CONTEKCS Pace -

Introduction--Brigadier General Donald Armstron~:, Comnandant, The Army Industr ia l Colleee . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Guest spealcer--ColonelAlton C. Miller, Director, Provost Office, Office of the Provosti"Iaraha1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

General discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

General Annstron@

Students

L t . Colonel Walter B. Koch

FLANT SECURITY, 1 Mar,h i946.

Gectlemen, ansnp. the p>ints that were im~rv-tant in World War I1 t h a t 1 tbink. w i l l he inf ' in l te lg more impcrtant i n the revolut ionar? period in which we l ive, in which ideologies play am!] an impwtant ro le , , t he s u b - ject on which we a r e going t o hear an eminently qua l i f i ed speaker t h i s raorriit&! is of the utmost. importance. Sabotage and subversive a c t l v i t i e s a r e possibly a g rea te r menace t o wur country today and i n aw fu6ure warfare t h a t we must an t i c ipa te than even the atomic bomb. . .

You knw how w e have already brought out the f a c t t h a t some of our most e s s e n t i a l needs were met in t h i s war by a s ing le p lant . That s o r t of thing must bg browht out and some klnd 3f remeaial meaaurea adapted. The thinking of t h i s Clam must bc directed a l o ~ t h a t l i ne .

We must r e a l i z e the g rea t d a n ~ e r t 3 indus t r i a l rn?bllization plans and t o the e f fec t ive use of our f a c i l i t i e s a t t he outbreak of any, fu ture war by what can be done by people who ar,? loyal t o a foreign government r a t h e r than t o o w own Natign. Obviously, without mentioning any namew, you gentiemen r e a l i z e t h a t is a f a c t o r we m u s t Con~ider .

The s p e a w r t h i s nornlng has been on duty Ln the War Department In t h i s pa r t i cu la r funct ion f o r a great many years'. Without &oin@ in to the d e t a i l s of h i s ca ree r in t h a t a c t i v i t g I can assure ycu t h a t there a r e few o f f i ca r s who can speag with the competence with which he can address you t h i s mornlng on t h l s subject . He is a t present in charge of t h i s work in the Office of the Trovowt Marshal General.

Gentlemen, it is a pr iv i lege t o present t o p u Colonel Alton C. Mil ler , whose ~ u b j e c t is "Plant Security." Colonel Mil ler .

General Armstrow and gentlemen: I note two s i p s here. I am going t o have t o keep a l e r t t o see which one is held up. One says, "QUIET" and there is one over here t h a t says, "LOUDEFi P W h . " (Laughter)

As I cover the subject f o r today, please keep i n mind t h a t I am alwaya t h i n k i w from the a n ~ l e of secur i ty and from no a ther a w l e . If there a r e any comments which I mag make which would appear t o be stepping on somebody's t3es , remember t h a t I a n lookine a t the b u i l d i w from only one angle. (That, is simply f o r my s e l f protect ion.)

The more I have learned about in t e rna l 8ecu:rlty and plant protect ion, the more incompetent 2 f e e l , a s an individual, t.3 do a g rea t deal about it. It. i n no hie an& so iarge t h a t it juat astounds me. It makes'me a f r a i d , . . very often, of the fu ture .

We s t a r t e d , i n i t i a l l y , without a grea t deal of precedent, without too much m which t o 80. So, t o m y I am looking at the matter, f I r s t of a l l ,

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his tor ical ly . I have made an outline fo r you, with a few errors in it, which I s b l l correct a s I go through, mainly to point. out, f i r s t , the scoge of the problem, and also t o ooint out t ha t a p e a t mny errors were macle. We w i l l not have time i n the futxre to grope a s we :did i n t h i s present w a r . That is one thin& tha t must be kept inn in&. We dare not-- T, repeat that: f o r o u r Own future sectu'ity, we da2e not be ent i re ly

by the past, because, i n the 1i;;ht of new developents, the paot has no precetlent fo r the thin@ tha tws lilUSt: clo for the future.

P.lso, We must look' a t the ent i re p~b3lem' i n the l i ~ h t of its 3-eetaile?. cwponents, because it was only when we .began t o break down p lmt ' s ecu r i t y i n al.1 i ts phases, in to i ts detailed co%$onents, t ha t we realljr began t o Un6.er~tand tha t we had t o take a more or l ess sc ien t i f i c approach. 11% canrrot understand a problem, or beginto-solxre it, u n t i l we c h se& the differences betweea i ts various elements. 'Therefore, we must l o o k a t it as many an srtist has t o contemplatea great masterpiece. We Oee it from a distance so tha t we pt the impesnlon the a r t i s t wished t o create; thcn, we step f o m d and lock a t it closely t o see its d.etailed cwposition.

This stu&y t h a t is being conE.uctea - t o w on t h i s ~roblem must ire con- tinued. I repeat that: it must be contin~~e?., because I am ful ly ' convinced tha t never again w i l l we have the chance, oi. the o!portuity, or the time t o go tkough a l l the errore we went .through during this ma..

My Whole ta lk today, therefore, since I cannot begin t o cover the 30 or bO-some pages of the brief outline--?a?. I wasn't being facetious-- follows.'alon& the notes which I believe have been ma&e available t o you. T:could. only h i t the main points. There are, however, i n the If isto-ical .

-.Division several monowaphs coveriw each one of the'subjects as they we brolcm d o w n in t h i s outline, complete wiVn footnotes. I can ? i ~ e ~ t an$ '

inLivic'ual who i s interestecl i n any g w t i c t ~ l a r phase t.o any one of the monosa~hs,, where an en t i re story is civen,. obiectively pointing out the errors as well a s some cf the GOO& points.

