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CRITIC L

THEORY A N D

METHODOLOGY



C O N T E M P O R A R Y S O C I A L T H E O R Y

Series Editor:

Mark Gottdiener

University of California, Riverside

CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY books are

brief,

introduc

tory texts designed to make current trends in social theory

accessible to undergraduate students in the social sciences.

VO LU ME S I N TH IS SERIES

1. Tom Mayer, AN AL YT ICA L M ARX ISM

2. Sondra Farganis, SITUA TIN G FEM INISM: From Thought to Action

3. Raymond A. Morrow with David D. Brown, CRITICAL TH EOR Y

A N D M E T H O D O L O G Y

4. Robert Hollinger, POSTMODERNISM IN THE SOC IAL SCIENCES:

A Thematic Approach

SERIES ED ITO RIA L B O A R D

Ben N. Agge r, Sociology, S U N Y Buffalo

Robert

J.

Anton io, Sociology, Univ. of Kansas

Wini Breines, Sociology, Northeastern Univ.

Richard Harvey Brown, Sociology, Univ.

of

Maryland, C ollege Park

Nancy Fraser, Philosophy, Norwestern Univ.

Kenneth

J.

Gerg en, Psychology, Swarthmore College

Lawrence E. Hazelrigg , Sociology, F lorida State Univ.

Douglas Kellner, Philosophy, Univ.

of

Texas, Austin

Jennifer M. Lehmann, Sociology, Univ.

of

Nebrask a, Lincoln

Eric Monkk onen, History, U CL A

John O'Neill, Sociology, York Univ.

Paul Rabinow, A nthropology, Univ.

of

California, Berkeley



CR IT ICAL

T H E O R Y A N D

M E T H O D O L O G Y

R A Y M O N D A . M O R R O W

W I T H DAVID D. BR O W N

C O N T E M P O R A R Y S O CIA L T H E OR Y

V O L U M E 3

S G Publications

International ducational and Professional Publisher

Thousand Oaks London New Delhi



Copyright © 1994 by Sage Publications, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized

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For information

address:

SAGE Publications, Inc.

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Printed in the United States of Am erica

Libra ry of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Mo rrow, Raymond Allan.

Critical theory and methodology / Raymond A. Morro w, w ith David

D. Brown

p. cm. - (Contem porary social theory ; 3)

Includes bibliographica l references and index.

ISBN 0-8039-4682-1. - ISBN 0-8039-4683-X (p bk .)

1. Critical theory. 2. Social sciences— Philosophy.

3. Sociology-Meth odology. I. B rown, David D., 1954 -

II.

Title. III. Series: Con tem porary social theory (Thousand Oaks,

Ca lif.) : 3.

HM24.M622 1994

301\01-dc20 94-10888

94 95 96 97 98 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Sage Pro du ct io n Editor : Astr id V ird i ng



C O N T E N T S

t

Acknowledgments ix

Preface xiii

PARTI: METATHEORY: GROUNDING METHOD

1. Intr od uct ion : W ha t Is Critical Theo ry? 3

W h y Social Science? 3

Critical Th eo ry as a Human Science 8

Th e Origins of Critical Th eo ry 13

Con temp orary Critical Th eor y 16

Critical Th eor y N o w 21

Critiques of Critical Th eo ry 26

A n Agenda 30

2. Fou nda tions of Me tatheo ry:

Be tw ee n Subjectivism an d Objectivism 35

Approaching Method ology 37

Orien ting Definitions 40

Basic Co ncep ts of M etatheory 42

The Subjectivist-Objectivist Polarization in

Metatheory 53

Three Approaches to Metatheory

and M ethod ology 56

Conclusion 60

3. Postem piricist Critiques of Positivism

an d Em pir icism 62

W h y the Critique of Positivism? 62

Positivist Philosop hies of Science 65

Positivism in the Social Sciences 69



Postempiricism and the Rise

of Antifound ationalism 72

Postem piricist Alternatives 76

Th e Critical Realist Th eo ry of Science 77

Con clusion: Rethin king Reason 79

PART II: CRITICAL THEORY

AS A RESEARCH PROGRAM

4. Ear ly Crit ical T he or y as a Resea rch

Pro gra m : A Histor ica l Introdu ct ion 85

From Western Marxism to Critical Th eo ry 85

Th e Herm eneutic-Dialectical Tradition 92

Interdisciplinary Materialism

as a Research Progra m 98

A n Em ergent Altern ative Research Prog ram 106

Th e D ecline o f a Research P rogram:

Th e Dialectic of Enlightenment 108

Con clusion: Beyon d the Crisis 110

5. Postem pir icist Me tatheo ry an d the H u m an

Sciences: Inter im De velo pm en ts 113

Th e Web erian Challenge 115

Action The ories 116

Th e (Post)Structuralist Re volu tion (s) 121

French Social Th eo ry 132

Critical Realism and the Social Sciences 136

Conclusion 138

6. Th e Me tatheo ry of Cr it ical Th eo ry :

Be yo nd Object iv ism an d Relat iv ism 141

Reth inking Critical Th eo ry 141

K n ow led ge Interests: Quasi Transcendentalism 145

Theory of Communicative Action: Reconstructive

Sciences 150

Tran scen ding the Subject-Object Split 153

Conclusion 164

7. Co nte m po rar y Cr it ica l Th eo ry as a

Research P ro gram : G iddens and H ab erm as 169

Wea k and Strong Research Program s

for Critical Th eo ry 170



Gidden s: A Critiqu e of Historical Materialism 174

Habermas: A Reconstruction

o f Historical Materialism 183

Co mp leme ntary Critical Research Traditions 190

Conclusion 193

PART III: CRITICAL THEORY AND

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

8. Dec onstruc ting the Con ventio nal

Dis co urse of Me thod ology : Quantitat ive

Versus Qualitative Me thod s 199

Th e Con ventional Meth ods Discourse 201

Critique o f the Discourse 207

Disciplinary Interests and Two

Research Log ics 211

A Ta xo no m y o f Social Research Strategies 215

Th e Investigative Con cerns of Critical Th eo ry 218

Conclusion 222

9.

Non -Em pir ica l Methods : Ref lex ive

P rocedu re s 6

Lo gic as Rhetoric 228

Positivist Research and Non-E mp irical Methods 233

Critical Th eo ry and Non-Empirical Meth ods 235

Is Th ere a Dialectical Method? 240

Conclusion 244

10.

Em pir ic al Pro ced ure s in Critical Rese arch 248

Explanation and Interpreta tion in Social Scienc e 248

Intensive Research Designs 250

Narrative and Discourse Analysis 258

Conclusion 266

11.

Co ntext s of Critical Em piric al Re sear ch 273

State and Econ om y 281

Cultural Th eo ry 287

Social Psych ology 293

Conclusion 299



12.

Critical Social Science an d Society:

Theory and Pract ice

302

Models of Social Science

305

Redefining Counterhegemony

and the Pu blic Sphere 313

Intellectuals and Practice:

Co ntex ts of Critical Research

315

Conclusion: Beyond Fragmentation?

320

References

322

Index

350

About the Authors

381



A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

T

his bo ok had its origins in three distinct events during a num

ber of years. Most immediately, I would l ike to thank Ben

Agger for recommending me for this project even though his

o w n con cep tion of a dialectical sensibil ity l ies at the Ado rno -

Benjamin end of the spectrum of crit ical theory; and I would

like to commend Mark Gottdiener for taking the initiative to get

this series off the ground and for having provided the patient

encouragement that is so crucial for those relatively inexperi

enc ed in complet ing a book .

More distantly, in 1978 Peter Bruck (now at Carleton Univer

sity in comm unica tions) organized a con feren ce at Conco rdia

University (M on treal) on Critical Th eor y and Empirical M eth od .

Alth ou gh last-minute attendance preclud ed my preparation of a

full pa per o n this top ic, the prob lema tic has stayed wi th m e. Th e

issues w er e sharpened as I was con fronted term by term w ith

new cohorts of skeptical graduate students. Although I could

have w r i t ten a som ewh at d i f fe rent b ook in be tw ee n, perhap s

n ow is the most approp riate t ime from the ironic per sp ect ive of

the subsequent ups and downs of critical theory as an intellec

tual force in the academic marketplace.

Th e crucial intermed iate factor has bee n m y association w ith

Da vid Bro w n, initially as a doc tora l student in so cio log y at the

Un ivers i ty of Alb erta , and no w c ol league at the Un ivers i ty of

Leth bridg e. Before I becam e his supervisor, David had gaine d a

reputation as a problem -solver in research m ethod s, and our asso

c iat ion began wh en I becam e a mem ber of his co mp rehens ive

exam inat ion com m it tee in m ethod ology. As it happ ens , he

had set out the agenda for a com preh ensive def init ion of the

ix



χ

C R I T I C A L T H E O R Y A N D M E T H O D O L O G Y

prob lem atic that revealed he was also a theorist wi th a prim ary

interest in interpretive methods. That experience revealed con

verge nt interests and led us to exp lor e the possibil ity o f col lab o

rat ion on a project redef ining m etho dolo gy from the pe rsp ect ive

of crit ical theory. That collaborative project was delayed by his

w rit in g a dissertation that recon structed Paul Ric oeu r's th eo ry

of narrative for a novel conc ept ion o f l i fe histor y m eth od olo gy;

and then i t was s idetracked by his subsequent re locat ion at

Lethbridge, where various distractions undermined his ability to

contr ibute to the extent or ig inal ly envis ioned. Alth oug h w e col

laborated dire ctly on ly on Ch apter 8, and I am solely resp ons ible

for all of the others, crucial aspects of my understan ding o f ma ny

key issues stem from our dialogue about theory and methods

during the past few years.

The foundations for this slowly gestating project were laid

(of ten unknowingly) by diverse, even contradictory, inf luences

in Toro nto in the mid-1970s: e.g., loan Davies, Bryan G reen , Joh n

Fekete, Wil l iam Leiss, Christian Lenhardt, Thelma McCormack,

Dieter Misge ld, John O'N ei l l , Paul Picc on e, Doro thy Sm ith, T om

Wilson, I rv ing Zeit l in. A DAAD fe l lowship to the Fre ie Univer-

sitat in Berlin in 1976-7 exposed me in depth to German social

theory. A pos tdoc toral fe l low sh ip at the Un iversite de M ontreal

from 1981-3 faci litated understanding the pro blem s of l ink ing

Germ an and French the ory (as exe m plified in the w or k o f the late

Quebecois soc io logist , Marce l Rioux) and led to an ongoing in

te llectual exchange with G reg Nie lsen (e .g. , Nie lsen and M or ro w

1991) ,

now at Glendon Col lege, York Univers i ty. Some recent

conversations with the crit ical theorist and theologian Gregory

Baum (n ow at M cGil l Univers i ty ) prov ided a boost o f con f iden ce

at a crucial moment when I was having doubts about f inishing

this project . Col laborat ion with Carlos Alberto Torres over the

past several years has be en a continu ous s our ce o f mutual learn

ing that has contributed indirectly to many aspects of the pre

sent discussion.

Here at the University of Alberta, I would l ike to thank the

m em bers of a smal l Cultural Studies reading g rou p w h o sensi

t i zed m e to a num ber o f interd isc ip l inary issues. Th e wo rk o f

m y colleagu e De rek Sayer has be en dif fusely signif icant for my

thinkin g, ev en if it is not directly manifest in wa ys that w ou ld b e

apparent to him . Barb Marshall , a graduate of our prog ram n o w



Acknowledgments

xi

teaching at Trent University, has kept me aware of the troubled

aspects of the relations between crit ical theory and feminist

the ory , thou gh that is on ly a them e insufficiently alluded to he re.

Among recent and current graduate students here at the Uni

versity o f Alberta, I wou ld like to single out several w h o have con

tributed indirectly in little ways (discussions, references, reading

their w o rk ) to this project : Guy Germain and Alan Law (soc io

logy ) , M ichael Mauw s (busine ss), Jerry Kachur, Ke lly Murphy, and

Donald Plumb (educational foundations).

Occasional cappuccinos with Taras at La Gare reminded me

of t w o th em es obscu red by the particular tasks of this bo ok : that

social the or y need s ultimately to speak to the issues o f ever yd ay

l i fe,

and in ways that do no t deny the po eti c orig ins o f all critical

thought. And to Marlene: Thanks for the pat ience and under

standing at several crucial turning points.

This book is dedicated to my father—Ray Morrow, Jr.—whose

natural pragmatism and principled skepticism contradicts his

ow n de ep sense of justice and human values. Alth ou gh circum

stances constrained him to w or k w ith his hands, he enco urag ed

me to pursue an inte l lectual vocat ion to learn to answer the

questions he could not. Mostly I have succeeded (as part of an

ext en de d comm unity of inqu irers) only in reframing s om e of the

questions, henc e the me thod ologica l focus of this bo ok . But the

ou tcom e is, I think, quite consistent w ith things w e im plicit ly

learned g row in g u p together and that I can no w name: the nece s

sary interplay be tw ee n crit ical realist ontology , m etho dolo gical

pragmatism, and communicative ethics in reconstructing human

understanding.



P R E F A C E

T

his book was written with dif ferent kinds of audiences in

mind, result ing in certain tensions within the text itself.

First, despite the prevalence of sociological issues, it is a work

of social theory and m etho dolo gy addressed to an interdiscipli

nary social scientific audience.

Second, it is oriented specif ical ly toward upper level under

graduate and graduate students in the social scienc es. A ltho ug h

it wa s con ceiv ed w ith the ho pe that it migh t supplement teach

ing in social science m ethodo logy, it m ore l ikely w il l b e used to

giv e the teaching o f social the ory a mo re metho dolog ical focus.

Further, it could se rve interested colleague s in search of a guide

to recent debates and a jum ping off p oint for m ore spec ial ized

reading.

Third, it seeks to address indirectly those trained in the hu

manities but in need of an introduction to social theory and

m eth od olog y from a critical sociolog ical per spe ctive . In particu

lar, pr op on en ts o f cultural studies approach es in the hum anities

oft en are han dicap ped b y a lack of ready access to the form s of

soc iolo gy and social science adequate to their needs, esp ecial ly

in relation to meth odo logical questions other than those of textu al

analysis. One manifestation of this problem is an often cavalier

attitude toward questions of empirical adequacy on the basis of

a wh olesale rejection of em piricism , a tende ncy f irst evident

in Althusserian structuralism and now reinforced in rather

dif

ferent way s by the postm odern ist suggestion that virtually any

thing go es w ith respect to kn ow ledg e c laims.

In the process of this synthetic reconstruction, it was neces

sary to deve lop themes that may prove useful for on goin g debates

xiii



xiv


within social theory, and crit ical theory in particular. The con

straints o f a relatively accessible form at have req uir ed formulat

ing (withou t fully defending or exe m plify ing ) a num ber of argu

ments that, w e ho pe , w il l be of some interest for those inv olv ed

in these more special ized debates. In particular, the methodo

logical notion of interpretive structuralism has an ecum enical

ob ject ive: I t seeks to dra w out the similarities be tw ee n a num ber

of research approaches that are more often thought as either

dist inct or com pe t ing , a tenden cy re infor ced by the inhe rent ly

competit ive character of scholarship.

Several limitations in the scope of this study should be noted

at the outset. First, it does not and could not seek to provide an

app l ied approach to l inking cr i tica l the ory and the techniqu es

of social research. Th e most fundam ental rea son is that the prag

matic nature of inquiry precludes any general formulas or reci

pes .

Dif ferent strategies of inqu iry can be m astered only by clo se

analyses of appropriate exemplary studies, combined with ongo

ing re f lect io n on and engagement in the research process itself.

Second, it does not provide the kind of close analysis of actual

empir ica l projects that would be appropriate for a somewhat

d i f f e rent ly con ce iv ed pro jec t ( e .g . , Ha rvey 199 0) . Th e imm e

diate task at hand is to pro vid e a jum pin g o ff p oin t for dire ct

immersion in the theoret ica l and methodological problems of

dif ferent contexts of inquiry.

Th ird , var ious consid erat ions h ave led to a re lat ive ne gle ct

of the range of external and internal crit ic isms that have been

dire cted against crit ical the ory as a research pro gra m . Yet the

w h ol e project is directed general ly towa rd answering mu ch

crit ic ism that has focused on crit ical theory's problematic rela

tion to empirical research. Further, it responds to the skeptical

and antiscientif ic mood of certain postmodernist tendencies.

On th e oth er hand, many of the most im porta nt crit ic isms are

internal to crit ical theory and closely related tendencies. As a

con seq ue nc e, such issues constitute the central them es of o ng o

ing debates and research controversies. Introdu cing to o many of

these m ore advanced questions here wo ul d only serve to furth er

confuse the a lready ov erw he lm ed reader.

The structure o f the bo ok re flects an attempt to facilitate acce ss

on the part of readers with diverse backgrounds. The chapters

are hig hly in tegra ted sequentially, in the sense that co nc ep ts are



Preface

xv

introduced f irst in contexts where their meaning is clari f ied.

Further, the chapters are linked in that the earlier ones set up

foundations for those that come later.

Nevertheless the chapters often could be read separately or in

othe r comb inat ion s for var ious pu rpo ses. Hal f o f the cha pters

are con cern ed w ith the recon struction o f crit ical the ory as a

specif ic research program (Chaps. 1, 4,6-7,11-12), whereas the

other half treat metatheoretical and methodological issues in a

manner that is not necessarily specific or unique to critical

th eor y (Chaps. 2-3, 5,8-10), even i f broadly l inked w ith the n ew

phi los oph y of soc ia l sc ien ce (Ou thw aite 1987; Bohman 1991) .

The latter, in short, could be extended to analyze, justify, or

crit iciz e other research pro gram s that focus on differen t aspects

of dom ination (e.g . , feminist th eo ry ) or dra w on dif ferent meth

odological tools (e.g. , analytical Marxism).

At th e proo f stage a coup le of studies came to our attention that

should be n oted, partly to indicate mo re precisely the dist inctive

strategy underlying our approach. These f inal prefatory com

ments are directed primarily to readers with more special ized

interests in social theory.

Derek Layder 's New Strategies of Social Research (19 93 ) pro

v ides a useful mediat ion be tw een convent ional meth odological

discussions (e.g., middle range and grounded th eo ry ) and a mu lti-

strategy co n ce pt ion o f social analysis close to that of Gidd ens .

As a con sequ enc e, in many respects it could be prof itably used

as a m or e ap pl ied sequel to our study. But his intr od uc tion is

developed largely without reference to the metatheoretical is

sues required for grounding methodology; partly as a conse

qu en ce , he fails to clearly differentiate b et w ee n variable analysis

and oth er uses of qua ntification. As we ll, the tradition of critical

theory-along with discourse theory and the concept of ideol

ogy—mysteriously disappear (despite references to history and

p o w e r ) . We do not find this sanitized approach fully consistent

with Giddens' social theory, and would contend it is more pro

ductive (as w e have do n e) to introduce the me thodo logical imp li

cations of his w or k in the contex t of a dialogue wit h Haberm as

and critical theory generally.

For accidental reasons w e did not be co m e aware of Douglas

Porpora's The Concept of Social Structure (1 98 7) until the last min

ute, eve n though our project w ou ld have gained from eng agem ent



xvi


with his paralle l theoretical argument. Theoretically, Porpora

uses (as w e d o ) Bhaskar's critical realism as a w ay o f differen ti

a t ing be tween Durkhe imian (nomothe t i c ) mode ls o f soc ia l

structure and what he takes to be the Marxian conception (via

Bhaskar's early work). Though he admits that much excit ing

recent w ork has focused on modes of dom inat ion bey on d

M arx, he re jects the gr ow ing chorus of voice s . . . arguing that

Marxian theo ry needs to be supersed ed (198 7, p. 117) . His

po int is that non-Marxian modes o f dom inatio n (e.g . , race and

gen der ) s t il l con form to the Marxian con cep t ion o f soc ial s truc

ture.

Like modes of production, they may all be interpreted as

powerful particulars with underlying generating mechanisms

that consist of relationships among catego ries of p e o p le (Por

po ra, 1987, p. 132 ).

Tho ugh ou r substantive conclusions w ith re spect to theo ry and

research are generally converg ent wit h Porpo ra's, w e have fra m ed

the problematic rather di f ferent ly by speaking more broadly

(and ecum enically) of the interpretive structuralist research pro-

gram of contemporary critical theory. W hi l e w e wou ld agree

that this general methodological conception can be traced back

to Marx (and H eg el ) , w e w ou ld contest the suggest ion that con

tem pora ry cr it ica l theo ry has m ere ly re inven ted the w h ee l (as

Derek Sayer has argued with reference to Giddens).

But the issue at stake is not on e o f a pr iorit y d ispute, but rather

of stressing theoretical discontinuity as part o f eng agin g the

particulars of the present historical horizon. The omissions in

Po rpo ra's account are sym ptom atic of his rehabil itative strategy:

no reference to Habermas or the debates on European structu

ralism (e.g., the later, structuralist side of Durkheim) and post-

structuralism (desp ite a brie f discussion of Fou cault); and a failure

to deve lo p the m ore speci f ic impl icat ions for research m ethods.

Th e attempt to distance his ow n co nc eptio n from that o f G idden s

(despite apparent resemblances) is not a l together convincing,

though it points to some important issues requiring further

clari f ication. The result ing theory of social structure, however

com pel l in g, is e laborated v ir tual ly without re feren ce to one of

culture and its relation to the normative presupposit ions that

de fine a critical th eo ry o f society— decisive issues for a critiqu e

and recon struction of historical material ism. Th e the or y of soci

ety w e n eed today requires historical contents, norm ative groun d-



Preface

xvii

ing and methodological ref lection that go far beyond the con

cep t o f social structure bequea thed by Ma rx. In short, our m ore

comprehensive response to post-Marxist nihil ism attempts to

avoid the temptat ions of e i ther methodological sanit izat ion or

Marxian nostalgia.

R A Y M O N D A . M O R R O W



R T

I

Metatheory:

Grounding Method



1

The hostility to theory as such which prevails in contempo

rary public life is really directed against the transformative

activity

associated

with critical thinking. Opposition

starts as

soon as theorists fail to limit

themselves

to verification and

classification by means of

categories

as neutral

as

possible,

that

is,

categories which are indispensable to inherited

ways

of life. Among the vast majority of the ruled there is the

unconscious fear that theoretical thinking might show their

painfully won adaptation to reality to be perverse and unnec

essary. (Horkheimer [1937] 1972a, p. 323)

La sociologie de la sociologie. .. est un instrument indispen

sable de la m ethode sociologique: on fait de la science—est

surtout de la sociologie-contre sa formation autant qu'avec

sa formation. (Bourdieu 1982, p. 9)

Why Social Science?

Th e social sciences have played a central part in the form atio n

of modern, liberal democratic societies. Yet what has been de

scribed as the contem pora ry p ostm odern con dit ion has funda

mentally called into question the claims that originally inspired

the Enlightenment project of social science. This book is con

cern ed wi th recon structing a social scientif ic per sp ectiv e that

has pr ovi de d on e of the most po w erfu l responses to the cultural

and socioeconomic crises implied by these terms of debate.

3

I N T R O D U C T I O N

What Is Critical Theory?



4

M E T A T H E O R Y : G R O U N D I N G M E T H O D

The notion of a scientific o r scholarly discip line is linked to t w o

basic assumptions rooted in the notion of modern science that

became institutionalized—largely in universities—from the 17th

century onward: (a ) that knowledge can progress through spe

cial ization on the basis of an intel lectual d ivision o f labor ro ote d

in the heterogen eous nature of emp irical things , and ( b ) that the

unity of these endeavors is l inked to a shared scientif ic m eth od

that cuts across spec ialization s and substantive findin gs. B oth of

these assumptions have beco m e problem atic in their original for m .

The contemporary university is characterized by a peculiar

threefold division of labor among disciplines, based on the dis

t inction between the natural sciences, the social sciences, and

the humanities. Th e natural science s are obv ious ly distinctive w it h

resp ect to wha t they study. But w ha t about the division b et w ee n

the humanities and the social sciences? Are they not both con

cerned with the same object of inquiry: the social and cultural

l i fe of humanity? But, many w ou ld argue, the hum anities em plo y

distinctive methods because they do not aspire to be scientif ic

in the strict sense as d o the social scien ces ; instead the hum ani

t ies make kn ow led ge claims based on their abil ity to in terp ret

culture, as op po se d to constructing scientif ic exp lanations o f it.

But is this op po sit ion so fundamental? Lite rary historians ne ces

sari ly do invoke explanatory principles derived from the social

scien ces, and social scientists cannot escap e the pro blem s of inter

pretin g cultural texts. Perhaps because of their shared ob ject of

inquiry and overlapping methods, the humanities and social

sc ien ces are co m bin ed most of te n in a s ingle arts faculty ;

som etime s, how eve r, the social sciences are housed in a dist inct

administrat ive unit w ith the un i fy in g-a nd te l l ta le -disc ipl in e of

history somewhat arbitrari ly al located to either the humanities

or the social sciences. Th e possibil ity of a m ore com pre he ns ive

notion of the human sciences gets lost in the process.

Th e origin s of the social sciences are l inked clo sely w ith trans

formations of soc iety that def ine modernity and the r ise of

industrial capitalism. Whereas the humanities disciplines are

roo ted in ph ilosoph y, l i terature, and languages and can be traced

backed to the M iddle Ages , the form s of thought associated w ith

the social sciences em erg e only in the 18th century. Th e particu

lar focus of the social sciences was the attempt to understand

the massive transformations—still continuing tod ay-th at em er ge d



Introduction

5

init ial ly in Europe in the form of what have been described as

the t w o great revo lutio ns of the 18th and 19th cen turie s: the

po litical rev olut ion in France in 1789 that red efine d po litica l

authority in terms of hum an rights such a liberty, equality, and fra

ternity; and the industrial revolutio n associated wit h the techni

cal inn ovation s, transformations o f ec on om ic and social life , and

urbanization that accompanied the rise of capitalism (Giddens

1982b, pp. 5-6). Although sociology as a more encompassing

discipline is associated most closely with the study of modern

societies, its accomplishm ents have depen ded on and been shared

with other disciplines and modes of thought. On the one hand,

the origins of sociology are l inked closely with l iterary forms

(Lepenies 1988). On the other hand, sociology itself has de

pe nd ed exten sively on other disciplines: history, w h ic h can only

arbitrari ly be separated from sociology; anthropology, which

differs primarily only in the typical kind of society it studies;

econ om ics and political science, w hi ch focus on particular insti

tutional spheres; psychology, which ranges from biology to

questions o f social psychology shared by all of the social scien ces ;

and geograp hy, w h ic h analyzes the relations bet w ee n th e physi

cal features o f the earth and its human popu lations. Mo re recently ,

communications departments have emerged in response to the

rise of the mass media and new comm unications tech no logie s in

information soc iet ies .

Alth ou gh these disciplinary distinctions and dif ferences often

are taken to be natural, it should be stressed that they often

ref le ct accidental features of the deve lopm ent o f mod ern , Euro

pean un iversit ies. A quite dif ferent and mo re prod uctiv e division

of intel lectual labor might have taken place, and ne w ones could

be imagined—both w ith in the social sciences and w ith resp ect

to their relation to the humanities. The point of departure of

crit ical th eo ry -t h e social science pe rsp ectiv e that is the focus

of this study-is precisely one of questioning this exist ing divi

sion o f labor and the social interests it serves, masks, or ne glec ts.

Competing Scienti f ic Perspectives

For crit ical theory, not on ly the given d ivision of labor amon g

disc ipl in es is pro blem atic . A seco nd l ine of que st ion ing con

cerns what it would mean to study social institutions and their



6


transformation in a scientif ic m anner. H ere pop ular ima ges of

science can be very misleading, especial ly the medical model

that psych ologists often resort to or the techno cratic m ode l that

economists have secured and that many sociologists enviously

aspire to. Th e crucial po int is that there are co m pe tin g co nc ep

tions of w ha t kind of scientif ic activity social scien ce should be .

As w e shall see , if it is no long er credib le to refer to the scie ntific

m eth od in the singular, our understanding of the nature of th e

social sciences must be profoundly transformed.

Broadly speak ing, tw o typ es of answers to this ques tion of the

scientif ic status of the social sciences have been proposed. On

the one hand, the earliest and most optim istic and influential v i e w

has be en that the social science s ne ed on ly to emu late the natural

sciences. Such naturalistic o rpos i t i v i s t i c approa ches argue that

the methodology of what are taken to be the most advanced

sciences (e .g. , physics , perhaps bio logy) should be the model .

On th e other hand, op po sin g p ersp ectiv es argue that to a signifi

cant de gr ee , social life is qualitatively differen t from the thin gs

studied by the natural sciences (whether physical or biological)

and that consequently a humanistic approach based on the study

of meanings is required. Other appro ach es-an d w e locate cr it i

cal th eor y here—try to mediate be tw ee n naturalistic and human

istic perspectives.

Th e reality of this m eth odo logic al pluralism is exp ress ed today

in the notion that the social sciences are multiparadigmatic

disciplines. In this context the notion of paradigm of research

refers to the full range of assumptions and practices associated

w ith fundam ental theoretical approa ches, not this or that system

of abstract con cep ts associated w ith the the ory. Th e task of

this study is to outlin e the basic features of w ha t has co m e to be

called critical social theory, or s imply critical theory, as a soc ial

scientif ic perspective that has become the basis of a diverse

research pro gra m (a paradigm of em pirical re sea rch ) that has in

f lue nc ed a num ber of disciplines. Th e term has its orig ins in the

w or k of a grou p of Germ an scholars (co l lec tive ly referre d to as

the Frankfurt School) in the 1920s w h o used the term init ially

(Kritische Theorie in Ge rm an ) to des ignate a spe ci f ic approach

to interpreting Marxist theory. But the term has taken on new

mean ings in the interim and can be neither exclu sively iden tif ied

with the Marxist tradition from which it has become increasingly



Introduction

distinct nor reserved ex clusively to the Frankfurt Sch ool, g iven

extensive new variations outside the original German context.

Prob lems o f De f in i t ion

Before w e turn to a mo re detailed def init ion of crit ical theory,

it is necessary to preface the discussion with some comments

about the rather unfortunate term critical theory itself.

1

Beyond

the obvious prob lem o f it bein g confused w ith l iterary crit ic ism,

a num ber of oth er approaches to social the ory could be consid

ered crit ical in som e sense. For exam ple, Marxist research of

all types could make an obvious claim to be critical. Even posi-

tivist researchers have claimed with considerable justif ication

that empirical f indings may involve criticism of existing under

standings of social reality. I f w e fol lo w the con ven tion o f identi

fying the term critical theory as a ver y specif ic ap proach to

social th eory , it is becau se n o suitable alternative seems to exist.

Further, the term critical itself, in the co nt ex t of cr i t ica l

theo ry, has a range of meanings not apparent in com m on sense

w h er e c rit ique im plies negative evaluations. This is, to be sure,

one sense of crit ique in crit ical theory, given its concern with

un veiling id eolog ical m ystifications in social relations; but an other

even m ore fundamental conno tation is m etho dolo gical, give n a

con cern w ith crit ique as invo lving establishing the presupp osi

t ions of approaches to the nature of reality, knowledge, and

explan ation; yet another dimension of crit ique is associated w ith

the self-ref lex ivity of the investigator and the linguistic basis of

representation. Al l of these are central to contem por ary crit ical

theory.

T w o basic strategies may be used in defining a scien tific ap

pro ach such as critical theory : systematic and historical. W e beg in

with a systematic presentation in this chapter by indicating in

intro du ctory terms som e of the key aspects of crit ical th eor y as

(a ) an approach to the sciences, (b ) as a con cep tion of society,

and ( c ) as a vision fo r realizing certa in values. Fo llo w in g that,

w e situate con tem po rary critical the ory in terms of its historical

origins in classical sociological theory and contemporary de

bates in social theory. Although we seek to avoid the dogmatic

presu mp tion that any one app roach (nam ely the one w e are

exp licating and de fen din g) should domina te or replace al l of the



8


others, w e w il l tr y to make the case for social scien ce as crit ical

th eo ry as having a distinctive set o f tasks that make it essential t o

the social science s mo re generally.

Such an appro ach is plagu ed at the outset by com m un ication

difficulties beca use it requ ires a differ en t voca bula ry, on e that

runs up against bo th com m on sense and much conv entional socia l

scientif ic research. But it w as foresha dow ed in m ore pop ular

terms in the w or k o f C. Wr ight Mi l ls (1916 -1962) , w h o a lmost

s ingle-handedly pion eered the Ame rican tradit ion of wh at cam e

to be known as radical sociology by the 1960s but even tua lly

splintered in several directions. Mills preferred to speak of "socio

logical imagination" in tryin g to con vey the form s o f under

standing of ten result ing from socio logical knowledge (Mi l ls

1967). The project that Mills had in mind in the 1950s is today

most w ide ly un derstood under the heading of critical theory, a

per spe ct ive wh os e inf luen ce no w extends throughout the soc ia l

sciences and to the humanities. In between has been an exten

s ive reappropriat ion of the European tradit ion of soc ia l and

cultural theory that did not occur until the 1970s and 1980s. In

that context it became possible to understand more fully the

contribution s of the dialectical ima gina tion o f the Frankfurt

School tradition of social and cultural research (Jay 1973).

Critical Theory as a Human Science

As a H u m an Science

Humanistic approaches to inquiry are l inked closely with the

remarkable inte rpre tive turn that has be co m e visible in the

human science s during the past deca de, in w h ic h interpreta

t ion has gained a certain currency, eve n prestig e, in ph ilosop hi

cal c ircles and in the social scie nc es (R ab in ow and Sull ivan

1987,

p. 1; Hiley et al. 1991). Such issues concerning the scien

tific status of social research—a central theme of this study—are

discussed under the heading of metatheory ( th eo ry about the

o r y ) . The reason for this shift in the human sciences has been

increasing recognition that the decisive feature that separates the

pract ice of the human and natural sc iences is the problem of



Introduction

9

interp reting meanings in social l i fe . Althoug h crit ical the or y has

a distin ctive po sitio n here becaus e of its insistenc e on a nalyzing

the objective structures that constrain human imagination, it is

otherwise broadly al l ied with humanistic approaches.

According to such antiposit iv ist or interpretive approaches,

the study of the em pirica l cha racter of socie ties differs in at least

t w o basic wa ys from th e natural scien ces. First, social fact s are

qualitatively different from the facts of nature becau se the y are

created and re-created by our own actions as human beings:

In

social theory,

w e cannot

treat human

activities

as though

they were

determ ined by causes in the same way as natural events are. We

have to grasp what I would call the double involvement of indi

viduals and institutions: w e create society at the same time as w e

are created by it .. . . Social

systems

are like buildings that are at

every moment constantly being reconstructed

by

the very bricks

that compose them. (Giddens 1982b, pp . 13-4)

Second, because w e create society, the application o f soc iolo gy

or social science is not really analogous to controlling physical

nature. Human bein gs have a unique cap acity to chan ge their

behavior in response to knowledge about it ; as a consequence

the regularities of social life are always in flux: If w e regard social

activity as a mechanical set of events, determined by natural

laws,

we both misunderstand the past and fail to grasp how

sociological analysis can help inf luence our possible futures

(Gidden s 1982b, pp . 14-5).

This is not to say that it is impossible-and for some purposes

us efu l-t o p ro ce ed as if social facts could b e analyzed in the

mann er of natural objects or thing s. Inde ed, critical theo ry

charges that one of the failures of traditional humanistic ap

proaches lies in their neglect of such strategies of inquiry. But

it is quite a differen t man ner to make this the exclu sive defin ition

of social inq uiry that takes its m eth od as the onl y scien tific on e.

As a His torica l Science of Socie ty

Whereas positivist approaches focus on those aspects that

natural and social science may have in common, critical theory



10


moves in the oppo site direct ion by explo r ing those aspects that

separate the two. A fundamental consequence is that crit ical

th eo ry is co nc eiv ed essentially as a form of historical so cio log y

(and in this sense a scien ce o f h isto ry ). W ha t is at issue here is

h ow cr it ica l theory c once ives the nature of

its

ob ject o f inquiry—

that is, h o w it understands the nature o f w ha t it seeks to e xp lain .

To speak o f crit ical the ory as historical, th erefo re, d oes not ex

clud e the pre sen t. The p oin t is, rather, that the ultim ate bou nda

ries of its dom ain o f inqu iry are the uniqu e set of ev ents that make

up world history and that are in this respect a kind of world-

historical sociology w ith impl icat ions for human values, w h ic h

is quite distinct from the general theoretical sociology, w h i c h

has always bee n the ideal of posit iv ist theories o f scien ce (Fararo

1989,

p. 15).

Th ese qualities are also closely associated w ith w ha t Mills calle d

soc io log ica l imaginat ion. M ore recent ly , An thon y Gi d de n s-

the leading con tem po rar y British crit ical theorist—has sp ec if ied

them in terms of several related form s of sensibil ity requ ired

for understanding con tem pora ry industrial societies: Th ese fo rm s

of the sociological imagination involve an historical, an anthro

po log ica l, and a crit ical sensit iv ity (19 82 b, p. 1 6). From this

per spe ct ive the tasks of soc io logy strongly over lap wit h those of

historians and anth ropolog ists, among others.

Such a historical sens itivity is req uire d to grasp im agin ative ly

the profoun d transformations w ith in human history, and our ve ry

categor ies of soc io logical conceptual izat ion chan ge w ith soc iety

itself.

An thro polo gica l ins ight requires com ing to terms w ith the

peculiar tension between the unity and diversity of human

cultures and the dif f iculty of avoiding ethno centrism— of ma king

one 's o w n so ciety the lens through w h ich a ll others are v i ew ed

and judged.

But critical th eo ry has a m ore sp ec ific focus o n the substan tive

problematic of domination, a com plex not ion based on a con

cern w ith the way s social relations also med iate po w e r relations

to create various forms o f alienation and inh ibit the realiza tion

of human possibil it ies. In this respect, crit ical theory is a kind

of co nflic t the ory in that it is reco gn ized that relations of dom ina

tion m anifest them selves in social struggles. W ha t is dist inctive

about critical theory, however, is its understanding of the com-



Introduction

11

plexity of domination itself (which cannot be reduced to overt

opp ress ion ) , as w el l as the methodological pro blems involved in

studying it (H arv ey 1990, p. 32 ).

As Sociocultural Cr it ique

This focus on relations of domin ation is con nec ted intimately

w ith crit ical theo ry's con cern w ith the simultaneous crit ique of

soc iety and the envisioning of n ew possibil it ies. Crit ique in this

sense is con cerne d w ith normative theory, the ory about values

and w ha t ough t to be . Cri t ica l ima ginat ion is requ ired to avoid

identifying w he re w e live here and now as som eh ow cast in stone

by natural laws: But this means w e must b e conscious o f the

alternative futures that are potentially open to us. In its third

sense, the sociological imagination fuses with the task of sociol

ogy in contributing to the crit ique of exist ing forms of society

(Gid den s 1982b, p. 2 6) . In a sense that w il l requ ire further clarifi

cation, in short, sociocultural crit ique joins up here wit h w ha t

often has been referred to as Utopian imagination.

Critica l Th eo ry an d Interd isc ip l inar i ty

Th e projec t o f crit ical theo ry is not unique to either soc iolo gy

or the social sciences generally. As a consequence it is possible

to identify variants of critical theory in all of the social science

disciplines: for example, anthropology (Scholte 1974; Marcus

and Fischer 1986), history (Pos ter 1989; Jay 199 3), political sci

en ce (Ball 1987; Dallmayr 1987; Luke 1990; W h it e 19 87 ), com

mu nications and cultural studies (Hard t

1992;

Agger, 19 90,19 92a),

psy cho logy (Sampson 1983; Sull ivan 1990 ), geo grap hy and ur

ban studies (G reg or y 1978; Go ttdiener 198 5), and econ om ics

(Sherman 1987 ). Paralle l develop m ents can be seen also in m ore

app lied and professional f ie lds such as education ( Gi rou x 198 1),

social wo rk (D rov er and Kierans 1993 ), organizational studies

and pu blic adm inistration (Du nn and Fozou ni 1976; C legg 1975,

1989),

legal studies (Unger 1986), and planning and policy re

search (Forester 1 985 d).

Beyond these more specific identifications it is also possible

to point to extensive inf luences that have reshaped somewhat



12


differently designated research approaches. For example, certain

tendencies in feminist theory have been inf lue nce d strongly by

crit ical th eo ry (Fraser 1989; Benhabib 1986; Marshall Fo rthcom

ing) . As w el l, the humanities often have been in fluen ced by c ritical

social theory, thus blurring the boundaries between social and

cultural cr i t ic ism, especia l ly under the heading of a cultural

studies l inkin g the humanities and social scienc es (Bran tl inger

1990;

Berman 198 9) .

Nev erthe less so cio log y do es have a strong case for centrality.

As Jurgen Haberm as, the leading cont em po rar y G erm an crit ical

theorist, notes, soc iolo gy's ult imate co nc ern is w ith a th eo ry of

society : Alo ne among the disciplines of social scie nc e, sociol

og y has retained its relations to pro blem s o f soc iety as a w h ol e.

W ha tev er else it has be co m e, it has always remain ed a th eo ry of

society as w ir (Hab ermas 1984, p. 5) . An oth er con sequ enc e is

that so cio log y becam e the scien ce of crisis par ex ce lle n ce ; it

concerned itself above al l with the anomic aspects of the disso

lution of tradit ional social systems and the dev elo pm en t o f m od

ern on es (Haberma s 1984, p. 4 ) . Neverthe less this pr iv i le ged

status in relation to so cio log y should not be a l low ed to obs cure

the inheren tly supra disciplinary character of crit ical theo ry.

As the American philosopher Douglas Kellner has argued in his

comprehensive synthesis of the Frankfurt tradit ion of crit ical

theory:

Yet, wh ile there is no unitary Critical Theory, I w ill suggest there

are features which define it in terms of method, presuppositions

and positions. From the beg innin g to the present, Critical Th eo ry

has refused to situate itself within an arbitrary or conventional

academic division of labor. It thus traverses and undermines

boundaries be tw een com peting disciplines, and stresses intercon

nections bet we en philosophy, econ omics and politics, and culture

and society. . . . This project requires a collective, supradiscipli

nary synthesis of philosophy, the sciences and politics, in which

critical social theory is produced by grou ps of theorists and scien

tists from various disciplines wo rk ing together to prod uc e a Criti

cal Theory of the present age aimed at radical socio-political

transformation. (Kellner 1989, p. 7)



Introduction

13

The Origins of Critical Theory

Classical Sociology

At this point it is necessary to begin the first step in the

process of introducing the tradit ion of thought associated with

the n otion o f critical social theory. In this initial historical p resen

tation w e w il l be able to pro vide o nly a ve ry general sketch. W e

necessa rily take for gran ted a certain basic fam iliarity w it h the

history of sociological thought and the frame of reference for

locating crit ical theory (Giddens 1971).

M ost per tin en t as a m od el for critical the or y is the classical

socio logic al in quiry that was the focus of M il ls 's account of the

sociological imagination. The trio of theorists who are held

(Giddens 1971) to be most crucial to the formation of contem

por ary so c io logy are Karl Marx (1818-1883 ) , Max We be r (1864-

1920), and Em ile Durkheim (1858-1917). In the cases of Karl M arx

and Max Weber-the most inf luential c lassical German socio-

log ists -th eir decisive impact on critical the ory is clear (A gg er

1979) . The continuity is both methodological and substantive.

M arx and W eb er shared a recog nit ion of the historical character

of s oci olo gy that puts them clearly outside the mod el of

a

natural

scien ce of society. To be sure, M arx has be en inte rprete d (e.g. ,

in Soviet Marxism) as doing a natural science of society, but

m ode rn com men tators have clari f ied that his notion o f a sci

en ce of history cannot be made fully intel l igible in posit iv ist

terms. Marxists, of course, often have been tem pted by redu cing

M arx to his eco no m ic th eory and its roots in posit iv ist econ om

ics, but this is not usually the M arx w h o inform s con tem po rar y

social theory.

Weber ' s explicit historicism led hi m to reject evolu tionist and

abstract th eor izin g and to stress the relative and chang ing nature

of soc io logical concep ts . W ebe r 's type of historic ism led him to

be cautious about abstract laws and generalizations, as opposed

to seeing social processes in specific historical contexts. Simi

larly, bo th M arx and W eb er we re con cern ed w ith the con f l ictual

and co ntr ad icto ry features of capitalist m odern ity, a the m e ex

pressed in their respective complementary concern with al iena

tion (assoc iated wi th the expa nsion o f the market system and the



14


comodif ication of social relations) and rationalization l inked

w ith bureaucratization and the ef fects of scien ce and te ch no log y

(L ow ith [193 2] 1982; D. Sayer 1991).

In contrast, the French classical sociologist Durkheim is pre

sented in standard met ho do log y texts as the exem plar o f posit iv-

ist m eth od and foundin g father of em pirical m eth od s in his

quan titative analysis o f suic id e.

2

In this con tex t his injunc tion to

treat socia l facts as th in gs is taken m or e or less literally.

Further, he is rec og niz ed as the pion eer o f functionalist th eo ry

and i ts conservat ive concern wi th the pro blem o f soc ia l order

and the division o f labor. Alth ou gh mu ch truth is in this g eneral

contrast between the two German theor ists who have inf lu

en ced dec isively the form ation o f crit ical th eo ry and Du rkheim s

role in legit imating posit iv ist sociology, more recent interpreta

t ions have po in ted to aspects o f Du rkheim 's w or k that have be en

appropriated by some forms of crit ical theory, especial ly as

mediated by his inf luen ce on French soc ia l the ory .

3

Ear ly F rank fur t Th eo ry

Historically the notion of a crit ical the or y o f soc iety is associ

ated most close ly wi th a research institute establish ed in th e

Germ an Weim ar Repub lic in 1923 and forc ed in to ex ile by Hit ler

in 19 32 -th e so-called Frankfurt Sc ho ol (Jay 1973; He ld 19 80 ).

The term Critical Theory (o ft en used in capitals to refer to this

specif ic German tradit ion) was used by its leading theorists to

iden tify their appro ach, in contrast to form s of tradit ional

the ory , w h ic h attem pted to emu late the naturalistic objectiv

ism o f the natural scienc es, an app roach to m eth od olo gy that the

crit ical theorists pejora tively labeled pos it iv ism . Instead Criti

cal Theory proposed that an alternative conception of social

scien ce was requ ired, on e that could grasp the nature of s oc iety

as a historical totality, rather than as an agg rega te o f m ech anic al

determinants or abstract functions. Further, it was argued that

such analysis could n ot take the for m o f an

indif ferent, value-free

contemplation of social reality, but should be engaged con

sciously wi th the process o f its transforma tion.

Th e three leading theorists o f this origina l Frankfurt gro up w e re

Max H orkheimer (1895-1973), Th eodo r Adorn o (1903-1969) , and



Introduction

15

Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979).

4

Th eir approach had a num ber of

unique characteristics:

• It was the first independent research group that was able to work

within an avowedly Marxist framework (though it eventually would

break with key aspects of orthodox Marxism).

• It was open to the interdisciplinary appropriation of theories and

methods from the social sciences, humanities, and non-Marxist

philosophy.

• It represented the first systemic effort to employ traditional empiri

cal research techniques (e.g., survey research) to the refinement and

testing o f propositions derived from the Marxist tradition.

De velop m ents i n the Ear ly Frank furt Scho ol

But this original Frankfurt tradition subsequently w en t throu gh

many sign ificant changes that led it away from its origina l iden

tif ication with classical Marxist theory. Three key phases can be

iden tif ied. Th e f irst wa s characterized by a kind o f interdiscipli

nary materialism that sough t to analyze the factors that m igh t

contr ibute to the deve lopm ent o f

a

revolutionary w or ki n g class.

The not ion of materialism here referred exp lic it ly to M arx's

historical materialism but rejected the eco no m ic reduction ism

associated w it h o rth od ox Ma rxism . Instead it w as argued that a

consistent materialist approach (one that began with the assump

tion that consciousness could be understood only in relation to

economic and social structures rooted in social being) required

a m ore self-ref lexive co nce ptio n of meth od, a m ore subtle th eo ry

of culture, and a social psychological analysis of c lass con

sciousness. De velop m ent of these issues required b oth recourse

to empirical research to assess the validity of such materialist

arguments, as w ell as bo rro w in g c oncep ts from non-Marxist

sources wh er e a pprop riate. At this stage the early Crit ical The o

rists still had some faith that the German working class would

mobi l ize-a long the l ine proposed by Marx 's theory of revolu

tion—to overthrow Hitler 's Nazi dictatorship.

With the failure of overthrow, and the regression of the Soviet

revolution to Stalinism, the early Critical Theorists abandoned—

in the second phase in the late 1930s—a specifically Marxist p oliti

cal position despite their continued op pos ition to the destruc tive



16


effects of capital ism. Instead they turned to an exploration of

the new found stabil ity of capital ism, which they attributed, in

part, to the rise of the welfa re state and the ability o f the n ew mass

media (w ha t they called the culture indu stries ) to distract wo rk

ing class audiences from w hat was held to be their rea l inter

ests.

Th e ou tcom e of this analysis wa s a pro fou nd pess imism .

Contemporary Critical Theory

G e r ma n Cont inua t i ons

Th e third phase involved the em erge nc e in the 1960s of n e w

generation under the leadership of Jurgen Habermas (19 29 -), w h o

radically revised crit ical theory to ensure its continuing rele

van ce as a crit ique o f the emerg ent for m o f advanced capital ism

(Mc Carth y 1978) . O f great strategic im porta nce h ere was con

t inuing an act ive engagem ent with the deve lop m ents throughout

the human sciences and philosophy, in contrast to the continu

ing insularity and dogmatism of much of the neo-Marxist tradi

t ion, w h ich tended to re fer to cri t ica l the ory w ith the pe jora t ive

t e rm revisionism. A num ber of Ge rm an scholars , such as

W olfgan g Βο ηβ , Helm ut Dubiel, Klaus Eder, A xe l Hon neth , Hans

Joas,

Claus Offe, and Albrec ht W ellme r have continued to ex pl or e

issues in ways strongly inf luenced by Habermas's approach.

Nev erth eless it should be stressed that desp ite a certain pop u

larity in late 1960s, the Frankfurt tradition has always had a

m arg in a l - i f quite v is ib le -p lace in postw ar German soc io log y

(Meja et al. 1987; Liischen 1979).

Today, however, the term critical theory has also co m e to be

associated with various theorists in different national traditions

(and disciplines) often directly inf luenced by this earl ier tradi

t ion, but w ith many mo re recent and indepe nden t deve lo pm ents

as w el l . Alth ou gh until the last decad e or so , many of these ten

dencies (e.g. , Mil ls ) wo uld have been associated with som e no tion

of a radical co nfl ict theory , today the gen eric n otion of crit ical

the ory is perha ps a m ore useful designation and invites a def ini

t ion of the problematic that goes beyond its specif ic national

origin s or roots in debates in classical sociolo gica l theory .



Introduction

17

French Connect ions

De spite a significant re cep tion o f both the earlier Frankfurt

and contemporary crit ical theory during the past decade or so

(Fer ry 198 7), the label critical th eo ry does not apply easily to

any high p rofile gro up in France, though it does in French Q u eb ec

(R iou x, 1978; Nielsen 1985). But as is evident in the inf lu en ce

of French debates on contemporary critical theory, many affini

ties and some subtle mutual influences are found. A looser

def init ion a lso would inc lude many whose work complements

crit ical the ory (of ten ref lecte d in citations by critical the orists)

without being explic it ly identif ied with it : the work of the con

tem pora ry sociologists Alain Touraine (Touraine 1977) and Pierr e

Bou rdieu (Bou rdieu 197 7), as w el l as that of the late ph ilos op he r

and historian Michel Foucault (Foucault 1984).

A ng lo Am er ica n Adapta t ions

Ironically critical theo ry n ow flourishes above all in the English-

speaking world. Examples of contemporary Brit ish and North

A m eri ca n soc iologis ts and social, po litical, and cultural theorists

closely associated with crit ical theory are the work of Zygmunt

Bauman, Anth ony Giddens , Dav id He ld , John Keane , W i l l iam

Ou thw aite, and John B. Th om pso n in Britain;

5

Ben Ag ger, Rob ert

Antonio, Andrew Arato, Stanley Aronowitz, Seyla Benhabib,

Richard B ernstein, No rm an Birnbaum, Craig

Calhoun, Jean

Cohen ,

Fred Dallmayr, Nancy Fraser, Henry Giroux, Alvin Gouldner,

Martin Jay, Douglas Kellner, Tim Luke, Tom McCarthy, Paul

Piccone, Mark Poster, and Philip Wexler in the United States;

Barry Adam, Gregory Baum, loan Davies, Rick Gruneau, Barb

Marshall, W illiam Leiss, Greg Nielsen, John O'N eill, Marcel Rio ux ,

and Charles Taylor in Canada; and in Australia and N e w Zealan d

in work associated with the journal Thesis Eleven (e.g ., Beilharz

et al. 1992 ) and individuals such as

Johann Arnason, Bob Co nn ell,

M icha el Pusey, Ro be rt E. You ng , and Barry Sma rt.

6

The diversity

of crit ical theory today is especial ly evident in sociologically

or ien ted journals such as Theory, Culture and Society, and Theory

and Society but also through out the human scien ces g en era lly.

7

Use d in a loo ser sen se, the term critical theory has be co m e

increasingly applicable to forms of what was earl ier a quite



18


distinctive intellectual tendency: British cultural Marxism (and

related forms of cultural studies) associated with the literary

critic and cultural theorist Raymond Williams, the social histo

rian E. P. Th om ps on , and the cultural studies Stuart Hall h el p ed

defin e (G . Turner 199 0). W ha t is characterist ic about this Brit ish

tradit ion is that M arx is interp reted from the pers pe ctiv e o f the

Italian ph iloso ph er An to ni o Gram sci (189 1-19 37) or as a histori

cal sociologist concerned with the particularity and cultural

aspects of social transformations, not simp ly explain ing them in

terms of abstract economic laws (Harris 1992; D. Sayer 1987).

More recent work associated with such revisionist cultural ma

ter ia l ism c lear ly converges with debates within contemporary

cr i t ica l theory (Morrow 1991a) .

The Boundar ies o f Cr i t ica l Theory

A n im portan t aspect of our appro ach, ho w eve r, is to stress the

discont inuit ies between contemporary cr i t ica l theor ies of soc i

ety and the neo-Marxist tradit ion with which they would other

wise commonly be associated. This strategy has both polemical

and substantive justifications. Polem ically, it is bo th cou nte rpro

du ctive and misleading to con flate the variety of appro ache s that

have been inf luenced by the Marxian tradit ion. Substantively,

for m ore than a half cen tury crit ical theories have rejecte d many

of the most fundam ental tenets of the Marxia n tradition and hav e

bee n inf lu en ced decisively by a num ber of non-Marxist contri

but ions. Thus w e wo uld fo l low those w h o c lear ly di f ferent iate

be tw ee n any not ion of a Marxist soc io log y or M arxism as

sci en ce from crit ical social the ory or crit ical theo ries of s ocie ty

(M or ro w 1992a) . Wh ereas both could be considered form s o f

wh at of ten has been term ed e i ther critical sociology o r critical

social science, crit ical theor y clearly is l inked wi th a dist in ctive

set of positions that set it apart.

8

Whether or in what sense the

result ing contemporary crit ical theory may be post-Marxist re

mains high ly contested—and a question to w h ic h w e w il l return

in a mom ent .

9

In the present conte xt , w e em ploy the term critical theory in

a broadly ecum enical manner, w ith the bound ary of neo-Marxist

theory on its left and neo-Weberian conflict theory on its righ t.



Introduction

19

Neo-Marxist theory is def ined by its continuing concern to

establish the scientific character of Marx's theory in terms of

the explanations building on a determ inistic con cep t of mo des

of pro du ction (W righ t 1985, 1989; W oo d 198 6). Crit ical theory,

in contrast, argues that M arx's the or y needs to be reco ns tru cted

in dec isive wa ys .

1 0

Neo-Weberian theory, on the other hand, provides important

insights w ith respect to ho w to reconstruct Ma rx - fo r exam ple,

the need for understanding social classes with respect to their

non-economic aspects, the importance of subjectivity and val

ues in social life, the state as a form of p ow er inde pen den t o f th e

econ om y, and the signif icance o f bureaucratization and scien ce

in modern society. But unlike critical theories, neo-Weberian

theo ries have rejected use of such kn ow led ge as the basis of a

programmatic cr i t ique of contemporary soc iety (Parkin 1979;

Collins 1986, 1990).

Although crit ical theories have been inf luenced by the theo

retical challenges and empirical f indings of both of these tradi

tions, they have resisted assimilation or identification of either

of these f lanking posit ions on a numb er of grounds: epistemo-

logical , methodological , analyt ica l , and pol i t ica l . Yet i t is im

portant to acknowledge the aff init ies and the fruit ful dialogue

that often have taken place in the competit ion among these

approaches.

Although critical theory in the Frankfurt tradition was never

fully un if ied, a n ew con figuration o f dif ferences em erge d in the

1980s: Perhap s the crucial aspe ct of this n ew con stellation is

the breakup of Critical Theory, particularly the separation made

b et w ee n Haberm as, on the one hand, and Ad orn o and Benjamin,

on the other (Hohen dahl 1991, p. 202 ) . Th e w ork of H abermas

is more popular among philosophers and social scientists be

cause it addresses m ore familiar prob lem s and largely rejects the

more speculative themes found in Adorno and Benjamin's con

cern with the Marxian theory of history and aesthetic theory.

Th e prim ary con cern o f this study, given the focus on the m ethod

olo gy of the social sciences, w il l be the tend ency re presen ted by

Habermas.

T w o social theorists are used in this study as the pr im ary

con tem po rary exemp lars of such a proje ct for crit ical the ory as



20


a form of cr i t ica l soc ia l sc ience: Jurgen Habermas (1 92 9- ) w h os e

work originated in the trajectory of the early Frankfurt School

in the late 1950s, but latter de ve lop ed a systematic m eth odo logi

cal revision of critical theory from the late 1960s; and Anthony

Giddens (1938- ) , a Brit ish soc io logist w h o de ve lo pe d an inde

pendent version of crit ical theory in the 1970s onward. No one

would dispute Habermas's status in this regard, and his name is

most strongly associated with the term critical theory t oday .

1 1

M or e problem atic is the signif icance o f his contin uing aff init ies

w ith the tradit ion of Weste rn M arxism , an aff il iation he has not

found necessary to renounce. Many others have concluded,

how ever, that the construct of 'W es ter n Ma rxism ' has lost som e

of its usefulness fo r the pr esen t deb ate . . . Jurgen Ha berm as

cann ot b e called a W ester n M arxist. . . . Boun daries that used to

be stable have col lapsed and new border l ines have emerged

(Hohen dahl 1991, pp . 227-8). Acc ordin gly the not ion of contem

po rar y crit ical the ory used in this study reco gn izes the in f lu en ce

of the Marxist tradition but assumes that critical theory can no

long er be describe d as a spec if ical ly M arxist ap proac h.

The prominence of Giddens is more recent, but in the past

several years an em erg ing seco nd ary literature also suggests that

his structuration theory is vi ew ed as another major refer en ce

po in t for the claims o f critical the or y as a distin ctive and influ

ent ia l approach to the human sc iences .

1 2

The usefulness of

Gidden s stems, in part, from his sustained enga gem ent w ith the

issues o f so cio log y as a disc iplin e and its relation to oth er s ocial

scien ces. Th os e w h o contest his status as a critical theo rist

(des pite his self-designation in these term s) poin t to his exp lic it

rejection of neo-Marxian theory, exten sive use o f n eo-W eberian

theory, and the lack of a fully w ork edo ut crit iq ue of con tem po

rary society. Yet for the purposes of the methodological focus

of this study, these aspects of Giddens's approach are often an

advantage because the result ing theoretical approach is both

ve ry op en-en ded and m eth od olog ically self-conscious; as w el l , i t

doveta i ls nice ly with the more phi losophical or ientat ion of

Habermas and his inevitable neglect of many issues of concern

to practicing social researchers.



Introduction

21

Critical Theory Now

Ideological Cr is is

Disputes about the relationship between contemporary crit i

cal th eo ry and the Marxist tradition are linked clo sely to the fact

that the ideological formations traditionally associated with

lib

eralism and socialism have ceased to b e adequate to the tasks of

a progress ive deve lopme nt o f contem porary pol i t ics . Th e part ia l

successes of neoconservatism—a return to the classical liberal

notion that the invisible hand of markets will solve all of our

pr ob lem s-c an be attributed to a great exten t to the chron ic in

abil ity of the proph ets of 19th century progress to exte nd their

linear visions of growth ad infinitum into the future. The ques

tion o f crit ical th eor y n o w cannot escap e the fundam ental

chal lenges that have eroded-or perhaps even exhausted-the

Utopian

aspirations underlying the project of crit ical theory

(W ex ler 1991; Habermas 1989, pp . 48-70).

As a con seq ue nc e a triple loss of faith is apparent in the W est:

( a ) politically, the break dow n of the great transformation

whereby free markets were to be succeeded by democratic plan

ning, ( b ) scientifically, a loss o f the faith in reason (and s ci en ce )

that w ou ld rationally guide this proce ss, and (c ) morally, perva

sive challenges to the universalistic values embodied in the theo

ries o f natural rights associated w ith mo dernity.

We propose to provide an introduction to an alternative dis

course that has long sought to address these issues. In the pr oc es s

I attempt to weave together an incredibly complex story about

what has happened in the human sciences during the past few

decades from the persp ective o f a constructive counterdiscourse.

The Post -Marx ist Context and Pos tm od ern ism

The intellectual paradox of the 1990s must be confronted at

the outset: Marx was fully rehabilitated in An gl o America n scholar

ship as a fully cre dib le em piric al social scientist in the ve ry

decade-the 1980s-that culminated in the practical repudiation

of M arxism as a universal, world-historical id eolo gy of revolu

t ionary progress. The theoret ica l and methodological opening



22


of Anglo American soc ia l sc ience during the past two decades

has for the first tim e low ere d th e ideo logic al resistances to a faire r

assessment of neo -Marxist and critical the orie s, as w el l as a m or e

acute analysis of their very important differences. But at the

same time, that low erin g o f boundaries has, in part, been largely

on the terms of the re igning empir ic ism, which, for the most

part, f inds a scientif ic Ma rx m ore cong enial than the for m of

interpret ive cr i tica l theo ry w h ich is defended here.

As a con sequ enc e, con tem por ary cr i t ica l theory, as op po sed

to neo-Marxist theory, has a ve ry d if ferent relationsh ip to t w o

intel lectual phenomena that have gained increasing currency in

the avant-garde intellectual m arketp lace: post-Marxism and post

modernism. Th e term post-Marxist has tw o key conno tat ions.

Th e first is the oretic al in the sense o f suggesting a pp roa ch es that

on ce id entif ied themselves as part of the Marxian tradit ion but

have found it necessary to break with M arx o n a nu m ber of

fundamental m eth odo logic al and substantive issues to deal w ith

the intel lectual crisis of historical ma terial ism (A ro n ow itz

1981;

Laclau and M ouffe 19 85 ). Critical th eo ry is arguably post-

Marxist in this sense, which should not be confused with the

simple obsolescence of the issues posed by the Marxian tradi

tion. The second meaning is political and historical and is asso

ciated with the year 1989 and the fall of Soviet-style regimes as

credible models of soc ia l ism and comm unism . Altho ugh the

term post-Marxist wa s po pu larize d only in the 1980s, it can be

argued that crit ical the ory has bee n b roadly post-Marxist in bo th

respects for several decades.

Th e relationship o f critical the ory as a for m of modernist

theorizing to postmodernist social theory is a much mo re com

plex topic , one for which only an or ient ing sketch can be pro

vided here. In its most widely understood version, postmodernist

social the ory is associated with the claim that total izing theo ries

of society and history are obsolete and that social theory must

content itself with local analyzes that accept the essential rela

t iv ity of all values and mod es of cogn it ion . Such p ostm ode rnism

is clearly incom patib le wi th critical theo ry, and yet many o f the

critiques by critical theorists directed against Marxism and so

ciolo gica l functionalism are uncann ily paralle l . For this reason a

nu m ber of crit ical theorists have argu ed that a crit ica l ap pro -



24


perspective. Not surprisingly these issues largely have been ig

nored beyond the early crit ique of posit iv ism, especial ly on the

part of crit ical theories that have been skeptical of what often

has bee n ch aracterize d as Marxist posit iv ism .

Th e present approach attempts to rescue the m etho dolog ical

foundations o f crit ical theo ry as a research pro gra m w ith em piri

cal dimensions, but not in the classic manner of conceiving

M arxism as a po sit ive, n aturalist ic scien ce. Instead the presen t

strategy is linked to w ha t has be en referred t o as the applied turn

in con tem pora ry cr it ica l theory, w he re in ap pl ied re fers not

to instrumental application but to crit ical, empirically and his

tor ica lly or iented approp riat ion (Forester 1985b, p.

x v i i ) .

The

cons eque nce is to locate actors w ith in m ore encom passing

structural sett ings of relations of power and control. The de-

emphasis of class analysis notwithstanding, this move distin

guishes these analyses both from traditionally functionalist and

from more voluntaristic, pluralist accounts. Critical theory thus

makes possible the concrete analysis of structure and of contin

gently staged social actio n (Forester 1985b, p.

x i i i ) .

We label this methodological approach interpretive structu

ralism ( o r hermeneutic structuralism), terms desig ned to con

vey several central principles whose full implications are elabo

rated in the chapters that follow: that social relations and social

analysis always have an interpretive (hermeneutic) dimension;

that meaning and language (hence discourses) are the basis of

forms of reality construction that both reveal and conceal the

ex pe rien ces of subjects; that structures may be spec ies-spe cif ic

or historically constituted and sometimes consciously transform ed

eve n i f they have a kind o f obje ctive factic ity that appears

independent of immediate actors; that social and cultural struc

tures constrain human action as does a gramm ar language, he nc e

not in the w ay im plie d by variables as proba list ic de term inan ts;

and that meaning and structures constantly are reproduced

(stat ica l ly ) and pro du ced (d yna m ical ly ) across space and t i m e .

1 3

This neglect of methodological questions has contributed to a

fourfold vuln erabil ity for crit ical theory. First, the dom ina nc e of

a restrict ive con cep tion of m etho d patterned on the natural

scien ces has ma de it diff icult to assess the claims of oth er ty pe s

of methods and forms of explanation that have been either



Introduction

25

ex clu de d as havin g no scie ntific status or giv en a rather m arginal

pla ce as useful as pr elim in arie s to research, but not essential

to do ing real social scienc e.

Second , the tenden cy has bee n for crit ical theo ry to be defen-

sive-that is, to be more concerned with crit ic izing other ap

proa ches than outl ining its o w n research program or even point

ing to wo rk consistent with it.

Th ird , the ideological co ntex t of research funding has contrib

uted strongly to the isolation of critical theories from engage

m ent w it h em pirica l research. Further, mu ch research that could

b e consid ered a form of crit ical research does not overtly or

explicitly define itself in such terms.

