Constitutional Law digested cases

7/30/2019 Constitutional Law digested cases

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86. DANTE V. LIBAN VS.RICHARD J. GORDON

GR. NO. 175352

Facts:

Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari

(petitioners) filed with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having

Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the

Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine

National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.

During respondents incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was

elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC

Board of Governors. Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of thePNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as

provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.

Petitioners claim that their petition is neither an action for quo warranto nor an

action for declaratory relief. Petitioners maintain that the present petition is a taxpayers

suit questioning the unlawful disbursement of funds, considering that respondent has

been drawing his salaries and other compensation as a Senator even if he is no longer

entitled to his office. Petitioners point out that this Court has jurisdiction over this petition

since it involves a legal or constitutional issue which is of transcendental importance.

In his Comment, respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to file this

petition which appears to be an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges that

respondent committed an act which, by provision of law, constitutes a ground for

forfeiture of his public office. Petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office

of respondent. Under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, only a person

claiming to be entitled to a public office usurped or unlawfully held by another may bring

an action for quo warranto in his own name. If the petition is one for quo warranto, it is

already barred by prescription since under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil

Procedure, the action should be commenced within one year after the cause of the

public officers forfeiture of office. In this case, respondent has been working as a Red

Cross volunteer for the past 40 years. Respondent was already Chairman of the PNRC

Board of Governors when he was elected Senator in May 2004, having been elected

Chairman in 2003 and re-elected in 2005.

Respondent also maintains that if the petition is treated as one for declaratory

relief, this Court would have no jurisdiction since original jurisdiction for declaratory relief

lies with the Regional Trial Court.

Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned orcontrolled corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the

Constitution does not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is

neither an office nor an employment.

Issues:

Whether PNRC is a government owned or controlled corporation and whether

respondent violated Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Phil. Constitution. Whether petitioners may

legally institute this petition against respondent.


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Held:

The Supreme Court find the petition without merit. Petitioners Have No

Standing to File this Petition A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is anaction for quo warranto. Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. It is clear that

Petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office against respondent, a public

officer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of

his public office. Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the

proper party plaintiff. However, an individual may commence such an action if he claims

to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can

bring the action in his own name. The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his

own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute;

otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage. In the present case, petitioners do

not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no

standing to file the present petition.

The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the

head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman.

Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since

his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly,

the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This

leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or

employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government official or employee,the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.

PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions. On 22 March 1947,

President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95, otherwise known as the PNRC

Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization,

whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance

for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social

status, or political affiliation.

The Fundamental Principles provide a universal standard of reference for all

members of the Movement. The PNRC, as a member National Society of the

Movement, has the duty to uphold the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the

Movement. In order to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to be

autonomous and must operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of the

Movement.

In the Philippines where there is a communist insurgency and a Muslim

separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned or controlled and

neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as government personnel or asinstruments of government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists will treat

PNRC volunteers as enemies when the volunteers tend to the wounded in the battlefield

or the displaced civilians in conflict areas.

To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC

cannot be owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government

does not own the PNRC.

The Supreme Court has resolved that PNRC Charter is violative of the

Constitutional Proscription against the Creation of Private Corporations by Special Law.


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The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was created by

special charter on 22 March 1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution. It

recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private corporations created

under a general law. The second refers to government-owned or controlled corporations

created by special charters. Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution.

Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special

charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only

under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a

general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can

qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation

Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives. The

Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled

corporations through special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special

charters, it follows that Congress can create corporations with special charters only ifsuch corporations are government-owned or controlled.

PNRC was created through a special charter, and cannot be considered a

government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of

ownership and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity,

Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional

prohibition against the creation of private corporations by special charters provides no

exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the PNRC

Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it corporate

powers, is void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1, 2,3,4(a), 5, 6,7,8, 9,10 11,12, and 13 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, are void.

In sum, Supreme Court hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a

government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for

purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However,

since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation,

the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the

Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.

SO ORDERED.

87. PUYAT VS. DE GUZMAN, JR.

113 SCRA 31 (1982)

Facts:

Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez appeared as counsel of a party in a case

before the SEC. Puyat, the opposing party, objected to the appearance of

Assemblyman Fernandez. However, Fernandez purchased ten shares of the company

of his client and proceeded to intervene in the case.

Issue:


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Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez violated the constitutional prohibition

not to appear as counsel?

Held:

In effect, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel, albeit indirectly, before

an administrative body in contravention of the constitutional provision.

His act of acquiring shares of the company was done after the fact and his

intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in

some other capacity.

89. AVELINO VS. CUENCO

83 PHIL 17 (1979)

Facts:

On February 21, 1949, shortly before the opening of the Senate session Senator

Tanada and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a

resolution enumerating charges against the then petitioner Senate President Jose

Avelino and ordering the investigation. Sufficient number of senator were at the session

hall to constitute a quorum at the appointed time, the petitioner delayed his appearance

at the session hall and requested instead from the Secretary a copy of the resolution

submitted by Senators Tanada and Salidad and in the presence of the public he read

the said resolution slowly and carefully, ordered the arrest of any senator who would

speak without being recognized by the petitioner and banged the gavel and abandoning

the Chair deliberately. In order to continue the session and not to paralyze the session

Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco was voted and took the oath to be the Senate Presidentof the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether ornot the Resolution of declaring vacant the position of the President of

the Senate.