I n the outline, "FFre Protection and Prevention* was offered f i r s t , witin malice afor~ethou~ht, because, in . tine b@inning, there were too many peo?le who thought and f e l t t h a t if soifiething coula not burn wg. st was not

' i m y r t a i t . Therefore, i n i t i a l l y , there was en t i re ly too w c h eWhaeiS on f i r e protection and not enough on some of' %he OW€% progams, Which remltec! i n just the same amount of, i f not rgea'cer, inportance to the o7er-all picture as' f i r e protection and prevention.

, .. . . .

Keep i n mind. t h a t the missioq.of inl;e-l be&rity was t o insure rm- interrupted. produ%ion of wteria;ls necessary f o r national aefense, in- clu&ing ghysical featwes, instal lat ions, equi:~ment and. everythinG e l se connected wfth it, against a l l hazartls. You can have no perimeter around your thinking when .?mu mention "againoL a l l haear6s."

I have marked bn the , first , . p&e of "Fire Pro%ection" a few things which c w r y over t o the others; for instance, the 'Plant Proteotion Divleion, i n the Office of the Assistant SecreWy end then the Under Secret%:yj s tar ted t o pave the way through the use of inspection report, ,fo,ms. That f o m was l a t e r t o become one of t h d f irst features o i p l w protection ins$itctions. . I t was constantly revikkd in& the chronolo~y is given, i n this f i h t la--% of the outline,

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a r a g r a p h 14, likewise, r e f e r s t o a "Master Inspect ion Responsibi l i ty L i s t , " which played an important prt.

I n jus t considering p l a n t f i r e protect ion, t h e things that gave ue d i f f i c v l t y were nst always mountains; they were molehil ls , iver which we constant ly t r ipped. There was more discussion about t h e pol lcy con- c e r n i w automatic eprinklera than perhaps a n y t h i w e l s e . I do not need t o go i n t o a l l the d e t a i l s , but it was a d f f f i e u l t point , beca&'e some- bodfhad t o haye Inspection r e spons ib i l i t y and scmebody had t o say if the inspector 3f the inspection agency had t o have an a;ltomatic spr inkler . Soyou can l e t SOW imagination run on from t h a t poin t and see what kind ,.of technica l d i scws ions r eau l t ee from t h a t .

.. ,

~ u r i s ' d i c t i o n & the inspect im agency, which I w i l l cover a 1itt . le l a t e r , was a cqnstant ly harass in^ problem. It was ~ r i g i n a l l y assvmed, f o r example, t h a t there would be one q e n c x , responcible f o r m e p lan t ; 6ut , normally,. there were as many as six t.s e ight War Department a p n c i e a and perhaps an equal number of other Feder@l. and q 'as i -Federa l agencies '

i n t e res t ed In the same plant , o r In t he same product. Somel;imes, l;!-.e important pr3duct was not the one i n a pa r t i cu la r p l an t where o ther prodmtg were manufactnred; it w a s not t h e one with a three and a h a l f mi l l ion t o e ight mil l ion d o l l a r contract , bnt was a n i n e i ~ n i f icant , un- impsrtant $50,000 contract without which we could not have conttnued ED

f i g h t very l q w . . . .. . .

,.,. 'The old acrsonncl &oblem cropped up. .There was the quest ion of

l n s p e c t l o ~ personnel, qual i f ied men. Everybody wanted them. A l l t he pro Curement , . . agencies of the Army, a l l the procurement agenciee of the Navy, other agencies, wanted them. The Arny wanted t o d r a f t them. So we con-.. e tar i t ly had t o meet the problem of inadequateand vntrained oersonnel by a process or training. and i n h c t r i n a t i o n . We never intended eoing in to a t r a in ing f i e l d , but we found t h a t it was necessary.

One of the g rea te s t d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered e a r l y i n the game was the lack of a cen t ra l , over-al l e v a l u a t i w agency. That point I w i l l

; s t r e s s seve ra l times during the t a lk .

TtIe protect ion people wanted t o h o w , 'What shall we protect?" That was the first question. The procurementagencies would give us l ists of the important contracts they had; bnt they always v i thheld t'ne s e c r e t and conf ident ia l ones as bein:: none of our business. They gave u s t h e large monetary contracts tha t we found were a l ready protected with adequate guard forces, adequate spr inkler systems, and even down t o the removing of subversives and a very carefu l cont ro l over p lants manufacturing canvas co t s . . .

. - We had t o beg, i n s i s t , plead, argue f o r an agency t h a t would evaiuate

the importance of every s ingle product in terms of every o ther s ing le product, and every plant i n t e r m s of a l l of those prod~lc ts t h a t it manu- fac tures , and :of every element in terms of the things in to which t h a t element had %Q go. That problem we fsuna one of the most important. Un- far tunate ly , the p r s t e c t i m tai l of the dog had t o wag the production do@.

Prqtect ion agencies should have no th im at a l l t o do with the evalu- a t i o n ; but we had and we had too much t o do with it. It was most un- for tunate. Primarily, we had t o ge t i n t o t h e f i e l d ?f evaluat ion, became we c m l d n3t pro tec t without t h e evaluation. I w ! l l touch t h a t point i n severa l places.