Fourth, there is an importan t sense in w h ic h the m etho dolo gi

cal approaches associated with crit ical theories do not provide

the immediate psychological grati f ications, expedient results,

and marketable skills ofte n associated w ith the appea l o f meth

o d s and tech niqu es in a market-oriented culture. W e do not

propose here to provide useful practical skills in the sense of

ordinary cookbook methods texts in the social sciences. What

w e d o seek is mu ch closer to the spirit o f so-called th eo ry

con struction texts but from a rather dif ferent pe rsp ect ive: the

methodological implications of a critical theory of society as

an interpretive structuralist research program.

T h e focus o f this strategy is thus m eth od olo gica l, rather than

substantive or po licy orien ted. W e do not pr op os e to recon struct

in detail the specific analysis of advanced capitalism proposed

by various crit ical theories. No r do w e p rop os e to suggest the

answ ers that critical th eor y migh t have about w ha t is to be

do ne. Altho ugh these are importan t questions and w e allude to

contributions that deal with such issues, our immediate task is

an analysis of strategies of inquiry that provide reflexive re

sponses to this triple loss of faith in politics, science, and

universal morality. For many, a m eth od olo gica l focus is not on ly

un exc iting , but it also appears as a distraction from ge ttin g o n

with real research, substantive theorizing, or political activism.

Such impatience is understandable but ultimately not fully de

fensible, especially in transitional phases of scientific inquiry

when nothing can be taken for granted anymore.



28


interpretations o f nature and soc iety are oft en dif f icult to g rasp

and translate into popular formulations. Although proponents of

critical social theory have engaged in defensive responses to crit

ics, he nc e could be inte rpre ted as el it ist in the pejo rativ e sense,

this should not obscure the more fundamental problem of com

mu nicating certain types o f ideas in a culture w h o se fundamen

tal categories tend to exclude philosophical and theoretical

re f lect ion . I f w e focus extensive ly on expl icat ing such con cep ts ,

it is because w e sym pathize w ith the assumption that, in th e

right contexts, comm on sense can be reconstructed through p hilo

sophical reflection. Further, it is only in this manner that the

questions of crit ical social th eor y can be brou ght to the level of

introdu ctory soc io logy w h er e it is oth erw ise large ly inv is ible or

tucked away under a br ie f vulgar izat ion of Marxist th eo ry .

1 4

Too Rationalistic?

I f the self-understanding o f scien ce is qu esti on ed , it is do n e so

in the name of deepening our understanding of reason, not in

defense o f unreason. In the current conjun cture, associated w it h

widespread attacks on the very not ion of sc ience, or soc io logy

as a scientif ic activity that should attempt to com pr eh en d overa ll

proc esses, the mean ing of crit ical the ory 's antiposit iv ism can be

seen in a differen t light. Given the attacks on soc ial sc ien ce by

certain types of postmodernist social theory, crit ical theory

now , paradox ically, is charg ed w ith b ein g to o rational and scien

ti f ic in its theoretical aspirations (Lyotard 198 4). Ac co rd in g to

many postmo dernist theorists, the mo dernist and Enlighten me nt

emphasis on reason and science has been ecl ipsed, along with

grand the or ies of soc iety, history, and human na tu re.

1 5

As im plie d ab ove , it is possib le to iden tify a m odern ist and

postmodernist strain of crit ical theory. The modernist strain-

most visibly represen ted in the w or k o f Habermas and Giddens—

ident i f i es s trongly w i th a rev ised Enl ightenment co n cep t o f

reason as the basis for individual and gro up em anc ipation ev en

though it argues that this reason has been understood in a

superf ic ial wa y by posit iv ism. From this pe rsp ect ive , the ories o f

society still have a major role to play in explaining social life,

though they retreat from the stronger claims of positivist function -

alism and structural Marxism as grand narratives. Pos tm odern ist



30


against crit ics who associate crit ical theory with mere ideology

and ungrounded theoretical speculation.

At the outset the reader should be warned of the l imits and

objectives of our project. First, although attempting to avoid

sectarianism and dogm atic partisanship, our app roach to th eo ry

and meth ods is from a spe cif ic pe rsp ect ive that challen ges m any

of the assumptions of mainstream social scienc e. To this exten t

it is con stru ctive ly (an d dia log ica lly) partisan: It seeks to take the

prin ciple o f C. W right Mi l ls's not ion of soc io lo gical imagina t ion

in a domain—m ethodology—that has be en largely n egle cted .

Secon d, this strategy involves taking a sp eci f ic p osit io n w it h

resp ect to divisions wit h in crit ical th eo ry and its relation to bo th

the Marxist tradit ion and postmodernist theory. We hope this

necessary posit ioning wil l not polemically distract readers from

our m ore fundamental theoretical arguments about m eth od olo gy

and social research.

Th ird , this is a study con cer ne d w ith the relationsh ips be

tween theory, methodology, and empirical research, but is not

a m etho ds text in the stric t sense, w h ic h ult imate ly wo uld

contradict the spirit of critical theory. Our task is thus much

broader and more fundamental, one that seeks to l ink theory,

methodology, specif ic research strategies, and social crit ic ism.

As a cons equen ce m uch of wh at w e present should be of va lue

to many of those w h o d o not direct ly ident i fy w ith th e research

progra m of cr i t ica l theory as a w ho le .

An Agenda

D eve lop in g this approa ch requires m ovin g in sequential steps.

First, in Part I, it is necessary to dwell extensively on the basic

concepts necessary for talking about social theory and method

ology. In this, Chapter 1, the task has been to provide an over

v ie w of crit ical the ory as social theory, thus anticipating the

issues to be c ove red in greater depth in the chapters that fol l ow .

Chapter 2 furthers this orienting task by reviewing the concep

tual language (metatheory) usually associated with the philoso-



Introduction

31

ph y o f scien ce and social scien ce. Chapter 3 takes up the pro b

lem of groun ding m etho dolo gy through metatheo retical analysis

by explor ing the re lat ionship between empir ic ist (pos it iv is t )

and postempiricist philosophies of science.

Part II is concerned with outlining the basic assumption of

critical theory as a strategy of inquiry, hence as a research pro

gram . Chapter 4 addresses the broade r historical que stion o f the

de ve lop m en t of a tradition of critical social research, on e in

itially associated w ith W estern M arxism but deve lop ing in vari

ous directions through the Frankfurt School tradition. Chapter

5 traces som e of the key debates in the meta theo ry o f the human

sciences that inf luenced the reformulation of crit ical theory in

the 1960s and 1970s. Then Chapter 6 reconstructs the central

themes of the crit ical metatheory developed by Habermas and

Gidd ens, where as C hapter 7 moves on to a m ore systematic

presen tation of their concep tions of crit ical theory as a contem

porary research program.

Part I I I turns to the question of how this methodological

approach looks in practice. Chapter 8 is concerned with the

methodological implications of crit ical theory's research pro

gram in the con tex t of ho w it rejects the quantitative-qualitative

distinction that informs contemporary approaches to methodol

ogy in sociology. Instead a distinction is made be tw een intensive,

and extensive approaches to inquiry. Chapter 9 explicates the

kinds of non-empirical or ref lexive proced ures taken by crit ical

the ory to be central from a postem piricist pers pe ctive . Ch apter

10 considers the type of empirical methods, techniques, and

research designs that tend to be favored by critical social re

search , gi ve n its sp ec ific interests in social analysis. For the most

part these are standard proc ed ur es but are organ ized in term s of

dif ferent configurations and for dist inctive purposes. In Chap ter

11 three key con texts of c onte m pora ry crit ical research are

re vi ew ed : the state and politica l econ om y, cultural analysis, and

social psy cho logy. T h e conc lud ing C hapter 12 turns to the inter

play b et w ee n s ociety and social research by contrasting com pet

ing models of social science and outlining the multiple relation

ships of critical research to social practice.



Introduction

33

(Fay 1987). This usage is confusing, given that neo-Marxist theory generally, and

analytical Marxism in particular, could b e con sidered forms of critical social scien ce

as well.

9. For a somewhat different approach, see Antonio (1990, p. 109) who

traces how Marxist theory "has changed and fragmented in response to the dis

junctive pattern of social and political change," resulting in the rise of "plural

istic, discursive, and open-ended Marxism."

10. This reconstructive stance is shared in many respects with analytical

Marxism, an approach that remains closer to positivism, defends a num ber o f

more orthodox Marxian constructs, and attempts to use rational choice theory

to deal with the social psychological deficit in classical historical materialism

(Ro em er 1986). But analytical Marxism 's focus on rational choice theories do es

put it in the postempiricist cam p (Bohm an 1991, pp . 67-76).

11. As of 1981 a bibliograph ical study of Habermas and the reception of his

work noted nearly 1,000 items in the secondary literature (Gortzen 1982); a

supplementary version can be found in Gortzen 1990. As well, several antholo

gies are organized around debates with Habermas and his work: Thompson and

He ld 1982; Bernstein 1985; Hon neth et al. 1992; Calhoun 1992b. Finally, be yo nd

more specialized studies are a number of synthetic and introductory presenta

tions of his work: Schroyer 1975; McCarthy 1978; Roderick 1986; Pusey 1987;

Ingram 1987; W hi te 1988; Brand 1990; Braaten 1991; Ho lub 1991.

12.

The following anthologies discuss Giddens's work and reference the

secon dary literature: Held and Thom pson 1989; Clark and Mod gil 1990; Bryant

and Jary 1991. The follow ing boo ks also are devoted to Giddens as a social theorist:

I. J. Co hen 1989; Haugaard 1992; Craib 1992. Structuration th eo ry -th e term

used to characterize Gidden s's app ro ac h-i s an entry in som e of the mo re recent

sociological dictionaries (Abe rcro mb ie et al. 1988; Jary and Jary 1991; Coh en 1993).

13- The term interpretive structuralism is used synonymously with herme

neutic structuralism and historical or historicist structuralism. We do not

kn ow of any prior use of these terms in this way, though they appe ar to pro vide

a rather natural mann er of expressing the methodo logical framewo rk shared by

the classical historical analysis described by Mills, Habermas's theory of commu

nicative action, Giddens's structuration theory, or Bo urdieu's theo ry of practice.

W e wo uld trace our ow n understanding of the reconciliation of hermeneu tics

and structuralism back to the seminal interventions o f Paul Ric oeu r in the 1960s

(Ric oeu r 1974). In effect w e co llapse into interpretive structuralism the co mp le

mentary aspects of what potentially is obscured by Waters's (1994) otherwise

useful typology differentiating constructionism, functionalism, utilitarianism,

and critical structuralism. He locates Gidden s's structuration the ory as a form of

construction ism and Haberm as's comm unicationism as a form of critical struc

turalism. Both are somewhat anomalous in their respective categories (whose

founders are respectively Weber and Marx), however, because Giddens has a

serious interest in structure, as doe s Habe rmas in agency. Later w e d esc ribe these

complementarities as respectively "weak" and "strong" research programs for

critical theory. As Waters (1994), Archer (1990), Mouzelis (1991), and others

argue, there are unresolved pro blem s w ith respec t to the status of "structu re" in

Giddens's schema.



2

F O U N D A T I O N S O F

M E T A T H E O R Y

Between Subjectivism

and Objectivism

What is "theory"? The question seems a rather easy one for

contemporary science Theory for most researchers is the

summ ary of propositions about a subject, the propositions

being so linked to one another that a few are basic and the

rest derive from these. . . . The real validity of the theory

depends

on

the

derived propositions being consonant with the

actual facts Theory is stored-up knowledge, put in a form

that makes it usefu l for the closest poss ible description of facts.

(Horkheim er [1937] 1972a, p. 188)

T

he pr ece din g chapter m ade a num ber of c laims about a par

t icular kind of sociolog ical the ory d ef ined as critical theory.

W h y should such claims be taken seriously? In other w or ds , h o w

does one attempt to ground or justify a theo retical approach?

To answ er such questions, w e n eed to turn to the fundam ental

questions of the philosophy of the human and social sciences.

1

In short, befo re emb arking o n a discussion of e ither crit iques

of positivism o r a reconstruction of the approach of critical th eor y,

it is necessary to introduce the basic concepts of metatheory

( th eo ry about th eo ry ) in relatively neutral terms and w ithou t al l

of the complications involved in defending spec ific positions and

reviewing complex debates. Some of the posit ions associated

35



Foundations ofMetatheory

37

Approaching Methodology

The Conv ent ion a l L i terature

Th re e types of texts typically are referred to in the con tex t of

training in methods and methodology in social research. Most

often texts in me thods have taken the form o f how -to-do-it coo k

book s (Babbie 1983; W im m er and Dom inick 1983) . Such texts

ref lect very directly the theory-methods split found throughout

the social sciences and reproduced in the undergraduate cur

riculum . Th ey typic ally be gin w ith a ritualistic pos itivistic ac

count of the scientific m etf iorf -und ersto od as a universal pro

ced ure in volvin g the testing of theories by referenc e to the facts.

Further, such texts are based on a prob lematic distinction —wh ich

w e consider later in d et ai l-b et w ee n quan titative and qualita

t ive m ethod s, w ith a focus on the former. Qualitative method s

are introd uced perip herally and from a frame wo rk d erived from

the ide alize d m od el of quan titative me thod s. Th e result is a ten

dency to conflate methodology with statist ics, given the strate

gic role of the latter in quantitative research. The discussion of

quantitative methods tends to be rather selective (var yin g w ith

the discipline) but focuses on the logic of experimental design

and the practicalities of the evaluation o f attitudinal surv ey data.

For the most part, each m eth od is pre sen ted in dividu ally as a

technique even i f some authors may point to the possibil ity of

multiple methods o r methodological triangulation. Th e nature

of social scienc e is largely taken for granted and is based on m od els

ostensib ly der ived from the natural science s and lo gi c. Usually

a brief discussion of the ethics of research touches on problems

involved in deluding experimental subjects, falsifying data, and

possible m isuses of social science in the w ro n g

hands. Such tex ts

rationalize themselves under the rubric of the s ocio logic al

m eth od (C ol e 1980 ) and in the name of the logic of scien ce in

soc io logy (Wal lace 197 1) .

3

Th eo ry con struc tion approach es, on the other hand, at

tempt to break down the theory-method split , but st i l l remain

large ly con fin ed to the statistical analysis o f variab les and related

mod es of theor iz ing (St inchcom be 1968; B. Coh en 1989 ) . He re



38


attention shifts from the testing of given theories to strategies

for generat ing new theoret ica l ly based proposit ions.

A third typ e of text ranges more broad ly und er the hea ding of

introduct ions to the ph i losoph y of soc ia l sc ien ce .

4

Writ ten

primarily by philosophers, these studies often cover important

recen t theoretical debates but remain distant from m or e sp ec if ic

methodolog ica l quest ions .

5

Although such books touch on is

sues and con cep ts that should be inclu ded in intro du cto ry meth

od ol og y te xts, they are virtually ignore d by social scientists.

Th e present study thus fal ls bet w ee n the the ory constru ct ion

and philosophy of social science treatments along l ines shared

in recent accounts inf luenced by feminist , phenomenological ,

and interactionist approaches (e.g. , Nielsen 1990; Kirby and

M cKen na 1989; De nzin 1989). N ot surprisingly it is in the co n te xt

of such som ewh at defensive counterm ethod ologies that w e f ind

a deeper re f lect ion on the problematic of methodology. Al

though generally sympathetic with these alternative methodolo

g ies ,

w e w ou ld seek to place them o n a broader foundat ion and

move away from the more skeptical and relativ ist ic tendencies

they often represent.

To summarize : The teaching of methodology and methods in

so cio log y and related disciplines is cha racterized by a series o f

dominant and largely taken-for-granted assumptions: that some

single, unifying scientif ic m eth od is shared by the natural and

social sciences; that this method takes two forms in social

scien ce that can be desc ribed ad equately as quantitative (prima r

ily variable analy?

s>

ad qualitative; and that qu estion s of social

scientif ic m eth od olog y can be redu ced to the study of the dif fer

ent qualitative and quantitative techniques for collecting data.

Before these kinds of assumptions can be questioned, however,

it is necessary to de ve lop an understanding o f a nu m ber of

me tatheoretical dist inctions useful for com par ing and assessing

di f ferent m ethod ologies and theor ies .

To wa rd a Cr i ti cal Th eo ry o f M etho do lo gy

Aspects of the methodology of cr i t ica l theory have been dis

cussed extensively, especially at advanced levels. Some eve n hav e

claim ed that crit ical th eo ry em bo dies the most persp icaciou s

extant understanding of what social inquiry is and must be



Foundations of Metatheory

39

(Leo na rd 1990, p. x iv ) ; as w el l , i t has succ eede d in stimulating

a vast bo dy of em pirical research, as w el l as reinterp reting re

search originating in other approach es. Yet there has be en ve ry

little discussion at a m ore in trod uc tory level o f the actual conse

quences for m ethod ology tra ining and soc ia l research pr ac t ice .

6

Alth ou gh a num ber o f excellen t and m ore special ized studies in

the various national traditions of critical th eo ry touch o n m etho

dology, they are neither very access ible nor concerned with

the range of issues under examination here (Fay 1975, 1987;

Habermas 1988; W el lmer 1971; Giddens 1976; M orr ow 199 1c) .

Although there is clearly a critical theory of methodology, it do es

not have a visible posit ion w ith in the curriculum o f the social

sciences.

Why this absence? Why this gap between an extensive tradi

tion of critical empirical research, on the one hand, and guide

l ines for how to conceptualize and conduct such research, on

the other? First, a nu m ber of c ircum stantial, historical factors

are at w or k h ere. Th e original bod y of em pirical research in the

Frankfurt School stems from the 1930s and 1940s and yet only

beca m e we ll k n ow n to social scientists in the 1970s. In b et w ee n ,

the domination of posit iv ism in sociology set the stage for a

pro lon ge d struggle for the legit im ation o f alternatives, a process

that culminated in the emergence of social theory as a speciali

zation. At the same time many others were engaged in crit ical

emp irical w or k in quite diverse settings, though often constra ined

in their theoretical and methodological self-understanding, given

the reign ing no rm s of social scien ce. On ly in the past dec ade ,

in short, has it be com e increasingly possible to reco ncile crit ical

theory and empirical research.

Even more fundamentally, however, breaking down the gap

b et w ee n crit ical the ory and research requires call ing into ques

t ion the w ho le framework w i thin w hic h method ology normal ly

is prese nted . Inde ed on e of the central c laims of a crit ical the ory

of methodology is that these characterist ics of methods and

th eo ry in struction are not accidental, inasmuch as they reveal

the posit iv ist ic scientif ic culture in which they are embedded

and cannot call into question: Disciplinary discourse m irrors a

contradictory social order and at the same time creates and re

creates i t . . . i t presents the w or ld im placably as a nest of 'social



40


facts' w ho se depiction occup ies everyday journal scien ce (A gg er

1989, p. 3) .

Orienting Definitions

W ha t I s Theory?

The most fundamental obstacle to rethinking crit ical social

th eor y and its relationship to m eth odo logy is the lack of a theoreti

cal vocabulary- inc luding crucia l phi losophical co nc ep ts-w ith in

w h ich a cr it ica l theo ry of meth odo logy can be understood and

jus ti f ied. T h e f irst step is to rid ou rselve s of som e no tio n o f a

un ified sci en tific language that stems from the natural scie nc es

and that al low s us to understand the human sc ience s. Th e con

cept of methodology is a diff icult o n e, par tly beca use it exists at

the intersection of the multiple theoretical languages that con

stitute the discourse of social research . T o speak of social sci

en ce m eth od olo gy as a discourse im plies her e simp ly that it

involve s a special mo de of speaking that is dist inct from co m m on

sense or eve n othe r scie ntif ic discourse, such as that in physics

or chemistry. A discourse can be id entified most readily and com

pared by analyzing its narrative structure-thzt is, the charac

teristic w ays it tells the sto ries that make up and un ify it as a

particular system of meanings. For example, the narratives of

scientif ic methodology are characterized by stories obsessed

w ith quest ions about emp ir ica l ev id enc e,

proof,

and vali dity that

are quite dist inct from those of theolog y, w h ic h focus o n assess

ing beliefs in terms of their rational adequacy in expres sing the

meanings and values expressed in the Bible and a particular tradi

t ion of rel igious interpretation.

It is possible to distinguish three key theoretical languages

(them selves d istinctive discourse s) that constitute and make possi

ble the social sciences: metatheory, empirical theory, and norm-

ative theory. T o v ie w social analysis in this ma nner rem ind s us

that ev er y soc ia l sc ien t i f ic tex t is co m po se d o f form s of lan

gu age that can be cha racterized as dif ferent typ es of sen tence s.

The construction of social scientif ic knowledge is thus the end-

product of the interplay of these dif ferent modes of analysis.



Foundations ofMetatheory

41

Typically the discourse of the human sciences falls along a con

tinuum: At on e po le are the natural or ordinary languages clos est

to common sense and everyday l i fe account; and at the other

extr em e are the formal languages that con struc t abstract m od es

of puri f ied symbol izat ion, culminat ing in formal logic and

mathematics.

Metatheory is the language of pre su pp osit io ns -clos ely associ

ated with the philosophy of science, or more specif ical ly, phi

losoph y of soc ia l sc ien ce-th rou gh w hi ch a research or ientat ion

is legit imated and groun ded (R itze r 1991 ). For the sciences the

key form of metath eory is epistemology, a branch of ph i losoph y

concerned with theories of knowledge or the criteria for deter

m ining wh ethe r a theory is sc ient i fic . For exam ple, w h en a

researcher argues that introspection does not p rovid e a valid basis

for social psychological data collectio n, this conclus ion requires

invoking specific kinds of metatheoretical claims—that is, that

such data are not adequate for the formulation of scientific

proposit ions.

Empirical theory invo lves the des cript ive and analytical (for

mal ) languages through which soc ia l phenomena-what is the

ca se -a re in terpreted and expla ined. To claim that the role of the

state has changed fundamentally in the transition from early capi

talism to advanced capitalism entails reference to empirical theo

ries.

This is the most com m on fo rm of theoriz ing in the scien ces.

Normative theory invo lves the mo des of theor izin g that legiti

mate different ethical, ideological, or po licy positions w ith resp ect

to wh at ou ght to be. To claim there should be m ore social justice

or less inequality is thus a value judgment or n orm ative statement.

What Is Science?

Im plicit ly w e have be en discussing a sp ecif ic t yp e of th eor y:

scientif ic th eor y in the con text o f the special prob lem s of social

science. This quali f ication is important because other types of

the ory are essentially nonscien tif ic , for exam ple, theo log y as a

rational reconstru ction of a rel igious belief system, or p olit ical

ideo logie s that express dogmatic beliefs about h ow society should

be orga nized . Science is, of cou rse, a belie f system from a socio

logical point of v iew. In the modern world the sc iences have

assumed a unique and largely dom inant p osit io n based on



42


advancing knowledge claims that are held to be unique, thus

taking precedence over other types of be l ie f systems in many

contexts .

Th e question of the distinctive nature of scien ce can be v ie w e d

from thre e quite dif ferent per spe ctives : as a mode of reasoning,

as a historical and institutional form of social activity, and as a

meaning system. These three correspond roughly to what gen

erally w ou ld be called the logic o f scienc e, its soc iolog y, and its

cultural imp l icat ions as a w or ld v i ew or Weltanschauung. In the

past, scienc e most often has be en defined by philosoph ers prima r

i ly in terms of its logic, an approach that has trickled down in

the com m on sense notion o f using a scientific m etho d. But scien

t i f ic act iv ity is a m ore com plicated ph eno m eno n than can b e

indicated by re ference to some pure logic . Accord ingly, through

out our study w e refer again and again to these three per spe c

t ives on science.

Basic Concepts of Metatheory

Alth ou gh w e g o into considerable in-depth discussion of all th ree

of these languages of socia l th eo ry -m eta - , empir ical , and no rm

ative th eo ry - i t i s useful to be gin so m e eleme ntary def in i t ions of

meta theore t i ca l t e rms . The f o l l o w in g conce p tua l dom a ins nee d

to be intro duc ed as a foundation for graspin g the impl icat ions of

our part i cu lar app ro ac h and for in t ro duc ing the cha pters that

lie ahead:

• Empirical theory and explanation

• Types of metatheory

• Norm ative social theory

• Subjectivist-objectivist polarization

• Research program s and paradigms

Empir ica l Theory and Exp lanat ion

At this stage let us be gi n w ith a re lat ively s imp le def in i t ion of

empirical theory (also referred

to as

analytical

o r

substantive



44


or to make logical dist inctions. On the oth er hand, he also ga ve

the empirical aspect of knowledge its due by admitt ing that the

effectiveness of pure reason de pe nd ed on its cap acity to d iscove r

the factual truths of nature. Despite Kant's remarkable attempt

at synthesis, this split between empiricism and rationalism in

evitably def in ed the inner tensions w ith in the histo ry of p osit iv

ism. Should the foundations of certain knowledge be located in

character ist ics of the kn ow er ( the subjec t ) fo l lo w ing rat ional

ism, or that w hi ch is to be kn ow n (the obje ct) as in empiricism?

Em piricism has pr ovid ed the prim ary justi f ication fo r socio

logical empiricism and is evident in the fet ishization of quanti

tative facts. Kantians, ho we ver , continually have rem ind ed social

scientists about the problem atic ch aracter of social facts, g ive n

the way our concepts help construct wh at w e o bse rve . Social facts

are particularly dif f icult (some say obdurate or stubborn) be

cause they cannot be taken for granted. Naive interpretations

tend to assume that facts are just there, out in the world, just

sitting and ready to be harvested by an em piricist m etho d. W ha t

this tack igno res, how eve r, is that facts are, in pr ac tice , obs erv

able (and hen ce the basis for data co lle ct io n ) on ly from the

per spe ct ive of a theory. The Cathol ic Church in Europe col

lecte d data about births and deaths for centu ries; on ly w ith th e

advent o f dem ography d id the in format ion bec om e demo

grap hic facts, as op po se d to records w ith famil ial and rel igious

signi f icance. General ly nobody even bothers to col lect or pro

du ce data until a th eo ry rend ers them o f sufficient interest. T his

the m e is talked about by refe ren ce to the theory-laden character

of facts and is the reason w h y oth erw ise reasonable p eo p le ofte n

disagree about what the facts are or whether they ef fectively

pr ove o r disprove a theory.

N o ti ce that at the outset w e stress the diversity o f theo ries and

make no attempt to impose any narrow, closed def init ion of the

logical forms explan ation may take. T h eo ry norm ally is taken in

the social sciences to refer to a th eor y about som ethin g, som e

asp ect o f socia l l i fe ; such th eo ry is substan tive becau se it is

about a particular typ e of ph eno m en on and attempts an expla

nation of it.

But wh at, then, is an explanation ? Again w e have to be careful

here and stay w ith a pre l im ina ry formu lation that limits itself to

two key contexts of use. Most methods texts refer to an expla-




45

nation as a particular kind of scientific expla nation w it h a logical

structure that parallels causal explanations in the natural sci

en ce. Th e logical form of such explanations often is referred to

as the covering law model, or the hypothetico-deductive model.

T o exp lain so m ething in this sense is to prov ide an adequate and

justifiable account of its necessary causes and essential determi

nants based on the opera tion of universal laws under sp ecifi c con

dit ions. In other words, the notion of explanation is restr icted

to the special case of causal explanation, and the idea of deter

min ation is l imited even further by causes ded uced from univer

sal laws. On e thus deduces the explanation o f a spe cif ic ty pe of

event f rom such laws. To expla in suic ide, Durkheim p rop ose d

that the prim ary de termina nts of different rates of suicide cou ld

be correlated with types of social sol idarity and integration. As

we wil l see, some fundamental problems with this correlational

no tion o f causation (based on variable analysis) per vad e soc ia l

scien ce; critical the ory n ecessari ly requires a m ore co m ple x,

structural, and historical conc ept ion of social determ ination . As

w e shall see, from this pe rsp ectiv e social determ ination oper

ates m or e as structural tenden cies wh os e effects are not stric tly

predictable and change over t ime.

But explanation also is used more loosely in other contexts

w ith re ference to understanding (o r interpre t ing) soc ia l pheno

mena that wil l concern us later: Sometimes it can refer to the

intentions of individuals (intentional explanation) or even an

analysis of the ordering principles of a given m eaning system o r

discourse (e.g ., a textual or narrative interpretation). These kinds

of questions w er e largely neg lected in em piricism and on ly w er e

given selective treatment in rationalist epistemologies. They

came into their own only in the tradit ion of German ideal ism

in the contexts of hermeneutics and also w ha t later be ca m e

k n o w n as phenom enologicalphilosophy. The most famous 19th-

century representative of such concerns was the German phi

losop her Wilh elm Dilthey (1833 -1911). W ith in these tradit ions

the methodological issues central to interpretive sociologies

w er e discussed under the heading o f Verstehen

t

or the interpre

tation of actions (deriv ed from understanding in Ge rm an ) and of

hermeneutics (theo ries of textual interp retatio n). Th e implica

t ions of these need not con cern us now , beyon d indicating that

they are central to debates about interpretive theorizing.



46


N oti ce that to refer to an intention - o r a re as on - as an explan

ation (e.g., we are writing this book to encourage a broader con

cep t ion o f me tho do log y) is to suggest an od d typ e of cause, on e

that lies in the future rather than the past. Th is is qu ite differ en t

from our normal sense of causes as op era ting in a tem po ral

sequ ence , as w h en inde pend ent variable A is he ld to cause

ou tcom e B. W h en the cause is related to the future anticipations,

on th e other hand, reference is made to teleological explanations.

Th ese types are actual ly quite com m on ev en in nature w h er ev er

w e o bs er ve feedback mechanisms that result in the self-regulation

of systems (as in biolo gica l hom eostasis or a the rm osta t) . Such

processes are especial ly important in functional-type explana

tions in social science that try to show how the existence of

certain types of structures contributes to the operation of the

system as a w h ol e. A classic exa m ple is the pro po sit i on that the

family exists because of the ne ed of soc iety to repr odu ce

itself.

Th e poi nt h ere is to rec og niz e that it is mislead ing to speak of

a s ingle , un i form not ion of sc ient i f ic explanat ion. Explanatory

activities result in the ories that take quite differe nt log ica l fo rm s,

and there is considerable disagreement about what form expla

nations should take in particular contexts. Positivistic episte-

mologies have always recognized this diversity but have argued

that this simply reflected deficient, unscientific explanations that

did not live up to the ideal of phys ics (o r oth er natural scie nt ific

models) usually associated with the covering law model.

Ty pes o f Metatheory

Metatheory, on the other hand, is theory about theory, where

meta re fers to that w hi ch is be yo nd the ory or , m ore pre

c ise ly, that w h ic h l ies beh ind the theor y 's presupp osit ions. T h e

preceding discussion of methods, methodology, and empir ica l

the ory has bee n metath eoretical in this sense. In ef fect w e have

already bee n doin g metatheory. A meta theory is not c on cern ed

w ith explaining social reality in the manner of a substantive th eo ry

exp lainin g sp ecif ic social phe nom ena; rather it is a for m of

rational inqu iry or argumentation concer ned w ith the theo ry of

the ory or th eo ry about theory. In contrast an analytical theoreti

cal question , for exa m ple, migh t involv e investigating the causes

of the rise of capital ism; a m etatheoretical re formu lation o f this




47

substantive ques tion m ight be the question o f the relative signifi

cance of mater ia l (eco no m ic and structural) , as op po sed to

idea l (sym bo lic and social psy cho logica l) factors in rival expla

nations o f the rise of cap italism as, for insta nce , the classic

debate between students of Karl Marx and Max Weber.

M etat he ory is also just another w ay for social scientists to talk

about the philosophical and methodological assumptions of their

work or issues considered in the philosophy of the social sci

ences. Broadly speaking, then, metatheory in the social and

human sciences can be associated with and draws on the major

branches of phi losophy: metaphysics, ontology, epistemology,

logic, aesthetics, ethics. Th ere is a sense in w h ich , for exa m ple,

eve ry social the ory has presupposit ions or implications that

touch on the questions framed by each of these philosophical

dom ains. The re is a sense in w h ic h in every day life w e are all

ph ilosop hers in emp loyin g rationales for our actions from all of

these branches o f ph i lo so ph y-e ve n i f w e are not consc ious o f

the fact.

O ne o f the characteristics of a social scien tific cu lture dom i

nated by positivism, however, is that the sophisticated discus

sion of these presuppositions is not made an integral part of

advanced training. Of course w e should ex pe ct this suppression

of philosophical debate in cultures dominated by dogmatic re

l igious tradit ions. But one of the peculiarit ies of the dogmas

of positivism is that they are defined as neutral and objective—

beyond dogm a. Yet for the most part students are socialized ritual-

istically into a particular metatheoretical pers pe ctive (so cio log y

as an objective, value-free science) that is accepted as a matter

of taken-for-granted faith, rather than the ou tcom e of sustained

self-reflection and systematic argumentation. Instead social sci

ence is contrasted vaguely to nonscientific and irrational ap

pro ach es, usually conjured up in straw-man caricatures w ith

just enough truth to be convincing. With the alternatives logi

cally trounced , then, real scien ce can be gin .

Further, for most purposes these metatheoretical questions

are not all of equal significance for social scientists. Metaphysi

cal questions about the existence of things beyond experience

(e.g., the existence of an afterlife) have been marginal to social

science, though they may be important for establishing the rela

tionship between theologies and social theory. As well, aesthetic



48


question s—wh ich re fer to questions about the criteria o f taste that

make something beautiful or art ist ically superior—have tended

to be marginal in social science, but central to the humanities

and imp ortan t for the so cio log y o f culture and cultural crit ic ism .

In practice, four domains of metatheory are of strategic im

portance for the methodology of the social sciences and are our

focus of attention: ontology, epistemology, logic, and ethics. Any

given approach to social science inevitably makes assumptions

in these domains of metath eory, and these presup posit ion s nec

essarily must be fairly consistent. Take, for example, the struc

tural functionalist general sociology of Talcott Parsons and the

experimentally based psychological behaviorism of B. F. Skinner.

The se are , respect ive ly, tw o wel l -k no wn theoret ica l approaches

in sociology and psychology. Both are empirical theories in the

sense that they m ake claims about expla inin g a particular do

m ain of social facts. Both theo ries m ake ontological assumptions

about the nature and existence of dif ferent kinds of things or

entit ies in the social w or ld . For Skinner m ean ing s are intro

spect ive phenomena not access ible to sc ience, whereas for

Parsons they are central to understanding social order as a cul

tural system. They both also make epistemological assumptions

because an empirical theory necessari ly makes certain claims

about what social scientif ic knowledge is and l inks this with

certain assumptions about the logic of scientif ic explan ation and

the me tho do logy of research, w h ic h are app lied in data analysis

and theo ry con struct ion. For Skinner, only expe r ime ntat io n can

gene rate scientif ic theo ry; for Parsons, verbal formulation s of

functional relations of structures suffices. Finally their theories

have certain ethical presu ppos it ions that make claims about

values; for ex am ple, they share the assumption that scien ce and

tech nolo gy have had a progress ive imp act on soc ia l evolu t ion.

To analyze Parsons's or Skinner's or any other theory in terms

of such q uestion s entails a m etath eore tical analysis that is quite

di f ferent f rom comparing them with respect to the f i t between

the theories and the empirical data invoked to confirm them.

If ind eed the scientif ic m etho d is based on som e un if ied, pu re

log ic, then presum ably that should be on e of the most im por tan t

foundations of advanced training for researchers. The fact that

it is not—that indeed even the most technically sophisticated

metho dologists have v ir tual ly no tra ining in formal log ic-s ho ul d




49

be inte rpre ted as the sign of a profou nd d iscrepancy b et w ee n

the rhetoric and the reality of social science. Technically logic

is the study of the rules of co rre ct reasoning. But wh at does that

mean? D o w e really understand its pla ce in scientific research?

We are most famil iar, however vaguely, with what is known as

formal logic.

Cen tral to this app roach is the fear o f in con sisten cy

or contradiction: I f two dif ferent proposit ions make the same

claim , they bo th cannot be true. Ye t in real life w e constantly

work with inconsistencies , even in sc ience. Hence nonformal

logic is concerned with the informal

logic,

or the practical logics

of eve ryd ay life that are central to scien tific p rac tice yet virtu ally

ignored in tradit ional reconstructions of science.

As w e have noted , the con cep t of knowledge is also amb iguous

and constitutes the central question of epist em olo gy -als o called

the the ory of kn ow led ge by phi losophers. For positiv ist phi

losophers the ambiguity was resolved by f iat: the introduction

of a logical prin ciple o f demarcation (e .g. , correspo nden ce to

the facts) to dif ferentiate scientif ic knowledge from mere be

liefs. Sociologists and anthropologists have resisted this, given

their need to com pa re and analyze the social origin s of differen t

types of beliefs as part of the sociology of knowledge: e.g., scien

ti f ic knowledge, commonsense knowledge, rel igious knowledge,

without initially making any assumptions about their respective

validity. As a con sequ ence , it perhaps wo uld be useful to fol lo w

the French language and use the awkward term knowledges to

stress the plurality of forms o f kn ow in g. For our purp oses at this

prel iminary stage, however, we need to dif ferentiate empirical

knowledge and normative kn ow led ge and to l ink these to the

distinctions made by dif ferent forms of epistemology.

A definition of epistemology has already been noted in refer

ring to Parsons's and Skinner's theories: how they both presup

p os e certain criteria that rend er a th eo ry scien tific. Traditiona l

em piricist epistem ology involves the investigation o f the criteria

for logically demarcating scientif ic from nonscientif ic knowl

ed ge . Ac co rd in gly there is a sense that scie nc e is the social enter

prise that pro du ces explan ations that take a sp ec ific logica l for m

and are l inked to empirical evidence in ways characterist ic of

science. H en ce an epistemologist can readily demarcate astronomy

as a natural scien ce and astrology as a ps eu do scien ce on various

logical grounds l inked to theory and methodology.



50


N orm at i v e Th eory

In other contexts , however, this problem of demarcat ion be

com es m ore dif f icult and controversial as, for ex am ple , in the

dist inct ion between empir ica l and normative knowledge (e .g. ,

ethical inq ui ry ). From the pe rsp ect ive o f a strict scientif ic epis-

temology, n ormative kno w led ge is not kno w led ge at a ll , mere ly

a type of nonrational belief. Wh ereas one kno ws wi th cer ta inty

the causes of the movements of the planets, knowledge about

the go od ne ss o f justice is in a sense just, or m erely, a pers on al

opin ion. H enc e convent ional phi losoph ers make a str ic t logical

dist inct ion be tw ee n empir ica l (sc ie nt i f ic ) and norm ative (va lu e)

quest ions. Wh ereas the forme r can be constructed and val idated

in a scien tific wa y, the latter cannot. But as w e shall see later,

others contend (with crit ical theory) that normative questions

can be and should be sub jected to rational and em piric al scrutin y

in ways that a positivistic scientific approach does n ot enco urag e.

No rm at ive theor ies thus are con cern ed w i th wh at ought to

be and, as a con seq uen ce, are associated broa dly w ith the philo

sophical or m etatheoretical f ield o f

ethics.

Indeed normative theo

rizing has be co m e re cogn ized as so significant that it has em er ge d

as an imp ortan t form of inq uiry in its o w n righ t, on e that goe s

far beyond the narrower domain of phi losophical ethics . Again

standard me tho do logy texts are not ve ry helpful her e in that they

con fine them selves to som e brief remarks about the ethics of

rese arc h -th at is, questions such as the con fidential ity o f re

spondents and the importance of exc luding value judgments

from the research process

itself.

But as contemporary social

the ory and polit ical ph iloso ph y have ma de clear, the eth ical

issues po se d by social research are bro ad er and m or e fundam en

tal than this and have profound ideological implications.

Th e pr imary contexts in w hic h norm at ive theor iz ing becom es

central are political philosophy, social criticism, and theories

of ideology. De spit e the aspirations for valu e-free social sci

ence, it is clear that value questions have always been central at

various stages of research practice. The division between polit i

cal science and sociology has been especial ly harmful to sociol

ogy in this context. The most important context of such ethical

theorizing for social theory has been the tradit ion of c lassical

political ph ilosoph y associated originally w ith the ancient G reek s




51

(Plato , Aristot le ) . Such polit ical ph ilosop hy is essentially norma

tive because o f

its

focus o n the grounds o f politica l authority and

obl igat ion, for exam ple, the quest ion of the go od soc iety

(Taylor 1989; Kym licka 1990 ). In contrast, em pirical (o r behav

iora l) polit ical scienc e shares w ith polit ical socio log y a conc ern

with the various factors that, in fact, characterize the function

ing of different political systems. Sociologists and other social

scientists have eng age d in similar activities in the 19th and 20th

centuries in the guise of social criticism , an activity that joins

the results of em pirical research w ith co nce ption s of wha t ou ght

to be. Unlike polit ical philosophy, however, social crit ic ism in

soc iolo gy has not been organized as an academ ic subfield and

has flourished on the margins of the discipline or outside the

academ y or in poli cy and social prob lem s research. Political ph ilo

sophy and social crit ic ism intermingle in the context of policy

analysis (whether polit ical, social, economic, or cultural) that

involves both an em pirical study of public polic y forma tion by

gov ern m en ts, as w el l as an assessment o f the no rm ative imp lica

tions. Such norm ative issues, ho w eve r, have always bee n centra l

to discussions about the nature of the welfa re state and pr ob lem s

of human needs, largely through the contributions of political

scientists and ph iloso ph ers .

7

But such questions are not the basis

of specific course offerings in sociological curricula because

norm ative the ory is not we ll rec ogn ized in the social sciences as

a legitim ate scholarly pursuit, w he rea s the evaluation of po lici es

in term s of taken-for-granted values is. A n im po rtan t reason for

this exclusion is the f ine l ine be tw ee n no rmative theo rizing and

ideologies .

The theory o f ideology pos es particular pro blem s becau se it

has been of concern in so many dif ferent contexts associated

w ith norm ative theor iz ing and pol i t ica l action (Thom pso n 1984,

1990; Ab er cr om bi e et al. 1990; Larrain 1 98 3). At various p oin ts

w e ha ve much m ore to say about this controv ersial and hig hly

contested concept, but here it is useful to distinguish two clear

and important uses of the term. Most commonly, the notion of

ideology is associated w ith o ne of the classical po litical id eolo

gies:

one of the well-organized, action-oriented belief systems

characteristic of modern politics, for example, conservatism, lib

eralism, social ism, comm unism , fascism. Wh at is uniqu e about

these belief systems is they contain both an empirical claim



52


about the nature of social reality (a th eor y o f soc iet y) and norm

ative claims about how society should be organized (Gouldner

1976). Unlike scientif ic belief systems, however, the normative

or pol i t ica l imperat ive predominates over the empir ica l dimen

s ion; even when key empir ica l c la ims of ideologies may be

un derm ined , adherents tend to persist in ign orin g them becaus e

of the priority of their value concerns.

Ye t there is a secon d, mor e subtle and confusing co nt ex t of

use of the term. The focus of attention here is not organized

ide olo gie s, but the cultural mechanisms in volv ed in the creatio n

and potential distort ions of consciousness and communication

in everyday l i fe . The main theme is that when individuals and

grou ps have m aterial or ideal interests at stake, the y tend t o jus tify

them in wa ys that distort their perce ptio ns of reality. In particu

lar the conce rn h ere is w ith ho w ideological p rocesses are a

pervasive feature of the practices that make up social l i fe and

institutions even where this is not overtly associated with ide

ologie s as organ ized bel ie f

systems. For exam ple , patriarchy has

long fun ctioned as both an exp licit belie f system and as an im pl ici t

dimension of many social relations (even where it has been

legally disenfranchised).

Many social theorists and philosophers h ave claimed that n orm

at ive theor ies are , l ike ideologies , mere be l ie fs that cannot be

justified rationally at all. To prefer vegetarianism over cannibal

ism is ultim ately a sim ple ma tter of taste. In this case the

im porta nt log ical dist inction be tw ee n facts and values is used to

exclu de value questions from the scientific dom ain on the grou nd s

that they are inherently irrational, or at least nonrational. An

essential assumption of both polit ical philosophy and crit ical

social theory, in contrast, is that normative theorizing does admit

to various degrees of rational argumentation that should be a

central aspect of the crit ique and ren ew al of academ ic tradit ions

and need not assume the form of simple ideological polemics

between incommensurate wor ldv iews . From this perspect ive ,

questions about justice, freed om , and equality can be subjected

to critical scrutiny and strong, weak, and fallacious arguments

for such values and the means to realize them can be po tentia l ly

differentiated. For this reason critical theory can claim to de

ve lo p a scientif ic research prog ram that com bin es emp irical and

normative theor iz ing.




53

The Subjectivist-Objectivist Polarization in Metatheory

With these dist inctions between metatheory, empirical the

ory, and normative theory in mind, let us take a closer look at

the typical metatheoretical posit ions in contemporary social

research. These can be represented conveniently in terms of a

po lar iza t ion between two contras t ing pos i t ions-ob jec t iv ism

and subjectivism—a clash found throughout the social sciences

(Burrel l and Mo rgan 1979). At on e pol e are metath eories that

strongly identify with posit iv ism, hence natural scientif ic mod

els o f research as the ideal w ay to con du ct em pirica l research .

H ere th e unity or iden tity of natural and social scien ce in logic al

and m eth od olo gy is stressed. At the oth er extr em e are thos e anti-

posit iv ist posit ions that stress the com plete dif feren ce b et w ee n

natural and social science, holding that the latter is defined by

the unique logical and methodological problems of interpreting

meanings, subjectivity, and consciousness. In psychology this

contrast is associated with the standoff between behaviorism

and phenomenology; in sociology it is associated with the divi

sion be tw ee n p osit iv ist and humanist or emp iricist and interpre

t ive soc io log ies .

It is instru ctive to see h ow this pola rization op era tes at several

levels of c losely interrelated presupposit ions: ontology, episte

mology, theory of action, nature of explanation. For pu rpose s

of a styl ize d, introd ucto ry discussion, w e stress the p ola rize d

extremes and avoid the complicated examples that attempt to

mediate between them (a central theme of later chapters). In

conclusion we allude to how crit ical theory tries to overcome

this polarization.

Onto logy

Objectivists adhere to an ontology that is broadly associated

w ith the notion of a traditional or naiv e realism that stresses

the reality of em pirical facts inde pend ently of our consciousness

of them . Scientif ic con cepts thus seek to cop y or corresp on d to

those factual realities in som e wa y, giv ing us a scien tific pic

tu re o f it, as it w er e . Naiv e realism is thus the basis of a th eo ry

of scientif ic representation or ho w the sc iences concep tual ize



54


reality. Brit ish emp iricism is associated close ly w ith this ty pe of

ontology.

In contrast, subjectivists tend to adopt a po sit ion that ph iloso

phers have called nominalism (perhap s the not ion of construc

tivism is m or e familiar in the social sc ien ce s) that argues the re

is a fundamental gu lf b et w ee n our conc ep ts and em pirica l real

ity. This is a theme introduced by Kantian rationalism and later

radical ized in phen om enology. He nc e nominal ists chal lenge that

w e cannot really kn ow or represent reality directly because ou r

understanding of it is mediated by the constructs of our con

sciousness. Indeed in strong versions nom inalism (e.g ., solipsism)

is associated wi th the assumption that all w e can really kn o w is

subjectivity and consciousness because they are immediately

accessible to us, whereas nature is outside of us,

henc e only in

directly knowable. Subjectivism in sociology is associated most

of ten w ith in terpret ive soc io logies such as sym bol ic interaction-

ism and social ph eno m eno logy; objectivism is linked wit h variants

of posit iv ist theo ries: em piricism , functionalism , and version s o f

materialism.

Epistemology

The consequences of these two opposing ontological pos i

t ions result in dramatic dif ferences with respect to epistemol

ogy. In other wor ds , ontologies are linked c lose ly to epistem olo-

gies because it is necessary to have a co nc ep tio n of the nature

of social reality be fore on e prop ose s to justi fy a scien tif ic analy

sis of it. Traditional realism is consistent with positivist episte-

mologies that identify science with the discovery of invariant

laws that determine the relations among observable empirical

facts or obje ctiv e structures outside consciousness. Th is app roach

is associated with posit iv ism, especial ly in the form of logical

empiricism.

In contrast, antipositivist epis tem olog ies iden tify the basis of

social scientif ic knowledge in the interpretation of what largely

is excluded (or at least rendered secondary) to posit iv ist episte

mology: the meanings and consciousness of social actors. This

posit ion has been most w el l deve lop ed in soc ia l p he no m en olog y

and a we ak version in symb olic interaction ism.



58


Max W ebe r 's interpret ive soc io logy. But W eber, o f course, was

concerned with analys is both in the context of meaning and of

the causal nexus of action. In other con texts , ho w ev er, interpre

t ive soci olo gy is associated w ith a stronge r claim associated w ith

strongly subject iv ist approaches grounded in phenomenology

and hermeneutics that argue that the interpretive analysis of

meanings is the only, or at least most important, form of social

inquiry. Posit iv ist approaches are rejected because of their re-

duct ionism; the tension between subject iv ism and object iv ism

evident in W eb er is resolved in terms of the pr im acy o f mean ing

in social action . This posit io n goe s back to the basic phe no m en o-

logical c laim that consciousness cannot be either und erstoo d or

exp lained in terms ou tside o f itself—that is, external social factors

and processes. As expressed in the social sciences, such inter

pretat ion theo ry construes inquiry as pure ly herm eneu tic , and

such a research prog ram im plies that social research should b e

redu ced to the interp ene tration o f mean ings (Litt le 19 91, p. 6 9 ).

In their extr em e form such pur ely interpretive approaches of te n

are chara cterized as antiscientific b ecause of their rejectio n of

causal explanations based on general laws.

Even in their more mo d

erate form, however, such interpretive approaches strongly limit

the genera lizing claims of the human scienc es. For exam ple, the

Am er i can anthropo log i s t C l i ff o rd G eer t z o f t en is c i t ed w i th

refere nc e to his interp retive analysis of the cultural me anin g of

Balinese cock fightin g. Th e focus of inq uiry here is on h o w

cock fightin g is i l lum inating for understanding a w id e variety of

social relationships (e.g., those o f kinsh ip, status, and co m m u ni ty)

in a local context. But such an approach also rejects considera

t ion of the objectivist aspects that m ight help ex pla in those

pract ices :

N ot e wh at th is accou nt does no t p ro v ide . It do es no t te ll us w h at

processes o r mechan ism brough t about cock f ight ing ( a causal exp la

na t ion ) and it do es no t a t tempt to sh o w h o w ind iv idua l B a l ines e

m e n p u r s u e the i r o w n int e re s ts o r p u rp o s e s th ro u g h c o c k f i g h t ing

( a ra t iona l cho ice exp lanat ion ) . Th is account , then , does no t p ro

v id e an ex pla na t io n o f the pra ct ic e ; instead it o f fers a rea din g o f

the p rac t ice in it s con text , inte nd ed to e luc ida te the me an ing o f

the pract ice for us . (L it t le

1991,

p .

69)




59

Beyond Subject iv ism and Object iv ism

Critical social science, to be sure, acknowledges the crucial

im po rtan ce of such reading s of social practices. Yet it agrees

with positivist social science that such readings fail to acknowl

edge adequately the social forces that act behind the backs of

participants. Nevertheless it is argued that positivist social sci

ence goes about identifying these external determining factors

in a ve ry n arrow and problem atic manner in trying to r edu ce

them to causal variables. In the process the subjective compo

nent of action can only be comp rehen ded— if con side red at all—in

a man ner restricted to the dictates of survey research m etho dol

ogy and correlational techniques. To analyze the interplay be

tw ee n meaning and structure, a very dif ferent m etho dolo gical

approa ch to social determination is required: on e based on the

nature of social relations, not im po rted from th e natural scien ces .

Explaining the presuppositions and nature of this alternative

app roach is the task of the chapters that follo w . At this po in t w e

need only characterize this position in general terms: its criti

cism of the reigning polarization between objectivism and sub

jectivism . A d ecisive aspect of critical metatheory is that it rejec ts

the objectivist-subjectivist polar ization (des crib ed a bo ve ) as an

adequate formulation of the problematic of the logic of social

inquiry.

Let us conclu de w ith a prel im inar y d ef init ion o f the nature o f

critical social research methodology in terms of its character as

a

u

critical-dialectical perspective" (e.g. , Ha rvey 1990 ). Such a

m eth od olo gy is critical because it asks m etatheo retical question s

and seeks to draw attention to the relations of power that shape

social reality. The question of power is largely ignored in purely

interpretive approaches because they exclude the analysis of

external socioeconomic structures and causality. Positivist ap

proaches may, in principle, study objective structural relations

in selective ways, but they avoid metatheory largely by restrict

ing th eir m eth od olo gy to the statistical analysis of variables.

The notion of something as dialectical is slip pe ry and usually

not ve ry precise . As a general reference to crit ical m ethod ology,

ho w eve r, it is useful as a wa y o f rejecting the standoff b et w ee n

pure ly inte rpretive and posit iv ist approach es. So in the p resent

context it has the advantage of pointing to the possibility of



60 M E T A T H E O R Y : G R O U N D I N G M E T H O D

Conclusion

The task of this chapter has been to clarify the basic themes

of contemporary metatheory. We began with considerat ion of

the conf lat ion of methods and m etho dolo gy in the co nven t ional

l iterature and then turned to an elucidation of key me tatheoreti

cal issues: the differentiation of meta theory, e m piric al theo ry,

and norm ative theo ry; analysis of scienc e as a m od e o f reason ing,

typ e o f com mu nity , and w or ld v i ew ; and cons iderat ion o f the

various typ es of me tatheo ry and the subject-objective polariza

t ion that has divided the human sciences, culminating in the

distinction between posit iv ist, interpretive, and crit ical social

sc ience.

Th e fol lo w in g chapters attempt to justi fy and elabo rate on the

metatheoret ica l foundations of a cr it ica l the ory o f m eth odo logy

as a spe cific approach to critical social science. Chap ter 3 con sid

ers the contribution of the shift from empiricist to postempiri-

cist philos oph ies of science in ord er to analyze the con seq ue nc es

of the declin e of pos it iv ism as the meta the ory of the natural

sciences as a prelu de to the consideration of crit ical the or y itself

in Part II.

Notes

1. No tice that w e pu rpo sely avoid use of the term behavioral science, because

of its original association with a positivist research pro gram . The mo re inclusive

notion of social science is thus preferable. The term hum an sciences is also

analyzing agency and structure as inte rtw ine d and mutually im pli

cating on e another. Further, this dialectical relationship b e tw ee n

subjective and objective realit ies implies something quite dis

tinct from dividing u p the w or ld dualistically into ma cro and m ic ro

relations. These are the kinds of grounding questions posed by

a cr it ica l m etho dolog y discontent w ith the polar izat ion be tw ee n

objectivist and subjectivist accounts of social reality. The chap

ters that fol low elaborate the implications of this posit ion.




61

useful to charac terize the humanities and social sciences taken together and is

suggestive of many overlapping concerns, especially between interpretive soci

ologies and the humanities in the context of what often is referred to now as

"cultural studies."

2. This distinction betw ee n me thodology and methods is largely Euro pean in

origin: "In the European tradition, 'methodology' refers not only to (research)

techniques or to inferential pro cedu res, b ut also to the epistemological reasons

for their choice . Recently, the term 'metascience' has tended to replace method

olog y in this sense" (Ge bh ard t 1978, p. 512).

3. Th e few exceptions to these tenden cies-influen ced by the sociology of

knowledge and a more critical approach to the philosophy of science-remain

marginal to the mainstream m ethodology texts (Sjoberg and Nett 1968; Phillips

1971; Ford 1975) and already incorpo rate elements of theory construction texts

and the newer philosophy of social science. These exceptions have, in part,

inspired the present approach . To be sure, symbo lic interactionists sa w themselves

as doin g som ething different, but their efforts w er e ham pered b y attempting to

justify their methodo logy in positivist terms (Den zin 1970).

4. Even such introductory studies pres upp ose a foundation in philoso phy that

is not a part of social scientific training. For such an introduction to philosophy

from the perspective of social scientists, see Anderson et al. 1986.

5. Metatheory is a term increasingly used by sociologists to express the kinds

of questioning that link sociology and philosophy. Despite important overlaps,

the recent expansio n of the philosop hy o f the social sciences tends to be defined

primarily by m ore traditional philosoph ical pro blem s and to remain distant from

the con cern s of social scientists (Ka plan 1964; Thom as 1979; Trigg 1985; Doyal

and Harris 1986; Mancias 1987; Rosenberg 1988), although Little (1991) is an

important exception here.

6. However, some recent works complement our approach. Critical Social

Research, by Lee Harvey (199 0), differs considerably from our approa ch in seve ral

ways: (a) a greater focus on British research, (b) the lack of an introduction to

issues in the philoso phy of social science, (c ) a rather too simplified account of

the theoretical and methodological issues, and (d ) an almost exclusive focus on

substantive research on class, gender, and race. Nevertheless it has profitably

informed our approach, and its case studies of research are recommended as a

follow -up for the present study. A n dr ew Saver's Method in Social Science (1992)

provides an excellent advanced introduction to many methodological issues from

a critical realist persp ectiv e b ut doe s no t relate these as closely to critical theory.

Th e analysis of the structure of sociological theory by Johnson et ai. (19 84 )

develops a useful typology differentiating empiricism, subjectivism, rationalism,

and substantialism (a form of critical realism). A m ore general form ulation can

be found in Donald Polkinghorne's Methodology for the Hum an Sciences (1983 ) ,

but it does not focus on critical theory or critical social science p er se even thou gh

it outlines a framework within which such approaches find a legitimate place.

7. For representative contemporary examples of normative theorizing, see

W alzer 1987; Guttman 1988; Go od in 1988; Doyal and Gou gh 1991; for a spirited

defense o f normative theory in sociology, see Calhoun 1991.



Postempiricist Critiques

63

Th e Ideo logic al Context

of Ph i losophies o f Sc ience

W h y are the issues of the ph ilosop hy of scienc e important?

A n d w h y are they so neg lected in the training o f researchers and

the curricula of higher education generally? The dominant insti

tutions of any form of society are cemented together culturally

through a set of metaphysical and onto logical presuppos itions that

sometimes are referred to as a Weltanschauung o r worldview.

In the case of mod ern Western (o r occid en tal) societ ies, scie nce

largely has replaced r eligion as the universalistic fram ew ork, espe

cially in the institutions associated wit h ed uca tion, research , and

economic production. Any culture f inds it inherently dif f icult

to reflect on its most fundamental presuppositions, especially

where this may involve call ing them into question. The culture

of posit iv ism is no exception.

Crit iques of the mo dern scientif ic w or ld vi ew have taken many

forms, inc luding var ious dogmatic re l ig ious and irrat ional ist

attacks. Th e stance of critical theo ry and related forms of thought

tow ard science is distinctive in at least tw o w ays: First, it is arg ued

that dominant political and social interests shape the develop

ment of science and technology, hen ce the autonom y of scien ce

is always pro ble m atic; and seco nd , it is claim ed that sci en ce and

tech no logy cannot be fully neutral w ith re spect to human values

because they inevitably mediate social relations. In other words,

debates about the status of science have important ideological

implications. Such is the case of the otherwise esoteric disci

pline of the philosophy of science that is ritualistically invoked

to legitimate the rationality of scientific method s and exp lanation s

against their allegedly non-scientific challengers.

This is not to say that philosophers of science are ideologists

in the norm al sense; to the contrary, they have defined them selves

as the great defenders of universal reason, as critics of dogma

tism, and generally have show n themselves w il l in g to revise their

o w n arguments in the l ight of n ew evid en ce. But certain of their

earlier arguments have been institutionalized in various disci

plines and have bee n dif fused w id ely in a popu lar form that has

litt le to do with the contemporary postempiricist theories of

scie nc e actually advoca ted today by most historians and ph iloso

phers of science who reject empiricism and posit iv ism:




65

These three levels of analysis can be referred to as problems

deriving from, respectively, the philosophy, historical sociology,

and critique o f science. As wes ha llse e, the transition from positivist

to postpositivist theories of sc ience can be graspe d readily by their

respective positions on the relationship between these three

perspectives.

Positivist Philosophies of Science

Introd uct ion : The Lure of Foun dat iona l ism

The point of departure for understanding the division be

tween the tradit ional posit iv ist philosophy of science and post

positivist approaches is to grasp how they diverge over a funda

men tal issue. Th e question is: H o w should w e justify scien tific

theories? In short, what kind of epistemology should be used?

Positivism shares with much of Western thought a foundational-

ist resp on se to this qu est ion -th at is, the postu lation of absolute

and certain (a po di cti c ) grounds for truth claims. Th e und erlying

me tapho r here is the notion that scien ce depen ds on the a bil ity

of its con cep ts to rep resen t reality in a man ner that is analogous

to m irror in g or copy ing i t (Ror ty 1979) .

T h e ans we r pr ov ide d by positivism has its roots in a search for

absolute truth that can be traced back to ancient Greece. The

resulting quest for certainty was based on the claim that such

absolute epistemological foundations for knowledge could be

found, though opin ions differed as to w h ere . The resulting foun

dationalism has sought to anchor scientific kn ow ledg e in diverse

ways: Plato's notion of pure ideas; the rationalism, logic, and

mathematics associated with Descartes ; postulat ion of God-

given natural laws in Aquinas; the empiricist reference to sense

data as in H um e; or the transcendental cate gorie s of the m ind in

Kant. Although few scientists selfconsciously embrace positivism

(th ou gh th ey m ight refer to them selves as em piricists or natural

ists), the y neverth eless adhere to the un ifying foundationalist

themes of this classic conception of science.

Even though technical discussions of positivism d iffer in detail,

it is possible to convey the broadly shared assumptions in terms




67

be explained (the explanandum . Gen eral, invariant laws are the

basis of science and demonstrate how events had to happen the

way they did. These relationships can be illustrated as follows

(Little 1991, pp.5 -6):

Li (one or more universal laws)

Q (on e or more statements of background circumstances)

(deductively entails)

Ε (statement of the act or regularity to be exp lained)

Because n ot all scien tific explana tions are universal in this sense,

logicians have employed inductive-statistical models that focus

on probabilistic statements:

Li (one or more statistical laws)

Q

(one or more statements of background conditions)

- « — « « - (makes very likely )

Ε (statement of the fact or regularity to be exp lained)

O nc e this ideal reconstructed logic has bee n iden tified, it be

comes possible to evaluate other scientific theories in terms of

h ow w ell they l ive up to this m odel.

History : Th e Idea l ized Sc ienti fic Co m m un ity

A second feature of classic positivism is the claim that the

his tory of the sciences is, for all practical pur po ses , irrelevan t

for their practice. The logic of justification or confirmation is

sharply distinguished from looking at the logic of discovery o f

theor ies : the psychological , histor ica l , and soc ia l condit ions

through w h ich science develops. Kn ow led ge about history is held

to have no significance for the evaluation of the validity of

theories and to be largely periph eral for the discovery o f better

research strategies. H o w researchers actually w en t about disc over

ing new knowledge was, strict ly speaking, irrelevant, mere

personal kn ow led ge (Polanyi 1962) .

In the light of this dictum the traditional histories of science

w er e co nc ern ed prim arily w ith the circumstances that lead great

scientists to their disco veries , largely attributing dis co ver y itself

to the gen ius of the researcher. Disco nne cting science from its



68


history was also closely connected with the assumption of value-

freedom—that is, the claim that scie ntific pr og res s is facilitated

by and dependent on the impersonality, objectiv ity, and lack of

bias on the part of investigators. Even sociological accounts that

cha llenge d the genius myth did not que stion the rigid d ist inction

between the logic of veri f ication and that of discovery. Begin

ning in the 1930s, Am erican soc io logist Robe rt M erton (1 96 8)

began to correct the simplist ic genius theory of science by

loo kin g m ore closely at the social co nte xt of scientif ic dis cov ery

and concluded that the nor m s of the scientific comm unity w e re

the basis of scientif ic progress, not the personal qualit ies of

individual researchers. H en ce all great scientists w er e standing

on the shoulders of the ir predecessors and con tem pora ries . Yet

M erto n's pos it ion wa s anch ored in a logical-em piricist dist inc

t ion be tw ee n wh at he termed the histor y and systematics of

theorizing that ef fectively blocked asking questions about the

dee per re lat ions betw ee n sc ien ce and soc iety, inc luding the

links between science and human values.

Meaning : Sc ience as Universa l Reason

Despite the suggestion that scientists should be value-free in

relation to research practic es, pos itivism also is associated cl os ely

w ith a tend en cy to postulate scien ce as the ult imate value. T o

this extent, posit iv ism often has aspired to the metaphysical

status o f a universal w or ld v ie w or Weltanschauung that claim ed

to have succee ded r el igion as the prim ary sou rce of meaning and

reason. As a cultural phe nom eno n, the sc ient i fic w or ld v i ew is

associated with two conf l ic t ing tendencies . On the one hand,

many attem pted to make claims about scienc e as an alternative

to religion , hen ce as em bod yin g all of the necessary ingredients—at

least po ten t ia l ly - for a ph i losop hy of l i fe . In certa in respects

both Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx were forced into this

po sitio n by default, in that neith er could esc ap e an ultima te faith

in science as universal reason and the ultimate basis of human

progress. From this poin t of v ie w sc ience could be co m e a re

placem ent for religion in the sense of both exp laining social reality

and providing the rationale for the values that should guide

social life.



72


Aspects of the crit ical rationalist posit ion are very pervasive;

ind eed m any suggest that Po pp er saved w ha t was valuable in the

posit iv ist tradit ion. To anticipate why postempiricist theories

still argue that this approach remains faulty, it is useful to co nsid er

som e of the fundamental problem s with even a Pop perian con

ception of science. First, despite the shift from verif ication to

falsif ication, scien ce stil l is iden tif ied e xclu sively w ith the ideal

of dedu ct ive ly organized and reconstructed explanat ions. M uch

that is clearly scientif ic (e.g. , in bio lo gy ) s imp ly does not l ive u p

to these cr i ter ia . Second, his concept ion of convent ional ized

criticism still assumes a problem atic de gre e o f rationality in scien

ti f ic disputes. Th ird , the contin uing strategy of dem arcating

sc ience from non science leaves in l im bo other type s of kn ow l

ed ge and calls into question the prio rity of scien ce

itself, w h i c h

cann ot, strict ly speak ing, be justi f ied scientifical ly. Ho w can w e

even justify scienc e as a g oo d thing (a norm ative, not an em piri

cal, c laim ) and consider it superior to other forms o f kn ow led ge ?

2

Many of these problems derive from the strict separation of

the logic o f disc over y and that of confirm ation or falsi fication.

Postempir ic ists quest ion w he the r the tw o log ics can be sepa

rated so sharply without distorting our understanding of sci

ence. Furthermore the criteria of scientif ic adequacy remain so

stringent that so mu ch that is clearly reaso na ble in practical

terms has no scientific status, especially in social life.

