.84%
, Pu
blic
35.
16%
Maz
roui
(bo
ard
mem
ber)
Nat
iona
l B
ank
of
Abu
Dha
bi11
Abu
Dha
bi I
nves
tmen
t C
ounc
il (U
AE
) 73
%,
Al
Qas
imi
Gro
up (
UA
E),
Pu
blic
27%
Maz
roui
(bo
ard
mem
ber)
Em
irat
es B
ank
Inte
rnat
iona
l12
Em
irat
es N
BD
100
%G
urg
Gro
up (
boar
d m
embe
r)A
l M
ajid
Gro
up (
boar
d m
embe
r)Lo
otah
Gro
up (
boar
d m
embe
r)D
ubai
Isl
amic
Ban
k13
Gov
ernm
ent
of D
ubai
29.
80%
Loot
ah G
roup
7.2
0%Fi
rst
Gul
f B
ank
14Sh
eikh
Tah
noun
Bin
Zay
ed B
in S
ulta
n A
l N
ahya
n 5.
60%
, N
ahda
In
vest
men
t C
ompa
ny 5
.12%
, Pu
blic
89.
28%
Mas
hreq
Ban
k16
Publ
ic 1
3%A
l G
hura
ir G
roup
87%
Uni
on N
atio
nal
Ban
k21
Gov
ernm
ent
of A
bu D
habi
40.
01%
Abu
Dha
bi I
nves
tmen
t C
ounc
il 10
%
Gov
ernm
ent
of D
ubai
10%
, A
l Q
asim
i G
roup
UA
E,
Publ
ic 3
9.99
%
(con
tinue
d)
206 B
ank
Ran
king
in
the
Top
100
Ara
b B
anks
200
7
Ow
ners
hip
Rela
tions
to
Kha
leej
i C
apita
l (e
ither
boa
rd m
embe
rshi
p or
sha
re
owne
rshi
p)
Nat
iona
l B
ank
of
Dub
ai24
Em
irat
es N
BD
100
% (
mer
ged
wit
h E
mir
ates
Ban
k in
200
9)
Com
mer
cial
Ban
k of
Dub
ai40
Gov
ernm
ent
of D
ubai
20%
, Pu
blic
80%
Al
Mul
la (
boar
d m
embe
r)G
hura
ir (
boar
d m
embe
r)R
osta
man
i (b
oard
mem
ber)
Futt
aim
(bo
ard
mem
ber)
Shar
jah
Isla
mic
B
ank
49G
over
nmen
t of
Sha
rjah
27%
, K
uwai
t Fi
nanc
e H
ouse
20%
, A
l Q
asim
i G
roup
, Pu
blic
50%
M
azro
ui (
boar
d m
embe
r)
Ban
k of
Sha
rjah
53G
over
nmen
t of
Sha
rjah
(U
AE
) 20
%,
Mub
arak
Abd
ulaz
iz A
l H
assa
wi
(Kuw
ait)
9%
Ara
b B
ank
for
Fore
ign
inve
stm
ent
and
Trad
e
57M
inis
try
of F
inan
ce a
nd I
ndus
try
(UA
E)
42.2
8%,
Liby
an A
rab
Fore
ign
Ban
k (L
ibya
) 42
.28%
, B
anqu
e E
xtér
ieur
e d’
Alg
érie
(A
lger
ia)
15.4
4%
Nat
iona
l B
ank
of
Um
m A
l-Q
aiw
ain
62G
over
nmen
t of
Um
m A
l Q
aiw
ain
(UA
E)
30%
, U
mm
Al
Qai
wai
n C
emen
t In
dust
ries
Com
pany
(U
AE
) 5.
55%
, Sa
lim A
bdul
lah
Salim
Al
Hos
ni (
UA
E),
6.7
4%,
Publ
ic 3
7.66
%
Ros
tam
ani
Gro
up (
20%
)
Inve
st B
ank
64G
loba
l Pr
ivat
e G
roup
(U
AE
) 15
.05%
, E
mir
ates
Dev
elop
men
t C
ompa
ny
(UA
E)
6.65
%,
Alli
ance
Ins
uran
ce (
UA
E),
Al
Qas
imi
Gro
up (
UA
E),
Pu
blic
69.
50%
Maz
roui
Gro
up (
6.08
%)
Rak
bank
65G
over
nmen
t of
Ras
Al
Kha
imah
(U
AE
) 52
.75%
, U
AE
inv
esto
rs 3
6.85
%,
GC
C i
nves
tors
10.
40%
Ghu
rair
(bo
ard
mem
ber)
Saga
r G
roup
—K
uwai
t (b
oard
m
embe
r)N
atio
nal
Ban
k of
Fu
jair
ah69
Gov
ernm
ent
of F
ujai
rah
43.2
3%,
Gov
ernm
ent
of D
ubai
10.
76%
, Pu
blic
24
.62%
Al
Gur
g G
roup
(21
.39%
)
Uni
ted
Ara
b B
ank
80C
omm
erci
al b
ank
(Qat
ar)
14.7
0%,
UA
B S
hare
hold
ers
Inve
stm
ent
Port
folio
(U
AE
) 14
.70%
, A
l H
osan
i G
roup
(U
AE
) 18
.10%
, A
l Q
assi
mi
Gro
up (
UA
E)
13.0
0%,
Publ
ic 2
4.60
%
Jum
a A
l M
ajid
Gro
up 7
.80%
Fard
an G
roup
(bo
ard
mem
ber)
App
endi
x B
C
onti
nued
207D
ubai
Ban
k92
Dub
ai F
inan
cial
(U
AE
) 70
%,
Em
aar
Prop
erti
es (
UA
E)
30%
Kuw
ait
Nat
iona
l B
ank
of
Kuw
ait
6Pu
blic
100
%
Bah
ar (
boar
d m
embe
r)
Kha
rafi
(boa
rd m
embe
r)Sa
gar
(boa
rd m
embe
r)Fu
laij
Gro
up (
boar
d m
embe
r)K
uwai
t Fi
nanc
e H
ouse
8K
uwai
t In
vest
men
t A
utho
rity
(K
uwai
t) 2
4.08
%,
Publ
ic A
utho
rity
for
M
inor
s A
ffai
rs (
Kuw
ait)
10.
48%
, K
uwai
t A
wqa
f Pu
blic
Fou
ndat
ion
(Kuw
ait)
8.2
3%,
Publ
ic 5
7.21
%
Bab
tain
(bo
ard
mem
ber)
Com
mer
cial
Ban
k of
Kuw
ait
31A
l Sh
arq
Hol
ding
(K
uwai
t) 2
3.11
%
Gul
f B
ank
35E
xpan
sion
for
Tra
ding
and
Con
stru
ctio
n 11
.74%
, Z
umur
uda
Hol
ding
10
.37%
, Pu
blic
40.
36%
Al
Gha
nim
Gro
up (
31.7
3%)
Beh
beha
ni G
roup
(5.
80%
)E
ssa
Gro
up (
boar
d m
embe
r)Sh
aya
Gro
up (
boar
d m
embe
r)Fu
laij
Gro
up (
boar
d m
embe
r)A
l A
hli
Ban
k of
K
uwai
t42
Kuw
ait
Inve
stm
ent
Com
pany
9.9
0%,
Gov
ernm
ent
Deb
t Se
ttle
men
t O
ffi ce
9.5
5%,
Publ
ic I
nsti
tuti
on f
or S
ocia
l Se
curi
ty 9
.51%
, W
afra
In
tern
atio
nal
Inve
stm
ent
Com
pany
7.5
0%,
Kuw
ait
and
Mid
dle
Eas
t Fi
nanc
ial
Inve
stm
ent
Com
pany
4%
, Pu
blic
23.
96%
Beh
beha
ni G
roup
(36
%)
Bur
gan
Ban
k46
Kuw
ait
Proj
ects
Com
pany
50.
24%
, Pu
blic
Ins
titu
tion
for
Soc
ial
Secu
rity
6.
11%
, W
afra
Int
erna
tion
al I
nves
tmen
t C
ompa
ny 5
.72%
, Pu
blic
37.
93%
B
ahar
Gro
up (
boar
d m
embe
r)
Bou
byan
Ban
k60
Kuw
ait
Inve
stm
ent
Aut
hori
ty 2
0%, T
he I
nves
tmen
t D
ar C
ompa
ny 2
0%,
Publ
ic 6
0%A
l Sh
aya
Gro
up (
boar
d m
embe
r)
Om
an
Ban
k M
usca
t44
Om
an g
over
nmen
t in
stit
utio
ns 3
4%,
HSB
C (
UK
) 17
%,
Dub
ai F
inan
cial
(U
AE
) 15
%,
Gro
upe
Soci
été
Gén
éral
e (F
ranc
e) 8
%,
Mus
cat
Ove
rsea
s G
roup
(O
man
) 9%
, Pu
blic
27%
(con
tinue
d)
208 B
ank
Ran
king
in
the
Top
100
Ara
b B
anks
200
7
Ow
ners
hip
Rela
tions
to
Kha
leej
i C
apita
l (e
ither
boa
rd m
embe
rshi
p or
sha
re
owne
rshi
p)
Nat
iona
l B
ank
of
Om
an54
Om
an g
over
nmen
t in
stit
utio
ns 2
3%,
Uni
ted
Dev
elop
men
t C
ompa
ny
4.46
%,
Nat
iona
l E
quit
y Fu
nd 2
.99%
, Pu
blic
17.
66%
Al
Fard
an G
roup
—Q
atar
(35
%)
[thr
ough
Com
mer
cial
Ban
kB
ahw
an G
roup
(14
.74%
)Su
ltan
Gro
up (
2.42
%)
Om
an I
nter
nati
onal
B
ank
70M
usca
t O
vers
eas
Gro
up O
man
7.9
1%,
Publ
ic 7
3.62
%Z
awaw
i G
roup
(18
%)
Ban
k D
hofa
r89
Dho
far
Inte
rnat
iona
l D
evel
opm
ent
and
Inve
stm
ent
Hol
ding
Com
pany
30
%,
Al
Auj
aili
10.1
4%,
Civ
il Se
rvic
e E
mpl
oyee
s Pe
nsio
n Fu
nd 1
0%,
Publ
ic 4
9.86
%
Om
an A
rab
Ban
k93
Om
an I
nter
nati
onal
Dev
elop
men
t an
d In
vest
men
t C
ompa
ny (
Om
an)
51%
, A
rab
Ban
k (J
orda
n) 4
9%Z
ubai
r G
roup
Qat
ar
Qat
ar N
atio
nal
Ban
k18
Qat
ar I
nves
tmen
t A
utho
rity
50%
, Pu
blic
50%
Dar
wis
h (b
oard
mem
ber)
Com
mer
cial
Ban
k of
Qat
ar26
Qat
ar I
nsur
ance
Com
pany
3%
, Pu
blic
87%
Al
Fard
an G
roup
(10
%)
Qat
ar I
slam
ic B
ank
39Pu
blic
100
%
Al
Man
a G
roup
(bo
ard
mem
ber)
Doh
a B
ank
45Q
atar
Ins
uran
ce C
ompa
ny (
Qat
ar)
0.80
%,
Al T
hani
fam
ily
Dar
wis
h (b
oard
mem
ber)
Man
a (b
oard
mem
ber)
Inte
rnat
iona
l B
ank
of Q
atar
66N
atio
nal
Ban
k of
Kuw
ait
30%
, A
l Sa
nad
Com
mer
cial
Com
pany
24
.50%
, B
roog
Tra
ding
Com
pany
24.
50%
, A
lfi ya
Inv
estm
ent
Com
pany
(Q
atar
) 10
.50%
, Q
atar
Inv
estm
ent
and
Proj
ects
Dev
elop
men
t H
oldi
ng
Com
pany
10.
50%
.A
hli
Ban
k82
Ahl
i U
nite
d B
ank
(Bah
rain
) 40
%,
Publ
ic 6
0%
Al
Man
a G
roup
(bo
ard
mem
ber)
App
endi
x B
C
onti
nued
Notes
Chapter 1
1. The First Saudi State was founded in 1744 in the Najd by the al-Saud clan, and slowly expanded to include the Hijaz in 1802. It came to an end after the Ottoman Viceroy of Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha, retook the Hijaz in 1803, and fully sub-dued the al-Saud in 1818. The al-Saud returned to power in 1824 but did not succeed in conquering the Hijaz, which remained under Ottoman control. After the defeat of the Second Saudi State in 1891 by the al-Rashid dynasty, the al-Saud regrouped and fi nally established modern-day Saudi Arabia in 1932. The 1915 to 1927 Darin Treaty (or al-Qatif Treaty), signed between the British and al-Saud, was in practice much looser than the control exerted by Britain over the Gulf states.