The l a s t main d i f f i c u l t y was t h e protect ion of c r i t i c a l stock p i l s s aga ins t f i r e ; t he re , again, as a n ind5rect relationship t o an o v e r - a l l evaluat ion agency. SD f a r as t h e pro tec t ion group was concerned, we coii1.d not f ind out where the stock p i l e s were or w!lat the r a t l o of demand agains t t h e s tock pi leo was 'in r e l a t i s n t o t h e output of production o r t h e intake back in to t h e stock p i l e s ; y e t , we were s t r e s s ing c e r t a i n th i rup , s:;ch as rnbber.. We found O L ? ~ t o our amazement t h a t nobody i n the country knew %here t h e rubber was, o r how much. Not even the Rubber Supplies Corporatipn knew it. For t h e fu tu re , there should s t i l l be, in t h i s and a1.l other plant, protect ion acti,v?.tles, central. ized cont ro l and, wherever possible , complete decent,rallzed operat isns. There mast be, l.f t h e problem is t o he e f f i c i e n t - l y so1ved;a cen t r a l :>ver-all, evaluat ing agency.

a he second thing whlch I toucheil upon i n ny oiltlIne is t h e Allen Employment Program. The baois f o r it was nound, but t h e reasons behind it wsre unsound. You see , i t was thought, !ni t i i l l ly , t h a t i: we had any t rouble from t h e s t a n d p i n t of sabotage and espionage t h a t we nad f i v e mi l l ion o r more a l i e n s t o klame; t h a t they would be t h e ones principally Who would engage i n sab0tw.e and espionage. Well, s t range a s j t nay seen t o you, t h e reverse was qu l t e t rue . Most of our d i f f l c u l t y cane not from the a l i e n s , but it came from good' o ld - l ine American fami l ies . Now I am not, going i n t o any ~f the reaeons: I merely s t a t e t h a t came a s a complete sur- p r i se t o us. Cmsequently, we had t o change esme of our plaminp: t o meet the s i tua t ion .

In the Alien PrDgram,'we foijnd ?or the f i rst time a need f o r coordi- nated ac t lon between the Army and t h e Navy. The Alien Pr-Jgrsrr., pr imari ly, was the f i r s t instance where there was jo in t acti.on between t h e Army and the Navy, and, a t a l a t e r da te , the Army tosk a l l responsibi1:t.y f o r Navy p lants , except Xaval Shore Establishments, a l t h o ~ q h thcre were detai led i n my o f f i ce , i n FMGO and on the I n d u s t r i a l Employment Renlew Eoard, o f f i c e r s from Op-!O i n the' Navy. It worked out very well. A t the decentralized leve l , with ~ u s t one or two instances i n t h e fielA, the s i t u a t i o n between the Naval D i s t r i c t s and the Army Service Commands worked out very smnothly.

The big d i f f l c u l t y with the handling of a l i e n s was, f i r s t , t h a t there were so many; sacond, t h a t t h e F.B.I. , i o l l o w i n ~ t,he Alien Regis t ra t ion Act, was t o invest igate every a1 Len, but it wao a slow process. There were t,oo macy of them. So t h e F.B.:. eventual ly sa id , "we q u i t . We have t3o many invest lgat lons t b make where a n overt a c t has benn committed o r where there has been an Lnatance which may lesd us . t o bel ieve that there was an a c t of sabotage."' S1 we f q n n d t h a t the 'nvesti@,ion of a l i ene prl-or t o approving them f b r work on classified aeronaut!.cal cont rac ts be- came one of our babies. It is touched upon l a t e r on aca in in the Loyal ty Invest %&at ions Program.

The question of c i t i zensh ip was a l s o very d i f f i c u l t . Unfortunately,

a good old Kentucky mountaineer had no way t o prove he was an American. Without being able t o prove he was an American,, t he plant In many instances sa id , 'Well you must be an a l ien ." We asked, f o r example', one plant in Texas how many a l i e n s they had. They s a i d , "Seventeen: Tour from Pennsyl- vania, 11 from New York and two from Maryland." ( ~ a u g h t e r ) They were a l l

rninor problem, but they gave us a l o t of headaches in t h e e a r l y days.

So we f i n a l l y cane t o the ooncluaion t h a t t h e b e s t t h i ~ l g t o do was t o send t h i s t n i m out t o the f i e l d , t o l e t than run it and t o t e l l them how. And t h a t was not an easy j3b e i t h e r , because w e had a l~Ost 150,000 f i l e a s e t up e n t i r e l y wrong, because they were s e t up by com- panies. We had t o break them a l l a p r t and s e t them 3 u t by individuals.

The a se lemen t of r e spons ib i l i t y f o r the'enforcement ..of Army and Navy regula t ions and the Federal s t a t q t e s was v e r y d i f f i c u l t . The Ord- nance Department of the Army or the BQyeau of Ordnance i n the navy had contracte i n Plant A. s i g n a l Corps a&&. a.perhaps some others had cont rac ts

... w i t h the Bureau of Ships, Bureau of Aeronautics. They both wanted t.3 take care of a pa r t f cu la r aJien; o r l a t e r on, subversive. . That, again t i e s i n

. .. w i t h the Maeter ,In&ection Responsibility L i s t .where, a v e n t ~ l l ~ , We spexled out and sa'i? Jus t who w a s responsible. We ddbsfgnated tQe agencies, ao':tlnat there wduld . . not be an ovei-lepping .. T h a t program @ill c m t l o u e a .

' The pr&i$le of decentr&izatltin should cmt inue , I .do n ~ t $my how we w i l l work ' i t ' cu t . The ServicsComiands have asked me f o r t.he past two weeks, "What w i l l we do with the a l i e n f i l e s when we reve r t t q fo.Ur, f tve, o r e ix k ' a y areas?" I sa id , "I do. no t knm; bane on to- the?; we' 11

. , t e l l you l a t e r . " . .

I n tine lieht of present labor movements in t h t s country, we think we should have more l eg i s l a t ive r e l i e f . Today, the War and Navy Departments a r e protected only bn aeronautical cont rac ts and aeronaut ica l accessories . They a re not protected on t h e i r c l a s s i f i e d contr.acts, unless it is wri t ten in to the contract . We should have l eg ie l a t ion which would protec t a l l c l a s s i f i ed cont rac ts against a l i ens an8 s e c r e t a n d top-secre t contraots at l e a s t a@inst individuals who ehcmldnot be allowecl t o work on that type of contract . -

, , 2 , I, believe that if we do.,not g e t tha t l e & i s l a t i v e r e l i e f , t h e day w i l l

. come when thc.manager of a plant w i l l have t o take Joe Doakea in tp his plant --Joe Doakes being furniohed by Le'oor--whether he knows t h a t Joe Doakea is basicalLy subversive or not . The bas is of proof w i l l have t o be furniohed by the employer who, i n many instances, w i l l not be i n a s t r o w enouah posi t ion.

