INS v. ChadhaIssue: May the House of Representatives enact a provision that permits one house of Congress to unilaterally override an executive action?Facts: Congress passed 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizing one house of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate an executive determination that allowed Chadha (plaintiff) to remain in the United States. Chadha lawfully came to the United States on a student visa, but remained after the visa expired. At a deportation hearing, a judge ruled that Chadha must file an application to be deported. However, at a second hearing, another judge suspended his deportation because he met the requirements of 244(a)(1) of the INA for lawfully remaining in the United States without a visa. The Attorney General submitted a recommendation for suspension of Chadhas deportation to Congress. Section 244(c)(2) of the INA granted Congress the authority to override the Attorney Generals suspension. The House of Representatives considered the case of Chadha and five other illegal immigrants, and passed a resolution pursuant to 244(c)(2) to override the Attorney Generals suspension of their deportation. Chadha appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his action. Chadha then appealed his case against the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (defendant) to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court of appeals ruled in his favor and held that Congress could not overturn the decision of the Attorney General. The INS petitioned to the United States Supreme Court.Procedural: In one section of theImmigration and Nationality Act, Congress authorized either Chamber of Congress to invalidate and suspend deportation rulings of the US Attorney General and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Congress decided that they had the authority to exercise a legislative veto over Executive Branch decisions. Its important to note here that it allowedeitherside, House or Senate to make a ruling. It didnt require the two to agree. In the past, Congress consideredprivate bills, in which a single member of Congress would cut a deal with a private individual for some specific favor (like granting citizenship), and it was passed with a wink and a nod.Private billswere so susceptible to corruption that the power was taken away from Congress and given to the Executive Branch. Chadha was a foreign exchange student had stayed in the US past his visa deadline and was ordered to leave the country. The House of Representatives suspended the immigration judges deportation ruling. The INS sued for an injunction. The INS argued that theImmigration and Nationality Actviolatedseparation of powers, since it authorized the Legislative Branch to invalidate decisions of the Executive Branch. Chadha had no other country to go to. He was born in Kenya of Indian heritage and neither Kenya nor India would take him back. Congress chose to rule on a few immigrations cases per year, pretty much at random, just in order to maintain the principle that Congress can overrule a Justice Department decision. The US Supreme Court overturned theImmigration and Nationality Act. The US Supreme Court found that the particular section of theImmigration and Nationality Actwas unconstitutional. It violatedArticle I, Section 7, clause 3. The idea of a legislative veto violated the principles of bicameralism and the Presentment Clause. ThePresentment Clausesays that bills must be passed in identical form in both the House and Senate and signed by the President. It also mentions that a 2/3 majority overrides a Presidential veto. Bicameralismis the practice of having two legislative bodies, (House and Senate). The Court felt that the House had taken actions that had the purpose of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons, including the Attorney General and Chadha. That ismaking a law. And under the ConstitutionsPresentment Clause, a single chamber of Congress cant make laws by itself. Of course, following that argument, pretty much every regulation made by an Executive Branch agency could be construed as making a law. It could be argued that all of those regulations are unconstitutional too! Justice White, in a dissent, argued that the Court has allowed Congress to delegate authority to Executive Agencies, which dont follow the rules of bicameralismorpresentation; therefore, lawmaking does not always require them. Why should this case be any different? In a concurrence, it was argued that Congress was exceeding its authority simply on the basis that it violated Chadhasdue process. Its almost like aBill of Attainder, which is clearly unconstitutional. Article I, Section 9, clause 3prohibits Congress from undertaking legislative trials that lack the safeguards and accountability of judicial trials.Rule: Legislation providing Congress with a veto over an action of the executive branch does not meet the constitutional requirements of presentment and bicameralism.Holding: No. Article I of the Constitution requires that all legislation be presented to the President before becoming law. The Framers carefully crafted this requirement into the Constitution. Additionally, the Framers also required bicameralism in the enactment of any lawa law could not be passed without gaining support from a majority of both houses. The Great Compromise established this provision, requiring the approval of both houses to accommodate representation concerns by smaller states. In order for these constitutional requirements of legislation under Article I to apply, 244(c)(2) must be a proper legislative provision. Section 244(c)(2) is a proper legislative provision since it altered the legal rights, duties and relations of persons, including the Attorney General, executive branch officials, and Chadha. This extensive type of action is historically only permitted by a legislative act of Congress. Additionally, there are specific enumerated instances in the Constitution granting the House of Representatives unilateral power to act. A unilateral veto of executive action is not included in these powers. The Constitutions silence in this area means that the House of Representatives cannot unilaterally act to defeat an executive decision. Thus, 244(c)(2) of the INA is unconstitutional. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.CONCURRENCE (POWELL, J.):The House of Representatives acted inappropriately in determining that the six illegal immigrants do not meet the statutory criteria for continued residence in the United States. These types of determinations are typically left to other branches of government. Allowing the House to assume this role would create a state of unchecked power for Congressa system of governmental tyranny the Framers sought to avoid. Congress exceeded its prescribed authority under the Constitution.DISSENT (WHITE, J.):The majoritys decision has far-reaching implications for over two hundred other statutory provisions in which Congress reserves the power of a legislative veto. The judiciary cannot prohibit legislative vetoes because they are necessary tools in the passage of legislation in a modern government. Additionally, the absence of a constitutional provision providing for a legislative veto should not be dispositive, as precedent decisions have frequently interpreted the Constitution as being flexible in addressing modern circumstances. Congress already has legislative veto power over Presidential actions, allowing them to exercise it in