Held:

In fine, all the four justices agree that the Court being confronted with the

practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate

deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support

Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most

injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being

essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators,


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the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amendable at

any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more

senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here

about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who

approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place

them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

As, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. ithout

costs.

90. PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS

324 SCRA 689

Facts:

While serving his sentence at the New Bilibid prison, Muntinlupa City. Romeo

Jalosjos was re-elected as Congressman for the first District of Zamboanga Del Norte.

Jalosjos filed a motion asking that he will be allowed to fully discharge the duties

of a Congressman, including attendance of legislative sessions and committee

meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of non-bailable offense.

And his confinement was depriving his constituents of their voice in congress.

Issues:

1.) Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which

will apply to validly incarcerated persons in general?

2.) Are articles VI and VIII valid to support his motion?

Held:

Election to high government office does not give you the freedom from the

common command of general law.

Section2, Article 6 & Article 8 of the constitution state: A member of the House of

representative is privilege from arrest during his attendance at its sessions only if

offense is punishable by more than 6 year imprisonment . In his case, confinement of a

Congressman charged with crimes punishable by more than 6 years has constitutional

foundation.

91. ARROYO VS DE VENECIA

277 SCRA 268 (1997)

Facts:


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Petitioner passed an amendment to the House of Representative and later

brought to the House of the Senate. After the questioning, the petitioner moved for

adjournment for lack of quorum which is needed to discuss the business under the

Constitution. The Bill was later made into Law and signed by the President of the

Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not the Law passed was a violation of the Constitutional Mandate.

Held:

The House concerned has no rule that quorum shall be determined by actual

voting. The Constitution does not require that the opinion of the Members betaken every

time a House has to vote, except only on the following instances upon the last and the

third readings of the bill, at the request of 1/5 of the Members present and in re-passing

a bill over the veto of the President. And there is obviousness on the part of the

petitioner to delay the business of the House, eliminating the alleged trick on part of the

accused. Lastly, the enrolled bill doctrine states that enrolled bills are in itself conclusive

thus legally binding provided it is in harmony with the constitution. The court upheld

principle of separation of powers, which herein, is applicable for the legislative branch

for it has exercised its power without grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction.

92. OSMEA VS. PENDATUN

109 PHIL 863 (1990)

Facts:

Then Congressman Osmea Jr. filed a verified petition with the Supreme Courtfor declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction againstCongressman Pendatun and fourteen others in their capacity as members of theSpecial Committee created by House Resolution 59. In the said petition, he alleged,among others, that his one-hour privileged speech entitled Message to Garcia did notconstitute disorderly behavior and that he could not be censured for his speech sinceother business transpired before Congress decided to take action. He further asked thatsaid respondents should not require him to substantiate his charges against thepresident which constituted a serious assault upon the dignity and prestige of Garcia asthe then President. For refusing to provide evidence as the basis of his allegations,Osmea was suspended for 15 months for the serious disorderly behavior.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Osmeas speech constituted disorderly conduct?

2. Whether or not the House has the power to suspend one of its members?

Held:

1. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly conduct, not only becausethe Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter


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depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best.Anything to the contrary will amount to violation of the theory of separation ofpowers observed by the Court.

2. The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such

limitations are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed tobe legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the PhilippineCongress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise. Hence, the Congress hasthe inherent legislative prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did notimpair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended aSenator for 12 months in 1949. Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.

93 SANTIAGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN

356 SCRA 636

Facts:

The case arose from complaints filed by the group of employees of the

Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) where she then acted as the CID

Commissioner.

The court is called upon to review the act of Sandiganbayan and how far it can

go in ordering the preventive suspension of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago in

connection with pending criminal cases filed against her for violation of Republic Act

3019 as amended otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt practices Act.

On May 24, 1992 Senator Miriam Santiago filed a petition to review on certiorari

of a decision with prohibition and preliminary injunction before the court and a motion

before the Sandiganbayan to defer her arraignment .

Issue:

If the authority of Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent

public official charged with violation of the provisions of RA no 3019 has both legal and

jurisprudential support and certiorari will be granted by the Court relative to this case.

Held:

On Jan 31, 1992 the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and lifting

the temporary restraining order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the

petitioner proved unvailing.

In issuing the preventive suspension, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the

clear and unequivocal mandate of the law , as well as the jurisprudence in which the

court has. Section13 of RA 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must

be suspended only in the office where he is allegedly to have committed the acts with

which he has been charged

The court suspends the accused from her position as Senator of the republic of

the Philippines and from any government position she may be holding at present. Her

suspension shall be holding 90 days only and shall take effect immediately upon notice.