T w o 20th-century streams o f thin kin g contribu ted to radically

revising our understanding of the nature of the foundations of

kn ow led ge : F irst , w ith in phi loso ph y i tse lf several d eve lop m ents

have pointed to the need to rethink the logical foundations of

kn ow led ge ; second , historica l and soc io log ical s tudies of sc ien

t i f ic com mu nit ies poin ted to the nonrat ional bases of kn ow led ge

construct ion.

Postempiricism and the Rise of Antifoundationalism

Systematics: Logics-in-Use

Versus Reconstructed Logic

Positivism and logical empiricism did not remain unchallenged

in 20th-century metatheory, and three major alternative tradi-




75

not expla in the nature of quali tat ive ly ne w k n o w le d ge -o f "revo

lutionary science. For K u h n -o r at least for many of those w h o

fo llo w ed in his footsteps—such evid en ce about h o w scien ce

changes called into question assumptions about the rationality

of sc ient i fic me thod s.

4

Th e stage thus was set for the em erg en ce

of postempiricist philosophies and sociologies of science that

also questioned the foundational role of logic and sense-data in

scien ce, as w el l as science 's meaning as part of the cultural system .

M ean ing : The Cr isis

of Science as a Belief System

The consequences of postempiricist theories of science have

been diverse. The unity implied by the very term postempiri-

cism is defin ed b y a shared op po sitio n to positivism , rather than

a settled agreement about the alternative. But two issues stand

out w ith resp ect to the social scien ces. First, these dev elop m en ts

have contributed to influential critiques of epistemological foun-

dationalism and have challenged the capacity of scientific knowl

edge to represent reality; second, they have reopened the prob

lema tic o f the status of the hum an and social scien ces, g ive n that

the positivist accou nt of the natural sciences no lon ger s erves as

an unquestioned exemplar for other disciplines.

A dec is ive consequence o f the new his tory o f sc ience was

that it was no longer possible to sustain the presuppositions of

positivist epistemology, for example, the unity of scientific ex

planation as covering laws, the indubitable character of scien

tif ic facts ind epe nd en t of the ories , and the rational con firm ation

of th eorie s by appeals to facts. Such criticisms p rov ok ed a crisis

in the status of scientific k no wle dg e. At one ex trem e som e ph iloso

phers o f scienc e such as Paul Feyerab end ce lebr ate d these find

ings in w rit in g against m eth od and call ing for epistem ologica l

anarchism (Feyerab end 1975). Others w er e less con fident and

feared that these develop me nts w ou ld serve only to justify n ew

attacks on scientific institutions and op en the way for n ew form s

of irrationa lism. As a con seq ue nc e the crisis of the scien ces first

ann oun ced in the 1930s (e.g ., Husserl, 1 970 ) had taken on a ne w

for m in the 1980s under the head ing of postmodernism (a po int

w e return to in a m om en t).



78


Furtherm ore, withou t some form of ontolog ical real ism the con

nect ion be tw ee n the sc iences and human emancipat ion is jeop

ardized (Bhaskar 1979, 1989; Ou thw aite 198 7). But this for m of

crit ical realism does not requ ire a cor res po nd en ce th eo ry of

truth whereby concepts are held to mirror reality.

Basic Real ist Assumptions

W hat is required to break do w n the emp iricist-subjectivist split,

according to Roy Bhaskar, the most important British defender

of crit ical realism, is a fundamental dist inction b et w ee n though t

and objects of thought, hen ce be tw ee n intransit ive and tran

s it ive objects of sc ient i fic kn ow led ge. Intransitive objects are

thus the (rela tivel y) unch anging real objec ts w h ic h exist out

side and perdu re independen tly of the scientific proces s, w he reas

transitive objects invo lve the chan ging (and theore t ica l ly -

imbued) cogni t ive ob jec ts which are produced wi thin sc ience

as a fun ctio n and result of its p ra ct ic e (Bhaskar 1 986, p. 51 ).

W ithou t the assumption of this endu ring intransit ive d im ens ion,

the result is the kind o f pos tem piricist relativ ism w h er e thing s

be co m e a m ere manifestat ion, express ion, externa l izat ion or

em bod im en t of thought, dev oid of extra-discursive conditions and

emp irical con trols ; and with out a transitive dim ension , tho ug ht

beco m es a me re impress, e f f lux ion , internal izat ion or Doppel-

ganger o f thin gs, ber e f t o f intra-discurs ive con dit io ns and

rational cont rols (Bhaskar 1986, p. 52 ). In oth er w or ds , the

transitive (ever-changing) concepts of science cannot be reduced

to the external ob jects they seek to represent and can only exist

in mo re or less historically spec if ic, sy m bolically m ediated and

expresse d, praxis-dependent, ineradicably social for m s (Bhaskar

1986, p. 52).

From this pe rsp ect ive the ref lex ive turn—the histo ry and soci

olo gy of the sciences—becom es a necessary basis of their intel l i

gibi l ity and justi fication. Th e continuously chan ging and d iverse

nature of scientif ic concepts and practices does not, therefore,

call into quest ion conf ide nce in sc ient i f ic k no w led ge because

there is no nee d for con cepts to co rre sp on d to reality in ord er

to be justif iable.

Further, crit ical realism prop ose s an alternative w ay o f loo kin g

at explanation, the empirical heart of the enterprise of science.




79

First, the deduc tive-no m oth etic account tied to universal laws is

reje cted as inadequ ate for even the natural scien ces. Secon d, the

poste m piricist con textualist approach , based on explanation as

a social proce ss culm inating in consensus, is qua lif ied as incom

plete because of

its

unw il l ingn ess to admit mod els as hypoth eti

cal descriptions of an un kn ow n but kn ow able reality (Bhaskar

1986,

p. 60). In contrast:

For transcendental realism, explanations are quintessentially socially

produced and fallible causal accounts of the unknown mode of

production of phenomena, or

the

episodes

in

which such accounts

are furnished. In theoretical science, explanation is accomplished

by an account of the formerly unknown generative mechanism; in

practical (applied and concrete) science, by an account of the for

merly unknown mode of combination or interarticulation, in some

specific 'conjuncture,' of antecedently know n mechanisms. Real

ism attempts to incorporate the situated strengths of both deduc-

tivism and contextualism. (Bhaskar 1986, p. 60)

Conclusion: Rethinking Reason

From a crit ical mod ernist (or eve n a crit ical po stm od ern ist)

pe rsp ec tive , the postpositivist critique has be en salutary by creat

ing the condition s that migh t facilitate a de ep er understan ding

of rationality and its relationship to other aspects of life. It is not

m erely a threat; it is also an o ppo rtun ity.

In certain respects postpos it iv ism un dermines the con cep t o f

pre scr iptiv e metho ds in the old er sense. Its ob jec tive is not to

replace posit iv ist metho dolog y w ith a ne w postpo sit iv ist meth

odology. For in the postpositivist understanding of science there

is no cor rect meth od to fol low (Polk ing ho rne 1983, p. 3 ). But

this postposit iv ist methodological pragmatism and pluralism

culminates in incoherence i f not coupled with something l ike a

critical realist ontology. Even if there is no single corre ct m eth od ,

there are distinguishable methodological strategies appropriate

to particular questions and subject matters, depending on the

nature of th e ob jec t o f inquiry. I t is in that sense that w e pr o

po se to exp lor e further the implications of a crit ical the ory of




81

5. Often critical realism (wh ic h has its origins in a theory o f natural scie nce )

has been portra yed as a rival of critical theory as antipositivist strategies (Stockman

1983). This is valid wit h respect to the philosoph y of science wh ere Habe rm as,

for example, relied extensively on traditional empiricist accounts, thus stressing

the differences between the natural and social sciences. Given a critical realist

perspective, more fundamental continuities are revealed although the unique

features of social science are recognized. A more recent study (Romm 1991)

contributes to this problema tic polarization of the tw o positions in superficially

contrasting what is called "Marxist realism" (Keat) and "Marxist nonrealism"

(Hab erm as). The convergence thesis developed b y Outhwaite (1987 ) appears more

convin cing and informs the present study.

6. As Bhaskar put it: "No longer can thought be conceived as a mechanical

function of given things, as in empiricism; n or can the activity of creative subjects

continue to be s een as constituting a wor ld o f objects, as in idealism; nor is some

combination of the two possible" (Bhaskar 1986, p. 51).



4

E A R L Y C R I T I C A L T H E O R Y

A S A R E S E A R C H P R O G R A M

A Historical Introduction

Just those

who

feel a responsibility toward theory will have

to confront

its

doubtful

aspects as relentlessly as they

confront

the inadequacies of mere empiricism. . . . Therefore critical

reflection about emp irical social research is

necessary,

and

also

an incisivefam iliarity with

its

results.

(Frankfurt Institute

for Social Research 1972, p.

119

Knowledge in this traditional sense, including every type of

experience, is preserved in critical theory and practice. B ut in

regard to the essential kind of change at wh ich the critical

theory aims, there can be no corresponding concrete perception

of it until it actually comes about. If the proof of the pudding

is in the eating the eating here is still in thefuture. (Horkheimer

[1937] 1972a, p. 221)

From Western Marxism to Critical Theory

In t roduct ion

Part I outlined many of the basic issues in metatheory and the

ph iloso ph y o f scienc e. Th e task of Part I I is to trace the o rigins

of critical theor y, a distinc tive research pro gra m that be ca m e

increa sing ly differentiated fr om , and eventu ally significantly

85



86

C R I T I C A L T H E O R Y A S A R E S E A R C H P R O G R A M

discontinuous with, the Marxist tradit ion. A research program

involves comb ining a metatheoret ica l approach with a concr ete

set o f em pir ica l explanatory p roblem s.

In th is chapter w e are con cern ed pr im ar i ly w i th the or ig ins

of early Frankfurt crit ical theor y as a dist inctive p er sp ec tive that

becam e def ined as an interdisc ipl inary research pro gram . T he

concept o f

a

research program w il l be used as a w ay of analyzing

the rationality of scien ce in the w ak e of postem piricist crit iques .

In this recon struction w e stress the innovative ch aracter of early

Frankfurt crit ical theo ry in relation to W estern M arxism , as we ll

as the internal shifts that ult imately culmina ted in co nt em po ra ry

crit ical theory. Th e chapter is con cern ed w ith o riginal Frankfurt

tradition from the 1920s into the 1950s.

Soc ia l Th eo ry as a Research P r og ra m

For the purpose of analyzing social theories, the notion of re

search programs, de ve lop ed init ial ly by the Brit ish-Hungarian

ph ilos op he r Im re Lakatos (Lakatos 1 97 0), has advantages o ve r

Kuhn 's notion of a research paradigm.

1

On e prob lem wi th the

paradigm co nc ep t in Kuhn 's version is that it is associated w ith

the assumption that disciplines are inherently unif ied. Another

is that Kuhn focuses on the social psychology of research at the

price of undermining how we might justify the rationality of sci

ence, given that mere appeal to empirical evidence is no longer

sufficient. W e have seen some of the con sequ ences o f this pro b le m

in the strands of post-empiricist metatheory that culminate in

postmodernist relativ ism. What is required instead is a revised

co nc ep tion of disciplinary p aradigms that can make sense of the

typ e of research program pro pos ed by cr it ica l theory.

Lakatos beg ins his sym pathetic crit iqu e of Po p pe r wit h a dis

t inct ion be tw ee n naive and sop hist icated fa ls i ficationism.

Sophisticatedfalsificationism prop oses considerably m ore leni

ent rules for the acceptance of theories (demarcation criteria to

e l iminate pseu dosc iences) and m ore f lexible ones for the rules

for fa ls i fy ing or e l iminat ing theor ies .

2

Given the problems in

volv ed in dev is ing fa ls i fy ing crucia l exp er im en ts even in the

natural scien ces, Lakatos pro poses that the accep tance o f th eo ries

should be seen comparat ive ly (re lat ive to the type of inquiry)




87

and should be based on its capacity to reveal novel facts (Lakatos

1970, p. 116).

Crucial to the rules of falsification is attention to the adjustments

that theoretical approaches make to discon firming evid en ce

bet w ee n rational and irrational change of th eo ry (Lakatos 1970 ,

p. 117 ). Th is attention requires distinguishing ( dem arc atin g )

b et w ee n th ose adjustments o f the theo ry that are rational (e.g. ,

ne w auxi liary hypothese s ) and henc e progressive, and thos e that

are irrational (e.g ., seman tic or linguistic trick s) and he n ce de

generative. This distinction be tw een progressive versus

degener

ative problemshifts-which can occ ur at either the theo retical or

emp ir ica l leve l-be co m es a ver y di fferent w ay of evaluating

changes w ith in a research prog ram . What it reveals is that th eo rie s

are a lways undergoing change, w hi ch is w h y wh at w e appraise

is

a

series of theories rather than isolated theories" (1970, p. 118 ).

And it is for this reason that the original paradigm concept

constituted a breakthro ugh for un derstanding wh at to evaluate

in scientific research.

A research prog ram consists o f meth od olog ical ru les: Som e tell

us w ha t paths of research to avoid (negative heuristic); othe rs tell

wh at paths to pursue (positive heuristic) (Lakatos 1970, p. 13 2).

Th e negative heuristic precludes attacking the hard co re of the

research prog ram . Instead it must dev elop auxil iary hyp othe

ses

to form a pro tectiv e belt that beco m es the target of tests

and readjustments. As a con sequ enc e, elements o f this protec

tive belt can be falsif ied without necessarily undermining the

core . The positive heuristic thus requires constructing this pro

tective belt and ignoring anomalies in order to get along with

research and sustain the necessary theoretical autonomy of

scie nc e: T h e positivist heuristic saves the scientist from be com

ing confused by the ocean of anomalies . . . . He ignores the

actual cou ntere xam ples, the available 'data

1

(197 0, p. 135). As

Lakatos concludes, his concept of criticism is more lenient than

Po pp er's and recognizes that on e must treat em ergen t program s

generously. Further, some of the most creative program s be co m e

visible only with hindsight and rational reconstruction (1970,

p. 179).

A major limitation of Lakatos's formulation is his stress on the

rigidity of the hard core and the ambiguous status of closely re

lated com pe tito rs. T o deal w ith these and related diff iculties, the



88

C R I T I C A L T H E O R Y AS A R E S E A R C H P R O G R A M

Am erican ph i losoph er o f sc ience Larry Laudan suggests a not ion

o f research traditions that is eve n more useful for the human sci

ence s, given its openn ess: Each research tradition (unlike a spe

c i f ic t he or y) goes through a num ber of di f ferent , deta i led (an d

of ten mutua l ly contradic tory ) formulat ions and genera l ly has

a long his tory exten din g through a s igni f icant p er io d o f t im e

(b y contrast , theor ies are f requent ly sho rt- l ived ) (Laudan

1977, pp . 78-9).

Th ese changes cannot be understood in emp iricist terms essen

tially as signs o f increasing truth that is app rox im ated throug h

self-correction. N o r can w e sim ply assume that scienc e is ration al

because of this increasing c orresp ond enc e to truth (real i ty ) , a

most problem atic c la im from a postem pir ic ist persp ect iv e . So

rather than l inking the rat ional i ty of sc ient i f ic change to this

s l ippe ry object iv ist ic truth,

w

Laudan suggests making it para

sit ic on rational, problem -solving cho ices (Laudan 1977, p. 12 5).

A n im porta nt advantage of this approach is that it pr ovi de s a

framework for acknowledging the cumulat ive character of the

humanistic disciplines, w h ic h eve ry bit as mu ch as the scien ces,

have empirical and conceptual problems; both have criteria for

assessing the adequacy of solutions to problems; both can be

shown to have made signif icant progress at certain stages of

their historical evo luti on (Laudan 1977, p. 1 91 ). Th is po in t has

been obscured, how ever, by the s impl ist ic ident i f icat ion of

(scientif ic ) rationality with experimental control and quantita

t ive prec is ion φ . 191) .

T w o cru cial con sequ ence s of l inkin g the rationality o f a re

search tradit ion with its problem -solving ab il it ies have pro fou nd

imp lications for understanding the social scienc es. First, the basis

of rat ional ly choosing between research programs is expanded

to inc lude many other aspects beyond how they wi l l appear to

correspond with the facts . The focus on problem solv ing con

tributes to recognizing many other bases for rational choices

about a research pro gra m : the potential r ichness of its theoreti

cal insight, the significance of the problems it defines, or even its

ideo log ica l impl ica t ions .

3

Secon d, this appro ach also calls into qu estion th e strict em piri

cist dist inction between the systematics of theorizing and the

history of theory ( logic of discovery) :



Λ Historical Introduction

89

Logicians teach

us

that it is

specific version of

the

so-called genetic

fallacy to imagine that the origin or historical career of

doctrine

h s anything whatever to do with its cognitive well-foundedness. . . .

I want to take exception with this view, even to turn it on its head,

by arguing that no sensible rational appraisal can be made of

any doctrine without a rich knowledge of its historical develop

ment (and the history of its rivals). (Laudan 1977, p. 193)

Th is basic insight wi l l guide our reconstruction of the tradit ion

of critical theory in terms of various progressive and regressive

prob lem shifts and their impact on problem -solving capacit ies in

research.

Of particular importance to problem solving in social theory

is the ro le o f historical events in con fronting theorists wi th quasi-

exp erim enta l evid enc e of a falsi fying nature. In social t he ory

this is recog nize d in the historicist prin ciple of historical respe-

cification: In the ligh t of the cha ngin g structure o f so cie ty and

crucial historical events, it often becomes necessary to adapt

con cep ts to the ne w historical realities. But this neces sity of con

tinuous revision constitutes a fundamental dilemm a: A t w ha t

point does historical respecif ication transform a theoretical

approach into something qualitatively different? The core versus

protective belt dist inction helps clari fy this problem, though it

is often dif ficult to apply in pra ctice, given the m ore dif fusely

organ ized character of social scienc e.

Western Marxism: Scient i f ic and Cr it ica l

The family of theories associated with the Marxist tradition

has be en divide d in various ways, but tw o typ es o f c lassif ication

are perh aps most useful: (a ) an epistem ological-m ethod ological

one that dif ferentiates between Western Marxism as pos it ive

scien ce and as forms of crit ical the ory and ( b ) a geog rap hic-

polit ical one that dif ferentiates between the Western Marxism

of Western Europe and the Marxist-Leninist tradit ion cen tered

in the Soviet Un ion. In the latter con text the research prog ram of

Ma rxism (iden tif ied in Soviet the ory as dialectical materialism

or Dimaf was reduced directly to its ideological functions for

a particular regim e, thus culminating in degenerating prob lem-

shifts and nearly a co m ple te loss of scien tific c redib ility. From



90


this pe rsp ec tive , Marx 's theor y was redu ced to a total izing dia

lectic of nature and history, with the former Soviet Union cast

as the leading e dg e of historical evo lution .

But W estern Marxism rema ined a m ore op en trad it ion, desp ite

its ideological origins and the repressive effects of marginalization

within bourgeois democracies . By the end of the 20th century

it had be co m e reco gn ized in academ ic circles as on e of the most

signif icant traditions of mo dern social and polit ica l theory. W est

e rn Marx ism has been d i v ided , how eve r , by tw o t e nd en c ie s -

scientific and critical—reflected in attempts to develop distinctive

research programs from the same theoretical tradition (Gouldner

1980) . Variants of the sci en tif ic app roac h or scientific Marx

ism reach back to Engels and Austro-Marxism and culm inate in

contemporary neo-Marxist research programs in the academy

(Bottomore 1975; M orro w 1992a). Variants o f the critical a pp roa ch

reach back to Lukacs, the Frankfurt S cho ol, and An to n io Gram-

sci in Italy and assume a var iety o f form s o f critical th eo ry and

critical social science today (Held 1980; Fay 1987; Leonard 1990).

The init ial basis of division between these two streams of

thought ref lects fundamental dif ferences about the core argu

ment of Marx's theory, above al l of the metatheoretical assump

tions of h istorical materialism as a th eo ry of s ocie ty and history.

The key analytical concepts in dispute here are the base-super

structure metaphor and the the ory of the evolut ion of modes of

production. For scientific Marxism the pr im ary obje ct o f in

quiry is the discovery, in the positivist manner, of the laws of

soc ia l deve lopment rooted in modes of product ion that are the

primary reference point for revolutionary action. The status of

the sub jects of m obil ization is amb iguous, ho we ver, inasmuch

as they are ultimately pup pets o f the laws of d evelopm ental trans

form ation , an assumption linked to the thesis of the de term inin g

economic base and the dependent cultural superstructure. The

earl ier versions of this model contributed to economic reduc-

tionism in the sense that, for ex am ple , the state w as see n as a

direct instrument of the rule of the dominant class.

4

Th e point of departure of cri t ica l approaches, w h ic h re ly m ore

on Marx's early writ ings, is the crucial importance of analyzing

the subject-object d ialectic through w h ic h so ciety as a contra

dictory whole ( o r totality) is form ed . In othe r w or ds , the basis

of early Frankfurt critical th eo ry is a m etath eore tical rere ad ing




91

of Marx, based on some of the Hegelian elements in Marx's

m ethod ology . This metatheoretical posit ion generally is referred

to as a for m o f critical hermeneu tics. Crucial to this reconstru c

tion was the discovery of Marx's and Engels's early manuscripts

(published in German in 1 932), w hi ch established the fundamen

tal im porta nce of the Hegelian con cept of alienation as "alienated

labor for M arx. O n this basis it bec om es pos sible to see M arx 's

app roach as requ iring a subject-structure d ialectic, h en ce a

m ode l of so ciety as a process o f social reproduction, rathe r than

the outco m e o f the linear ef fects of an eco no m ic base on a cul

tural structure (as in the base-superstructure m od el) . H en ce this

m ode l involve d a w ay o f thinkin g o f society as a contr adicto ry

totality in which the various elements had considerable auton

omy even i f they ult imately expressed the contradictions of the

whole (Marcuse, [1941]

I960 ) . The result ing research program

inv olved a fundamental revision of what Marxist theo ry had

be en u nd erstoo d to be until the late 1920s (tho ug h this w as do ne

in the nam e of faithfulness to Mar x's origina l inte ntio ns ). In any

case the resulting interpretatio n in volv ed a revisio n of the co re

do ctrin e of eco no m ism and related metatheoretical assump

tions regarding the epistemological status of historical material

ism. Nevertheless this more f lexible social reproduction model

still had a deterministic side in that its operation was tied to a

tele olo gic al process—that is, the unfolding o f w or ld h isto ry as

envis ioned by M arx.

T hr ee Pro b lem shi f ts in Cr i tica l Th eo ry

Three crucial problemshifts can be identif ied in the develop

ment of the critical theory tradition associated with the original

Frankfurt Sch ool. In the first, neo-Marxist phase, critical th eo ry

w as envis ion ed as a form of interdis ciplina ry m aterialism that

identif ied w ith the project of working-class revolution , but from

the per sp ec tiv e o f the autonom y of a research pro gra m . It is in

this first phase that the most important empirical redirection

away from orth od ox Marxism too k place and established crit ical

theory as an empirical research program. But this research pro

gram was div ided be tw een inner and outer c irc les w ho se

dif ferences pref igu red later developm ents (Hon neth 198 7). This

first phase is also characterized by significant shifts of interest



92


from the init ial W eim ar phase in the 1920s to the exile p er io d in

the late 1930s. Th e init ia l pe r io d was con cern ed esp ecia l ly w ith

explain ing the lack of resistance to fascism by the Germa n w o rk in g

class. In the exile phase interest shifted to rethinking the nature

of the capitalist state and understanding the emergent form of

society.

By the 1940s, ho wev er, critical the ory had bec om e disillusioned

w ith its earl ier interpretations and largely abandon ed its co nc ern

with deve loping empir ica l methods for test ing and e laborat ing

theory. In this second phase, a de c l i n e-a degen erat ing problem -

sh ift -w as eviden t at the em pirical level. Th is led many oth ers

away from crit ical theory and contributed to its near ecl ipse as

a research program.

A third phase (to be taken up later) is rep rese nted in the w or k

of Jurgen Haberm as, w h o led a secon d gen erat ion in the ear ly

1960s and h elp ed stimu late a nu m ber of o th er theorists else

where by the end of that decade (e .g. , Anthony Giddens, Alv in

Gouldner) who attempted to cr i t ic ize and e laborate on an ap

proach inspired, in part, by the older Crit ical Theory of the

original Frankfurt School.

The Hermeneutic-Dialectical Tradition

Introduct ion :

Th e Herm eneu t ic Tradit ion

Within the German tradit ion the methodological status of the

social sciences has been debated most intensely. In France and

Britain variants of posit iv ism dominated unti l the post-World

Wa r I I pe rio d. An d in the 1930s the inf lux of many of the lead ing

posit iv ists from Europe led to posit iv ism's dominance in the

United States at the expense of the marginalization of pragma

tism (the philosophical foundation of symbolic interactionist

so c io log y) in the 1940s. Th e pr imary ex cep t ion to these positiv

ist tendencies was in 19th-century Germany, where a tradit ion

of ph ilosoph ical idealism resisted positivism in the name of h erm e-

neut ics (M uel ler-Vol lmer 1988; Ble icher 19 80) . Alth ou gh these

idealist ph ilosoph ies contained many obscurantist elemen ts, the y




93

did po se im portant questions that had been suppressed els ew he re .

At the outset, however, some of the three key tendencies in this

tradit ion need to be identif ied in greater detail : hermeneutics,

phenomenology, and historicism.

Although the term hermeneutics does not appea r in tradi

tional dictionaries of the social sciences, it has become current

in English language socio log y du ring the past deca de in referrin g

to a the ory and meth od of interpreting human action and

artifacts. It derives from the term for interpreting biblical texts,

a practice which involved detailed attempts to understand the

'authentic* version of the work. Dilthey used the term (and also

Versteheri) to refer to the method of the 'cultural scien ces' (Jary

and Jary 199 1, p. 2 72 ).

The hermeneutic philosopher and cultural historian Wilhelm

Dilthey (1833-19 11) def ined the problem atic in terms that have

influenced German sociology by strongly differentiating between

the natural sciences (or the Naturwissenschaften) and the

moral or cultural sc iences (jGeisteswissenschaften) (Di l they

[1910] 1981; Dilthey 1976). Th e use of the original Germ an term s

here is advisable because o f the inadequacy of

translations, w h ic h

cannot clearly convey the nuances of this debate. For example,

in English the ter m science is already loaded w ith natural scien

tific connotations, reflecting the traditional empiricism and posi

t iv ism of Anglo American scholarship. The German term Wis-

senschaft is mu ch broader, closer to the no tion of a disc iplin e.

Further, the term Geist is sugg estive of the spiritual dim en sion

of social reality, though in the sense of its cultural and moral-

evaluative aspects, rather than specifically religious ones.

The differences between the natural and cultural sciences are

linked with two concepts that also resist translation: Verstehen

and Erklaren (A p el 198 4). Th e first of these is quite familiar in

sociological theory under the heading of Verstehen-z term that

com es from the ver b mea ning literally to und erstand and refers

to the processes of meaning interpretation required for com mu ni

cation. As such, it overlaps with the methodological issues of

herm eneutics or the interpretation of texts. Ac cor din g to

Dilthey, in terpre tation w as the task of the cultural scien ces , and

natural scien tific causal expla nation w as rejecte d as inap prop ri

ate for understanding human action. The term Erklaren means

exp lanation in the natural scientific sense of causal explanation




95

Hegel's thesis that societies and the concepts used to describe

them are relative to the historical context ( D 'A m ic o 1989; Gru mley

1989). For example, historicists would tend to evaluate the mean

ing of any statement in terms of what it meant in the period in

question. Attitudes about w om en or slavery, for exam ple, w ou ld

be ju dg ed as relative to wh at wa s typical at a particular po in t in

time. Similarly any concept-such as social c lass-would be as

sum ed to have quite a differen t mea ning in ana lyzing, say, a

feudal as op po se d to a capitalist society. Con sequ ently histori-

cism has f l irted w ith problem s of relativ ism ( he nc e is an impo r

tant precursor of postempiricism) and is directed explic it ly

against positivist assumptions about invariant, universal laws

equally applicable to any historical situation.

5

In the con text of the Marxist tradition, the term Hegelian Marx

ism is used as a co de ter m to desc ribe the co m ple x and d isputed

process w here by Marx 's theory w as re interpreted as a form of

critical herm ene utics, as op po se d to a natural scien ce o f so ciety.

Although opposing the tradit ional hermeneutics of Dilthey, the

resulting hermeneu tic-dialectical tradition interpreted soc iety

from a pe rsp ec tive that too k into account that cultural pro du cts

w e re con ditio ne d by the social relations of capitalism, an ap

proa ch that made the crit ique of id eolog ies the central interpre

tive task. And unlike positivist approaches to Marxian theory, it

did not attempt to reconcile Marx with reigning empiricist con

ceptions of science.

G eor g Lukacs (1885-1971), a Hungarian philosoph er w h o spen t

mu ch of his l i fe in Germ any unti l ex pe lled b y the Nazis, w as on e

of the first (along wi th K arl Ko rsc h) to introdu ce these kinds of

m etath eor etica l issues as the basis of reth ink ing the m eta

theoretical foundations of M arx's theor y.

6

For Lukacs the cen tral

aspect of Marx's theory was his method based on an analysis of

society as a contradictory totality constituted through the sub

ject-ob ject dialectic (Lukacs [1 92 3] 1968; Jay 19 84). Th e m ost

nov el aspec t of Lukacs's app roach wa s that it dem onstrated h o w

the domination of capital was not sustained simply by external

co erc ion , but through a process o f reification (l iterally, to make

into a th in g ) through wh ich social agents came to identify

falsely w ith a social reality that they per ce ive d as natural — even

thou gh it wa s created o rigina lly by them . For Lukacs this w as the

key to how the commodify form of capital ist social relations



96


con structe d the total ity of capitalist society. The later d isco ver y

of Marx's early manuscripts showed that he used the notion of

alienation ( o r estrangement) w ith refere nc e to al ienated labor

in a similar w ay (A rato and Breines 1 97 9) .

7

What defines Frankfurt critical theory (and links it to the

socio logy of kn ow led ge ) as a form of interpret ive theo ry was i ts

effort to explore this subject-object dialectic and its relation to

both capital ist exchange relations analyzed by Marx and the

processes of bureaucratization ( instrumental rationalization)

iden t i f i ed by Max We ber . Th ese quest ions de f ine d the mate

rial ist basis of its spe cif ic critical herm ene utic ap pr oa ch -th at

is , its insistence on the interplay between social being as an

ob ject ive factic ity and acts of interpretation as som eth ing m or e

than a process of culture re f lec t ing eco no m ics or tech no logy

(Rabinow and Sull ivan 1987, pp. 16-7).

The early Frankfurt approach to social science can be recon

structed in terms of its dist inction between "critical" and "tra

ditional" theory, w h e re the latter refers pr im arily to the natural

scientif ic model or to any contemplative conception of absolute

kn ow led ge. In contrast ear ly Cri tical Th eor y 's co nce pt ion of ten

is referred to as a form of H egelian M arxism , though this term is

mislea ding t o the ex ten t it do es not entail a full return to He ge l.

Wh at it does correctly suggest, how ever, is a con ceptio n o f M arx 's

theory that cannot be subsumed in orthodox posit iv ist concep

tions of a naturalist ic scien ce. Altho ug h am biguous on many

important issues, the early Critical Theorists gave a forceful

defense o f the unique kind of theoriz ing the y found in Marx , o ne

they associated with the idea of a dialectical method as under

stoo d by Lukacs's analysis of soc iety as a co nt ra dic tor y totality.

For H ork heim er the crucial aspect here is the dif feren t relation

ship b et w ee n subject and ob ject in natural and social scien ce, a

difference that changes the nature of causal necessity:

The object with which the scientific specialist deals is not affected

at all by

his

own

theory.

Subject

and

object

are

kept strictly apart. . . .

A consciously critical attitude, however, is part of the developm ent

o f society: the construing o f the course of history

as

the n e c e s s a ry

product of an economic mechanism simultaneously contains both

a protest against this order of things . . . and the idea of

self-

determination for the human race.. . . The judgment passed on the



A Historical Introduction 97

necessity inherent in the previous course of events implies here a

struggle to change it from a blind to a meaningful necessity.

(Horkheimer 1972a, p. 229)

From this perspective the task of crit ical theory was one of

immanent critique that merely required poin ting to the discrep

ancy between the basic l iberal values of freedom and equality

proclaimed by bourgeois society and the objective realit ies of

economic irrationality that could be subjected to human con

tr ol -th at is, from a blin d to a mean ingful necessity. For this

reason the kno w led ge o f these contradictions pro du ced by crit i

cal research could be presumed to inform directly the mobil iza

t ion of opposit ional movements. In other words, crit ical theory

did not need to employ some kind of crit ic ism from outside be

cause it could emp loy a form of ideo logy crit ique w h os e message

wa s potentially available and sensible to the subordinated classes.

Such a con cep tion d oes not preclu de the practical im po rtan ce

o f the traditional th eo ry of the po sitive science s: If such a

m eth od is app lied to society, th e result is statistics and d escrip

t ive sociology, and these can be important for many purposes,

eve n for crit ical th eo ry (H ork he im er 1972a, p. 22 9) . Crit ical

th eo ry also asks such fragm entary qu estion s about reality in

the for m of general and spe cif ic hyp othetical prop osit ion s about

aspects of social life. But at the same tim e, the critical th eo ry

of so cie ty is, in its totality, the un folding of a single existential

jud gm ent about social deve lopm ent and its relation to human

reason and freedom (Horkheimer 1972a, p. 227).

The historicist aspect of this approach is the assumption that

theories must change in response to fundamental changes in

society : Crit ical the ory does not have on e doctrinal substance

today, another tomor row . Th e changes in it do n ot mean a shift

to

a who l ly ne w out look, as long as the age itself does not radically

change [ ital ics ad de d] (Ho rkh eim er 1972a, p. 23 4). Further,

Ho rkhe imer argued that critical theory had to rely on findings from

the spe cial ized disciplines to f lesh out its existential jud gm ent

and to assess w he th er n ew stages of develo pm ent have em erg ed

(H ork he im er 1972a, pp . 225-6). Early crit ical the ory wa s thus

clearly Marxist in its insistence that the overall movement of

history was revealed by the successive contradictions of modes

of pro du ction . But Ho rkhe imer sti ll remained am bivalent about



98


l inking such truth claims to the Ma rxian assump tion of the revo

lutionary role of the w or ki ng class because there is no social

c lass by whose acceptance of the theory one could be guided

(Ho rkh eim er 1972a, p. 242) .

Interdisciplinary Materialism as a Research Program

The key aspect of the original Frankfurt Institute for Social

Research w as its transformation of M arxist the ory into a relatively

autonomous research program.

8

Unti l that point, despite the

efforts of particular individuals, Marxism remained a polit ical

id eo log y d esp ite its claims to a scien tific status. Rese arch car ried

out under the sponsorsh ip of a polit ical p arty cou ld not, by def i

nit ion, be suff ic iently autonomous for a scien tif ic research pr o

gram . But the comb ination of a private en do w m en t and affi li

ation with the University of Frankfurt provided such autonomy.

The signif icance of this project to 20th-century social science

did not begin to become wel l known in the Engl ish reading

w or ld unti l the 1970s, fol l ow in g its revival in W est Germ any in

the 1960s Gay 19 73 ).

9

Where it was noted previously in the English-speaking world,

it wa s subsumed under the somew hat misleading rub ric of "mass

society theory," a term popu lar in the 195 0s .

1 0

The term mass

society wa s used by bot h left-wing and con serva tive crit ics to

designate wh at was per ce ive d to be a fundamental sh ift in 20th-

century culture brought about by democratization (especial ly

mass edu cation ) and the mass media, both of w h ic h had the effe ct

of eroding the close l ink between class posit ion and cultural

characterist ics. Left-wing crit ics lamented the emergence of a

national mass cultu re (a pseu doco nsen sus) that l inked all so

cial c lasses because it def lected the working class from becom

ing awa re of its co lle cti ve interests and sp ec ific cu ltural iden tity;

con servative crit ics w er e disturbed becau se in a mass culture the

marketplace determ ined the valu e of cultural goo ds and the cul

tural e l ites no longer served to provide ef fective models for

soc ia lization (Sw in ge w oo d 1977) . Often the cr i tic ism o f cr i tica l

the ory of mass and popular culture was mistaken wit h this elitist,

conservative reaction.




99

We are not centrally concerned here with recounting either

the history of the older Frankfurt tradition, surveying the forms

of social research condu cted in its name, or rev iew in g its recep

tion in the social sciences. The task, rather, is to trace the shifts

that culminated in the transition from the research program of

early Crit ical Theory to the contemporary context. The distinc

tive feature of Max Horkh eimer's research progra m w as that it w as

posit iv ist ic enou gh to envision the necessity of an interdisci

plinary materialism-thiX is, coop erat ion be tw een Marxist the

or y and the social sciences (Hon neth 1987, p. 349 ). At the time of

his inauguration as dire ctor o f the Frankfurt Institute, H ork he im er

define d the program m atic task of Crit ical Th eo ry as:

the question o f the connection between

the

economic life of society,

the psychic development of individuals, and the changes in cul

tural domains in the narrower sense. To these belong not only the

so-called spiritual contents of science, art, and religion , but also

law, custom, fashion, public op inion , sports, leisure pastimes, life

style, etc. (Horkheimer 1972b, p. 43; trans. R. M.)

From this persp ect ive wh at was required was overcom ing the

split betw ee n empirical research and philosophy, wh er e the latter

wa s l inked to a Hege lian Marxist conc eptio n o f historical reason.

Nev ertheless the core of this research program w as a co nc ep tion

of historical materialism firmly anchored in sociological analy

sis. But paradoxically, change in the Weimar Republic and else

where in the 1920s and 1930s was not clearly moving in the

direction predicted by Marx's revolutionary theory. This anom

aly provided the substantive problematic that defined this re

search program—its positive heuristic—and its central object of

inquiry: the increasing integration of the working class in ad

vanced capital ism. So for Horkheimer the investigations of the

institute in the 1930s w er e guided by the question, H o w [d o]

the mental mechanisms come about, by which it is possible that

tensions be tw ee n social c lasses, w h ich feel imp elled tow ard

co nfl ict because of the econ om ic situation, can remain latent?

(cit ed in Ho nne th 1987, p. 353).

Answering this question required supplementing tradit ional

Marxist political economy-thc explan ation of social form s in

terms of their genesis in the capitalist m ode of p ro d u ct io n -w ith



100


the two new disc ipl inary approaches of soc ia l psychology and

cultural theory. Changed historical condit ions had transformed

the nature of polit ical econ om y. Because there wa s no long er the

direct l ink be tw ee n the contradict ions o f the eco no m y and class

action assumed by Marx , a crit ical social psy ch olog y b ased on a

historical reading of Freud w as required to exp lain the irra

t iona l forces that block ed the w or ki n g class from reco gn izin g

its o w n interests. Further, a th eo ry of culture wa s necess ary to

study the contents of the social ization process l inked with the

rise of the mass media (H on ne th 1987, p.

353).

From the perspective of the third phase of crit ical theory

represe nted b y Haberm as and Gidd ens, the crucial l imita tion of

Hork heim er 's program was that even though it avoided the eco

nomic reductionism of the base-superstructure model, it

suf

fered from a form of Marxist functionalism: Hork he im er and

his collaborators could on ly ach ieve a theo retical un ity in his

programme by using Marxist functionalism to establish a direct

dep end ence be tw een the individual elements of the investigation

(Ho nn eth 1987, p.

353).

Th is approach w as functionalist in

employing strongly teleological explanations: Particular struc

tures and cultural characterist ics were interpreted as respond

ing to the functional imperatives or needs of the system to

repro duc e i tse l f as

a capital ist society. Ne verth eless refer en ce to

em pirical investigations serv ed through out this p er io d as a cru

cial basis for revision and formulation of alternative theoretical

arguments in a mann er that wa s unp rece den ted in the M arxist

tradition.

The theoretical unity of this research program in its mature,

post-Weimar phase in exile has been characterized in terms of

the catchphrase "rationalization as reification," a no tio n that

pro vid ed a fram ew ork fo r analyzing the pecu liar transformations

evident in Stalinism, National Social ism, and the emergence of

state capitalism. As the term suggests, classical critical theory

inv olve d a synthesis o f conce pts draw n from W eb er and Lukacs.

The use of the notion of rationalization was originally devel

oped by Max Weber, who dist inguished between formal or

instrumental rationality and substantial rationality. Instrumen

tal rationality referred to the ef f ic ien cy of the means realizing

given ends (va lues ) , w h er e e f f ic iency was based on calculations

and expertise was based on scientif ic techniques. In contrast,



102 C R I T I C A L T H E O R Y A S A R E S E A R C H P R O G R A M

interpretations. In other words, there was a remarkable degree

of internal dialogue and dif ferenc es o f op in ion , ofte n cha ngin g

rapidly in response to empirical investigations and n ew historical

events. N ow h er e wa s this m ore evident than w ith th e reassessment

of the relat ionship be tw ee n pol i t ica l econ om y and the state.

Th e po int o f departure for state th eor y was the assump tion o f

a fundamental transformation of capitalism: the end of the lais

sez-faire liberal capitalism— that is, an un regu lated market sys

tem. The ou tcom e was a set o f in tertw ine d research quest ions

about the emergent form of state capitalism. Acc ord ing to the

basic argument, a ne w organized phase of capitalism had em er ge d

in which the state increasingly functioned to of fset or control

the e f fects of the prev iously autonomous product ion process,

for exam ple, in Keynesian eco no m ic p olic ies. Ab ov e al l, the ques

t ion was whether this new socia l formation would have cr is is

tend enc ies l ike the old one (Ara to 1978, p. 1 3).

The details of the shift ing responses to these questions are

primarily of historical interest today. What is most striking for

our present method ological purp oses, ho we ver, was the manner

in w h ic h they reformulated th e research pro blem atic in the l ight

of various kinds of empirical evidence. During the early 1930s

Crit ical Th eo ry had wo rked with in the orthod ox Marxist assump

tion that the basic cho ice available was b et w ee n a planned socialist

eco no m y and capita lism, w hi ch w as inherent ly incapable ( in its

l iberal fo rm ) of planning. A crucial step here wa s taken in eco no

mist Friedrich Po llock 's studies of Soviet plann ing ef forts in the

late 1920s, and later his analysis o f the n e w structu ral ele m en ts

within capital ist development—increasing centralization and

monopolization, state intervention (as yet unplanned and arbi

t rary ) , and vast increases in the use of industrial technology

w h ic h had respond ed to the crisis of the old self-regulating system

(Ar ato 1978, p. 1 4). Qu estionin g the Soviet system and bec om

ing aware of its authoritarian character put the whole thesis of

planning as inheren tly go od in a pro blem atic l igh t. From these

studies, as w e ll as thos e on Na zism , it be ca m e neces sary t o stress

increasingly the relative prim acy of po lit ic s and the dist inc tive

authoritarian potentials of these dif ferent forms of planning:

capitalist, fascist, com m un ist (A ra to 1978 , p. 1 6) .

Research on th e structure and dynamics of n eocapitalism tend

ed to be pursued on the basis of tw o contrasting hyp oth eses : ( a )




103

that it represented a n ew form of m anipulated, closed system

(Ho rkh eim er, A do rn o, Marcu se) or, alternatively, (b ) that it was

ope nin g up ne w dem ocratic possibil it ies (Neum ann, Pollo ck). T he

form er po sition is most w ell kn ow n and culminated in the slogans

portra ying p ost w ar capitalism as an adm inistered (A d o rn o ) or

one-dimensional (Ma rcus e) society in w h ic h the we lfare state

and mass culture industries had succeeded in paralyzing the

contradictions that otherwise would transform society. From

this dominant pers pect ive the ne w form of one-dimensional

soc iety was dom inated by a dep olit ic ized technical rationality

incap able of fundamental criticism (Marcu se 196 6). But in either

case, these investigations established a fundamental n ew po in t

of depa rture for the analysis of state/econom y relations : the

change in the function of polit ical economy, the end of the

primacy of the economic under industrial ly advanced contem

porary social formations and the necessity of the replacement

of polit ical econ om y as the frame work and ob jectiv e of M arxism

as crit iq ue (Arato 1978, p. 22 ).

Soc ia l Psychology

Th e central social psych ological prob lema tic in the co nte xt of

the W eim ar Republic was that of exp laining the lack o f resistance

of the German working class to the fascist centralization of

dom ination . This question was not altogether new for the Marx

ist left because, from World War I onward, the subjective basis

of revolutionary change had not appeared even though the

ob jec tiv e basis of crisis wa s clearly at hand. T h e qu estion of the

use of Freud for this purpose elicited diverse responses. From

the turn of the centu ry onw ard, those w or kin g w ith in the Social

Dem ocratic Party had toyed wit h an eclectic adaptation of Freud ,

the Comm unists had respon ded w ith the dogm atic dissociation

from Freud, and there w er e several med iating pos it ion s by

practicing psychoanalysts, mostly without strong party affil i

ations (Βοηβ 1984, p. 5; I . Cohen 1982; Lichtman 1982). Erich

Fromm (1900-1980) was among the latter and was recruited by

Ho rkh eim er to carry though such a recon cil iat ion o f M arx and

Freud in the con tex t of empirical research projects. Th e basic theo

retical argument involv ed the develo pm ent of a historical psy

choanalytic social psychology (Dahm er 1980) con cern ed with



104


the historical deve lopm ent o f social character: Th e task o f s ocial

psy cho logy is to explain the shared, social ly relevant, psy ch ic

attitudes and ideologies—and their un conscious roots in particu

lar—in terms of the inf luence of economic condit ions on l ibido

strivings (From m 1978, p. 48 6) .

Two major research projects developed on the basis of this

theoretical framework. The f irst, never completed and only

pub lished in its fragmen tary fo rm in 1980, inv olve d a large-scale

survey designed to gain insights into the psy chic structure o f

manual and wh ite-col lar w ork ers (Fro m m cited in Βο ηβ 1 984,

p. 1). To this end an over ly com pl ex 271-item question naire w as

distributed to 3,300 responden ts in 1929, w it h abou t a third

eventua l ly re turned.

1 2

This largely exploratory survey, based primarily on open-

ended quest ions, was plagued by metho dolog ical and th eoret ica l

prob lems com pou nd ed by the di f ficult c ircumstances. Neverth e

less it wa s suggestive of possibil ities that nev er w er e de ve lop ed .

But most im porta ntly, it did result in a centra l f ind ing that wa s

key to the further development and revision of crit ical theory.

Th e original hypothesis was that a strong correlation w ou ld be

found be tw ee n personal ity types and pol i t ica l or ientat ions: I t

wa s assumed that the authoritarian . . . w ou ld ten d tow ards con

servatism, the ambivalent towards l iberalism, and the genital-

revolut ionary character towards soc ia lism (Β οη β 1984, p. 27 ) .

The results, however, clearly falsif ied the basic assumptions of

the W eimar Left . N ot only wa s the percen tage of revolu t iona ry

responses surprisingly low , but the authoritarian ones w e re to o.

Th e central ten den cy w as thus inconsistent response s that sup

ported an interpretation of the success of fascism after 1933 as

reflect ing the discrepancies bet w ee n m anifest and latent attitudes:

The outward verbal radicalism of the Left was misleading with

regard to tbe actual anti-fascist potential of the labour movement

. . . in many cases a left-wing outlook was neutralized or p erve rted

by underlying personality traits. Fromm's conclusion was that despite

all the electoral successes of the Weimar Left, its members were

not in the position, owing their character structures, to prevent

the victory of National Socialism. (Β οη β 1984, p. 2 9)



106


and led the analysis o f culture back into the func tionalist refer

ence system into which he had already previously integrated

political econ om y and social psych ology (Hon neth 1987, p. 3 55 ).

Hence, with the except ion of certa in forms of high art , culture

was associated by Horkheimer and Adorno with the pure ly

manipulative effects of the capitalist culture industries (Adorno

1991).

From this per spe ct ive the increasing com m odif icat io n of

culture brought about by the mass media largely had the effect

of intensifying reif ication and alienation. Again the reduction-

ism of this approa ch does not un derm ine the crucial im po rta nc e

of the introduction of the theories of cultural industries, but it

explains some o f its empirical weaknesses and its eventual partial

rejection by the burgeoning cultural studies movements in the

1970s.

Nevertheless the contributions of the Frankfurt Institute

remain foundational for the origins of crit ical communications

studies (Hardt 1992).

An Em ergent Alternative Rese arc h Pro gram

Th e ou ter cir cle o f the Frankfurt Institute shared a cer tain

marginality but not any other immediately visible characteristics.

Franz Neumann and Otto K irch heim er had a num ber of shared

interests based on their legal training and con tribu ted studies o n

law and the state in the exile period. Erich Fromm was con

cerned with social psychological issues, though he broke from

the Institute in 1939 after changing directions in his interpreta

t ion of psychoanalytic theory. And Walter Benjamin, though

personal ly c lose to Ad orn o, was a ver y or ig inal though ecce ntr ic

figure interested in literary and cultural th eor y (Benjam in 19 69 ).

Although these contributors do not share theoretical orienta

t ions and thematic concerns,

what fundamentally unites them is the overall direction of their

thinking wh ich allowed them as a bod y to go b eyo nd the function

alist reference system of the original program me of the institute. Th e

spirit of contradiction of all four authors is ignited by M arxist func -

tionalism, against wh ich they oppo se considerations that converge



A Historical Introduction 107

in an upward revaluation of individuals' and groups' own communi

cative performances. (Honneth 1987, p. 362 )

As these were issues that helped provoke revision of crit ical

theory in the 1960s and 1970s, it is important to note these

earlier internal divisions. In each case (politics, culture, social

ps yc h olo gy ) the authors po inte d to fundamental prob lem s stem

min g from the denial of the possibil ity of human agency im plie d

by the d eterministic one-dimensional society thesis. For Neumann

and Kirchheimer theories of total itarian state control-whether

in a Soviet typ e or state capitalist so ci et y- w er e prob lem atic

because of the v ir tual impossibi l i ty o f complete central con

trol over soc ia l groups. In the context of cultural analys is ,

Walter Benjamin similarly questioned the thesis developed by

Adorno that culture industries dominated by large-scale capital

ist enterprises would produce total homogenization. According

to Benjamin, m odern tech nology increasingly had made art form s

technically reproducible (e.g. , f i lm, radio, photography), thus

the mechanical reproduction of art had transformed the rela

t ionsh ip be tw ee n art wo rks and pub lics. Previously art had b een

enjoyed through a

cultic aura which previously lifted them, like a sacred relic, out of

the profane everyday world of the beholder. The technical media

. . . destroy the aura surrounding the art produced and expose it

to a remote view ing by the public; the contemplative form of the

solitary enjoyment of art is suppressed by the public methods of

the collective experiencing of art. (Honneth 1987, p. 366)

On this basis he argued that new technologies might allow arts

and communications media to el ic it new forms of what today

might be called resistance to dom inant ideo logies , and even to

mobil ize opposit ional col lective action in new and unforeseen

ways.

Finally Fromm's reinterpretation of psychoanalysis had

called into question Freud's instinct theory and turned to inter-

actionist social psycholo gy to de velo p a m ore soc iologic al ac

count of self formation. Adorno and Horkheimer reacted most

directly against softening the libidinal instinctual basis of Freu

dian the ory, ch argin g that it betrayed th erapy for the pu rp os e o f

conformist therapy. Partly for this reason Fromm eventually left



108


the Frankfurt Institute. W ha t rem ained n egle cted in this debate ,

how ever, w as the potent ia l s igni f icance of the interact ive dimen

s ions of Fromm 's ne w ap proach to soc ia l psych ology in overcom

ing the functionalism of early crit ical the ory 's account o f human

agency.

The Decline of a Research Program:

The Dialectic of Enlightenment

Histor ical Context

W ith the fai lure of the working-class revolu tion in Ge rm an y to

overthrow Hit ler and the contradict ions of Sta l inism revealed

by the end of the 1930s, the empirical tasks of critical theory

be cam e am biguo us. In its first phase in W eim ar Germ any , Frank

furt critical th eo ry id en tified itself as a catalyst for th e kinds of

changes that would transform capital ism. Although tradit ional

social science was held to be an obstacle to this process, there

wa s sti ll faith in the spontaneous abil ity of op pre ssed g roup s (th e

working c lass ) to construct Utopian visions of alternatives. But

the practical failure of revolution ary m ovem ents in the 1930s led

the central critical theorists—Max Hork heim er, Th eo do r Ad or no ,

Herbert Marcuse—to abandon their original conception of com

bining research and prac tice in an interdisciplinary research pr o

ject. Yet rather than reject their adherence to Marx altogether,

Adorno and Horkheimer in part icular proposed a speculat ive

con cep tion of history as a kind of catastrophe broug ht about by

the fai lure of revolution. In terms of the theory of research

pro gram s, this apparent historical falsi f ication of Ma rxian

revolut ionary theo ry culminated in a problem atic phi los oph y of

history that revealed the crisis of Crit ical Theory (Horkheimer

and Adorno 1972; Held 1980).

Th e dec line o f the institute research prog ram can be attributed

to several interrelated factors: (a) the organizational conse

quences of exi le, (b) the heavily posit iv ist c l imate of the United

States, w h ic h m itigated the further deve lop m en t of the meth odo

logical strategy that originally inspired critical theory, and (c) the




111

Notes

1. For exam ple, Giddens wro te: Lakatos' formulation of 'degenerative' versus

'progressive problem-shifts' is probably the most adequate treatment of these

issues yet work ed out in the contempo rary literature in the philosophy of science

(Giddens 1976, p. 141); Alexander also uses this model to analyze the function-

alist-neofunctionalist transition (Alexander and Colomy 1990). The present dis

cussion draws on Lakatos and Laudan here primarily as a contribution to the

sociology of science, rather than as an epistemological solution to problems in

Popperian empiricism.

2. For a go od discussion of these issues, see A. Sayer (1992 , p. 205 ), w h o

recalls: Ob serv ation is theory-laden but not necessarily theory -determ ined.

3. This point can be extended to choices bet we en ideologies: The presum p

tion that the acceptance or rejection of ideologies can never in principle be

rationally justified ( a p resumption at the core of the sociology of kn ow led ge ) is,

on this analysis, entirely unf oun ded (Laudan 1977, p. 192).

4. This understanding of the base-superstructure model w as linked to wha t

later becam e labeled instrumentalist theories of the state. In the 1960s another

version of scientific Marxism emerged under the leadership of Louis Althusser

in France, w h o p ropo sed a com plex m odel of social reproduction culm inating in a

structuralist theo ry of the state that attributed great autonomy to the state even

though the eco nom ic factor wa s held to be determ inant in the last instance .

Early Frankfurt theory worked with a similar social reproduction model a gen

eration earlier, though its operations were understood in Hegelian, rather than

French structuralist, terms.

5. A m ore unusual use (established by P op pe r) is a historical vie w of society

that assumes a strong evolutionary form as a succession of stages based o n develop

mental laws. The position overcomes relativism but at the price of a dogmatic

theory of history.

6. A similar position wa s deve loped by Anton io Gramsci (1891-1937) in Italy

in the 1920s and 1930s (Gramsci 1971; Kilminster 1979).

7. These issues we re bequ eathed to postw ar sociological debates primarily

in the context of the An glo Am erican receptions of Max W eb er and Karl M annheim ,

who represented closely related but distinctive positions on these issues in

relation to the theory of ideology and instrumental rationalization (Simonds 1978;

Hekman 1986). Most importantly, both generally were misunderstood because

of efforts to translate the project of the sociology of knowledge into variable

analysis, thus misunderstanding its hermeneutic foundations as a form of inter

pretive historical sociology.

8. Give n our focus on classical Critical Th eory as a research pro gra m , w e

are not concerned with a survey of the range of empirical inqu iries involved (Jay

19 73 ,19 84, 198 5,1 98 8,1 99 3; D ubiel 1978; Sollner 1979; Held 1980; Βο ηβ 1982;

Wigg ersha us 1987; Kellner 1989a). Als o, to simplify the discussion w e have not

generally attempted to reconstruct these issues by reference to the more convo

luted language of the original texts.



112


9. Most of the writin g spo nso red by the institute appea red in the Zeitschrift

fur Sozialforschung, pub lished in nine volum es from 1932 until its cessation in

1941. Only the final two volumes appeared in English, thus greatly reducing

international access. The key writin gs w er e not translated into English until the

1970s.

10. Even unde r the heading of

tt

mass society theory " the recep tion o f Critical

Th eo ry-t ha t term wa s not even used as the label in English until the 19 70 s-w as

fragmentary (largely amo ng a few cultural critics) and generally hostile, given

the positivist climate (Br am son 1961). But an astute, if unsym pathetic , critic such

as Edw ard Shils ackno wled ged that "Horkheimer b ecam e in the course of several

decades on e of the most influential sociological write rs of his time. . . . He has

certainly had a much greater impact on sociological wor k than Man nheim " (Shils

1980, p. 1 90). W h e n written in 1970, hardly any No rth Am erica n sociologists

would have known who he was referring to, let alone that he might be more

influential than Mannheim. Mentions of the Frankfurt School tradition did not

regularly enter undergradu ate theory texts until the 1980s.

11. Partly because differences in translations, a nu m ber of other terms are

broadly synonymous with Zweckrationalitat: instrum ental rationality, formal

rationality, technical rationality, means rationality, purposive rationality, goal-

oriented rationality and contrasted w ith the rationality of ultimate ends or values

(Wertrationalitdf), hence substantial rationality (o r what Ho rkheim er called

objective reason, as opp osed to the subjective reason o f instrumental rationa lity).

For Weber substantial rationality was essentially nonrational, whereas for the

Frankfurt tradition it could b e subject to rational critique in the form of n orm a

tive theory.

12. M uc h of this material was lost in the mov e into exile. The actual surve y

wa s executed by a wo m an (H ilde We iss), and Paul Lazarsfeld wa s consulted for

statistical advice.



114


direct ly with the tw o authors, a them e dev e lop ed in the secon

dary l iterature on them . Rather our task is largely pe da go gica l:

to fam iliarize readers w ith issues and con cep ts that w il l largely be

taken for granted later on. At the same tim e, how eve r, it pr ovid es

an occa sion to advance a central con tentio n: that weostructural-

ist m etathe ory is crucial for understanding the exp lan atory

object ives of contemporary cr i t ica l theory.

Ou r discussion is orga nize d around four them es. First, the chal

lenge prov ide d by Max We be r can be seen as having pre f igu red

much of subsequent attempts to reconstruct historical material

ism along postempiricist l ines. Subsequent debates have been

influenced by his ef fort to reconcile agency and structure, his

astute and often sympathetic critique of historical materialism,

his th eor y o f rationalization, and searching q uestions about the

status of normative theory.

Secon d, w e cons ider some of the contributions that have b ee n

influential in forcin g postposit iv ist redef init ions of co nc ep tion s

o f social actio n and languag e (as w el l as the subject o r age nt ) in

herited from historical materialism and the early Frankfurt Sc ho ol.

Linguistic philosophy, social phen om eno logy, and pragm atic (sym

bol ic ) interact ionism have been especia l ly important in this

context .

Th ird , many similar issues have been taken up in the con tex t of

French debates about metatheory, though they are mediated by

the particular problematics of existentialism, structuralism, and

poststructuralism. These debates provided insights for under

standing the relationship be tw ee n ag enc y and structure and the

nature of social determination that m oved debate bey on d the te rm s

set out by W eber , social ph eno m eno logy, and crit ical herm eneu

tics generally.

Fourth, w e rev iew brief ly three approaches in French soc iolog y

and social theory that have proven especial ly inf luential for

debates w i th in recent c r i t i ca l theory : A la in Toura ine , P ie rre

Bourdieu, and Michel Foucault.

Finally w e again take up critical realist m etath eory , esp ecia lly

with respect to its implications for the human sciences in op

pos ing a non posit iv ist structuralism to traditional em piricis m .



Interim Developments

115

The We berian Chal lenge

The internal conf l ic ts within Weimar Germany prec luded a

prod uct ive interchange be tw een the op pos ed fo l lowe rs of Marx

and W eb er despite the ef forts of pe op le l ike Karl Man nheim and

especial ly Karl Lowith in the 1920s and 1930s. Mannheim, on

the on e hand, de velo pe d a the ory o f ideolog y under the heading

of the soc io logy of kn ow led ge that general ized Marx 's method

by app lying it to the Marxist tradition

itself.

Further, he dre w on

W eb er and hermeneu tic theory in order to explore other dimen

sions shaping ide olog ies bey on d those of social c lass (M ann heim

1936,

195 2). Karl

Lowith,

on the other hand, first poin ted to the

affinities and com plem entarity o f Marx's theory o f al ienation

and Weber's account of rationalization (Lowith [1932] 1982).

Nev ertheless the theory o f rationalization did be co m e central to

the second phase of the Frankfurt Institute, especially in the

dialectic of Enlightenment thesis. Further, Weber also influ

en ced the polit ical socio logy of some of the outer cir cle in the

institute. Th e long-neglected figurational sociology o f No rber t

Elias-originally Mannheim's assistant before exile in England-

also can be situated in this con text (Elias 1 97 8,1 98 2). O th erw ise

the full deve lopm ent o f a Ma rx-Weber dialogue only took place

m ore re cently and has had a broad inf lu enc e on crit ical the ory

(A n to n io and Glassman 1985; W ile y 1 987).

Neo-Weberian theory has challenged the olde r crit ical th eor y

on a nu mb er of key issues: the dogm atism o f its ide olo gy critiq ue ,

its subordination of the political to the economic, its neglect of

the problems of instrumental rationalization and bureaucratiza

tio n in its

Utopian account o f alternatives to capitalism, the limits

of the labor-capital class contradiction given the rise of the

m iddle strata, and the dangers of mix ing id eolo gy and em pirical

research. Such W ebe rian inf lu enc es w er e most ev id ent ear ly

on in the wo rk o f Giddens, a tend ency that often led him to be

classified as a neo-Weberian con flict theorist (Cra ib 19 84 ).

1

Simi

larly Habermas often has bee n repro ached from the neo-Marxist

cam p for his W ebe rian revisionism (Th erb orn 197 6). But this

reco gn it ion of conv ergen t interpretations of Marx and W eb er is

one of the most characteristic features of contemporary critical

theory regardless of the label (D. Sayer 1991).



116 C R I T I C A L T H E O R Y A S A R E S E A R C H P R O G R A M

Action Theories

Th e fol low ing three approaches to metatheory and social action

initia lly w er e deve lop ed indep enden t ly and w er e long v i ew ed as

separate and even opposing. More recently, however, their simi

larities as critiques of positivism have been r eco gn ized , along w it h

shared concern s in their analyses of the prim acy o f language in

the construct ion o f kno w led ge and soc ia l act ion. In com ple x and

changing w ays the tradit ion o f contem pora ry cr i tica l the ory has

embraced many of these speci f ic arguments even though not

fully em brac ing any of these three per spe ctive s (Bernste in 1971 ,

1978).

L ingu is t ic Ph i l osophy

The dominant style of contemporary profess ional phi losophy

in the English-speaking world often is referred to as analytic

philosophy. W ith the failure of logical em piric ism to carry fore

word the ambit ious project o f pos it iv ism, most phi losophers

retreated eve n farther from the speculative traditions o f Europ ean

phi losophy (o f ten labe led continental philosophy today ) . A l

though there is a sense in w h ic h logica l emp iricism wa s ea rl ier

an imp ortan t form of analytic philoso phy , today analytic philo so

ph y is op en to postem piricist alternatives. Yet from the analytic

per spe ct ive the quest ions pos ed by continental philosophy--by

phenomenology, hermeneutics, and structuralism—are of little in

terest and are charge d wi th lacking con ceptu al r igor. Even w h en

analytic and continental ph iloso ph ies are similar or refer to the

same topics, it is from different d irections; and they have diffe ren t

m ethods o f argument, dif ferent criteria for judgin g the merits o f

a pie ce of phi loso ph izing (Charlton 1991, p. 3) . Th e tasks of

philosophy are held to be based rather on careful logical, con

ceptu al, and linguistic analysis, a focus that critics ha ve ch arg ed

has led to its trivialization.

In any case, the most inf luential form of analytic philosophy

is linguistic philosophy (also refer red to in an earlie r pha se as

ordinary language philosophy). Linguistic ph ilos op hy usually

is traced to the later work of eccentr ic Austr ian phi losopher

Lud wig Wittgenste in (1889 -1951) , w h o eventual ly located in




111

Ca m brid ge in the 1930s. Alth ou gh a strict positivist in his early

w ork , W ittgenste in eventual ly deve lop ed a ph i losop hy o f lan

guag e, or more precisely, a w ay of doin g ph ilosoph ical analysis

throu gh linguistic analysis (W ittge ns tein 19 74 ). Such lingu istic

ph iloso ph y rejected most of tradit ional philosop hy as based on

using language in mistaken or confused w ays. Ab ov e al l , empiri

cist theories were charged with the fal lacy of l inking language

exclusively w ith the function of representing reality. From this

pe rsp ect ive em piricist science was just another language game

that could make no claims to objective truth in terms of the

verif ication principle proposed by logical posit iv ists.

More generally, linguistic philosophers have argued that much

of tradit ional philosophy was based on confused uses of terms

that can be clarified by careful linguistic and logical analysis.

Crucial to this pos ition is a theory of mean ing quite distinct fro m

classic positivism 's search for a pu re, formal language to literally

represent reality. According to the pioneer Brit ish l inguistic

ph iloso ph er John Austin (1911-19 60), meanings do not have an

inde pen den t existen ce that can be com plie d in a dict ion ary or

derived from the things they may happen to refer to; rather

mean ing can be determ ined only in the con text o f the sentences

in w h ic h con cepts are used. Th e use of

wo rds , in short, invo lves

doin g a kind of de ed, hen ce is a social act. Ac cord ing to Au stin's

speech acts theory

y

wo rds in an utterance (or sentenc e) have three

kinds of uses (meanings): locutionary (or prop osit iona l ) mean

ing about the truth or falsity of something; illocutionary mean

ing, related to the fo rc e of an utterance w ith respec t to stating,

comm anding, prom is ing, or warn ing; and perlocutionary mean

ing, ori en ted to influ en cin g a hearer's attitudes or state of m ind .

Alth ou gh there has bee n l itt le direct inf lu en ce of l inguistic

ph iloso ph y o n social theory, it has pro vide d an imp ortant al ly in

the debate wi th posit iv ism in social scienc e, as w el l as com ple

mented research on the social uses of language, for example, in

the theo ry o f speec h acts. A bo ve al l , l inguistic philos oph y is

associated w ith a l inguistic turn that could be used to show

the conceptua l or logical impo ssibil ity o f a social scien ce m od

eled on the natural scie nc es (Bern stein 1978, p. 1 12). O n the

other hand, linguistic ph ilosophy has only a rather circum scribed

view of language use that simply does not address many of the

questions of interest to social theory and social science.