The next one is Vis i to r Control and , Ident i f ica t ion , an important par t of the mer-all picture. It worked well where i t was so wanted by t h e management. The matn d i f f i c ~ ~ l t y there . came s o l e l y from a minute de f in i t ion of, "What 1s , a v i s i t o r ? " I s t i l l do not how, because there a re a11 types of fndividuals going in to a p lant . For instance, a General M ~ t o r s ' service- man; he has nothing in the world t o d o w i t h the p lan t . Actvally, t he only

t h i w he i s thinkine of is the General Motors equipment. Then there bmuLi be individual sent i n by Turkey, for c x ~ l e , t o study plant operation. The Turkish officers, as i n many cases they were, were sponsore ' 3 ~ t h e k ~overmnent and also by our own government; but they rec l ly had no business i n the p l a t .

So, the question of citizenshi; an?. the Lefiniticn of a "viaitor" again Gave us plenty of heaCmches.

Then there is the Master Inspection :.:eqonsibility L i s t . I t .took quite sane a b i n i s t r a t i v e machinery t o kee:~ that thing operatin;:. It took tile joint action of the Amy, the Navy, \.!a;. ?;.06.v.ction Board., Axmy A i r Zorces, O.C.D., and the Provost Marshal ~ e n e r a l ' a Office t n provide the basis fix- it, which vas the evaluat iw agency. That iqkhei-e, I repeat, the yr.o'tcc'~ion t a i l was waeging the.pro&uction doc.

Primarily, the establishment of the BJ2L was an atternyt t o s e t u? sat is- factory con&ols of evaluation. It was d i f f icu l t t o determine, iI we ha& t o furnish some men, whether we shouli f~i-nish thap t o a ro l l e r m i l l or a tunnel. It i s almost as bad as saying, "iihich do you l ike bet'cei-, the Ohio r iver or ice cream for dessert?"

It was also, l a t e r on, uocd as a 5asis for justif ication of the use of yersonnel. on just such a function. Vhen the need came for ret'ucfng ?exon- no1 vlflercvex powsiblo, bocausc of mmp~ici" shortages, we were able t o juoti- f y any particular product, any p a r t i c u l e area, any particular elenent, i n the l igh t of the t h i n ~ s intp which it was n1ad.e. 'i/e could s te te the ep- proximate mount of work one given lnan could. $0 i n a given area i n a given time. I n sorne cases we found, yes,, t'neqe were too many personnel; ;-c.t not many.

IInaer Pa-a~raph.8 of the section on i.hster Inspection I iesponsiXlik List , I said, i n the second sentence, "?;,GO wa.8 now chwged wi th ?!~e re?;~onsi- b i l i t y for determinin[; the f a c i l i t i e s rr!~ich were t o be assi@oi! t o .tho ?,Zl?L." I n my opinion, that was s t i l l an error. lie siloultl hzve ha6 nothini;. to i~o with s ta t ing whidh f a c i l i t i e s or plants should go on the MIDL. \&en ws-31ad.c t ha t . statement, it waemisuntlerstood t o uean that we should n o t s t a t e what protection should be a f f o r b d a given facil.ity. We were the ones vho wero charged with protection. TherePore, we said that we are . the ones 'LO sta.te what t jve of protection wi l l . be civen t o one fac i l i ty , but we shoulcl not >e the ones to s ta te which Sac i l i ty shoul.C ?eceive protection. I cb not :E- lieve that the policy on tha t i s , as ye-i;, clarified..

Fac i l i t i es a t one time numbered over 16,000. That waa too may. There were not that many f ac i l i t i e s , the loss ofvhich infl~ividually woulc? 1,ltitc- r i a l i y a f f e c t t h e war or cause us t o lose i.t. After e better evaluation was made of a l l the f ac i l i t i e s , the nmli3er was reduced, by Mbvemller of 19k3, t o somo 4600 f ac i l i t i e s .

1-0 evdurrtion was one of the p e a t e s t heafiziches. A s t o recomen:lations for the future, I have two. I w i l l jus t i.ea3. the l a s t sentence of the first

' 11 one: The deficiencies o f present way evahct ion reveal the necessi-Lj. i?o? evaluations based on t o t a l !,m&uction ca.!acity."

So far a s the protection men were concerned, there were too r;lW pi"0- &uctFon boys thinking solely i n terms of the en8 product. They ccu?,?! not 5ec tha t a simple l i t t l e plant, manufactwing eomethiw ( tha t ap>?ar.cnttl.~ noboSiy bo@it)' fo r use i n %he w a r , was considerably more jm9ortant. nnS

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more v i t a l than ruany-of the end prodwts without which we could have gotten along S f we dld not have them.

T h a t evaluation should be continuous and ourrent. I.t should not 're made by anybody connected with protection. If I were out of ICY f ield, I s:~ould also sey it should not be maae ei ther by anybody concei-ned with :~rocluction.

. . The next, program, deals with tho ?emoval an& suspension of suhers ives .