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94. UNITED STATES VS JUAN PONS

34 PHIL 729

Facts:

Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamerLopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. Thesaid barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels toPons house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrelslisted as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not beingone). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering thatthe 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the ct of trading anddealing opium is against Act 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and

fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Ponsappealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the PhilippineCommission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that thesaid law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of theCommission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381should be null and void.

Issue:

Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine ifAct 2381 was indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914.

Held:

The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SCrefused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals areconclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the PhilippineLegislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate

both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Governmentwas brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of theGovernment, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of theLegislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness ofthe Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislatureadjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the courtdid not err in declining to go behind these journals. The SC passed upon theconclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

95.CASCO PHILIPPINES VS. GIMENEZ7 SCRA 347

Facts:

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of syntheticresin glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of thesaid glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuantto RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippinesissued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign


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exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated amemorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from thepayment of said fee, as provided in same law. In compliance, Casco paid the fees butlater moved for reimbursement as Casco maintained that urea and formaldehyde areexempted from such fees. The CBP issued the vouchers for refund (pursuant to

Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the banks auditor refused to honor the vouchers sincehe maintained that this is in contrast to the provision of Sec 2, par 18 of RA 2609 whichprovides: The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision ofsection one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for theimportation of the following:

xxx xxx xxx

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard whenimported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.

The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBPs auditor. Casco maintainsthat the term urea formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be construed asurea and formaldehyde He further contends that the bill approved in Congresscontained the copulative conjunction and between the terms urea and,formaldehyde, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt urea andformaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the syntheticresin glue called urea formaldehyde, not the latter a finished product, citing in supportof this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration ofthe bill before said House, by members thereof.

Issue:

Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea andformaldehyde.

Held:

Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a

condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certainconditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce whenapplied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly lowcost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea formaldehyde is clearly afinished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde,as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as ureaformaldehyde The opinions of any member of Congress does not represent the entiretyof the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon thecourts. It is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehydeinstead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards thetenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there hasbeen any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers ofCongress and approved by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without

jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of thecornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curativelegislation, not by judicial decree.

96. ASTORGA VS. VILLEGAS

G.R. NO. L-23475 (APRIL 30, 1974)

Facts:


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House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives tothe Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments whichwere approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments,thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and

attested to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065.Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introducedby him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and thePresident withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitionerargued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusiveproof of a bills due enactment.

Issue:

W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.

Held:

Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrewtheir signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enactedand therefore did not become a law. The Constitution requires that each House shallkeep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation orevidence of the bills due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of theCongress to verify such. Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment wereintroduced and approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to thePresident for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enactedand did not become a law.

97. PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO

227 SCRA 703November 11, 1993

Facts:

The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section35 of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs,MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with certain other government offices. Itis alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory becasue while withdrawing the frankingprivilege from judiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vice-President of thePhilippines, Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC, NationalCensus & Statistics Office and the general public. The respondents counter that there isno discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance withthe equal protection clause.

Issue:

Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

Held:The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as

every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It hasnonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of theConstitution to provide for amore specific guarantee against any form of unduefavoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challengedon the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of anunwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equalprotection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarlysituated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilitiesimposed. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according


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to a valid classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional. Circular No.92-28 is set aside insofar.

98. ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST, ET AL. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARYEDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL.

469 SCRA 1

Facts:

On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VATReform Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TROenjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for

certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.

The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5and 6: That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%, after any of thefollowing conditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of theprevious year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);

(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceedsone and one-half percent (1%)

Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increasethe VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because suchdelegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is atax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be included withinthe purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties,tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed onimported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause,influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditionsprecedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to howthe Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation.

Issue:

Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase theVAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretaryof Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power?

Held:

NO. It is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment

of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law

is contingent. It is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12%

rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty,

which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT

rate when the specified conditions are present.

Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain theexistence of a fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as apercentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government

deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1%. There is no


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undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of alaw. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax butthe mere implementation of the law.

99. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., ET AL. VS. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THEWHOLE REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE,

G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011

Facts:

The case at bar refers to the ethics complaint filed against Sen. Manny Villar onthe alleged double insertion of Php200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the2008 General Appropriations Act. Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of theEthics Committee by the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villarsright to due process.

Issue:

Whether Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative ofSenator Villars right to due process.

Held:

The SC did not agree. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate itsown rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court. The onlylimitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance ofquorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements arecomplied with, according to the SC, the Court will not interfere with the right of Congressto amend its own rules.

100. JOSE A. ANGARA VS.THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA,MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR

63 PHIL 139 July 15, 1936

Facts:

In the case at bar, Petitioner Angara run for the position of members of theNational Assembly for the first district of Tayabas on September 17, 1935 Electionstogether with Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor as rivals for the saidposition. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara asmember-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which ineffect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed beforethe Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, amongother things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assemblyor that the election of said position be nullified.