118


Th e most direct inf luence of this form of l inguist ic ph i losop hy

in social scien ce is evide nt in Peter W in ch 's The Idea of a Social

Science (1 9 5 8 ), w h ic h essentially rejects causal analysis in favor

of a pure ly Verstehen or interp retive app roach that em brac es

cultural relativ ism. Fe w in the social scienc es fo l lo w these dras

t ic conclu sions, but such w or k has be en imp orta nt in un derm in

ing the pretensions o f emp iricism and positivism (Frisby and Sayer

1986). More constructively, l inguistic philosophy has contrib

uted to the pos tem piricist ef fort to understand scie nc e in terms

of sp ecif ic rhetorical strategies of argum entation and thus com

plements the history of sc ience fo l lowing Thomas Kuhn. Simi

larly the resulting studies of linguistic use have been important

in re thinking the nature o f human agency in nonpos i t iv is t

terms.

H abermas, in particular, has draw n up the theo ry o f sp ee ch

acts in his theory of comm unicative action (Hab erm as 1979,

p p . 1-18).

As more recent observers have noted, many of these conclu

sions con verg e wit h the earl ier tradit ion of Europ ean herm eneu

tics,

wh ic h also stressed the l inguistic basis o f social k n ow le dg e

and cr i t ic ized the nomothet ic model o f explanat ion. Both have

bee n charged, ho we ver, with a pure ly interp ret ive no t ion of

social life that undermines analyses of social causation central

to the very notion of a crit ical theory of society.

Soc i a l Ph en om en o l ogy

an d E th n om eth odo l ogy

Ph eno m eno logy has roots in the tradition of Germ an idealism

and is a for m of herm eneu tic philoso phy . Edmund Husserl (185 9-

193 8) is rec og niz ed as its found ing father. H e w as co nc ern ed

espe cial ly w ith rejecting posit iv ist ef forts to ex pla in human

consciousness in objectivist terms (hence his antipsycholo-

gism). Instead he pro pos ed a desc r ipt ive sc ience of subjectiv

ity based on the human capacity to brack et the natural attitude

of ordinary awareness and ref le ct on the fundamental pr op ert ies

of human consciousness. But Husserl 's pure or transcendental

phenomenology was init ia l ly not very helpful for soc ia l theory

because of its focus o n the abstract, isolated individual (Husser l's

Cartesian ego ) .




119

The l ink between phenomenology and soc io logy was e labo

rated init ial ly by the Austrian Alfred Schutz (1899-1959), who

attemp ted to w or k out prob lems in Max Web er's theor y of a ction

(Schu tz 1 96 7). Husserl pr ov ide d distinctions that could clarify

some aspects to Weber's account of Verstehen and interpretive

understanding. As opp os ed to Husserl, ho we ver, Schutz cam e to

stress—after his move to New York-the interactive basis of sub

ject iv i ty , a them e that eventual ly led to an e f fort to co m bi ne

phenomenology with aspects of symbol ic interact ionism ( i .e . ,

G. H. M ead ) .

More crit ical possibil it ies for social phenomenology were de

ve lo pe d in an inf luential attempt to inco rpora te the th eor y of

reif ication into Schutz's perspective under the heading of the

social construction o f reality (Be rge r and Luckmann 196 7). Fur

ther, this app roach pr ov ide d a suggestive accoun t of the subject-

object dialectic that anticipated aspects of later critical theory

despite succumbing to a Durkheimian theory of soc iety and value-

relativism.

Further, under the leadership of Harold Garf inkel 's (1967)

ethnomethodology the techniques of phen om enology w er e turned

tow ard the rational pro per ties of mundane or everyday reason

ing. Such analysis (base d, in part, on the study of con vers ation s)

dr ew attention to the essential ref lex ivity -as eviden t in the indexi-

cal or contextual nature of meaning—built into social action.

Again these kinds of concerns later proved useful for justifying

aspects of the revitalized project of critical theory, especially in

the con text o f its formulation of a theo ry of agen cy and comm u

nicative interaction.

Prag m at ism and Sym bol ic Interact ion ism

The fortunes of American pragmatism as a ph ilosop hica l

tradition have shifted dramatically in this century. Although it

enjo yed a de gre e of international acclaim from the turn of the

century into the 1930s, pragmatism was largely eclipsed in its

homeland by the arrival of logical positivism from Europe in the

1930s and the later coalescing of analytic philosophy as a style

of ph iloso ph izing . Further, it wa s largely igno red by continental

phi losophy wi th which i t o therwise had some important but



Interim Developments 123

tence

on the individual's responsibility for the stance he or she

takes

towards the wor ld. (C oo pe r 1990, p. viii)

As a well-defined philosophical and political movement, exis

tentialism emerged with the postwar French writings of people

such as Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1986)-a founder of feminist

theory-Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1907-1961), and Jean-Paul Sartre

(1905-1980). The latter two have been especially important in

relationship to sociology (Craib 1976; Kotarba and Fontana 1984).

Above all, French existentialism involved a reception and appropri

ation of the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger, generally

in association with a rereading of Marx as a theorist o f alienation

and an analyst of the pathologies of human existence. Rereading

Hegel and Marx from the perspective of these concerns stressed

the key importance of Marx's early writings and relation to Hegel

and often is referred to as a version of a humanistic or existen

tial Marxism (Poster 1975) that was, in important respects, the

French equivalent of early Frankfurt critical theory.

2

The German philosophy of Hegel's critical hermeneutics,

Husserl's phenomenology, and Heidegger's existential phenome

nology were used against the rationalism and positivism that had

dominated French philosophy since Descartes. Given its pheno-

menological underpinnings, existentialism implied a very radi

cal voluntarism for the human sciences and suggested a focus on

the lived-experience of pain, suffering, and hope. In this respect

existentialism embraced many of the themes traditionally only

of concern to theology. It also involved forms of existential

psychology-uwx

is, a historicist appropriation of Freud as a

theorist of anxiety (Izenberg 1976). In this respect existential

theory as the basis of a theory of action complemented in some

respects the role of symbolic interactionism and neo-Freudian

theory in the Anglo American context (Aboulafia 1986).

Structuralism blossomed in the 1960s as the philosophical

rival of existentialism and phenomenology. Whereas existential

ism focused its attack on positivism and Cartesian speculative

philosophy, structuralism claimed to have found a new methodo

logical basis for grounding knowledge: in this respect it is clearly

foundationalist in its aspirations. The basic explanatory princi

ple underlying structuralism can be traced back to another stream

of German philosophy—to Immanuel Kant and his critique of




125

lyz e the constraints on social action in a ve ry differen t w ay from

that found in the positivist notion of deterministic laws.

It is important, therefore, to distinguish European structural

ism as a sp ecif ic me thod (based on the linguistic analogy) and

as a fundam ental meta theory. As an on tolo gica l and epistem o

logical posit io n, strong forms o f structuralism bord er on a kind

of id ealistic p ositi vism in that it is argued that social reality exists

as a logical pattern and as a product of ideas, but that through

structuralist methods these can be k no w n in a purely ob jectiv e

and fully scientific manner.

In its most militant metatheoretical form, structuralist meta

the ory def ined itself exp lic it ly as antihum anist, antihistoricist

f

and antiempiricist. At the level of social action this antihuman-

ism results in a thorough determ inism often identif ied w ith the

no tion of the death of the sub ject, a slogan that refers to the

suggestion that the intentionality of agents is an e piph en om eno n

or illusion because all actions are constituted by structures

(h en ce the no tion that the structures speak us, rather than w e

spea kin g for ou rselves, as the existentialist wo u ld say). N o ti ce

that this argument parallels behaviorism in its objectivism but

locates determ ina tion in the linguistic character o f social reality,

rather than some material properties external to consciousness.

W ith resp ect to explanation this approach is also a ntiempiricist

and antihistoricist. In opposition to the empiricist focus on

observable features of social reality or the search for statistical

relations between variables, structuralist social science seeks to

uncover the generative rules evident in the depth-structure of

events. The resulting method is also antihistoricist because it

does not vi ew social life in terms of the simple unfolding o f h isto ry

through processes o f change. Ap plyin g a dist inction based on

structuralist linguistics, such historical o r diachronic approaches

are contrasted wi th the synchronic per spe ctive of structuralism

that reveals the und erlying structure o f the phe no m en on at a

given p oin t in t im e (as a kind of sna psh ot).

4

Th e m ost famous app lication o f classic structuralism to social

theory (as opposed to Levi-Strauss's cultural analysis) can be

found in Louis Althusser 's (1918-1990) structuralist Marxism

(Benton

1984),

wh ic h dom inated m uch French and British M arxist

debate in the 1960s and 1970s. Although this approach had the

advantage of shifting the focus in neo-Marxist theory from an



126


eco no m istic base superstructure m ode l to a structuralist social

reproduction model that stressed the relative autonomy of the cul

tural and political, the outcom e was a deterministic functionalism

w ith e ven graver prob lem s than early Frankfurt theory . A ltho ug h

few today would defend such strongly posit iv ist forms of struc

turalism or the ontological and epistemological c laims made on

its

behalf,

aspects of structuralist metatheory and methodology

remain of crucial im po rtan ce in the con text o f p oststructuralist

theor iz ing.

Th e L inguistic An al o gy

More enduring have been some of the implications of structu

ralism as a m etho d, or a typ e o f me thod ological strategy app ropri

ate for the human science s.

5

From this m ore cautious pers pe ctiv e,

the ob jects of such structural analysis are diverse (e. g., lingu istic,

psy cho logical, his torical) and de vel op their substantive analyzes

indep end ently, eve n i f sharing an antiatomistic, n on em piricist

metatheory:

Structuralism

is a

philosophical view according to which the reality

of the objects of the human or social sciences is relational rather than

substantial. It generates a critical method that consists of inquiring

into and specifying the sets of relations (o r structures) that consti

tute these objects or into which they enter, and of identifying and

analyzing groups of such objects whose members are structural

transformations of one another. These groups jointly constitute the

domains of the respective sciences. (Caws 1988, p. 1)

As a m etho do logica l strategy, structuralism is iden tif ied most

oft en w ith a linguistic analogy that makes it quite distinc t fro m

em piricist uses o f the term structure or structuralism in the socia l

sc iences. Th e basic pr inc iple , how ever, can be co nve yed by the

exa m ple of g ramm ar as a kind of structuralist accou nt. First, a

grammar is not an observab le feature o f spe ech . Rather a gram ma r

spec if ies a set of relations (ru les ) that describe em pirical regu

larities than can be infe rred from a system of langu age. T h es e

regular i t ies are reconstructed in the form of generat ive rules ,

rather than as invariant laws. Although not visible, they can be

justi f ied empirically by reference to how their misuse produces




131

ologies flourish throughout the humanities and social sciences.

Partly as a consequence, the possibil ity and importance of a

poststructuralist structuralism—such as exem pli f ied ver y vis

ibly in the m etath eor y o f Paul Rico eur , the discourse analysis o f

Foucault, and the theory and research of, say, Pierre Bourdieu,

Anthony Giddens, or Habermas-gets lost. Perhaps the term neo-

structuralism (som etime s used in Germ an discussions) mig ht

be appropriate here because it implicit ly acknowledges that

structuralist-type methods have not been abandoned altogether.

W e gen erally use the term interpretive structuralism (o r herme-

neutic structuralism or even historical or genetic structuralism )

to characterize this programmatic posit ion.

9

Th e second aspect of poststructuralist structuralism w e w ish

to stress is its contribution to rethinking the agency/structure

relation ship . It has be en argued that such relational structural

ism offers the only viable alternative to the everlasting confron

tation betw ee n the tw o predom inant soc io logical vers ions of the

objective versus subjective empiricist explanation—the 'natural

sc ien ce ' and the 'in ter pr etiv e' paradigm s. . . . Such a confronta

t ion is partial ly ref lected or paralle led in the clash between

structural and individualistic exp lan ation (Rossi 1982, p. 10).

H en ce the notion s of de ep structure and transforma tional rules

permits one to account both for empirical surface structures

(which are the focus of tradit ional structuralism) and the pro

du ctivity o f the sub ject (Rossi 19 82, p. 1 2). As w e argue later,

this basic intuit ion - i f not the prec ise termin olog y-u nd erl ies the

metatheory and research program of contemporary crit ical the

ory. From this pers pe ctiv e such a neostructuralism is acutely

aware of its own limitations:

What we need is not an umbilical cord to some impossible origin ,

divine or mystical, or a vector to a similarly impossible transcendent

destiny, but stabilizers, gyroscopes, devices for local orientation,

limited structural connections of optimum complexity, serviceable

for human needs on a human scale. The discovery and reflection

on structures of language, kinship, history, mythology, literature

and so on , on the one hand and of subjectivity on the other seem

to me the way of providing what is needed. (Caws 1988, p. 255)



138


complex or holistic, the explanatory schemata . . . requ ire adjust

m en t (Bhaskar 1986, p. 10 9).

Further, it should be noted that structuralist analysis is ultim ate ly

a unique form of hermeneutics (o r interpretat ion ) . Althou gh

herm eneu tics originally was seen as op po se d to structuralism in

France, this pe rce pt ion wa s misleading because structuralist analy

sis (say o f a myth or eco no m ic sy stem) is a typ e o f interpretat ion.

Th e dif fere nce is the focus on intentions and surface aspects o f

culture in traditional herm en eut ics. But if w e reca ll the cr itical

herm eneu tics o f the early Frankfurt Sch ool, w e are rem ind ed o f

forms of depth-hermeneutics that also are concerned with the

underlying social and economic structures as condit ions of hu

man agency .

1 2

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted the arduous task of tracing the

highlights of key developments in the philosophy of social sci

ences since the original Frankfurt School, especial ly those that

have inf luenced the re formulat ions of contemporary cr i t ica l

metatheory . I t was argued that w i th in Weber ian and neo-

W eber ian th eor y could be found most of the major challeng es to

both classical Marxism and its reformulation in early Frankfurt

crit ical theory. Further, three major philos oph ical challenge s to

posit iv ism were discussed: l inguistic philosophy, social phe

nomenology, and pragmatic interactionism. Each of these also

provided important resources for understanding language and

its relation to social action.

Un der the heading of French m etath eor y the relations be

tw ee n existential ism, structuralism, and poststructuralism w e re

used to identify a metatheo retical alternative to emp iricism . T h e

theories of Touraine, Bourdieu, and Foucault were reviewed to

illustrate some of the characteristic contributions of neostruct-

uralist and poststructuralist inquiries. Finally such an interpre

t ive conc ep tion of structuralist metath eory b ecam e the basis for

understanding the explanatory strategy of the critical realist al

tern ativ e to emp iricism in the social science s. W ith these issues

in mind, we can now turn to the metatheory of Habermas and

Giddens.



140


of its "expressive" conception of the effects of structure, the more fundamental point

is that both the Kantian-Hegelian and Durkheimian traditions legitimate forms of

analysis that are "structural," rather than merely "empirical." Also in this context

should be mentioned the economic anthropologist Maurice Godelier.

11. For a detailed account of some of the implications of critical realism for

social science, see A. Sayer (19 92 ), and m ore generally the useful introduction by

Keat and Urry (19 82).

12. As later commentators have pointed out, these two strategies of analysis,

in fact, take up in different ways problems in Husserl's phenomenology (Holen-

stein 1975), and ultimately structuralism is a specific case or type of herm eneu tics

(Ric oeu r 1974, pp . 27-61).



142


this perspective crit ical theory's original crit ique of posit iv ism

from the 1930s onward was not simply the idiosyncratic re

spo nse of a handful o f disillusion ed, antiscien tific in tellectu als;

rather this crit ique both anticipated and indirectly inf luenced a

much bro ader shift associated w ith th e gradual displace m ent of

posit iv ism by postempiricist theories of science. The justi f ica

tion of critical theory as a research program thus has found in

dep en den t corr ob ora tion , at least as a crit ique o f posit iv ism. A n d

in the context of crit ical realism and certain developments in

poststructuralist and feminist theory, it also finds some further

com plem entary support (as w el l as construct ive cr i t ic ism ).

W e have stressed this po int becau se critical theo ry o ften has

been caricatured for its negativism (its crit ique of posit iv ism),

as op po se d to b eing appreciated for its con tributio n as an alter

native research pro gra m (Shils 1980; van den Berg 1 98 0). W e

w ou ld support a rather different assessment: It is sheer nons ense

to assert that critical theorists were antiscientific. Quite to the

contrary, the group relentlessly defended the sciences against

neo rom antic, spiritual, and idealist attacks, as w el l as against th eir

posit iv ist ic reductions (Gebhardt 1978, p. 371). But the tradi

t ion o f crit ical the ory is associated wit h a quite dist inc tive

posit ion in the con text of postem pir ic ist theor ies of kn ow led ge .

We f ind it instructive to reconstruct the metatheoretical pro

gram o f cr it ica l theo ry in a re lat ive ly access ib le form in the

light of these interim developments. The distinctive aspect of

our approach, how ever, w i l l be to juxtap ose the w or k o f Jurgen

Haberm as (the focus of atten tion) and An th on y G iddens as rival

but essentially com plem entary research program s for critical the

o ry .

1

Althou gh this com plem entar i ty is o f ten vagu ely ack now l

edg ed, comparisons o f the ir w ork are fe w and far betw ee n . But

taken togeth er, they not on ly pr ov id e a pro fou nd cr i t iqu e o f

posit iv ism (Hab erm as 1971, 1976; Gidden s 1974, 1977) but also

out l ine a po w er fu l cr i t ica l m odern ist re jo ind er to skept ica l

postmodernist social theory (Habermas 1987b; Giddens 1984,

1991a).

Th e prim ary task of this chapter is to presen t the d eve lop m en t

of crit ical th eor y as m etath eory b eyo nd it origin s in the fo rm of

critical hermeneutics associated w ith the He gelian M arxist his-

toricism of the early Frankfurt School. Here the focus is on its

fundamental revision in the theory of know ledge interests and



Beyond Objectivism and Relativism

145

W ith respect to the history of science, Habermas largely rejects

the dialectic of Enlightenment thesis and returns to the earliest

position of critical theory with its stress on the strategic impor

tance of the social context of the production and implementa

tion of technology. The outcome was the thesis that although

science and technology appeared to be neutral with respect to

values, they had increasingly com e to serve ideo logica l interests

(Hab erm as 1970). From this per sp ectiv e the negative effects of

science and technology were not so much inherent in scientif ic

reason as such, as a manifestation of the contradictions o f soc iety .

Finally he red efines the nature of s cien ce as a m eanin g system

by expanding the very concept of reason to include more than

the form s of k no w led ge r eco gn ized by posit iv ism . As against his

Frankfurt m ent or's later thesis on the dialectic of En lightenm ent,

ho w ever , he is reluctant to juxtap ose an ob jec tive truth avail

able on ly to the isolated ph ilosop her and the sub jective truth

legitimated by the instrumental rationality of science and tech

nology. The crit ique of instrumental rationality needed to be

carried out in terms that went beyond the hermeneutics of

Hegel ian Marxism and could draw on some o f the deve lopm ents

in 20th-century ph ilosop hy (broad ly associated with a so-called

linguistic turn ) that pro vide d resources for a m ore com preh en

sive account of human reason, especially pragmatism, linguistic

philosophy, and structuralism.

Kn ow led ge Interests: Qu asi Transcen dentalism

Reth inking the Prob lemat ic :

The Pragmat ist Tur n

The origins of the notion of knowledge interests (or cognit ive

interests) can be traced to questioning the posit iv ist formu lation

of the problem s of epistem ology as ones of logical reconstruc

tion . Th is latter app roach b egin s wit h the assumption o f a uni

versal cognit ive subject who produces knowledge. The context

of this activity—the history and social psyc holo gy of d is co ve ry -

is of no relevance to its scientific validity. Validity is rather an

outco m e of the con text of justif ication in w h ic h the verif ica tion



Beyond Objectivism and Relativism 151

grounding of the crit ical-emancipatory interest. The primary

reason is that it rema ins to o foun datio na list in its intentions—

that is, it is still caught up in the attempt to groun d k n ow le d ge

(fo l lo w in g Ka nt) in ahistorical, a priori certainties derived from

ph ilosop hical ref lection . Resp ond ing to the so-called l inguistic

turn in ph ilosop hy (associated w ith continental herm eneu tics,

structuralism, pragmatism, and Wittgenstein's theory of lan

guage ) ,

he develop s a dif ferent, though largely com plem entary,

strategy to the theory of knowledge interests. This shift is

evident in a concern with what he refers to as universal prag

matics, the task of w h ic h is to ide ntify and recon struc t univer

sal conditions of possible understanding [Verstdndigung]"

hence of comm unicat ive act ion (Habermas 1979, p. 1) . No t ic e

that the kind of research involving the elucidation of universal

pra gm atics im pli es a structura list-type analysis that, in this case ,

is held to be universal in the sense of constituting part of the

deep structure of any possible form of society. This general

app roac h usually is referred to as Haberm as's theory of comm u

nicative action.

From this perspective, even though processes of communica

tion and interpretation may appear to be completely open and

relative, they are, in fact, grounded and made possible by the four

im plic it validity claims of com preh ens ibility, truth, truthful

ness, and Tightness" (Habermas 1979, p. 3) . W her eas the th eo ry

of knowledge interests focuses on the origins of distorted com

munication, the theory of communicative actions shifts the

emphasis to the most general condit ions o f intersubjective com

mu nication as such (Hab ermas 1984, 1987a). Assuming the exist

ence of such universal features embedded in human social life,

it becomes possible to criticize deviations. But the fundamental

pro ble m h ere is the status of the typ e of kno w led ge presu ppo sed

by this type of knowledge, which, though grounded in l inguis

tics, does not have an empirical status like that of knowledge

based o n d irect observations. Ho we ver, it is not strictly philoso ph

ical and rational in the sense of the quasi-transcendental argum ents

grounding the theory of knowledge interests or the universalis-

tic claims o f on to logica l herm eneu tics. Th e key he re is the status

of what he calls reconstructive sciences that fall b et w ee n the

purely empirical and the transcendental. Perhaps the most well

s tudied example is cogn it ive deve lopmen tal psychology 's theo ry




153

l inking is and ought in way s that allow co nn ectin g social analysis

w ith ethical imperatives. For exam ple, if cogn itive d evelopm ental

theory can reconstruct intel lectual development and establish

that certain groups of individuals do not attain levels of compe

tence that are potentially available to them, that is an empirical

claim with respect to what is the case. But this kin d of em piric al

analysis is related intimately to the normative claim that such a

restriction of real possibilities is unjust, and this implies a value

claim with respect to what ought to be.

Transcending the Subject-Object Split

Weak and Strong Research Programs

I f w e return to the subjectivist-objectivist pola rization in meta

theory described earlier, the distinctive contributions of critical

theorists such as Haberm as and Giddens bec om es app arent. T h e

basic intuition underlying their approach is the inadequacy of

this very dichotomy that reproduces the original German dis

t inc t ion between Verstehen (to understand through interpreta

t ion ) and Erklaren (t o explain throu gh causal analysis based on

invariant l a w s ) .

1 1

In identifying critical theory with the aspira

t ion to break down or overcome this polarization, we have a

useful fram ew ork for laying out the kinds of shared assumptions

broa dly shared by critical theorists (e.g., Gidd ens's structuration

theory) whether or not they adhere closely to Habermas's par

ticular formulations.

Haberm as's strong progra m , on the one hand, is m ore strongly

idealist ic in its insistence on evolutionary prin ciples of direc

tiona lity in human history and its attempt to secu re the bases for

grounding ideology cr i t ique in normative theory (communica

tive ethics). Giddens, on the other hand, tends to be more

realis tic and em pir ica l in his insistence on historical discon

tinuities and his relative indifference to epistemological ques

tions and norm ative gro un ding . But these can be seen as tensions

w ith in the shared fram ewo rk of a metatheoretical prog ram that

would transcend the opposit ion of interpretive and explanatory

understanding in social life and would identify this with its



154


potential contribution to the realization of the universal values

of human autonomy.

Th e shared po int o f departure for both the the ory of comm u

nicative action and structuration th eo ry is a rejec tion of the

metaphysical philosophical paradigm that has def ined modern,

W estern ph iloso ph y: wh at Habermas refers to as the philosophy

of consciousness and Gidd ens as subject-object dualism. The

fundamental quest ion involved here is h o w kn ow led ge is to b e

grounded. According to c lass ical modern epistemologies , there

have been two basic choices: locat ing the certa inty of knowl

edge in the self-ref lecting subject along the l ines of German

idealism or French rationalism, or anchoring it in the nature of

the preexistin g, extern al obje ct along the l ines of British em piri

c ism. These approaches remain wedded to phi losophies of con

sciousness or ref lection because debate turns on assumptions

about the nature of consciousness for deciding whether to opt

for subjectivism or objectivism. These thus are competing ver

sions of foundationalist epistemology that reject other alterna

tives as destroyin g the basis of scientif ic kn ow led ge .

According to the philosophy of language implied by the l in

guistic turn, ho we ver, the focus on con sciousness and certa inty

of k no w led ge is misplaced because the ult imate bas is-o r rather

medium—of kn ow led ge is language

itself, the means through

w h ic h w e have to represent reality. From this po int of v i e w the

subjective and objective mutually constitute one another and

cannot be elaborated as isolated, ind epe nd ent m odes of k no w

ing without deforming human understanding. This does not

mean that w e can dispense w ith such term s, but w e must always

struggle to avoid the reif ications and distortions involved in

one-sided characterizations. But this awareness of the linguistic

and interpretive basis of al l knowledge does not preclude that

social science cannot ef fectively represent causal processes in

social life, at least if these are un ders tood in terms o f structural

mechanisms that constrain and enable social possibilities. Tak

ing these tw o dimensions together, the m etatheory of H abermas

and Giddens may be described usefully as an interpretive struc

turalism, w h er e interpretat ion re fers to both the herm eneutic

and historical ch aracte r o f structural analysis.




155

Ontology: Cr it ical Real ism

It is important to distinguish traditional ontology's abstract

co nc ern w ith the nature of b ein g as such, and that of a scien tif ic

onto logy con cern w ith the ent it ies posited or presupp osed by

som e particular substantive scientif ic th eor y (Ou thw aite and

Bo ttom ore 1993, p. 42 9) . It is in this secon d co nt ex t that social

ontology becomes central to contemporary social theory. For

this reason , although Haberm as rejects the ph iloso ph ical on tolo

gies of German idealism, he nevertheless is concerned with

on tolo gica l quest ions despite his apparent focus on epistem ol

ogy. A l tho ugh he has not dev e lop ed an exp l ic i t onto log ica l

position, he necessarily assumes something like a critical real

ism, given his fundamental dist inction between work and sym

bolic interaction, his claim that the social sciences can analyze

the process o f societal reprod uction , and that the recon structive

sciences can describe the depth-structures of language and cog

n it iv e deve lopm ent .

1 2

Giddens has al luded specif ical ly to view

ing his own theoretical project in similar critical realist terms

(Cr aib 1992, p. 12 0). A critical realism is not based on a corre

sp on de nc e th eo ry of truth as in traditional realism. From the

perspective of postempiricist theories of science, it has become

most prob lem atic to claim that theories som eh ow ref lec t, copy,

and map reality in some kind of literal sense that becomes the

basis of certain knowledge. But critical realists hold that the

identif ication of deeper causal mechanisms does presuppose a

view of reality outside discourse even i f i t can only be known

fallibly throug h it. H en ce for critical realists structures are a

pr op er ty of bein g and not just a pr op erty of our discourse about

be in g (Baugh 1990, p. 60 ). From this per sp ectiv e w e cannot

kn ow be ing

in-itself,

of course, because our kno w led ge is always

med iated by interpretations.

Alth ou gh G iddens does not share Habermas's epistem ological

concerns (related to the l inguistic turn and postempiricist phi

losophies of science), he explic it ly def ines the theory of struc-

turation as a for m of social on tolo gy that challeng es the du alism

of subjectivism and objectivism:



156


Significant as these may be, concentration upon epistemological

issues draws attention away from the more ontological concerns

of social theory, and it is these upon which structuration theory pri

marily concentrates . . . . Those working in social theory . . . should

be concerned first and foremost with reworking conceptions of

human being and human doing, social reproduction and social

transformation. O f primary importance in this respect is a dualism

that is deeply entrenched in social theory, a division between

objectivism and subjectivism. (Giddens 1984, p. x x )

Giddens's notion of the double-hermeneutic of social life is

one of his most important contributions, one that f leshes out

some of the problematic aspects of Habermas's ef fort to over

come the polar izat ion between quasi-nomothet ic explanat ion

and interpre tation. Th is is a way, of cou rse, of d raw ing out the

methodological impl icat ions of the interplay between the her

meneutic and analytical dimensions of social inquiry also noted

by Habermas above. The f i rst point- the not ion of a double

her m ene utic-re fers to the wa y the structures of the soc ia l w or ld

w er e con structed or ig inal ly by human agents, wh ereas those of

nature w er e n ot. In this resp ect, th erefo re, a qualitative on to

logical dif ference exists between nature and society.

Th is fact has fundamental cons equ enc es for soc iolo gica l meth

ods because the pro secu tion of all type s of social and historical

research demands communication, in some sense, with the per

sons or collec tivities that are the 'subject-matter' o f that res ea rch

(Gid den s 1976, p. 151 ). Further, the law like pro pe rtie s o f social

life are essentially historical, a fact that has im po rtan t imp lica

t ions for social explan ation, give n that they are the re pr od uc ed

unintended conseq uences of intende d act, and are malleable in th e

light of the developm ent of human kn ow led ge (1976 , pp . 153-4).

As a con sequ en ce human inter ven tion in nature is qualita

t ively dif ferent than in soc iety because the nature of the con trol

is not identical. For this reason the model of applied science as

technology breaks down when appl ied to soc iety where inter

ven tion is better und erstood as a form of social pra xis. Th is

theme was deve loped or ig inal ly by Habermas in his cr i t ique of

sc ience and techn ology as ideo logy (Habermas 1970) .



158


than contextual. On the contrary, in my view those wh o have taken

such a standpoint have misinterpreted w hat is essentially a set o f

profound institutional changes (the development and radicalizing

of m odern ity) with the undermining of valid claims as such. Their

position is as much an expression of these institutional transfor

mations as a means of adequately comprehending them. (G iddens

1991b, p. 207)

A further shared feature of Habermas and Giddens with re

spe ct to empirical-analytical kn ow led ge in the social sciences is

the pre feren ce given to structuralist, as op po se d to em piri

c ist metho ds, a them e that w i l l be dev e lo pe d in m ore deta i l in

the context of their approach to explanation. What is crucial

here is the dist inction between the empiricist use of variable

analysis to analyze the surface correlations of phenomena, as

op po se d to the generalizations about de ep er causal mechanism s

and structural rules that op era te historically.

Social Act ion : Prax is

and Communicat ive Act ion

Th e hermeneutic commitments o f both Habermas and G iddens

ult imately require them to assume the interpretive foundations

of inquiry in the manner suggested by the early Marx. In fact,

Giddens exp l ic i t ly def ines structuration theory as an ext en de d

ref le ctio n up on a celebr ated and oft-quoted ph rase to be found

in Marx . . . 'Men [ let us immediately say human beings] make

history, but not in circumstances of their o w n choosin g* (Gid

dens 1984, p. x x i) . But both Haberm as and Gidd ens go be yo nd

Marx in expl icat ing agency more expl ic i t ly in terms of the

human capacity for ref lexivity and self-ref lection. Whereas Gid

dens stresses this as a general property of the actor, Habermas

has been concerned especia l ly with the processes through

which se l f - re f lect ion makes possible the overcoming of sup

pressed forms of domination. At this point, therefore, such

epistem olog ical com mitm ents call forth an ex plic it account o f

human age ncy and social action.

Habermas 's concern with communicat ive act ion is directed

prim arily to fundamental questions about the prag ma tic u niver

sale of human comm unication, rather than the mo re social p sych o-



Beyond Objectivism and Relativism 161

unders tand

the

pr in cipa l i ssues

of

socia l theory, ethn ogra phy ,

and histor ical sociology. For th is p ur po se w e n e e d to recal l the

structuralist alternative

to

explanation

and its

emphasis

on

gener

at ive mech anism s that we refer to as quas i -causal . W h a t is at sta ke

here

is not the

k ind

of

hypers t ructura l i sm assoc iated w i th

the

ahistor ical formal ism of Levi -Strauss 's structuralist th eo ry of

myths

or of the

s t ructu ra l causa l i ty enta i led

in

A l t h u s s e r ' s

s t ructura l i s t Marx i sm. More pert inent are the f o r ms of genetic

and histor ical ly speci f ic structural ism grounded

in the

a gency -

structure d ia lect ic . These can

b e

g r ou pe d conven ient ly toge ther

as

interpretive structural explanations-our

t e rm

for

d esc r i b

i ng wh at John

B.

T h o m p s o n

has

incisively ch arac ter ize d

as the

"d i st inctive m ethodo log ica l con cep ts " that a l lo w " re form ulat ing

the p rog ram

of

dep th interpretat ion in it iated

by

R i c o e u r

and

H a b e r m a s " (T h o m p s o n

1981, p. 1 7 3 )

1 4

First, there

is the

gener

ative regulation

of

the type assoc iated w i t h Bou rd ieu ' s con cep t

of habitus:

Bourdieu characterizes the habitus as "systems

of

durable, transpos-

able dispositions," which regulate practice without presupposing

a conscious or collective orchestration

of action.

Moreover, as both

Ricoeur and Bourdieu rightly suggest, the form of regulation w hi ch

is relevant he re

is

pecu liarly generative. Institutional schemata

do

not spec ify the course

of

action to be pursued in every foreseeab le

situation, but merely provide general p rinciples for the creative

production of particular acts. . . . The concept of schematic gen

eration avoids the hypostatizations and reifications

of

role theory,

insofar

as it

eliminates

the

need

to

posit

a

package

of

detailed

instructions for every institutionalized act. The concept equally

eludes

the

reductionism

of

some interpretive sociologies,

for it

emphasizes that social interaction

is

always more than the sum

of

its individual and ephem eral aspects. (Thom pso n 1981,

p. 174)

Second ,

at the

level

of

socia l s tru cture

is a

further bas is

for

exp lanatory s t ructures

in the

"socia l s truct urat ion "

of

institu

tions. H er e the focus is on the other e nd of the reprod uction cycle :

For the reconstruction of structural elements presupposes a the

ory

of

social development,

and the

developmental stages spec ify

the conditions wh ich must

be

satisfied by institutions

of

a particular

type

A

structural analysis may facilitate the depth interpretation




163

Wh ether or not

it

admits this interest, sociology pursues

it

even today,

insofar

as it

does not dissolve into

a

social-psychological behavior

science, systems research, or the hermeneutics of intellectual

history.

. . . The

truth

of

historically oriented functionalism

is

confirmed

not

technically

but

only practically,

in the

successful

continuation

and

completion

of a

formative process. (Habe rmas

1988, pp. 187-9)

From Ana lys i s to Critique :

Emancipatory Sel f -Ref lect ion

De sp ite his insistence of the universality

of

dom ination, G idde ns

still is c o n c e r n e d w i t h the critical func tions of k n o w l e d g e a b o u t

soc iety and eva luat ive com par i sons of d i f ferent form s of society.

A l though

not

p reoccup i ed w i th

the

epistemological qu estion s

driv ing Habermas 's theory

of

kn ow led ge interests

and

c o m m u n i

cat ion act ion,

he is

s imi la r ly w a ry

of

the uncritical pote ntial

of

pure ly he rmeneut i c pe r spec t i v es :

The

tasks

of

socia l sc ienc e

then s eem p rec i s e ly limi ted

to

e t h n o g r a p h y - t o

the

h e r m e n e u

t i c endeavor

of the

' fus ion

of

hor i zon s . ' Such

a

paralysis

of the

cri tica l wi l l

is as

logical ly u nsatis factory

as the

un tu to red

use of

the reve latory mode l " (G iddens

1984, p. 336). As he

adm its, this

pos i t ion "p resum es

a

de f in i te ep i s tem olog ica l v i e w w i th ou t sup

p o r t i n g it in deta i l" (G idde ns 1984, p. 338). Ab ov e a l l, it involves

the c la im that exp lanatory knowledge can inva lidate co m m on -

sense p ropos i t ions

in

wa ys that transform prop osit ion al bel ie fs

in

a

critical

way :

It can be shown, I think, that there is a non-contingent relation

between demonstrating a social belief to be false, and practical

implications for

the

transformation of action linked to that belief. . . .

N o w social beliefs, unlike those to do w ith nature, are constitutive

elements of what it is they are about. From this it follow s that

criticism of false be lief (ceterisparibus) is a practical intervention

in society, a political phenom enon in a broad sense of that term .

(Giddens 1984, p. 340)

Th e pr im ary d i f fe rence f rom Ha berm as ' s fo rmulat ion ( ba se d

o n

the

psychoana lyt ic ana log y )

is

that Ha berm as seeks

to

focus

o n

a

par t i cu lar typ e

of

t ransformat ive soc ia l know ledge— that

is,

forms re lated to beliefs related to po w er and authori ty (a cr i t ique




167

critical) are imm anent in hermen eutics

itself,

in the "dialectic of the rec ollectio n

of tradition and the anticipation of freedo m" (R ico eu r 1981, p. 100); further, "the

emancipation of the text constitutes the most fundamental condition for the

recog nitio n o f a critical distance at the heart of interpretation; for distanciation

now belongs to the mediation itself (Ricoeur 1981, p. 91). In short, "to under

stand is not to project oneself into the text but to expose oneself to it; it is to

receive a self enlarged by the appropriation of the proposed worlds which inter

pretation unfo lds. . . . Distanciation from o neself dema nds the approp riatio n o f

the propo sed wo rlds o ffered by the text passes through the disappropriation of

the

self.

The critique offalse consciousness can thus becom e an integral part of

hermen eutics, conferring upon the critique of ideology that meta-hermeneutical

dimension which Habermas assigns to it" (Ricoeur 1981, pp. 94-5).

6. This is not to say, how ever, that all forms of dom ination are equal. C ritical

theory is based on the assumption that an overall evolutionary gain has occ urre d

with respect to reducing traditional forms of domination, even if this has

involved introducing new, more subtle forms.

7. This analo gy can be traced back to Heg el's famous analysis of the master-

slave dialectic, a theme that now has been explored in comparative historical

terms (Patterson 1982).

8. It shou ld be stressed that the validity of this analogy do es not dep en d o n

the adequacy of any particular explanatory thesis drawn from psychoanalytic

theory. Th e key issue, rather, is method ological: To the extent that psycho analysis

(or any similar therapeutic strategy) is effective in its own terms, these are the

processes that are transformative.

9.

A very similar argument was developed virtually simultaneously by the

French social philosopher Paul Ricoeur, initially through a critical hermeneutic

reading of Freud (Ricoeur 1965). Freud's method was analyzed as a "hermeneu

tics of suspicion" that was contrasted to the "hermeneutics of restoration"

associated wit h traditional herme neutics. The element of suspicio n relates to the

question of asking wh eth er the overt consciousness of a subject may be illusory,

whether for the objective psychodynamic blocs identified by psychoanalysis or

for those linked to social relations of domination.

10. In Haberm as's denser formulation: "I am thinkin g of the rational construc

tions of the kno w- ho w of subjects, w ho are entrusted to provide valid expressio ns

and who trust themselves to distinguish intuitively between valid and invalid

exp ressio ns. T his is the domain of such disciplines as logic and mathematics and

the philosophy of language, of ethics and the theory of action, of aesthetics, of

the theory of argumentation, etc." (Hab erm as 1983, p. 260).

11. To be sure, certain positions wi thi n the subjectivist or objectivist cam ps

have attempted m ediating formulations that wo uld , in effect, synthesize analysis

of agency and structure, bu t these have largely failed. Parsonian theory in its mature

form remain ed clearly within the objectivistic framew ork of systems theory. A nd

symbolic interactionism did not succeed in uniting microsociological concerns

with a theory of society despite the early suggestive formulations of Gerth and

Mills (1964) and the phenomenological account of the "social construction of

reality" develo ped by Berger and Luckmann (196 7). Nevertheless this did em erge

as the central theme of social theory in the 1980s with the eme rgen ce o f critical



168


theory as a major contender. Under the heading of the "agency-structure prob

lematic," however, critical theories have staked out a number of mediating

positions.

12. The question of Habermas's relationship to Bhaskar's version of critical

realism goes bey ond the present discussion, but w e w ou ld follo w the suggestion

that "the examination of the recent develo pm ent of Haberm as's thought suggests

that it is no longer right to see his version of critical theory as in fundamental

oppo sition to a realist naturalism of the type argu ed for in this bo ok " (Ou thw ait e

1987, p. 91).

13.

It is beyond the scope of this book to defend or assess Habermas's

particular form of antifoundationalist epistemology; see, how ever, Baynes et al.

(1987) and, on the methodological implications, Morrow (1991c).

14.

No ne of this should be confused wi th the Am erican forms of empiricist

structuralism identified by Gid dens as "structural sociolo gy" o r the later w or k o f

Peter Blau (Giddens 1984, pp. 207ff). Nor should the notion of interpretive

structuralism be confused with some logical claim about a unique type of

explanation. What is suggested, rather, is simply a family resemblance between

a variety of logics-in-use com bin ing historically conceptu alized structural analy

sis w ith the critical interpretation o f agents' sym bolic activities as elab ora ted , fo r

example, in the rich discussions by Sewell (1992), Crespi (1992), and, more

generally, Bohm an (199 1).

15.

41

W e can see the overall unity and utility of this com plex activity of exp lana

tion, if w e v ie w it as the kind of description w hi ch is most fundam entally a basis

for copin g wit h reality, i.e., for promo ting o r preven ting cha nge Without the

requirement of depth, we could not expect explanation generally to direct us

toward a crucial point at which to intervene in order to change reality [italics

add ed]. W h en depth as necessity is lacking, it wi ll b e a waste of time to try to

prevent phenomena like the explanandum, in similar cases, by preventing the

shallow cause. The sequel will simply arrive by another route" (R. Miller 1987,

pp.

104-5).



7

C O N T E M P O R A R Y C R I T I C A L

T H E O R Y AS A R E S E A R C H

P R O G R A M

Giddens and Habermas

The circle of transmitters of this tradition is neither limited nor

renewed by organic or sociological laws. It is constituted and

maintained not by biological or testamentary inheritance,

but by a knowledge which brings its own obligations with it

And even this knowledge guarantees on ly a contemporary, not

a future comm unity of transm itters. The theory may be

stamped with every logical criterion, but to the end of the

age it will lack the seal of approval which victory brings.

(Horkheimer [1937] 1972a, p. 241)

Critical social theory does not relate to established lines of

research

as

a competitor; starting from its concept of the rise

of modern

societies,

it attempts to explain the specific limita

tions and the relative rights of those

approaches.

(Habermas

1987a, p. 375)

T

his chap ter reconstru cts the research prog ram s of Hab ermas

and Giddens as respec tively strong and w eak versions of

critical theory. First, this reconstruction requires establishing

the case for the loose ide ntity of their research prog ram s, as w el l

as their com plem en tarity-th at is, Giddens's w eak pro gram ,

w h ic h gen eralizes historical materialism as part of its critiq ue ,

169




171

tic; though rivalries may exist, they do not involve fundamental

di f ferences o f the typ e involv ing com pet ing research programs.

Indicative of this are the collections in wh ich sympathetic crit ics

have com me nted o n the w ork o f Habermas and Giddens wh o, in

turn, have at times responded to their critics. Further, Giddens

has com m ented sym pathetically on various aspects o f Habermas's

pr oje ct, tho ugh it has be en argued that he seems to learn little

from Haberm as and none of his con cepts are directly integrated

into structuration the ory (Kilm ins ter 1991, p. 92 ). M ore mu

tual inf lue nce s are evident on the part of pe op le strongly inf lu

enced by Giddens (Thom pson and Held

1982).

Althou gh Habermas

has not bee n direc tly inf lue nc ed by Giddens either, this appears

to be so for circumstantial reasons. Nevertheless the explicit

dialogue between these two variants of crit ical theory has been

much less than one would have expected, but can be extended

by differentiating them as strong and w eak research p rog ram s.

Habermas Versus G iddens

To deal w ith the problem of the dif ferences b etw ee n Giddens

and Habermas, w e find it useful to differentiate b etw ee n a w ea k

and a stron g research prog ram for critical theory, w h er e wea k

im plies a minimalist progra m and strong a maxim al. H abermas's

strong p rog ram retains a close r relation, for ex am ple , to the

M arxist tradition b y defining itself as a reconstructed historical

materialism (Hab erm as 197 9). As som e have argued , such a re

con stru ction u ltima tely im plies a rejection of historical m ateri

alism (R oc km or e 198 9). In any case the poin t of depa rture is a

reco ns truc tion that challenges such basic issues as the pr im ac y

of labor in Marx's theory and suggests that epochal transitions

can best be accounted for in terms of changes in normative

structures, rather than relations of pro du ctio n.

1

But Giddens makes it explicit that he seeks to go further:

Historical materialism and evolu tion ary theorie s cann ot be re

constructed, but have to be replaced with an approach of a dif

ferent character (Gidd ens 1991b, p. 20 6). Altho ugh G iddens

takes grea ter pains to differentiate his po sitio n from the M arxist

tradit ion, his con cern with a con tem po rary crit ique of histori

cal material ism is quite com plem enta ry wit h Habermas in other

respects:



172


There has been an abundance of attem pts... written either by impla

cable opponents of Marx or by disillusioned ex-believers. I belong

in neither of these categories, though nor do I accept the label

Marxist. Marx's analysis of the mechanisms of capitalist produc

tion, I believe, remains the necessary core of any attempt to com e

to terms w ith the massive transformations that have swept through

the world since the eighteenth century. But there is much in Marx

that is mistaken, ambiguous or inconsistent; and in many respects

Marx's writings exemplify features of nineteenth-century thought

wh ich are plainly defective w hen looked at from the perspective of

our century. (Giddens 1981, p.

2).

O f course there is an obvious di f ference be tw ee n these recon

structive strategies: Giddens's militant antifunctionalism and

antievolutionism do confl ict with Habermas's crit ical appropria

t ion o f Parsons and related attempts to rehabil itate evo lutio na ry

themes from historical material ism. Although there are some

important tensions here, Habermas's uses of functionalist and

evolutionary concepts are dif ferent in important ways from the

imm ediate target of Giddens's attack. M oreove r, these differe nce s

expre ss the range of op in ion w ith in crit ical th eo ry and the basis

of ongoing, unresolved debate indicative of an open-ended and

fall ibi l ist ic research program.

2

Further, Giddens has not been concerned with grounding the

no rm ativ e basis of critical theor y, a ten de nc y that has led to

charge s of evasiveness (Ber nste in 19 89 ). Partly it seem s that

such issues hardly requ ire justi f ication, thou gh in terv en ing post

mo dernist debates may giv e rise to som e doubts her e: I f Ma rx's

pro ject b e regarde d as the furthering , through the con jun ction

of social analysis and po litica l activity, of for m s o f hum an s oc iet y

in which the mass of human beings can attain freedoms and

modes of self-realisation in excess of any they may have enjoyed

befo re , w h o can dissent f rom it (Gidd ens 1981, p. 24 ) .

In general terms Giddens's minimal program resembles the

outer cir cle of the Frankfurt School and its m ore ope n-e nd ed

research pro gra m in the 1930s. Giddens's an tievolutionism leads

him to be suspicious of the transformative projects left over

from revo lutio na ry M arx ism , and his stress on the skills of a gents

leads him away from strong formulations of false con sciousness

and the enlightening role of intel lectual crit ique. I f Giddens's



180


Theory of Soc ia l Change :

Ant i funct iona l i sm and Ant ievo lu t ion ism

Th e basis of Giddens's conc ep tion o f soc iety is an op en m od el

of social rep rod uc tion consistent w ith his antifunctionalist sta nc e.

He nce the concept o f social reproduction

a

is n ot in and of itse lf

an explana tory on e: all reprod uction is contin gent and h istorical

(Gid den s 198 1, p. 27 ). In crucial resp ects, there fore , it dif fers

from both Marxist theor ies of soc ia l reproduct ion (whether the

olde r Frankfurt Scho ol version or mor e recent structuralist on es )

and the structural function alist m od el o f

a

self-regulating system

in dynamic equi l ibr ium. Viewing the re lat ion between agents ,

structures, and system as situated pr ac tice s fol low s from the

notio n o f the duality of struc ture un derstood in inte rpr etive

structuralist terms:

A crucial move in this theory is an attempt to transcend the oppo

sition between action theories and institutional theories . . .

This move is accomplished by the concept of what I call the duality

of structure. By the duality of structure I mean that the structured

properties of social systems are simultaneously the medium and the

outcome of social acts The concept of the duality of structure,

I believe, is basic to any account of social reproduction, and has no

functionalist overtones to it at all. (Giddens

1981,

p. 19)

Evolutionary th eories also are rejected and def in ed as fo l lo w s:

an irreversib le series of stages . . . som e con cep tua l link age

w ith bio logical theor ies of evolut ion; and the speci f icat ion of

direction ality through the stages indicated , in respe ct o f a g iven

criterion or criteria, such as increasing co m ple xity or exp an sion

of the forces of pro du ct ion (Gidden s 1984, p. x x i x ) . Instead

Gidden s wo ul d restrict the analysis of social change to co nc ret e

"episodic" transitions-that is, as a nu m ber o f acts or even ts

having a spec if iable beg inn ing and end , thus inv olvin g a particu

lar sequ en ce (198 4, p. 244) . Large-scale episodes w ou ld invo lve

proce sses such as the em erg en ce of agrarian states or the m od

ern nation-state. But he rejects linking such episodes together

as part o f an over all the or y o f h istory.



182


At the same time the role of the nation-state in relativized in

relation to globalization in the form of the w or ld system or inter-

societal systems. Indeed emphasis is placed on the gen eric short

comings of trading any ty pe of societ y as an isolated en tity

(Gidde ns 1981, p. 24 ) . As a conse quen ce h e credits Wal lerste in 's

world system theory for having pro v ide d an imp ortant cr i t iqu e

of endogen ous conce pt ions of soc ia l cha ng e despite reserva

tions on a num ber of key poin ts (Gidd ens 1987a, pp .

l66 f f ) .

Giddens's point of departure in the analysis of contemporary

societies is a co nc ep tion of m od ernity that stresses its co m ple te

discontinu ity from those that pr oc ee de d; and yet he also rejects

the postmodernist emphasis on the assumption of some kind of

fundamental rupture within modernity. Instead he speaks of

hig h m od ern ity as a l inear continu ation of on e of the most

distinctive features of mod ernity, an increasing in tercon nec

t ion be tw ee n the tw o 'ex trem es ' o f extensional i ty and intent ion-

ality: globalis ing inf luences on the one hand and personal dis

posit ion s on the oth er (Gid den s 1991a, p. 2 ). Th is focus on the

self and self-identity is sugg estive of them es that others pre fer to

label as pos tm ode rn :

Modernity

is a

post-traditional order, but not one in wh ich the sureties

of tradition and habit have been replaced by the certitude o f rational

knowledge. Doubt, a pervasive feature of modern critical reason,

permeates into everyday life as well as philosophical conscious

ness, and forms a general existential dimension of the contem porary

social world. Modernity institutionalizes the principle of radical

doubt and insists that all knowledge takes the form of hypothe

ses. . . . In the settings of what I call "hig h" or "late" m odernity-o ur

present-day w or ld- th e self. . . has to be ref lexively m ade. Yet this

task has to be accomplished amid a puzzling diversity of options

and possibilities. (Giddens 1991a, pp. 2-3)

Consistent with the characterization of his research program

as a w eak vers ion of crit ical theory, G iddens do es not sp ecif ica l ly

elaborate on his analysis of contemporary societies as a crisis

th eor y orien ted to a practical strategy of transformative cha nge ,

an absen ce closely associated w ith a l im ited co nc ern w ith nor

mative foundations. Ye t his overall app roach d oe s of fer insights

that certainly wou ld be of central im po rtan ce for such an ef fo rt.




185

Given the assumption of the primacy of communicative ration

ality, it be com es possib le to de fle ct the arguments of those such

as W eb er and Foucault, w h o p oin t to the primacy of c on f l ictual

relations at the heart of social life. Further, it provides the

fram ew ork for an evaluation of the processes wh ere by strategic

rationality may deform and distort communication in the inter

est of various forms of con trol and dom ination. In this res pec t,

the dist inction serves both empirical and normative purposes.

Like Giddens, Habermas's model of society is based on the

dis tinc tion be tw een system integration and social integration.

6

But it is used som ew ha t differently, g iven H aberm as's pa rticular

interest in a sp ec ific thesis relating systems of tech nical ration

ality (or the systemic level of systems integ ration ) to everyd ay

l i fe, o r wh at he calls ( in phe nom eno logical te rm s) the lifeworld.

He holds that the characteristic feature of modernity is the

selective appropriation of technical rationality mediated by the

systemic constraints impos ed by structure of p ow er (bureaucra

t izat ion) and money (commodif icat ion) , which have the e f fect

o f colonizing the lifeworld, thus elicitin g various social path olo

gies, as w el l as forms of resistance. This discrepancy b et w ee n

systemic intrusion and l i few orld ex pe rien ce stems from the w ay

instrumental rationalization introdu ces forms of distorted com

munication that cannot adequately comprehend the needs ex

pressed in the l i feworld of everyday l i fe .

T he or y of Soc ial Change :

Reconstructing Histor ical Mater ia l ism

Hab ermas's th eo ry o f society is based on a critiqu e of histori

cal materialism. A key elem ent o f this pro cess is the rejec tion of

the classic notion of m od e of pro du ctio n as insuff ic iently

general for the purp oses of

a

th eo ry of social cha nge . Instead he

proposes the concept of an organizational principle that in

cludes four possible (universal) combinations of social integra

t ion: kinship , l ineage, polit ical of f ice , and formal law (Hab erma s

1979,

pp. 150-4).

W h at these mo difications make possible is a clear distin ction

between two qualitatively dif ferent kinds of learning/rationali

zation pro cess es. Th e first is m ore familiar and invo lves the k ind

of rationalization associated with the development of science




187

1985; Haberma s 1 975 ). Th e resulting Haberm as-Offe thesis of

legitimation crisis was based on attempting to identify the spe

cific, emergent forms of social contradictions in the welfare state.

The key theme was that crisis tendencies had been displaced

from the blind operation of economic contradictions (as in

liberal capitalism) to the steering responsibilities of the modern

dem ocratic state. Th e polit ical eco no m ic basis of con tradiction

was the fiscal crisis of the state generated by the increasing short

fal l b et w ee n govern m ent revenues and demands for se rv ice s

necessary for democratic legit imation. What was distinctive

about this interpretation was the suggestion that tw o n ew forms

of crisis tendencies had become central in advanced capitalism:

the rationalization crisis evid ent in overbu rdened adm inistrative

systems, a legitimation crisis for the dem ocra tic state in relation

to citizens, and a latent motivational crisis linked to the diff i

culty of family and schools to socialize individuals consistent

w ith system im peratives. Althou gh a legit imation crisis in this

sense did not emerge in quite the way hypothetically proposed

as a possibil ity (th is was not a pre dictiv e m od el ) , this them atic

has form ed on e of the central questions of conte m por ary crit ical

theories of the state (Pierson 1991).

In his more recent work, Habermas has revised this analysis

of the contemporary role of the state and economy (the thesis

of the colonization o f the l i fe w or ld ) and exp lic it ly conn ecte d the

contemporary agenda of his version of crit ical theory with that

of the original interdisciplinary progra m set out by Ho rkh eim er

in the early 1930s. Th e fundamental d ifferen ce is that Haberm as

has attem pted to free historical materialism from its ph iloso ph i

cal ballast (Hab erm as 1987, p. 38 3) esp ecially the tele olo gic al

ph ilosoph y o f history of Hegelian Marxism. That allows H abermas

to take up many of the older questions in the light of int erv en ing

historical transformations. Four basic areas of inquiry are iden

ti f ied: (a ) the forms of integration in postl iberal soc iet ies , ( b )

family social ization and eg o dev elop m en t, ( c ) mass media and

mass culture , and ( d ) potentials for pro test (Haberm as 1987a,

pp .

383 -97). Let us br iefly discuss each of thes e areas as topic s

for explan atory and interpretive inqu iry.

7

First, the question of integration in postliberal societies in

volves questions about the relationship between the state and

capitalist econ om ies in adva nced capitalism, a the m e associated



190


reg ion al); psyc holog ical self-help movem ents; religious fundamen

talism and cults; and the women's movement. In this context of

such a spe ctrum of protests, Habermas seeks to differentiate

emancipatory potentials from potentials for resistance and with

dra wa l (Hab erm as 1987a, p. 39 3). Th is shift in value orienta tions

is thus broadly compatible with what Giddens refers to as from

em ancipatory po lit ics to l i fe polit ics. Habermas differs here

because his approa ch begin s w ith the rationality pro blem atic and

the tw o questions it poses: H o w could a reason spli t up betw ee n

its three moments of science, law and morality, and aesthetics

co m e to com mu nicate w ith o ne another? and the related qu estion ,

How can expert cultures be mediated with everyday practice?

(Habermas 1987a, p. 3 9 8 ) .

8

Complementary Critical Research Traditions

R iva l Theore t ica l App roa che s

In dif ferentiating a we ak and strong research prog ram for

critical theory, w e m ust ack no w ledg e othe r variants as w el l, ev en

i f they are mentioned only in passing. This acknowledgment

assumes, o f cou rse, that such rival research pr og ram s are essen

tial ly complementary in the dialogical sense that they mutually

influ en ce on e another and share sufficient cor e assumptions (e v en

i f only im pl ic i t ly ) to partic ipate in a com m on frame o f theoret i

cal discourse. T o a significant d eg ree , ho w eve r, the national

inf lections of theoretical tradit ions in social theory often ob

scure these similarit ies, and competit ion tends to exaggerate

di f ferences. B eyond Giddens and Habermas w e must ackn owl

edge other variants of social theory that some might consider

under the heading o f critical theor y, even if they are m en tion ed

only in passing. From this perspective crit ical theory as a re

search program as def ined above can be seen as engaged in a

fruitful, on goin g dialogue with several other rival, but not neces

sar i ly opposed, theoret ica l tendencies : British neo-Gramscian

cultural studies, inclu din g its post-Ma rxist variants; socialist

feminism; and French critical sociology and postm odern ist criti

cal theory. Because w e do not return to these approache s in a



P A R T I I I

Critical Theory and

Empirical Research



200

C R I T I C A L T H E O R Y A N D E M P I R I C A L R E S E A R C H

com ple tely m utually exclu sive, they typica lly do have dist inct re

search interests that often are cha racterize d, som ew ha t m islead-

ingly, by the dist inction be tw ee n quan titative and qua litative

research, or in other con texts , be tw ee n th eo ry and em pir ica l

research .

1

Indeed the terms empirical research and quantitative

research, based on variable analysis, are oft en s im ply equ ated as

if historical and ethn ogra ph ic research wa s not em piric al. Th is

distinction also must be decon struc ted i f the full m eth od olo gica l

implications of the research strategies most central to critical

theory are to be clari f ied.

A n imp ortan t im plicatio n o f this argument is that the gu lf

b et w ee n these tw o research strategies is so fundamental that

ther e is v ir tual ly no pr os p ec t that the ot h er w is e laudable goal

of improving quantitative research designs can ever achieve the

il lusory goal of reconcil iat ion, even though in certain cases

m ult im ethod approaches and tr iangulat ion m ay b e possible .

The problem is greater than that of social theorists and metho-

dologists gett ing to geth er to resolve their dif ferenc es, as i f their

di f ferences w er e a mere produ ct of the div is ion of aca dem ic

labor. M or e realistic is a bet ter understand ing o f their d istin ctive

contributions and problems and the occasional bases for con

structive mutual interplay.

2

De spite its crit ique o f posit iv ism gen erally, crit ical theo ry has

no basis for a prior i rejec tion of any particular meth ods or

techn iques as such, even i f som e have pro no un ced mislead ing

blanket re jec t ions o f num ber crun chin g. As w e have seen ,

methodological pragmatism does not justi fy such a conclusion,

given its essential pluralism. But critical theory does require a

critical pluralism in that it directs attention not on ly to ho w the

type of theoret ica l problems shapes the choice of methods but

also to the polit ical and ideological contexts of methodological

cho ices as part o f the process of non-em pirical argum entation

(Beardsley 1 980 ). As Galtung argues in chara cterizing m etho d

olo gy as ideo logy , the structure of soc iety tends to de ter m ine

the selection of meth odo logie s: Far from universal, a m etho dol

og y eve n contributes to the definition and maintenance o f a cer tain

social structure by bein g com patible w ith it, or to its dow nfall and

replacement by another by be ing incom patible w ith i t (Galtung

1977, p. 13). Th e prevalen ce and manner of use of existing tech

niques can be attributed to a significant ext en t to the rela tion sh ip



206


Qual i tative (a n d Histo r ica l ) Me thods

Similarly three characteristics also define qualitative research

in the conventional discourse: case study design, interpretat ion

of action (Verstehen), and thick description. Research that w e con

ven tion ally r efer to as qualitative tends to invo lve a case study

design; this simply means that w e exam ine

a

single case or

a

l imited

set of cases during the research, in marked contrast to the large

aggregate approach discussed above. For example, the analysis

of on e person 's autobiograp hy w ou ld be a case study, as w ou ld

an ethnographic analysis of

a

single comm un ity or the historical

analysis of a sing le society .

Central to the notion of qualitative research in the conven

tional discourse is the non-use of formal quantitative represen

tations in favor of natural language. It could be argued that at all

levels of qualitative analysis (individual, organ izational, hi sto ric al)

there is a reliance on the natural language accounts of actors

concerning their actions or the actions of others within their

social f ie ld. Even in historical analysis w e are con cer ne d w ith

accounts left to us by actors and with the per sp ec tive of the so-

called histor ical actor. Im plic it, then , in the emph asis on n atural

language is an interest in the local interpre tation o f action. Furth er

more it is accepted in qualitative sociology that action and its

local interpretat ion are a lways imbed ded w ith in the soc ia l w or ld

of the actors them selves.

Such analysis is taken t o b e idiographic. In other w ord s, rather

than attemp ting to m ake statistical generalizations c on cer nin g a

l imited set of variables, the concern in a case study is with

comprehending the rich complex of factors that def ine the case

at hand—be it individual, organizational, or societal. The social

context of action and interpretation, along with the emphasis

on natural language, leads much qualitative research to be con

ce rn ed w it h layers of social reality, thus req uirin g a dep th or

thick description of the case at hand (G ee rtz 198 3). T he basis of

qualitative analysis as inte rpre tation theo ry, acc ord ing to the

con vention al discourse, is the determ inatio n and rep resenta tion

of m eanings (Litt le 1991 , p p. 68-86 ).



208


necessari ly are based on the interplay of con struc ted m eaning s.

To imagine an appropriate question for a statistical survey is to

eng age in the natural language em plo yed by both the analyst and

the subjects of the research. The language of research is not an

adequate criterion for a major dif ferentiation o f research for m s.

Specif ic Ana lyt ic Strategies

Th e practices conven tionally associated wit h the terms qualita

tive and quantitative do represen t quite distinct analytic strate

gies.

We argue that it is necessary to acknowledge these funda

mental di f ferences, rather than the more i l lusory language

di f feren ce, in orde r to beg in com preh end ing the major div is ions

within empir ica l soc ia l sc ience.

The main underlying factor that needs to be made explic it in

this regard is that for the most part quantitative research in

so cio lo gy is statistical in the strong sense of b ivariate and m ulti

variate statistical modeling. Yet quantification means many dif

ferent th ings . For ex am ple , studies may b e refe rred to as statis

t ica l , w ith the impl icat ion that they invo lve a spec i f ic form of

theoretica l analysis. So w h en w e read that Fren ch soc iolog ist

Pierre B ourdieu has rep orte d on quantitative emp irical research

that sho ws . . . that there are coh erent social class dif fere nc es in

the consum ption of culture (Hal l and Ne itz 1993, p. 1 17) , w e

would be misled to think that Bourdieu has drawn on statistical-

causal analysis. In fact, the researc h in q ues tion is base d tangen -

tially on su rveys that are used to dem ons trate strikin g differ

ences (expressed in percentages) in the tastes of dif ferent

occu pation al groups. In fact, Bourdieu exp lic it ly rejects wh at h e

labels the mu ltivariate fallacy as a the ore tical strategy beca use

the tech niques sociolo gist gen erally use to establish and meas

ure relations im plic it ly con tain a ph iloso ph y that is at on ce ana

lytical and instantaneist . . . the structures s oc io lo gy deals w it h

are the pro du ct of transformation w h ic h , un folding in t im e, can

not be con sidered as reversible ex ce pt b y a logical abstraction,

a socio logic al absurdity (Bou rdieu and Passeron 1977, p. 8 8 ) .

5

W e must ask, then , h o w is statistical modeling dif ferent from

other forms of quantitative analysis in sociology. As mentioned

earlier, the strategy of statistical analysis is to model the social

world in terms of causal relations—understood as nonspurious



Quantitative

Versus

Q ualitative

Methods

211

dis t inc t ive aspects - the f i e ld-dependent cr i te r ia -o f the inves

tigative con cern s of statistical m od elin g as op po se d to social

theorizing.

Disciplinary Interests

and Two Research Logics

Having laid out a decon struction of the dom inant meth odologi

cal discourse, w e n ow seek to rethink m ethodological discourse in

a manner based on the dist inction between two types of disci

plinary practice.

Socia l Theor iz ing

One can identify two fundamental disciplinary interests in

sociology: world-historical social theorizing and the social en

gineering m od el-th at is, the dom inant form of variable-based

methodology grounded in nomothetic explanations. We argue

that these , in turn, pr ov id e the nor m ative founda tion for p articu

lar research logics. An interest in social theorizing, in our view,

is expressed in the desire to comprehend and, in some cases,

transform (through praxis) the underlying orders of social life—

those so cial and system ic relations that constitute society. From

this perspect iv e the raison

d'etre of social th eo ry is to co nstru ct

a tenable account dep icting the underlying prin ciple of chan ge

at work in the emergence and disappearance of the numerous

form s o f human life and the countless w elt er o f human activities

and relationsh ips (Fay 1987, p. 69 ). In this resp ect, social the oriz

ing is interp retive, but also structural. Hence it cannot be reduced

to the ideograp hic interpretation; it retains a strong quasi-causal

exp lan ator y interest, but on e consistent wit h the nature of social

reality. Ac co rd in gly w e con tend that the theo retically d riven task

of articulating underlying generative structures of social orders

requires tw o distinct yet interdep ende nt research logics: inten

sive explication and comparative generalization.

Let us first consider the log ic o f intensive explication, a strategy

groun ded in herm eneu tic assumptions. By the term explication



212


w e intend the research logic of empir ica l ly l i f ting into v ie w the

underlying semantic, sociocultural, and structural relations that

are constitutive of h istorically unique actors, m ediations , and sys

tems, resp ectiv ely (A . Sayer 1992, p p. 23 6f f ) .