!re SeQan to 'get reports, i n the e w l y clays, about subversives. !.re Stid not :sow what t o do i?l.th them. We fount, hovever, tha t there was s ~ ~ f f i c ien t l e sa l authority t o take action. The ection, i n i t i a l l y , was taken hjr a l l the vmious bureaus i n the Itavy, indivicluzlly, and by the various Tecimical Serv- ices or Supply Services i n the- Army. Zventual1.y. that was clrarm together in- t o the Provost Marshal General's OPXce, where it %,as handle& ent i re ly too academically. Ve..could not Eee 'no;? &zn@roue the employmen% of Joe Do3J:es vas i n a efven ' faci l i ty , because we ;~c?. no idea, a t the t ine we? got %3e re- i,ort, what the $.ant was manu$aokrlni., what the man w a s doing ir. the >lar t , or even if he had, the mentality or tile mzans t o a0 any clamwe or ~ i v e out m y info&tion,

It was &ff icul t t o decentralize, :mC it WBS Gbcent rd iz~d and it vorke6 a thousand percent Set ter a f t e r it was sen* clown t o the various Service Con- mands md Proc~u-emept Dis t r ic ts of 31% A.A.F. Froin there on out; we had fev hedaches. We ha& a 1o.L of lawsuits, but no r e a l headaches. Tihere vere fswcr changes durin~; thio proexam tlm i n any other p r o m . . . .

Under D m a p ~ p h ,17 01 the t h i r a p z e of t:lat one, the first sentence should rcad, he &tcmination of t h i iqor tance of the f a c i l i t y to 'c3e war ef for t was om of t h e most a.l.ffic111i obstacles t o eff ic ient Ql3lication of the profgwii." The Under SecreCmy of \tar save special at tention t o the monocjaph on t h i s p-ogr&i,and unofficiaLly state* it was one of the mos-t im~ortant . Renem'ner, it came alon;: as an af ter- tho~ght , crken we aiscovered tha t roost of our subversives were not a.l.iens kt were good 013-line i?inericm cit izens. . .

The Fiwerprinting Program >r& a. mistdce, but it waa a goo6 one. As I say, we ma& a l o t of mistakes. ?!ewe glad it hap?ened, :mcause tho country i s fiwerprint-mindod t o b y . Bic!: i n 1941 and earLy i n 1942, there were about twenty ~ o v e m n l : agencfea a l l yellinc: for the sane Irin8 o'l

national regis t ra t ion tlmt Kr~ent ina had. But everybody wanted t o T L ~ it; therefore, the baby died because eveI?jr>ocLy was giving it too auch love.

The ilrmy,, in an attemgt t o wee? out criminals, y ~ ~ t i n tLe Finyiemrint- in2 h-ogrm: the Navyairoed. It eventually died of its oym r*ei;;i;t. I, :>oroonally, Ties glad to see it die. D L I ~ it achieved. certain thin@: r t sroe&$& out the worst type of criminal. In some places it weeded them out ,?here rre 81.6 not went t o , became rre foun8. i n a ma~nesiurn nine out !lost we could cithcr got r iwemrint cards or get aacnesiwn; we could not eet both. So rre d i a withnil6 th finger?3rint car&.

It has a weat psych01o~;ical effect, C,enorklly. It adcled t o o w over- 'all central, f i l e s of IY.B.1. some 50-?lus pillion--we did not know Ilor~; :nany-- cwds which .bheg Vould othenvise no-i; ;larpe had end which w i l l >e of v e a t benelit i n the filture. It did. break Coio..m the c:enaral -reelin:: of <is-Lash cn "che part of the pu-blic for being fingcqrin'ked.

. .

The Key Personnel ?rowam was a uost nis~m.6.erstood phase of illant P m - tection. i!hen T?e starteb, we Bid. no$ know hrnr t o find out who weye the

- 7 - , "~

~ ~ . . . . ~

. .., , ., .

GOO<, boys and who were the badboys i n a pxtJcu1ar plant. . So we trie6. a l l k i n a of uchemes, the most successful of viliich was the Key ilersonnel Pros:.am, but no'oo6.y i n the f i e l d understood it. Tie were glad whenwe vere able t o acconrplish the same t h i q tinrough the ine$.ia of production security an?. yer- sonnal secwity inspections, and subject the ent i re plant personnel roster t o a screenine, rather than just those yseople whom we were trying, to Lefine as "liey personnel." Unfortunately, we Zoruzd ourselves i n the position, un$.er t h i s program, of having to Investi tate t h e vice-presi&en'c, the ?resi- dent, treasury, secretary and a few other offficials; and they tllou&t that was oomethin~ awful. . .

Then, too, t h e mechanics of it were very diff icul t . Form WI-14.0, iihlch ~ ra s f i r s t used, was cumbersome and complicated. It had t o be mde out i n duplicate, so we were glad when we f ina l ly cot r i d of t ha t form.

"Federal Coordination," I Just oTTer you. TKere i s a nee& i n the future for having one agency responsible for a l l ty9es of internal security. ro r example, tho Provost Marshal General's O.ffice was the coordinatinp: ... ~ agency, but not necessarily the ~ ~ E o ~ s & ~ ~ qency. You w i l l notice I l i s t e d unzei- parapay11 6 a l o t of inclividu&l prop%m, an8 :mt a t the en& "(h18. some 50 others)," a l l of- which had to be coor0.inated.

Then I pointed out i n parappph 7 tllzt a l o t oT l i t t l e , apgarent3.y mal.!., yrocrams were not even inclvdeh i n the others, such a s the BW ??ro;rai?, B a c t s r i ~ l o ~ i c a l !Jarfare; a program tu protect milk an6. milk pro&v:cts; food. dehydration; K-Ration; crude rub3er; 2ii-e-fly Projym (forest-fire f i ~ h t i n ; ? an& prevention prowan); the Big Inch an<. L i t t l e Inch, ad in f in i tm .