On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) statingthat last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitutionconfers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards themerits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court thereforehas no jurisdiction to hear the case.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/187714.htmlhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/187714.html


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Issue:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the ElectoralCommission and the subject matter of the controversy?

Held:

YES. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government,and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law betweendepartmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined bythe judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matterof the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and

extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of allcontests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of theNational Assembly."

101. OSE O. VERA, ET AL. VS. JOSE A. AVELINO, ET AL.

G.R. NO. L-543 AUGUST 31, 1946

Facts:

On May 1946, the Commission on Elections submitted to the President and theCongress of the Philippines a report regarding the national elections held the previousmonth stating that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in theprovince of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region didnot reflect the true and free expression of the popular will. During the session, when thesenate convened on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring tothe report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero who hadbeen included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number ofvotes, proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, asmembers of the chamber, pending the termination of the of the protest lodged againsttheir election.

Petitioners thus immediately instituted an action against their colleaguesresponsible for the resolution, praying for an order to annul it and compellingrespondents to permit them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorialprerogative. They also allege that only the Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction overcontests relating to their election, returns and qualifications. Respondents assert thevalidity of the pendatum resolution.

Issue:

Whether the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whetheror not votes cast in the said provinces are valid.

Held:

The Constitution provides (Article VI, section 15) that "for any speech or debate"in congress, Senators and congressmen "shall not be questioned in any other place."The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers,


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holding that the case was not a contest, and affirmed the inherent right of thelegislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership.

Wherefore, the case at bar is dismissed.

102. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

211 SCRA 315

Facts:

On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in GR No. 104704, disqualifyingMelchor Chavez, private respondent therein, from running for the Office of Senator inthe May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying

that it (1) disseminate through the fastest available means this Courts Resolution datedMay 5, 1992 to all regional election directors, provincial election supervisors, city andmunicipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors, the six (6) accreditedpolitical parties and the general public; and (2) order said election officials to delete thename of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets,election returns and to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez in favorof Francisco I. Chavez. On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued Res. No. 92-1322 whichresolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates.However, it failed to order the crediting of all Chavez votes in favor of petitioner as wellas the cancellation of Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates.

Issue:

Whether or not the law allows pre-proclamation controversy involving the electionof the members of the Senate.

Held:

A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no causeof action, the controversy presented being one in the nature of a pre-proclamation.

While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversiesinvolving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senatorand Member of the House of Representatives. Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides:For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of theHouse of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on mattersrelating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of theelection returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be. However, this doesnot preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or uponwritten complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate ofcanvass or election returns before it.

103. AQUINO VS. COMELEC

243 SCRA 400 (1995)

Facts:


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Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of

Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati,

a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP

of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that

the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which,

under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year

immediately preceding the elections.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for

congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution

Held:

In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second

District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but

domicile of choice.

Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that

he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of

the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate

indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate

places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently

clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his

most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing

a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of

petitioners intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of

permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile.

Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare

assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of

domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a

bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new

one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and

positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

104. FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

166 SCRA 651 (1988)

Facts:

This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of theSenate Electoral Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying,respectively, the petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion forReconsideration thereafter filed.

Senator Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal were being asked to inhibit

themselves in hearing SET Case No. 002-87 as they are considered interested parties,therefore leaving the Senate Electoral Tribunal senateless, and all remaining members


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coming from the judiciary.

Issue:

WON the SET can function without the Senator members.

Held:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and affirmed thedecision of the Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or disqualify himself,rather, just let them refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where hesincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of anobjective and impartial judgment.

105. BONDOC V. PINEDA

201 SCRA 792 (1991)

HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to judge election contests andqualifications concerning members of Congress

For HRET to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction, it must be independent andimpartial, a separate body from the legislative

HRET members are entitled to security of tenure regardless of any change in

their political affiliations

HRET members cannot be removed for disloyalty to a party

Facts:

Pineda and Bondoc were rival candidates as Representatives of the 4th district.Pineda won in the elections, prompting Bondoc to file a protest with the HRET,which decided in favor of the latter. However, before promulgation of thedecision, Congressman Camasuras membership with the HRET was withdrawn

on the ground that he was expelled from the LDP. As such, the decision couldnot be promulgated since without Congressman Camasuras vote, the deicisonlacks the concurrence of 5 members as required by the Rules of the Tribunal.

Issues:

Whether or not the House of Representatives can issue a resolution compellingHRET not to promulgate its decision

Whether or not the composition of the HRET may be affected by a change in thepolitical alliance of its members

Held:

HRET is a non-political body

The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and

Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the

House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and

qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs.

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990).


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The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of

its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What

this Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the

electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives:

Electoral tribunals are independent and impartial

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission

was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of

contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to

that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters

pertaining to contested elections of its members.

The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the

election and qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be

as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.