2. The nature of the precapitalist social formations in the Arabian peninsula dif-fered greatly from the feudal societies found in Europe or Japan. One of the key features of Arabia was the constant confl ict between nomadic and settled peoples, which refl ected itself in repeated cycles of conquest and downfall a characteristic noted by the Arab thinker Ibn Khaldun (see Baali 1988). Another important feature of these societies was the preponderance of state-ownership of land. Arab scholars describe the nature of landownership with the term ‘iqta, under which rulers granted the right of usufruct (but not ownership) to indi-viduals in exchange for military service.
3. This control was exerted through a Native Agent, fi rst appointed by the British in 1825. The Native Agents were usually Muslims from India or the Iranian littoral whose job was to report on political developments and tribal alliances, and to control the entry permits into the area. The Native Agent reported to the Political Resident, located in Bushire, Iran. In turn, the Political Resident reported to the Government of British India, which was subordinate to London.
4. At the time, foreigners described Iran as “Persia” although inhabitants of the country used the name Iran. This book will use Iran as the preferred term.
5. From 1934, Bahrain was also a key administrative center of British rule. In that year, the British created a new position on the island, the Political Agent, who became the main conduit of British rule in the Gulf Arab states.
6. From 1856 to 1970, the country was known as the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, refl ecting the division between the two geographical areas of the
210 ● Notes
country. Following the separation from Zanzibar, Britain was the main source of income for the Sultanate (Townsend 1977, p. 43)
7. Kaylani (1979, p. 574) estimates that 70 percent of the armed forces were composed of Baluchi and another 20 percent were mercenaries conscripted from British dependencies.
8. Although the link is rarely made in the literature, the origins of the term “rentier-state” actually extend back to the early 1900s and debates over the nature of the world economy. With the growth of fi nance capital at the end of the nineteenth century, and the increasing signifi cance of fi nancial profi ts drawn from credit extended to overseas borrowers, many commentators described the leading European states as rentier-states. There is clearly a distinction with the contemporary use of the term and its focus on states that have weakly developed domestic economies, but this earlier usage has the value of highlighting the fact that externally derived fi nancial fl ows have long been a key feature of the world market and need to be situated in the broader context of developments in the world economy as a whole.
9. Ross attempts to prove the rentier-state/authoritarian nexus through a statistical analysis of time-series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997. Among many other problems with this methodology, he completely ignores the role of foreign powers in shaping “regime types.” Tim Mitchell (2009) has presented a useful critique of the rentier-state claims around authoritarian states, arguing instead for an interpretation that examines the character and control of energy within the capitalist world market.
10. Lukacs is here describing the fetishism expressed by the commodity, but the same argument applies to the nature of the state.
11. The latter should not be understood solely in the sense of force, as Gramsci, among others, has emphasized. The more the state is able to project itself as a neutral body that stands above the different classes of society, the more effec-tively it is able to conceal its actual character as a class relation. For this reason, a key feature of the modern capitalist state is the projection of the interests of the dominant class as equivalent to the interests of all. This function relates to the legitimacy of the state, and is developed through an ideological representa-tion of the “common good.”
12. It is a misunderstanding of this point that leads Nazih Ayubi in his lengthy discussion of the Arab state to claim that Marx held two “potentially contradic-tory concepts of the state” (Ayubi 1995, p. 5). The question of relative autonomy, and much of the subsequent debate around this concept in Marxist state theory, extends the analysis of Marx’s classic work The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. In this book, Marx provides an assessment of Bonapartism, the state-form in France following the rise to power of Louis Bonaparte, who became Napoleon III after a coup in December 1851. Marx argued that Bonaparte had risen above the contending classes in society as a mediating fac-tor during the great social crisis of the time but nevertheless continued to act in the interests of French capitalism at a time when the bourgeoisie was unable
Notes ● 211
to do so. See also Poulantzas (1978, p. 161) for an important discussion of the notion of relative autonomy.
13. Much of the following is analogous to an argument that Ollman has presented in relation to the development of the Japanese state. Among other features of class-state relations in Japan, he discusses the role played by state bureaucrats who move to leading business positions after their term in the bureaucracy (a job-shift known as amakudari, “descent from heaven”) thus blurring the lines between state and capitalist class.
14. Another pertinent example outside of the Gulf is the Egyptian state under the leadership of Muhammed Ali. Samir Amin (1985) argues that Ali played an important role in fostering the rise of a “bureaucratic bourgeoisie,” in alliance with foreign powers, which was tied to the export of cotton to Europe.
15. Terry Karl (1997) raises similar criticisms over “agency-centered” approaches to the rentier-state. She attempts to overcome these problems by presenting state deci-sion-making as being framed by “structured contingency,” effectively a form of path-dependency in which the decisions of the state are shaped by the structural constraints of earlier choices. In essence, however, this approach does not funda-mentally move away from a focus on institutions rather than social relations.
16. See Ross (2001) for a striking, but by no means unique, example of this approach.17. A similar critique is made by David McNally (1981) of the main institutionalist
school of Canadian history, the Staples Approach, which interprets Canadian capitalism through the lens of various staple products such as furs and timber.
18. This approach should be distinguished from theories of the “transnational capi-talist class” (Cox 1987; Sklair 1995, 2001; Robinson 2004, 2007). Transnational theorists argue that a qualitative change has occurred in capitalism in which the state is “no longer the organizing principle of capitalism and the institutional ‘container’ of class development and social life” (Robinson 2004, p. 40). In contrast, this book employs the notion of “internationalization” articulated in the vein of Palloix, with its emphasis on the continuing salience of the nation-state and its role in reinforcing rather than undermining state formation.
Chapter 2
1. Figures provided by Robert Brenner confi rm this pattern. He compares the net profi t rate in manufacturing from 1950–1970 to that prevailing in 1970–1993: 12.9 percent/9.9 percent in the US, 23.2 percent/13.8 percent in Germany, 21.6 percent/17.2 percent in Japan (Brenner 2000, p. 8). See also T. Weisskopf (1992) who presents before and after tax profi t rates for eight advanced capital-ist countries (UK, Sweden, France, West Germany, Italy, Canada, Japan, and the United States) showing a marked decline in profi t rates from the late 1960s onwards.
2. Another factor helping the US economy was the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, which helped to generate a commodities boom and a rapid increase in industrial activity, primarily benefi ting US capital and its ally Japan.
212 ● Notes
3. The period 1930 to 1960 saw the development and commercial production of polyurethane, polystyrene, nylon, Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET), polyester, polypropylene, Styrofoam, DDT, detergents, and so forth.
4. One of the preconditions for receiving US funds was the reinstatement of the Agnelli family (allies of Mussolini and original owners of the fi rm who had been ousted by the Italian resistance following liberation) to a position of power in the fi rm.
5. See the superb account by Simon Bromley (1991, especially chapters 2 and 3) for detailed discussion of these trends and the relationship between oil and US hegemony in the postwar period.
6. Allied forces consciously targeted German, Italian, and Japanese oil supplies, and this was a major factor in the eventual collapse of the latter’s military machines.
7. The historical account of this process has been told by many authors. See Sampson (1976); Terzia (1985); Skeet (1988); Yergin (1991); and Bromley (1991).
8. The discussion over the reasons behind the end of the “Golden Age” is complex and cannot be given full treatment here. See Mandel (1983, 1995); Harvey (1999, 2005); and Brenner (2000) for some of this debate.
9. These companies controlled virtually all the world’s oil supplies during the 1950s and 1960s. In 1966, for example, the eight IOCs controlled 76 percent of all oil outside North America and the USSR (Sampson 1976, p. 221).
10. As the role of Saudi Arabia makes clear, this does not imply that the national-ization of Gulf oil supplies was antagonistic to the interests of the United States. Simon Bromley (1991) clearly maps the common interest of Gulf producers and the IOCs that was centered on securing a steady oil supply and IOC con-trol over refi ning, marketing, and distribution. Moreover, a rise in the price of oil did not hurt the United States as much as it did European and Japanese rivals, which were heavily reliant on imported oil.
11. The increasing price of oil further accentuated infl ationary problems and the undermining of the rate of profi t in the industrial sector due to the increasing cost of energy inputs. Although it was widely argued at the time that the oil price rise was the cause of the economic crisis, it is more accurate to see the crisis as systemic, representing the exhaustion of the factors that had made the upturn in the rate of profi t possible in the immediate postwar period. Indeed, the decline in the rate of profi t across most of the advanced capitalist world had begun long before the rise in oil prices, and the price rise was initially used to counteract its effects through the extension of liquidity in the form of credit. See Mandel (1995) for a full treatment of this argument.
12. The interlocking of the Gulf fi nancial sector and the Euromarkets can also be seen in the direct geographical expansion of Gulf banks into Europe. Sherbiny provides a 1983 list that shows 60 Arab banks in London, 3 of which were established before 1970, 12 during 1970 to 1975, 22 during 1976 to 1980, 16 after 1980, and the remaining 7 at an unknown time. Paris held about 39 Arab banks, 3 of which were established before 1970, 7 during 1970 to 1975, 26 during 1976 to 1980, and 3 after 1980 (Sherbiny 1986, p. 36).
Notes ● 213
13. While these are fi gures for OPEC as a whole (Algeria, Angola, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Ecuador) the Gulf countries (particularly Saudi Arabia) were the dominant producers. Calculated from Gibson (1989, p. 5) and Congressional Budget Offi ce (1981, p. 35).
14. According to a US treasury memo, in March 1978, US Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal secretly fl ew to Saudi Arabia in order to negotiate a deal with the Saudis to sell their oil solely in US dollars (Clark 2005, p. 2).
15. Gowan argues that the Nixon administration encouraged OPEC to raise oil prices a full two years before this actually happened, and to place US private banks at the center of petrodollar recycling in the emerging Euromarkets. Gowan’s explanation of this process is detailed and fascinating although his argument sometimes confl ates the outcome of policies with the intention of actors. He thus implies that the use of petrodollars and the oil price rise was deliberately engineered by the Nixon government in order to construct what he calls the Dollar-Wall Street Regime. It is necessary to bring into the argument the relative strength of the oil exporting countries in the context of the antico-lonial movements of the postwar period. In other words, it is mistaken to understand the Gulf countries as being “forced” to undertake a rise in oil prices, rather than seeing the confl uence of interest between the Gulf monarchies and US policy.
16. See Saad-Filho and Johnston (1995) and Harvey (2005) for further discussion of neoliberal ideology.
17. For an excellent analysis of the Volcker Shock and its role in the reconstitution of US fi nance as the dominant pole of a new global order, see Panitch and Gindin (2005).
18. On the western fl ank of the Middle East, the key element to US control was its embrace of Israel, which, with its origins as a settler-colonial state, was organically tied to external support for its continued viability in a hostile envi-ronment.
19. Abrahamian casts the 1953 coup as a battle between Western Imperialism and Iranian nationalism over control and distribution (not profi ts) of oil, rather than a US-Soviet proxy battle. He uses British Foreign Offi ce documents to dispute the CIA version of events and shows that from the outset Britain and the United States knew quite well that Mossadegh was distrustful of the Soviet Union.
20. It should also be noted that the United States simultaneously gave support to Iran, which later came to light in the Iran-Contra Scandal.
Chapter 3
1. The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman was renamed the Sultanate of Oman in 1970 following a coup by Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said against his father, Said ibn Taymur.
214 ● Notes
2. The following historical overview necessarily leaves out much detail. See Crystal (1995); Chaudhry (1997); Zahlan (1998); Vassiliev (1998); Kazim (2000); and Niblock (2007) for surveys of the history of individual GCC states.
3. For examples of these machinations in the case of Kuwait, see Smith (1999). 4. Moreover, an argument that solely relies on these “push” or “pull” factors to
explain labor migration to the Gulf, obfuscates the role of Gulf capitalism in actually creating the conditions in the periphery that generate these labor fl ows in the fi rst place. If the later argument of this book is correct (see in particular chapters 4 and 6), then the Gulf itself is implicated in creating the worsening poverty found in the peripheral countries, and generating the widening differen-tial between their social conditions and the GCC. In other words, the two key themes of this book are mutually reinforcing and deeply intertwined: the GCC’s central role in the development of global capitalism helps to generate the political and economic dynamics that induce labor migration to the Gulf itself.