In connection with emergency yotec-tton, I &pPve you: the l a t e s t l aw . I gave it t o you i n f u l l without the Wos. I v i l l be lad t o furnish a&v in- divifiual the ta.bfi referred t o in t h i s . I &o not hive Vflem, '5u.t if you 6.e- s i r e them, I w i l l see tha-t they arc 1wi.e available. So many people 8.0 not unclerstanB tho whole pogram on emsrLency protection. Here is the 1a.w. It is the l a t e s t word. It nee& no e::plana;iion; ;'c is sell-eqlana-Lory.

Tile Loyalty Inveati@ations pro gas,^ was the largest, from the stwlQoint of nm,fi)ers of personnel involved i n i t s o p r a t i o n and Trom t h e ~ W I I ~ ~ S of personnel affected by i ts ogaration. I wo'ce on my notes 3.5 xlillion and. my nemetary t rmnla tea tha t into 550 xinion. So tha t i s real ly 5.5 million loyalby investi&itions, approximbeYy, c:lat wero made during the W a r .

That -irropat1, I might say, was 2nc-Leal only. The poup which I ha6 on inveotifiations was constantly hard-yrcsoetl to r e s i s t an ef for t on the ~~t of' otller agencies t o get them t o t e l l then vho sho,~ld. he investigateb. That savors o-T gesta~oism. I f the invest j .~a- the agency hos. the powr to s'cntc who sha l l be invefiti&ate&, I think we aie hea$.e8. i n the r:ronG c l i ~ e c t r ~ n . l'he acency responsible for the p+otectior. of a given installet ion, O7 fol" safe- gdan:in& a mili tary installat ion, sho~ClC. be the one t o s ta te , what. investiga- t ions are necessary. The experts are then the ones who would conC.uct m6- perfom the investigations.

The r e s t of t h i s i s factual. It lxe2ely c i tes how rapidly an& how L M n y

different types of investications were neceuoary. It covers a h o 6 t eve;-y- thin^ acrom the board, i n both the an?^ Navy propw~.s.

, .

I coulcl not help but -iro.int out th.t t h e men who were &om on the wound d o i q these investir;ations were the f ines t moup of man I think you cov.16. possibly f in& anywhere i n the country. The requireement~ to hecome one of

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these i n v e s t i ~ a t o r s were f a r above those which were required of me to becone an ofzicer. Those men were ~ o o d off icer mte?ial.. we were unable, i n the Amy, t o get them anythiw higher than a Master Sergeant--and few of those! They weye d i s t r i c t Sud~es, country sud.gee, a11 types of attorneys and they were some of the best old-time i n v e s t i ~ a t o m we c:ould find, plus many sMlled technicians of a l l types.

The Auxiliaxy MiLitary Police Pro(;z.em i s on6 p o p a m tha t cost us 1mmLI.y a. nickel but, for the mount of money gut i n to it, we got the c ~ e a t e s t return. There were over 200,000 plant protection r:en, mostly guards, who were i'ecl-eral- i zed and sti l l pald by the company. Mow I c1.a not say here that the Govern- ment s k i l l paid for it, because i n many inetctnce~~ tha t company never even had my contracts where they could col lect under a cost-plu6-2.-fired.-feo contract. Basically, it was paicl fo r out of the pocket of the lmn a t w2ose plant these auards were stationed.

- The Safety Propam continues. It started la tes t , %ut the Tarther we go the more impetus there i s given t o %he ?ro@-apl. Safety training, safety supervision, safety reportin& proceS~u-es have made more progress i n 'the l a s t eiglrt months than they did. auring the ent i re courwa o i the war.

The Japanese-American Pro~xam was s;?ecialized, It, comblneA a11 the othor features of' in ternal security, ins?iection 2nd personnel security ac- t i v l t i e s w i t h reference t o a particular ininority goup Chat the Cauce~ian hardly ever understood. Fortunately, we were ~ i v e n a l l kinds of nssistanco lly experts i n the Department of Justice, P.B.I., O.N.I., and even from Gle Joint Chiefs of Staff', where my good friend, B i l l . McGovern, helped. v.s out personally i n many instances. It is one o i the uiost specialized subjects w i t i n which we had t o deal. We never !sov, :mt what we ~ a y have' t o &a1 with other minority g?oups, so the experience ;;ainetl i n .iandliw one t n e is ex- cellen%. 'Ve s t i l l have Yra(?~nents or that ,u;'ticu.lar program exist in^.

Now, t o conclucle t h i s ?&cussion, I r:ant,to yoint out that the Provost ilaxlml General a t the present time i s :..iven a study and there are %lro questions asked. One question i s , "What s h o ~ ~ l d be done t o defend a~a ins i ; eneiny action ilirected a t civil ians?" The secona question is, "lk3 ahould d.0 i t ? " Those are b i ~ questions. It i s i n the l i gh t of that im"ticulm stu8.y.that I imo.Le th i s "Conclusion" .in hers for your thoueht.

Ire believe tha t plant protection is v i t a l t o the propees of any W a r , whether it i s a defensiGe w a r or a n offensive NW; tha t we wi l l n3t have m y t h e to plan a f t e r tile next w a r has s'ca:rted; tbat , i n i t i a l l y , a t ieact , vhen.the next war s t a r t s , the safest :?lace t o be w i l l be i n the L f l Q r or i n the Navy. Tire believe, therefore, that the first attacks which DRY be dirccted'a(&%inst ua would Be a t some inchs-lrial erea, which w i l l Like ;oeo?le, s-toc!: piles, .l>lants and homes; which wl l l a?lect production, m t e r i e l , morale en& any thin^ else you k r i t t o a.C.6.