Electoral tribunals as sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and

qualifications of members of the legislative houses

The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the

Constitution as special tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to

election returns and qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as

such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select their own

employees, and to supervise and control them, without any legislative

interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)

To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must

be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election

contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.

The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the

legislature and though not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to

all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an

independent organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it

is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.

xxx xxx xxx

The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose

of determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members

of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and

while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has

jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the

character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole

judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members ofthe National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)

Can the House of Representatives compel the HRET not to promulgate its

decision?

The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the

framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a

farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle

and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the

electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.

Removal of HRET member for disloyalty to a party impairs HRET constitutional


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prerogative

The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman

Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because

he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear

impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be

the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the

House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the

aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the

Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority

party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.

Is disloyalty to a party a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET?

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must

discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and

independence even independence from the political party to which they belong.

Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds

for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman

Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc,

based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and

the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed

a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Itsresolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and

void.

HRET members enjoy security of tenure

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of

Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of

tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests,

are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of

tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore,

membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a

just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office,

his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents

in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other

valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for

"party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political

group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has

become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the

LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right tosecurity of tenure.

106.) VIRGILIO ROBLES VS. (HRET

GR No. 86647(February 5, 1990)

Facts:


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Petitioner and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidate for the position

of congressman of the first district of Caloocan city in the last May 11, 1987

congressional elections, petitioner Robles was proclaimed the winner of December 23,

1987. On January 5. 1988 Santos filed an election protest with respondent HRET. The

alleged among others that the election in the first district of Caloocan city held last May

11, 1987. Were characterized by the commission of electoral frauds and irregularities in

various forms. The private respondent likewise prayed for the recounting of the ballots

casted in all 320 contested precincts. On Jan. 14, 1988. The petitioner filed his answer

to the protest. He alleged as among his affirmative defence the lack of residence of

protestant and the late filling of the protest.

Issue:

Whether or not the allegation of petitioner that he was deprived of due processwhen respondent tribunals rendered partial decision pursuant to section 18 of the

HRET.

Held:

It would not be amiss to the state at this point that an election protest is

impressed with public interest in the sense that the public is interested in knowing what

happened in the election(Dimaporo v. Estipona,supra), for this reason, it must yield to

what is for the common good. Accordingly, finding no grave abuse of discretion on thepart of the house of the representative electoral tribunal in issuing the assailed

resolution, the instant petition is dismissed.

107. JOKER ARROYO VS. (HRET)

GR No. 118597(July 14, 1995)

Facts:

After the May 11, 1992 election, Arroyo was declared as the duly elected

congressman of the lone district of Makati. Arroyo won by 13,559votes over his

opponent. His opponent Sy juco protested the declaration before the HRET. He alleged

that Arroyo won due to massive fraud hence he moved for revision and recounting of

the ballots casted. HRET gave way but during the process some HRET employees and

personnel conducted some irrugalarities to ensure Sy Jucos win. After some paperbattles between the two, Sy Juco, realized that mere revision and recounting would not

suffice to overthrow the more than 12,000 votes lead of Arroyo over him. He revised his

complaint by including and introducing in his memorandum cum addendum that his

complaint is based on a broader and more equitable and non-traditional determination

of the existence of the precinct-level document based on anomalies and that the

revision he initially is just incidental to such determination. The 3 justices members of

the HRET ruled that such amendment is already beyond the tribunals jurisdiction abd

the 6 representative members ruled otherwise. Consequently, by a vote of 6-3, the

HRET did not dismiss the protest filed by Sy Juco and the HRET later declared Sy Juco

the winner.


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Issue:

Whether or not HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction.

Held:

However guised or justified by Sy Juco, this innovative theory he introduced for

the first time in his memorandum cum addendum indeed the scope of the election

protest beyond what he originally sought the mere revision of ballots. From his initial

prayer for revision which lays primary, if not exclusive emphasis on the physical recount

and appreciation of ballots alone, private respondent attempt to inject his theory at the

memorandum stage calls for presentation of evidence aside from others than, the

ballots themselves, Sy Juco in fact intended to completely abandon the process and

results of the revision and there after sought to rely on his brainchild process. This is

clearly substantial amendment of the election protest expressly prescribed by rule 28 of

the HRET internal rule.

109. GEORGINI AGGABO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTION (COMELEC)

GR NO. 135756(JANUARY 26, 2005)

Facts:

The petitioner seeks to annul and set aside as having been issued with grave

abuse of discretion the resolution No. 7233 of the COMELEC En bank and the

proclamation of private respondent Anthony Miranda as congressman for the fourth

district of Isabela. During the may 10,2004 election. It was claimed that canvass of

votes(COCU) for the municipalities of Cordon and San agustin was tampered. Miranda

moved for the exclusion of the first copy of the COCV. On may 22, 2004, the provincialboard of canvassers (PBC) excluded from canvass the contested COCVs and used

instead the 4th and 7th copies of the COCVs. Based on the results, Miranda garnered

the highest number of votes for the position of congressman.