5. A key step in this process was the 1968 Royal Decree, the Public Land Distribution Ordinance (PLDO) (Royal Decree No. 26/2, 1968), which pre-vented use of undeveloped lands. Instead, land was reallocated as private prop-erty to individuals, companies, and organizations.
6. Steffen Hertog notes the remarkable fact that in 1975, one-third of the employ-ees in the Saudi Deputy Ministry of Social Affairs were illiterate (Hertog 2010, p. 106).
7. In Kuwait today, the term bidoun (those without) is used to describe the large numbers of Kuwaiti residents who have long been present in the country but lack citizenship rights. The issue of bidoun is a central question of Kuwaiti politics.
8. Heard-Bey notes that these schemes also differentiated rights according to tribal background and relationship to the ruler.
9. These fi gures likely underestimate the number of temporary migrant workers throughout the GCC. If workers who are living and working illegally are included, this fi gure would rise considerably. In the mid-2000s, Saudi Arabia was deporting around 700,000 “illegal” workers on an annual basis, more than 10 percent of the total number offi cially recorded as present in the country.
10. The death sentences were never carried out and the 14 were freed from impris-onment following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
11. Children of migrant workers were allowed back into Emirati schools in 2006, but only at the ratio of one in fi ve pupils. Noncitizens were also required to pass entrance exams and pay tuition fees.
12. This shift should not be interpreted as diminishing the importance of the Gulf region for Arab workers. Many Egyptian, Lebanese, Yemeni, and Jordanian families are still reliant upon remittance fl ows from the Gulf region. It has been estimated, for example, that in 2007, 30 percent of Lebanon’s labor force resided in the Gulf and the country obtained 24 percent of GDP from remittance fl ows.
13. This number increased dramatically following the oil boom of the early twenty-fi rst century. By 2002, 95 percent of Bangladeshi overseas workers were located in the GCC.
Notes ● 215
14. These details are drawn from multiple visits by the author to Al Muhaisnah 2 in October 2009.
15. Poorer areas of Dubai are covered with posters advertising “bedspaces” or “par-titions” for “bachelors.” The tragic consequences of this were seen in August 2008 following a fi re that gutted a two-storey villa in the Naif area of Dubai and killed 13 people. Over 500 workers were found to have been living illegally in the villa.
16. In Saudi Arabia, for example, a Saudi manufacturing worker was compensated, on average, three times more than a non-Saudi worker in the year 2000. In the trans-port and communication sector, the difference was four times as great (Saudi MoEP 2000). A foreign manufacturing worker in Qatar received one-sixth the average compensation of a Qatari worker in 2003 (State of Qatar 2004, p. 127). In Bahrain, according to the General Organization for Social Insurance, the general average wage for 2006 in the private sector was BD377 for Bahraini workers and BD170 for foreign laborers (http://www.bahrainrights.org). An important related factor here is that national labor tends to be concentrated in the government and public sectors, which are higher paying (and with better conditions).
17. The fi rst comment is from Majeed Al-Alawi, the Bahraini Minister of Labour and Social Affairs (Qatar Peninsula 2004) and the second from GCC Secretary-General Abdul Rahman Al Attiya (Alam 2006).
18. With the partial exception of Bahrain, where the larger proportion of poor nationals within the overall workforce, overlapping with the Shia-Sunni dynamic noted in Chapter 1, creates greater potential for anti-regime struggles.
19. Aramco originated in 1933 under the name California Arabian Standard Oil Company (Casoc) after the government of Saudi Arabia granted an oil conces-sion to Standard Oil of California (today known as Chevron). In 1936 the Texas Oil Company (known today as Texaco) purchased a 50 percent share in the concession and in 1944 the joint venture became known as Aramco. The Saudi Arabian government acquired a 25 percent share of Aramco in 1973, increased to 60 percent by 1974, and fi nally acquired full control by 1980.
20. In the UAE, each of the Emirates established its own state-owned company but considerable foreign investment remained in the subsidiaries of these compa-nies. For example, in Abu Dhabi, the Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations (ADCO) was 40 percent owned by foreign multinationals and 60 percent by the state-owned ADNOC. ADCO generates more than half of Abu Dhabi’s oil production and is the largest crude oil producer in the southern Gulf. In Qatar, foreign companies accounted for around one-third of Qatar’s oil production capacity. In Oman, more than 90 percent of oil exploration and production in Oman takes place through Petroleum Development Oman (PDO), which is a joint venture between the government (60 percent) and foreign companies (Royal Dutch Shell 34 percent, Total 4 percent, and Partex 2 percent). In Bahrain, onshore oil production is controlled by the state-owned Bahrain Petroleum Company (Bapco) while exploration concessions have been awarded to foreign investors in offshore areas.
216 ● Notes
21. Dubal grew to become the largest manufacturer in the country and the biggest single non-oil contributor to Dubai’s economy.
22. The Zayani conglomerate is a massive Bahraini capital group whose investments span automobiles (agents for BMW, Rolls Royce, Mitsubishi, Ferrari, and Hyundai), fi nance capital (founders of Investcorp, the Bahrain Islamic Bank, and Bahrain Kuwait Insurance) as well as manufacturing. Xenel is involved in petrochemical production (the fi rst privately owned petrochemical plant in the Middle East at Yanbu), construction, real estate, and information technology.
23. These companies were the Saudi Cement Company (1955), Qatar National Cement Company (1965), Kuwait Cement Company (1968), and, in the UAE, the National Cement Company (1968). Oman established the Raysut Cement Company in 1981 (although ownership was dominated by Saudi and UAE capital).
24. Prominent Gulf capitalist groups involved in cement include Al Rajhi, Olayan, Al Zamil, Gosaibi (Saudi Arabia); Al Rashed, Saqer, Al Kharafi , Babtain, and Boodai (Kuwait); Ghurair, Qassimi (UAE); and Al Fardan (Qatar). The UAE also leads in the related ceramics industry. The RAK Ceramic plant in the UAE is the world’s largest single ceramic products plant and accounts for 5 percent of the total world production of ceramic tiles (UAEY 2006, p. 113).
25. Calculated by author from World Bank statistics.26. Calculated by author from UNCTAD data, www.unctad.org. 27. Niblock argues that this is one piece of evidence against the thesis of Chaudhry
that the rise of a new Najd bourgeoisie had displaced the dominance of the old Hijazi merchant class.
28. In the UAE, there were 6,000 commercial agencies registered at the Ministry of Economy in 2009. According to one of the country’s largest holder of agencies, the Bin Hamoodah Group, the system was explicitly designed by the late Sheikh Zayed as an alternative to taxes on foreign investors (Abdel Hai 2009, p. 3). This is one further example of how the state established preferential laws that privi-leged citizen-owned businesses rather than the entire resident population.
29. Between 1959 and 1966 the Gulf states (again with the exception of Saudi Arabia) issued their own currency, the Gulf Rupee, which was pegged to the Indian Rupee. When the Indian rupee was devalued in 1966, the Saudi Riyal was briefl y adopted as a common currency. By the early 1970s, all states had their own sovereign currency.
30. In Saudi Arabia, where oil was discovered in 1939, the Nederlands Handel-Maatschappij (NHM) (today known as ABN AMRO following a merger with the Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank) held the country’s gold stock and processed oil royalty payments. In Qatar, the Eastern Bank was established in 1950, a few months after the fi rst oil exports. It was the only bank in the country at that time and acted as the government bank. In Dubai, BBME acted as a state bank and helped fi nance Dubai’s fi rst hospital and other development schemes. It also collected customs dues on imported goods on behalf of the ruling family. The Dubai manager of BBME was part of a coterie of close advisors to the
Notes ● 217
ruling Sheikh (Jones 1986, p. 17). In Oman, BBME issued the fi rst national currency of the country in 1970 and administered the governmental Muscat Currency Authority.
31. Bin Mahfouz is a powerful Saudi family whose members the Saudi government had used as export-import agents in the early decades of the state. They con-tinued to control the bank until 1999, when 50 percent of the shares were sold to the Public Investment Fund and the management changed.
32. Following a liquidity crisis in 1960 and the insolvency of Al Watani Bank, SAMA transferred the assets of Al Watani to Riyad Bank and rearranged the management of the latter in 1961. The crisis had arisen due to the failure of some of the board of management to repay loans taken from the bank. In response, the government took over the shares of the defaulters and ended up with 38 percent ownership of the bank.
33. Champion (2003) and Chaudhry (1997) document the role of state largesse in the development of these institutions, particularly the Riyad Bank. Riyad Bank was owned by Najdi merchants and was given the lucrative contract to manage government accounts at the expense of the NCB in 1967, despite the latter being the more qualifi ed institution. They argue that this was one marker in the transi-tion to Najdi-dominated capitalism in Saudi Arabia (Champion 2003, p. 98).
34. In 2004, 40 percent of all loans and deposits in Kuwait were held between Kuwait Finance House and the largest bank, the National Bank of Kuwait.
35. In Qatar, the state owns 50 percent of Qatar National Bank. In Oman, the Royal Court owns around 20 percent of Bank Muscat.
36. Hertog has a different reading from Chaudhry of this period in Saudi Arabia, arguing that the Saudi state acted to maintain its wider distributional mecha-nisms rather than business interests per se (see Hertog 2010, p. 119).
Chapter 4
1. In 1989 the US Treasury built upon this approach by proposing a new plan, the Brady Plan (named after US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady), which inaugurated an avalanche of private capital fl ows to the South. The Brady Plan enabled debtor countries to switch their outstanding debt from an amount of money they were required to pay a particular lender, into a bond that could be bought and sold in fi nancial markets. Brady Bonds, as they were called, carried a slight reduction in the overall loan principal or in interest rates. In return for receiving this discount, countries were required to implement neoliberal struc-tural adjustment measures. Under the scheme, thousands of investors from across the world could purchase a share in the income stream generated by these debts simply by purchasing a bond on the fi nancial markets. Because the price of these bonds moved up and down depending on market conditions, investors could also speculate on these movements.
2. The importance of this intraregional trade for Asia is shown in export fi gures: in 2005/2006 intraregional exports accounted for 40 percent of total Asian
218 ● Notes
manufacturing exports (for component exports the comparable fi gure was 60 percent) (Brooks and Changchun 2008, p. 30). Nevertheless, 61 percent of total Asian exports are eventually consumed in the United States, Japan, and the EU.
3. IMF Statistics. Accessed August 10, 2008, http://www.imf.org. 4. For a good explanation of the rise of derivatives and the role they play in “bind-
ing” and “blending” capital across different geographical spaces, see Bryan and Rafferty (2006). David McNally (2009) has also argued that the rise of deriva-tives represents an attempt to fi nd a new standard of “world money” given the increasing contradictions in the role played by the US dollar in the global economy as both a universal measure of value and a domestic currency.
5. This all required a series of changes to the regulations governing US fi nancial markets. Enticed by enormous potential profi ts, US banks led a sustained lobbying effort to free themselves from restrictions on their investment activities. In 1999, the US Congress passed The Financial Services Modernization Act, which repealed the Banking Act of 1933 (also known as the Glass-Steagall Act). Glass-Steagall had been passed in the wake of the Great Depression and prohibited commercial banks from engaging in investment and insurance services. It had been aimed at prevent-ing bank deposits of ordinary Americans from being exposed to risky investments and speculative activities. The repeal of Glass-Steagall opened the door to com-mercial bank investments in instruments such as derivatives.
6. Iraq, Algeria, and Kuwait are also among the top Middle East oil exporters to the United States.
7. Natural gas imports are also projected to double between 2005 and 2010, and then quadruple between 2020 and 2030 as Indian demand continues to grow and domestic production peaks (IEA 2007, p. 501). Much of this demand stems from the expansion of Indian industry. After China, India is the world’s second-largest producer of both cement and nitrogenous fertilizer (IEA 2007, p. 471), two industries that require large quantities of energy. India is also the world’s seventh-largest producer of steel, and by 2030 around 35 percent of India’s total industrial electricity demand will come from the iron and steel industry (IEA 2007, p. 469).
8. There are differences of course in the importance of these regions. While the GCC, Iraq, and Iran possess large quantities of oil and natural gas, the Afghanistan/Pakistan region holds more of a strategic signifi cance—located in the intersection of the Gulf and Central Asia. Not only does it form the cross-roads of these two energy-rich areas, but (through Pakistan) it abuts onto the Indian Ocean, which remains the primary shipping route for Gulf oil (see Kaplan 2009 for a discussion of these strategic issues).