7

More specif ical ly

w e can imag ine (a ) the interpretive exp lication o f the self-identity

and social cogn it ions ap prop riated by a giv en actor, (b ) the inter

pretive or structural explication of the social interaction situ

ated w ith in a give n med iation, and ( c ) the structural exp licat ion

of the polit ica l and ec on om ic relations comp rising a giv en social

system. The term intensive imp lies a case study focus on sp eci fic

individual actors, med iations, or systems. Th e log ic o f intensive

exp licatio n includes the con struction o f representation s such as

ethnographic accounts ( interpret ive soc ia l psychology) , compo-

nential taxon om ies (cognit iv e anth rop olog y) , and formal mod els

(mathematical sociology). Essential to any ef fort at intensive

exp licatio n is the desire to discern and elaborate the substantive

relations posited in social theory.

Comparative generalization is a logic com plem enta ry to in

tensive explication. Here the strategy is one of comparing the

patterns disclosed through intensive explication across a f inite

set of historically com parab le cases (actor s, med iations, or sys

t ems) . This step may be accomplished in order to make l imited

generalizations regarding identif iable patterns obtaining across

several cases at a single p oin t in time o r for cha nge s in th e

pattern of a single case ove r som e duration o f t im e. I t is imp or

tant to recall here that the patterns explicated and compared

through these theoretically driven strategies are those found in

the cognitive, cultural, or structural constitution of actors, me

diations, or systems, respectively.

The logic is parallel to that found in structuralist linguistics.

In that discipline one strives to disclose the internal orders and

pr op erti es underlying the cons truction and transform ation of

meaning through explication and comparison of discourses. In

the broader theo ry of soc iety context , w e exte nd this approach

to include the social cognit ions o f

actors, the sociocultural p rop

erties of m ediations (col lec tiv it ie s, as w el l as discou rses), and

the structural properties of societal systems. In the case of both

explication and comparison, we may f ind it useful for heurist ic

purposes to model such properties and processes through formal

languages such as mathem atics. A n d in som e cases w e may w ish



214


variables and ( b ) across larger aggregates. Many instances of s oc io

logical inquiry may involve quest ions concerning phenomena

not readily standardized, such as meaning systems, or may in

vo lve cases suff ic iently unique that there are on ly a fe w comp a

rable cases.

N o n e o f this is to argue that statistical causal mo de lin g is com

pletely nappropriate for the purposes of theorizing or never in

the interests of critical soc iolog y, but it is to say that the affinity

bet w ee n statistical research and social the or y is not at all straight

forward. The primary reason that the conventional status of

qualitative analysis as a heuristic ( faci l itating dis cov ery but not

its fundamental basis) for the ideal of statist ical generalization

should be rev ersed: Mathematics is, at best, a heuristic tool for

social research whose conceptual language is necessarily

grounded in explicative interpretations and structural gener

alizations.

9

We would suggest that this lack of clear affinity finds its

socio logic al source in the interest of social eng ine erin g that has

shaped, to some extent, the discipline of sociology in the latter

part of this century. Th e norm ative interest of social e ng ine erin g

is dist inct from the norm ative interest of social the orizin g as w e

have outl ined it . Social engineering is interested in empirical

descriptions in order to conceptually reproduce, rather than to

reveal or transform, given social orders (Habermas 1970; Fay

1975).

The function of research in this institutional practice is

to inform state and, in some cases, corporate policy and pro

gram min g. In this rat ional ized mil ieu the pro gra m bec om es

the means to realize a f it be tw ee n individuals and collectiv i

ties,

on the one hand, and the state, on the other hand. The

evaluation of p oli cy decisions is based on the prob ab il ity that a

given indiv idual or col lect iv i ty wi l l demonstrate som e posit ive ly

def ine d attribute as a con sequ enc e of pro gra m m ing init iat ives

and expenditures. In this context the social relations obtaining

between actors and between mediations are virtually irrelevant.

What is relevant is the ability to predict outcomes on the basis

of various inputs. Hence statist ical causal modeling becomes

app ropriated as the log ic of c ho ice.

Th e fact that the capacity o f a social science to p rod uc e such

knowledge or iented toward technical control may have been

greatly exaggerated by earlier critical theory does not alter,



Quantitative

Versus

Qua litative Methods

215

ho w eve r, the basic critiqu e. Indee d it calls for an exp lana tion of

why con trol-orien ted social scien ce has not lived up to its prom

ise.

In many cou ntries the loss o f faith in the technical contribu

tions of social science have led inevitably to decline in research

fund ing. Explana tion of this anom aly is imm anent in H aberm as's

the ory of com mu nicative action and exp lic it in Giddens's t he ory

of structuration: The decontextualized analysis of controll ing

variables touches only on the surface of the generative causal

mechanisms of social relations and cannot be translated readily

into long-term, ef fective interventions.

W e wo ul d suggest that as a cons equ ence o f the pub lics of

socio logy — esp ecially state interest in social engineering— a

strong sense of legitimacy arose for statistical analysis in society

and,

perhaps unfortunately, within the social sciences (Halliday

and Jan ow itz 199 2). Th e rise of statistical m od elin g as the d om i

nant legit imate logic in modernity may well correspond to the

decline in legit imacy of other approaches that were more theo

retically grounded, for example, American pragmatism.

A Taxonom y of Social Res ear ch Strategies

The distinction between extensive research-oriented correla

tional accounts of causation on the on e hand, and t w o mo m ents

of intensive accounts—individual explication and comparative

generalization— on the other, al lows a com preh ensive typ olo gy

of research strategies. In particular w e wish to differentiate h ow

each of these three types of explanatory focus has different

im plica tion s for the three analytical m om ents of social repro duc

tion : (a ) the social psy cho logica l analysis of individual actors, ( b )

the systemic analysis of social structures, and (c) the sociocul

tural analysis of med iations (o r social pr ac tice s in Gid den s's

terms) .

Social Psychological Analysis

of Individual Actors

The pr imary naturalistic strategy app lied to individual actors

can be found in various forms of behavioral social psychology,



216 C R I T I C A L T H E O R Y A N D E M P I R I C A L R E S E A R C H

for example, Skinnerian operant conditioning. We consider to be

individual-level modeling those form s of research that ideally

seek to establish universal coverin g laws o f behavioral proce sses

(e .g. , in Homan's exchange theory) .

Interpretive social psychologies reject the thesis of universal

determinat ion even though most acknowledge the importance

of extern al constraints on social action (e ve n i f these are ign ore d

by the theory) . Indeed interpret ive soc ia l psychologies can be

arranged o n a continuum on this basis. H en ce a fundamental ten

sion in interp retive soc iolo gy is ref le cte d in diverg ent attempts

to reconstruct the logic-in-use of its research practice. Some

stress its search for ru les of action that ide nt ify regu larities

w ith exp lanatory s igni f icance, hen ce the cont inuity and com ple

mentar i ty bet w ee n naturalist ic and interpret ive m etho dolo gies

(Braybrook e 1987, pp .

47ff ) . Others stress the discontinuity

eviden t from a focus on interpretation as a herm ene utic p roc ess :

This approach is thus hermeneutic: It treats social phenomena as

a text to be decoded through imaginative reconstruction of the

significance of various elements of the social action or even t. The

interpretive framework thus holds that social science is radically

unlike natural science because it unavoidably depends upon the

interpretation of meaningful human behavior and social practices .

(Little 1991, p. 68)

W e account for this discrepancy by distinguishing the t w o aspects

or mom ents that chara cterize interpr etive accounts of individual

focused analyses: actor explication , w hi ch fo l low s the herme

neu tic mod el in analyzing unique cases, and actor generalization,

con cern ed w ith ident i fy ing general rules of indiv idual act ion in

specif ic causal contexts.

Macrostructural Analysis o f Social Systems

System-level modeling is based on the hyp othe tical assump

tion o f treating social systems as if they we r e relativ ely c los ed .

On this basis, statistical techniques for studying collective prop

erties can be imported from the natural sciences. The most

com m on vers ion in soc io logy is probab ly aggregative compara-



Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods

217

five research, w h ic h attempts to iden tify crucial variables in

systems dynam ics on th e basis of large samples of cases.

In contrast, systemic analysis in interpr etive social the ory dis

pen ses wi th the organic analogy, holding that societ ies are op en

systems wh os e regularities are historically changeable and do no t

often lend themselves to formalization. On the one hand, this

definition suggests analyzing systemic properties (those struc

tures that opera te b ehin d the backs of a ctors) in terms o f systemic

explication-that is, definin g the pro cessin g of social repro du c

tion and contrad iction w ith in the specif ic historical case. O n the

other hand, such case studies presuppose basic structuralist

concepts involving system generalization based on certain typ es

of societies. Although these structural rules invoke the assump

tion of regularity and causality, they do so in a manner that is

highly historically contingent.

Sociocultural Analysis of Mediat ions

Mediation-level modeling attempts the ve ry diff icult task of

identifying the probabil ist ic condit ions of social change or cor

relations between aggregate properties of groups and institu

tional orders. Mediation-level explication involves the attempt

to identify intensively the crucial points of potential rupture,

breakdown, or change in the processes of reproduction carried

out at the intersection of systemic and social integration. Again

such case studies presuppose mediational generalizations o f

the type associated with theories of col lective behavior, social

mo vem ents, and cultural ch ange.

This com preh ensive scheme has the advantage of be ing related

directly to investigative concerns and disciplinary practices,

rather than based on the more limited qualitative-quantitative

distinction. The use of formal languages does not play a major

role in the way we have conceptualized social methodology.

Qu antification could be used as part of any o f the nine ide ntifie d

strategies, and it is certainly used in the six strategies falling

under the sociocultural and macrostructural analytic moments.

Th e reader should no te, ho w eve r, that although strategies involv

ing explication and generalization employ formal languages to

represent social structure and process (mathematical s oc io lo gy ),

those strategies f lo w in g from a social eng inee ring parad igm of



220


interpretations produced by situated researchers, coders, govern

ment officials and others . . . qualitative and quantitative methods

should be seen as complementary rather than antagonistic aspects

of social research. (Giddens 1984, pp . 333-4)

Gidden s is po intin g h ere to the essentially heurist ic fun ction

of quant i f icat ion in general and the construct ion of a l l data

through interpretation. But he does not seem to appreciate the

deeper, inherent antagonism between variable analysis and the

structuration the ory h e advocates-that is, be tw ee n extensive and

inten sive research d esigns. On e reason is that he tends to e qu ate

quantitative approa ches w ith macroanalysis and qualitative w ith

microanalysis: I t is not dif f icult to see in the co n fl ic t b et w ee n

these tw o posit ions a m etho dolo gical residue of the dualism of

structure and actio n (Gidd ens 1984, p. 330 ). As suggested by

the taxon om y of m ethod ologies a bove, w e do not find any strong

affinities of this type. Statistical modeling is possible and well

de ve lop ed at all three levels: system ic, action , med iational. A ft er

all, on the one hand, most of social psy cho logy is co nc ern ed w ith

the exper imental analys is of microphenomena. On the other

hand, the qualitative approach of comparative historical sociol

og y has always be en the foundation o f macr oso ciolog y. W e thus

w ou ld rephrase and quali fy G iddens's form ulation .

Th e quantitative-qualitative op po sit io n disappears only in the

sense that qualitative app roach es use statistics des cript ively, and

quantitative ones inevitably use interpretive procedures to con

struct measures. In this general sense it is perhaps possible to

speak of complementar i ty for the purpose of the descr ipt ive

uses for social theorizing. But this occasional complementarity

does not e liminate the antagonism be tw ee n so me typ es of quan

tif ication (statistically based variable analysis) and interpretive

structural theorizin g as mo des of con ceptu alizing social reality.

As a cons eque nce the re lat ionship be tw ee n the tw o in this case

is not on e of essential or natural com plem enta rity as i f they w e re

equally necessary term s. Giv en that quantitative proc edu res are

heuristic, their complementarity with social theorizing is only

occasional and cannot be taken for gran ted. A n d these intrinsic

antagonisms are reinforced by the social demand f or instrumen tal

kn ow led ge that tends to distort the uses of variable analysis, h en ce

draws it away from reconci l iat ion with interpret ive soc io logy.



Quantitative Versus Qualitative M ethods

221

Invest igat ive Concerns

and Ana lyt ic Mom ents

Th e theo ry o f society underlying crit ical the ory is based on an

open-en ded mo del of social and cultural reprodu ction o f the t yp e

pro po sed by both H abermas and Giddens. Unlike older structural

functionalist and structuralist Marxist approaches, ho w eve r, thes e

m odels avoid strong functionalism and v ie w the attainment of

reproduct ion o f a give n ord er as a high ly historically con tingen t

process. This analytical focus on the dynamics of stability and

change, in turn, defines the investigative concerns of critical

research that can for heurist ic purposes be broken down in

terms of three analytic moments.

Fol low ing a number of theorists (Lo ck w oo d 1964; Giddens

1984; Hab erma s 19 87a ), w e can recall again two investigative

concerns in con tem pora ry critical sociolo gy: questions concern

ing the phen om enon o f social integration and those conce rning

system integration. Th e con cern w ith social integration directs

questions to the imm ediate nexus of social actio n, wh ereas the

con cer n w ith system integration directs questions to the repr o

duc t ion of inst i tut ions -soc ia l o rders-a cross t im e and space

(Gidd ens 1984, pp . 139-44). Th e conce rn w ith questions of social

integration is ref lec ted in the various types of social psy cho logy

and microsocio logy (symbol ic interact ionism, soc ia l phenome

nology, ethnomethodology, and cognit ive soc io logy) , whi le the

con cern w ith questions of system integration is ref le cted in the

variants of macrostructural sociology (neofunctionalism and

neo-Marxist pol i t ica l economy). In other words, we see act ion

research and macrostructural research as analytic mom ents flo w

ing from prior investigative concerns grounded in the intersec

tion of social and system integration.

But w e w ish to introd uce a third m omen t based on the idea o f

mediations (Sartre 1963). In other wor ds, w e have to inco rpo rate

a sociocultural analysis of mediations (what we refer to as me-

diational analysis) that bridg es the social psy ch olog ical analysis

of individual actors, on the one hand, and the macrostructural

analysis of social systems, on the other hand. Such mediation

imp lies that an analysis f lo w in g from a con cern w ith social inte

gration potential ly can be both social psychological and socio

cultural, an approach best exem plif ie d in Bourdieu's con cep t of




for a nonquantitative a ppro ach on the grou nds that analysis of variance is difficult

to reconcile with answering fundamental questions about social processes: "The

focus on e xplain ed variance has had a major effect on the choice o f prob lem s to

study wit hin sociology. . . . Many, if not most, fundamen tal sociological que s

tions, however, involve macrolevel, structural forces in which there is little or

no variation. These problems cannot be addressed through this type of analysis

(Singer and Marini 1987, p. 380). For a provocative, non-empiricist attempt to

connect measuremen t with the study of structural mechan isms, see Paws on 1989.

3. As Baldamus argues, contrary to the usual assumption that the ideolo gical

content of theories makes them a good indicator of social change, empirical

methods lend themselves mo re readily to study by the sociology of k no wle dge ,

"provided due attention is paid to the implicit theorizing' that shapes and

controls the application of empirical procedures. . . . To use empirical m ethods

instead of theories as a mirror of changes in social reality has the additional

advantage that the form er are much m ore com pact an d less fluctuating than the

latter" (Balda mus 1976, p. 151).

4. Thus w e are not mak ing the same critique of quantification pre sente d by

Cicourel in his Method and Measurement in Sociology (Cicou rel 1964). That

argument involved an assessment of the degree to which arithmetic measures

could be applied to the nonmaterial "dime nsion s" of social reality. Alth ou gh w e

are essentially in agreement w ith C icourel o n the limits of measurem ent in this

regard, it is not our p urp ose here to critique quantification pe r se. Rather it is

our intention to question the priority given to the m ore basic distinction be tw ee n

qualitative and quantitative approaches to social research and the invidious

characterization of qualitative theory as falling short of the quantitative ideal.

5. Many forms of analysis can be referred to as quantitative, of which

statistical proced ures represent o nly a part. The field of m athematical sociology,

wi th its interest in mod eling social structures and proce sses, covers the range o f

quantitative and formalized analysis not addressed by even the most advanced

statistical techniques (Fararo 1989). W e w ou ld argue that som e of the appro ach es

found in mathematical socio logy are actually theoretically compa tible wit h mu ch

of what we called "qualitative sociology" (e.g., network analysis).

6. Fararo (198 9, pp . 53ff) thus rejects existent positivism (b as ed on variable

analysis and the covering law model) in favor of a realistic position oriented

toward the construction of generative structuralist models concerned with

formalized general sociological theory as opposed to the world-historical sociol

ogy and normative social theory of concern here.

7. W e consider in greater detail the nature of intensive, as opp ose d to

extensive, research designs in Chapters 9 and 10.

8. This is the basis of the important distinction between statistical and

nonstatistical comparative research: "While it is true that the logic of social

science is continuous from one subdiscipline to another, the peculiarities of

comparative social science make it an ideal setting for an examination of key

issues in method ology. . . . The most distinctive aspec t of co mp arative social

science is the wi de gulf be tw ee n qualitative and quantitative wo rk. It is w id er in

comparative social science than in perhaps any other social science subdisci

plin e. In part this is bec ause its qualitative tradition is dom inan t, the opp osi te o f

the situation in most other fields" (Ragin 1987, p. 2). We w ou ld argu e, h ow ever,



Quantitative

Versus

Qualitative M ethods

225

that Ragin fails he re to differentiate clearly bet wee n the field-invariant an d field-

depen dent aspects of the logic of social science.

9. For a rigorous defense of this thesis, see W ilson (1 98 7), w h o conclud es:

"Mathematics cannot play the same role as a vehicle for express ing fundamental

concep ts a nd prop ositions in the social sciences as it does in the natural sciences.

The reason for this is that the basic data of the social sciences, descriptions of

social phenomena, are inherently intensional in character: the social sciences

cannot insist on extensional description without abandoning their phenomena.

This, h owe ver, does not m ean that mathematics has no place in social scien ce;

rather, that mathem atics play a heuristic rather than a fundam ental role in

the study of social phenom ena [italics adde d] (W ilso n 1987, p. 402 ).

10. Although this also would be possible (though more difficult) to do with

respect to extensive m ethods, that wo ul d require a very technical treatment of

h o w to link measurem ent techniques to the study of causal mechanisms, a project

that w e leave to others (e.g., Paw son 1989).



9

N O N - E M P I R I C A L M E T H O D S

Reflexive Procedures

That we disavow reflection is positivism. (Habermas 1971,

p. vii)

Dialectical though t is the attempt to break through the coercive

character of logic with the means of logic itself

(Adorno, cited

in Gebhardt 1978, p. 3 96)

Thinking does not get caught up in dialectics because it disdains

the rules of formal logic, but because it obs tinately sticks to

these rules; it em ploys these rules even to think about logic

itself instead of break ing off their application at this c rucial

point.

(Haberm as, cited in Gebhardt 1978, p. 396)

To argue. . . that the writing of ethnography involves telling

stories, making pictures, concocting

symbolisms,

and deploy

ing tropes is commonly resisted, often fiercely, because of a

confusion, endem ic in the

West since

Plato a t least, of the imag

ined with the imaginary, the fictional with the false, mak ing

things out w ith mak ing them

up. The strange

idea that reality

has an idiom in which it prefers to talk about it without a

fuss—a spade is a spade, a rose is a rose—on pain of illusion,

trumpery and self-bewitchment, leads to the even stranger

idea that, if literalism is lost

t

so is fact. (Geertz 1988,

p. 140)

Future discussions of m ethod in social science will presum

ably push in this direction of the examination of rhetoric,

description and language.

(A .

Sayer 1992, pp. 265-6)

226



228


Crit ical theo ry's research prog ram is thus quite consistent w ith

the postempiricist theory of scientific research programs, which

argues that the rationality and prog ressiv ene ss of a th eo ry are

most closely l inked-not with its confirmation and falsi f ication—

but rather w ith its problem solving effectiveness

1

' (Laudan 1977,

p. 5 ). A n d o f course it is the research prog ram that selects th e

types of explanatory prob lems and the pert ine nt meth ods.

A def ining characterist ic of crit ical research methodology is

that choices about l inking theories and methods are an ongoing

pro cess that is con textu al ly bou nd , not a techn ical dec is ion

that can be taken for granted through refere nc e to the log ic of

scie nc e. But wh at is the alternative? Critical the ory 's m eth odo

logical uniqueness has been associated wi th t w o terms: its

reflex

ive and dialectical character. Th e f irst is con sidere d ex ten sive ly

in this chapter under the heading of non-em pir ica l m e th o d s -

largely ignored though implicit in empiricist research-that are

crucia l to the conduct of empir ica l inquiry and that should be

a part of methodological selfconsciousness and training. With

resp ect to the second question , w e argue that although there is

no distinctive dialectical m eth od in the strict sense, crit ical

the ory d oes have a unique me tho dolo gica l strategy based on the

agency-structure dialectic and the interpretive structural ap

proach to historical explanation.

Logic as Rhetoric

W ha t, then, is the m eth odo logica l imp lication o f the identif i

cat ion of cr it ica l theo ry as a re f lexiv e soc io log y (Go uldn er

1971,

1975; O 'N eil l 1972)? Re flexi vity m ay be seen to o pe rat e

in t w o co ntex ts. First, i t involve s metatheo retical ref le ctio n that

is a form of inqu iry in its o w n right, a top ic w e con side red

previou sly under the headin g of crit ical m etatheory . Secon d,

re f lexiv i ty is an appl ied pract ice that, w h i le draw ing o n general

metath eoretical categories, is inv olve d integrally (conscio usly or

no t ) in the overal l process through wh ich research is prod uc ed.

For exa m ple, eve n the posit iv ist refere nce to lo gi c indicates

a refere nc e to non -empirical m odes of persuasion that are other

w is e taken for granted . Critical theorie s, in contrast, make ref lec-




231

examination of accounts need not be merely a form of talk about

talk, but a more self-aware form of talk about how w e understand

our world. . .. Future discussions of method in social science will

presumably push in this direction of the examination of rhetoric,

description and language [italics added] (A. Sayer 1992, pp. 265-6)

Inde ed, to speak of non -emp irical method s may appear in

it ial ly l ike a con tradictio n in terms; yet the term empirical

methods doe s im ply oth er typ es. Such an imp ression is indica

tive of the persuasiveness of positivist assumptions in our cul

ture. Th e implication of the exclusiveness of emp irical m ethods

is that they need no recourse for justif ication except to them

selves and their relation to the empirical facts. But the practice

of social research reveals ot he rw ise . On e of the tasks of a critical

th eo ry o f me tho dolo gy is thus to bring these backgrou nd fea

tures of research into the foreground so that they may receive

the same kind of scrutiny and crit ic ism to w h ic h o ther m ethod o

logical procedures are subjected in the course of training and

research

itself.

As cognitive skills pert inent to the produ ct ion

and evaluation of research, they need to be made mo re exp lic it

as rational procedures of scientif ic practice. Our objective is

prim arily to identify some o f the key types of such non-em pirical

methods and their general implications, rather than to provide

an exhaustive account of their specific forms.

Ty pe s o f Ref lexiv ity:

Non -Empir ica l Methods

Th e identif ication o f m etho dolo gy wi th a the ory of argumen

tat ion helps c lar i fy this issue (M or ro w 199 1b) . Clear ly, non-

empirical methods contribute to argumentation-and to the ra

tional justif ication of theo ries, eve n if by differen t mean s. In

other words, the notion of non-empirical methods fol lows from

the antifoundationalist ref le xiv e thesis (Ash m ore 1989) about

the nature of scientific k n ow led ge discussed previously. Further,

empirical argumentation is inconceivable with prior decisions

about both metatheoretical and normative assumptions, as well

as the existential imp lication s o f the research pro cess for partici

pants.

To be sure, these latter assumptions do n ot norm ally co m e

into play in the day-to-day routines of research pra ctic e, but th ey




233

Positivist Research and Non-Empirical Methods

In prin cip le, of course, non-emp irical methods are rec og niz ed

in positivist conceptions of research even if they are not usually

term ed as such. W hat is most important, h ow ever, is because they

are put in the background rather than the foreground, assump

tions w ith regard to such procedu res require only m inimal justif i

cation due to the way they can invoke the authority of the

reigning posit iv ism in methodology training. A brief review of

typical, largely implicit assumptions is thus instructive.

Logical Essentia l ism

Alth ou gh form al logic is often almost equated wit h the def ini

tion of empirical methods as statistical methods, this compari

son obs cure s the status of lo gic as a non -empirical m eth od . Th is

conflation is possible because logic and empirical research are

seen as on e, rather than logi c sim ply as a rhetorical re sou rce for

research. In this context logic is associated closely with consis

tency ev en though the history o f science suggests that all research

programs are characterized by high levels of internal inconsis

tency and the results are not nearly so grave as suggested by

prop osit iona l logic (Harre 1986, p. 5). Th e major prob lem here

is that this characterization excessively narrows the forms of

log ica l criteria that may be pe rtin en t to assessing ev id en ce o f

com paring theor ies . Th e ideological funct ion perfo rm ed by logi

cal essentialism in scientistic discourse is perh aps e vide nt in the

fact that courses in formal logic are not required for advanced

training in the social sciences.

Ant ih istor ic ism and Logocentr ism

Another dogma of the logical empiricist tradit ion is the rigid

distinction between the logic of discovery and the logic of veri

f ication. In Merton's terms the history of sociological theory

must b e distinguished clearly from its system atics as de fine d

by the ory con struction and verif ication (M ert on 1968 ). On these

groun ds all histories of social th eo ry are regarded as ornam ental

and not contributing to the construction of real theories. The



238


our interpretive skills are groun ded in, and on ly bec om e poss ible

through, our experiences and prejudices; denying or suppress

ing them can only distort the communication process and our

abil ity to interpret o thers. A n d as feminists have show n, absen ce

of attent ion to the ex pe r ie n ce of w om en has cal led into ques

tion the sociolog ical e nterpr ise (D . Smith 199 0) and has contrib

uted to various attempts to incorp ora te insider kn ow le dg e as a

credible tech nique of investigation (Lather

1991; J. Nielsen 1 99 0).

But it is also necessary to ack no w led ge that standp oint theoriz

ing (o r insider k n ow le d ge ) can be used as a resou rce and claim

for any social grou p and that me diating princip les of kn ow le d ge

(even i f not formal ized universal ism) become necessary for a

comprehensive understanding of social l i fe across existential

dif ferences.

Further, ther e is the poten tial dang er of infin ite regre ss in to

express ions of di f ference w ithi n a given interpret ive comm u

nity. Th e interpret ive character of kn ow led ge do es pro du ce the

apparent paradox of the hermeneu tic circle, w hi ch invo lves an

endless process of interpretation and precludes any absolutely

co rre ct on e. Th ese matters are com plica ted further by the

epistem ologica l dif ferences that separate dist inc tive stand points

defined by the interplay of historical contexts and social pos ition s.

But as Gad am er argues, such in terp reti ve d iffere nc es do n ot al

together preclude the possibil ity of a fusion of horizons that

al lows otherwise apparent ly incommensurate and incompatible

viewpoints to come to recognize shareable understandings that

are the foundations o f a social scien ce that w ou ld aspire to speak

only in terms of fragmented voices. To be sure, the posit iv ist

dream of purely ahistorical, decontextualized, formal, and in

variant social theory fails to understand the essential historical

character of social inquiry.

Normat ive Theory :

The Rational ity of Cr it ique

As a discursive prac tice, no rma tive argum entation is so p erva

sive that w e rarely stop to c ons ider that it is a rational technique

of persuasion. An d w he n w e do be com e aware at mom ents, norm

ative argum entation usually is associated wi th the irrational—the

intrusion of emotionally and blindly held beliefs.




241

Ironically the dom inant conte m po rary n eo-Marxist th eor y has

attem pted to salvage some o f the core analytical elem ents o f his

torical materialism through abandonment of any assumptions

about its methodological uniqueness understood in dialectical

terms. For example, analytical Marxists are chara cterized by

the assumption that Marxist theory cannot be def ined in metho

dolo gical terms w h er e this refers to strategies for con cep t

formation, theory construction, the ' logic ' of justi f ication and

discovery, and related issues that con tem por ary philoso phe rs of

science conventionally designate 'methodology. ' So understood,

most analytical Marxists implicitly reject the view that Marxism

is dist inguished by its m eth od (Le vin e 1989, p. 3 4). Th e reason

is that M arxists aim to pro vid e causal explana tions in the famil

iar sense (Lev ine 1989, p. 3 5 ) .

9

For these kinds of reasons,

critical th eo ry as an alternative to classical Marx ism is sum ma rily

rejected : Th e ideas of

a

critical, directly em ancip atory or other

w ise 'prac t ica l ' theory-and a fortiori of less de vel op ed extra-

scientific explanatory agendas-has yet to be satisfactorily de

fend ed (Lev ine 1989, p. 38). Acco rding ly any definition of eith er

Ma rxism or critical the ory wo uld be dist inguished, at most, by

the particular configuration of methodological postures it em-

braces" [italics added ] (Lev ine 1989, p. 38 ), hen ce not a un iqu e

m eth od olo gy that def ines the approach as such.

We feel quite comfortable with the suggestion that crit ical

the ory can be def ined by the particular configuration of meth

od olog ical postures it em bra ces, and inde ed this has be en the

central theme of this book. But Levine's dismissive response to

crit ical theo ry l inks the uniqueness of m ethod to the m on olithic

log ic of causal the orizin g and obscu res the prac tical sign ifican ce

of particular configurations of methodological postures of the

typ e that help d ef ine a research program . As previously note d,

crit ical theory is eclectic with respect to the use of techniques

of inve stigation . Wh at is distinctive is their use w ith in a particu

lar system of inqu iry :

M eth od s , then , take their va l id ity and re l iabi l i ty f rom their part ic i

pat ion in a part icu lar system o f inqu iry . . . . Part icular m eth od s do

not ope ra te ind epe nde nt ly o f a sy s tem o f inq u i ry ; the use o f a

m et ho d cha ng es only as a resea rche r uses i t in d i f ferent system s

of inqu iry . . . . Th e me an ing o f a part icular rese arch co nd uc t is



244


a pre-interpreted world, in which the meanings developed by active

subjects actually enter into the actual constitution or production

of that world; the construction of social theory thus involves a

double hermeneutic that has no parallel elsewhere; and finally the

logical status of generalizations is in

a

very significant way distinct

from that of natural scientific laws. (Giddens 1976, p. 146)

For these kinds of reasons w e have preferre d to speak of the

m eth od olo gy o f crit ical the ory in terms of an inte rpr etive struc

turalist approach to social history (social and cultural reproduc

t io n) coup led w ith a norm ative f ram ewo rk fo r assess ing the

relations of dom ination revealed by such investigations. Further,

although crit ical theory in principle aspires to inform transfor

mative action, there is no historical guarantee of this. In short,

on the on e hand , the analytical M arxist reje ctio n o f the dialec

t ic in the form p resupp osed by the Marxist tradition's th eor y

of history from Marx through Horkheimer is shared by crit ical

theo ry. O n the oth er hand , critical th eo ry also neces sarily insists

that the latent positivism of analytical Marxism blinds it to the

multiple logics-in-use that make up creative and credible social

research. In this respect the debate about dialectics is far from

over but goes beyond our present purposes.

1 1

Conclusion

Reflexive methods are more central to the formation and self-

crit ic ism w ith in a research com m un ity than to the typical con

duct of

a

particular research pro ject. Th is is on e reason that such

issues have been neg lected; they can routinely be taken for gra nte d

as part of the socialization process of m em ber ship w ith in a

particular discipline and research approach. However, during

times of internal debate and chang e, such con cern s often b ec o m e

central to day-to-day activities w ith in a research com m un ity.

Al so m uch of the re f lexive m ethodo logical w or k is carr ied about

by specialists in those kinds of activities: Historians of disci

plines, theorists, and meth odologists all may contribute frequ en tly

to these kinds of debates. Al so outsiders ( in ap plied f ie lds, or a

disciplin e such as ph ilosop hy o r intel lectual his to ry ) may be




245

crucial to this process and feed back on a discipline

itself.

In

other words, al l research communities use ref lexive methods

whether self-consciously or not. Critical theory, however, makes

such issues a central co nc ern o f social inq uir y and attempts to

link them up to the more visible issues of empirical techniques

and strategies of inquiry.

Further, critical theory is not only distinctive in its concern

w it h re fle xiv e me thod s but also dialectical in its use of em piric al

techniqu es. This statement does not imply a spe cif ic dialectical

method, but it does suggest a distinctive theoretical strategy

based on the agency-structure dialectic. This strategy involves

the form of theor izing that w e previously have labeled interpre

t ive structuralism and w h os e theoretical reach wa s con sidered

briefly under the heading of limited comparative generalization.

The task of the next chapter is to explore some of the ramifica

t ions o f this approach wit h resp ect to the em pirical proc edu res

of social inquiry in the context of intensive research designs.

Notes

1. "Th e giving of primacy to logical structures as the inner essence of dis course

has had a disastrous effect in philosophy of science, vividly illustrated by the

implausibility of H em pel's account of scientific explanation. The same doctrin e

appears again in Poppe r's early form of fallibilism . . . Logic does have a place in

the creation o f scientific disco urse, but not at its core. That is forme d by semantic

structures, and relations of likeness and difference. A clear-eyed look at the

cognitive and m aterial practice s of the scientific co mm unity wi ll reveal that logic

is a socially motivated addition, a rhetorical contribution to persuasive power"

(Harr e 1986, pp . 4-5).

2. Versions of this postempiricist "logic as rhetoric" argument have been

dev elop ed b y critical realists (Ha rre) , post-Wittgensteinian linguistic philo soph y

(To ulm in), and the tradition of rhetoric deve loped in Chaim Perelman's argu men

tation theory: "The formalization of language, far from being natural to it, is the

result of a previous effort of understanding, rooted in contextual implications,

wh ich one does away with in order to clarify .... Perelman does not grant privilege

to the logico-mathematical aspect because there is no discourse without an

audien ce; hen ce, no argumentation witho ut rhetorical effect. Argum entation and

rhetoric are linked. The relation to the audience is the search for its agreement;

and the rhetorical strategies are the means" (M eye r 1986, pp . 92-4). Such con

ceptions of logic also can be traced back to Dew ey's pragmatism ( D ew ey 1938)

and, in the German tradition, to the constructivist conception of the "logic of



246


reflection" and its "analogical interpretation of logic. Particular knowledges are

things done, or constructed. They have a primary location, in other words, in

practice; they do not hover in a depersonalised realm ba sed on p ure description"

(Ro berts 1992, p. 285).

3. This is not to say that non -emp irical meth ods are insignificant in ex tens ive

research, so m uch as trivialized by the methodological c anons associated with most

statistically base d research, wh ich , by design, attempt to eliminate their need as

much as possible. On the contrary, intensive research designs require, by their

very nature, greater concern wit h these issues; further, from a postem piricist

perspective, concern with non-empirical issues becomes a requirement of the

rational problem solving in a research tradition (e.g., Guba 1990).

4. In a pionee ring exploration of these issues, Baldamus notes that he orig inally

was driven to ask such questions because of concern about the ideological evalu

ation of theories, indepen dent of evidenc e. On ly later did he realize this w as not

only a fundamental problem but also a resource for a more reflective methodo

logical con cern w ith political and politically neutral non-empirical procedures"

(Baldamus 1976, p. vii) , a topic open ed up by Lu dw ig Fleck's wor k ( w hi ch later

influenced Thomas Kuhn) on the role of collective error in scientific discovery.

5. He nce as a sociologist recently con cludes, consistent wi th postem piricist

critical realism: "It is not that Science is 'reduced' to rhetoric and thus rendered

corrupt and useless. It is rather that the rhetorical comp onen t seems to b e unav oid

able if the w or k is to have a theoretical or policy re levan ce. Thu s an analysis of

scientific wo rk should also include its rhetorical as we ll as its emp irical co m po

nent" (Gu sfield, cited in Simons 1990, p. 10).

6. Mo reover, these arguments often are presen ted as com pletely novel, wh en

in fact they have been wit h the social sciences for mo re than half a century ; one

wo uld have only to replace Mann heim's sociology of know ledg e with "postmod

ernism" to agree with Lather that "postmodernism foregrounds an awareness of

our o w n structuring imp ulses and their relation to the social ord er" (Lather 19 91,

p. 89 ). To be sure, many of these issues can no w be taken up in a more sophisticated

way and, more importantly, gender has been added to the arsenal of under

standing "structuring impulses."

7. The term deconstruction is used increasingly loo sely to refer to virtually

any type of rhetorical analysis that calls into question naively realistic and unre-

flexive conceptions of representation. But the more technical sense refers to

Derrida's approach, wh ich has been defined succinctly as follows: "To deconstruct

a discourse is to sho w h ow it undermines the philosophy it asserts, or the hierar

chical oppositions on which it relies, by identifying in the text the rhetorical

operations that prod uce the supposed ground o f argument, the key conce pt or

prem ise" (Culler 1982, p. 86).

8. In som e discussions the con cept of deconstructive methods (e.g., Lather

1991, p. 90) has been expanded somewhat to incorporate a broad range of

reflex ive issues that w e separate out und er distinctive headin gs.

9. In practice, how ever, the meth odolo gy of analytical M arxism has tended

to imply two basic and often conflicting research strategies: attempts to rigor

ously justify the explanatory value of the base-superstruc ture mo del in functional

terms (G. A. C oh en ) or to revitalize a reconstructed pro duction -based class analysis

(E. O. Wright); and the application of the methods of neo-classical economics



Empirical Procedures

251

to its conc lusions (Y in 1984, p. 29) . M ore spec if ical ly that in

volve s f ive com pon ents: (1 ) a study's questions; (2 ) its pr op o

sitions, if any; ( 3 ) its un it(s) of analysis; ( 4 ) the logica l link ing of

the data to the pro po sition s; and ( 5 ) the criteria for inte rpr etin g

the f indin gs (Y in 1984, p. 29 ). In this section w e consider four

typ es o f intensive research designs based on case studies: histor

ical analysis, ethnog raphy, participatory action research, and dis

course analysis.

3

At this po in t it is app ropriate to reiterate the systematic signifi

canc e of the crucial poin t made in the pre ced ing chapter regard

ing the comparative nature of all social kn ow led ge , a po in t lost

by the ideographic-nomothetic polarization. The ideographic ap

proach assumes a co m ple tely uniqu e case as the unit o f analysis,

thus obscu ring that w e can com preh end a case only through our

kn ow led ge of s imi lar ones. In contrast, nomothetic theorizing

redu ces case s to represe ntative samples of artif icial character

istics such that the individual instance b eco m es a man ifestation

of a universal law. From the pe rsp ec tive of intensive research

designs, each case resembles others of that ty pe , w h ic h allows

cons truction of l im ited generalizations, as w el l as explication s

of the individual case.

Further, we wish to l ink this point closely with the primacy

of case study methods in intensive research. Recent indications

are that the centra lity of the case study to social research has bee n

redisco vered (H am el 1992; Ragin and Becker 1 992). Alth ou gh

the question of identifying cases has prov oke d considerab le

disagreement, the extensive/intensive research design distinc

tion allow s a clear-cut association o f variable analysis wi th ex

tensive designs, and case study methods with intensive ones.

Ob viou sly case studies are not unique to critical research and

be co m e associated w ith the latter only w h en they address theo

retical questions within its research program. Further, it needs

to be stressed that the case study is at the heart of a number of

research strategies that have be en central to critical theo ry. For

ex am ple , analytic case studies differ from historical research pri

marily in having con tem pora ry access to the phen om eno n, thus

making systematic observation and interviewing possible (Si l

verma n 1985). An d they differ from traditional ethnograph ies due

to a stronger explanatory (as opp ose d to interp retive) focus and

do not necessari ly depend on detailed participant observation




255

We thus are concerned here init ial ly with ethnographic and

case study analysis as a genera l research p rac tice bro adly shared

by anthro pology, sociology , and other disciplines. In the proce ss

we wi l l be concerned with two over lapping contr ibut ions of

critical ethnography b eyon d its descrip tive and explan atory va lue :

cultural critique as defam iliarization and cultural critique as

ideology critique. Altho ugh these are in prin ciple shared wit h

historical research , they assume a m ore d irec t poign an cy as part

of f ield research, as opposed to the more arcane process of re

constructing historical processes through the interrogation of

remote documents.

Th e contribution of ethnograp hy to ide olog y crit ique assumes

various more familiar forms in the context of the analysis of re

lations of imperial domination found in the formation of post-

colon ial societies , as w el l as the internal dynam ics o f class-divided,

largely agrarian (peasant-based) so cieties. Both der ive the ir criti

cal for ce fro m particular strategies of com pariso n and ultimately

are groun ded in a critical herm eneutics orien ted tow ard the

demystif ication of hegemonic power relations.

The more general strategy of defamiliarization is less well

kn ow n and has been reconstructed from recen t w ork on ethno

graph ic writin g (Marcus and Fischer 1986). Such w ork (som etim es

misleadingly labeled postm ode rn eth no gra ph y ) is interesting,

in part, because o f its dem onstration of the uses of poststructu

ralist them es for critical purp oses . In this res pec t it serves as a

ref lexive contribution to methodology, though one distinctive

from the normative context of ideology crit ique.

More specifically, it is argued that realistic analysis of cultural

form s, even wh en carried out in the name of em pirically g rou nd ed

ideology cr i t ique, has i ts l imits . In other words, exper imental

forms of representation may be more insightful or effective, given

the dialogical character of the reception and comparison of

dif ferent forms of knowledge and perceptions of reality. This

the m e has long b ee n rec og niz ed in various expres sionist and sur

realist critiques of realism in the arts. In this context two basic

strategies of defamiliarization have been identified for ethnogra

phy. Defam iliarization by epistem ological crit iqu e stems from

travel to the exotic worlds on the margins of the Eurocentric

universe and h ow this reacts back to raise havoc w ith our settled

way s of think ing and conce ptua lization (Marcus and Fischer



256


1986, p. 138 ). De fam iliarization b y cross-cultural juxta pos i

t ion, ' ' on the oth er hand, of fers a m ore dramatic, up-front k ind

o f cultural crit ic ism . It is a ma tching of eth no gra ph y abroad w ith

ethn ogra ph y at h om e (Marcus and Fischer 1986, p. 138 ). For

example, Margaret Mead juxtaposed adolescence in Somoa and

America in this provocatively crit ical way.

Defining crit ical ethnography in terms of strategies of ideol

og y crit iqu e and defamiliarization helps make sense of a

num ber

of misunderstandings that swirl around the methodological

status of critical ethnography. A circumstantial factor here is

perhaps the tenden cy of some defenders o f cri t ica l e th nog raph y

to stress its dist inctiveness by focusing on p olit ica l pra ctic e and

breaking d ow n the gap be tw een researcher and object of research.

Feminist exponents of crit ical ethnography express these ele

ments most strongly in making ideology crit ique and praxis the

def ining mo men t of meth odo logy (Lather 199 1) . This tactic sets

the stage for an unsym pathetic crit ic to def ine the p ro ble m in a

pro blem atic wa y: Th e term 'critical ethnography * refers to a

for m of qualitative research that contrasts w ith m ore tradit ional

approa ches in bein g closely, perhaps on e should say organically,

l inked to socialist and/or feminist po lit i cs (Ha m m ersley 1992,

p. 97 ) . Altho ugh this def init ion may be appl icable to some form s

of action research (as w e w ill see in a m om en t), it scarcely tou che s

on the deeper issues involving the intensive analysis concerned

w ith com bin ing interp retive und erstanding, causal analysis, and

crit ique . As w e have just seen, the de ep er sources of ethnogra

phy's crit ical potential l ies in its capacity for ideology crit ique

and defam iliarization, n ot its imm ediate link w ith p olitica l causes .

Further, such a con crete ly polit i c ize d def in it ion allow s sett ing

up a simp list ic kn ow n -d ow n set of arguments ult imately based

on relativ ist and posit iv ist prem ises. A b ov e al l , bo th crit ics and

som e defenders of an activist version o f ethn ogra ph y leap fro m

general epistemological c laims about the ult imate grounding of

inquiry in kn ow led ge interests in Habermas to a con cep t ion of

the immediate transformative ef fects of the practice of such

research—all in a manner quite inconsistent with Habermas's

o w n in tentions. This leap allows quasi-posit iv ist crit ics to sh ow

how po l i t i c i zed approaches inher i t most o f the problems o f

validity in conventional research and then add some new ones:

It presu ppo ses a co m ple x th eor y of socie ty and its poten tial for




257

transformation; it is supposed to be im med iately polit ical w h en

ethnography takes t ime and corrective fol low-up studies; in

using the concept of ideology it cannot suspend judgm ents

necessary for understanding the beliefs of others; and critical

th eo ry p resup pose s quasi-causal laws that are giv en n o atten

tion in the discussions of their approach by critical ethn og rap he rs

(Ham m ersley 1992, p. 1 18). As Habermas exp lic it ly warn s, how

ever, thou gh a critical so cio log y n ecessarily resists red uc ing

intentional action to behavioral responses, its hermeneutic dia-

logical approach sti ll requires discip line and autonom y in the

research proce ss that is not adequately addressed by act ion

research or iented toward immediate enl ighten me nt.

5

Part ic ipatory Act ion Research

By defining critical historical, case study, and ethnographic

research in methodological terms that include reference to in

terpretation, explanation, and crit ique, we would also reaff irm

the autonomy required of any research program . Th e spe cif ic ity

of critical research lies in its non -empirical re f lexivity, co m bi ne d

with the use of case study methods for the purposes of the kind

of compa rative generalization and intensive exp lication inv olve d

w ith mo dels of social and cultural repr odu ction.

At this point, however, we turn to the critical functions of

ethn ograp hic research in a stronger sense l inked to polit ical

practice. One of the distinctive characteristics of critical re

search is that the kinds o f question s asked relate to the dyn am ics

of p ow er and exploitation in way s that potential ly are l inked to

practical intervention s and transformations. Acc ordin gly, from

this persp ective, enga ged, participatory action research becomes

a legitim ate po ssibility, though not the exclus ive basis for defin

ing crit ical ethnog raphy (K em m is and McT aggart 1988a, 1988b;

Lather 1 99 1). Partic ipato ry action research is also close ly related

to standpoint methodologies in the sense that the research ers

may, in fact, be stud ying th em selv es, or at least others in a sim ilar

situation (D . Smith 1990 ). This n otion has bee n in voke d most

com m on ly for w om en , racial and ethnic groups, and alternative

sexual orien tation s. Such pos sibilities perha ps are built into the

ve ry nature of autobiographical and life history methods, g iven

the intimate relationship between the crit ical-emancipatory



258


kn ow led ge interest and indiv idual deve lopm ent as med iated by

collective awareness.

In this respect such inquiries may break with some of the

methodological restrict ions of partic ipant observation by push

ing the question of partic ipation even further because the re

searcher no lon ger is assumed to be merely an outsid er loo kin g

in . Standpoint methodologies thus assume that researchers are

capable of ful l membership in the community to be observed,

hence further eroding the expert/subject dist inction. Further,

this assumption is coupled w ith a moral obligation to p articipa te,

given awareness of the l ived-exper ience of spec i f ic dominated

groups. This approach has been most well developed in stand

po int method olog ies concerned wi th the unique ex pe r ien ce

of race and gender. A n d it is he re that act ion research (a top ic

taken up in the concluding cha pter ) comes into its o w n in the dia

logu e o f me tho dolo gical strategies, as a special case of crit ical

ethnography.

Narrative and Discourse Analysis

In t roduct ion

Previously w e have spoken of the l inguistic turn as having

had a decisive imp act on the formulation o f con tem po rary critical

m etath eory , esp ecia lly as the basis o f

a

critiq ue o f the traditional

subject-object p olarization. But a paralle l develop m ent— wh at

som etimes has bee n called a narrative tu rn -h as had m ore

pract ica l consequences with respect to methodologies for the

study of the production, interpretation, and reception of mean

ings in social life.

A l imitation of Andrew Sayer 's account of types of extensive

and intensive explanation discussed above is that he does not

adequately address the problems specif ic to interpretive re

search of the typ e associated with cultural and social p sych ologi

cal analysis w h os e exp lana tory obje ctives do not fully co in cid e

w ith causal explanations o f the origins o f events. Th is l im itation

is also evident in efforts to make sense of the analysis resulting

from the intensive explication involved in case studies prior to




259

and ind epen den tly o f their possible uses for com parative gener

alization. T o be sure, he ack now ledge s that interp retive under

standing is presupposed by all these types of research, though

the exten t to w h ic h it is prob lema tized wi l l dep end on the top ic:

e.g., cultural studies as op po se d to ec on om ics (A . Sayer 1992,

p p . 236-7). Th e con cern here is neither w ith this question nor

the larger claim that ultimately all forms of social explanation

are narrative in character; instead w e w ish to address narrative

analysis o f discourse as a spe cif ic meth odo logical ap proach

central to ethnograph y, social psychology, and cultural st ud ies -

issues that go b ey on d Sayer's cons ideration o f intensive research

designs. He does address some of these issues in an appendix

con cern ed w ith the textual character of the presentation o f k no w l

ed ge in a discussion o f the narrative versus analysis deba te, the

neg lect of description and the inf lue nce o f rheto ric (A . Sayer

1992, p. 2 58 ). Perhaps Sayer's stress on structural explan ations

is salutary, give n the perva sivenes s of postm odern ist textuali-

zat ion of reality.

The study of narrative and discourse is concerned with the

analysis of meanings in social life. To the ex ten t that such re search

is allied w ith critical theory , ho w eve r, it necessarily resists either

the interpretivist temptation to reduce meanings to free-floating

discourses and the positivist imperative of reducing them to

structural variables. The problem of meaning is not entirely

absent in most empiricist research (the prim ary ex cep tion bein g

radical be ha vio rism ) but is hand led in quite a differen t way,

prim arily attitude research. This pro blem represents perhaps

the most central concern of empiricist quantitative (extensive)

socio logy, w h ic h attempts to measure attitudes and correlate them

with variables indicating social structures (e.g., income, educa

t ion). As w e shall see, how ever, the strategies for analyzing m ean

ing in intensive research be gin from ve ry different assum ptions.

To the exten t that posit iv ist approaches to m eth od olog y have

incorp orated a conc ern w ith techniques spe cific to cultural analy

sis and texts, the me tho d o f content analysis has be en the focus

of attention (H olsti 196 9). Con tent analysis, of course, is defin ed

in em piricist m etho dolog ical terms as a research techn ique for

the objective, quantitative and systematic study of communica

tions content. I t involves charting or counting the incid en ce, or

co-inc idenc e, of particular items belon ging to a set o f (usua lly)



260


pr ed eter m ine d cate gor ies (Jary and Jary 199 1, p. 11 7). For

example, endless studies of advertis ing and television show the

frequency with which particular racial or gender groups are de

picted (or not) in particular roles.

T h e questions related to a non -em piricist analysis o f m ean ing

(whether in the context of soc ia l act ion or cultural texts ) were

broached in important ways in symbol ic interact ionism, the

con cern w ith interpret ive understanding in the the ory o f Verste-

hen in the Germ an tradition (Dilthe y, W e b e r) , and the nature of

ideology cr i t ique in the Hegel ian Marxist tradit ion's concern

w ith cr it ica l hermeneut ics (Ado rno , Mann he im ) . An d indeed

these represent the foundations of interpretive social science.

But these early debates with in soc io logy w he re l im ited in im por

tant respects because of the absence of an adequate theory of

language. The revitalization of such issues during the past three

decades under the headings of structuralism, ' ' poststructural

ism , discourse analysis, and narrative th eo ry are l inked to

the impa ct of various typ es of l inguistic theo ry and the e xte ns ive

use o f narrative techn iques in the hum anities, espe cially lite ratu re.

W ha t is meant today by discourse and, m ore specifically, narra

tive as discou rse, espec ially as related to debates in the socia l

sciences? Narrative refers to the prim ary basis o f the m akin g o f

meaning. As a cogn it ive process i t organizes exp er ie nc e into

temporal episodes that can only be indirectly studied with

structuralist-type methods because they cannot be observed as

such: H ow ev er, the individual stories and histories that em erg e

in the creation of human narrative are available for direct obser

vation. Exam ples of narrative include pers onal and social histo

ries, m yths, fairly tales, no vels, and the ever yd ay s tories w e use

to explain our ow n and other 's actions (Polkin gho rne 1988, p. 1) .

T w o features o f this def init ion are crucial to note, both relat

ing to the w ay narrative as an ob je ct of in qu iry is no t available

to d i rec t observat ion ( the pr imary cr i te r ion o f fac tua l i ty in

em pir ic ism ). Th e def init ion stresses the di f ference b et w ee n

inv isib le narratives as cog nit ive proces ses, as op po se d to thos e

that take a wr it ten for m -as texts. Everyday stories have an

ambiguous status here because they occur in contexts of social

ac t ion and ye t could be wr i t ten do w n ( t ranscr ibed ) to beco m e

texts. W ha t this sl ippage b et w ee n th e analysis of action and nar

ratives suggests is that narrative analysis is co n ce rn ed w it h bo th




261

the analysis o f social action and texts even thoug h these m etho ds

originally were elaborated for the purposes of textual analysis.

In oth er wor ds , cogn it ive narratives do bec om e partial ly observ

able in the con text of in teraction. For this reason Paul Ric oeur has

wr it ten of meaningful act ion considered as a tex t (R ic oeu r

1981, pp. 197-221) .

6

But all narratives are also not subject to d irect o bs erv atio n in

another sense that is familiar from the basic problem faced by

structuralist-type analysis: The rules governing narrative struc

tures must be inferred from interpretive analysis and cannot be

ob se rv ed as socia l facts. It is this feature that has led to th e virtu al

exclus ion o f such meth odo logical issues from em piricist ac

counts of social scientific methodology.

The term discourse, in contrast, refers to the issues in vo lve d

in def ining units of analysis in narrative inqu iry. A discourse is

not just any colle ction of wo rd s or sentences: A discourse in an

integra tion o f sentences that prod uce s a global m eaning that is

more than that contained in the sentences viewed indepen

dently. Th er e are various kinds of d iscourses, and each kin d links

the sentences that compose it according to dist inct patterns

(Polk ingh orn e 1988, p. 31 ) . For exam ple, in the precedin g chap

ter , conc erned w ith non-empir ica l methods, w e w er e, in e f fect,

con cer ne d w ith s ociolog ical research as a kind o f social scien

tific discourse. In that co nt ext it wa s suggested that certain

types of ref lexive procedures should be used to analyze that

discourse as part of the research process

itself. Ref lex ive meth

ods (rhetorical, historical, and deconstructive analysis) were

give n particular attention because of their spe cif ic app licabil ity

to the analysis of social scientific discourse. We do not pursue

these forms of analysis any further here largely because, on the

one hand, they are less central to the issues of narrative struc

ture, ideology, and interpretation that have been central to the

sociology of culture and communications. On the other hand,

they re ma in m ore cen tral in literary analysis, thou gh in way s that

often are problematic from the perspective of l i terary crit ics

informed by crit ical social theory (Norris 1990).

Two tradit ions have contributed to the development of theo

ries of texts that have been of more central concern to substan

t ive inquir ies inf luenced by cr i t ica l theory: hermeneutics and

structuralism/poststructuralism. Critical hermeneutics provided



262


(as w e have se en ) the original basis of the the ory of id eo log y as

de velo pe d wi th in the Hegel ian Marxist tradition, on e l imited by

its dogmatic theory of history. We begin by discussing these

separately in ord er to gain som e historical pe rs pe cti ve. The n w e

turn to some specif ic types of discourse analysis that cur ren tly

are inf luential in the social science s and have pro ven instru ctive

for the problems posed by crit ical theory.

It should be poin ted out, ho we ver , that discourse has be co m e

one of the most widely and of ten confusingly used terms in

recen t theories in the arts and social scien ces, with ou t a clearly

def inable single uni fy ing co nc ep t (M ein ho f 1993, p. 161) . Th e

form s o f discourse analysis that have bee n d raw n o n by crit ical

theory have been characterized by two def ining traits: f irst,

interpretations of meaning are sensit ized to detecting forms of

distorted comm unication linked to p ow er and strategic (o r manip

ulative) forms of interaction; second, discourses eventually are

recon textu alized w ith refere nce to the historical social relations

through which they are constituted. Most recently, the method

ology of discourse analysis of this type has been synthesized

usefully in term s of a three-dim ension al m od el:

Any discursive event

(i.e., any instance of discourse) is seen as being

simultaneously a piece of text, an instance o f discursive pract ice,

and an instance of social practice. The text dimension attends to

language analysis of

texts.

The discursive practice dimension .. .

specifies the nature of the processes of text production and inter

pretation. . . . The social practice dimension attends to issues of

concern in social analysis such as the institutional and organiza

tional circumstances of the discursive event and how that shapes

the nature o f the discursive practice. (Fairclough 1992, p. 4

Hermeneut ics and Ideology Cr i t ique

Th e m ethodo logical problem s n ow associated w ith the not ion

of discourse analysis in critical theory can be traced back to the

crit ical hermeneutics of Georg Lukacs, Karl Mannheim, and the

early Frankfurt Sch ool. Th is typ e of analysis w as based on a th eo ry

o f total ity and the assumption that the underlyin g con tradictio ns

of the material foundations of society were expressed and re

flected in its cultural reproduction. The focus of such analysis




263

was elucidating the ideological dimensions of ideological proc

esses both through a transcendent critique based on the v ie w po int

of the revolutionary working class or an immanent critique

(more characteristic of the Frankfurt School) based on the inter

nal contradictions of bourgeois culture—that is, its inability in

practice to live up to its universalistic ideas of freedom and

equality. These issues entered into sociological theory through

the largely marginalized discussions in the sociology of knowl

ed ge and culture originally associated primarily wit h M ann heim 's

hermeneut ic sociology of knowledge (Simon ds 1978; Longh urst

1989;

Dant 199 1). Man nheim, for exam ple, turned the crit iqu e

of ideology on the Marxian tradition itself by demonstrating that

it could not ground its claim to a priv i leged per spe ctive (that o f

the working class) except through an arbitrary, metaphysical the

or y o f history. But Mann heim also poin ted to the general m etho

dological importan ce of a hermeneutic soc io logy of k no w led ge

as a basis for understanding the social genesis of ideas and the

evaluation of ideologies.

Such strategies remain a central part of critical cultural re

search but have been complemented by the shift toward under

standing ideology as distorted comm unication as op po sed to

false consciousness, and by m ore recen t de velo pm en ts in narra

tive theory. Classical ideology critique based on the theory of

total ity suffered from the problematic epistemological assump

tion of c laiming objectiv e truth , hen ce al low ed a strategy of

reading off other view po ints as merely false. Further, the th eo ry

of language implicated by this approach was inadequately devel

oped. Both the theory of communicative action and structura

tio n theory, in contrast, require a con cep tion of the active subject

that goe s beyo nd any assumption of mere du pes of ideo logy and

extensive ly incorporates linguist ic theory (T ho m pso n 1990) .

From Structural ist Semiotics

to Soc ial Semiotics

Un der the heading of structuralism, an ( init ia l ly) distinc

t ively different tradition deve lop ed under the inf lu enc e o f Durk-

heim ian socio log y (espec ially his analysis of religious thought sys

tem s) and the structuralist linguistics of Ferdinand de S aussure.

7

Th is tradition is also ofte n associated w ith the term sem iotics o r



264


semiology. Th e most famous exem pli f icat ion o f this approa ch

can be seen in the wo rk o f Claude Levi-Strauss on k inship system s

and tribal myths (Levi-Strauss 1967) and Roland Barthes on the

mythical structures of con tem pora ry mass culture (Barthes 19 72 ).

But the changes w ith in this tradit ion, as w el l as its co m pl ex

process of recept ion e lsewhere, have contr ibuted to a rather

messy situation wi th r esp ect to the status o f such m eth od s in the

socio logy of culture.

At t imes the no tion of a se m iot ic app roach to culture has

been used in an offhand and potential ly misleading way as, for

exam ple, in the influent ia l case of the interpre t ive anthrop olo

gist Cl i f ford Ge ertz, w h o conf lates it w ith any sym bol ic (h en ce

nonbehaviorist, nonfunctionalist, or nonmaterial ist ) approach:

The concept of culture I espouse . . . is essentially a semiotic one.

Believing with Max Weber that man is an animal suspended in webs

of significance he himself has

spun, I take culture to be those webs,

and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science

in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning. . . .

What defines it is the kind of intellectual effort it is: an elaborated

venture in, to borrow

a

notion from Gilbert Ryle, thick description

(Geertz 1973, pp . 5-6)

In fact, G eertz 's approa ch is a herm ene utic o n e quite at odds

with the traditional association of semiotics (and semiology) with

structuralist linguistics, w h ic h is associated for Ge ert z w ith the

mixtu res of intuit ion and alchem y that w ou ld quic kly dis

credit a sem iot ic approach to culture (G eer tz 1973, p. 30) .

Further, the status o f se m ioti c app roac hes has be en b lurr ed in

the context of poststructuralist theories of discourse that move

freely am ong the herm eneu tic tradit ions. Alt ho ug h in the Fren ch

con text the herm eneutic and structuralist traditions w e re v ie w e d

as diame trically op po se d appro aches to the study o f m ean ing,

m ore recently their com plem entarity has be co m e eviden t, a thesis

introdu ced by Paul Rico eur (R ico eu r 1974). From this latter post-

structuralist pe rsp ect ive , structuralist or sem iotic tex t interp re

tation is simp ly a special ty pe o f herm eneu tics inv olvin g hig h

levels of distanciation.

Considerable confusion is evident in discussions of semiotics

because of the profoun d sh ifts from th e 1950s through the 1970s




265

associated with the advent of poststructuralism as a successor

to structuralism. This confusion is perhaps most obvious in the

career of Roland Barthes, who was most responsible for popu

larizing th e term in his early w or k and then largely aban don ed it

in his later poststructuralist phase. Th e term social semiotics is

useful as a designa tion o f the form of s em iotic analysis that has

retained cre dibil ity in a poststructuralist con text w h er e it is

cruc ial to b e sensitive to history, interac tion , and the ref lex ivit y

of the researcher (Hodge and Kress 1988). Such strategies have

become an indispensable complement to the older forms of

ideolo gy cr i tique based in hermeneutics (Th om pso n 1990) .

Textua l D isco urse Ana lys is and P ow er

Sometimes the term discourse(and discourse formation) is

used synonymously with the specif ic approach of Michel Fou

cault and narr ow ed to scientif ic d isciplines, as in the fol low in g

definit ion: the particular 'scien tif ic ' and special ist lang uag e(s),

and associated ideas and social outcomes, which, according to

Foucault, must be seen as a major ph en om en on o f social po w er ,

and not simply a w ay o f describing the w o rl d (Jary and Jary

1991, p. 166). Foucault's version of discourse analysis is associ

ated closely w ith a crit ique of notions of po w er as a centralized

form of contro l, rejection o f the use of the con cep t of ideology,

and skepticism regarding the possibility of tracing the historical

or ig ins of kn ow ledg e systems.

But mo re comm only discourse analysis is ack no wled ged as a

general strategy (Parker 1992) incorpora ting a w id e variety of

techniqu es (e.g . , critical herm eneutics, social semiotics, con ver

sation analysis), as w el l as type s o f discourse (e.g., scien tific, inter

actional, pop ula r and elite cu ltu re). But a focus o n question s of

power,

ideology, and historical genesis defines the link to criti

cal methodologies even though Foucault 's contributions have

called into question conventional formulations of these ques

tions in instructive—and often completely devastating—ways.

More recently, an emergent major influence in discourse analy

sis is associated with the work of Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975),

a Russian ph i loso ph er and l i terary theor ist w h o has be co m e

re co gn ize d du ring the past deca de as perh aps the most signifi

cant social theorist in the Soviet tradition (Gardiner 1992). But



266


many of his w ork s we re lost and the rest (alon g w it h the Bakhtin

Circle he ins pir ed ) suppressed under Stalinism, and w e re fo r th e

most part only recently translated. What is most distinctive about

his approach in the present context is that he developed a

crit ique of structuralism from a crit ical herm ene utic pe rs pe cti ve

in the late 1920s (Volos in ov 1986) . Alth oug h he pre serv ed the

concept o f narrative structure as crucial to the the ory of ideol

ogy, he deve loped a dialogical model that anticipates man y of

the basic insights in Haberm as's th eo ry o f distorted comm unica

tion as an approa ch to the prob lem of i de olo gy and the analysis

of cultural texts.

Conclusion

The Decentered Ident i ty

of Crit ical Research

Alth ou gh the theoretical tradit ion of crit ical th eo ry has a

relatively coherent identity exten din g beyo nd the Frankfurt Sc ho ol

tradit ion, as w e h ave seen, the same cannot b e said of the form s

of substantive research that exemplify the intentions of this

research prog ram . First, there is a bo dy of em pirical research

directly associated with the early Frankfurt School tradition, as

well as more recent work that labels itself with reference to

co nte m po rar y theorists such as Haberm as or Gidden s.

But it w ou ld b e a mistake to limit the iden tificatio n of the link

be tw ee n cr it ical theory and emp ir ica l research to these exp l ic i t

indications of w or kin g w ith in a sch ool o f research. Th e pr i

m ary reason is that many of the centra l theme s and assum ptions

of cr i tica l the ory have been em braced im pl ic i t ly by p eo pl e w h o

do not directly identify with the key theoretical f igures dis

cussed in this study, or perhaps fall back on the inspiration of

others (e.g. , Foucault, Bourdieu, feminist theory) indirectly re

lated to this tradit ion. Furtherm ore m uch go od research carried

out under the inf luence of theoretical debates in substantive

domains does not necessarily link itself back to the general theo

retical debate. Althou gh w e wo uld not go so far as to label all

go od research as crit ical in this stronger sense, w e w ou ld not




267

want to restrict the tradition of critical research to explicit con

ne ction s. Th e increasin gly diverse and international cha racter o f

social research has increasingly erod ed the stronger sc ho ol

ties of various kinds that contributed to more solid identifica

tions of research orientations. Again this is not to fall back on

some kind of postmodernist pluralism to suggest that many com

plem enta ry things are bein g do ne under slightly dif ferent labels.

As a con sequ enc e, crit ical the ory as a research prog ram makes

no claim to be self-sufficient or define itself as a sc h oo l in the

traditional sense strong ly associated w ith a master thinker. As

a glance at the m ore substantive w ritings o f Giddens and Habermas

show s, they make referenc e to a w id e range of empirica lly b ased

literature that is not dir ectly insp ired by critical theory. Further,

their work is open-ended and fallibilistic in ways quite distinct

from the totalizing theor etical system s that have fil led the

intel lectual graveyard of W estern thought. Acc ord ing ly Gidden s

suggests that the em pirica l imp lications of structuration t he or y

have to be pursued primarily through the introduction of con

siderations—concerned with particular types of social systems

and their tran sfor m atio n-w hic h are not part of the the ory itself

(Gid den s 1989a, p. 30 0). At other points, those w h o m ay appear

to be crit ics may be taken to exe m plify the intentions of a

theoretical approach . For exam ple, Giddens cites R. W. Co nn ell 's

study on Gender and Power (C on ne ll 1987 ) as a major contri

bu tion but adds: Co nn ell is critical of my app roach and makes

use o f it on ly at a fe w junctures in his argum ent. Ye t these seem

to me pivotal to the overall c laims of the work and results in

a stand point that I f ind persua sive (Gid den s 1991a, p. 21 5) .