Issue:

Is COMELEC proclamation of Miranda as wining candidate valid considering that

there is an appeal still un resolved.?

Held:

The petition is impressed with merit because the petitioner has been proclaimed

winner for the congressional election in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath

of office as such, and assumed his dutie3s against him would be usurp the function of

the house of tribunal. The reason for this ruling is the avoid duplicity of proceedings and

a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies with due regards to the peoples

mandate.


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110. LIMKAICHONG V. COMELEC

GR NO. 178831, APRIL 2009

Facts:

Jocelyn Limkaichong filed a candidacy as a congresswoman in the 1st District of

Negros Oriental. Paras, her rival, and some other concerned citizens filed

disqualification cases against her. Limkaichong is purportedly not a natural born citizen

of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that

her mom, though Filipino lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichongs

dad. During the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC,

Election day came and LImkaichong won. About 2 days after the counting of votes,

COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days

however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC

issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted

elections.. Paras opposed the proclamation and she filed a petition before the

COMELEC. Limkaichong assailed the petition filed by Paras on the ground that that

since she is now the proclaimed winner, the COMELEC can no longer exercise

jurisdiction over the matter. It should be the HRET which should exercise jurisdiction

from then on. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.

Issue:

Whether or not COMELEC should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter.

Held:

The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichongs proclamation. The SC

has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,

and assumed office as a Member of the HOR, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election

contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own

jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests

the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the

proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a

proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and

decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the

latters election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word sole in Section 17,

Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity

of the Electoral Tribunals jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

111. BANAT V. COMELEC

GR NO. 177508, AUGUST 7, 2009


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Facts:

This is a petition for Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary

restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioner BarangayAssociation for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party List

(petitioner) assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369 (RA 9369)and

enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the

statute. RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352

passed by the Senate on 7 December 2006 and the House of Representatives on 19

December 2006.On 23 January 2007, less than four months before the 14 May 2007

local elections. On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization,

filed this petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of

the Constitution.Petitioner also assails the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and

43 of RA 9369.According to petitioner, these provisions are of questionable applicationand doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.

Petitioner argued that Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by impairing the

powers of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal

(SET).According to petitioner, under the amended provisions, Congress as the National

Board of Canvassers for the election of President and Vice President (Congress), and

the COMELECen banc as the National Board of Canvassers (COMELEC en banc), for

the election of Senatorsmay now entertain pre-proclamation cases in the election of the

President, Vice President, and Senators.Petitioner concludes that in entertaining pre-

proclamation cases, Congress and the COMELEC en banc undermine the

independence and encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 9369 is unconstitutional.

Held:

The COMELEC maintains that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertain

only to the adoption and application of the procedures on pre-proclamation

controversies in case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration in the

certificates of canvass.The COMELEC adds that Section 37 does not provide that

Congress and the COMELEC en bancmay now entertain pre-proclamation cases for

national elective posts. Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the

COMELEC the power to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of

violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,

offenses, and malpractices.COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary

investigations and prosecute election offenses, it likewise authorizes the COMELEC to

avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. In the 1993

COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the authority of the COMELEC was subsequently

qualified and explained.


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112. DRILON, ET AL VS. SPEAKER

GR NO. 180055, JULY 31, 2009

Facts:

Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents to

the Commission on Appointments (CA). Petitioners went to respondent then Speaker

Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for the Liberal Party in the CA. Representative

Taada, by letter of September 10, 2007, requested the Secretary General of the House

of Representatives the reconstitution of the House contingent in the CA to include one

seat for the Liberal Party in compliance with the provision of Section 18, Article VI of the

ConstitutionRepresentative Taada also brought the matter to the attention of then

Speaker De Venecia, reiterating the position that since there were at least 20 members

of the Liberal Party in the 14 th Congress, the party should be represented in the

CA.However, No report or recommendation was proffered by the Legal Department,

drawing Representative Taada to request a report or recommendation on the matter

within three days. Hence spawned the filing on October 31, 2007 of the first petition bypetitioner former Senator Franklin M. Drilon (in representation of the Liberal Party), et

al., for prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto with prayer for the issuance of writ of

preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, against then Speaker De

Venecia, Representative Arthur Defensor, Sr. in his capacity as Majority Floor Leader of

the House of Representatives, Senator Manuel B. Villar in his capacity as ex

officio chairman of the CA, Atty. Ma. Gemma D. Aspiras in her capacity as Secretary of

the CA, and the individual members of the House of Representatives contingent to the

CA.

Issue:

Whether the House of Representatives have committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to alck or excess of jurisdiction in constituting the commission onappointments in contravention of the required proportional constitution by depriving the

Liberal Party of its constitutional entitlement to one seat therein.

Held:

The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the

prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and

party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the


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HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the

Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would

fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on

Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber exercises

the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members

would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chambers respective electoral tribunal.