9. There is considerable debate over the reasons for this rise in the price of oil and the relative contribution of increased demand from China, the actions of speculators and derivative markets in commodity futures, or the depletion of oil fi elds. There is no space to explore this debate in detail—suffi ce to say that the increased demand from China was certainly a major contributing factor in the oil price rise.
Notes ● 219
10. At this stage, the discussion focuses on fl ows to the advanced capitalist economies. Those to other areas of the world are discussed in the following two chapters.
11. Of course the overall quantity of petrodollars rose dramatically, so even if a decreasing proportion was spent domestically, its absolute size was increasing very rapidly with important implications for the process of class formation (see next chapter).
12. Deutsche Bank was to estimate in 2009 that GCC countries accounted for around 45 percent of all SWF global assets.
13. Setser and Ziemba’s estimate of $457 billion is probably closer to the mark and has been obliquely confi rmed by ADIA spokespeople.
14. It was estimated in 2007, for example, that only 27 percent of asset purchases by Middle East oil investors (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, UAE, Qatar, Libya, Iran, and Oman) were identifi able (Toloui 2007, p. 5).
15. One of the reasons for this is the predominance of family-owned companies that are not publically listed and therefore do not need to provide public fi nan-cial records. Individuals also include the private wealth of the ruling families.
16. For example, it is widely believed that the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority does not use a mark-to-market method for valuing their assets (i.e., measuring value on their current fair market price) and thereby understated losses in the 2008 downturn (Setser and Ziemba 2009, p. 13).
17. These estimates broadly correspond with Toloui (2007), who notes that net private capital outfl ows, as a proportion of total current account surpluses, reached 36 percent for Saudi Arabia, 30 percent for Kuwait, and 40 percent for Qatar in 2007—greatly exceeding the average of 20 percent all the world’s major oil producers.
18. See Lubin (2007); Setser and Ziemba (2006); Toloui (2007) for a discussion of these issues.
19. Middle East OPEC is defi ned as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, UAE, Qatar, Libya, Iran, and Oman. Lubin (2007) provides slightly different fi gures but with the same overall trend. He has compared the post-2000 oil price rise with that of the 1970s period. Using available statistics from the Bank of International Settlements, Lubin estimates that only 19.8 percent of the total current account surplus from 2002 to 2005 was deposited in BIS reporting banks. This contrasts to the 1977–1982 period, in which 28 percent of the surplus was deposited in these banks (Lubin 2007, pp. 5–6).
20. Toloui estimates 64 percent for the period 2002–2006. ECB fi gures broadly confi rm this estimate (Sturm, Strasky, Adolf, and Peschel 2008, p. 42). The caveats about TIC data raised above should also be noted.
21. Toloui estimates 27 percent for 2002–2006 (of identifi able petrodollars).22. For Credit Suisse, the two largest shareholders are Qatar Investment Authority
and the Saudi Olayan Group (10 percent and 7 percent). Barclay’s Bank is one-third owned by investors from the Gulf. The largest stakes in the London Stock Exchange Group—equivalent to nearly 50 percent are owned by Gulf investors (Borse Dubai and Qatar Investment Authority). With Daimler AG,
220 ● Notes
the world’s largest truck maker, the two largest shareholders (holding 17 per-cent) are from the Gulf (Aabar Investments and the Kuwait Investment Authority). The Qatar Investment Authority owns stakes in J Sainsbury, NYSE, Volkswagen, and Porsche.
23. The estimate of US$420 billion in private wealth is found in SABB (2008, p. 5).24. The Saudi British Bank (SABB) estimates only $7.5 billion returned to Saudi
Arabia in the year following the attacks (SABB 2003, p. 5).25. Author calculated from McKinsey (2009).26. Figures calculated by author from UNCTAD. Accessed July 10–15, 2008,
www.unctad.org.27. See, for example, Zoellick’s comments at a press conference in Jordan following
the World Economic Forum in 2003: “[W]e could start to combine [FTAs], for example, we look towards the possibility of countries in the Gulf perhaps joining into the Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, making specialized arrange-ments for their goods and agriculture but following the basic rules, and that would have a benefi t of encouraging regional integration, so that their products to qualify would not have just to come from Bahrain, but may come from Qatar or Oman or from UAE or a combination of that. So we can encourage regional integration in the process, whether in the Gulf, whether in the Maghreb or whether in other parts of the Arab world. And the ultimate goal, as the President said, would be to draw these into the Middle East Free Trade Area. That, of course, depends on the willingness of countries to undertake these reforms” (Zoellick 2003b).
28. If the negotiations are successful, the European Union-Gulf Cooperation Council FTA would represent the fi rst ever FTA between two regional blocs.
Chapter 5
1. An earlier statement, the Unifi ed Economic Agreement (UEA), had been signed at the formation of the GCC in 1981. The UEA was part of the broader goal of establishing “the institutions and apparatus that will make . . . economic integration and social merger a living reality” (cited in Ramazani 1988, p. 28). It aimed to lessen the ability of member states to control the movement of capital (in its various forms) across intra-GCC borders. It called for the freedom of movement, work, and residence for GCC citizens regardless of their national location, and extended national treatment in a range of economic sectors to capital investments. In 1983, as part of the UEA framework, a GCC free trade area came into operation. Nevertheless, the pace of integration moved slowly throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, with many of the stated goals of the UEA remaining rhetorical rather than real changes on the ground. Signifi cant restrictions on the movement of capital and goods continued to exist within the GCC and national economic policy was largely uncoordinated.
2. This law removed certifi cate-of-origin requirements for all domestically pro-duced goods in the GCC. Previously, an elaborate procedure was required to
Notes ● 221
prove a minimum 40 per cent domestic content and goods had to go through customs inspection at each internal border.
3. With the exception of higher tariff rates that existed for tobacco and alcohol products. The common external tariff meant that some states were forced to vastly reduce the costs placed on foreign importers to the region (in 1999 the simple mean tariff was 12.6 percent in Saudi Arabia, compared with 4.8 percent in Oman).
4. The intent of Articles 3 and 4 were summarized in the closing statement of the 26th Session of the Supreme Council in 2005: “The [economic agreement] aims at unifying the external trade policy of the GCC States, and dealing with the outside world as a single economic unit. It also calls for adopting a unifi ed internal trade policy that would facilitate the movement of citizens, commodi-ties, services, and means of transport” (CS26 2005).
5. The earlier 1982 agreement raised the possibility of a monetary union but no concrete steps were taken in this regard. In December 2000, the GCC Committee of Monetary Agencies and Central Bank Governors, and member states’ Ministers of Finance, were mandated by the GCC Supreme Council to devise a working plan and a timetable for a single currency, which they presented to the 2001 Muscat Summit. It was included within Article 4 of the EASCC.
6. With the exception of Kuwait’s dinar, which is pegged to a basket of currencies. The precise breakdown of this basket is not made public but is clearly weighted toward the US$.
7. The convergence criteria were put forward by member states in Abu Dhabi on December 18–19, 2005: a cap on the budget defi cit at 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) when oil prices are $25/barrel or above; a ceiling on public debt of 60 percent of GDP; infl ation to be kept within 2 percent of the GCC average; interest rates to be no more than 2 percent above the average of the three lowest rates; and maintenance of foreign exchange reserve coverage of four-six months of imports (MEED 2005, p. 28).
8. The countries and year of membership are as follows: Bahrain (1995), Kuwait (1995), Qatar (1996), United Arab Emirates (1996), Oman (2000), and Saudi Arabia (2005).
9. At a meeting of the Arab Business Council in December 2006, this disciplinary nature of FTAs was succinctly captured by Robert Lawrence, Professor of Trade and Investment at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, who opined that “[t]he test of a good agreement is what it gets you to do” (ABC 2007, p. 7). It should be noted that these agreements also accentuated the contradic-tions in the regional integration process. Bahrain and Oman’s bilateral FTA agreements with the United States violated the collective negotiation position outlined in EASCC Article 2 and generated signifi cant complaint from other GCC states.
10. Niblock argues that membership of the WTO was utilized by elements within the Saudi state as a useful pretence for enabling those reforms to move forward against the efforts of others who were opposed. Hertog examines the neo-patrimonial
222 ● Notes
structure of the Saudi state, which he characterizes as a hierarchical and vertically divided “hub-and-spoke system.” As a result of deals and counterbalancing within the al-Saud family, ministries were parcellized from one another and operated as independent “fi efdoms” with strong vertical control but little horizontal commu-nication. This pattern meant that some liberalization measures could be retarded through a de facto veto power held by each ministry. In contrast, in the case of a small emirate such as Dubai, the operation of the state was much more centralized in the individual decisions of the Ruler and his immediate family members.
11. “Extra liquidity” refers to the amount of petrodollars that these states received relative to the period preceding the oil price rise. The rate of increase of this liquidity was also accelerating in this period. According to the IMF, the current account surplus for the Gulf region in 2006 amounted to nearly one half of the cumulative surplus during the period 2001–2005 (Lubin 2007, p. 8).
12. This average obscures signifi cant differences between GCC states. In 2008, GDP per capita ranged from $18,903 in Saudi Arabia to over $70,000 in the small Gulf country of Qatar. These fi gures also need to be framed by the con-siderable differentiation of wealth due to the very large proportion of low-paid migrant workers. For these reasons, average per capita GDP is a poor represen-tation of the true nature of accumulation in the GCC states.
13. A caveat should be noted here regarding the transparency of data in the GCC. A 2002 IMF report estimated, for example, that the Saudi government did not disclose 20 percent of oil receipts within the budget (Rutledge 2009, p. 88).
14. By 2008, the GCC’s per capita energy consumption was among the highest in the world, and electricity demand to 2015 was estimated to require $7 billion per year and a capacity increase equivalent to 80 percent of currently installed capacity (Hertog and Luciani 2009, p. 8).
15. Calculated by author from national statistics.16. In contrast, among UAE nationals the gender profi le is almost balanced at 50.7
percent males and 49.3 percent females. 17. The Compounded Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) for the construction sector
from 2003–2007 was as follows: Bahrain (32.15 percent), Kuwait (13.80 per-cent), UAE (22.35 percent), Qatar (33.04 percent), KSA (20.51 percent), and Oman (29.52 percent). Calculated by author from national statistics.
18. The law is called “Regulation of Ownership and Investment in Real Estate by Non-Saudis,” issued under the Royal Decree No M/15 dated 17/4/1421H.
19. The survey was based on the value of contracts won in 2006 and 2007. It covered contractors involved in the building and civilian sectors and did not include companies that focused on the oil and gas, petrochemicals, utilities, and industrial sectors (foreign companies dominate those sectors and are discussed below).
20. Of the entire list of 50, 28 companies are from the GCC. 21. Although strictly outside of the period examined in this chapter, inclusion of
this analysis is justifi ed due to the fact that almost all of these projects were launched in 2005–2007.
22. Author calculation from annual statistics.
Notes ● 223
23. The cement sector also grew rapidly, with one estimate claiming 13 percent per annum annual growth over the 2000–2003 period four times greater than the global average and nearly twice the fi gure recorded for China (HSBC 2005, pp. 3–7). This sector, however, will not be discussed further here as the owner-ship structures remained very similar to those discussed above.
24. Of course, the latter prediction depends greatly on the future scenarios of world economic growth.
25. Balexco by the Gulf Finance House, which is controlled by the Al Shaya Group (Kuwait), the Saudi Arabian Economic Development Company, Dubai Islamic Bank, Ohali Group (Saudi Arabia), QInvest (Qatar), Oman Pension Fund, and Kuwait Investment Company; and Midal Cables controlled by the Ali Reza Group (Saudi Arabia) and Al Zayani Group (Bahrain).
26. The GCC’s relative advantage in petrochemical production arises because it uses ethane as a feedstock, rather than naptha, which is typically used elsewhere. Ethane in the Gulf is captured as a byproduct of crude oil production (it is extracted from the associated gas produced alongside crude oil), whereas naptha is distilled from oil and hence linked to the oil price. The cheap supply of ethane in the GCC is indicated in the price differential natural gas is offered to domestic producers at US$ 0.75/mmbtu compared to US$3-8/mmbtu elsewhere in the world. Because the price of naptha is linked to the price of oil, in periods of high oil prices there is even greater cost benefi t for ethane-based petrochemical production.