this way is not unconstitutional. The Constitution does permit Congress to delegate legislative power to the executive without fulfilling presentment and bicameralism concerns. These elements of the Constitution need not always be met in all legislative actions. A legislative veto is a constitutionally acceptable manner for Congress to override a decision made by the executive branch.DISSENT (REHNQUIST, J.): Congress would not have passed 244(c)(1-3) without 244(a)(1). The INA must be considered as a whole. The majority cannot invalidate one provision without invalidating the INA in its entirety.Case Notes (from class): Non-Delegation Doctrine - legislative branch cannot give too much of its power to the executive. See Schechter Poultry Case (1935) See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan ( Only rarely have dissenters urged that the non-delegation doctrine be given a sharper teeth. Legislation Veto - INS v. Chada Line Item Veto - Clinton v. City of New York Framers were concerned about giving too much power to every branch and the people. It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative action in Art. I section 1,7 represents the Framer's decision that the legislative power of the Federal government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure. Legislation Veto = UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Clinton v. New YorkIssue: Is the Line Item Veto Act constitutional?Facts: The Line Item Veto Act (Act) gave the President the power to cancel in whole three types of provisions signed into law. Specifically, the Act allowed for the cancellation of (1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit. The effect of the cancellation was the prevention of the item from having any legal force or effect. President Clinton (defendant) invoked the Act to cancel a provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 that would have allowed New York to avoid repaying funds received under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. Individuals who would have benefitted under those provisions of the Social Security Act (plaintiffs) challenged the cancellation. The district court found that the Act was unconstitutional. The case came before the United States Supreme Court.Procedural: TheLine Item Veto Actof 1996 allowed the President to cancel, that is to void or legally nullify, certain provisions of appropriations bills, and disallowed the use of funds from canceled provisions for offsetting deficit spending in other areas. TheLine Item Veto Actwas politically controversial. Six members of Congress, sued to prevent use of the line-item veto. The Trial Court found for the Congressmen. The President appealed. The US Supreme Court dismissed the case. The US Supreme Court found that the Congressmen lacked standing and dismissed their suit. Several other groups (including the City of New York) filed suit in a second attempt to have the Act declared unconstitutional. The Trial Court ruled found theLine Item Veto Actunconstitutional. The President appealed. Because theLine Item Veto Actestablished an expedited appeal process for challenges, the case was directly appealed from the District Court to the Supreme Court. The US Supreme Court affirmed. The US Supreme Court found that theLine Item Veto ActviolatedArticle I Section 7of the Constitution. TheLine Item Veto Actallowed the President tounilaterallyamend or repeal parts of duly enacted statutes by using line-item cancellations. That violated the Presentment Clauseof the Constitution, which outlines a specific practice for enacting a Statute. The Court construed the silence of the Constitution on the subject of suchunilateral Presidential action as equivalent to an express prohibition. The Court found that Statutes may only be enacted in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure, and that a bill must be approved or rejected by the President in its entirety. In a concurrence it was argued that basically the President already has the equivalent of a line-item veto, since the President already has the authority to not spend money on a program he doesnt like. Whats the difference? In a dissent, it was argued that the objective of theLine Item Veto Actwas constitutionally proper and was consistent with powers that the President has held in the past. The Act, does not violate any specific textual constitutional command, nor does it violate any implicit Separation of Powers principle. This ruling is a companion to theNondelegation Doctrine. In that doctrine, it was held that Congress does not have the authority to give away its powers to make laws. Here, it appears that Congress is not allowed to allow the Executive Branch to modify laws they make.Rule: There is no provision in the United States Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, amend, or repeal statutes.Holding: No. There is no provision in the United States Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, amend, or repeal statutes. Instead, Article I, 7 of the Constitution requires that legislation originate in Congress and only be presented to the President upon passage in both the House and the Senate. The Constitution further provides that if the President does not approve the bill, he shall return it to the house where it originated. This return, which is also known as a veto, is subject to being overridden by a two-thirds vote in each house of Congress. Here, the Presidents cancellation power under the Act differs significantly from his power to return a bill under the Constitution. For example, the statutory cancellation takes place after the bill becomes law, while the constitutional return of the bill takes place before the bill becomes law. Additionally, the statutory cancellation only applies to part of the bill, while the constitutional return applies to the entire bill. The Act authorizes the President to effect the repeal of laws, for his own policy reasons, without regard for the procedures set forth in Article I, 7 of the Constitution. This unilateral power to change the text of a duly enacted statute is unconstitutional. If Congress seeks to create a new procedure for creating laws, it must amend the Constitution. Accordingly, the Act is unconstitutional and the district court is affirmed.CONCURRENCE (KENNEDY, J.):Separation of powers is central to ensuring that each branch of government is able to vigorously assert its proper authority. The Act increases the power of the President beyond what the Framers envisioned, thereby compromising the political liberty of American citizens.DISSENT (BREYER, J.): The Act does not violate any specific textual constitutional command. It also does not violate any implicit separations of powers principle. The Constitution authorizes Congress and the President to experiment with novel methods to improve government, such as the one contained in the Act.CONCURRENCE/DISSENT (SCALIA, J.):This case presents an issue under the separation of powers doctrine, not the Presentment Clause. The question at the core of the case is whether the Act transferred to the President a degree of political, lawmaking power that is traditionally retained by the Legislative Branch. There is no difference between Congress authorizing the President to cancel a spending item and Congress authorizing money to be spent on a particular item at the Presidents discretion. Congress has been engaging in the latter behavior since the founding of this country.Class Notes: Can the President veto part of a bill?