113.GUERRERO VS. COMELEC

G.R. NO. 137004, JULY 26, 2000

Facts:

Guillermo Ruiz sought to disqualify respondent Farinas as a candidate for

the position of Congressman in the First District of Ilocos Norte. Ruiz alleged that

Farinas had been campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998

polls, despite his failure to file a certificate of candidacy for said office. On May 8, 1998,

Farinas filed his certificate of candidacy substituting candidate Chevylle Farinas who

withdrew on April 3, 1998. On May 10, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition of

Ruiz for lack of merit. After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner.

Thereafter, Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Farinas could not

validly substitute for Chevylle Farinas, since the latter was not the official candidate of

LAMMP, but was an independent candidate. Another person cannot substitute for an

independent candidate. Ruiz claimed that Farinas certificate of candidacy was fatally

defective. On June 3, 1988, Farinas took his oath of office as a member of the House of

Representatives. The COMELEC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion in

holding that the determination of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent

Farinas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

Held:

There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held

that its jurisdiction over the case had ceased with the assumption of office of respondent

Farinas as Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte. While COMELEC is

vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to

exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by
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Farinas is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and

the HRET. Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive

jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of

members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been

proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of

Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,

returns and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the

COMELECs decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in

deference to the HRETs own jurisdiction and functions.

118.TEOFISTO GUINGONA VS. NEPTALI GONZALES

214 SCRA 789

Facts:

In May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC

senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the

requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the partiesagreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats)

Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5

members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5

member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8

senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-

PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the

proposition compromise by SenTolentino who proposed that the elected members of

the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-

NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He

alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation.

Issue:

Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation inthe COA.

Held:

It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional

membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the

political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution

leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5

or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted

a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one

half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional

membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the

Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in theSenate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance


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with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional

representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more

representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either

the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC.A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly

elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate,

a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. Inorder to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with

proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the

other party.

120. BENGZON VS. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

203 SCRA 767

Facts :

It was alleged that Benjamin KokoyRomualdez and his wife together with the

Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino

people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon law office and Ricardo Lopa

Corys brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business

enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and

Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation. Sen. Enrile subsequently delivered aprivilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government owned corporations

which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech

is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on

Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee

hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a

pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due

process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and

that his allegations are baseless and malicious. Enrile subsequently took advantage of

the Senates privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the

matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea. Claiming that the Senate BlueRibbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and

testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and

legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to

their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor

any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the

Bengzon et al filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary

restraining order and/or injunctive relief.

Issue:

Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.

Held:

No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no

suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a

possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and


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Corrupt Practices Act. In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the

Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly

Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39

corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no

intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really

in aid of legislation because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction ofCongress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of

the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the Anti-

Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the province of the

courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr.

Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.

121. STANDARD CHARTER VS. SENATE

GR. NO. 167173

Facts:

Before us is a Petition for Prohibition (WithPrayer for Issuance of TemporaryRestraining Order and/or Injunction) dated and filed on March 11, 2005 by petitionersagainst respondent Senate Committeeon Banks , Financial Ins ti tut ions and

Currencies , as represented by Edgardo Angara.P e t i t i o n e r SC B i s a b a n k

i n s t i t u t e d i n England. Petitioners are Executive officers of said.Respondent isis oneof the permanent committees of the Senate of the Philippines. The petition seeks theissuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin respondent from (1)

proceeding with its inquiry pursuan t to Phi lipp ine Senate (P .S.) Reso lu tion No .166 ; (2 )

compelling pet it ioners who are off icers of petitioner SCB-Philippines to attend and testifybefore any fu rther hea ring to be conducted by responden t, pa r t i cu la r ly tha t s e t on

M a r c h 1 5 , 2 0 0 5 ; a n d ( 3 ) e n f o rc i n g a n y h o l d - d e pa r t u re o r d e r ( H D O ) a n d / o r

putting the petitioners on the Watch List. It also praysthat judgment be rendered (1) annulling theSubpoenae adtestificandum and ducestecum issued to petitioners, and (2) prohibiting therespondent from compell ing peti tioners to appear and test ify in the inquiry

being conducted pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 166.S e n a t o r J u a n P o n c e

E n r i l e , V i c e C ha ir pe rs on of re sp on de nt , d el iv er ed a p ri vi le ge speechentitled Arrogance of Wealthbefore theSena te based on a le tte r from At ty . Mar k

R. Bocobo denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered f o r e i g n s e c u r i t i e s i n

v i o l a t i o n o f t h e S e c u r i t i e s Regu l a t ion Cod e ( R .A . No . 879 9) andurg ing the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of leg is la t io n, to

p re v en t the oc cur r e n ce o f a s im i l a r fr audul ent act iv ity in the fu ture . Upon

mot ion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, the speech was referred torespondent. Prior to theprivi lege speech , Senator E n r i l e h a d i n t r o d u c e d P . S . R e s o l u t i o n N o .