27. The impetus for this shift has been reinforced by the increasing cost of oil (and hence the relative advantage of GCC-based production) for global petrochemical companies such as Shell, Exxon, Union Carbide, Mitsubishi, Hoechst, and Dow.
28. A manager of Shell’s joint venture plant at Nanhai, which supplies China’s special economic zones with petrochemicals, confi rmed this shift: “In 2000, about 25% of our chemicals assets were in the Middle East and Asia-Pacifi c. By 2010, the aim is to have just over a third in these two regions, to take feedstock advantage opportunities and to be positioned to meet demand in the area of highest growth potential. The bulk of Shell’s future chemicals capacity additions will be in these two regions. In the Middle East, we have two produc-tion joint ventures in Saudi Arabia, one producing ethylene, styrene monomer, EDC, MTBE and crude industrial ethanol, the other producing benzene. We are also planning a joint venture world-scale gas-based cracker and derivatives complex in Qatar” (McKendrick 2007, p. 11).
29. A key signal of this was a visit by then Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Saudi Arabia in 1999, which resulted in an agreement to open up the Chinese refi nery sector to Saudi investment, in return for allowing Chinese companies to invest in Saudi hydrocarbon exploration and development. As a result of this agreement, the Chinese state-owned oil company Sinopec won the bid for a natural gas project in a northwestern block of Saudi Arabia’s Rub al-Khali gas fi elds in 2004 the fi rst time in 25 years that the area had been opened up to foreign fi rms.
30. If basic infrastructure costs are also included, the sector constitutes around 55 percent of the total megaproject bill. Examples of these megaprojects in
224 ● Notes
Saudi Arabia include a $10 billion Aramco-Sumitomo Chemical refi ning and petrochemical joint venture called Petro-Rabigh, a $6 billion Aramco-Total export refi nery, a $6 billion Aramco-ConocoPhillips export refi nery, and the US$8 billion Saudi Kayan Petrochemicals plant.
31. It should be noted that despite LBC-Rotana’s relatively small share, it is the most diversifi ed of all the media conglomerates. Owned by Saudi Arabia’s Prince Bin Talal Al Waleed, it controls the largest music label in the Middle East, six music TV stations, and two Lebanese newspapers. It is also the third-largest shareholder in the global conglomerate, News Corp.
32. This internationalization of capital within the media sector bears signifi cant cultural implications within the Arab world. Despite Gulf-dominated owner-ship and the apparent conservatism of the Gulf societies, TV programming is heavily westernized and music videos often portray women in ways that are strikingly at odds with typical Gulf norms. It is also now commonplace for Lebanese and Egyptian performers to include khaleeji-style music on their recordings, or to fi lm videos within the Gulf, in order to cater to the Gulf consumer market. In this sense, the internationalization of Gulf capital is pro-voking a broader cultural transformation through the Middle East.
33. A second local company, DU, entered the UAE market in 2007. The Omani market is dominated by a local company, Omantel, and a Q-tel subsidiary, Nawras Telecom. In September 2010, Etisalat made a non-binding offer to purchase 46 percent of Zain, an acquisition that would strongly confi rm the pan-GCC internationalization tendencies characterizing this sector.
34. One illustration of the strong outlook toward broader internationalization in this sector was an estimation by the Chief Executive of Q-Tel, Nasser Marafi h, that as much as 90 percent of Q-Tel’s revenues would come from international revenues by 2014 (George-Cosh 2009, p. 6).
35. With the sole exception of 1996–1997. Calculated by author from United Nations Statistics Database. Accessed June 2008, http://comtrade.un.org.
36. Calculated by author from United Nations Statistics Database. Accessed June 2008, http://comtrade.un.org.
37. Calculated from United Nations Commodity Statistics Database. Accessed June 2008, http://comtrade.un.org.
38. Calculated by author from UN Comtrade fi gures. Accessed April 2007.39. Over 3,000 companies reside within UAE FZs, the majority of which are
located in Dubai and involved in warehousing and repackaging of goods before they move to their fi nal destination. Dubai’s integration in these regional fl ows is indicated in fi gures released by the Dubai Chamber of Commerce in 2009, which show the GCC accounted for 46 percent of total exports of DCC mem-bers and was the largest export market for the Emirate. Iran, India, and Egypt are other important non-GCC export markets (KT 2009).
40. A prominent franchising industry magazine argues, for example, that Dubai is “a ‘window to world.’ It provides a soft landing for international franchise systems to test product and brand acceptability against a diverse cultural and
Notes ● 225
social mix, and a potential gateway to the other GCC markets and the Middle East and North Africa region ”(Furey 2007).
41. Author calculations from UN Comtrade Data. Data for Kuwait not available. 42. Based upon author analysis of UN Comtrade statistics. Figures for Kuwait are
based upon 2001 fi gures, Qatar for 2004, and Bahrain and Oman for 2005.43. In November 2009, Agility was suspended from bidding for US government
contracts on claims that it overcharged the US military by $60m over a 41-month period on $8.5bn worth of food supply contracts.
44. Futtaim also operates hotels, a property development company, a fi nancial services fi rm, and an indoor energy-use and facilities company.
45. A striking example of this was the Qatargas II project, the world’s largest LNG project and, in 2004, the third-largest project fi nancing in history (behind the Channel Tunnel and a Taiwanese high-speed rail fi nancing). According to the law fi rm that represented Qatar Petroleum and Exxon in the negotiations for the fi nancing, it took forty-eight commercial banks, one Export Credit Agency, six Islamic banks, and one ExxonMobil Lender to fi nance the $12bn project (White and Case 2004).
46. Figures calculated by author from Bank of International Securities database. Cross-border bank loans refer to BIS reporting banks, mostly headquartered in North America, Europe, and Japan.
47. Calculated by author from Central Bank reports. Changes in banking policies helped to facilitate this credit growth. The initial steps taken in this regard through the 1990s involved an end to central bank controls on interest rates, and removing ceilings on individual or aggregate credit in the banking sector. By 2003, the traditionally strict ceilings on credit had been completely eliminated across the GCC and only minor administrative restrictions on loans remained.
48. Of course these markets later retreated in the wake of the global crisis. In the course of 2008, the Dubai Financial Market decreased by 72.42 percent, fol-lowed by the Saudi Stock Exchange (56.49 percent), Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (47.49 percent), Muscat Securities Market (39.78 percent), Kuwait Stock Exchange (38.03 percent), Bahrain Stock Exchange (34.52 percent), and Doha Securities Market (28.12 percent) (BSE 2008b, p. 18).
49. In 2008, international investors were allowed to buy local equities through swap agreements with local companies, giving them indirect ownership.
50. UAE owns 82 percent and GCC citizens 9 percent (DFM 2008, p. 25).51. From 2001 to 2007, the GCC represented just over 60 percent of all global sukuk
value, with the UAE making up 36 percent of global issuance (GIH 2008d).52. It should be noted that while estimates of total GCC debt market size vary
across different sources, the overall trends remain constant. The issuance of sukuk dropped dramatically in 2008 and 2009 as a consequence of the global fi nancial crisis (see Chapter 7).
53. “Corporate” does not necessarily mean private as it includes massive state-linked companies. Over the 2006–2008 period, for example, the largest conventional bond in the GCC was issued by the ports operator DP World, worth US$1.74
226 ● Notes
billion. DP World is government-controlled yet is considered a corporation under NCB defi nition. Likewise, the largest sukuk was offered by Nakheel, another “corporate” state-run entity.
54. By the end of December 2009, the value of sukuk listings on Bursa Malaysia totaled $17.6 billion, compared to Nasdaq Dubai ($15.7 billion), The London Stock Exchange (GBP6.5 billion), Luxembourg Stock Exchange ($7.3 billion), and Bahrain Stock Exchange ($2.18 billion). In mid-2009, Saudi Arabia launched a sukuk market on Tadawul with fi ve sukuk (three of which were issued by SABIC).
55. Of this amount, around $9 billion was invested, leaving $11 billion still to be deployed by early 2010.
56. Information on Abraaj is taken from Abraaj Website. Accessed June 2008, http://www.abraaj.com.
57. Investcorp’s investments in this regard include the luxury brand companies Gucci and Tiffany’s both of which were bought by the company and subse-quently fl oated.
58. Global Investment House, Shuaa Capital, and Gulf Capital are representative examples.
59. The EDB is composed of four teams that are tasked with developing the mac-roeconomic strategy for Bahrain, mapping out the detailed economic changes that the government should take, seeking foreign investments and articulating an ideological justifi cation for these measures to the Bahraini public (Accessed August 2008, http://www.bahrainedb.com). The WTO has remarked on the pace of neoliberal change in Bahrain, noting that the country “has shown signi-fi cant change in terms of economic transformation, but the next 6 years are projected to be nothing short of remarkable” (WTO 2007, p. 5).
60. The 2009 confl ict between Saudi Arabia and the UAE around the establishment of the GCC Central Bank (see Chapter 7) is one indication of this contradiction.
Chapter 6
1. The full text of these orders is available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/. Accessed October 5, 2009.
2. It should also be noted that many commentators overlooked the fact that Iraq’s economy had begun moving away from state-dominated ownership in the 1980s and during the decade of sanctions in the 1990s, (see Parker and Moore 2007).
3. See, for example, the 2005 interview by Democracy Now with Hassan Juma’a Awad al-Asade, President of the General Union of Oil Workers in Iraq. Accessed 10 October 2009, http://www.democracynow.org/2005/6/13/iraqi_oil_workers_fi ght_privatization_and.
4. A fourth company, the UAE-giant Etisalat, also announced plans to enter the market in early 2010.
5. These ANIMA fi gures confi rm the conclusions of the World Bank data cited above. It should be noted, however, that the World Bank utilizes a different
Notes ● 227
methodology and encompasses a slightly different range of countries. Furthermore, in actual money spent, ANIMA notes that the GCC fell to sec-ond position (27 percent of real FDI as opposed to 40 percent from Europe). This disparity is partly to do with the sectoral bias of GCC investment toward construction and real estate, which are more prone to cancellation than other types of investment (de Saint-Laurent 2009, p. 3).
6. In the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya), GCC FDI is also highly signifi cant despite the fact the region has traditionally been closely linked to Europe. The GCC constituted 29 percent of total FDI to the Maghreb from 2003–2008 (compared to 46 percent from Europe) (ANIMA 2009 p. 23).
7. Calculated by author from analysis of Amman Stock Exchange data. 8. Indeed, even in many of apparent instances of “noneconomic” investment
fl ows, a closer examination reveals that these investments actually act to further deepen the penetration of regional economies by GCC capital groups.
9. Beyond the geographical scope of this chapter, but nevertheless important to note, is the recent rash of Gulf acquisitions of huge tracts of prime agricultural land in Asia and Africa for both food production and biofuels. These investments have included the purchase and leasing of 1.6 million acres in Indonesia (by a consortium of 15 Saudi fi rms), 800,000 acres of farmland in Pakistan (UAE), 250,000 acres in Philippines (Qatar), and 124,000 acres in Cambodia (Kuwait).
10. See Timewell 2009 for the full list.11. Among the GCC banks, Saudi Arabia tops the list with just over 27 percent of
the total Tier 1 capital of all 100 banks on the list. Saudi dominance is being challenged, however, by the UAE, which has more banks in the top 100 (17 compared to Saudi Arabia’s 11) and has 23 percent of the list’s total Tier 1 capital. Kuwait has 7 banks in the top 100 and Bahrain has 11, and make up around 10 percent and 9 percent of total capital, respectively. Qatari and Omani banks together hold another 10 percent of the total capital in the top 100.
12. The Arab Bank was initially established by the Shoman family (of Palestinian origin, based in Jordan) and consistently ranks as one of the largest in the Arab world. It has the largest Arab banking branch system worldwide, with 400 branches across 29 countries in 2007. The infl uence of the Shoman family has dropped considerably over recent years to around 5 percent of ownership.
13. The 1993 Oslo Accords established the Palestinian Authority, which was described as a self-rule Palestinian government in the key towns of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It was constituted by returning members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and dominated by the PLO’s leading faction Fatah. The PA has led the negotiations process with Israel since that time, although the Fatah faction lost control of the Gaza Strip in 2006. The follow-ing analysis concentrates on the West Bank.