M uch the same can be said of the diffuse i nflu en ce of H aberm as,

many of w h os e apparent crit ics could be vi ew ed , from a broad er

perspective, in terms of participating in the tradition of critical

theory. It is thus important to differentiate family squabbles or

issues derived from exploring dif ferent empirical contexts of

research from m ore fundamental dif ferences.

Bas ic Assu m pt ions o f Cr it ica l M etho dolo gy

Similar prob lems o f identification be com e apparent in outlining

the basic assumptions of critical methodology. For example, the

implications of the critical theory of methodology developed in



268


the pr ece din g chapters for research pra ctice can b e distinguished

from emp iricist approaches in the fol lo w ing way s:

• The choice and manner of using methods (logics-in-use) cannot be

separated from the theory-informing method and the problem to be

clarified.

• Critical theory is dialectical in its recognition o f the double herme

neutic of social inquiry, hence social structures are preconstituted

by human agents.

• The non-empirical aspects of methodology (crucial to the logic of

discovery) are made explicit components of research practice.

• Because research within a

given society cannot be ideologically neu

tral, it is legitimate to justify rationally the definition of forms of

research guided by critical-emancipatory cognitive interests.

• The empirical dimensions of methodology are differentiated as

extensive

and

intensive, rather

than

quantitative and qualitative; and

intensive methods are considered primary for social theorizing

understood in interpretive structuralist terms.

• Extensive and intensive research designs can be differentiated with

respect to their focus on processes at the level of system integration,

social integration, and sociocultural mediation.

It w ou ld be possible to iden tify form s o f research that fall w ith in

these guidelines without making them fully explic it or making

reference to the critical theory tradition (through explicit cita

t io n) as w e have def ined it here. Much postcolonial anth ropolog y

would fall into this category. Similarly most social scientific defi

nitions of feminist methodology are clearly a specie s o f critical

methodology whose identity stems from its focus on gender/

po w er issues as the object of inqu iry.

8

Th ree M om en t s o f I n q u i r y

A n obstacle to understanding crit ical the ory as a research pro

gram has been the tendency to reduce its methodology to these

particular characteristics. For example, the critical-emancipa

tory interest may be invok ed to require ev er y individual investi

gation to have immediate transformative effects. Or, alternatively,

the ult imate focus on social prac tices may be interp reted to pre

clude the analysis of systemic properties of social institutions.




269

V ie w ed as a research prog ram w ith m any roo m s, crit ical th eor y's

analysis of the proc esses o f social and cultural rep rod uc tion and

chan ge em braces a w id e variety of intensive research designs;

the activist and interactionist options are in this respect exem

plary but not def init ive. In other words, although the research

pr og ra m itself do es entail certa in kinds of quasi-totalizing am bi

t ions as a regulative ideal, eve ry spe cif ic m etho dolog ical strategy

entails focusing on some aspects of reality at the expense of

oth ers; any give n investigation cannot attempt to do eve ryt hin g

at on ce . This is one p ractical reason for the traditional qualitative-

quan titative split, ev en if it obscu res mo re fundam ental bases fo r

selecting strategies. Similarly the macro-micro split reflects the

practical prob lem s in sl ic ing up social reality in man ageable

portions for inquiry. In both cases the resulting reification of

techniques and theoretical dist inctions becomes an obstacle to

inquiry.

Alth ou gh w e sym pathize wit h Giddens's suggestion that analy

sis should focus on social prac tices in a manner that bypasses the

dualism of agency and structure (as in the macro-micro distinc

t ion ) , w e f ind c on vinc ing the suggestion that there are practical

methodological grounds for research designs that focus on on e

or other of these dimensions, at least as long as their ultimate

unity in mutual constitution is never completely forgotten. Such

possibil it ies are built into the dist inction between system and

social integration shared by Habermas and Gidden s, one distinct

from the macro-micro dist inction, given its implication in the

understanding of the dua lity of structure un derlyin g critical

theory.

Analysis at the level of system integration may involve conc epts

invo lving functional-type part-whole relations. Th is involve

m ent entails the ma cro soc iolog ical assumption that society, as a

co nt rad icto ry totality, must be analyzed structurally as a proc ess

of reproduction and transformation of agency/structure rela

tions over time. But system integration here is understood in

term s of an inte rpr etive structuralism that rejects the analogy of

organic systems in favor of open, historical social formations.

In contrast, analysis at the level of social integration is pro c-

essual and interactionist, involving both individual and group

processes. Such investigations are carried out with the implicit

awareness of the conditional nature of social action—that is, that




i t ult imately is embedded in constraints imposed by systemic

relations. But the focus here is on skilled actors constructing

reality through praxis; hence it entails the phenomenological

assumption that the formation and transformation of individual

subject or self is the constitutive pr in cip le un derlying all social

inquiry, without fal l ing back into methodological individualism.

H en ce G iddens suggests that Verstehen must be un derstoo d no t

as a special m etho d o f entry into the social w or ld p ecu liar to the

social scie nc e, but as the on tolog ical co nd it ion o f human so ciet y

as it is pro du ced and repro duc ed by its m em ber s (Gid den s 1976,

p. 151).

Finally w ha t w e have called sociocultural mediation is analo

gous to what Giddens calls social practices, a fo rm of analysis

that seeks to realize the nearly impossible task of transcending

dualism, a task perhaps pos sible only fo r rather uniqu e type s of

social sett ings and con texts. On ly in crucial conjunctures do the

ruptures of social reproduction become studiable in the media

t ions between systemic structure and social action, the points

o f dereification in w h ic h nascent form s o f awareness are eithe r

increasingly elabo rated in a co llec tive learning pro cess o r tem

por ari ly (o r perm an en tly) s i lenced as a fai led qu estion ing. I t is

here that the dialectic of domination and resistance becomes

mo me ntari ly visible in forms that reveal the fragile foundations

of soc ia l order and potent ia l change. Th e nex t chapter exp lores

the conte xts of crit ical research in terms of these three m om ents

of inquiry: systemic, actional, and mediational.

Notes

1. There has bee n much recent discussion of the meth odology of the sociology

of culture that w e cannot review h ere, for exam ple, Grisw old 1987; Den zin 1991;

Mu nch and Smelser 1992. For informative o verv iews of issues in qualitative m ethod

ology, see Silverman 1989, Atkin son 1990, and Gu ba 1990.

2. Our approach is consistent with Craig Calhoun's formulation: "One of the

problem s of m any epistemological critiques is that they have seem ed to end orse

or entail a relativism so thoroughgoing as to make empirical rese arc h- an d most

scholarly discourse -mea ningless. . . . M y argument is not just for the virtues of

history and ethnography, but for the virtues of a theory which can take both of

them seriously. Yet . . . this is an argument for theory— including bo th empirical




271

and normative theory, and theory of very broa d reach. . . . The kin d of th eory I

advocate would be continuous with cross-cultural and historical description, but

not identical to them beca use the explanations the theory pro poses wo uld purp ort

to anticipate or account for cases beyon d those for w hi ch they wer e dev elop ed"

(Calh oun 1992a, p. 246).

3. See An dr ew Saver's text (1992) for a detailed elaboration of the meth odology

of intensive research applied to problems of structuralist causal analysis in case

studies and, m ore generally, tw o studies that beca me available only after com ple

tion of this manuscript: Layder (1993), which provides a useful sequel to the

present study; and Blaikie (1993 ), whi ch covers much of the same ground as w e

do in the philosophy of social sciences, but somewhat confusingly and schemati

cally stresses the differences among interpretivism, critical theory, realism, struc

turation theory, and femin ism-a s opp ose d to the broader convergence stressed here.

4. Ragin's formalization of wha t he calls the "qualitative comparative m etho d"

reinforces our previous argument about the problem s of the qualitative-quantita

tive distinction, as well as the distinctiveness of interpretive generalization and

variable analysis: "The princ iple guiding the formulation o f this approach w as that

the essential features of case-oriented methods should be preserved as much as

possib le. . . . This is important beca use mainstream statistical methods disaggre

gate cases into variables and distributions be fore analyzing them. This practice m akes

historical interpretive work very difficult, if not impossible." (Ragin 1987, p. x).

5. As Haberm as stresses: "In place of controlled observatio n, wh ic h guarantees

the anonymity (exchangeability) of the observing subject and thus of the repro

ducibility of the observation, there arises a participatory relation of the under

standing subject to the subject confronting him [Gegenuber] (alter eg o) . The

paradigm is no longer the observation b ut the dialogu e-thu s, a comm unication in

wh ic h the understanding subject must invest a part of his subjectivity, n o matter

in wha t m anner this may be controllable, in order to be able to meet confron ting

subjects at all on the intersubjective level which makes understanding possible.

To be sure (as the example of the ground rules for the psychoanalytic dialogue

sh ow s) this makes disciplinary constraints more necessary than ever. Th e fashion

able dem and for a type of 'action research,' that is to comb ine p olitical enlighten

ment with research, overlooks that the uncontrolled modification of the field is

incompatible with the simultaneous gathering of data in that field, a condition

which is also valid for the social sciences" (Habermas 1973, pp. 10-11).

6. Ov er the past deca de the concept of discourse as narrative analysis has be en

pr op os ed -in opposition to attitude theory and cognitive scie nc e-as an alternative

paradigm for a constructionist social psychology (Potter and Wetherell 1987;

Bruner 1990; Parker 1992). A parallel developm ent is evident in No rm an Den zin's

effort to revise sym bolic interactionism as part of a critical cultural studies (De nz in

1992).

7. The differences between the critical hermeneutic and structuralist tradi

tions are most striking in the positivist phase of structuralism; in the poststructu

ralist form represented b y Ricoeu r and Bourdieu, their potential comp lementarity

becomes apparent.

8. "From a revie w of the literature we have identified five basic epistemological

principles discussed by scholars who have analyzed feminist methodology in the

field of sociology. They include: (1 ) the necessity of continuously and reflexively



272


attending to the significance of gender and gender asymmetry as a basic feature

of all social life, including the conduc t of research; (2 ) the centrality of cons cious

ness-raising as a specific methodological tool and as a general orientation or 'way

of seein g'; ( 3 ) the need to challenge the norm of objectivity that assumes that the

subject and object of research can be separated from o ne another and that personal

and/or grounded experiences are unscientific; (4) concern for the ethical impli

cations of feminist research and recognition o f the exploitation of wo m en as objects

of knowledge; and (5) emphasis on the empowerment of women and the trans

formation of patriarchal social institutions through research" ( Co ok and Fo no w 1990,

pp.

72-3).



1 1

C O N T E X T S OF C R I T I C A L

E M P I R I C A L R E S E A R C H

The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many

determinations, hence unity

of

the diverse

. . . the

method

rising rom the

abstract

to the

concrete

is the only way in which

thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the con

crete in the mind. (Marx cited in Tucker 1978, p. 237)

The problem of the relation between the constitution (or, as I

shall often say, production and reprodu ction) of society by

actors, and the constitution of those actors by the society of

which they are

members,

has nothing to do with a differentia

tion between micro- and macro-sociology; it cuts across any

such division.

(Giddens 1976,

p. 22)

The world is systematized

horror,

but therefore it is to do the

world too much honor to think of it entirely as a system; for

its unifying principle is division, and it reconciles by asserting

unim paired the irreconcilability

of

the

general and

the

par

ticular.

(Adorno 1974,

p. 113)

The Range of Cr it ical Re search

Th e task of this chapter is to give som e indications of the influ enc e

of contem porary crit ical theory

on

em pirical research. By that

we

do not refer exclusively to the specif ic inf luence of people such

as Haberm as, Giddens, o r others, or even an exp licit identification

w ith crit ical theo ry or critical social sc ien ce as a research

273



274


pro gram . As any close investigation o f research fields wo ul d show ,

so many of the concepts and methodological stances originally

associated w ith critical the ory in the narrow er sense have b ec om e

part of the com m on culture of the human science s, at least among

researchers engaged in work falling outside the traditional bounda

ries of empiricist or purely interpretive inquiry. The names given

to such tend enc ies and the authors cited fo l lo w a w id e var iety

o f patterns reflectin g specific national traditions and the diversity o f

contemporary research.

Th e most com m on strategy of a com preh en sive research re

vi ew has the advantage of providing a com pend ium of the theore ti

cal approaches and results. For exa m ple, Ke llne r surveys critical

theory from the early Frankfurt School to the present under the

head ing o f early state and political ec on om y debates, authoritarian

perso nality theory , culture industries research, along wit h m ore

recent trends: needs and consumption theory, state crisis theory,

the ne w social movem ents and radical politics (Ke llne r 1989a). In

contrast, Harve y surveys a small num ber of exam ples o f emp ir

ical research studies draw n from the substantive dom ains o f class,

race, and gen der (H arv ey 199 0). That appro ach has the advan

tage of the concreteness of a substantive prob lem focus , for

w h ic h a variety of m etho dolog ical strategies can be i l lustrated

by topic in some detail .

We propose yet another alternative for the purposes of this

chap ter, on e that lies b et w ee n the abo ve strategies. In the 1990s

the inf luence of crit ical theory and crit ical social science cuts

across so many disciplines in complex ways that it has become

virtual ly impossible to survey without arbitrary boundaries .

Ke llne r doe s so in a man ner that adheres clo sel y to the Frankfurt

tradit ion and its m ore or less direct inf lu enc es in Nor th Am eri ca ,

but even there crucial soc iolog ical contributors such as No rm an

Birnbaum and A lvi n Gou ldner are ne glec ted, along w ith Gidd ens

and all of those inf luenced by his example in Britain.

1

Further,

i f w e w er e to exten d the criteria o f inclusion on ly slightly, o ne

would have to consider extensive debates stimulated by crit ical

the ory in f ie lds such as anthro pology, history, law, ed uca tion,

social work, social psychology, cultural studies, feminist theory,

and theology—to name just a fe w of the disciplina ry dom ains

largely neglected.



Contexts of Research

275

In the present study we have argued, however, that broadly

shared metatheoretical and substantive issues cut across these

disciplinary p ractices. Soc iology has been perha ps the most w ell

situated in m ediating this proc ess, eve n as it has ben efitted from

the seminal contributions of those in other fields o r on the margins

of s ocio logy as a discipline (M or ro w 1985). That is the justif ica

tion for referring to critical th eo ry as a sup rad isciplin ary

project even though in practice most researchers have had to

code their work in more disciplinary terms that facilitate com

mu nication w ith sp ecif ic audiences. Similarly w e have foc used

m ore on the notion of crit ical theo ry as soc iolo gy as part of

defining an ecumenical framework, rather than as any kind of

imperial c laim for the disciplinary primacy of sociology.

Th e ob jectives o f our revie w in this chapter thus are d ictated

by attempting to com e to terms with the intrinsic tensions w ith in

critical research arising from the effort to study agency and

structure without the dualism of micro-macro. For purposes of

convenience, therefore, we organize our discussion around the

classic three domains in which crit ical research has focused:

political economy and state theory, cultural analysis, and social

psychology. Thes e broad, overlapp ing domains conc eal many

top ics that also m ight illuminate critical research. So, for exam

ple,

the focu s on gend er, race, and class usefully focu ses o n the

primary contexts of asymmetrical power relations, topics that

m igh t appear in any of the dom ains in our m ore gen eral schema .

In the case of gender, however, the limitations of this basic

schema-deriving from the interdisciplinary research program

of the early Frankfurt School and extended by Habermas—run

de ep er than the incidental constraints inevitably im po sed by any

organ izing fram ewo rk (Fraser 1989; Marshall Fo rth co m ing ). De

spite the pioneering analysis of authority in the patriarchal

family in early critical theory, as Nancy Fraser has argued, an

unth ematized gen der sub text of Habermas's the ory of comm u

nicative action contributes to relegating the issues of the family

and gender to issues of socialization and social psychology that

ob scur e fundamen tal issues. Such an analysis revea ls the inade

quacy of those crit ical theories that treat gender as incidental

to politics and political economy. It highlights the need for a

critical the ory w ith a categorical framew ork in w h ic h gender,



276


po lit ics, and polit ical econ om y are internally related (Fraser

1989, p. 128 ). Th ese gend er blindsp ots are especially consequen

tial for the theo rization o f the we lfare state and the pro blem atic

ef fects of the private/public dist inction with respect to Haber

mas 's theo ry o f the democrat ic pub l ic sphere (Calhoun 199 2b) .

Such issues w ou ld b e central to a discussion o f the interna l

crit iques of crit ical theory, as w el l as n ew poin ts of depa rture

for research. For the pur pose s at hand, ho w eve r, w e necessari ly

focus on simply illustrating the range of crit ical research from

the general ized perspect ive of the re lat ionship between theory

and methodology. He nce , our primary purp ose here is an analyti

cal presentation of the relationship of crit ical theory, methodo

logical strategies, and various con texts o f emp irical research.

For that pu rpo se w e isolate the three m om ents of the research

process that define focal points for research strategies: (a) struc

tural analyses o f system integration, ( b ) inte rpre tive analyses of

social action by individual and grou p agents, and ( c ) mediational

analyses that reveal the simultaneous op era tion o f agency and

structure-the ideal outcome of inquiry according to Giddens 's

theory of structuration. Further, our objective here is il lustrative

rather than evaluative; that is, w e are not dire ctly co nc ern ed

w ith the various internal disputes that def ine the on go in g devel

opm ent o f such a mult i faceted research pr og ra m .

2

What is dist inctive about crit ical research when well done is

that even if it focuses on any one of these moments (or substan

tive dom ain s), i t tr ies to remain conscious o f the other t w o in

framing and executing the research process. The result ing ten

sion stems from the assumption that you can't do eve ry th ing at

on ce . Built into any m ethod ic pro ced ur e is the heurist ic ne ed

to break up the f low of reality—here society as a multidimen

sional, historical totality—for analytic purposes. To be sure, on

the one hand, the posit iv ist model so priorit izes the moment of

the techn ical co ntr ol o f data that reality itself is fully re ifie d and

fragmented. On the other hand, purely interpretive models run

the risk of an immersion in reality that does not allow analytic

distance. And purely activist approaches risk being swallowed

up in the present m om ent in a search for resistance and ch ang e.

A key assumption is that each of these modes of analysis pre

supposes the other even though polemical pr ior i ty disputes




277

often obscu re this comp lementarity. Dif ferences amon g crit ical

researchers largely reflect these different research emphases:

Those concerned with systemic structures lean in a posit iv ist

direction ( w e reinterpret their objectives in critical realist ter m s)

to be able to identify structural determinations; those focusing

on social action give prio rity to an interpretive stance c on cern ed

w ith agents; and those w h o attempt the most challen ging form s

of mediational inquiry o ften m ake no one happy because neither

age nc y no r structure is assigned cen ter stage.

An Extended Example :

Gottd iene r ' s Cr i t ique of U rb an Socio logy

Given the volume of the material to be reviewed and the

resulting cursory indications of the research strategies, it is useful

to beg in w ith a m ore detailed presentation o f a representative

exa m ple of em pirically oriented crit ical theory. For this pu rpo se

Mark G ottdiener's The Social Production of Urban Space (1985b )

cross-cuts the issues at stake in a manner that nicely illustrates

most of the basic methodological concerns of research inf lu

enced by crit ical theory.

3

Th e poin t of departure is a crit ique of

mainstream urban sociology (and related forms of geography)

based on posit iv ist methodologies and simplist ic evolutionary

models of universal and inexorable urban development, for exam

p le ,

the sequence of preindustrial, urban-industrial, and metro

po litan stages. In such mainstream analysis fundam entally n ew

forms of sett lement spaces either have been ignored or their

implications have been theoretically misrecognized.

The focal point of empirical analysis in Gottdiener's critical

th eor y o f urban sociolo gy is the reorganization o f sett lemen t

spaces, especia l ly the process of dec on cen trat ion - t he expan

sion of high-density populations outside traditional city regions

and urban centers. Altho ugh a genera lized proc ess, d econ cen-

tration is nevertheless historically specific (at this point) to

postwar developments in the United States. Polit ical economy,

w ith its emphasis on class confl ict and the logic o f capital accumu

lation, pro vide s som e crucial initial clues for a fundam ental re-

conceptualization of urban science directed toward explaining



278


deco ncen tration . Yet th ere are l imitations to these analyses that

are endemic to Marxist theory generally, for example,

the inab ility ... to break away from the ideological categories of main

stream economic rea soning. ..; the scourge of positivism, in particu

lar the penchant for replacing monocausal, deterministic arguments

on the mainstream side with marxian versions o f the same thing; and,

finally, the imprecise way in wh ich the state-society articulation is

specified, which undercuts the ability of the marxian approach to

address political phenomena within settlement space. (Gottdiener

1985b, p. 20 )

As against the positivism underlying this form of political eco no m y,

the exa m ple o f critical realism and its und erstanding is invoke d as

an alternative metatheory for redirecting inquiry of this type

(G ottd ien er 1985b, pp . 158-9). M or e specifically, an analysis o f

space is introd uce d at the de ep level o f capitalist relations to sh ow

how such processes of development affect spatial phenomena in

a wa y marxists cannot explain (Go ttdien er 1985b, p. 160).

D eve lop ing a synthetic and con structive alternative, he con

tinues w ith a crit ical rev ie w o f the rich, m ore sp ecif ic discus

sions of spatiality in the Marx ian tradition as foun d in the w or ks

of M anuel Castells (a Spanish sociologist w h o studied in F ran ce)

and Hen ri Le febvre , a French Marxist ph i losop her w h o p io

neered the them e of everyday l i fe and the pro du ct ion of

spa ce as socio logica l topics. In the course of Gottd iene r 's dis

cussion, on the on e hand, the pro blem atic elem ents o f Castells 's

Althusserian-type structuralism become apparent; and on the

othe r hand, suggestive aspects of Lefe bvre 's hu ma nistic ap

proach lead directly into consideration of structure and agency

in the production of space. What is required is to see that the

relations involved are "simultaneously eco no m ic, pol i t ica l and

cultural . . . that social phenomena are contingent rather than

predeterm ined, fo l low ing a rea lis t ep is temo logy (Got td iener

1985b, p. 207 ). From this per spe ctive, sociospatial patterns and

interactive process es are seen as constituting c on tinge nt out

comes of the many contradictory relations inte rac ting in the

capitalist m od e, rather than as dir ect pro du cts o f either capitalist

intentions or structural ma china tions (19 85 b, p. 2 3) .



Contexts of Research 279

On the basis of this synthesis, Gottdiener's attention shifts

back to the empir ica l analys is of deco nce ntra t ion as a form of

uneven d eve lopm ent in the Un ited States, a proce ss that has under

cut the previous city-country opp osit io n stil l relevant else w he re.

Th e outc om e of decon centration is thus a profou nd transforma

tion of the social landscape:

The action of abstract space fragments all social groups, not only

the least powerful, so that local community l ife loses the street and

public areas of communion to the privacy of the home The new

areas of communion are encapsulated within social worlds engineered

by the logic of consumption-the malls, shopping centers, singles

bars, amusements parks, and suburban backyards. (Gottdiener

1985b, p. 272)

Th e mainstream literature's account of the natural pro ces s

of urbanization is unveiled as an unco ordinated form o f p rof it

taking aided by the state and involving the manipulation of

spatial patterns by vested interests operating within the prop

erty sec tor (198 5b , p. 23 ). Thus the em pirical analysis of decon

centration has direct imp lications for polic y crit ique, espec ial ly

the standoff between neoconservatives and left ist l iberals who

remain locked w ith in the same mainstream framew ork of assump

tions about economic growth and urbanization. In this context

Marxists differ from mainstreamers only through the reformist

schemes proposed, which seek to ameliorate the inequit ies of

economic patterns of development. This eludes the transforma

tive role of social thou ght (198 5b , p. 271 ). Further, mainstream

ecolog ists focus on the value pro blem atic and thus neg lect the

historical processes that have created these outcomes. In short,

through the ideological devices of conventional thought, the

causes of society's problem s are advocated as their cures (1 98 5b ,

p. 288 ) .

As op pos ed to the "Utopian schemes of left-liberal reformers,

another form of Utopian though t is requ ired, on e based on a very

differen t diagnosis of the realities of capitalist urban ization. Th is

form requires a shift of attention to un priv i lege d spaces, n ew

social m ovem ents, contradictions of the ideo logy o f gro w th , and

to chan ging the exist ing pr op ert y relations of society and re

des igning both the workplace and community accordingly



280


(198 5b, p. 28 9) even though this project , ty ing prod uct io n and

con sum ption relations toge ther in a l iberated sp ace, remains

un deve loped in radical though t (198 5b, p. 29 1) .

In short, Gottdiener 's study combines virtually al l of the fea

tures we have l inked with unit ing crit ical theory and empirical

research : a critical me tath eor y that stresses in ter pr etiv e structu

ralism and the agency-structure d ialectic; a crit iqu e o f exist ing

knowledge claims coupled with an alternative synthesis based

on a historical, interp retive structural mod el that l inks system ic

analysis (e. g., po litica l econ om y, the sta te) w it h cultural analysis

and social psych ology; the use o f a w id e range o f emp irical evi

de nc e (case studies that are oft en qua ntitative, but not driv en by

stat ist ica l model ing) based on histor ica l , e thnographic , demo

grap hic, and cultural materials; and a norm ative critique gro un de d

in an understanding of the generative causal mechanisms under

lying the phenomena to be transformed in the name of generaliz-

able and justif iable needs and hop es as exp resse d and ref lected—

often is distorted form—in the everyday lives of mem bers o f urban

communit ies .

The fol lowing overview somewhat arti f ic ial ly organizes an ex

tensive bod y o f material in terms o f a substantive focus on po litic al

economy and the state, cultural theory, and social psychology.

Within each, discussion touches on representative analyses re

flecting, respectively, the systemic, actional, and mediational em

phases of critical research. T h e three substantive dom ains iden ti

f ied corresp ond w ith ( thou gh also s l ight ly reor gan ized ) the four

dom ains of em pirical in qu iry that Haberm as sees as the con tem

po rar y agenda of crit ical the ory : interd isciplina ry research on

the selective pattern of capital ist m od ern izatio n (Ha berm as

1987a, p. 39 7). W ha t he calls the form s of integra tion in post-

liberal so cie tie s corr esp on ds to our analysis o f the state and

eco no m y; mass media and mass cultu re to the dom ain of the

so cio lo gy of culture and cultural studies; and fam ily socializa

t ion and eg o develo pm ent along w ith protest poten tial to social

psych ology. Ou r m ore standard and gen eric terms he lp p re se rve

the dist inct ion be tw ee n Habermas 's strong progra m for cr i t ica l

theory and the range o f complementary top ics that might be

and have been o f concern to those w ork ing w i t hin a w eak er

program.




281

State and Economy

Introdu ct ion : Pol it ica l Econo m y

and Pol it ical Sociology

The use of statistical modeling for studies of systemic proper

t ies has been the basis of modern economic theory (economet

rics) and has been em ployed w ide ly in various forms of system s

analysis. The most compell ing versions appear to be those in

domains that most closely touch on the interface between

nature and soc iety- th at

is ,

areas w h e re statistical regularities are

grounded in the nature of the phenomenon: economic and demo

grap hic processes and their relationship to the environm ent. For

mal system models of society have been much less convincing

and largely without inf luence. Formalization of systems models

is ach ieved at the price o f an extre m ely h igh level of abstraction

(Freem an 1973 ). Th e more inf luential systems mod els w ith in

soc iolo gy (structural functionalism and neofu nction alism ) are

qualitative in nature (Alexan der 198 5). In other w or ds , the use

of statistical m ode ling largely took the form of con firm ing theo

retical arguments generated by structural functionalist theory,

rather than participating in the construction of the theory.

Systemic analysis in the political economy and critical theory

traditions is most similar to qualitative functionalist theo ry, tho ugh

it may employ economic model ing procedures for certa in pur

poses. In fact, functionalist Marxist accounts are methodologi

cally parallel to structural functionalism in their attribution of

system needs and teleolog ical m echanisms; they dif fer because

the need s of capital replace the i l lusory need s of society. Th e

develo pm ent of a mo re historically contingent interp retive struc

tural crisis the or y

as a theory of social and cultural rep rod uc tion,

however, has allowed analysis of systemic contradictions in a

more plausible manner consistent with recognit ion of the

communicative basis of social integration and the possibilities

of transformation.

Systemic Models : Cr is is Theory

Classical political economy wa s used in basically det erm i-

nist ways based on simplistic assumptions about the inexorable



282


unfolding of systemic contradictions. As w e have seen, early Frank

furt Crit ical Th eo ry wa s plagued by a Ma rxist functionalism of

this kind, though one creatively used to analyze the transit ion

from laissez-faire to state capitalism in the 1930s and 1940s.

Co nte m po rar y crit ical theories of the state can be cha racteriz ed,

in contrast, w ith having pio nee red research based on th e assump

tion of the l imitations of polit ical econ om y, a strategy em plo ye d

today by many w h o otherw ise migh t be labeled neo-Marxist .

The l imits of pol i t ica l economy have been expl ic i t ly and con

structively addressed in the w or k o f Offe and Hab erma s, as w e

have seen , in their attempt to con struct a crisis th eo ry fo r the

form o f advanced capitalism eviden t by the 1970s. In this co nt ex t

the thesis of the fiscal crisis of the state is rooted in a polit ical

economic model o f systemic contradict ion (O'Connor 1987) . In

this revised form, systemic analysis informed by polit ical econ

om y remain s a key aspe ct of critical social research and has b ee n

expa nd ed in creative ways by a num ber of researchers not

direct ly conn ected (des pite important inf lu en ces ) to the Frank

furt critical the or y tradition. Des pite stress on the nee d to re vise

the older polit ical econ om y, critical theo ries dif fer sharply fro m

the tendency of theories of postindustrial society and postmod-

ernity to deny the continu ing signif icance of key elemen ts of the

capital ist organization of production.

A distinctive theme of classical critical theory was the selec

t ive way technology was appropriated in the capital ist produc

t ion process, a form of analysis inf lue nced by W eb er 's th eor y of

instrumental rationalization. From this perspective technology

and bureaucratization had to be analyzed as independent sources

of domination that had been neglected within the Marxist tradi

t ion. Today this typ e of quest ion has bee n pre serv ed under the

heading o f the critical theory of techno logy. An oth er focal po int

for med iational analysis related to the state and eco nom y has be en

research on the social uses and shaping of technology (Leiss

1974,

1990; Ar on ow itz 1988) and the imp l icat ions for feminist

th eo ry (Wajcm an 199 1). In m ovin g back from th e abyss of the

technological determinism and fatal ism implied by authors as

diverse as Ad or no , Heideg ger, and Ellul, crit ical th eo ry neverth e

less rejects the thesis of the neutrality of technology:




283

The dominant form of technological rationality is neither an ideol

ogy (an essentially discursive expression of class self-interest) nor is it

a neutral requirement determined by the nature of technique

Critical theory argues that technology is not a thing in the ordinary

sense of the term, but an ambivalent process of development

suspended between different possibilities. This ambivalence of

technology is distinguished from neutrality by the role it attributes

to social values in the design, and not merely the use, of technical

systems. On this view, technology is not a destiny but a scene of

struggles. It is a social battlefield, or perhaps a better metaphor

would be a parliament of things on which civilization's alternatives

are debated and decided. (Feenberg 1991, p. 14)

A rem arkable illustration of the role of tec hn olo gy as part of

a

social batt lefie ld is pro vide d by David No ble 's study of h ow

eng inee ring in Am erica early came under the sway of c orp ora te

capitalism, a pro cess that dramatically shaped industrial design

around issues of po w er and control in the w ork plac e (N ob le 19 77 ).

Transformations of technology also are implicated in the

em erg ing form of techno-capital ism, w he re wh at M arx calls

the 'organic composit ion of capital ' shifts toward a preponder

ance o f constant over variable capital, as ma chines and tech no lo

gies progressively and often dramatically replace human labor

p ow er in the prod uct ion pro cess (Kel ln er 1989a, p. 179) . A

related polit ical ec on om ic argument that has inf lu enc ed crit ical

the ory is the notion of p o s t - F o r d i s m - t h z t is, the sug gestion that

a fundamental shift is occurring in the production process. In

contrast to the For dist strategies of the past based on r igid

specialization along assembly lines, post-Fordist production

processes increasingly are built around decentralization and

flexib ility. T he se changes have far-reaching effects in all spheres

of society and culture, including the phenomenon of postmod

ernism (D . Ha rvey 1989 ). Th e post-Fordist theme , for e xam ple,

is cen tral to the disorganized capitalism thesis o f Lash and U rr y

( 1 9 8 7 ) .

4

In their comparative study of f ive countries (Germany,

Sw eden , Britain, France, and the Un ited States) they attem pt to

demonstrate the shift ing relations between l iberal, organized,

and disorganized capitalism, especially the latter two. Changes

are comp ared along three axes: the predomin ant organizational

structures, changes within territories, and the predominant



284


method s o f transmitting kn ow led ge and carrying out surv eillanc e.

Dis org an ized capitalism is associated w ith a glob al, transnational

economy, the decline of distinct national and regional economies

built around major industrial cities, and the role of electronic

communicat ion in reducing the t ime-space distances between

p eo pl e, as w el l as enha ncing capacit ies for surv eil lance . W ha t

is espe cial ly signif icant m eth odo logic ally about this study is the

wa y it incorporates polit ical eco no m ic arguments w ith in a frame

work sensit ive to transformations of culture.

An oth er th em e that has em erg ed as central in crit ical th eories

is the phenomenon of globalization:

The challenge for sociology . . . is to both theorize and work out

modes of systematic investigation which can clarify these globaliz

ing processes and distinctive forms o f life wh ich render problem

atic what has long been regarded as the basic subject matter for

sociology: society, conceived almost exclusively as the bounded

nation-state. (Featherstone

1990, p. 2)

As w e have seen, this them e has been especially central to G iddens's

critique of historical materialism and an ack no w ledg ed strength of

world system theory despite its pro blem atic aspects (Wa llerstein

1990;

Boyne 199 0). Finally in political sc ienc e the field o f interna

tional relations has been influenced increasingly by debates in

critical theo ry and poststructuralism (Lin klater 1990; D er D erian

and Shapiro 1989).

Another disputed theme or ig inat ing in pol i t ica l economy has

b ee n the status of the analysis o f social class in adva nc ed capital

ism. Research guided by neo-Marxist assumptions (M iliba nd 198 7;

W right 198 5,19 89) cont inues to def ine the prob lema tic in terms

of class posit ions and their relation to the mode of production.

H en ce the prim ary focu s of such research has be en to m ap class

positions defined in this way despite modifications that acknowl

edge intermediate middle strata and the signif icance of subjec

tive class awareness. But it has pro ven most problem atic t o co n ne ct

that kin d o f structural analysis to actual pr oce sse s of and p ote n

tial for ch ange . As a con seq ue nc e, the status and functions of

class analysis have be en tran sformed fundam entally in co ntem

porary crit ical theory. The classic Marxian thesis that reduces




285

class dynamics to the systemic features of the capitalist mode

of production is rejected as a failure. A pioneering contribution

of this kind was Giddens's analysis of the class structure of ad

vanced societies (Giddens 1973). More recently an alternative

critical stratification theory is suggested that seeks to reestab

lish the links between stratification processes and social action

as suggested by the work of Habermas, Offe, Touraine, and others:

A post-Marxist approach to stratification should be able to identify

the structural contradictions, crisis tendencies, and mechanisms of

stratification within contemporary social systems; to assess the

potentials for and of social movements without presupposing the

primacy of either the economy or socioeconomic class struggles. It

must also be able to justify the principles guiding the partisanship

for a given social and political project against others. (I. J.

Cohen

1982,

p. 195)

Action Analysis:

Political Actors and Civil Society

Research concerned with social integration can be pursued by

a number of different interpretive perspectives, and hence is not

specific to critical theory as such. The most important body of

such work is Weberian in inspiration because, for Weber, a focus

on concrete group struggles was the primary concern of socio

logical analysis. In this connection social closure theory has

proven especially fruitful for the analysis of group-based strate

gies of exclusion both within social classes and outside of them

(Murphy 1988; Manza 1992). Somewhat more broadly, interpre

tive studies of actual and potential political actors have been

important for critical researchers. In this context the primary

focus of analysis has been civil society-t\\2X is, the non-state

institutions not directly linked to the economy. For it is here in

voluntary forms of association that the foundations for partici

pation and political protest are built. From the perspect ive of

critical theory one of the central issues has been the implications

of the changing character of civil society for the social actors

within it (Keane 1984, 1988a, 1988b; Cohen and Arato 1992).



286


Media t iona l Inqu i ry : The Pub l ic Sphe re

an d Trans form at ive Act ion

In a sense m ediational analysis is to a great ex ten t a special case

of interpretive action analysis; the primary difference is that it

involves the study of phenomena that are indicative of crucial

mo men ts of fai led or successful social and cultural r ep rod uc tion ,

hence the strategic interplay of structure and action. In the

context of Western democracies the deve lopment of the public

sphere o f dem ocratic debate has pr ovid ed the central the m e f or

mediational research on the state (Calhoun 1992b). Central to

crit ical theory, especial ly in the wake of abandoning classical

revolution ary theory , has be en the pro ble m o f l inkin g the em

pir ica l and normative aspects of a n ew theo ry o f dem ocra cy

(Frankel 1987; He ld 198 7). M or e generally, it has be en argued

that Habermas's account of the democratic public sphere needs

to be cor rect ed by emp irical research in the sociolo gy o f culture

that suggests that advances in un iversalistic ration ality h ave no t

necessari ly required decontextualized systems of discourse

conducted by talking heads in virtual isolation from the baser,

quotidian realities that were essentially antithetical to discourse

based on universalist ic claims (Zaret 1992, p. 2 3 ).

A landmark historical mediational study is E. P. Thompson's

The Mak ing of the English Working Class,

clo se analysis o f th e

em erg en ce o f a self-conscious co llect ive acto r in Brit ish histo ry

(T ho m ps on 196 8). Similarly research on various typ es of con

temporary class, racial, and gender movements has provided

insights into the dynamics of the restructuring of democratic

pu blic l i fe . For exam ple, Eyerman and Jameson attemp t to m ake

a case for the cognitive dim ension of the Am eric an civi l r ights

movem ent and its impact on restructuring Am erican dem ocra cy

(Eyerman and Jameson 1991) . Th e broader con text of media

t ional analysis in polit ical sociology revolves around the theme

of the dem ocratic pub lic sph ere, a top ic that has revitalized the

discussion of democratic theory. Of course these issues cannot

be separated clearly from cultural theory and the mass media.

Similarly a con cern of crit ical po licy research has be en on the

interplay bet w ee n planning pract ices and pub l ic part ic ipat ion

(Kemp 1985; Forester 1985a; Chorney and Hansen 1993) . The

issues are parallel to those o f many othe r domains o f po lic y analysis



Contexts o f Research

287

(Fore ster 1985c; Fischer and Forester 19 87). Furth erm ore the

debates on technology also suggest a critical social ecology that

seeks to connect environmental debates with crit ical theory

(Alford 1985; Luke 1987) and related work in eco-fem inist re

search that seeks to reveal the links of historical gen de r charac

teristics and ways of understanding social relations to nature

(Diamond and Orenstein 1990).

The central problematic of mediational research in this con

text—and on e that spills over into the dom ains of cultural th eo ry

and social psychology-is the question of transforming these

critiques into cred ible alternative strategies for org aniz ing social

relations. The diff iculty stems, in part, from the high level of

complexity of such innovative social relations and the forms of

collective learning required for making social exp erim en ts both

cred ible and potential ly gen eralizable, a them e that has b een

discussed w id ely under the heading of postindustrial Utopians

(Frankel 1987 ). Germ any may pref igure future deve lopm ents

here, give n its current sociolo gical preoccu patio n w ith the cri

sis of the w ork socie ty :

Work has been reorganized to such an extent that the type of work

represented by the working class has lost its critical place .. . . Thus

the crisis of the working society is the crisis of a class that has lost

its function and role as a historical actor. And it is with the crisis of

the working

class

that the crisis o f

its

opponent, the bourgeois class,

is inextricably connected. (Eder 1992, p. 389)

Cultural Theory

Introduct ion : Mass Com mu nicat ion s

and Cultural Studies

The primary focus of variable-based research in the sphere of

cultural so ciol ogy has bee n so-called effects research in the fie ld

of comm unications (L ow er y and DeFleur 1983; Git l in 19 78).

From this perspective, researchers attempt to l ink specif ic me

dia events (e.g. , v iolence) with concrete behavioral ef fects de

f ined in experimental or quasi-experimental terms. Indeed for



288


many years this l inkage wa s synonymou s w it h the so cio log y of

mass com m unica tions. Th e largely incon clusive results of such

research contributed to the happy pluralist conclusion that the

mass media were not the diabolic monsters portrayed by mass

culture theorists and critical theo ry. In contrast early Critical Th e

o ry w as associated w ith a version o f the th eo ry o f mass culture

that postulated a reductionist polit ical e co no m ic thesis regard

ing the capa city o f the culture indu stries

n

to subvert protest

potentials and reproduce false consciousness. Contemporary

research, how ever, is con cern ed with ov erco m ing the determ i

nism of the older Crit ical Theory without rejecting altogether

the decis ive character of the mass media in the repro du ctio n of

con tem po rar y societ ies; as such it is part of a m ore gene ral

revital ization of the sociology of culture that al lows empirical

correction of and constructive dialogue with questions originally

posed in crit ical theory (Bil l ington et al. 1991). In this context

the w or k o f Pierre Bourdieu in France and N orb ert Elias-o rigin ally

a student o f Ma nnh eim w ho se m agnum opu s w as only translated

belatedly (Elias 1978, 19 82 )-ha s pro ven espe cial ly inf luential in

revital izing the analysis of cultural pro du ctio n and con sum ption

(Featherstone 1992).

Systemic Models :

The Do m ina nt Ideo logy Thes i s

The original impulse of Marxian-inspired research on culture

is linked close ly to the base-superstructure m ode l and the m et hod

of polit ica l eco no m ic research. Internationally such research has

be en de vel op ed ex tens ively in France (Mattelart 1979; Mattelart

and Mattelart 1986, 1992) and Britain (Garnham 1990), as well

as in N or th Am eri ca (Sm ythe 1981 ; Schil ler 197 1, 1973, 1976;

Ewen 1976) .

Th e di ff iculty w ith such pol i t ica l eco no m ic research, how

ever, is establishing the precise link bet w ee n the ec on om ic infra

structure of communications and culture and the actual out

com es w ith res pec t to both content and ult imate ef fects o n con

sumers. Pluralist defenders o f com m od ified cultural systems cla im ,

for example, that consumer sovereignty guarantees the owners

of the media are in no position to im po se their class interests and

ide olo gy on consum ers. As a con seq ue nc e, central to the revitali-




289

zation o f critical cultural research have bee n cultural reproduc

tion theories that postulate som e form o f dominan t ideology o r

a system of cultural hegemony. Und er the general heading of the

dom inant ideolo gy thesis such theories have been crit ic ize d

for their functionalist meth od of argum ent.

5

In their more deter

ministic versions (as in the structuralist Marxism of Althusser)

such theo ries attribute to culture a great deal o f auton om y from

immediate economic determination, but then argue that in the

long run the ideolog ical conten t of culture ind eed does serv e the

interests of the reproduction of capital. The basis of the argu

ment here is thus the functionalist assumption that capitalism

has a n ee d for a dom inant ideo log y that the cultural system

inevitably produces. From this perspective it becomes impossi

ble to conceive how resistance to cultural domination might be

mediated by actual subjects of social change (Connell 1983).

Yet i f v ie w ed in a mo re op en and historically contingen t man

ner, m od els of social and cultural rep rod uc tion can serv e as a

useful f ramework w ithin w hi ch the re lat ions be tw ee n systemic

integra tion and social integration can be conceptua lized. R esearch

in various domains based on such open models of systemic

integration have produ ced a quite variegated picture of h ow the

structures of dom ination ope rate ov er time. For exam ple, the pro -

ductivist ideolo gy based on the reduction of work ers to m achine s

has be en tra ced back to 19th-century liberal and Ma rxist th ough t

alike, as w e ll as 20th-century p hen om ena such as Fordism and

Taylorism (R abin bac h 199 2). Similarly studies of edu cational

rep rod uc t ion h ave m oved away from an ear ly focus on the

corresp ond ence pr in c iple r ig idly l inking the functions of edu

cation to th e econ om y, to a m ore dy nam ic analysis of the rela

t ionship betw een education and po w er (Ap ple 1982;

W hitt y 1985;

Co le 198 8). Th ese issues reappear in a som ewh at dif ferent form

in applied and professional fields, for example, the critical legal

studies mo vemen t (Hutchinson 1989), radical social w ork (W ag ne r

1990) ,

crit iques of medicalization (I l l ich 197 5), along w ith the

feminist critiques cross-cutting and complementing all of these.

The implications of cultural hegemony as expressed in cul

tural products—as forms of discourse—have drawn particular

attention. Despite the continuous risk of the formalism of syn

chronic analysis, structuralist-type methods have provided a

crucial antidote to naive interactionism, social ph eno m eno logy ,



2 90 C R I T I C A L T H E O R Y A N D E M P I R I C A L R E S E A R C H

and conventional content analysis of media messages. Understood

in more social and interactionist terms, such neostructuralist

discourse analysis has exp lor ed a w id e ran ge of cultural p hen om

ena. Espe cially valuable has be en th e notio n o f a social semiotics

of hegem ony (H od ge and Kress 1988; Go ttdiener 1985a), a the m e

obviously central to communications studies but also such dis

parate domains as prom otional culture (W ern ick 199 1) , urban

studies (G ottd ien er and Lago poulos 198 6), geog raph y, architec

ture, and the theory of complex organizat ions (Mumby 1988) .

Today these m ore structuralist approaches h ave mo ved , as in the

case of state theory, toward more open, historically contingent

models . A go od exam ple of this typ e of approach can be found

in Douglas Kellner's focusing on the United States in Television

and the Crisis of Democracy, w h ich draws on a synthesis of

crit ical theory and the Gramscian notion of counterhegemony

(Ke l lner 1990) .

Act ion Analys is :

Cu l tura l Product ion and Recept ion

In response to the l imits to the focus on the system ic imp era

t ives of reproduct ion, critical comm unications research has

moved beyond polit ical economy by increasingly examining cul

tural processes at the action level—that is, as processes of pro

du ction and rece pt ion (Hard t 19 92 ). As in the case of the state,

research on social integration in the context of culture and mass

communications has been carried out ef fectively from a variety

of perspectives, e ither in relation to the production of culture

or its consum ption (Curran and Gu revitch 1991). A central th em e

here has been the deve lop m ent of a th eo ry o f cultural consum p

tion (Kellner 1989a, pp. 146-175). Sports and leisure research

gen erally have em erg ed as sites w h er e the issues o f the relation

ship be tw ee n constraint and agen cy have taken on strategic im

portance and increasingly global dimensions (Gruneau 1983;

MacCannell 1992).

Much actor-oriented research in the area of cultural research

remains prima rily w ith in the limits of interpretive and interaction

ist assumptions (Denzin 1992). Similar problems are especial ly

evident in the most common tradit ional form of actor-oriented

research in the analysis of media con sum ption: so-called uses and




291

gratifications research based simply on asking pe op le w h y they

use the m ed ia-t ha t is, the manifest needs that are gra tif ied. Th is

methodology largely uncritically accepts the manifest attitudes

of actors as adequate for understanding con sum ption pro cesse s

(Blum ler and Katz 1974 ). In contrast, actor-oriented research em

be dd ed in or indirectly infor m ed by a critical the ory fram ewo rk

tends to construct analyses of both cultural production and

cons um ption in a m ore potential ly crit ical wa y by pr ob ing m ore

deeply into the process of reception (Morley and Silverstone

1990).

The crucial difference is that the assumption of con

straints on cultural production becomes central to analysis,

though not in the deterministic way assumed by political econ

om y. Similarly research con cer ne d w ith th e study of the relation

ship between needs and commodities shifts attention to the

agent as constrained by, but not a mere dupe of, the system of

advertis ing (Leiss 1976, 1978; Leiss et al. 1986; Jhally 198 7).

Especial ly important in this context for questioning simplist ic

theories o f heg em ony has bee n research on the active ch aracter

of the receptio n o f popu lar culture by audiences (Rad wa y 1984;

Liebes and Katz 1990). Such interpretive audience reception

analysis has called into ques tion simplistic the ories of cultural

hegemony.

John Thom pso n attempts a m ore general account in his w ork

on ideo logy in mo dern culture (Th om ps on 1990 ). Strongly influ

en ced by Giddens and Habermas, Thom pso n d evelop s an analy

sis of the m ediatization of cult ure that stresses the interac

tional im pa ct of techn ical media , as w el l as its im plica tions for

the theory of ideology. In the context of education, theories of

cultural reprodu ction have be en recast in terms of op en mo dels

that explic it ly confront many of the issues posed by postmod

ernist critics of agency and representation (Ar on ow itz and Giro ux

1991; M or ro w and Torres Fort hc om ing ). Mark Poster has sought

to push critical media theory in an even more poststructuralist

direction w ith analyses of wh at he calls the n ew m ode o f infor

m atio n that calls into question or points to the limits of the

verbal bias and rationalism of theorists such as Habermas and

Giddens. In contrast to earlier work on the role of the media in

reproduct ion , dom ination , or eliciting resistance, Poster's study

of the mode of information is more concerned with the manner

and forms in which cultural experience constitutes subjects



292


(Pos ter 1990, p. 1 6). Electronically mediated phen om ena such

as advertising, databases, w or d p rocessing, and com pu ter scie nc e

are analyzed from this perspective.

Media t iona l Inqu i ry :

Res istance an d Tran s form at ion

The theorization of mediational-type analysis has been devel

oped most extensively in the often overlapping f ie lds of crit ical

pedagogy, feminist theory, l iberation theology, and studies of

resistance in pop ular culture. Perhaps the most central th em e in

this kin d of research is w ith the study o f manifestations of

resistance, a co m pl ex and con teste d term that re fers to the

wa ys actors act ive ly com e to terms with and poten t ia l ly strug gle

against cultural forms that dominate them. A central shift visible

here is the m ove from d ogma tic toward m ore dia logical theor ies

of ideology crit ique, partly under the inf luence of Gramsci,

Ha berm as, and Bakhtin (Gard iner 19 92 ), as w el l as on gen eral

efforts to de velo p resistance theory (Leo ng 1992). Indeed , it w ou ld

be possible to broadly equate British style cultural studies re

search as increasing ly med iational in character (Bran tlinger 1990;

G. Turn er 1990; Ag ge r 1992a; Easthope and M cG ow an 1992;

Barker and Beezer 1992).

The point of departure for mediational analysis in critical

pedagogy is the seminal w or k of Paulo Freire , a Brazilian educa

tor w h os e theo ry of conscient izat ion de ve lo pe d in the con text

of l i teracy training in Latin Am eric a (Fre ire 1970; Leon ard 1990;

Misge ld 1985) . Adap ted to advanced soc iet ies , cr i tica l p ed ag og y

has bee n con cern ed es pecial ly w ith teachers as crit ical intel lec

tuals (G iro ux 1988a, 1988b, 199 2) and the possibilities for cu rricu -

lar re form (A pp le and Weis 1983) . Habermas 's w or k has be en a

focus for research in curriculum th eory (C arr and Kem m is 19 86 ),

as w el l as a major reinterpretation of the peda go gica l implica

t ions of Habermas's theory of communicative action (R. Young

1989). Education also has be en a key site for critical eth no gra ph ic

w ork (K an po l 1992) . On e of the most w ide ly c i ted exam ples o f

m ediatin g critical research is that o f W illis on Learning to Labor,

an ethno graph ic study that pow erfu l ly captures the m om ent of

failed resistance among working-class male youth in the transi

t ion from school to work (Wil l is 1981) .




293

Social Psychology

Introdu ct ion : Tow ard a C r i tica l

Soc ia l Psychology

As a subfield o f psycho logy, social psychology has be en de

scribed as a research tradition almost com plete ly d ef ined by

variable-based experimental and quasi-experimental research.

The primary exceptions to this description have been in sociol

ogy w he re sym bol ic interact ionism and soc ia l p hen om eno logy

have be en established as an often closely related fram ew ork for

various microsociological investigations. Also psychoanalytic the

ory has been inf luential on the margins of sociology and cen

trally in feminist theory. At various points all of these latter in

terp retive approaches have prove n useful for addressing the kin ds

of social psychological questions that have been of concern to

critical social theory, for example, alienation and reification,

theory of domination and social character, the psychodynamics

of ideology crit ique and transformations of consciousness, and

communicative interaction. Although aspects of such questions

have been and still are translated into research projects based

Cultural studies research has been especially influential in

bringing the issues of critical theory to the study of popular

culture (Gru nea u 1988; Gro ssberg 1992; Gro ssberg et al. 19 92 ).

The range of research in this area suggests noting some repre

sentative them es. Popular music has be en a particular focus of

attention (Gross berg 1992; Mid dleton 1990 ). He bd ige 's study of

the origins o f punk music in Britain provid ed the basis for w id ely

c i ted ethnog raphic research on the interplay bet w ee n wo rking -

class youth culture and race relations (H eb di ge 19 79 ). A sugges

tive analysis o f the possibilities for con sum er resistance has bee n

de ve lop ed in Grahame's research on crit ical l i teracy amon g

consumers, evoking the educational literacy analogy in the

sphere of consum ption (Graham e 1985 ). Paralle l conc erns are

evident in anthropological research on the relations between

polit ical e con om y and culture (Marcus 1990 ) and the nature o f

peasant resistance (J . Scott 1985; No rdstro m and Martin 199 2).



294


on statist ical m ode ling, in terpr etive research has be en m ore

conducive to dealing with these questions.

The concept of a critical social psycho logy (o r a critical psy

ch olo gy that is imp l ic i t ly a social ps ych olo gy ) has at t imes been

suggested as a f ramew ork for ove rcom ing the var ious prob lem s

and l imitations of the exist ing social psychological orientations

(Sampson 1983; W exle r 1983; Boer 1983; Parker 198 9). O ne o f th e

characteristics o f these concern s is that a w id e ran ge o f ap

proaches (e .g. , interact ionist , cognit ive , deve lopm ental , psycho

analytic) have been brought to bear on social psychological prob

lems put on the agenda of research by crit ical theo ries. A no th er

aspect of such tend encies is a crit ique o f exist ing psy cho logica l

and social psychological work (Stam et al. 1987; Broughton 1987;

Buss 1979).

The variety and range of these ef forts defy easy summary.

W ha t w e attempt instead is to re vi ew s om e of the repr esenta tive

contributions associated with the three modes of social psycho

logical inquiry that naturally fol low from the three moments of

soc ia l reproduct ion: systematical ly or iented models concerned

with the nature of domination, action-oriented accounts focus

ing o n issues o f agency and subjectivity, and mediational accou nts

attemp ting to capture aspects of the agency-structure dialectics

in relation to resistance.

Systemic Mod e l s : D om inat ion

The uses of systemic models in social psychological analysis is

l inked closely to early determ inistic mo dels of social ization. T h e

early Frankfurt School research on the authoritarian personality

in the German working c lass can be c i ted as a p ioneer ing

contr ibut ion in this context .

6

Later work in the United States

suggested the partial compatibil ity of this type of research with

con ventio nal survey meth ods (Ad or no et al. 1964; Forbes 1 985 ).

Throu gh the inf luenc e of Er ich Fromm , David Riesman 's Lonely

Crowd (R iesman 1961) prov ided a v i ew of the soc ia l izat ion

process whose concern with social character sharply dif ferenti

ated it from then reigning functionalism and complemented the

effort of Ge rth and Mil ls to de vel op a historical social p syc ho log y

(G erth and Mills 1964). Riesman s distinction b et w ee n tradition -,

inner-, and other-direction wa s suggestive of the profo un d cha nge s




295

in the relations of social control as med iated through coll ecti ve

person ality structures. In diverse and often co nfl ic t ing wa ys this

tradit ion of critical historical social psy ch olog y has be en ex

tended in various directions (Lasch 1979, 1984; Langman 1991;

Langman and Kaplan 1981; Sennett 1977; Kreilka m p 197 6).

At the same tim e, more theoretical inqu iry has contribu ted to

the question of the relationship between critical theory and psy

choanalytic theory. Most importantly, some of the gen der blind-

spots have been crit ic ized in an ef fort to draw out further the

interactive foundations of subjectivity and domination (Benjamin

1988). Ot he r research has tack led a w id e range o f issues w it h

resp ect to the relationship b et w ee n child ho od and the rela

t ional preco ndit ion s of social ism (Richards 1 984 ). An oth er area

of related inquiry has already been cited in connection with

cultural theory: studies on the social psy cho logy of consu m ption

and its relation to human n eeds (Leiss 197 6).

Research on alienation marked one of the first social psycho

logical topics extensively drawn on for more conventional em

pirical research techniques (Blauner 1964; Seeman 1975). As

critics have pointed out, however, the simplistic translation of

al ienation as a social psych ological catego ry of pow erlessn ess

defined by attitude scales undercuts the basic agency-structure

dialectic (S chw albe 1986 ). Research in this area has for so me tim e

for m ed the basis of a research area for the International Socio

logical Association (Schweitzer and Geyer 1976, 1981, 1989;

Geyer and Heinz 1992).

The most popular way of gett ing around the l imits of survey

research to study these issues is evid en t in som e uses o f dis

course analysis and narrative th eo ry for a critical social psychol

ogy (Parker 1992). For example, Mumby has studied organiza

tional cultures in terms of the discources of storytelling within

burea ucracies to get at issues o f dom inatio n and subject forma

t ion (Mumby 1988) .

Act ion Analys is :

Agen c y an d Au ton om y

The limitation of domination theory in its various guises is its

negativity—that is, a focus on the relation of po w e r to subjuga

tion and person ality forma tion. This con cern does not ex plic it ly



296


address w ha t is pres up pos ed b y the notio n of resistance to

dom inat ion: a m ore general ized com pe ten ce for interact ion and

communication that might pref igure the possibil it ies to be real

ized through transformative practices. One strategy of dealing

w ith this top ic has be en recourse to theo ries of human natu re,

issues that tradit ionally have been def ined in the continental

tradit ion as those of ph ilosop hica l anth ropo logy. Tradit ional

philosophical discourse attempted to deal with such issues in

terms of specu lative accounts of an invariant hum an esse nce .

Ma rxian accounts have remained am bivalent becau se, on the o n e

hand, historical materialism necessarily insisted on the social

structural determinants of individual social character; on the

other hand, the thesis of alienation and revolutionary transfor

mation presupposed some kind of essential, inherent possibil i

t ies that so m eh ow esca pe historical deter m inatio n. Crit ical theo

ries have be en central to formu lating a co n cep tio n o f historica l

an thr op olo gy that relates universality and particularity in a

m ore conv incin g manner (Ho nn eth and Joas 1988) .

As Haberm as and Gidden s have argued in som ew ha t dif ferent

ways, the miss ing dimension of the Marxian theory of soc iety

was the absence of an adequate mod el o f sym bol ic o r com mun i

cative action. O th erw ise the subject has bee n def in ed almost

exclu sively in negative terms as al ienated or suffering from

exp loitation and false consciousness and yet able to act pro gres

sively because of util itarian mo tives driven by material nee ds.

The lack of an adequate theory of the subject led inexorably to

Leninism , a vanguardist the ory o f revolu tion that turned o ve r to

the revolu tiona ry exp erts the task of social izing co rre ct con

sciousness through the erect ion o f a bureaucratic apparatus

ostensibly represent ing the objec t ive w i l l o f the wo rk in g c lass.

Habermas has been con cern ed part icularly w ith integrat ing

competence models o f deve lo pm ent (e g o, moral , soc ia l ) into a

the ory of the subject as understood by the the ory o f com mu ni

cative action (Haberm as 1984, 1987a). Consistent w ith his stron g

program for crit ical theory, various types of reconstructive or

structuralist sciences ( l inguistics, developmental psychology)

are taken as evidence of universal potentials inhibited or facili

tated by social relations. Giddens, on the other hand, has not em

braced a strong the ory o f the developm ental subject in Haberm as's

manner. Instead he has been more concerned with the self and




297

identity in high m odernity, a them e ref lected in mu ch o ther

recent work inf luenced by crit ical theory (Lash and Friedmann

1992). Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutic poststructuralism has been

used to analyze discursive m om ents of iden tification in a ma nner

that ove rcom es the neg lect of agency in much social psy ch olog y

(D .

B row n 199 4). Und er the inf luen ce of Mikhail Bakhtin, others

have sought to dev elo p aspects o f his dialogical the or y of the self

(Bakhtin 1981; Gardiner 1992 ). Finally, m icros ocio logic al research

has stressed the crucial importance of emotions to an interac-

t ionist the ory infor m ed by theories of po w er and status, a shift

com plem enta ry to the further develo pm ent of the crit ical th eo ry

of the subject (Ke m pe r 1978; Ho chs child 1983; Scheff 199 0).

This shift co m plem ents the long-standing interest in theor ies of

the body and its relation to body polit ics (B. Turner 1984;

O 'Ne i l l 1985; M orr ow 1992b) .

Attributing agency and knowledgeabil ity to dominated sub

jects opens up new l ines of inquiry that seek to establish the

character of the experience of exploitation and alienation prior

to postulating how and in what direction that change might or

should take place. Indicative of the possibilities here is a recent

ethnographic study of unemployment (Burman 1988) that ex

plicit ly orients itself in relation to Giddens's structuration theory ,

though focusing on the subjective dimensions of the e xp er ien ce

of unemployment. Although this study otherwise resembles

much good interpretive research carried out under the heading

of sym bolic interactionism and social phe nom enolo gy, it explic

itly relates its ob ject of study to questions of p o w er and d om ina

tion. A lso m uch feminist research is con cern ed wit h portray ing

w om en w h o , despite their dom ination in relations of subordina

tion, exhibit qualities of resourcefulness indicative of missed

possibilities and potential transformations.

Mediat iona l Inquiry :

Changing the Subject

It is in the co nt ex t of social psych olog ical med iational analysis

that the most fundam ental issues of the subje ctive bases of so cial

repro du ction and chan ge be co m e apparent, though from a m ore

individual perspective than the analysis of similar issues in the

con tex ts o f the state and culture. Studies of actors in this co n tex t



298


typically focus on the tensions involved in resistance and situ

at ions in w h ich ne w possibi l it ies may be gl im psed mo men tar i ly

and perh aps lost altogether, o r cons olida ted as part o f the cumu

lative change process. I t is at these moments that it becomes

possible to vie w agency/structure relations in their most d yna m ic

form, especial ly in the context of the cultural polit ics of every

day l i fe and social movements (Shotter 1993). Historically the

Marxist tradit ion was l imited by its focus on the working class

and the absenc e of an adequate transform ational soc ia l psy

ch olog y, a pr ob lem ex acerb ated by individual-society dualisms

(Henriques et al. 1984).

Theological crit iques of Marxism always have been sensit ive

to these issues, and con tem po rar y form s of crit ical the ol og y

(Baum 1975; Lamb 1982; M cCarth y 1991, pp . 181-99) and l iber

ation the olog y (Sigmund 1990; Leonard 1990, p p. 167-248) hav e

provided important contributions to the reconcil iat ion of crit i

cal the ory and religion. An thro po logica l research on resista nce

has pr ovi de d a nee ded com parative pe rsp ect ive on these issues

(J . Scott, 1985, 1992; No rds trom and Martin 199 2). Critical

pedagogy also has related its concerns directly to fundamental

issues in critical social psychology (Sullivan 1990).

An oth er line of research strongly influe nce d by Michel Foucault

has sought to und erscore som e of the pro blem s o f v i ew in g l iber

at ion as mere ly a process of ove rcom ing dom inat io n (P. M i l ler

1987).

Her e an imp ortant c orre ctive is app lied to the assum ption

that freed om and p o w er are total ly opp os ed , as i f

a

soc iety could

be form ed w ithout p ow er, and as i f po w er w er e not essentia l to

the very possibil ity of freedom. Such questioning provides in

sights into the more complex nature of resistance than implied

by a focus on the prob lem atic o f rationality evid ent in Ha berm as.

Such questions have been central to feminist debates about

theories o f the subject (Nic ho lso n 1990; P. Smith 19 88).

Probably the most important focus of work touching on me

diational analysis has been related to research on new social

movements involv in g, for exam ple, w om en , racial and ethnic

claims, and environmental concerns (A. Scott 1990) . Whereas

social class was the primary agent in classical Marxist theories

of social rep rod uct ion , the diversity of social m ovem ents in civ i l

soc iety is the conce rn of critical th eor y (Co h en and Ara to 1 992 ).

In certain contexts the study of movements in process cannot




299

be separated read ily from a research relationship that approx i

mates an act of intervention. As we have seen with respect to

critical ethnography, an inevitable tension exists between critical

distance and engag eme nt, a them e pursued in the final cha pter

in discussing research and practice. In this regard, however,

reference to another context of mediational research helps un

derscore the importance of these issues.

Alain Touraine's meth od of perm anen t soc iolo gy is espe

cially suggestive of the constructive role of critical research in

relation to m ob ilizin g prac tices. Tou raine's meth od is of interest

as w el l becau se it stops just short of the mor e dire ctly en gag ed

strategies of participatory action research. The primary reason

is that the tensions between research and practice are made

ex pli cit : T h e researcher, then, is neither exter nal to the grou p

nor iden tified w ith it. Rather, the researcher tries to have the focu s

on and clari fy those meanings of its action w h ic h challeng e the

constraints on practical discourse and the active formation of

polit ical wi l l (Hea rn 1985, p. 198 ). In general, there fore, this

focus is consistent with Habermas's suggestion that critical re

search can ser ve on ly in an instruc tive or advisory c apa city quite

distinct from the practical decisions that have to be made by

actors themselves.

Conclusion

Th e prec ed ing survey could only serve to i llustrate selec tively

the kinds of problems involved in the movement between a

focus on systemic, actional, and mediational processes in social

life in the domains of state theory, culture, and social psychol

ogy. In particular our discussion did no t link up the details of th e

m etho dolog ical techniques em ploy ed in the research alluded to,

partly because they involved the full gamut of interpretive ana

lytical techniqu es in intensive case studies and case study co m

parisons of a historical and ethnographic character, textual analy

sis, and even the occasional use of variable-based research.

Systemic-level analyzes made extensive use of structural gener

alizations involvin g contrad ictions (as in state crisis th eo ry ) or th e

formation of new relationships between polit ical publics and



300


the state or au diences and the mass me dia. But these structural

argum ents retained—at least in their non fun ctiona listic variants—

an interpret ive d imension that ack now ledge s that the o utcom es

w er e a lways mediated in a cont ingen t way in con crete c ircum

stances by agents w ith at least partial awaren ess o f their co nt ex ts

of action.