1 6 6 ,

d i r e c t i n g t h e c o m m i t t e e o n b a n k s , financial institutions and currencies,t o c o n d u c t a n i n q u i r y , i n a i d o f l e g i s l a t i o n ,

i n t o t h e i l l eg a l s a l e o f unregistered and high-risk securities by s t a n d a r d c h a r t e r e d b a n k , w h i c h resulted in billions of pesos of losses to theinvesting public.

Act ing on the refe rral, respondent, th roughits Chairperson , Senator EdgardoJ. Angara, set theinitial hearing on February 28, 2005 to investigate, inaid of legislation, thesubject matter of the speech andresolution filed by Senator Enrile.Respondent invited petitioners

to attend thehea r ing , req ues t ing the m to sub mit the i r wr i t ten position paper.

Petitioners, through counsel, submittedt o r e s p o n d e n t a l e t t e r d a t e d F e b r u a r y2 4 , 2 0 0 5 presenting their position, particularly stressing thatthere were cases

pending in court allegedly involvingt he s am e i s su es sub j ec t o f the l e g i s l a t iv e

inq ui ry ,th er eb y po si ng a c ha lle ng e to the ju ris di ct ion of respondent to continue

with the inquiry.O n F e b r u a r y 2 8 , 2 0 0 5 , r e s p o n d e n t commenced theinvestigation. Senator Enrileinquiredwho among those invited as resource persons were


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present and who were absen t. There af ter, Sena tor Enrile moved that subpoenae be

issued to those whodid not attend the hearing and that the Senate requestth e Dep ar t men t

of Ju st ic e, th ro ug h th e Bu re au of Immigration and Deportation, to issue an HDOagainstthem and/or include them in the Bureaus Watch List.Se na t o r J ua n F la v ie r

s ec on de d t he m ot i on a nd t he motion was approved.R e s p o n d e n t t h e n

p r o c e e d e d w i t h t h e investigation proper. Towards the end of the hearing,p e t i t i o n e r s , t h r o u g h c o u n s e l , m a d e a n O p e n i n g Statement that brought to the

attention of respondentthe lack of proper authorization from affected clientsfor the bank to make

disclosures of their accounts andt h e l a c k o f c o p i e s o f t h e a c c u s i n gd o c u m e n t s mentioned in Senator Enr il e' s privi lege speech, andr e i t e r a t e d t h a t

t h e r e w e r e p e n d i n g c o u r t c a s e s regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by

SCB-Philippines of unregistered foreign securities.

Issue:

Whetheror not petitioners SCB-Philippines illegally sold unregistered foreignsecur it ies i s a lr eady preempted by the cour ts tha t took cogniz ance of thefor eg oi ng ca ses , th e respondent, by this investigation, would encroach upon the

judicial powers vested solely in these courts.

Held:

Contention is UNTENABLE.P.S. Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subjectand nature of the inquiry to be (and already being) conducted by the respondent

Committee, as found in the last threeWhereas clauses thereof. T h e u n m i s t a k a b l e o b j e c t i v e o f t h e

i n ve s ti g at io n , a s s e t f o rt h i n t h e s a i d r e so l u ti o n, exposes the error inpet it ioner s al lega tion that the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very sameSenator Enrile, was simply to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank

in selling unregistered foreign securities x xx. This fallacy is m ad e mor e g l a r ing whe n

we cons id er tha t , a t the conclusion of h i s pr iv il ege speech, Senator Enr ileu r g e d t h e S e n a t e

t o i mm e d ia t e ly c o n d u c t a n inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent theoccurrence o f a similar f raudulent act ivity in the future

.Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a courtor a quas i- judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct.

122. Arnault v Nazareno

87 PHIL 25 (1990)

Facts:

In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural

Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong forthe sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000 was paid for the first

sum and P 500,000 to the second sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American,

thru his two attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as represented by Jean L. Arnault, for

both estates respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not the original owner of the

estate. He bought the first from San Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the

Philippine trust company. In both instances, Burt was not able to pay the necessary

amount of money to complete his payments. As such, his contract with said owners

were cancelled. On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed,

and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by anabsolute deed of sale inconsideration of the sum of P750,000. The Philippine


29/40

Government then, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of

Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of

Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed,

accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as

stated at the outset .On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No.8,

which created a special committee to investigate the transactions surrounding the

estates. The special committee created by the resolution called and examined various

witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing

question which the committee sought to resolve was the apparent unnecessariness and

irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000for his

alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited

anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were

responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the

Government. Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregatingP1,500,000

were delivered to him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date heopened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National

Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000;and that on the

same occasion he drew on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he

transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National

Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It was the

desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that

gave rise to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money,

the senate then approved a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution

which brought him to jailand is being contested in this petition.

Issue:

1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal

the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000.

2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its

period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.3. WON the privilege

against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.

Held:

1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a

legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness

to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional

right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative

body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by

the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which

the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material orpertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation.The materiality of the question

must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its

indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the

necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the

action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result

of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single

question.

2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the

periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no


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limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power

ma

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