14. Information taken from ASTRA Corporate profi le. Accessed March 2007, http://www.astra.com.sa/.
15. In addition to the Masri Group, a signifi cant proportion of CAB is held by the Talhouni family (12 percent), a prominent Jordanian business group with close
228 ● Notes
ties to the Jordanian state. The Masri and Talhouni groups are closely linked through the jointly owned Zara Holdings, which operates luxury hotels throughout Jordan.
16. Another example of a major Palestinian-owned conglomerate enriched through activities in the Gulf is the Consolidated Contractors Company (CCC). The company was established by Sa’id Khoury and Hasib Sabbagh in 1952, and built its initial fortune through contracting work in the Middle East for the largest engineering company in the US, Bechtel. CCC is one of the largest construction companies in the Middle East, and the thirteenth-largest engineering contractor by revenue in the world. Although headquartered in Athens for regulatory reasons, many of CCC’s largest projects are based in the GCC and much of its staff are located in Dubai. In 2006, Sa’id Khoury was estimated to be worth US$6 billion and was listed as the eleventh-richest Arab in the world by Arabian Business. Khoury was also the Governor of the Arab Monetary Fund.
17. This “Palestine Investment Conference” (PIC) was convened in Bethlehem from May 21–23, 2008, with Munib Al Masri a keynote speaker at the opening panel. The conference was organized with the strong backing of the Israeli and US governments, and formed the major point of discussion at a summit con-vened in Jerusalem on March 30, 2008, between Condoleeza Rice, Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak, and Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. The main aim of PIC was to showcase the PRDP as “good for business” and an attractive reason to invest in the Palestinian economy.
18. Hasib Sabbagh and Sa’id Khouri were also founding shareholders.19. One fi nal indication of the role that Gulf-related capital plays in the West Bank
is shown in the fi nance sector. The Palestinian banking system is overwhelmingly dominated by the Jordanian banks listed in Table 6.1, which, as the analysis above demonstrated, are closely related to GCC capital. These banks include the Arab Bank, CAB, The Housing Bank for Trade and Finance, Jordan Kuwait Bank, Jordan Islamic Bank, Union Bank for Savings and Investment, Jordan Ahli Bank, and Jordan Commercial Bank (in 2005, for example, the Arab Bank and CAB alone held around 60 percent of total customer deposits between them). The main exception to this is the Bank of Palestine, which was estab-lished in Gaza in 1960 and later expanded to the West Bank. The main share-holders are Palestinian investors (such as the Shawa family). Other Palestinian-based banks include the Palestine Investment Bank and the Al Quds Bank for Development and Investment. Both of these banks show a strong connection with Khaleeji Capital groups (the former through the Qatari Salam Group and the latter through Kuwait’s Global Investment House).
Chapter 7
1. From 2007 to 2009, the current account balance as percentage of GDP fell in Bahrain (15.8 percent to 3.7 percent), Kuwait (44.7 percent to 29.4 percent), Oman (8.4 percent to −0.5 percent), Qatar (30.4 percent to 10.8 percent),
Notes ● 229
Saudi Arabia (24.3 percent to 4.1 percent), and the UAE (16.1 percent to −1.6 percent).
2. Estimates are from Setser and Ziemba 2009, p. 2. These fi gures do not include privately held assets.
3. In the preceding period of high oil prices, a weak dollar, low US interest rates, and high infl ation in the Gulf, many speculators believed that the GCC would not be able to hold its peg to the dollar. They thus placed funds in the region (and local Gulf residents brought their capital home) in expectation of making a profi t when the currency was revalued. This currency appreciation did not occur because of the fi nancial crisis and the strengthening of the US dollar.
4. In the case of Dubai, some companies had originated asset-backed securities similar to those issued in the United States. These securitizations were backed by mortgages that lost signifi cant value during the crisis. In November 2008, Tamweel, one of the two largest home lenders in the UAE, ceased operations due to fi nancial diffi culties arising in part from asset-backed securities derived from mortgages on the Nakheel Palm Jumeira project. Prices for apartments and villas on the Palm dropped by 60 percent from their peak.
5. Although the plan was supported by at least half of the 50 elected legislators it was eventually scrapped and replaced with a more targeted assistance scheme.
6. The budget also included a public sector wage increase, further example of the privileging of citizenship given the overwhelming concentration of national labor in this sector.
7. This is the fi rst development plan passed by Kuwait’s parliament since 1986, an indication of the particularly fractious relationship between the parliament and the Kuwaiti ruling family that is peculiar to the country.
8. In Kuwait, for example, 200,000 square meters of offi ce space was available in the city center in early 2010 while annual demand for 2003–2009 was only 40–60,000 square meters. An additional 425,000–450,000 square meters will be available by 2013. Rents in the city center have almost halved as a result of overaccumulation of offi ce space (MEED 2010, p. 21).
9. For example, Bahrain’s BBK had planned to merge with Shamil Bank (eventu-ally postponed) and, in Kuwait, the National Bank of Kuwait gained central bank approval to acquire 40 percent of Boubyan Bank in order to gain access to the latter’s Islamic banking capacities (Chawdhry 2009, p. 46).
10. These tendencies predated the crisis. In March 2008, the Commercial Bank of Qatar (CBQ) acquired a 40 percent stake in the UAE-based United Arab Bank. CBQ also has a 35 percent stake in the National Bank of Oman. In August 2008, Qatar National Bank—Qatar’s largest bank with 47 percent of the country’s total bank assets—acquired a 24 percent stake in the Commercial Bank of Dubai, one of the ten largest banks in the UAE.
11. A related development was the call—particularly expressed in the wake of the extensive cross-border liabilities arising from the collapse of the Saad and Gosaibi conglomerates—to establish a pan-GCC institution to exchange infor-mation on corporate and consumer debt.
230 ● Notes
12. Credit default spreads on debt from across the GCC particularly Qatar, Bahrain, and Abu Dhabi—soared in the wake of Nakheel’s imminent default. Another indication of the regional view in which this was perceived was the sharp fall in share prices of European companies in which GCC investors held large stakes. Share prices of the London Stock Exchange, UK supermarket J Sainsbury, and German carmakers Porsche and Daimler dropped in the fear that Dubai’s default would mean other GCC states would pull back their for-eign investments in order to meet obligations at home.
13. In 2005, the UAE’s construction contracts were worth over ten times that of Saudi Arabia ($28.7 billion compared to $2.4 billion). By the fi rst three months of 2009, Saudi construction contracts were worth $15.7 billion compared to the UAE’s $4.1 billion. (MEED 2009, p. 21).
14. Arabtec formed its joint venture with the Saudi Bin Ladin Group.15. See, for example, the comments by Mohammed bin Obaid Al Mazroui,
Assistant Secretary-General for economic affairs at the GCC general secretariat, who described the railway project as “a strategic one intended to achieve eco-nomic integration” (Roberts 2007). A related example of the economic incen-tives toward transport integration is found in the aviation industry, where a number of companies have called for the creation of a single GCC aviation market. Jazeera Airways, a Kuwaiti company controlled by the Boodai Group, noted prior to the 30th GCC Summit in Kuwait, that “[u]nder a single market, all commercial restrictions for GCC carriers fl ying within the GCC, such as the restrictions on routes, the number of fl ights and fare, will be removed to allow the aviation industry to reach its full potential” (Emirates Business 2009b).
16. World Bank fi gures for India show remittance fl ows nearly doubled during 2008 (US$51 billion compared to $27 billion in 2007). In Pakistan, the year-on-year growth of the three-month moving average of remittances averaged more than 20 percent for each month of 2009.
17. Rahman and Mohaiemen also note that there are no timely offi cial Bangladeshi statistics on the number of workers losing their jobs and returning home (only outgoing migrant numbers). They argue that anecdotal observations from low-cost carriers confi rm a large number of Bangladeshi workers returning home after being deported.
18. Remittance statistics should be treated with some caution. First, much of the geographic specifi city of remittance data can be misleading as it is common for various cities to route remittances through correspondent banks in the United States. Since banks attribute the origin of funds to the most immediate source, the United States appears to be a larger source of remittance fl ows than it actu-ally is. Moreover, much of the remittance fl ows to South Asia from the GCC do not show up in offi cial fi gures because they happen through informal chan-nels rather than licensed money exchanges or the banking system. This is particularly true in the case of Pakistan where the informal hawala money transfer system is highly popular and almost impossible to track. In this system, a customer approaches a broker in one city and gives them a sum of money to
Notes ● 231
be transferred to a recipient in another city. The hawala broker calls another hawala broker in the recipient’s city and gives instructions for the funds (usually minus a small commission). No actual transfer of money takes place but net debts are then settled at a later date. The entire process takes place on trust and no records of the person sending the money are kept. Moreover, a thorough assessment of the impact of any drop in remittances needs to differentiate on a subnational basis as labor fl ows to the Gulf tend to be drawn from specifi c regions within countries. Remittances, for example, represented over 30 percent of the Indian state of Kerala’s net domestic product in 2008, whereas they only represented around 2 percent of total Indian GDP (Zachariah and Irudaya 2008, p. 13).
19. Documentation of these deaths was not widely covered in the media; the Website migrant-rights.org was the only online source that drew attention to these deaths.
20. In mid-November 2010, Saudi newspapers reported the torture of a young Indonesian woman who had been brought to the country to work as a maid. Her body had been burned, fi ngers broken, and skin removed from her face. Also in November, a Sri Lankan maid in Kuwait had nails hammered into her body by her employees whenever she requested to be paid. Because of their dependence on sponsors and virtually complete isolation from the rest of soci-ety, domestic workers are particularly vulnerable to this type of abuse in the GCC.
21. To date, most Gulf states have responded to this tension with “Gulf-ization” programs that offer incentives or set quotas for businesses in the hiring of Gulf citizens. These programs, however, have had little real effi cacy and have not substantially altered the structure of the labor force.
22. This point was stressed to the author in a 2010 interview with a member of the UAE Foreign Ministry who wished to remain anonymous.
23. As this book was coming to press a series of uprisings across the Arab world seemed to confi rm this analysis. Despite some isolated calls for democratic reform, the GCC states appeared to remain relatively insulated from these uprisings. It was only in Bahrain, where the larger component of poorer Bahraini citizens intersected with Shia grievances against the Sunni al-Khalifa rulers, that signifi cant protests occurred.
24. In Saudi Arabia, for example, investments in productive capacity raised the country’s oil production capacity to 12.5 mbd in 2008, which meant a record 4.3 mbd of spare capacity (IIF 2009, p. 10).
25. According to estimates by international oil companies, in 2005 the Caspian Sea region held proven oil reserves equivalent to about 4 percent of total world reserves (48 billion bbls)—far exceeding that of the United States (29 billion bbls). Likewise, proven gas reserves constituted 4 percent of world reserves. Most signifi cant is the fact that many areas of the Caspian Sea basin remain unexplored. It is estimated that additional crude oil reserves approach the amount now held by Saudi Arabia (reaching about 15 percent of total world
232 ● Notes
reserves), and that natural gas reserves potentially exceed Saudi deposits (Gelb 2006, p. 3).
26. These estimates obviously depend on a variety of factors including the price of oil, the amount of money spent domestically, asset appreciation/depreciation, and the pace and shape of any global recovery. See McKinsey (2009) for a full discussion of different scenarios.
27. Chinese estimates given in McKinsey (2009, p. 46).28. These estimates for foreign asset accumulation as well as the potential for
expansion of development plans depend a great deal on the future oil price. In general, the “break-even” price for oil to keep budget spending at 2008 levels is estimated to range from a low of $35 in Qatar to around $75 in Oman, with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait at around $50. If the price drops below $50 for an extended period of time, some foreign asset sales may be necessary to cover expenses (IIF 2009, p. 14).
29. In this respect, it is interesting to note that in early 2010 China was the largest investor in Iraq’s oil and gas sector, winning around 20 percent of the reserves auctioned in the 2009–2010 period.
30. In Malaysia, for example, Al Rajhi Bank, Kuwait Finance House, and Dubai Islamic Bank all operate Islamic fi nance subsidiaries. In Singapore, the Islamic Bank of Asia was established in 2007 as a partnership between one of the larg-est banks in Asia, DBS, and investors from the GCC.
31. Clearly this is a complex question and only broad themes in relation to the Gulf can be raised here. For more on the contradictions in China’s accumula-tion model see Li (2008) and Hart-Landsberg and Burkett (2005).