!,!e believe, therefore, tha t while. c iv i l i an defense was oet ul, an& con- ceive$ a s somethingdiEerent i n tho yast wax, if' ci7rilians mi. kheii' ZC- t i u i t i e s and their. nroduction a r e v i t a l t o t:le desfonso 05 any nation, . then there can be no difference .in f w t ~ ~ e :31anning :,elween s m e t h i n ~ l ike y h t protection, in ternal security of E. mttion, and civi l ian defense. Basicdly, it is a l l one problem. I lec-:.e tha t t.hou&ht withyou. 1 ELXI

not going t o attempt t o evaluate erne of the conc:lusions c t WhiC!l ?re m i & t arrive i n tl?,e @ccom@ishment of t:!at stucly, but I - just w a n t to leave t h a t l;hou&t with you.

General Armstrong, from here on out lay time is yours. I t r i l l atteiipt t o answer any questions you may have.

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GENET& RRMSTRONG:

Thanlc you very m h , Colonel E I i l l e r . Any questione, pntlemen?

n s m :

Earlg i n your ta lk I understood you t o say t h a t the old Wricans vere more suspicious characters i n the matter of sabotage end espiona~c t h a - ~ aliens. May I ask why.

There i s a s l ight ly different connotation there. I did not say they vere more suspicious characters, because if they had been more suspicious we vmuld have planned for them. lie f e l t , i n i t i a l l y , that the aliens vould be the ones who wodld attempt t o cormit espionage and sabotage. But un- fortunately, and t o o m amazement, the Peverse proved true. Nolost of the cases of suspected sabotage and espionage were actually, as a matter of fact , perpetraten by good old-line .berican ci t izens and, so help ne, one of them had h i s anoestoro corn over on "The Mayflower."

Why t h i s condition existed, I do not know. I say it rras t o our amazement.

Colonel Miller, were these ideological reasons tha t caused these men t o do that?

General, I would p r e w so. ide found tkne to just try t o trace tb Fermily history i n one o r two instances and w found tha t usually the individual during h i s college (lays, o r among h i s associates, got a warped ideology somewhere along the l ine which made h in disgusted with the world an& with Ammmsrican l i f e in general, ma particularly with the effor ts of t h i s country to ovorcme Gcrmany. Nov in many cases they had never been t o Gemany. They appprentlp had no t i e s a t a l l with Gemmy.

We could not convict them because we could not prove that they were agexh of a foreign goverrmrent. Wa were l e f t i n the pecu.lier position of having to do somthingtbbt not 3eing able t o pin them t o the cross an8 say, "Now, see here, you: W e t o talrc the p u n i a b n t . " I rea l ly do not know why.

They wero younger people, then, were they not?

GOLQNEL MILLER :

There seemed. t o be no age braclret. i!e have had them as old as 69, and th.e 3.oungcst, I bolieve, was about 18.

In the f i c l d o f oubversive inveotigations, hov did you dclineo.te the responsibil i ty botween the F.B.I. and the Office of the Provost Xaxshal General?

That was a &irPicult problem. 'Ie vrjw i n t n i s position: If we auapectod that an individual wac sub?~ei.oive, we were t o take tha t case t o the F.D.T. an& say, '% think 'chit; ;blJ.cw i s subvorsiva ." The E.B.I. was supposed to investigate. In the ;?oan$into 1715 did not want that lnan i n the plant, so we would kick h5in owt.

!Je were then facad with not b e t n ~ able to j.,astify our 'ensons. The F.B. I., haviw so many of those casec, !as unable t o fumFsh us an in- v e s t i ~ a t i o n report for six monthn 01- nine montha. So they said, ' ' t iell now, for heaven's sake, when you p:im us tho naae of an individual as e. suspeoted subversive, give us sow fec ts ." Wo said, "T.I&L OU?C i s n ' t the investigative rcsyonsibility," So they then apood, and there vas written (as c a l l i t ) "the l i t t l e agreanent," wherein ?re inves'ci;iatcd .:.

my suspicious individual t o deteminc whether the C l a r Department should take action to remove him. I f :lo fomd m y substantial evidence, We would stop the case. I m i ~ h t say i n one instance it %vorkod so ell we, un- fortunately, suspended the F.B. I. undercover scent . (%au&htor)

A STUDENT:

Colonel, can you aefine for us "Subversive activity" as used by the Frovost Marshal Gsntiral'a O~Plce? llhat is i - b ?

Tha.t I would. not atttmpt t o b f l n s any more thon I would attempt t o define z oucceooful man. Labor, Civil :Libertioo League, Lcyal Federation of Gem-Americans, and hundreds of other &c:encios, attempted t o ket us t o put down cxactly what we meant by a "sulnreroiva" individual. It cannot be &one. It can a f t e r the overt act ho.s baen cemitted; bcforrj, it cannot.

But we did se t up certain pov.nd rules. For instanw, we m i d tha t i f an individual has apgarontly boon Tory friendly with known subversives, ?re had bettor look a t him and sec i:? there is awy othcr evidence. I f an individual was educated a f t e r 1935 i n Camany, wo had bettor look at hiin. Then, by a s u m t l o n of a l l thin;s, which led uo t o believe th3k t'he indi- vidual 7ras not t o bc trustod, wc; woulc? thon brand hlm with %:lo sta.tcmcnt "suspected subvorsl.vei' and pet h b out of the plant.

There was unfairness, l o t s of unfairness, m d there was discrimination. But We had an Industrial Employment Roview Board. The man i n the f i e l a had to protect tine plant and he As forced t o act In the intorest oP se- ~ ~ Y ' i t y and no't i n tho interest of %he individual. That webe f o r the Xoviow RoarLrci t o determine l a t e r on when they :wO. plenty of time 'GO look a t a.lI tha facts, study a l l tho recorda, and taUr with the man and f ind ou% 7rhy he did these t h i w s . In many cascs hc rvas able t o defend h i s ?osit.ion an& explain sat'isfactorily, clearly, logical.ly, frankly, why he did. certain thin@, and we said, "we're ~ a t ~ s f i e % . You're a l l r'i@rt.. YOU go on bac!c,'' And we reimbursed him; but the plarit .was pi-otocted i n the mcantlmc.