Another central feature of crit ical research, however, is that

empirical research is not an end in

itself.

Empirical research is

typic ally theory -driven and, often as not, co nc ern ed w ith the

further exemplif ication of already partly validated theory of

cultural rep rod uct ion or chang e, rather than focusin g strict ly on

con firm ation or falsi fication as in the case of midd le-range the o

ries. Further, given its potential relation to pr act ice, mu ch crit i

cal research is mo re con cern ed w ith produ cing k no w led ge for

the uses of particular publics and constituencies. This knowl

ed ge doe s not seek to be com plet ely orig ina l, so mu ch as to

exte nd and comm unicate wha t already is und erstood to au diences

prev iously deprived of such knowledge. This communicat ive

aspect is similar to many form s o f applie d research orien tation ,

but with the crucial dif ference of a very di f ferent c on cep t ion of

the re lationship be tw ee n theory and pr ac t ic e- th e theme of the

final chapter.

Notes

1. These pro blem s are not ones of ignorance, of course, but reflect the increas

ingly unmanageable nature of the material. Kellner thanks Giddens for his com

ments even thoug h the latter does not figure in the study.

2. For the most sustained critical discussion of the uses and alleged abuses of

the social versus system integration distinction by H aberma s, Gidd ens, Lo ck wo od ,

and others, see Mouzelis (1991), notwithstanding his intemperate impatience

with Habermas's philosophical concerns.

3. It should be noted that for primarily circumstantial reasons Gottdiener's

study wa s consulted o nly after the first draft of this man uscript wa s com pleted .

Hen ce its exemp lary status with respec t to the themes of this bo ok could b e taken

to suggest a broader convergence in critical theory about the understanding of

theory and em pirical research—one occ urring independently in disparate, special

ized areas.

4. Ind eed the issues surrounding theories of the state have beco m e so extensive

and convo luted that many of the earlier distinctions b et we en political econo my,




301

structuralist Marxism, critical theory, and so forth have become blurred as neo-

Ma rxist app roaches attempt to adjust to rapidly changing realities (Jessop 1990).

The purpose of the present discussion is to assert the pioneering importance of

the research questions pose d by H abermas and Offe and their ongo ing elaboration,

refinement, and critique in subsequent debates about the welfare state (He ld 1987;

Frankel 1987; Pierson 1991).

5. To be sure, several variants of this type of argument have bee n sub jected to

extensive criticism with respect to some of the stronger claims made about their

explanatory force in theories of social reproduction (Abercrombie et al. 1980).

Many of these issues have been addressed, however, in more recent discussions

about the theory of the public sphere (Calh oun 1992a).

6. More recently, the "interpellated subject" of Althusserian structuralism

becam e for a time the basis of an even m ore deterministic m odel of social rep rod uc

tion bas ed on a fusion of Ma rxian and Freudian (Lacan ian) structuralism. Alth oug h

such contributions acknowledge the social psychological deficits of classical

Marxism, they do so in a rather selective and problematic manner, but see Craib

1989; Elliott 1992; Fraser and Bartky 1992.



12

C R I T I C A L S O C I A L S C I E N C E

A N D S O C I E T Y

The assum ption that thought profits from the decay of the

emotions, or

even

that it remains unaffected, is itselfan expres

sion of the process of stupefaction.

(Adorno 1974, pp. 122-3)

In its proper place, even epistemologically, the relationship of

subject and object would lie in the realization of peace among

men as between men and their

Other.

Peace is the state of

distinctness without domination, with the distinct participat

ing in each other. (Adorno 1978,

p.

500)

Thus the theory that creates consciousness can b ring about

the conditions under w hich the systematic distortions of com

munication are dissolved and a practical discourse can then

be conducted; but it does not contain any information which

prejudges the future action o f those concerned.. .. Therefore

theory cannot have the same unction for the organization of

action, o f the political struggle, as it has for the organization

of enlightenment... the vindicating superiority of those who

do the enlightening over those who are to be enlightened is

theoretically unavoidable, but at the same time it is fictive

and requires selfcorrection: in a process of enlightenment

there can only be participants.

(Habermas 1973,

pp.

38-41)

T

o this poin t w e have not taken up the implication s o f this ap

proach for the interplay between research and society, other

than clearly differentiating be tw ee n critical theo ry as a research

Theory and Practice

302



Theory and Practice

303

prog ram and ideologies as action-oriented be lief systems. As n oted ,

the post-Marxist context of contemporary politics dramatically

alters the tasks of critical theory in ways that can at the moment

on ly be vagu ely anticipated. But Giddens's formu lation o f the stance

of a w eak prog ram bears repeating here: In bein g stripped o f

historical guarantees, critical theo ry enters the universe of contin

ge ncy and has to adop t a log ic that no lon ger insists upon the

necessary unity of the ory and pra ctice (Gidd ens 1987a, p. 33 7).

Not unlike the failure of economic depression to generate the

revolutionary class consciousness anticipated by classical Marx

ism earlier in this century, the pervasive fiscal crisis of the con

tem po rar y capitalist state has resulted in an ambiguous legitima

tion crisis w ho se effects are con tradictory and have called into

question the very notion of progress. These circumstances have

de ep en ed th e crisis of intellectuals w ith re spect to the project of

mod ernity, a proje ct w ith w h ich critical the ory has be en impli

cated from the outset (Boggs 1993). Having passed through the

self-doubts of Adorno and Horkheimer's dialectic of enlighten

ment, ho we ver, critical the ory acce pted the absence of guarantees

long ago; moreover, in its more recent forms it has rejected the

simple ch oice b etw een D ew ey and Foucault as ingeniously formu

lated by the ph ilosoph er Richard Rorty:

What Foucault doesn't give us is what Dew ey wanted to give us—a

kind of hope which doesn't need reinforcement from the idea of

a transcendental or enduring subject. . . . Foucault sees no middle

ground, in thinking about the social sciences, betw een the classic

Galilean conception of behavioral science and the French notion

of "sciences de Vhomme" It was just such a middle ground that

Dewey proposed, and wh ich inspired the social sciences in Amer

ica before the failure of nerve which turned them behavioral.

(Rorty 1982, p. 206)

Th is contention— characteristic of liberal, as op po sed to techno

cratic, models of enlightenment—appears tenable at first glance.

As Ro rty con tinues, Reading Foucault reinfo rces the disillusion

which American intellectuals have suffered during the last few

decades of watching the 'behavioralized' social sciences team up

w ith the state (19 82 , p. 207) . But against Foucault he argues:



304


But there seems no particular reason why, after dum ping Ma rx,

we

have to keep on repeating all the nasty things about bou rgeo is

liberalism w hich he taught us to say. There is no inferential connec

tion between

the

disappearance

of

the transcendental su bj ec t-o f

"man" as something having a nature wh ich society can repress or

understand-and the disappearance of human solidarity. Bourgeois

liberalism seems to be the best example of this solidarity we have

yet achieved,

and

Deweyan pragmatism the best articulation

of

it.

(Rorty 1982, p. 207)

Even if bou rgeois l ibera l ism may b e in som e sense the best ex

ample

of

hum an sol idarity,

it has an

increasin gly precari ous rela

t ionship to it. The mediating pos i tions o f Hab erm as and G id d e n s -

b e t w e e n D e w e y and Foucau l t -p rov ide the m ost astute alernative

in the form of apostbehavioral critical social science . That pr ag m a

tism's failure

wa s not

m erely circumstantial

and

related

to

som e

endemic p rob l ems is g lossed over by those neopragm atists (e .g. ,

Shalin 1992) w h o j ump on the postmodernist ba nd wa go n as critics

of critical theory, forgetting that

it was

critical the or y that

put

pragmat ism back

on the

agenda

of

late

20th-century

ph i l o sophy

and social th eo ry floas 1993; Anton io , 1989; M o r r o w , 1983). H ow

so? First, bec au se crit ical theo ry pr ov ide d the basis for a critical

theory of society absen t in pragmatism; and secon d, beca use in the

f o rm represented

by

Hab erm as 's interpretat ion

of

Pe irce (a lon g

w ith crit ical real ism ), it has pro vid ed the most forceful attempt to

secure universalistic ontological g rounds for reaso n and sol idarity

be y o nd the foundational isms of a transcend ental sub ject and the

Marx ian ph i l o sophy

of

history.

What o f ten were seen to be s o me of the weakn esses of critical

theory in the past can in the new context o f ten be d r a w n on as

resources. Given

its

strong m etatheoretical orientation, capa city

for theoretical renewal , and lack of co m pr om isi ng pol it ical af fi li

ations, critical theory has been in a go od pos i t ion to r edep loy the

concepts of critical thought to dea l wit h the emergent fo rms of

crisis and the reorganization o f the hu m an scien ces.

In

conc ludin g

w e can only br ie f ly touch on so m e o f these issues in terms o f th ree

basic objectives. First, w e attempt to locate our acco unt o f critical

social research in relation to four con cept ion s of social sc ienc e:

the technocratic, liberal enlightenment, critical-dialogical,

and

skeptical postmodernist models.



Theory and Practice

305

Second, we examine the current historical context of critical

research in ad vanced capitalist societie s. Our task is not to defin e

w ha t is to be do ne in any con crete sense, a strategy that wo uld

involve a conjunctural diagnosis based on specific societies that

is bey on d the scop e of this study. W ha t w e d o attemp t, h ow ever ,

is a lim ited, historically spec ific characterization o f the p osition

of critical research in relation to the current crisis of the welfare

state and the N e w Right ch allenges to it. W e stress in particular

the co nflu en ce of three vocabularies of theoretical discourse that

define this situation: the radicalized rights-based discourse ema

nating from liberal theory, the revised and pluralized discourse

constituted by counterhegemon ic struggles and cultural crea tion ,

and the unifying discourse directed toward the revitalization of

the dem ocratic p ub lic sphere and civil society.

Ou r third objectiv e in this chapter is to exten d the imp lications

of this general critical mo del wi th respect to the different sites or

locales of inquiry and practice. All too often statements about

recom mended relations of theory and practice are voic ed in abstract

terms witho ut referen ce to particular contex ts of pra ctice. In the

process w e discuss three locales of inquiry, each w ith specific tasks:

the relatively autonomous inquiries located in universities and

other locations that encourage fundamental or relatively autono

mous research oriented to relevant scientific communities', the

interventions of social criticism-thzt is, forms of inqu iry and

advoca cy primarily directed toward the public sphere, though also

often invo lved in professional training associated w ith p ol icy and

social problems analysis; and critical action research directed

toward informing the social praxis actually carried out by social

agents. Although each of these is essential and some researchers

may m ove b et w ee n these three locales, it is misleading to redu ce

critical inqu iry to any on e or to see them as a hiera rchy leading

from theory down to practice.

Models of Social Science

Th e notion of the myth of value-free science extends beyon d

its impossibility. In practice, few social scientists have seen their

w ork as ultimately without red eem ing value; indeed the w ho le



306


history of social scien ce is caught up in the classic Enlightenm ent

and modernist vision of reform and progress. What most people

mean by the value-free do ctrin e is shared broadly even by critical

researchers: that one should not allow one's personal values to

distort or bias the cond uct o r interpretation o f research. Th e pri

mary dif ference is in how to achieve that goal. Posit iv ists have

tended t o argue that it requ ired som e kind of ascetic com m itme nts

to im per son ality; critical app roach es argue that self-consciousness

about values is the best wa y t o b e vigilant against such p rob lem s.

As a con sequ en ce the most crucial issue at stake is not w h eth er

to be value-free or not, but how to connect values and research

in rationally justifiable ways. That statement imp lies spe cif ic

models of the relationship between social research and society.

Previously we have distinguished broadly between social engi

nee ring m odels of explana tion and those of social theo rizing . Th is

ty pe o f distinction ofte n has bee n the basis of

a

parallel distin ction

between technocratic and crit ical conceptions of applied knowl

edge in which the latent ideological implications of the former

strategy are suppressed fully in the emulation of the engineering

m odel. W e find this heuristic schema a bit simp listic; a ccor din gly

we compare four basic models of applied social knowledge-the

technocratic, liberal enlightenment, and critical dialogical and

skeptical postmo dernist models—in terms of th ree basic issues: (a )

their metatheoretical assumptions about the nature of scientific

knowledge, (b) their understanding of the theory/practice rela-

tionship-that is, account of the dynamics of the relationship be

tween knowledge application and concrete social actors, and (c)

their imp licit or explic it Utopian vision about the g oo d society.

Technocrat ic Models

Metatheory. A succinc t definition of techn ocratic the orizin g has

been characterized as the Am erican ideo log y (W ilso n 1977,

p. 15) because it would not

have bee n poss ib le at a ll had it not been for the em erge nc e and co m in g

of age of this "first n e w n ation". . . This ideo logy is techn ocratic b e

cau se it invo kes sc ie nc e in ord er to just i fy po l i c ie s a im ed at rea l iz

ing part icular ob jec t ives . Th ese po l i c ies take the fo rm o f a l leg ed ly

neut ra l t echn iques w h o se o r ig ins and con cern s a re d i s tend ed f r om



Theory and Practice

307

the interests they serve. It is science's effective condemnation of

both critical reflection and common-sense thinking which makes

such obfuscation possible. (Wilson

1977,

pp. 15-7)

It is not necessary here to review again the epistemological foun

dations of such technocratic persp ectives, whe ther in logical posi

tivism or general systems theories (Bryant 1985).

Theory and Practice. Altho ugh techno cratic mod els have never

been consistently applied except under authoritarian political con

ditions, the form of criticism they represent has be en a po w erfu l

tendency that pervasively has influen ced pos tw ar political culture.

The technocratic impulse thus has shaped much contemporary

discussion and contributed to the suppression of the political di

mension of applied knowledge even though it never has been real

ized in a com plete fo rm . Habermas's discussion (197 0) of the lo gic

underlying the potential of science and techno logy to serv e as a

new form o f ideology

is

instructive here regarding an emergent ideo

logical tendency, though one that nowhere has been fully real

ized—partly because o f the sustained critiques aligned against it.

Utopian Vision. Despite the austere imp lications o f emu lating

the natural sciences, technocratic visions of the constructive poten

tial of social kno w led ge have a decid edly

Utopian

cast but primar

ily in the more pejorative sense of that term . A systems theo retica l

and behavioral vers ion can be distinguished. Most systems analysis

is w ed de d f irmly to controll ing change processes w ithin the l imits

of the given, serving the powers that be (Boguslaw 1965; Hoos

1974; Lilienfeld 197 8). For the most part, then , the Utopian vision

of techn ocratic approaches follo w s in the tradition of St. Simon in

providing magical tools to bring to bear on controlling society in

the name of wh atev er values are pro jected from the given official

or popular culture. In this context the imagery of the metaphor

of social en gin eer ing takes on a literal form .

Liberal Enlightenment Models

Metatheory. Th e epistem ologic al foundations of an alternative

to classical positivism in the social sciences can be found in




Amer ican p ragmatism, especially as elaborated by D ew ey and his

fol lowers (Kaplan 1964), as w ell as the critical rationalism asso

ciated wit h Karl Po pp er and his disciples.

1

The se approaches gen

erally acknowledge the dist inctive features of the relationship

be tw ee n social technology and human actors, as op pos ed to techni

cal control over nature, though references to analogies between

the tw o (e .g. , the not ion of piecemeal eng ineer ing in Po pp er )

often sound like more traditional technocratic conceptions. In

American pragmatism, in particular, the social and political di

mensions o f applied k no w led ge are taken into account at the leve l

of the theory of knowledge. But the result is a relatively narrow

focus on the ethical imp lications of research (prac tical disco urse )

and the definition and resolution of social pro blem s. Alth ou gh this

focus constitutes an advance over technocratic approaches, the

resulting linkag e of em pirical and norm ative issues ofte n remains

superficial and unref lective. As Ag ge r conc ludes : Social pro blem -

oriented scientism is still scientism, unable to understand its own

constitution of, as w el l as its constitution by, the im per m an ent

present. Freedom requires the l ived expe rien ce o f free thought as

seeming social determinism is undone historically, not only in

'humanist' m eth od-id ealism (Ag ge r 1989, p. 15).

Theory and Practice. T o their credit, l iberal enligh tenm ent mod

els do not predicate their conception of critique on purely scien-

tistic assumptions—that is, the denial of the polit ica l dim ension o f

knowledge application or the suppression of value questions. Yet

they do not entirely escape the dilemmas of what Habermas has

referred to as a positivistically bisected rationalism (in the case

of Po pp er ) or a som ewh at naive con ceptio n of the dem ocratic

public sphere ( in the case of Am erican p ragm atism). Th e l iberal

conception of critique is based on the assumption that if a gap

exists be tw ee n the means and ends of policy, or in the w ork ing s

o f any social or cu ltural institution, the re exists a rational basis for

illuminating that discrepancy empirically (e.g., evaluation re

search or studies of institutions). Such criticism is recognized as

the prel im inary step in the def inition of social pro blem s, he nce

the necessary poin t of departure for pro blem solving. Altho ugh

experts and technical professionals are acknowledged to be falli

ble and caught up in political processes, it is argued that profes

sional ethics pro vid e an adequate defense against abuses of po w er .



Theory and Practice

309

Such a position acknowledges the necessity of evaluative dis

course in the social sciences, especially the app lied dom ains, but

contend s that it can be con duc ted in a manner that escapes the

dilemmas o f traditional ideolog ical confrontations (M acR ae 1976;

Rule 1978).

Utopian Vision. Th e liberal enlightenm ent m ode l is considerab ly

m ore cautious than its m ore optim istic techn ocratic counterpart.

Alth ou gh the metaphors of social en gin eerin g or social tech

no log y often are em ploy ed in this literature, they usually are

deplo yed in an analogical rather than literal sense, as in the case

of tech nocr atic app roaches. In other wor ds , although liberal prag-

matist strategies of reform may employ the scientific rhetoric of

the dom inant culture, projects o f reconstruction clearly are con

ceiv ed as having crucial political dim ensions, and the differences

b et w ee n con trolling natural processes and social ones are the sub

ject of considerable attention.

Inevitably there is a considerable degree of convergence be

tween the liberal enlightenment and critical enlightenment con

ceptio ns o f dem ocratic planning, but this should not obs cure the

fundamental differences. Despite overt intentions, liberal prag

matic mod els of planning veer off in an elitist direc tion .

2

Th e social

psy chologica l assumptions that gu ide such a liberal humanism are

con vey ed effectively w ith the them e of pub lic educ ation. Edu

cation h ere is seen as a rational proce ss of com mun icating infor

ma tion that culminates in the we ll-inform ed citizen necessary for

liberal dem ocracy. Such aware citizens thus be co m e re cep tive to

the definition of new social problems and the development of

strategies of reform that guarantee continued progress. Chronic

failure in achieving these ambitions, however, has left the liberal

enlightenment perspective increasingly vulnerable to neoconser-

vative criticism e ven if in some of its current versions (e.g., Ro rty

1989) it can find ironic comfort in the paradoxes of postmodern

contingency.

Crit ical Dialog ical M ode ls

Metatheory. Th e po int of departure of critical social scien ce is a

critiqu e o f the uses of instrumental rationality as a pro ces s of



310


domination over both external and internal nature (Leiss 1974;

He ld 1980 ). A m uch sharper distinction than that found in liberal

pragmatism is made between the logic underlying the notion of

control over natural processes and social ones. This theme is

illustrated most effectively in Habermas's notion of knowledge

interests, which distinguishes between empirical-analytical, her

meneutic-historical, and critical-emancipatory forms of knowl

ed ge . W he reas th e first is based on the natural scientific no tion of

technical contr ol, the latter tw o im ply a fundam entally different

relationship between knowledge and action. Most importantly,

crit ical-emancipatory kn ow ledg e is vie w ed as having decisive

significance for fundamental social chan ge because it invo lves the

fundamental transformation o f individual and co llec tive identities

through liberation from previous constraints on communication

and self-understanding. From this pe rsp ect ive th e process o f mod

ernization has been mediated selectively by relations of power,

rather than reflecting the natural logic of technological change.

This approach opens the way for understanding the full implica

tions of the diversity of critical methods and modes of discourse

(practical, therapeutic, aesthetic) invo lved in social transformation.

Theory and Practice. O n the on e hand, critical theo ries do not

deny or completely ignore the importance of empirically based

analyses as the basis o f a for m of e nligh tenm ent. T o that e xten t

there is considerable continuity between the liberal and critical

enlightenment models. On the other hand, critical theories do

contend that liberal enlightenment models seriously underesti

mate the obstacles to reasoned dialogue , let alone either the imp le

men tation or app lication of pertin ent form s of em pirical research .

In short, liberal enlightenment models of critique simply do not

take into account the full implications of the theory of ideology

and its conception of the depth-structure of distorted comm uni

cation. It is for this reason that critical the or y nece ssarily resists

the dissolution o f the tasks of critical intellectuals in to the p rofes

sional model (Gouldner 1975; Bauman 1987). Indeed the very

possib ility of exercisin g the tasks of critique pres upp oses a deg ree

of ma rginality and risks of unp rofessional cond uct. As A gg er

laments: Th ey inevitably find us w an ting -m eth od olo gy , objectiv

ity, reasonableness (19 89 , p. 2) . T o that exte nt the professional

model—its concep tion o f discipline —inevitably contains a residue



Theory and Practice

311

of posit iv ism e ven i f it m oves beyon d a pur ely tech no cratic

self-understanding.

3

Utopian Vision. The reconstructive project of contemporary

critical social science is jeopardized at the outset because of its

ambiguous relationship to the given sociohistorical context w ith in

w h ic h it seeks to speak: above all, deep-set doubts about the ve ry

historical possib ility (and nature ) of potential transform ation. S till

a certain broadly based consensus has emerged with respect to

the contours that social transformation and recon struction mig ht

em bod y; m uch more problematic is the deg ree to w hi ch they can

be practically prefigured within, and hence might contribute to

transforming , existing forms of society (Frankel 1 987). Th e recon

structive

Utopian themes of critical theo ry thus are refle cted most

typically in the concepts of participatory democracy and critical

pedagogy.

Th e ambivalence of planning concepts in cr i tica l th e o r y -

notions o f h o w to practically construct a rational society—is linked

closely to the rec ogn ition o f the obstacles to participatory democ

racy. And yet there is a radical reformist side of critical social

science that persists in evoking this notion as the basis of policy

and planning research (Forester 1985c; Friedmann 1979, 1987).

This strategy is based on the somewhat problematic assumption

that participatory processes do -e v e n if a failure in pra ctice by

technical standards-facilitate the formation of form s o f conscious

ness and resistance necessary for fundamental change even though

som e p opu list responses may release a destructive ressentiment.

A typical expression of this paradox is the examples of critical

theorists w h o ad vocate participation in the electoral processe s of

party systems that give little immediate prospect of fostering

fundamental transformations (Birnbaum 1988).

Th e po int of departure of critical peda gog ies is that the liberal

humanistic notion o f public educa tion, how eve r n oble in its inten

tion, has lost its grip on reality in the era of the decline of the

public sphere, the emergence of massive cultural industries, and

the failure of educationa l institutions to challenge effectiv ely their

repro du ctive functions. Th e alternative is a critical ped ag og y that

redefines the categories of p ublic education in terms of such con

cepts as cultural hege m on y and resistance attuned to the postm od

ern condit ion (Girou x 1992). H ow eve r imp ortant the forma tion



312


o f a

Utopian

discourse of poss ibility may

be,

the concrete p rosp ects

o f the researcher as social actor requires a pec uliar com bin ation

of detachment and engagem ent (Pop ke w itz 1984, pp . 183-202).

Skeptical Postmodernism: The End of Reason?

Metatheory. Th ere are basically t w o readings o f postm odern ist

social th eo ry on o f the issue of the ory and pra ctice . Th e first-va ri-

ously descr ibed as critical, opp osition al, and fem in ist -ca n be read

in dialogical terms as both a critique of critical theory and yet

com plem entary (ref lectin g thus self-crit ic isms imman ent w ith in

it ) .

Much postmodernist theorizing in this sense has been incor

por ated w ith in critical theory. Th e second—variously des cribe d as

relativist, nihilist, and skeptical—culminates in

a

varie ty of political

pos itions that, at best, assume an iron ic acceptan ce o f the status q uo

or, at worst, suggest the futility of all projects of human transfor

ma tion. Rather than attempt to m ap this co m pl ex terrain, w e

simply allude to the central challenges posed by skeptical post

modernism.

4

With respect to the epistemological foundations of

inquiry, skeptical postmodernist social theory calls into ques

tion the ver y notion o f an objective represen tation of reality,

w heth er because of the reliance of science on language or because

of the w ay the postm odern con dit ion itself has und erm ined grand

narratives of ph iloso ph y and social scien ce (Ly ota rd) or has

obscured the very relationship be tw ee n the real and the h yperreal

(Baudrillard).

Theory and Practice. Un der the influ en ce o f M iche l Foucault,

kn ow led ge and p ow er are vi ew ed as mutually imp licated in their

mutual constitution. To this exte nt kn ow led ge is inseparable from

dom ination, and any claim to expe rtise or know ledge— even in the

nam e of ema ncip atory interests—is contaminated from the outset.

In the process of this generalized struggle in which no partici

pants have a priv ilege d p osition in relation to truth, the notio n of

ide olo gy disappears in a w or ld o f universalized, distorted com mu

nication. But w he the r vie w ed as an endless conversation (R or ty )

or as interminable struggle, politics in the strong postmodernist

interpretation can no longer b e und erstood in terms that cumula-



Theory and Practice

313

tively relate to the needs of real people in existing communities

w h o w ant to conn ect their personal problems with public troubles.

Utopian Vision. T o the ext en t that any form o f politic al or trans

formative practice becomes conceivable in skeptical postmod

ernist terms, it is completely cut off from transcendent or univer

sal claims. The British sociologist David Silverman has aptly

described the current crisis in terms of criticizing the imp ossible

dreams for reform ism and roman ticism. It is con clude d that

Foucault has m oved b eyon d this through his decon struction of the

techniques based on such representations:

This constitutes five challenges to the Enlightenment thinker: an on

ward march of Progress can no longer be assumed; politics is not

reducible to the practices of the State, for pow er does not arise in

any central point; power

is

seen in an incitement to speak

as

much

as in censorship, repression, or exclusion; the human sciences are

not free-floating critical apparatuses but are inside mechanisms of

power; and

inally,

the free individual is a construction of power/

know ledge, not its antithesis. (Gubrium and Silverman 1989, p. 5

Redefining Counterhegemony

and the Public Sphere

T w o themes have emerged as central to a ne w con ception of

theory and practice and its relationship to social research: devel

oping strategies for overcoming the fragmenting effects of the

pluralization of counterhegemonic movements, and the develop

ment of incorp ora ting rights-based claims as part of the n orm ative

theory.

Counterhegem ony and P lu ra l i sm

Postmodernist critiques of the Enlightenment have important

implica tions for critical theo ry, as does the parallel but different

thesis that w e have entered a new postmodernist cultural epoch and

phase of econ om ic organ ization. From this per sp ectiv e the classic

theory of counterhegemony (a universalizing social movement



314


based on the working class) has lost its force. Critical theory no

longer claims any kind of class-based Archimedean position that

would justify such a universal class, and poststructuralist neo-

Gramscian theo ry has been r ew ork ed to deal w ith m any of these

prob lems in ways that often co nve rge wi th debates in con tem po

rary critical theory (Laclau 1990; Golding 1992). In other words,

although the result is a recognit ion of the plurality of forms of

domination, this does not necessarily culminate in a form of

liberal pluralism that endlessly fragments politics. As a conse

quence, regardless of the changes that might take place, the

opp osition al role of critical th eo ry as distinct from liberalism w il l

persist, albeit in new guises and perhaps under different names

because of the transformation of counterhegemonic struggles.

Rights -Based C la ims

The social problems focus of much applied sociology contrib

utes to the tendency of normative debates (social criticism) to be

couched in terms of the claims of specific groups in relation to

university-based research (T ro w and N yb om 199 1). De spite the

built-in liberal and social dem ocratic bias o f the socio log ica l tradi

tion, the normative justif ications of such positions rarely have

been the focus of systematic inquiry o r debate w ith in sociology.

In the past, Marxist the ory has be en p ron e to dismiss the ories of

human rights and rights-based claims as a bou rgeo is il lusion or

mere ideology. For critical theory, in contrast, the principle of

immanent critique has long been the basis of using liberal prin

ciples of rights as the basis of a critique of existent realities. But

such concerns with normative theory have been dif f icult to as

similate w ith in the socio logica l tradition or professional training.

O therw ise normative questions are relegated to the dogmas o f vari

ous ideological grouping s ( includ ing th eolo gies ) and the polit ical

sphere. In short, despite being the cognitive center of cultural

reproduction in advanced societies, universities—faithful to their

secular status—at no poi n t m ake training in skills related to no rm

ative reasoning a central part of the curriculum. Although some

religiously affiliated institutions do have such requirements or

op tion s, they genera lly are tied to particular den om inationa l con

cerns or, at best, an ecumen ical religious p ers pe ctiv e.



Theory and Practice

315

A fundamental shift in normative theory in critical theory is

evident in acknow ledgm ent that the theory o f domination (he nc e

theories o f jus tice) does not pr ov ide a self-sufficient foundation

for moral discourse. In Giddens this is reflected in the d istinction

b et w ee n em ancipato ry politics and life po litics; Fay poin ts to the

tension b et w ee n th e goals of clarity and autonomy and happiness;

and Habermas acknowledges the contrast between the formal

determ inations of procedural ethics and the fact that actual form s

o f life and actual life-histories are em bedd ed in unique traditions

and that the the ory of social evolution perm its no con clusions

about orders of happiness (Haberm as 1982, p. 22 8). On this basis

a communicative ethics is confronted with the crucial challenge

of bridging the gap be tw een the generalized and concrete other

of rights-based claims, a them e of feminist contribu tions t o the

theory of communicative ethics (Benhabib 1986, 1992).

Intellectuals and Practice:

Contexts of Critical Research

Introduct ion

Un fortunately th e crisis expe rie nc ed by leftist intellectuals dur

ing the past fe w decades has con tributed to an increas ingly un pro

ductive rift over issues of theory and practice. On one side are

thos e w h o f ol lo w the thesis that in large measure the failure of the

Left can be attributed to its academ ic institutionalization and the

dec line of pu blic intellectuals (Jacoby 1987 ). An oth er version is

the insistence in much feminist theo ry (Lather 1991) that imm e

diate emancipatory relevance take methodological priority. How

ever, withou t den ying the latter as a legitima te goal of som e form s

of th eo ry and research, it is possib le to counter that im m edia cy

of practice does not provide an adequate basis for the multiple

possible and necessary relations between critical theory and its

overall counterhegemon ic project (Po pk ew itz 1990). N or does

this defense of the autonomy of critical inquiry entail some nec

essary capitulation to p ositivism, careerism, and reform ism. Th e

production and appropriation of these different forms of knowl

ed ge vary w ith th e different social locations of intel lectuals and



316


their relation to the pertinent systems of social and cultural

reproduction.

Th e con seq uen ce o f the historicity of pr actic e is that the funda

mental ambivalence of critical theory is implicit in its conception

of the unity of theory and practice. First, this unity is itself his

torically variable, taking on different meanings in different con

texts. Second, critical theory's insistence on unifying critical

intelligence and democratic participation results in an aporia o r

unresolvable logical proble m . This issue beco m es most apparent

in discussions that define critical research as radical transforma

tive pra xis, as bo th im m ediately relevant to pr act ice and based o n

a subject-subject relation that does not involve domination of

tho se resea rched. But this is on ly an aspiration

a

in pr inc ip le g iven

the realities of research, especially in the light of the divisions

between the researchers and the researched. In response to this

pr ob lem , on e focus of critical research has be en con cre te situ

ations in w h ich the dif ferences be tw ee n subject and objec t are

minimized and where material circumstances pose least resis

tance to cha ng e (A . Sayer 1992, p. 25 4). But these situations are

fe w and far be tw ee n in the present conjuncture. As a con sequ ence

most critical research is con fronted w ith the risk that the dev el

opm ent o f certa in types of know ledge may (and of ten d oe s) have

the effect of reinforcing dom ination and subordination and hen ce

op po sin g a general ema ncipation. Social divisions therefo re fre

quent ly overr ide the immanent l ink between knowledge and

em an cipa tion (A . Sayer 1992, pp . 254-5). It can be argued that

even Marx was confronted with this dilemma because the refor

mist responses o f the dom inant classes w er e based, in part, on the

ways hegemonic bourgeois intel lectuals took seriously much of

his diagnosis of the contradictions of laissez-faire capitalism. The

crucia l issue is that the typ ical failure o f the ideal of an im m anent

l ink between knowledge and emancipat ion in the pract ice of

research cannot be resolved through a retreat from kn ow led ge

to imm ediate pra ctice even i f this step remains in som e sense

the central experim ental p rem ise of partic ipatory action research.

One way to respond to these diff iculties is to recognize that

generalizations about theory and practice need to be contextual-

ized strategically. It is useful here to distinguish three basic con-

tex ts-o f ten over lapp ing- in w hi ch cr it ica l theor y is impl icated in



Theory and Practice

317

social life: (a) its relation to scientific communities as relatively

autonomous research in institutions such as the un iversity, ( b ) its

public functions in policy analysis and social criticism, and (c )

its contributions to action research involving actual agents of

chang e. Such a notion of a dece ntere d research tradition requires

a multiplicity of different relationships to theory, research, and

prac tices. As a con sequ ence it dow nplays glorification or demean

ing of any of them. To this end it is instructive to contrast the

constraining and enabling conditions characteristic of the three

primary contexts of theory and practice.

Univ ersities a nd the Critical

Renewal of Tradit ions

M any -espec ial ly Marxist and N e w Left-c rit ics of the Frankfurt

tradition have remarked on the intellectual aloofness of people

such as Th eo do r Ad orn o as a kind o f betrayal of the theory/praxis

orientation of critical theory. Often this aloofness is attributed to

a kind of intellectual elitism that is used as the basis of ad hom i-

nem arguments against the validity of specific theoretical argu

ments.

Much o f this attitude reflects a han gover o f the origin al

New Left 's ambivalence toward the university, culminating in its

bein g labeled as the prim ary bastion of the system in the late

1960s.

But a more fundamental question is involved here: that the

autonom y o f even a critical research progra m po ints to limits o f

enga gem ent and the prim ary responsibility o f university-based re

search to the critical renewa l of traditions. For this reason Habermas

has mad e a sharp distinction b et w ee n the scien ce system and

political organization:

I don't think that w e can ever again, or even that w e should ever

again, bridge the institutional differentiation between the science

system and political agitation and political organization and politi

cal action. That is what Lenin tried to do. An d I think that it's a part

of the past that we don't wan t to retrieve. So there are just bridges

between us as participants in some sort of political action and as

mem bers of

the

science community. I kn ow that Horkheimer be gan

his career with

a

famous article denying just this. (Ha bermas 1992b,

p. 471)




On the other hand, an optim istic reading of the p ostem piricist,

refl exi ve turn in scien ce and tech no logy studies has set the stage

for a critical renew al o f scientific traditions that go es bey on d the

mo men tary loss of con fidence represented by skeptical postm od

ernism (e.g ., Fuller 1993). Th is reco gn ition of the po litics o f

kn ow led ge im plied by social epistemo logies need not result in

the confrontation of simplistic politicization and postmodernist

skepticism. Instead a deepening of the analysis of the problems

linked to the democratization of the public sphere has been

envisioned by the new science and techn ology studies. In this con

text the boundaries be tw een scientific com mu nities and the pub

lic sphere are blurred, but not obliterated. Th e original pro jec t of

the Frankfurt School has bee n ren ew ed and transform ed in hop e

ful ways.

Pol icy Research and Social Cr it ic ism

Second, it is important to locate social criticism and forms of

po licy evaluation as a form of kn ow led ge in their o w n right, form s

that can neither be reduced to the empirical or elevated to the

pur ely norm ative. This form o f research and w riti ng is associated

w ith the notion of social criticism but needs to be given a stronger

rationale as practically contextu alized and em pirica lly info rm ed

norm ative claims with polit ical imp lications. From this perspec

tive the strategic implications of non-empirical methods become

central, rather than periphera l: the question of kn ow led ge for

w h at thus reverses the logical prio rity of the em pirical and norm

ative. Alth oug h som e of this ty pe o f w or k is and can be undertaken

in university contex ts, its most central co nte xt o f referen ce is the

pu blic sphere w h er e pu blic intellectuals have a particular part

to play and radicalize the m etho dolo gical issues ot he rw ise hid den

under technocratic notions of evaluation research (Fischer and

Forester 1987; Guba 1990). In this context public intellectuals

have a strategic plac e to play both w ith the university system and

on the margins o f the mass media (w h er e critical voic es oft en can

be repres ented ), as w el l as the various contexts w h er e th e educa

tional tasks of revitalization o f the pub lic sph ere may be realized .



Theory and Practice

319

Crit ical Act ion Rese arch

The third context in which critical research intersects with

socie ty invo lves wha t is som etimes called critical action research ,

especially in education (Kemmis and McTaggart 1988a, 1988b;

Carr and Kem m is 198 6). Related notions include participa tory

action research and earlier associations w ith the no tion of con

flict m eth od olo gy (T. Youn g 1976 ). It also is associated closely

with feminist theory and feminist methodology generally (Lather

1991).

An oth er version couples a dialectical sensibility w ith

radical em piricism (A gg er 1992a, pp . 239-268).

Although the term action research has its orig ins in the w or k

of the cognitive social psychologist Kurt Lewin, in its contempo

rary radicalized form it often has been associated with forms of

critical social theory:

Action research is a form of collective self-reflective inquiry under

taken by participants in social situations in order to improve the

rationality and justice of their own social or educational practices,

as wel l as their understanding of these practices and the situations

in which these practices are carried out. (Kemmis and McTaggart

1988b , p. 5 )

T w o t ype s of situations are characteristic of action resea rch.

First, social movements are in a position to actively appropriate

knowledge for their own purposes or to al low participant ob

servers to make them in to an objec t o f inquiry on their ow n terms.

In this first context involving social movements the diversity of

the audiences for critical research becom es eviden t. Th e prolifera

tion of interests represented in the new social movem ents is both

a blessing and a curse. The blessing is perhaps obvious: Recogni

tion of the multiplicity of sources of domination and distorted

communication has allowed the voicing of many different types

of suppressed anger and frustration. The curse is the other side:

the babel of causes and practical consequences of the dissipation

of en ergies in single-issue movem ents or aw kw ard and artificially

popular coalitions be tw een them (Adam 1993).

Second , action research may at times be encou raged or tolerated

w ith in o r on the margins of existing institutions as part of ex pe ri

mental programs. A limitation of focusing on ne w social movem ents



320


is co m m on to all analyzes of ov ert political a ction: the assum ption

that the political can be limited to participation in activities

exp licitly defined in such terms. A close r look suggests a num ber

of oth er dialogical spaces w h ere challenges to the dominan t orde r

have been mounted and visions of alternatives projected. One of

the central themes uniting these often highly institutionalized

dom ains is the question of alternatives to bureaucracy. From this

perspective the necessity of complex organization is acknow

ledg ed, but the reification o f existing forms o f administration and

centralization are challenged in terms of alternative organizational

strategies and modes of democratic representation within domi

nant institutions. In part, this challenge may be viewed as one

con text for wh at was labeled in the late 1960s as the lon g m arch

throu gh institutions. N ot surprisingly, there for e, a critical litera

ture has em erg ed for virtually all of these institutional location s,

for ex am ple, education, health and therapeutic professions, w ork ,

communities (rural, urban ghettoes, Natives and reserves), envi

ronmental issues, the family, intimate relationships, the media,

rel igio n , and last but not least—politics.

Conclusion: Bey ond Fragmentation?

The debates about postmodernism have brought to the fore all

of the accumulated issues suppressed by the positivist vision of

restoring order through science fol lowing the collapse of the

rel igious wor ldv iew . Given the wa ning of this total izing mod ernist

vision , w e are con fronted w ith its dialectical op po site : in finite

fragmen tation, differe nc e, and particularity as ineluctab le fea

tures of social life and foundational limits to social inquiry.

Th e pers pec tive o f critical theo ry involves an attempt to medi

ate between totalizing unification and anarchic fragmentation.

The central claim o f such a balancing act is that it is our histo rical

understanding o f social determ ination that allow s us to env ision

alternative worlds. Crit ical methodology thus is concerned with

careful explication of what is in order to ultimately liberate us

from the destiny of what has been: Reality as it is n o w n eeds

reasons, legit imations for being thus and not ot h er w ise -th e w ay

it con cretely could be . As against the current scien tific fatalism,



Theory and Practice

321

mo tives like dreaming , ho pe . . . assume a cognitive function in a

less zealously restrictive scien ce (Gebh ardt 1978, p. 406 ). On e

task of such concrete Utopian thinking was formulated long ago

by an Am eri can associate of the Frankfurt Institute in its N e w Yo rk

phase (Rob ert Ly nd ) by suggesting that it should not be our o nly

con cern to ask w he the r a hypothesis is true, possible or realistic;

w e should, perha ps, also ask the other wa y around: 'wh at sort of

earth' would it have to be in which this hypothesis (e.g., one

describing a possible situation) would be realistic. Only history

could verify such hy poth eses-b y realizing them (Gebhardt 1978,

p. 406). Perhaps the logics of experimentation are not that far

from the raison d'Gtre of critical theory w h ich is, after all, no thin g

m ore and nothing less than a the ory of the necessity o f o vercom

ing d istorted com mu nication as part of an endless process of

collective learning.

Notes

1. The present analysis follows Stockman (1983, pp. 121-38) and others in

ack no wle dging the distinctiveness of Pop pe r's critical rationalism and the dangers

of subsuming it with in any narrow definition of positivism ( or technocratic ap

proaches generally). These issues have been discussed extensively within the

German tradition, for example, Adorno et al. 1976.

2. Perhap s the most illuminating exam ple of this can be found in the later wo rk

of Mann heim (194 0) and the wh ole history of social democratic planning theory.

3. Nee dless to say, this presuppositions a conceptio n of the role of cont empo

rary intellectuals that cannot be develop ed h ere (Gou ldne r 1979; Lemert 1991;

Bauman 1987; Eyerman et al. 1987; Jacoby 1987; Birnbaum 1988; Bog gs 1993; B.

Robbins 1993).

4. In so doing w e are assuming that the debates stemm ing from critical post

mo dernist perspective s can be read as part of internal dialogue with in the critical

dialogical model. These complex debates-strongly shaped by feminist theory-go

bey ond the present discussion.



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I N D E X

Abel, Theodore, 70

Aberc rom bie, Nicho las, 32n., 33n.,

51,203, 301n.

Aboulafia, Mitchell, 123

Abstracted empiricism (vs. grand

theory), 250

Accounts, 206

A Contemporary Critique of

Historical Materialism, 181

Action (the ory of; see also Communi

cative action ), 53ff., 116-121,

158-159, 216-217, 222, 275,

285, 290-291 (and culture)

Actionalist theo ry

(see also

Touraine), 132

Action research (critical; see also Par

ticipatory action), 227, 257,

305, 317, 319-320

Activism, political, 25, 27

Actor explication (vs. generaliza

tion),

217

Actors, 212

Adam, Barry, 17

Ad hominem

arguments, 236

Adm inistered society, 102

Adorno, Theodor, 14, 19, 103, 106,

107, 108, 141, 189, 226, 260,

273,

282, 294, 302, 303, 317

Advanced societies (class structure

of) , 181

Advertising (see also Promotional cul

ture), 259, 289

Aesthetics, 47, l67n., 189

Aesthetic theory, 20

Agency , 33n., 106-110 , 118, 137

and autonomy, 295-297

and structure, 59, 113-114, 126,

130ff., 158-159, I68n., 173,

195n., 218

Agger, Ben, 11, 13, 17, 23, 40, 129,

237, 308, 310, 319

Aggregate analysis, 205, 250

Agrarian states and societies, 180,

255

Alexander, Jeffrey, 11 In.

Alford, C. Fred, 287

Algebra, 229

Alienatio n, 10, 13, 91, 96, 105, 106,

122, 293, 296-297 (research on)

Allocative (vs. authoritative) re

sources, 178, 181

Alternative methodologies, 39

Althusser, Louis, ll l n . , 125, 130,

161, 278, 289, 301n.

American (see also An glo American;

Pragmatism; United States), 23

(sociology), 58 (anthropology)

"American ideology, the," 306

Analytic case studies, 251

Analytic methodologies (vs. herm e

neutic), 144

Analytic philosophy, 116, 144

Analytic strategies, 208-209

Analytical Marxism, xv, 32-33n., 240-

244, 247n.

Analytical theory, 42, 46

350



Index

351

Anarchism (epistemological) , 75

And erson, R. J., 6 ln .

Ange not, M arc, 32n.

An glo A me rican theory, 18, 22, 93

(and empiricism), 11 In. (rece p

tion of Mannheim and Weber)

Ansart, Pierre, 132, 139n.

Anthropology (cultural), 5, 10, 11,

58, 148, 184, 252, 255, 264,

274, 291

Anthropology (philosophical) , 294

Antiempiricist (methodology), 125

Antievolutionism, 172, 179

Anti-foundationalism, 59, 72-76, 152,

223

Antifunction alism , 172, 179

Anti-historicist (explanations), 125,

234

Antihumanism, 125

Anti-intellectualism, 27

Antinaturalism, 143, 164

Anti-positivism, 9, 28, 57, 164

Antipsychologism (in Husserl), 118

Anti-science, 26

Antisociology, 135

Antonio, Robert, 17, 33n., 115, 129,

304

Anxiety (in existentialism), 123

Apel, Karl Otto, 43

Aporia (of praxis), 316

A priori:

reason, 43

structures, 98, 123, 147

Apple, Michael, 289, 292

Applied sociology (see also Models

of social science), 9

Applied turn (in critical theory), 24

Aquinas, Thomas, 65

Arato, An dre w, 18, 95, 101, 102,

284, 297

Archaeology of knowledge, 135

Architecture, 290

Arminger, Gerhard, 223n.

Aron, Raymond, 132

Archer, Margaret, 33n., 195n.

Argumentation (theory of), 46, 52,

157, I68n., 211, 223, 229-232,

246n.

Aristotle, 51, 94

Arnason, Johann, 17

Aronowitz, Stanley, 17, 22, 282, 291

Art(s), 98, 101, 105, 107 (mechani

cal reproduction of), 255

Arts faculties, 4, 148

Ashmore, Malcolm, 76, 80n., 231

Astrology (as pseudoscienc e), 49

Astronomy (as science), 49

Atkinson, Paul, 270n.

Attitude research, 104 (on Weimar

working class) 259, 294 (on al

ienation)

Audience reception analysis, 291

Austin, John, 117

Australia (and critical theory), 17

Austria, 69

Austro-Marxism, 90

Authoritarian personality, 104, 293

Authoritative (vs. allocative) re

sources, 178, 181

Authority

(see also

Dom ination), 43,

50 (political), 105 (and the fam

ily)

Autobiography, 207, 257

Autonomy (as freedom), 55, 144,

154, 195n., 315

Autonomy (of research pro gram s),

25, 63, 91 ,9 8, 173, 257, 271-

272n., 305, 315-318

Babbie, Earl, 203

Bakhtin, Mikhail, 265, 292, 297

Bakhtin Circle, 234

Baldamus, W , 224n., 246n.

Bali, Terence, 11

Barker, Martin, 292

Barthes, Roland, 264

Bartky, Sandra Lee, 301n.

Base-superstructure metaphor (or

model), 90, 100, 11 In ., 126,

246n., 288

Basic research, 148

Baudrillard, Jean, 128, 139n., 192, 312

Baugh , Ke nneth , Jr., 155, 254

Baum, Gregory, 17, 298

Bauman, Zygm unt, 17, 310, 321n.



352


Baynes, Kenneth, l68n.

Beardsley, Philip L., 200

Beauvoir, Simone de, 123

Becker, Howard, 251

Beezer, Anne, 292

Behavioral (political science), 50

Behavioral science, 60-6ln., 303-304

Behaviorism (psychological), 47, 52,

120, 124, 216, 286

Beilharz, Peter, 17

Being (see also On tology ), 122, 155

Belief systems

(see also

Ideology),

41,

52, 75 (science as), 163

(critique of)

Benhabib, Seyla, 12, 17, 152, 191,

240,

315

Benjam in, Jessica, 105, 295

Benjamin, Walter, 19, 105-106

Berger, Peter, 119, I67n.

Berm an, Russell Α., 12

Bernstein, Richard, 17, 33n., 117,

120, 143, 172

Bhaskar, Roy, 78, 80n., 121, 136-

138, 168η., 247n.

Billings, Dwight Β., 32n.

Billington, Rosamund, 288

Bioethics, 240

Birnbaum, Norman , 17,19 2, 274, 311

Blau, Peter, l68n.

Blaikie, Norman, 27In.

Blauner, Robert, 295

Bleicher,

Josef,

92

Bloor, David, l66n.

Blumer, Herbert, 120

Blumler, Jay B., 291

Body (theory of), 135, 191, 295

Body politics, 295

Boer, Theo de, 294

Boggs, Carl, 303, 32In.

Boguslaw, Robert, 307

Bohm an, James, xv, 33n., I68n .

Bohrnstedt, Geo rge W , 223n.

Βοη β, Wolfga ng, 16, 103, 11 In.

Bottomore, Tom, 90, 155

Boudon, Raymond, 132

Bourdieu, Pierre, 3, 17, 113, 114,

131-134, 139n., 161, 192, 208,

221, 271n., 288

Bourgeois culture, 263

Braaten, Jane, 33n.

Brand, Arie, 33n.

Bracketing (in phenom enolog y), 118

Bramson, Leon, 112n.

Brantlinger, Patrick, 11, 292

Braybrooke, David, 56, 208, 216

Breines, Paul, 95

British theory and research, 10, 18,

32n., 6ln., 92, 190, 292

Broughto n, John, 294

Brown, Richard Harvey, 237

Bruner, Jerome, 27 In.

Bryant, Christopher G. Α., 33n., 69,

307

Bureaucratization, 96, 101, 115, 182,

185, 281, 295 (L eninist )

Burman, Patrick, 297

Burrell, Gibson, 53

Buss, Allan R., 294

Calhoun, Craig, 17, 33n., 6ln., 133,

134, 236, 271n., 276, 286, 301n.

Canada (reception of critical theory),

32n.

Canadian Journal of Political and

Social Theory, 32n.

Cannibalism, 52

Capital, 94, 95, 272 (and technology),

276 (accum ulation o f)

Capitalism, 41, 46 (rise o0 , 102

(liberal), 160-161, 178, 179

(contradictions of), 181, 272

(disorganized)

Carlin, Alan, 247n.

Carnap, Rudolf, 69

Carr, Wilfred, 292, 319

Cartesian ego, 118

Case studies, 55, 6ln., 206-207,

251ff., 279

Castells, Manuel, 278

Categories (a priori), 123

Causal explanation, 45, 57, 93, 193n.

(vs. functional analysis), 203,

230, 240

Causality (surface vs. depth), 161,

215, 248



Index

353

Causal modeling

(see also

Statistical

modeling), 213-215

Causal necessity, 96

Causal powers, 136

Causation, 66, 136

and correlation, 46, 56, 206

vs .

interpretation, 57-58, 93, 118

Caws, Peter, 126, 130, 131

Change (see Scientific deve lopm ent;

Transformation)

Charlton, William, 116

Chorney, Harold, 286

Childhood, 293

Cicourel, Aron, 224n., 236

Civil rights movement, 285

Civil society, 285, 297

Clark, Jon, 33n.

Class (see Social class; W orkin g class)

Class conflict (and division), 179,

181, 247n., 255, 276ff.

(in urban studies), 273-284 (in

advanced capitalism)

Classical sociology, 12-13, 199

(classic social analysis)

Class Structure of the Advanced

Societies, 181

Clegg, Stewart, 11

Clifford, James, 254

Cockfighting (Balinese), 58

Coerc ion (and domination), 104

Cognition (a p riori character of), 147

Cognitive anthropology, 212

Cognitive developmental psychology,

126, 151, 188

Cognitive interests (see also Knowl

edge interests), 145

Cognitive skills, 231

Cognitive sociology, 221

Cohen, Bernard P., 37

Cohen, G. Α., 246n.

Cohen, IraH., 103

Cohen, Ira

J.,

33n., 170, 195n.

Coh en, Jean, 17, 285, 298

Cole, Mike, 289

Collective behavior, 218

Collective learning, 185-186, 271,

287, 320-321

Collins, Randall, 19, 139n., 164

Colomy, Paul,

11

In.

Colonization (of the lifewor ld), 185,

187-188

Commodification, 100, 105, 185,

288 (of culture)

Commodity form, 95

Common sense (see also Everday

life; Lifewo rld), 28, 46, 48

(knowledge), 129 (empiricism

as), 237

Communication (see Distorted

communication; Mass media)

Communications:

electronic, 178, 191, 272

mass, 5

Communications studies, 11, 286-291

Communicative action, 33n., 106, 109,

118,

135, 143, 151-153 (theory

of),

158-159, 158 (vs. strategic),

184ff„ 188, 263, 294-297

Communicative ethics, 152-153, 183,

240, 314-315 (and feminist

theory)

Communicative rationality (see also

Rationality), 184-185

Communism, 22, 51 (as ideology)

Community of inquirers (science as),

41,55-56, 67-68,71,73-74,

223,

237, 241 (as a system),

244 (and reflexive methods)

Community of science (autonomy

of), 27, 305, 317-318

Comparative generalization ,212-21 4,

227, 252ff.

Comparative historical sociology,

220, 252-253

Comparative method(s), 213-214,

225n., 253-254 (of agreement

vs. difference)

Competence (development of), 152,

296 (models of)

Complex organizations, 288

Componential analysis, 212

Configurational method, 252

Confirmation (see also Falsification;

Verification), 42, 64, 228

Conflict (vs. contradiction), 94, 179

Conflict theory, 17, 19, 132



354


Conjectures and refutations (Popper),

71

Connell, R. W., 17, 289

Connerton, Paul, 32n.

Conscientization, 291

Consciousness, 154

Conservatism (and personality), 103

Construc tion, 24 (of reality), 72, 156

(of science)

Constructionism, 33n., 75-76, 136,

205n. (and Giddens), 272n. (in

social psychology)

Constructivism, 54, 76

Consumer sovereignty, 288

Consump tion (cultural, see also

Rece ption), 209, 288, 289-291,

293

Content analysis, 259, 288

Continental philosophy, 116

Con tradict ion(s), 90, 94, 96-97, 115,

161, 179 (defin ed), 187

(eco nom ic), 193n. (systemic),

242, 278, 280-284 (systemic)

Contradictory totality, 270

Control, 176 (dialectic of), 215 (in

statistics)

Content analysis, 259

Conversation (politics a s), 120, 312

Conversation analysis, 119, 265

Cook, Judith Α., 143, 272n.

Cooper, David E., 123

Co-presence, 178-179

Copy theory (of knowledge), 65, 74

Cornell, 191

Correlation (see also Statistical

modeling):

and causation, 46, 56

as method, 58, 129, 205, 209

Correspondence (in social reproduc

tion), 133, 173, 288

Correspondence theory of truth, 77,

78 , 155, 156

Coser, Lewis, 23

Counterhegemonic movements (see

also N e w social movements),

313-314

Counterhegemony, 288, 305 (as

struggle), 315 (as project)

Covariation (statistical), 206

Covering law model (of explanation),

44, 45, 55, 66, 135, 145, 161,

216,

224n.

Craib, Ian, 33n., 115, 123, 130, 155,

195n., 301n.

Crespi, Franco, l68n.

Crisis theory, 12, 182, 186-187

(of legitimation), 187 (of

rationalization, motivation), 280-

284 (systemic)

Crisis:

adolescent, 188

economic, 101

fiscal, 187, 303

ideological, 21

of Critical Theory, 143-144

of historical materialism, 22, 108

work society, 286

Critical action research (see Action

research; Participatory action

research)

Critical communications studies,

105, 290

Critical dialogical model (of social

scien ce), 309-312, 313-321n.

Critical-emancipatory interest, 144,

148, 268-269, 310

Critical ethnography, 254-257

Critical hermene utics (see also

Hermeneutics), 91, 109, 113,

114, I42ff,

I66n.,

236, 254-

255, 259, 262-263

Critical legal studies, 288

Critical Ma rxism (vs. scientific), 89-90

Critical methodology, 38-40, 267-268

(summarized)

Critical modernism, 79, 142

Critical pedagogy, 292, 311-312

Critical postmodernism, 79

Critical psychology, 292

Critical rationalism, 62, 70-73, 308,

321n.

Critical realism, 76-79, 120, 136-138,

155-157, I68n., 227, 230, 278

(in urban studies), 304

Critical reason, 182

Critical social ecology, 287



Index

355

Critical social psychology, 294-298

Critical Social Research,

6 In.

Critical social science, 18, 32n., 163

Critical social theory (see Critical

theory), 6

Critical sociology, 18, 23, 32n., 132

(French)

Critical structuralism, 132, 135-137,

194n.

Critical theology, 296

Critical theory:

and cultural Marxism, 18

and ideology, 26-27

as a research pro gram , 85-111

(passim.), 141-194, 24lff., 269-

271, 274-275

concept of, 7-12, 241-244

critique of, 240-241

definition of, 12, 16

of methodology, 38-40

of technology, 282

origins of, 12-16

strategy of introducing, xii-xv

supradisciplinary character of, 12,

274

Critical-dialectical perspective, 58

Critical-dialogical model (of social sci

ence), 304, 309-312

Criticism:

conventionalized, 71

literary, 3In.

of critical theory, xiv, 26-30

scientific,

70ff.

social and cultural, 11, 47, 50, 152

Critique, 7, 109, 174-175, 254-255

cultural, 255

imm anent vs. transcendent, 263

intellectual, 174

moral, 174

of ideologies, 95, 149-150, 162-

163, 174

of technology, 101

practical, 174

sociocultural, 10

Crozier, Michel, 132

Crucial experiments (see Falsifica

tion

sm), 85

Culler, Jonathan, 129, 246n.

Cultural:

anthropology, 148

arbitrary, 133

capital, 134

change, 218

criticism, 47

critique, 254-255

Marxism, 18

materialism, 18

sciences, 92-93

studies, 11, 18, 6 ln ., 105 (an d

Horkheimer), 189-190 (British),

258, 292

theory, 99, 272n., 273, 274, 287-

292

Cultural reprod uction

(see

Reproduction)

Culture:

elite, 265

mass, 98

popular, 98, 265

sociology of, 47, 249, 263-264,

271n., 286-291

Culture industries (see also Mass

media), 15, 106, 286, 311

Curran, James, 290

Curriculum theory, 291

Dahmer, Helmut, 103

Dallmayr, Fred R., 11, 17, 152, 240

D'Amico, Robert, 95

Dant, Tim, 263

Data (see also Sense-data), 43-44

Davies, loan, 17

Death (of the subject), 124

Deconcentration (of urban spaces),

276ff.

Deco nstruc tion, 122, 128, 129, 201,

202,

227, 237, 246n.

(definitions of)

Deconstructive argumentation, 232

Deduction, 66

Deductive logic, 228

Deductive-nomological model, 46,

66ff.,

78



356


Deep-structures, 184

Defamiliarization (as cultural

critique), 254-255, 255 (by

epistemological critique vs.

cross-cultural juxtaposition)

DeFleur, Melvin L„ 287

Demarcation principle, 49, 8In ., 86

(criteria)

Democracy (see also Public sphe re),

143, 275, 284-285

Democratic participation, 316

Demo cratic planning, 21, 309

Dem ocratic state, 187

Democratization:

of education, 98

of knowledge, 27-28

Demography, 46, 280

Demystification, 255

Denzin, Norm an, 38, 6l n. , 254,

271n., 290

Dependency theory, 192

Depth (explanatory) , l66n.

Depth-hermeneutics (see Critical

hermeneutics)

Depth interpretation, 160-161

De r Derian , James, 284

Dereification, 271

Derrida, Jacques, 128, 191, 234-255,

237, 246n.

De Saussure, Ferdinand, 124, 263

Descartes, Rene, 43, 65, 122, 123

Description (intensional vs. exten-

sional), 225n., 226

Determination (social) , 44

Development:

ego,

100

moral, 151-152

psychic, 98

scientific, 71, 73-74, 86-88

social, 97, 161-162

Develo pm ental laws , 11 On.

Developmental psychology, 126,

139n., 151-152, 155, 184, 292

Dew ey, John, 120, 146, 245n., 303-

304 (vs. Foucau lt)

Dews, Peter, 128, 135

Diachronic, 125

Dialectic (of subject and object), 90

Dialectic (the), l66n.

Dialectic of control, 176

Dialectic of enlightenm ent, 108, 115,

143-144, 303

Dialectic of n ature, 89

Dialectical imagination, 8

Dialectical materialism (Dimat), 89

Dialectical meth od, 96, 228, 240-

244, 247n., 268

Dialectical relations, 58-59, 242

Dialectical thought (vs. logic), 226

Dialogical model, 266, 290-291 (of

ideology critique), 310-311

Dialogue:

as conversation , 120

of M arx and We ber , 115

of master and slave, 149

of subject-subject in action

research, 271-272n.

Diamond, Irene, 287

Dictatorship, 15

Dictionaries, social scientific, 32n.

Differences, 238 (mediating

between )

Dilthey, Wilhelm, 45, 93, 95, 148

Disciplinary (power), 134

Disciplines (academ ic; see also

Interdisciplinary), 4, 12, 38-40,

88 (humanistic), 93 (scientific),

97 (specialized), 191, 273-274

(critical theory and), 310

Discourse, 24, 40 (disciplinary), 78

(scientific)

Discourse analysis, 191, 251, 258-

265,

262 (three dimensional

model of) , 288 (of m ass media

and),

294

Discourse formation, 265

Discourse o f possibility, 312

Discovery (logic of, vs. verification),

67, 72, 88, 145, 229 (psych ology

of) ,

233, 236, 246n.

Discursive penetration (of agents),

176

Disintegration (logic of), 108-109

Dismantling reality, 76



Index

357

Disorganized capitalism (the sis), 283

Distanciation, 150, 165, l66n., 178

(of time-space), 264

Distorted communication, 52, 149,

152,

159 (vs. uncon strained),

183, 185, 188, 26 1,2 63 , 265,

310, 321

Division of labor, 5, 12 (academ ic), 13

Dogma, 46-47

Dominant ideology thesis, 288-288

Dom ination, xv, 10, 29, 100 (and

techno logy), 104 (as

Herrschafi\

108 (internal vs. external), 120,

132, 148 (as basis of critical

the ory ), 158 (and distorted com

munication), 163, l66n., 177,

185, 191, 254, 271 ,

292ff.

(so

cial psychology o f), 296-297

(and Foucault)

Double-herm eneutic, 9 (as double

involvement), 156, 176, 243

Doubt (radical), 182

Doyal, Len, 6ln., 240

Drover, Glen, 11

Dualism (of subject-object), 59, 154,

155

Duality of structure, 159, 180, 269

Dubiel, Helmut, 16, 11 In.

Dunn, William N., 11

Durk heim , Em ile, 13, 32n., 45, 68,

119, 124, 134, I40n., 263

Easthope, Antony, 292

Eco-feminist research, 287

Ecology, 276 (and urb an studies)

Economic growth, 276

Economic life, 98

Econom ic reductionism, 15, 90, 98

Economics, 5, 11, 12, 13, 102 (pri

macy of), 247n. (and rational

choice theory), 258, 280

Economism

(see also

Base-superstruc

ture model), 91

Eder, Klaus, 16, 287

Edmondson, Ricca, 237

Education, 11, 63 (and s cience ), 132-

133,

181, 188, 274, 288 (and

reproduction), 291, 309 (and lib

eralism), 317 (and action re

search)

Effects research, 286

Ego deve lopm ent, 100, 187-188

Electronic media, 178, 191, 272, 290

Elias, Norbert, 115, 288

Elite culture, 265

Elitism, 27-28, 98 (and cultura l

elites), 309, 317

Elliott, Anthon y, 301n.

Ellul, Jacques, 282

Elster, Jon, 247n.

Emancipation (hum an), 28, 77, 183,

192

Emancipatory (vs. life) politics, 174-

175, 189, 194n., 314

Emergent properties, 55

Emotions, 29-20 (vs. reason in

Habermas), 295 (social psychol

ogy of), 239, 302

Empirical-analytical interest, 144, 147

Empirical methods,

23

32n.

Empirical research, 14, 25, 29, 32n.

(vs.

empiricist), 38, 85 (critical

reflection on), 98 (vs. philoso

phy),

173, 200 (vs. theory)

Empirical theory,

42ff.

Empiricism, xiii, 6ln., 85, 114

British, 43, 53, 123, 147, 153

logical, 54

vs. idealism, 8In.

Empiricist structuralism, 127, I66n.

Empowerment, 192

Engels, Friedrich, 90, 100

Enlightenment (as eman cipation),

163, 191 (Foucault and), 256-

257, 271 172η. (in action re

search), 313 (in skeptical post

modernism)

Enlightenment (the):

as illusion, 24

as project, 28-29

attack on metaphysics, 69

challenges to, 313

ref lexivity and, 157

Environmental critique, 108, 297

(and social movements)



358

C R I T I C A L T H E O R Y

A N D


Epiphenomenal (consciousness as),

55

Epiphenomenon (intentions

as), 56,

124 (subject

as)

Episodic transitions,

180, 253

Epistemological anarchism,

75

Epistemology,

41, 47, 48,

62-54,

157-

158

anti-positivist,

54

foundationalist,

65-69

rationalist,

45

vs. ontology,

77

Equality,

41,

52 ,96,

146

Erklaren (vs. Verstehen) 93, 153, 202

Essence (human),

294

Essentialism,

73, 137,

146 (log ical)

Estrangement

see also

Alienation;

Reification),

96

Ethics,

37 (of

research),

47, 48,

I68n.,

235,

238-239 (profe s

sional),

240

(social ),

315

(proce

dural)

Ethnicity,

257

Ethnic movements,

297

Ethnocentrism,

10

Ethnography

(and

research),

32n.,

160, 163, 201, 207, 208, 212,

226,

235, 251,

254-256,

291 (in

education),

295 (on

unemploy

ment)

Ethnomethodology,

119, 178, 236,

242

Eurocentrism,

255

Europea n tradition,

36, 6In.

Evaluation research,

308, 318

(tech

nocratic understanding

of)

Everyday life,

46, 48, 51 (and

ideol

ogy), 109

(and

reification),

185,

188, 193n.,

237, 278

Evolution

(and

evolutionary theo

ries),

13, 48, 89, 153,

161-162,

172,

180,

183, 253, 276 (in ur

ban studies),

315

Ewen, Stuart,

288

Exchange theory,

216

Existential argumentation,

232, 234,

237-238

Existentialism,

114,

121-124

Existential Marxism,

123, 133n.