32. This phrase, and the accompanying conception of US dominance, is drawn from Panitch and Gindin (2005).
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Index
Abbas, Mahmoud, 163Abbas, Tareq, 163Abrahamian, E., 213n19Abu Dhabi, 63, 176, 182, 221n7,
230n12border disputes and, 5British Bank of the Middle East in, 78foreign population in, 62Great Britain and, 6, 39, 62Nahyan family and, 82oil industry in, 7, 38, 62, 215n20support of Dubai, 172, 175as Trucial State, 6See also International Petroleum
Investment Company (IPIC), 182Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 82Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil
Operations (ADCO), 215n20Abu Dhabi Grand Prix, 113–14Abu Dhabi Investment Authority
(ADIA), 95, 158, 184, 219n13Abu Dhabi National Oil Company
(ADNOC), 72, 215n20Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange, 134,
136–38, 225n48Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity
Authority, 117Achcar, Gilbert, 93–94Afghanistan, 50, 52, 93–94, 128, 186,
218n8Agility, 128–29, 150, 225n43agriculture, 5, 33, 67, 73–74, 160–61,
220n27, 227n9
Ajman, 6Al Ahli Bank, 80–81Al Ghanim Group, 70, 76Al Gurg Group, 68, 76, 144Al Mana Group, 70, 73, 76Al Rajhi Group, 74–75, 216n24Al Watani Bank, 80, 217n32Al Zayani Investments (AZI), 73Alfonso, Perez, 37–38Algeria, 38–40, 151, 213n13, 218n6,
219n14, 219n19, 227n6Ali, Muhammed, 211n14Altvater, Elmar, 32Aluminum Bahrain (ALBA), 72,
116–17aluminum industry, 72–73, 116–18,
146, 168American International Group, 167Amin, Samir, 211n14Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), 37anticolonialism, 30–32, 36, 39, 59,
213n15Arab Bank, 154, 162, 227n12, 228n19Arab Palestinian Investment Company
(APIC), 163Arab Supply and Trading Corporation
(ASTRA), 161Arabic language, 12, 14Aramco, 42, 58–59, 61, 69, 120, 183,
215n19, 223–24n30Aramex, 128–29, 141automobile industry, 33–35Ayubi, Nazih, 210n12
250 ● Index
Bahrain, 1, 3, 6–8, 38, 49, 57–59, 63, 106, 110, 146–47, 209n5, 215n16–18, 226n59, 231n23
aluminum industry in, 72–73, 116–17
banking industry in, 78–82, 134, 158, 175, 227n11, 229n9
British Bank of the Middle East in, 78
border disputes and, 5construction industry in, 113, 115credit crisis and, 176–77, 230n12discovery of oil in, 57equity markets and, 134–45, 171fi nancial industry and, 44formation of GCC and, 51free trade agreements and, 100,
220n27, 221n9National Bank of, 80real estate industry in, 112retail industry in, 129–31steel industry in, 118telecommunications industry in, 124
Bahrain Islamic Bank, 175, 216n22Bahrain Petroleum Company (Bapco),
72, 215n20Bahrain Stock Exchange, 134, 138,
225n48, 226n54Baker, James, 48Baker Plan, 48Baltic Dry Index (BDI), 168Bangladesh, 64, 177–79, 214n13,
230n17Bank Audi Sal, 158Banking Act of 1933, 218n5banks and banking industry, 78–82,
132–35, 138–41, 144, 153–54, 158–62, 175, 168–73, 227n11, 229n9. See also specifi c banks
Bear Stearns, 167Beblawi, Hazem, 10–11Bin Ladin Group, 176, 230n14Bin Mahfouz family, 80, 217n31blowback, 94
Blumenthal, Michael, 213n14Bonapartism, 210–11n12border disputes, 5Brady Plan, 217n1Bremer, Paul, 149Brenner, Robert, 211n1Bretton Woods Conference, 30, 41,
48British Bank of the Middle East
(BBME), 78–81, 216–17n30British Petroleum (BP), 37Bromley, Simon, 35, 212n5, 212n10Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 93Bush, George H. W., 53, 85Bush, George W., 99
Cairo Amman Bank (CAB), 161, 227n15, 228n19
Callinicos, Alex, 92Capital Markets Law (CML), 135capitalist class formation, 2, 17, 57,
66–82, 111capitalist class, use of the term, 14Carter, Jimmy, 50–51, 93Carter Doctrine, 50, 53Cayman Islands, 41, 44, 144cement industry, 73, 216n23–24,
223n23CFP, 37. See also TotalChampion, D., 217n33Chaudhry, Kiren, 67, 73, 82, 216n27,
217n33, 217n36Cheney, Dick, 92Chevron, 215n19. See also Standard Oil
of CaliforniaChina, 31–32, 85–100, 118, 120–21,
125, 168, 181–86, 218n7, 218n9, 223n23, 223n28–29, 232n29
circuit of capital, 18–27, 40, 55, 68, 83, 110, 145–47
commodity circuit, 18–19, 55, 74–78, 81, 83, 101, 123, 125–34, 146
fi nance circuit, 19, 78–82, 132–34
Index ● 251
productive circuit, 18–19, 54, 68–75, 81, 83, 110–30, 146, 174–76, 182
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 149–50
colonialism, 3–9, 15, 36–40, 57, 62, 69, 78–80, 83, 158, 213n18. See also anticolonialism
commodity circuit, 18–19, 55, 74–78, 81, 83, 101, 123, 125–34, 146
Consolidated Contractors Company (CCC), 228n16
construction and contracting industries, 1, 62, 69–71, 112–17, 121, 126–30, 133, 145–46, 154, 170–77, 222n17, 228n16, 230n13
credit default swaps (CDS), 171credit crisis of 2008, 167–80Crystal, Jill, 12, 62currency, 30–31, 39–41, 45, 79–80,
105, 170, 176–77, 184, 216n29, 216–17n30, 218n4, 221n5, 229n3
Dallah Al Baraka Group, 70, 123debt markets, 138–39Dubai, 58, 145, 169–75, 177, 216n21,
221–22n10, 224n39, 229n4, 230n12
aluminum industry in, 116–17British Bank of the Middle East, 78,
216n30Commercial Bank of, 229n10Consolidated Contractors Company
(CCC), 228n16construction industry in, 1, 62, 64, 112economy of, 134–39Emirates National Bank of, 174equity markets in, 134–39foreign labor in, 62–64Jebel Ali Free Zone, 128Media City, 123National Bank of, 80, 174poverty in, 63–64, 215n15real estate industry in, 75, 139,
170–71
retail industry in, 130–32, 224n–25n40
Sheikh Zayed Road, 1trading routes and, 7as Trucial State, 6See also Nasdaq Dubai
Dubai Cable Company (Ducab), 73Dubai Financial Group, 143, 157–58Dubai Financial Market (DFM), 129,
132, 134–39, 225n48Dubai Financial Support Fund (DFSF),
172Dubai Holding, 151, 171Dubai International Financial Centre,
134, 137, 184Dubai Islamic Bank, 223n25, 232n30Dubai Roads and Transports Authority,
178Dubai World, 139, 172Dubal, 72, 116, 216n21
East Africa, 8–9, 91EDGO, 161–62EFG-Hermes, 141, 154, 158Egypt, 49–50, 59, 61, 63, 77, 151–52,
169, 209n1, 211n14, 214n12, 224n32, 224n39
anticolonialism in, 36–37, 39–40banking industry in, 28, 141,
153–54, 158–59free trade agreements and, 100Suez Canal, 10war with Israel, 43
Engels, Friedrich, 15engineering, procurement, and
construction (EPC), 120–21, 183
equity markets, 134–41, 144–45Esso, 37–38ethylene, 118, 120, 168, 181, 223n28Euromarkets, 40–47, 212n12, 213n15European Union (EU), 88, 91–93,
99–100, 131, 151, 177, 183export processing zones (EPZs), 46, 88
252 ● Index
exports, 27, 34, 37–46, 77–79, 82, 87–92, 94–101, 116, 120, 126–27, 167–69, 183–84, 216n30, 217–18n2, 224n39
Exxon, 42, 223n27, 225n45Exxon-Mobil, 42, 181, 225n45. See also
Mobil
Fannie Mae, 90, 167Farouk, King, 37Fiat, 34fi nance circuit, 19, 78–82, 132–34fi nancial crisis of 2008, 1, 167–180Financial Services Modernization Act,
218n5Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 27,
87–88, 121, 132–33, 150–51, 154, 159, 226–27n5, 227n6
France, 9, 30–31, 36–39, 57, 78–79, 129, 158, 210n12, 211n1
Freddie Mac, 90, 167free trade agreements (FTAs), 88, 99–
100, 220n27–28, 221n9Fujairah, 6
Gaza Strip, 160, 162–63, 227n13, 228n19
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 34
Germany, 30, 32–34, 117, 211n1, 212n6
Ghurair Group, 129, 131, 137Gindin, Sam, 32, 232n32Glass-Steagall Act, 218n5Global Investment House, 151, 162,
226n58, 228n19Golden Age of capitalism:
defi nition of, 29end of, 39–53, 212n8rise of, 29–39
Al Gosaibi family, 68, 75, 117, 172, 216n24, 229n11
Gowan, Peter, 213n15Gramsci, Antonio, 210n11Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF),
110
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), description and establishment of, 1–3, 51
Gulf Bank, 80Gulf Oil, 37Gulf War (1990–91), 52–53, 64, 85,
92, 161
Hariri, Rafi k, 160Hariri, Saad, 160Hart-Lindsberg, Martin, 185Harvey, David, 25, 29Heard-Bey, F., 214n8Hertog, Steffen, 214n6, 217n36,
221–22n10Hijaz region, 5, 57, 75, 209n1,
216n27Housing Bank for Trade and Finance,
158, 162, 228n19HSBC Group, 78
Ibn Faisal, Sultan Taymur, 9Ibn Khaldun, 209n2Ibn Saud, King, 58–59, 67imports, 47, 55, 74–78, 82–83, 90–92,
118, 125–27, 131, 183, 218n7India, 5, 7–9, 62–64, 68, 78–79, 87,
92, 95, 169, 177–79, 183, 209n3, 216n29, 218n7–8, 230n16, 230–31n18
Indonesia, 38, 169, 213n13, 227n9, 231n20
Industries Qatar (IQ), 71–72initial public offerings (IPOs), 135–38International Energy Agency (IEA), 91International Finance Corporation
(IFC), 86International Monetary Fund (IMF),
41, 47–48, 80, 106, 134–35, 137, 149, 152, 154, 160, 167, 169
international oil companies (IOCs), 37, 42–43, 212n9–10, 231n25
International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC), 182
internationalization explained, 2–3, 19–35
Index ● 253
Investcorp, 144–45, 216n22, 226n57Iran, 62, 91, 181, 186, 209n3–4,
213n19, 219n14anticolonial struggles in, 36, 39Bahrain and, 7border disputes and, 5British Bank of the Middle East and,
78colonialism in, 78economy of, 10Maadi Pact and, 37oil industry of, 36–38, 49–50, 66,
218n8, 224n39OPEC and, 38, 213n13, 219n19Revolution of 1979, 10, 63United States and, 49–50, 52, 93,
213n20See also Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
(AIOC)Iran-Contra Scandal, 213n20Iran-Iraq War, 50, 52Iraq, 59, 62, 93–94, 117, 128, 181,
186, 232n29anticolonial struggles in, 37, 39border disputes and, 5colonialism in, 78economy of, 149–50, 226n2invasion of Kuwait by, 64, 214n10Maadi Pact and, 37oil industry of, 36, 66, 218n6, 218n8OPEC and, 38, 213n13Shia in, 49, 63trade routes and, 6, 8U.S. invasion of (2003), 94, 149,
153See also Gulf War (1990–91); Iran-
Iraq WarIsrael, 43, 77, 100, 151, 158–60,
213n18, 227n13, 228n17
al-Jalahima family, 6–8Japan, 20, 30–31, 39, 46, 58, 88–92,
100, 121, 211n13, 211n1–2, 212n6, 212n10
Jebel Ali Free Zone, 82, 128
Jerusalem Development and Investment Company (JEDICO), 162
Jiang Zemin, 223n29Johnson, Lyndon, 49Jones, Geoffrey, 79Jordan Ahli Bank (JAB), 141Jordan, 28, 100, 128, 151–54, 158–62,
214n12, 220n27, 227n12, 227–28n15, 228n19
Kamel, Saleh Abdullah, 70Karl, Terry, 211n15Kaylani, N., 210n7Kennedy, John F., 34Khaleeji Capital, defi nition and