I did not quite answer your quectian, I know, but you oce how rro had t o act .

GENERAL AFNSTRONG:

1dhiiht;t are you doing today, Colonol--if iif chould have another -div you w i l l have a l ist o f the glants t o be protected, r i i l l you not= mean r i ~ h t no?? what i s the s ta tus of that?

k n f r a l ~k-mstrong, I m afraid that thwo i s n o t b i k b e i w done r i ~ h t now. We made tvro studies yointine: out the necessity for a continued evaluation. ?do even went so far, i n the f i r s t study, as t o s t ick OW necks out and say tlzat a particulm'agency should ha.':e that function. I think someone should be continuing tha t evaluation.

GFNERAL ARMSTRONG:

That i s the yoint I wanted you t o brinG out here for the benefit of these s t u k n t s . A smm:

Colonel Miller, could you t e l l us about ho~r my bona' f ide cases of sa'ootapj occurred during the war? Could you zive us Just a r o u ~ h f i ~ w r e on tha t ? ' .

C OLOrnL ElILIER :

Unfortunately I am not allowed to eive out that information.

You me not allowed t o eivo out tha t information?

COIKImL ivIImR:

No, s i r .

LT. COLONEL KOCR:

1 was wonderin& about your experience v i t h c i ~ i l i a n s who had prison records; and we had "GO employ them at Mi l i tmy Establishments, i n the motor shops end i n the armament shops. . What w m your experience with

' . . ' . i n d i ~ i ~ a l s with past prison records?

I r r i i l put it t h i s way: Where the War Depcstment was monkeying v i t h the F i n ~ e r p r i n t Program we had t o s t a t e t o Jahor t imt those f ingerpr in t records wem not tc be given out t o managoraen-t. !!hon t h a t was s e t u? we . '

found that f f ve corporations already had a f in;:i.ry-int pro,yun: Hercules, DuPont, h e l l O i l , \fileelin(: Steel , &id Ford. S o wo did not put our finger- ' p r i n t pr.oLram i n those r i m .

The f j r s t time labor aiscovored t h a t , tbsy ; o t us on the carpet and. said, "IIcre, management gets them reoords." !k said, "Yes." (We wore never i n any of t'nosa plants , but we were i n a v6i.y poculinr posi t ion.) . . So we said, "All r igh t . FJo're not ~ o i n g t o a q p o v i t h m y Labor-trlnnagmcnt problem. !k'll s tep out of the pict.Jru, d.iscontinu:; our propam, and l e t the p l m b s conduct t h e i r own." About 96 pcrccnt oi' t h m did, too.

NOTT whero the !&r Department got those records some of the h is tory was bad. I n one p lan t jus t because a aan was convicted twice f o r f o r p r y ?ras no reason he could work on a par t i cu la r comLrc.ct. no ;just loved t o t r ace somebody's si@aturo. (Laughter) So when h3 for& one of the p l a n t ' s checks and made himself twenty, thousand eas i ly , ho s a i d t o tho War Departanent and the plant , "Why, i t ' s your o m f a u l t . You took my pr in ts . You know Iwas a forger. You should. not havc put ma i n the financo section." And tho man was rie;ht. T h e company f i n a l l y withdrew its prosecution, put hint i n a di f ferent position, and the mon paid the amount back.

Now whom tho plants did i t --snch as those :rive I montioncd--if a man had a his tory of pe t ty larceny, he w a s not pint i n any posi t ion where he could pick up l i t t l e i t e m . If ha w a s convfc.tcd of rape, he vas not put i n a shypwhere there were mixed sexes. Therer'ore, we believed t h a t the sound thing t o do w a s t o r e s t r i c t and eliminate only those with a h is tory of nlttlicious destruction of property; a h i s to ry of axson, and a h i s to ry of mental i n s t a b i l i t y . Lmagine our amazement vhen we discovered one of these Park Police ~ u a r d i n g a door at one oi' o w buildings--1 think it was e i the r War o r Navy--with a gun loadec?, two d.ays a f t e r he &ot out of' S t . Ellzabcth's. ,

Normally, most of those criminals could pror:uce. I believe Liiat the value i n the Tingerprint Pro&ram came a f t e r the !la;- Department stepped. out; t h a t then the p lant management Cave it i t s 1v.U a t t en t ion and was able t o r e a l l y place the men where they would not y i e l t zo t h e i r temptations.

Did I answer your question, Colonel?

COLONEL I W H :

My question rea l ly was more--let me word it another m y : O n the average, did you find t h a t the men or the women with prison recoras were loyal7

COLONEL l t i L m R :

Yes, a large percentage of them were. Nost of those were perfectly loyal. There is surprisingly l i t t l e correlai;ion between so-called crimes of passion, for example, and certain other and absolute disloyalty t o the country. Even though.thoae nen i n sm~e a1 the ma@ealw mines w e p somo of the most-hardened criminals i n the country, eaccping Prom praoti- 'cal1.y every prison and j a i l i n the United S t a t e s , they were perfectly rvillinr: t o produce, break the i r backs, for the war e f for t u n t i l we rval&ed up with a f i n ~ e r p r i n t card.

Then the Beneral policy seem t o be thar, as l o w as a man indicated. on the application form that he had a orison record, rue were t o take him.

That is correct. . .

COLOiWL KOCH:

Then if we hired him and l a t e r on learnea he had a prison record, even a minor oxfense, we had t o discharge kiu.

I do think there was a l o t of discriraina'cion,

Thank you, Colonel Miller. We are very iluch indebted t o you for a most interesting talk.