Existential phenomenology,

122

Existential p sychology,

123

Existential reflexivity,

234,

237-238

Experience,

42, 237 (o f

wom en )

Experimentation, 47-48,

55, 88, 220,

250,

285

(social ),

286, 292 (so

cial psychological), 319-320

(in

bureaucracies), 320-321

(and

collective learning)

Expert cultures,

189

Experts

see

Intellectuals; Models

of

social science)

Explanandum,

67

Explanation,

42ff.

(defined),

52

as

a

social act,

249

causal,

57

covering

law

model

of, 44

deductive-nomological model

of,

46, 66ff., 78

empiricist vs. structuralist,

127

functionalist,

45

hypothetico-deductive model

of,

46, 66ff., 78

ideographic,

56

intentional,

45

interpretive structuralist, 159-162

nomothetic,

54

scientific,

45

subjectivist vs. objectivist,

55

teleological,

46, 100

Explication

see

Actors; Mediations;

Systems), 211-213,

227

Exploitation, 161,

294

Expressionism,

255

Extensive

(vs.

intensive) analysis

(or

research designs),

218, 223,

230,

250

Eyerman,

Ron, 286,

32In.

Face-to-face interaction, 178-179

Face validity,

208

Facts:

demographic,

44

empirical,

42, 66

ethnographic,

226



Index

359

social, 9, 35, 39

theory-laden character of, 46, 70-

71,

74

Fact-value distinction, 49, 51

Fairclough, Norm an, 262

Faith, loss of, 21 , 25

in science, 68, 76, 100

Fallibilism, 71, 172, 245n.

False consc iousne ss, 105, 149, 162-

163,

263, 286, 295

Falsificationism, 71-74, 86-87 (sophis

ticated), 107 (of revolutionary

theory), 145, 228

Family (an d authority), 104

Family socialization, 100, 187-188

Fararo, Thomas, J., 10, 210, 224n.,

249

Fascism, 51 (as ide olog y), 91

Fashion, 98, 236 (in social sc ience )

Fay, Brian, 33n., 39, 80n ., 90, 194n.,

211 ,214 ,315

Featherstone, Mike, 288

Feedback mechanisms, 45

Fekete, John , 29

Feminist theory, xv, 11, 36, 37 (meth

odology), 104, 122, 142, 143,

189-190 (socialist), 192, 232,

237, 239, 256-257 (and ethn og

raphy) ,

268, 272n. (methodol

ogy ), 281 (and technology), 285

(eco-feminist), 288, 290, 292,

296, 297, 312, 315 (and commu

nicative ethics), 318, 321n.

Ferry, Jean-Marc, 17

Feyerabend, Paul, 75

Fields (socia l), 134

Figurational sociology (of Elias), 115

Film, 106

Fiscal crisis of the state, 187, 282, 303

Fischer, Frank, 287, 318

Fischer, Michael M ., 11, 255

Fleck, Ludwig, 246n.

Fon ow, M ary Margaret, 143, 272n.

Fontana, Andrea, 123

Forbes, H. D., 294

Forces of production, 180

Ford, Julienne , 61 n.

Fordism, 272, 288

Forester, John , 11, 24, 286, 311 , 318

Formal language, 4 1, 205

Formal logic (and formalization), 4 0,

48, 210, 229-230

Formal rationality, 112n.

Foucault, Michel, 17, 29, 114, 129,

131,

135-136, 159, 177, 185,

192, 265, 266, 298, 303-304,

312-313

Foundationalism, 62, 65-69, 122,

123,

143, 150-154, 164

Fozouni, Bahman, 11

Fragmentation, 314 (and resistance),

320-321

Frankel, Boris, 286, 287, 301n., 311

Frankfurt:

Institute for Social Research, 14,

85, 97, 108-110 (dec line of) ,

199,

248

School, 6, 8, 14, 32n., 39, 79,

90ff., 91 (inn er vs. outer circle ),

92,

143, 139n., 143-144, 172,

184, 262, 265ff.

tradition, 12-16, 20, 31 , 86, 112n.,

125, 265ff., 274

Fraser, Nancy, 12, 17, 143, 191, 275,

301n.

Freedom

(see also

Emancipation;

Autonomy), 52, 96, 144, 146,

149, 297

Freeman, Christopher, 281

Free will (see Voluntarism)

Freire, Paulo, 193, 292

French theory, 14, 17, 43, 92, 110n.,

114, 120-135, 189, 190 (critical

sociology)

Freud, Sigmund, 100, 103ff., 107,

123,

124, I67n., 188 (instinct

theory), 301n.

Freudo-Marxist model, 188

Friedmann, John, 297, 311

Frisby, David, 118

Fromm, Erich, 104, 294

Fuller, Steve, 317

Functionalism, 53

and Habermas, 162, 183, 193n.

Marxist, 100, 106, 125

positivist, 29



360


Functionalist:

explanation, 45

sociology, 23

theory, 13

Fusion of horizons, 162, 238

Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 148, 237-238

Galtung, Johan, 201-202

Gardiner, Michael, 265, 292, 297

Garfinkel, Harold, 64, 119

Garnham, Nicholas, 288

Gebhardt, Eike, 6ln., 142, 226, 229,

321

Geertz, Clifford, 58, 226, 264

Geist (Spirit), 93 (an d cultural sci

ences)

Geisteswissenschaft, 93

Gender, 6ln., 190, 247n., 258, 259,

272n., 274-275 (and Hab erm as),

284-285 (and social movements),

293 (and psychoanalytic theory)

Gender and

Power,

267

Genealogy of knowledge, 135

Gen eral interpretations, 162, 173

Generality (worship of), 229

Generalization, 13, 57, 159-160, 212-

213

Generalized (vs. concrete) other, 315

Gen eral systems theories, 307

General theoretical sociology (vs.

world-historical), 224n., 248

Generative mechanisms (in critical re

alism), 78-79, 135-137, 160, 215

Generative regulation, 160-161

Generative rules (and structures),

125, 126, 133, 151, 210, 212

Genetic fallacy, 88

Genetic structuralism, 126, 130,

131, 139n., 184

Genius (in science), 67

Geography (see also Time-space rela

tions), 5, 11,

276ff.

(and urban

studies), 288

Ger m an theory, 13, 15-16, 43, 92ff.,

122-123 (and existentialism),

146 (idealism), 204 (methodo

logical disputes), 259

Gerth, Hans, 168n., 294

Geyer, Felix, 295

Gidde ns, Antho ny, 5, 9, 10, 11, 13,

17,

20, 28-29, 33n., 39, 80, 92,

100, 110, ll l n . , 113, 115, 131,

132,

138, 139n., 142-168, 169-

182, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194n.,

219-220, 221, 222, 243, 253,

254, 267, 273, 274, 296, 300n.,

303,

304, 315

action theor y of, 158-159

analysis of m odern societies, 181-

182

basic conc epts of, 17 61 79

concept of critique, 174-175

concept of explanation, 158-159

epistemology of, 1561 57

methodology and, 172-176

ontology and, 155-156

theory of change, 180

vs. Habermas, 171-173

wea k research progra m of, 153-

154

Giroux, Henry, 11, 17, 291, 311

Gitlin, Todd, 287

Glassman, Ronald M., 115

Globalization, 128, 179, 182, 284

Goal-oriented rationality (see Instru

mental), 112n.

Godelier, Maurice, I40n.

Goffman, Erving, 134

Golding, Sue, 314

Goldm ann, Lucien, 139n.

Goodin, Robert E., 6ln., 239

Good society, 51, 175, 306

Gortzen, Rene, 33n.

Gottdiener, Mark, 11, 277-280, 290,

300n.

Goug h, Ian, 6ln. , 240

Gou ldner, Alvi n, 17, 43, 52, 90, 92,

228, 274, 310, 321n.

Grahame, Peter, 293

Grammar, 24, 126

Gramsci, Antonio, 18, 90, l l l n . ,

139n., 292

Grand narratives, 29, 128, 164, 312

Grand theory, 28, 34n., 250

Great transformation, 21



Index

361

Greeks (ancient), 50

Gre en , Bryan S., 237

Gregory, Derek, 11

Griswold, Wendy, 270n.

Grossberg, Lawrence, 293

Grumley, John E., 95, 135

Gruneau, Rick, 17, 290, 293

Guba, Egon G., 246n., 270n., 318

Gubriu m, JaberF., 313

Gurevitch, Michael, 290

Gusfield, Joseph, 246n.

Guttman, Amy, 61 n.

Habermas, Jurgen, 12, 16, 20, 21, 28-

29,

32n., 33n., 39, 80, 81n., 92,

100-101, 109, 113, 118, 130,

131, 136, 138, 141-168, 169-

173, 183-189, 193, 194n.,

195n., 215, 221 , 222, 226, 243,

253, 256, 265, 267, 271n., 275,

280, 282, 291, 296, 300n., 302,

304, 307, 308, 310, 315, 317

and communicative ethics, 151-152

and competence models, 295

basic concepts, 184-185

explanatory theses, 186-189

metatheory of, 154-162

meth odolo gy of 183-184

resp onse to crisis of critical the

ory, 143-145

strong research program of, 153-

154

theo ry of chan ge, 185-186

theory of comm unicative action,

150-151

theory of knowledge interests,

147-150

vs. Giddens, 171-173

Habitu s, 134, 161, 222 (as media

tional analysis)

Hahn, H., 69

Hall, John R., 208

Hall, Stuart, 18, 34n., 191

Halliday, Terence C., 215

Hamel, Jacques, 251

Hammersley, Martyn, 256

Hanen, Marsha, 240

Hansen, Phillip, 286

Happiness, 315-316

Hard core vs. protective belt

(of research program s), 87

Hardt, Hanno, 11, 106, 290

Harre, Rom, 229, 233, 245n.

Harris, David, 18, 189, 191

Harris, Roger, 6ln.

Harvey, David, 274

Harvey, Lee, xiv, 59, 6ln., 110, 227,

283

Haugaard, Mark, 33n.

Hearn, Frank, 299

Hebdige, Dick, 293

Hegel, G. W. F., 94, 96, 120, 122,

139n., I66n.

Hegelian:

concept of alienation, 90

Marxism, 94-98, 11 In. (vs. structu

ralist), 142, 145, 259

methodology, 90, 243

theory of history, 32n., 161, 187

Hegemony (see also Counter

hegemony; Gramsci; Neo-

Gramscian), 255, 289 (cultural)

Heidegger, Martin, 122-174, 282

Heinz, Walter, R., 295

Hekm an, Susan J., 11 In.

Held, David, 17, 32n., 33n., 90, 108,

11 In ., 171, 286, 301n., 309

Henriques, Julian, 298

Hermeneutic circle, 238

Hermeneutic-dialectical tradition,

92ff.,

95, 240

Hermeneutic-historical interest, 144-

148

Hermeneutic phenomenology, 121

Hermeneutics (see also Critical her

meneutics), 33n., 45, 57-58, 93,

142, I66n. (of suspicion vs. res

toration), 176, 216-217

Hermeneutic structuralism, 24, 130

Herrschaft (see also

Domination;

Authority), 104

Heuristics (ro le in researc h), 56, 87

(negative vs. positive), 214

(mathematics as), 218, 230

(logic as), 235, 275



362


Hidden curriculum, 133

Hiley, David R., 8

Historians, 10

Historical:

anthropology, 294

respecification, 89

sensitivity, 10

sociology, 9, 160, 207, 252254

structuralism, 33n., 131

totality, 14

Historical materialism, 15, 91 , 192,

193n., 240, 273

crisis of, 22, 108

logic of, 183

reconstruction of, 32n., 114, 171-

172

social psy cho logica l deficit of, 33n.

Historical social psychology, 293

Historicism, 13,

92ff.,

94 (radical),

97 ,

139n., 142

Historicist argumentation, 232

Historicist reflexivity, 236

Historicist structuralism, 156

Historicity, 132

History, 4, 11, 274 (as a discipline)

science of, 9, 13, 67-68

theory of, 20, 23, 32n., 97, 109,

110n., 161-162 (and evolu tion)

History of science (see also Kuhn),

59,

73-74, 144-145

Hitler, Adolf, 15, 108

Hochschild, Arlie R., 297

Hod ge, R obert, 265, 290

Hohendahl, Peter, 19, 20

Holenstein, Elmar, I40n.

Holism, 128, 138, 193n.

Holsti, Ole R., 259

Holu b, Robert C , 33n.

Holy, Ladislav, 252

Homan, George C , 216

Homeostasis, 45

Homogenization, 106

Hon neth, Ax el, 16, 32n., 33n., 91,

99, 105, 107, 296

Hoos, Ida R., 307

Horkheimer, Max, 3, 14, 35, 62, 85,

96-97, 99, 103, 106, 107, 108,

112n., 169, 187, 189, 194n.,

243, 303, 317

Horizons (see Fusion of )

Humanism, 120 (vs. beh aviorism),

248; liberal, 308

Humanistic approach, 6, 8-9

Humanistic Marxism, 123, 278

Humanistic sociology, 148

Human ities, xiii, 4, 11, 14, 47, 6 ln .,

148,

205, 260

Hum an nature, 28, 60, 135, 144, 294

Hum an sciences, 17, 18, 21, 22n., 87

(as research traditions), 125

(and linguistic analogy)

Hum e, David, 43, 65

Hungarian philosophy, 95

Hunter, Albert, 237

Hunting and gathering societies, 178

Husserl, Edmund, 75, 118, 122-162,

I40n.

Hutchinson, Allan C , 289

Hyperreal, 312

Hyperstructuralism, 160

Hypothesis testing, 67

Hypothetico-deductive model

(of explanation), 45, 73, 161

Idea of a Social Science, The

(Winch) , 118

Ideal (vs. material) factors, 46

Idealism, 81n. 139n.

German, 45, 118, 146, 153

phenomenology as, 92

vs. empiricism, 136

vs. materialism, 55

Idealistic positivism, 124

Ideas (in Plato), 65

Ideal speech situation, 149

Identity, 181, 188, 295

Ideographic (explanations, vs.

nomothetic), 56, 112n., 136,

148, 160, 207, 212, 251

Ideological crisis, 21

Ideology, 110n., 135, 143, 190, 191

and research funding, 26

and the mass media, 286-291



Index

363

definitions of, 51

in research, 49-52

Marxism as, 22

political, 51

vs. research program s, 118

Ideology critique, 95-97, 115, 149-

150, 153, 255-257, 262-265, 310

Illich, Ivan, 289

Illocutionary meaning, 117

Imagination:

critical, 11

dialectical, 8

sociological, 13

Utopian, 11

Immanent (vs. transcendent) cri

tique, 263

Immanent critique, 97, 314 (and

rights)

Incommensurability thesis, 74, 81n.

Indexicality, 119

Individualism (see Methodological in

dividualism)

Individual-level modeling, 216

Induction, 66

Inductive-statistical model, 67

Industrial design, 281

Inferential logic, 66

Informal logic, 48, 228, 235

Information (storage of), 178

Information societies, 5, 290

Ingram, David, 33n.

Inquiry (see also Communities of):

normative, 49-50

objects of, 10

three locales of, 305, 315-320

three moments of, 270-271, 292-293

Institutional orders, 176

Instrumentalist (theories of the

state), 90, 110η.

Instrumental rationality (see also

Technical and formal rationality

vs .

substantial), 100, 109,

110n., 145, 186, 187-188, 281

309-310

Integration (see Social and system in

tegration), 99 (of working

class), 187 (postliberal)

Intellectuals, 43, 142, 303 (crisis of),

310 (critical), 315-320 (and

contexts of practice), 32In.

(theories of)

Intensive explication, 211, 258 (as

discourse analysis)

Intensive (vs. extensive) research

designs, 220, 223, 250-265,

258, 259

Intentional explanation, 45

Interaction (face-to-face), 178-179

Interaction (sym bolic ), 184

Interactionist approaches, 37

Interdisciplinary (see also Disciplines)

materialism, 15

research program, 97ff., 108-109,

187, 279 (and Habermas)

Interdisciplinary materialism (see

also Supr adisciplinary ), 15, 99-

101

Interests:

conflict of, 179

ideal, 51

knowledge, 142-143, 239

of wo rkin g class, 98

material, 51

social, 5, 63

International relations, 273

International So ciological As socia

tion, 294

Interpellated subject (Althusser),

301n.

Interpretation:

narrative, 45

textual, 45, 237 (de constru ctive)

Interpretive:

social psychology, 212

sociologies, 53

theory, 51

Interpretive structuralism, xiv, 24,

25, 33n., 131, 154, 160-162

(and explanation), I68n., 183

Interpretive turn, 8

Interpretive understanding, 203, 227

Interpretivism, 163

Intervention (socio logica l), 297

Interviewing, 227



364


Intransitive (vs. transitive) objects

(of thought), 78

Introspection, 38

Invariant laws, 55, 129, 160

Invisible hand, 21

Irrationality:

and science, 75

of values, 68-69

Izenberg, Gerald N., 123

Jacoby, Russell, 27, 315, 321n.

Jakobson, Roland, 124

Jameson, Fredric, 139n., I6 6n., 286

Janowitz, Morris, 215

Jary, David, 32n., 33n., 92, 110n.,

260, 265

Jary, Juali, 32n., 33n., 92 , 110n.,

260, 265

Jay, Martin, 8, 11, 17, 95, 98

Jenks, Chris, 134, 195n.

Jessop, Bob, 301

Jhally, Sut, 291

Johnson, Terry, 6In.

Joas, Hans, 16, 119, 194n., 296, 304

Jary, Juali, 32n ., 33n., 92, 110n.,

259,

265

Jurisprudence (interpretive model

of), 229-230

Justice, 41, 52, 239, 314 (theories of)

Justification (logic of; see also

Verification), 67

Kalberg, Stephen, 252

Kanpol, Barry, 292

Kant, Immanuel, 43, 65, 94, 123,

139n., 147, 151

Kaplan, Abraham, 6 ln ., 73, 157, 308

Kaplan, Leonard, 295

Katz, Elihu, 289, 291

Keane, John, 17, 285

Keat, Russell, 81n., I40n.

Kellner, Douglas, 12, 17, 128, l66n.,

274, 290, 300n.

Kelly, George Armstrong, 94

Kelly, Michael, 152

Kemmis, Stephen, 257, 292, 319

Kemp, Ray, 286

Kemper, Theodore D., 297

Keynesian economic policy, 101

Kierans, Patrick, 11

Kilminster, Richard,

11

In., 171

Kinship, 178, 184, 185

Kirby, Sandra, 38

Kirchheimer, Otto, 106

Knowledge:

and pow er, 174, 191

archaeology of, 134

gen ealo gy of, 135

sociology of, 32n., 49, 6ln., 95,

115,

134, 166η., 224n., 232, 236,

247n. (and postmodernism)

theory of, 40, 49

Knowledgeability (bounds of), 176

Know ledge-constitutive interests (see

also Kn ow led ge interests),

144, 146

Knowledge interests, 142-143, 165,

239, 256, 310

Kohlberg, Lawrence, 152, 184

Korsch, Karl, 95

Kotarba, Joseph Α ., 123

Kreilkamp, Thomas, 295

Kress, Gunther, 265, 290

Kritische Theorie, 6

Kroker, Arthur, 32n.

Kroker, Marilouise, 32n.

Kuhn, Thomas,

56ff.,

64, 73-74,

80n., 86, 118, 246n.

Kurzweil, Edith, 129

Kymlicka, Will, 51, 240

Labo r (vs. interaction), 94, 144, 148,

171,

184

Lacan, Jacques, 124, 301n.

Laclau, Ernesto, 22, 189, 314

Lagapoulos, Alexandras, 288

Lakatos, Imre, 86-87, 11 I n , 170

Lamb, Matthew, 308

Langman, Lauren, 105, 295

Language, 24, 40 (of science), 114,

119-151 (and universal pragmat

ics), 226, 234, 259 (theories

of), 263-264 (and semiotics)



Index

365

mathematical, 66,

125ff.,

154

(an d represen tation), l66n .,

(philosophy of)

Language game, 117, 205

Langue, 124, 127

Larrain, Jorge , 51

Lasch, Christopher, 295

Lash, Scott, 283, 297

Lather, Patti, 238, 246n., 256, 257,

315, 318

Laudan, Larry, 88-89, ll l n . , 228

Lauren, L., 308

Law, 98 (sociology o f), 185 (form al),

189 (and reason), 274

Laws:

general, 136

invariant, 129, 144, 159-160

natural, 65

nomothetic, 93, 126

of social development, 90

scientific, 13, 25, 46, 55

universal,

66-67,

94

Lawson, Hilary, 76

Layder, Derek, xv, 27In.

Lazarsfeld, Paul, 112n.

Learning processes (see also Collec

tive learning), 185-186

Learning to Labor, 292

Lefebvre, Henri, 278

Left (see also Ideology; N e w Left):

and post-Marxism, 189

critique of universities, 317

failure of, 315

in the Weimar Republic, 103-104

Legal studies, 11, 288

Legitimate authority, 105

Legitimation crisis, 187, 303

Leibniz, G. W , 43

Leiss, William, 17, 109, 282, 291,

295, 309

Leisure, 98, 289 (res earc h)

Lemert, Charles, 129, 321n.

Lengermann, Patricia M., 191

Leninism, 295, 317

Leonard, Stephen T., 29, 38, 90, 193,

292, 298

Leong, La urence Wai-Teng, 292

Lepenies, Wolfgang, 5

Levine, Andrew, 241

Levi-Strauss, Claude, 124, 125, 134,

161,264

Lewin, Kurt, 319

Li, Peter, 34n.

Liberal:

enlightenment model (of social sci

ence), 303, 307-309

rationalism, 308

social science, 54

values, 96

Liberal capitalism, 102, 187

Liberal humanism, 309

Liberalism, 2 1, 52, 103 (an d person

ality), 235

Liberation (see also Emancipation),

296

Liberation theology, 192, 290, 296

Lichtman, Richard, 103

Lieberson, Stanley, 223n.

Liebes, Tamar, 291

Life history, 150, 257, 315

Life politics (vs. emancipatory), 174-

175, 189

Life styles, 98

Lifeworld, 185, 187-188 (coloniza

tion of), 237

Lilienfeld, Robert, 307

Lineage, 185

Linguistic analogy, 125-128, 213

Linguistic philosophy, 73, 114, 116,

120, 145, 229-230

Linguistic turn, 145, 150-151, 155,

184, 258

Linguistics (structural), 123-124, 184

Link later, An dr ew , 284

Literature (and literary studies), 4, 5,

31n., 148, 260

Little, Daniel, 58, 6ln., 67, 165, 206

Lived-experience, 122

Livesay, J. l66n., 183

Locales of inquiry, 305, 315-320

Locke, John, 43

Lockwood, David, 195n., 221, 300n.

Locutionary meaning, 117

Logic, 37, 41, 47, 74, l66 n.

as rhetoric, 228-229, 246n.

deductive, 66-67, 228



366


formal (pure ) ,

41, 49, 69, 120,

157,

226,

229-230

inductive, 66-67

informal,

49, 228

of confirmation, 67

of discovery (see Discovery)

of disintegration, 108-109

of justification, 67

of reflection, 246n.

of verification (see Verification)

practical,

49

reconstructed,

66

Logical emp iricism

and

positivism),

54,

69ff., 81n., 307

Logical essentialism, 73, 145-146,

229, 233

Logical positivism, 66ff., 117, 119,

120

Logic-in-use

(see

also Informal logic;

Practical log ic),

72, 157,

l68n.,

211, 223, 235, 242, 268

Logic

of

capital,

242

Logicism,

229

Logocentrism, 233-234

London School

of

Economics,

67

Lonely Crowd,

293

Longhurst, Brian, 262

Low ery, Shear on, 286

Lowith, Karl,

13, 115

Luckmann, Thomas,

119,

l67n.

Lukacs, Georg,

90, 95, 96, 100, 109,

118n.,

243, 262

Luke, Tim, 11, 17, 29, 287

Luschen, Gunther, 16

Lynd, Robert,

321

Lyotard, Jean-F ra^o is,

28, 29, 34n.,

128,

191, 312

MacCannell, Dean, 290

MacRae, Duncan, Jr., 309

Macrosociology,

217,

220-222

Macro-

vs.

micro- (distinction),

59,

178,

190,

220-222, 269-270,

272

Making of the English Working

Class, 286

Mancias, Peter, 61 η.

Manganaro, Marc, 254

Mannheim, K arl, 32n., 11 In ., 112n.,

115,

246, 260, 263, 288,

32In.

Manza,

Jeff, 285

Marcus, George

E., 11, 254, 255, 293

Marcuse, Herbert, 15, 91, 103, 108,

194n.

Marini, Margaret Mooney, 224n.

Marketing (see P romotional cult ure )

Markets, 21

Market system, 101, 108

Marshall, Barbara, 12, 17, 143, 275

Martin, JoAnn ,

293, 298

Marx, Karl,

13, 18, 21, 33n., 46, 68,

89ff, 93, 95, 96, 100, 103 and

Freud),

115 and

W ebe r ) ,

122,

133,

144, 158, 170, 177, 178,

184, 193n., 272, 304, 316

Marxian theory of history, 161

Marxism:

analytical, xv

and existentialism,

123

classical,

143, 181

critical vs. scientific), 89-90

Hegelian, 94-98

orthodox, 14

scientific, 90

Soviet,

13, 89

structuralist,

125

Western, 20, 89-91

Marxist:

functionalism,

100, 106, 280

research,

7, 219

sociology, 18, 131

science, 19

tradition, 6, 89, 171-172 (critique

of) , 240-241,

262

Marxist-Leninism,

89

Mass culture (see also Popu lar cul

ture), 187-188,

263

Mass education,

98

Mass media, 5, 15, 98, 105, 187-189,

285

Mass society theory,

98, 112n.

Master-slave d ialectic,

149, 165,

I66n.

Material vs. ideal) factors, 46

Materialism:

as ontology, 53



Index

367

cultural, 18

historical, 15, 91

interdisciplinary, 15, 97-99

physicalistic, 54

vs .

idealism, 55

Mathematical logic, 69, 211

Mathematical models, 218

Mathematical sociology, 212, 218,

224n.

Mathematics, 40, 65, l6 8n ., 214,

225n. (as heuristic)

Mattelart, Arm and, 288

Mattelart, Micheie, 288

Mauss, Marcel, 124

McC arthy, Thom as, 16, 17, 23, 29,

32n., 149, 243, 298

Mc Gow an, Kate, 292

McKenna, Kate, 38

McTaggart, Robin, 257, 319

Mead, George Herbert, 119, 120, 188

Mead, Margaret, 256

Meaning(s), 6, 8, 24, 54, 5658, 148

and narrative, 259-265

illocutionary, 116

in qualitative research, 207

locutionary, 116

perlocutionary, 116

theory of, 116

undecidable character of, 76

Measurem ent, 118, 205, 224n.

Mechnical materialism, 54

Mechanical reproduction of art, 107

Media (electronic), 178

Media studies, 129

Mediational analysis, 217, 222 (so

ciocultural), 270, 276, 284-286,

290-291 (and culture), 297-298

Mediation-level explication (vs. gener

alization), 217-218

Mediation-level modeling, 217-218

Mediatization (of culture), 290

Medicalization, 288

Medical model, 6

Meinhof, Ulrike, 262

Meja, Volker, 16

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 123

Merton, Robert, 68, 73, 233

Metaphysics, 47, 69, 153, 234 (of

presence)

Metascience, 6I n.

Metatheory, 8, 35 61 n. (foundations

of), 232ff. (as argumentation),

62-81 (postem piricist), 85-112

(early critical theory and), 113-

140 (interim developments in),

141-167, 169-196, passim, (of

Habermas and Giddens), 199-

247 (in empirical research)

critical-dialogical model of, 309-

310

liberal enlightenment m odel of,

307-308

skeptical postmodernist model of,

312

technocratic model of, 306-307

Method(s ) :

dialectical, 96

empirical, 23

multiple, 37

positivist, 13

qualitative, 129

texts, 204

textual, 128-129

triangulation of, 37

vs. methodology, 36, 61 n.

Method and Measurement in Sociol

ogy, 224n.

Methodenstreit, 204

Method in Social Science, 61 n.

Methodological:

individualism, 132, 193n., 219,

270

pluralism, 6, 164

pragmatism, 136, 201, 227

strategies, 79

triangulation, 37

Methodology, xiii

and pluralism, 6, 79

and pragmatism, 77, 79

and structuration theory, 175-176

as focus, 20

as ideology, 201-202

as prescriptive, 36

as strategy, 36



368


critical theo ry of, 38-40

neglect of, 25

texts on, 36-38

vs. methods, 36, 6In.

Methodology for the Human Sci

ences, 61 n.

Microsociology, 220, 221, 292

Middleton, 293

Middle strata, 115

Mill, John S., 253

Miller, Peter, 298

Miller, Richard W., 80n., I68n.

Mills, C. Wright, 8, 10, 13, 16, 30,

33n., 120, I67n., 199, 294

Mirroring reality, 69, 77

Misgeld, Dieter, 292

Model:

formal, 127

medical, 6

technocratic, 6

Mod els (in critical realism), 78

Models (of social science), 305-313

critical dialogical, 309-312

liberal enlightenment, 307-309

skeptical postmodernist, 312-313

technocratic, 306-307

Mode of information, 290

Modernism:

as theory, 23, 28-29, 164

critical, 79

Modernity, 21, 128, 157, 175, 181-

182 (high , late), 185 (and tech

nical rationality), 215, 295 (and

identity), 303 (projec t of)

Modernization, 185-186 (theories of)

selective, 187-188, 310

Mo des of prod uction , 19, 90 (evolu

tion of), 97, 185

Modgil, Celia, 33n.

Modgil, Sohan, 33n.

Moral development, 151-152, 188

Mo ral discourse, 314-315

Morality, 21, 25, 157, 189 (and reason)

Morgan, Gareth, 53

Morley, David, 291

Morrow, Raymond Α., 18, 19, 29,

34n., 39, 90, 156, I68n., 189,

192,

231, 275, 291, 297, 304

Motivational crisis, 187

Mouffe, Chantal, 22, 189

Mouzelis, Nicos P., 195n., 300n.

Movements (see N e w social move

ments; Social movements)

Mueller-Vollmer, Kurt, 92

Multiple methods, 37, 201

Multivariate analysis (see also Statisti

cal modeling; Variable analysis),

218,

227

Mumby, Dennis K., 290, 295

Mundane reasoning, 119

Murphy, Raymond, 285

Music (popular), 291

Myths (and structuralism), 123, 160,

184

Narratives, grand, 29, 128

Narrative theory, 45, 249, 294

Narrative structure, of social re

search, 40

Narrative turn, 259-263

National Socialism, 100, 104

Nation-state, 175, 180, 273

Nation-State and Violence, The, 181

Natural attitude (in phenomenology),

118

Naturalism, 14, 52, 77 (critical), 164

(positivist)

Naturalistic approach, 6

Natural language (in accounts), 41,

206,

Natural rights, 21

Natural sciences, 4, 8, 25, 37, 46, 62-

81, passim., 86, 93 (vs . cul

tural), 161 (an d ex plana tion)

Nature:

domination of, 108, 156

in pragmatism, 120

internal vs. external, 144, 309-310

Naturwissenschaft, 93

Nazis, 15

Needs (human), 50, 185, 289 (and

advertising), 293

Needs (functionalist concept of), 45,

280

Neitz, Mary

Jo ,

208



Index

369

Neocapitalism, 102

Neoconservatism , 21

Neo-Freudian theory, 123

Neofunctionalism, 221, 280

Neo -Gram scian cultural studies, the

ory, 190-191, 313-314

Neo-Marxist theory/tradition, 17, 18,

21 ,

23, 29, 32n., 221

Neo-Parsonian theory, 193n.

Neopragmatism (see also Rorty),

120, 304

Neostructuralism, 114, 130, 131

Neo -Web erian theory, 18, 21 ,115 , 181

Nett, Roger, 6ln.

Network theory, 139n., 218

Neu ma n, W Lawren ce, 57, 139n.

Neumann, Franz, 102, 106-107

Neurath , Otto, 69

Neutrality (of science and technol

ogy), 32n., 63, 145, 281-272

New Left

(see also

Left), 27, 317

New Left Review,

32n.

N e w philosoph y of social science, xv

N e w Right, 305

New social movements

(see also

So

cial movements), 189-189, 298

New Zealand (and critical theory), 18

Nicholson, Linda, 298

Niebrugge-Brantley, Jill, 191

Nielsen, Greg, 17, 32n.

Nielsen, Joyce McCarl, 38, 143, 191,

238

Nielsen, Kai, 240

Nietzsche, Friedrich, 136, 177

Noble, David, 283

Nominalism, 54, 156

Nomothetic (explanations, vs.

ideographic), 56, 66, 94, 113,

126, 136, 144, 160, 183, 212 ,

251

Non-empirical methods (see also Re

flexive methods), 223, 227-247

Nordstrom , Carolyn, 293, 298

Normal science, 74

Norm ative argumentation, 232, 234-

235,

238-240

Norm ative foundations, 172, 181, 182

Normative rationality (evolution of),

185-186

Norma tive theory, 11, 40, 50-52,

6l n ., 143, 143 172, 181, 228,

238-240

and critiques of Habe rmas , 194n

and rights, 314-315

as communicative ethics, 151-152

as kno wled ge, 49

Norms (in science), 68

North American theory, 18, 36 (con

text)

"Nothing but" fallacy, 54

Ny bom , Thorsten, 314

Objective reason, 108, 112n. (vs. sub

jective), 145

Objectivity, 25, 68, 234

Objectivism (in metatheory), 52-59

Object of inquiry, 10

Obligation (political), 50

Observation language, 63, 66

O'Connor,

James, 282

Offe, Claus, 16, 186, 282, 284, 301n.

Oilma n, Bertell, 242, 247n.

One dimensional society, 102, 107

O'Neill,

John, 17, 228, 297

On the Logic of the Social Sciences,

184

Ontogenetic stages, 152

Ontological hermeneutics, 151, 163

Ontology, 47, 53-54, 154-156, 242

(dialectical), 304

critical realist, 79, 120, 136ff.,

205, 227

vs. epistemology, 77

Open University, 32n.

Operant conditioning, 216

Ordinary language, 41

Ordinary language philosophy, 116

Orenstein, Gloria Feman, 287

Organic analogy, 217

Organizational analysis, 288

Organizational culture, 294

Organizational princ iple, 185

Organizational studies, 11



370


Organized capitalism

(see

State

capitalism), 101

Outhwaite, William, xv, 17, 78, 81n.,

155

Paradigm:

of research, 6, 56, 74,

86ff.

(vs. re

search programs)

Parker, Ian, 265, 271n., 294, 295

Parkin, Frank, 19

Parole,

124, 127

Parsons, Talcott, 48, 49, l6 6n .

Participant observation (see also Eth

nographic research; Ethnogra

ph y), 32n., 227, 235, 254-256

Participation (public), 285

Participatory action research, 223,

257, 297, 319

Participatory democracy (see also De

mocracy), 311

Part-whole relations, 270

Passeron, Jean-Claude, 133

Passion (vs. reason), 29-30 (in Haber

mas)

Pathologies (social), 185, 188-189

Patriarchy, 104 (and the family), 51

(as ideology), 272n. (and femi

nist methodology), 274

Pattern theory, 139n.

Patterson, Orla ndo , l67 n.

Pawson, Ray, 224n., 225n.

Peasant resistance, 291

Pedagogy, 192

Peirce, Charles Sanders, 120, 146, 304

Perelman, Chaim, 245n.

Perlocutionary meaning, 117

Permanent sociology, 297

Personality, 105 (authoritarian)

Personal knowledge, 67

Petit, Philip, 127

Phenomenology, 92, l68n., 185

and existentialism, 122

and methodology, 37, 57

as philosop hy, 45, 73, 139n.

social, 113, 118-119, 292

vs. behaviorism, 52

Phillips, Derek L., 6ln.

Philosophy, 12, 14, 15, 72, 98 (vs.

empirical research)

analytic, 116

and everyday life, 46

continental, 116

of history (see also Theo ry of ) ,

108-109

of ordinary language, 116-117

neglect of, 36, 63

Western, 184, 234

Philosophy of consciousness, 154, 184

Philosophy of science, 40, 6ln., 63

(as specialty), 86-89, 246n.

Philosophy of social science, 38,

6ln. , 63

and ideology, 63

as Weltanschauung, 63

empiricist, 31

new, xv

postempiricist, 31

texts, 37

Photography, 107

Physics (model of), 70, 73 (history

of) ,

157

Piagetjean, 127, 139n., 184, 188

Piccone, Paul, 17, 32n.

Pierson, Christopher, 187, 30In.

Planning, 11, 21, 101-102 (com m u

nist, socialist, Soviet, fascist),

285 (dem ocratic), 321n. (social

democratic)

Plato, 51,65, 226, 234

Pluralism:

liberal, 314

methodological, 6, 164, 201

Polanyi, Michael, 67

Polarization (sub jectivism vs.

objectivism), 52-59

Policy research, 11, 41 , 50, 276

(urban), 285, 316, 318

Political activism, 118

Political culture, 307

Political economy, 94, 99 (Marxist),

101-102 (and the state), 275,

276-278 (in urban studies), 281-

286



Index

371

Political philosophy

(see also

Norma

tive theory), 50

Political science, 5, 11, 50, 239, 273

Political sociology, 50

Politics

(see also

Democracy; Models

of social sc ienc e), 12, 21, 25,

102 (pr imacy of) , 175 (o f self-ac

tualization), 312 (in skeptical

postmodernism)

Polkinghorne, Donald, 6ln., 242,

260-261

Pollock, Friedrich, 101

Popkewitz, Thomas S., 312, 315

Popp er, Karl, 62, 70-73, 80n., l l l n . ,

165,

245n., 308, 321n.

Popular culture

(see also

Mass cul

ture), 98, 289-291 (reception of)

Popular music, 291

Populations (statistical), 206, 210

Porpora, Douglas V., xv

Positivism, 6, 13, 14, 23, 36, 38, 46,

52ff., 65-69,

92 (dom inance of),

141, I45ff.,

183, 226,

276ff.

(in

urban studies)

as culture, 63

as social science , 10,

57ff.

definition of (Hab erm as), 146

Marxist, 24, 29

Postcolonial societies, 255

Postem piricism, 31, 33n., 62, 63-64,

75-80, 94, 114, 135-137, 142,

246n.

Poster, Mark, 11, 17, 23, 29, 122,

135,

192, 291

Post-Fordism, 272

Postindustrial society, 132, 281 (the

ory of)

Postindustrial Utopians, 286

Postliberal societies, 187-188

Post-Marxist theory, 19, 22, 189-190,

273-284 (of stratification), and

politics, 303

Postmodern condition, 128, 311

Postmodern ethnography, 255

Postmodernism, xiii, 22, 64, 75-77,

182, 247n.

Postmodernist culture, l66n., 272

(and post-Fordism)

Postmodernist critical theory, 29,

190-191

Postmodernist theory, 23, 28, 127

(vs. poststructuralism), 133,

139n., 157, 163

Postmodern society, 139n., 281

Postpositivism

(see also

Postempiri

cism), 59, 79, 113

Poststructuralism, 76, 114, 121-136,

142,

163, 191, 255, 264-265,

272n., 273

Poststructuralist structuralism, 131

Potter, Jonathan, 27 In .

Power, 10, 24, 29, 58, 104-105, 120,

131,

133, 134-135, 148-149

(and knowledge interests), 158,

174, 177-178, 191 (Foucault

and), 261-265 (and narrative),

296-297 (and Foucault)

Power/knowledge relations

(see also

Foucault), 136, 159, 313

Powerlessness, 294 (as alienation)

Practical consciousness, 176

Practical logic, 48, 210, 235

Practice, theory of, 33n., 133, 191

(political), 315-320 (contexts of)

Practices (social), 58

Pragmatic interactionism

(see

Sym

bolic interactionism)

Pragmatics

(see

Universal pragmatics)

Pragmatism

(see also

Neopragma-

tism), 73, 145-146, 156-157,

215, 246n.

and social science , 308

and symbolic interactionism, 116-

117

Dewey and, 304

epistemological, 77, 147

marginalization of, 92

methodological, 77, 136, 201

Praxis, 144, 158, 183, 193n., 212,

256-257 (and ethnography), 272-

272n., 305,

315ff.

(and critical

intellectuals)

Prediction, 206, 215, 218

Prejudice (in interpretation), 234, 237

Private/public distinction, 275

Probabilistic models, 66-67



372


Problemshifts (progressive vs. degen

erative), 87, 91ff. (in early Criti

cal Theory)

Problem-solving (and scientific pro

gress),

88, 228

Procedural ethics, 315

Process philosophy, 242

Production (relations of), 171-172,

179,

184 (forc es o f), 181

(material),

278ff.

(of space),

272 (and technology)

Professional ethics, 238, 308

Professional model, 310

Professionals (technical), 308

Programs (see Research program s)

Progress, 2 1, 22, 29, 68, 88 (in re

search), 303 (mode rnist)

Progressive (vs. degenerating) prob

lem shifts (see Problemshifts)

Promotional culture, 288

Property relations (in urban studies),

276-279

Propositions (scientific) 35, 41

Protective belt (vs. hard-core of

research program s), 87

Protest (social psychology of), 100,

187-189

Protocol sentences, 70

Psychoanalysis (see Freud)

Psychoanalytic analogy, 150, 163, 165

Psychoanalytic social psychology,

103-104, 292

Psychology

(see also

Social psychol

ogy) ,

5-6, 1 1, 229, 292 (c ritica l)

Public administration, 11

Public intellectuals, 315, 318

Public opinion, 98

Public sphere (see also Democracy) ,

275, 286, 301n., 305, 308, 311,

317-318

Punk mu sic, 291

Pusey, Michael, 17, 33n

Qualitative comparative method, 27In.

Qualitative m ethods (see also Dis

course analysis; Ethnography;

Intensive research; Participant

observation), 55

Quantiative m ethods (see Statistical

modeling; Variable analysis)

Quantitative vs. qualitative distinc

tion, 13, 31, 37, 56, 129, 176,

199-225, 227

Quasi-causal explanations, 160,

212ff.

Quasi-experimental evidence (histori

cal change as), 89

Quasi-transcendental argumen ts, 145-

147

Quebec, 16

Rabinbach, Anson, 289

Rabinow, Paul, 8, 95

Race, 6ln., 257, 259, 284-285 (and

social movements), 291

Rachlin, Allan, 247n.

Radical:

historicism, 94

social work, 288

sociology, 8

Radical conflict theory, 16

Radio, 107

Radnitzky, Gerard, 70

Radway, Janice Α., 291

Ragin, Charles C , 224n., 251, 253,

271n.

Rasmussen, David M., 29

Rational choice theory, 33n., 57,

247n.

Rationalism, 28, 43, 6ln., 65

Cartesian, 123, 153

critical (Popperian), 62

Kantian, 53

Rationality, 21, 79, 100 (instrumental

vs. substantial), 152 (an d

valu es), 182 (an d mode rnity),

184-185 (comm unicative vs.

stratetic), 229 (of scientific

procedures), 238-239 (and

normative theory), 297

in scientific disputes, 72, 74, 87-88

Rationalization:

and alienation, 14, 115



Index

373

as reification, 100

instrumental, 109, 110n., 184

Rationalization crisis, 187

Reading (see also Hermeneutics;

Interpretation), 58 (social

practices)

Realism:

artistic, 255

critical, 6ln., 62, 76-79, 120

Marxist, 81n.

naive, 53

ontological, 77

transcendental, 78

Utopian, 174-175

Reality construction, 24

Reason:

critique of, 108, 173, 228, 230

faith in, 2 1, 29

historical, 98

Kant and, 43

understanding of, 28

Western, 128

Reception research (see also

Consumption), 189, 289-290

Reconstructed logic, 55, 66, 73, 139

Reconstruction of historical material

ism, 32n., 114, 171

Reconstructive sciences, 151-152,

155,

I68n., 295

Reconstructive Utopian themes, 311

Reductionism:

econ om ic, 15, 90, 191

of interpretive sociology, 161, 163

(anthropology)

Marxist, 98

positivist, 57

psychological, 54

Reflection, philosophical, 28, 146

(vs. positivism), 226

Reflection theory (of knowledge), 95

Reflexive methods, 223, 232233, 261

Reflexive sociology, 133 (Bourdieu

and), 228 (Gouldner and)

Reflexive thesis

(see also

Construc

tionism ), 76, 231

Reflexive turn, 78

Ref lexivity, 109, 119, 157 (o f mo der

nity), 158 (o f the self), 182, 228-

247 (in metho dology)

Reform, 94, 276 (left-liberal), 311

(radical) , 313 (as im possible

dream)

Regression equation models (see also

Statistical modeling), 210

Reification (see also Alienation ), 95,

101 (and rationalization), 105,

109, 118-119, 161 (in role

theory), 188, 292

Relational structuralism, 130

Relative autonomy, 125

Relativism:

of values, 23, 68-69

moral, 152

postmodernist, 76, 250

scientific, 78, 94, 139n., 157

Religion:

and liberation theology, 296

and normative theory, 314

as dogmatic tradition, 46

sociology of, 32n., 98, 263

vs. science, 63, 68-69

Representation:

as copying, 53, 65

as mirrorin g, 65 , 77

as pictures, 53

ethnographic, 226

experimental forms of, 255

linguistic basis of, 7, 117, 154, 234

postmodernist critique of, 312

poststructuralist critique of, 129

scientific, 53, 205, 207

Reproduction (social and cultural),

24-25, 45, 91 ,9 9, 106, 109,

110n., 125, 133-134 (and

education), 148 (and v alues),

155, 158, 173ff., 176 (of

practices), 177, 179, 180

(defined), 189 190, 192, 216,

221-222, 272, 284, 289-293

Research:

designs, 220ff.

ethics, 37



374


funding, 215

Research, empirical:

historical, 200

positivist, 7

traditions (Laudan on), 88

Research pro gram:

critical theory as, 227-228, 274-275

defined, 6, 56,

86ff.

hard co re vs. protective belt of, 87

interpretive structuralism as, 25

social theory as, 86ff.

strong vs. weak, 143,

153ff.,

169-

173

vs. ideology, 118

vs.

paradigms, 56, 85

Resistance, 102-105, 185, 189, 254,

271, 288, 292 (cultural), 296-

297

Resistance theory, 290-291

Resources (allocative vs. authorita

tive), 178-179, 181

Revelation, 43

Revisionism, 17, 115 (Weberian),

l66n. (o f Haberm as)

Revolution:

French, 5

industrial, 5

in scientific M axism , 90

polit ical, 5, 94, 107, 194n. (H ab er

mas and)

Russian, 55

scientific

(see

Kuh n), 71

structuralist,

128ff.

wo rki ng class, 15, 91, 284, 295

Rhetoric, 48 (of methods), 81n. (sci

ence and), 118, 226, 229-232

(logic as), 236

Richards, Barry, 295

Ricoeur, Paul, 33n., 131, I40n., 150,

160, 165, I66n., 261, 264,

271n., 297

Riesman, David, 294

Rights (natural), 94

Rights-based claims (discourse of),

305, 314-315

Rioux, Marcel, 17

Ritzer, George, 41, 134

Robbins, Bruce, 32In.

Robbins, Derek, 133

Roberts, Julian, 246n.

Rochberg-Halton, Eugene, 121

Rockm ore, Tom, 171

Roderick, Rick, 33n.

Roemer, John, 33n., 247n.

Role theory, 161

Romanticism (Utopian), 313

Romm, Norma R., 8In., 195n.

Rorty, Richard, 65, 120, 195n., 303-

304, 309, 312

Rosenau, Pauline, 64

Rosenberg, Alexander, 6 ln .

Rossi, Ino, 127, 129

Roth, Michael S., 139n.

Rule, James, 309

Rules, 126, 130 (transformational),

216

Ryle, Gilbert, 264

Sabia, D aniel R., Jr., 110

Sampling, 250

Sampson , Edw ard, 11, 294

Sartre, Jean-Pau l, 123, 124, 221

Sayer, And rew, 6ln . , l l l n . , 129,

I40n., 212, 219, 226, 229, 231,

249, 258, 271n., 316

Sayer, Derek, 14, 18, 115, 117, 252

Scheff, Thomas, 297

Schiller, Herbert I., 288

Scholte, Bob, 11

Schools, 187

Schroyer, Trent, 33n.

Schutz, Alfred, 119, 122, 203

Schwalbe, Michael L., 295

Schweitzer, David, 295

Science (see also Autonomy; Com mu

nity of science; Inquiry; Reflex

ive thesis technology):

and social interests, 63

as belief system, 41, 156

as form of activity, 41

as ideolo gy, 156

as meaning (cultural) system, 41,

64, 68-69, 75

as mode of reasoning, 41, 189

explanation in, l66n.



Index

375

images

of, 6

loss

of

faith

in, 21, 25, 68, 76, 100

history

of, 59, 64,

73-74,

78, 144-

145

modern,

4

natural vs. cultural, 93

social construction of, 64

sociology of, 68, 78, 98

systematics

of, 63ff., 68

unity of, 66, 8In.

Weltanschauung

of

science,

41, 68

Science studies,

76, 317

Science system (autonom y

of), 317

Scientific Marxism vs. critical), 90-

91

Scientific method,

6, 26, 37, 164

Scientific revolutions, 74

Scientific worldview,

63

Scientism, 308

Scott, Alan,

298

Scott, James C , 293, 298

Seeman, Melvin,

295

Seidman, Steven,

29

Selective modernization, 187-188,

279

Self, 54-55, 120, 181-182, 295

Self-actualization (politics

of), 175

Self-ref lexivity, 7, 158

Self-regulation,

45

Sem iological analysis, 227

Semiotics,

204,

263-264

Sennett, Richard, 295

Sense-data,

42, 65, 69, 74, 147

Sewell, W illiam, Jr., I68n.

Sexuality, 181

Shalin, D imitri

N., 304

Shapiro, Michael J., 284

Sherman, Howard

J., 11

Shotter, John, 298

Shils, Edward, 112n.,

142

Sigmund, Paul E., 298

Silverman, David,

251,

270n.,

313

Silverstone, Roger,

291

Simonds, A. P., 11 In. , 263

Simons, Herbert

W , 237,

246n.

Singer, Burton, 224n.

Situated practice s,

180

Sjoberg, Gideon, 6ln .

Skeptical postmodernism, 62, 76,

135,

142, 152, 304,

312-313

Skeptical postmodernist model

of so

cial science), 312-314

Skinner,

B. F., 34n., 48, 216

Skocpol, Theda,

253

Slave (see Master-slave dialectic)

Slavery, 94 (Athenian), 149

Smart, Barry, 17, 29, 135

Smelser, Neil, 270n.

Smith, Doroth y,

238, 257

Smith, Paul,

298

Smith, Tony,

240,

247n.

Smythe, Dallas

W , 288

Social:

being, 95

character, 103-104

construction of reality, l66n.

criticism,

51

democratic planning theory, 32In.

determination,

44

development,

45,

161-162

ethics, 240

facts,

9, 13, 118

fields (see Fields)

order,

13

phenomenology, 113

policy,

240

practices, 58

problems,

50, 239, 308

Social change (see also Transforma

tion; Evolution), 180-182,

185-

186

Social character (the ory

of), 292, 294

(inner- vs. other direction of)

Social class, 19, 24, 6ln., 179

Social closure theory, 285

Social criticism,

305, 316, 318

Social Democratic Party, 103

Social ecology (critical),

285

Social engineering, 211-215, 219-221

(vs. social theorizing),

307, 309

Social

vs.

system) integration,

100,

176,

179, 184, 185, 193

194η.,

221-222, 269-270, 275, 301n.

Socialism,

21, 22, 159, 181, 194n.

(state), 256, 293

Socialist feminism, 189-190



376

C R I T IC A L T H E O R Y A N D M E T H O D O L O G Y

Socialist planning, 102-103

Socialization, 293

and mass media, 98

and the family, 100, 187-188

into disciplines, 244

Social movem ents (see also N ew so

cial movem ents; P rotest), 25,

132, 218, 284-285, 296297, 319

Social phenom enology , 53, 54, 221,

288,

292

Social practices, 23, 222, 270

Social Production of Urban Space,

275, 277

Social psychology, 5, 33n., 99, 103-

104 (psychoan alytic), 119, 181,

212 (interpretive ), 216-217,

221, 258ff. (and narrative), 274,

274, 285, 293-298 (critica l)

Social reproduction (see

Reproduction)

Social science(s), xiii, 3-5, 9, 20

and postempiricism, 62-63

critical, 19, 32n., 57

interpretive, 57

positivist, 10, 57

vs. behavioral, 59-60n.

Social semiotics, 264-265, 290

Social technology, 309

Social theorizing, 199ff., 211-212,

216-218, 219-221 (vs. variable

analysis), 250

Social theory, xiii, 160

Social wo rk, 11, 274, 288

Social vs. system integration (see

also

Inte gratio n), 185, 221-222

Society:

concept of, 177

theory of, 12, 23, 29

Sociocultural analysis (of media

tions), 217-218, 222, 271

Sociological imagination, 8, 10, 13, 30

Sociological intervention, 132

Sociology, xiii

and methods, 24

and normative theory, 314

applied, 9

as critical theory, 23, 274

classical, 12-13

descriptive, 95-97

historical, 252

interpretive, 57

radical, 8

vs .

cultural studies, 190

world-historical, 10

Sociology of culture, 263, 271n.,

285,

286-291

Sociology of education, 133

Sociology of kno wle dge , 32n., 49,

6ln., 95, 110n., 115, 134,

I66n., 263

Sociology of religion, 32n.

Solidarity, 304

Solipsism (as ontology), 54

Sollner, Alfons, l l l n .

Soul (as explanatory con cept), 54

Soviet Marxism (and tradition), 13,

22 ,

89, 265

Space (vs. time ), 177, 276-279 (socia l

production of)

Spee ch acts theory, 117

Sperber, Irwin, 237

Sports, 98, 289

Stages of development (social), 97

Stalinism, 15, 100

Stam, HenderikusJ., 294

Standpoint methodologies, 237, 257

State, 19, 40, 143, 215 (and social re

search)

democratic, 187

and political econom y, 101-102,

274, 279-284

State capitalism, 102, 187-188

State socialism, 194n.

State theory, 3 0I n.

Statistical-causal analysis, 205

Statistical modeling (or analysis;

see

also Variable analysis), 37, 125,

199ff., 208-210, 213-215, 218,

220-231,

279-280

Statistics, 96-97, 209

Status, 295

Steering crises, 187

Stinchcombe, Arthur, 37

Stockman, No rma n, 70, 8I n., 32 In.

Strategic action, 158, 261

Strategic rationality, 184-185



Index

i l l

Strategies (methodological), 79

Stratification, 190, 273-284 (critical

theory of)

Strong (vs. weak) research programs,

33n., 143, 153ff., I66n., 169-173

Structural causality (and Althu sser),

160

Structural functionalism, 47, 221,

242, 280

Structuralism, 125-126 (defined),

139n., 145

Althusserian, xiii, 11 In. , 130, 288

and Durkheim, 32n.

and semiotics, 262-263

critical, 33n., 132, 135-137

French, 110n., 114, 121ff„ 184

genetic, 127, 131

hermeneutic, 24, 33n., 130

interpretive , xiv, 24, 33n., 131

relational, 130

vs. poststructuralism, 272n.

Structuralist Marxism, 29, 125, 130,

173,

191, 221

Structural sociology, l66n.

Structuration theo ry

(see also

Gid

dens), 20, 33n., 142, 153ff.,

158 (defined ), 176ff. (as re

search program), 193-194n.

Structure, 24, 32n.

and agency, 59

in Giddens, 32n.

deep vs. surface, 130

(critiques of), 263, 295

Structure of Scientific Revolutions\

56ff., 64, 73-74

St. Simon, 307

Studies on Authority and the

Family, 104

Subject (theory of, see also Action;

Communicative action; Social

psychology)

death of, 124

Foucault and, 297

of knowledge, 234

Subjective reason (vs. objective),

112n., 145

Subjectivism (in metatheory), 52-55,

6 ln.

Subjectivist-objectivist polarization,

52-59, 129, 183-184

Subject-object dialectic, 90, 95, 119,

121ff., 141, 153-162

Subject-subject relations, 159, 243,

316

Substantialism, 6In.

Substantial rationality (vs. instrumen

tal), 101, 112n.

Substantive theory, 42

Suicide (Durkheim and), 13, 44

Sullivan, Edmund, 11, 298

Sullivan, William M., 8, 95

Surface causality (vs. depth;

see also

Depth structure), 161

Surrealism, 255

Surveillance, 178, 181, 272

Survey research (meth ods ), 14, 55,

58,

103-104 (Fromm and), 206,

250,

293-294 (on alienation)

Swingew ood, Alan, 98

Symbolic interactionism, 53, 54,

6ln., 114, 120, 123, 144,

I68n., 22 1, 259, 272n. (and cul

tural studies), 292

Symbolic violence, 133

Synchronic, 125, 184 (investiga

tions),

288

System (see also Socia l) integration,

179, 185, 221-222, 275

Systematics (of theory vs. history),

64ff, 68, 88, 233

Systemic analysis, 212, 217, 279-284

Systemic explication (vs.

generalization), 217

System-level (statistical) m ode ling,

216, 279-280

System-lifeworld relations, 222

Systems of inqu iry, 241

Systems models, 193n.

Systems theory, l68n., 193n., 242

Taste, 51

Taylor, Charles, 17, 51

Taylorism, 288

Technical control, 144, 156, 215,

223,

307-309



378 C R I T I C A L T H E O R Y A N D M E T H O D O L O G Y

Technical rationality (see Instrumen

tal),

102, 112n, 185, 281-272

Techniques (methodological), 207,

219-220 (vs. theory construc

tion),

227-228

Techno-capitalism, 281

Technocratic model ( of social sci

ence) 6, 304, 306-307

Technological change, 310

Technology:

and ideology, 145, 156

critical theory of, 282

growth of, 100

neutrality of, 63, 145, 281-272

social interests and , 63

Teleological explanation, 45, 9 1, 100,

280 (Marxist vs. functionalist)

Teleology (o f history ), 162, 187

Television, 259

Television and the Crisis of Dem oc

racy,

290

Telos,

32n.

Texts, 25

and ideology critique, 150

biblical, 92

on methodology,

36-38,

56, 204

on theory construction, 6In.

Textua l analysis

(see also

Discourse;

Narrative), 258-265

Theology, 40, 41, 123, 191 (of libera

tion), 274, 296 (critical)

Theory:

analytical, 42

empirical, 40ff.

of criticism, 30n.

of practice, 133, 175

substantive, 42

testing, 37

traditional, 14

The ory and practice (see also

Praxis), 192, 194n. (Habermas

and),

302-321

critical dialogical model of, 310

liberal enlightenment model of,

309-310

skeptical postmodernist model of,

312

technocratic model of, 307

Theory and Society, 17

Theory construction, 25, 37, 6ln.,

213, 220, 223

Theory, Culture and Society, 17

Theory-laden (character of facts), 44,

71,74

Theory of society, 12, 29, 173, 177

Therapy, 107 (Freud ian), 150 (psy

choanalytic analogy), l66n.

Therb orn, Goran, 115

Thesis Eleven, 18

Thick description (Geertz and), 57-

58, 206, 264

Thom as, David, 61 n.

Thompson, E. P., 18, 285

Thompson, John B., 17, 33n., 51,

161, 171, 263, 265, 286

Time (vs. s pa ce ) relations, 177, 221,

272

Time-space distanciation, 178

Torres, Carlos Alber to, 29, 291

Totalitarian control, 107

Totality:

and dialectics, 243

and evolution, 184

contradictions of,

90-91,

94, 262,

270

defined, 179

general and particular in, 272

historical, 14, 94, 133-139n. (ex

pressive vs. structura l)

Marxist theory of, l66n ., 183

Totalizing the ory

(see also

Grand nar

ratives), 23, 89, 134, 267

Toulmin, Stephen, 210, 230, 245n.

Touraine, Alain, 17, 114, 132-133,

192, 284, 299

Tradition, 52, 178, 148, 317ff.

Traditional hermeneutics, 143

Traditional theory, 14

Traditional theory (vs. critical), 95-97

Transcendental:

categories (in Kant), 65, 94, 124,

138n., 147

phenom enology (in Husserl ), 118

realism (in Bhaskar), 78

subject, 304

Transcenden t critique, 262



Index

379

Transformational rules, 130

Transformation of identities, 310

Transformative:

potentials, 29, 181

praxis, 27

Transitive (vs. intransitive) objects

(of thought), 78

Triangulation (methodological), 37,

201

Trigg, Roger, 6ln.

Trow, Martin, 314

Truth, 62-65 (abso lute), 71, 76, 88,

97 (truth claims), 117, 143, 145

(subjective vs. objective), 233-

234,263

correspondence theory of, 77, 155

Tucker, Robe rt C , 273

Tu quouque argument, 80n.

Turn:

applied, 24

interpretive, 8

linguistic, 145, 148-149, 184

narrative, 258-262

pragmatist, 145

Turner, Bryan S., 297

Turner, Graeme., 18, 292

Unconstrained communication (see

also Ideal spe ech situation), 159

Uncoupling (of system and life-

world), 188

Undecidable meanings (in decon-

struction), 237

Understanding (socia l), 45, 93 (as

Versteheri)

Unemploym ent, 295

Unger, Roberto M., 11

United States (and critical theory), 18

Units of analysis (in discourse), 261

Unity of science, 66, 69-70, 81n.

Universal:

laws, 94

reason, 68, 304

rights, 94

values, 153

Universalism, 63 (of s cienc e), 313

(critiques of)

nonfoundationalist, 164, 304

Universal pragmatics, 150-151, 164

Universities, 4, 314 (and research)

Urb an studies, 11, 276-279, 288

Urry, John, I40n., 283

Uses and gratifications research, 290

Utilitarian motives, 295

Utopian:

imagination, 11, 21, 107, 162

realism, 174-175

thought, 276, 286 (po stindustrial),

306

Utopian vision (social science

models of)

critical dialogical, 311-313

liberal enlightenment, 309

skeptical postmodernist, 313

technocratic, 307

Utterances, 117

Validity, 208, 256 (met hod ologic al),

229 (logical)

Validity claims, 151

Value-free science, 14, 47, 68-69,

235, 305 (myth of)

Values (see also Normative theory ),

11, 21, 23, 48-52, 68-69 (relativ

ity of) , 96 (libe ral ), 112n. (ulti

mate)

van den Berg, Axel, 142

Variable analysis

(see also

Statistical

modeling), 24, 32n., 38,

56ff.,

l l l n . , 125, 129, 136, 157, 199,

205ff., 209ff., 213-215, 218,

220-221,

222-223, 224n., 250,

279-280, 286 (effects research),

292

Vegetarianism, 51

Verification (principle, logic of; vs.

discovery), 66ff., 70, 81n., 117,

145, 233, 236

Verstehen,

45, 57, 70, 93, 148, 202,

206, 260, 270

Vienna Circle, 66, 69-70

Violen ce, 104, 133 (sym bo lic), 181

(centralized), 286 (and mass

media)



380


Volosinov, V. N., 266

Voluntarism, 54, 123, 159

Voluntary associations, 284

Wachterhauser, Brice R., 148

Wacquant, LoicJ. D., 113, 134

Wagner, David G., 29, 289

Wajcm an, Judy, 282

Wallace, Walter L., 71

Wallerstein, Immanuel, 182, 284

Wallulis, Jerald, 110

Walzer, Michael, 6ln.

Warnk e, Georgia, 148

Wartenberg, Thomas E., 150

Waters, Malcolm, 33n., 195n.

Weak (vs. strong) research programs,

33n., 143, 153ff., 169-173

We ber , M ax, 13, 33n., 46, 57, 68-69,

95 , 100, 104, 108, 109-110,

110n., 112n., 118, 133, 139n.,

143, 170, 177, 181, 184, 203,

248, 252, 259, 281, 284

Weimar Republic, 14, 91, 99, 107

Weis, Lois, 292

Weiss, Hilde, 112n.

Welfare state, 15, 101, 186-187 (con

tradictions of), 189, 239

Wellmer, Albrecht, 16

Wernick, And rew, 290

Weltanschauung (scien ce as), 42,

63 ,

68

Wertrationalitat

(valu e rationality)

112n.

We stern M arxism , 20, 31, 85, 89-90

Wetherell, Margaret, 271n.

Wexler, Philip, 17, 21, 294

W hi te , Stephen K., 11, 33n., 165, 170

White-collar workers, 103

Whitehead, Alfred N., 242

Whitty, Geoff, 289

Wiggershaus,

Rolf,

l l l n .

Wiley, Norbert, 115

Williams, Raymond, 18

Willis, Paul, 292

W ill to pow er, 135, 191

Winch, Peter, 118

Wilso n, Η. T , 306-307

Wilson, Thomas P., 225n.

Wissenschaft, 93

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 116-117, 122,

151, 204, 245n.

W o m en

(see also

Feminist theo ry;

Gender), 239, 257

Wood, Ellen Meiksins, 19

Woolgar, Steve, 73, l66n.

Work, 272 (and technology), 286

Wo rk (as categorical distinction vs.

interaction), 144, 154, 184

Work society (crisis of), 286

Working class, 15, 91 (and revolu

tion, fascism), 97, 99, 102-105,

107, 144, 179, 262

Wor ld-historical sociology, 10, 225n.

World history, 10, 91

World system theory, 182, 284

Worldview (science as), 63, 68

Wrig ht, Erik Olin., 19, 246n.

Yin, Robert E., 251

Young, Robert E., 17, 292

Young, T. R., 319

Youth culture, 291

Zaret, David, 286

Zeitgeist, 94

Zeitshcrift fur Sozialforschung,

112n.

Zweckrationalitat (de fine d), 112n.



A B O U T T H E A U T H O R S

R a y m o n d A . M o r r o w is Assoc ia te Pro fessor o f Soc io logy , Uni

vers i ty of Alb erta , Edm onton, wh er e he has taught s inc e 1984.

His gradua te training includ ed an M A at the University o f British

Colu m bia, study at the Free Un iversity o f Be rlin, a Ph .D. at Yo rk

University (1981), and postdoctoral research at the Universite

de M ontre al. H e also has taught at the Un iversity o f Manitoba and

the University of Western Ontario. He teaches primarily in the

areas of sociologic al theo ry and cultural soc iolog y (es pec ial ly in

relation to mass communications and education) and has pub

lished articles and chapters in critical theory and cultural studies.

He recently completed a

boo k on social theory and education (w it h

Carlos Alberto Torres, Graduate Faculty of Education, UCLA),

and is w or ki ng on a pro ject o n theories of social psych ology.

David D. Brown completed his Ph.D. in soc io logy at the Uni

versity o f Alb erta in 1990. His thesis was titled Ricoueur's Narra

tive Methodology and the Interpretation of Life History Texts.

He is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University Leth-

bridge, where he teaches in the areas of contemporary theory

and research methodology. He recently published an article titled

Discursive Mo m ents of Identif ication in Current Perspectives

(Contemporary Social Theory) Raymond a. Morrow, David D. Brown-Critical Theory and Methodology-SAGE...

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