formation of, 2, 23–26, 103–48 al-Khalifa family, 6–8, 231n23King Abdullah Economic City, 132,
171Klare, Michael, 91–92Korean War, 211n2Kuwait, 1, 3, 7–8, 12, 34–37, 57–59,
75–77, 100, 123–24, 126–28, 150–51, 179, 229n7
banking industry and, 44, 78–82, 158, 162, 217n34
Banking Law, 134bidoun in, 214n7border disputes and, 5–6citizenship and, 62–63Commercial Bank of, 80construction industry in, 70, 112–13credit crisis and, 170–73GCC Summit in, 133, 176, 230n15invasion of/by Iraq, 52–53, 64,
214n10National Bank of, 79, 151, 217n34,
229n9OPEC and, 38regional electricity grid and, 176retail industry in, 129–34al-Sabah family and, 6, 62, 67state control in, 69steel industry in, 118See also fi rst Gulf War; Gulf War
254 ● Index
Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) 184
Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), 69Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC),
120Kuwait Stock Exchange, 134–36
Lawrence, Robert, 221n9Lebanon, 28, 44, 63, 151–54, 158–60,
165, 214n12, 224n31–2Lefebvre, Henri, 24–25Lehman Brothers, 167, 170Libya, 38–39, 106, 213n13, 219n14,
219n19, 227n6Luciani, Giacomo, 10–12Lukacs, György, 210n10
Majd Al Futtaim Group, 129, 131, 151Maadi Pact, 37–38Mahdavy, Hossein, 10–11al-Maktoum, Sheikh Rashid bin, 7,
132, 137al-Maktoum family, 75Malaysia, 39, 46, 139, 184, 232n30malls, 130–34manufacturing industry, 31, 33, 39,
73, 85, 87, 110–11, 115–18, 125, 151, 161, 211n1, 215n16
Marshall Plan, 29–30, 34Marx, Karl, 13, 15–21, 103, 210n12Marxism, 13, 210n12Masri, Maher Al, 162–63Masri, Munib Al, 161–62, 228n17Masri, Sabih Al, 161–62Al Masri family, 161, 227–28n15Massey, Doreen, 24–25McKinsey Global, 96, 98, 182McNally, David, 211n17, 218n4media sector, 70, 121, 123–24,
224n31–32megaprojects, 1, 120, 132, 223–24n30Merrill Lynch, 167Mexico, 86–88, 169Midal Cables, 72–73, 117, 223n25
Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA), 99–100
Middle East OPEC, 219n19migrant labor, 3, 26, 54, 60–65, 70,
75, 83, 111, 167, 176–79, 214n9, 214n11, 222n12, 230n17
Mitchell, Tim, 210n9Mobil, 37, 42Mossadegh, Mohammed, 37, 49, 213n19muwahiddun, 6
Najd region, 5–7, 57, 59, 67, 74, 209n1, 216n27, 217n33
Nakheel, 132, 139, 172–73, 175, 225–26n53, 229n4, 230n12
Nasdaq Dubai, 139, 226n54Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 37Nasser Bin Khaled Group (NBK), 70,
79, 141, 147Al-Nasrawi, Abbas, 14National Commercial Bank (NCB),
80–81, 217n33Native Agents, 209n2neoliberalism, 46–48, 53, 85–89, 149,
159–60, 163, 217n1, 226n59Niblock, Tim, 216n17, 221n10Nigeria, 38, 213n13Nixon Doctrine, 39, 49, 53Nixon, Richard M., 39, 41, 49,
213n15Nowais Group, 78, 141Nowais, Hussein, 78
offshore banking units (OBUs), 44Oil Facility, IMF, 47–48oil industry:
discovery of oil, 6–7, 37, 57oil prices, 2–3, 37, 43, 47, 52,
74, 82, 85, 94–95, 106, 168, 172, 181–82, 212n11, 231n15, 219n19, 221n7, 222n11, 223n26, 229n3, 232n28
oil reserves, 3, 5, 36–37, 43, 91–92, 231n25
Index ● 255
oil revenues, 1, 6, 10–11, 15–16, 26–27, 43, 47, 60, 66–67, 79–80, 97–98, 125, 170
power and, 35–39, 42–46rentier-state theory and, 10See also petrochemical industry;
specifi c oil companiesOllman, Bertell, 13, 16, 211n13Oman, 39, 60, 63, 70, 124, 176–77,
216n23, 220n27, 221n8, 225n42, 228n1
aluminum industry in, 116–17banking industry in, 78, 80–82, 174,
216–17n30, 217n35, 227n11, 229n10
border disputes and, 5British Bank of the Middle East in,
78, 216–17n30Central Bank of, 81, 174colonialism and, 8–9, 57construction industry in, 115,
222n17economy of, 106, 169EDGO and, 162fi nancial markets in, 134, 136, 138,
141–42, 224n33free trade agreement and, 100,
221n9GCC membership of, 1, 51Great Britain and, 57imports and, 126–27, 221n3naming of, 209n6, 213n1oil industry in, 91, 215n20, 219n14,
219n19, 232n28OPEC and, 219n19real estate industry in, 112retail industry in, 129–31steel industry in, 118–19United States and, 51, 57, 100
Oman Oil Company (OOC), 72, 117
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 38, 42–45, 213n13, 213n15, 219n19
Oslo Accords, 160, 227n13Ownership Holdings Limited (OHL),
144
Pahlavi family, 49Pakistan, 9, 62, 64, 93–94, 144, 169,
177, 179, 186, 218n8, 227n9, 230n16, 230n18
Palestine and Palestinians, 28, 59, 63–64, 151, 153, 160–64, 186, 227n12–13, 228n16–17, 228n19
Palestine Development and Investment Company (PADICO), 162–63
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 64, 227n13
Palestine Real Estate Investment Company (PRICO), 162
Palestinian Authority (PA), 160–64, 227n13
Palestinian Stock Exchange, 162Palloix, Christian, 20, 211n18Paltel, 162–63Panitch, Leo, 32, 232n32Paris III Conference, 159–60People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA), 50Persia, use of the term, 209n4petrochemical industry, 33, 35, 54,
71–72, 110, 112, 115–16, 118–22, 146, 168, 174, 181–83, 212n3, 216n22, 222n19, 223n26–8, 223–24n30
petrodollars, use of the term, 43Poulantzas, Nicos, 152, 210–11n12poverty, 48, 63, 88, 214n4private equity, 140–41, 144–45productive circuit, 18–19, 54, 68–75,
81, 83, 110–30, 146, 174–76, 182
Public Land Distribution Ordinance (PLDO), 214n5
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), 174
256 ● Index
Qatar, 1, 3, 6–8, 12, 57–59, 63, 75–76, 91, 94, 96, 106, 110–11, 215n20
aluminum industry in, 116banking industry in, 81–82, 141,
216n30, 217n35border disputes and, 5construction industry in, 70, 112–
15, 176equity markets in, 134, 172–73free trade agreements and, 100GCC and, 51manufacturing industry in, 116OPEC and, 38retail industry in, 130–34steel industry in, 73, 118See also Industries Qatar
Qatar Industrial Manufacturing Company (QIMCO), 73
Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), 184, 219n22
Qatar Petroleum International, 120Qatar Steel Company (QASCO), 73Qatargas II project, 225n45
Ras Al Khaimeh, 5–6Ravi, Vayalar, 178reexports, 118, 126–27, 146relative autonomy, 12–14, 210–21n12rentier-state theory, 9–12, 14–16,
210n8–19, 211n15retail capital, 129–30Riyad Bank, 80, 217n32–33Ross, Michael, 11, 210n9, 211n16
al-Sabah family, 6, 62, 67Saidi, Nasser, 137, 184Sampson, Anthony, 42al-Saud, King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz,
91al-Saud dynasty, 5–6, 68, 75, 209n1,
221–22n10Saudi Arabia, 1–2, 9, 12, 36, 71, 75,
105–6, 126–7, 129, 146, 160–4, 209n1, 215n16, 216n30
agricultural industry in, 73–74aluminum industry in, 116–17Banking Control Law, 80banking industry in, 80–82, 154,
159border disputes and, 5China and, 91construction industry in, 112–13,
115, 171credit crisis and, 169, 171–83equity markets in, 134–41, 144–45domination of GCC, 3, 120–21Five Year Economic Development
Plans, 69–70, 80Maadi Pact and, 37media industry in, 123–24military imports and, 77, 161private equity and, 140–45OPEC and, 38, 42–47retail industry in, 129–34state control in, 67–70steel industry in, 73, 118Tadawul, 134–35, 226n54temporary migrant labor and, 61–63,
111United States and, 49, 51–53, 57–
60, 92–94, 213n14Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company
(SAFCO), 7Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority
(SAMA), 80, 98, 170, 173, 217n32
Saudi Aramco, 69, 120. See also AramcoSaudi Basic Industries Corporation
(SABIC), 71–72, 120–21, 182–83, 226n54
Saur Revolution, 50Savola, 74, 130September 11, 2011, attacks of, 94Seven Sisters, 37, 43Sharjah, 6, 38–39, 78Sheikh Zayed Road, Dubai, 1Shell, 37, 223n27–28Sherbiny, N., 212n12
Index ● 257
shopping centers, 130–34Singapore, 39, 44, 100, 127, 174, 181,
184, 232n30Socal, 42South Africa, 61, 169South Korea, 31, 46, 48, 121, 169,
182–83Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs),
95–98, 151, 154, 158–59, 170, 219n12
Soviet Union, 31–32, 39, 213n19Afghanistan and, 50, 52collapse of, 27, 52, 87–88, 93
spatial fi x, 25, 60–66spatial structure, 24–28, 54, 61, 63,
65–66, 83, 177, 180Spiro, David, 44–45Sri Lanka, 64, 66, 177–78, 231n20Standard Bank, 81Standard Oil of California, 33, 37, 58,
215n19state, use of the term, 12–14States of the Cooperation Council
(EASCC), 103–05, 221n5, 221n9steel industry, 25, 71–73, 116–19, 146,
168, 218n7stock markets. See equity marketsstructured contingency, 211n15Suez Canal, 10, 37Syria, 37, 43, 151
Tadawul, 134–35, 226n54Tariki, Abdullah, 38, 42, 61Teicher, Howard, 50telecommunications, 121, 123–24, 137,
149, 151–52, 159, 161–63Texaco, 37, 42, 215n19al-Thani family, 7–8, 73, 75Toloui, Ramin, 97, 219n17, 219n20–
21Total, 37, 43transnational capitalist class, 211n18Treasury International Capital (TIC),
96–97
Trucial States, 6–7, 38, 57, 62. See also United Arab Emirates (UAE)
Truman, Harry, 58Truman Doctrine, 36, 38, 50, 53
Umm al-Quwain, 6Unifi ed Economic Agreement (UEA),
103, 220n1UNIPAL, 163United Arab Emirates (UAE), 1–8, 38,
43, 49, 68, 70, 77–78, 95–96, 106, 126–29, 146, 215n20, 216n27
aluminum industry in, 72, 116banking industry in, 80–82border disputes and, 5construction industry in, 111–13,
115debt crisis and, 169–81equity markets in, 134, 136–41, 144FDI and, 121formation of, 57, 62free trade agreements and, 100GCC and, 51media industry in, 123–24migrant labor and, 62–64, 66retain industry, 129–34steel industry in, 118
US Air Force Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft (AWAC), 51
US Central Command (CENTCOM), 51, 93–94
USSR. See Soviet Union
Venezuela, 37–38, 95, 213n13Vietnam, 39–40Vitalis, Robert, 61Volcker, Paul, 47Volcker Shock, 47, 213n17
Washington Mutual, 167Weisskopf, T., 211n1West Bank, 28, 153, 159–64, 227n13,
228n19
258 ● Index
West Germany, 30–31, 211n1Wilson, Harold, 39World Bank, 14, 48, 67, 86, 88, 99,
149–50, 152, 160, 163, 167, 226–27n5
World Trade Organization (WTO), 105–06, 145, 221n10, 226n59
World War One, 6World War Two, 16, 26, 29, 33–36, 58,
78, 212n6
Xenel Group, 73, 216n22
Yamani, Ahmad Zaki, 42–43Yemen, 59, 61, 63–64, 169
Zadjali, Hamood Sangour al-, 174
Zanzibar, 8–9, 209–10n6Zayed, Khalifa bin, 175, 216n28Zoellick, Robert, 99, 220n27
