Marcos vs Managlapuz

FACTS:February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government.

Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, they contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect. The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed. Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

HELD:

SC well-considered opinion that the President has a residual power which justifies her act of banning the return of the Marcoses and she did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines.

Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]

The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.

We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, we cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.

SOLIVEN VS. JUDGE MAKASIAR

FACTS:

This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila

ISSUES:

Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a complaint-affidavit

DECISION:

Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the President’s filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court’s jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf.

The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person (And there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege).

Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions.

The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc is LIFTED.

REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA

Facts:

-There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board examination were circulated during the examination period among examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center. The examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in two of the examinations’ five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing members. Exam results came out but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees.

-President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines. CHED Chairman Puno approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006 (Implementing Rules and Regulations).

Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers. CHED Chairman Puno however believed that suspending the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566.

In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to the petitioner that: to exclude the operation of independent review centers from the coverage of CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said Executive Order No. 566; As to the request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with an HEI, tie-up/be integrated simply means, to be in partner with an HEI.

Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court praying for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional exercise of legislative power, and the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR. Motion to intervene filed by other organizations/institutions were granted by the Court.

On 21 May 2008, CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of 2008 (CMO 21, s. 2008) extending the deadline for six months from 27 May 2008 for all existing independent review centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs in accordance with the RIRR. On 25 November 2008 Resolution, SC resolved to require the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of EO 566, the RIRR, and CMO 21, s. 2008.

Issues:

1. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive’s rule-making power. [Yes, it is invalid.]

Held/Ratio:

1. The exercise of the President’s residual powers under Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO (invoked by the OSG to justify GMA’s action) requires legislation; as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the President’s other powers and functions has to be "provided for under the law." There is no law granting the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.

The President has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. Meaning, he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, he is granted administrative power. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHED’s quasi-legislative power. Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. But The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities.

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA) is assailed on its constitutionality. This document prepared by the joint efforts of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland.

Issue: When the Executive Department pronounced to abandon the MOA, is the issue of its constitutionality merely moot and academic and therefore no longer justiciable by the Court?

Held: Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into effect. The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court.

An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great public interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not of public opinion. The power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by other branches of government, the Court must be careful that it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of constitutional law.

LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that: 1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies. 2] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

ISSUES:

1. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

2. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

RULING:

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.

2. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Doromal v Sandiganbayan 177 SCRA 354

FACTS:

Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC).

An information was then filed by the “Tanodbayan” against Doromal for the said violation and a preliminary investigation was conducted.

The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the “Tanodbayan” to file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman.

The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the information filed by the “Tanodbayan”.

A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the President, and which company participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the constitution.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.

HELD:

Yes, as to the first and second issues. No, as to the third issue. Petition was granted by the Supreme Court.

RATIO:

(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."

Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any business.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending the result of such investigation.

Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary

FACTS:

Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.

Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices orpositions in addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:

Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.

Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.

Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

Issue:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.

Held:

No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more than two positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.

Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the President,

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the designation of respondent Undersecretary Maria Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA).

On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.

On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment. On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the MARINA and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.

Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution .

On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not present in this case. In fact, there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be resolved in view of the appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and the relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, which rendered the present petition moot and academic.

Issue:

Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.

Held:

Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the MARINA, we are hardly persuaded by respondents’ submission that respondent Bautista’s designation as OIC of MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry Board, which includes the DOTC Secretary as Chairman, the MARINA Administrator as Vice-Chairman, and the following as members: Executive Secretary (Office of the President), Philippine Ports Authority General Manager, Department of National Defense Secretary, Development Bank of the Philippines General Manager, and the Department of Trade and Industry Secretary.

It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words “hold the office” were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To “hold” an office means to “possess or occupy” the same, or “to be in possession and administration,” which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.

The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. Civil Liberties Union traced the history of the times and the conditions under which the Constitution was framed, and construed the Constitution consistent with the object sought to be accomplished by adoption of such provision, and the evils sought to be avoided or remedied. This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials, who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission would draft into the proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration, which were envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and employment.

Aytona vs Castillo Case Digest

FACTS:

On December 29, 1961, Carlos P. Garcia, who was still President that time, made last minute appointments while the Commission on Appointments was not in session. Said last minute appointment included Dominador R. Aytona, who was appointed as ad interim Governor of Central Bank. The latter took oath on the same day.

At noon on December 30, 1961, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office. He issued Administrative Order No. 2 on December 31, 1961 recalling, withdrawing and canceling all ad interim appointments made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961, which was the date when Macapagal was proclaimed President by the Congress. He then appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank and the latter qualified immediately.

On January 2, 1962, both exercised the powers of their office. However, Aytona was prevented from holding office the following day and thus instituted a quo warranto proceeding, challenging Castillo’s right to exercise the powers of the Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona claims that he was validly appointed and had qualified for the post, therefore making Castillo’s appointment void. Castillo then contended that Aytona’s appointment had already been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 issued by President Macapagal.

ISSUE:

Whether President Diosdado Macapagal had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by President Carlos P. Garcia even after the appointees had already qualified.

HELD:

Upon the ground of separation of powers, the court resolved that it must decline and refuse jurisdiction in disregarding the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, canceling such “midnight” or “last-minute” appointments.

Case dismissed.

IN Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998

of

Hon. M.A. Valenzuela and Hon P.B. Villarta as RTC Judges

FACTS:

Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution, thePresident is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII.

HELD:

During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years. The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban.

Arturo de Castro v JBC and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, March 17, 2010

FACTS:

The case trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.

On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately.

In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution, stating therein that they unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice Honorable Reynato S. Puno.

De Castro submits that the conflicting opinions on the issue expressed by legal luminaries one side holds that the incumbent President is prohibited from making appointments within two months immediately before the coming presidential elections and until the end of her term of office as President on June 30, 2010, while the other insists that the prohibition applies only to appointments to executive positions that may influence the election and, anyway, paramount national interest justifies the appointment of a Chief Justice during the election ban has impelled the JBC to defer the decision to whom to send its list of at least three nominees, whether to the incumbent President or to her successor.

ISSUE:

Does the incumbent President have the power and authority to appoint during the election ban the successor of Chief Justice Puno when he vacates the position of Chief Justice on his retirement on May 17, 2010?

HELD:

YES. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:

Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

The petitioners, submit that the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.

The Court agrees with the submission.

Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII. The Court has no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.

In addition, The framers, in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers neither discussed, nor mentioned, nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments under Section 15, Article VII, or its effects on the 90-day period, or vice versa. They did not need to, because they never intended Section 15, Article VII to apply to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or in any of the lower courts.

Binamira vs. Garrucho (G.R. Nos. 91223-26)

FACTS:

Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to have been removed without just cause in violation of his security of tenure. The petitioner bases his claim on the following communication addressed to him by the Minister of Tourism on April 7, 1986 . Persuant thereto, petitioner assumed office on the same date.

Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors and had been acknowledged as such by various government offices, including the Office of the President. He complains that his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism.

On January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho a memorandum stating that petitioner's designation is invalid since it was designated not by the President but only by the Secretary of Tourism. Garrucho is then designated as General Manager until the President can appoint a person to serve in the said office in a permanent capacity. Garrucho took over as the General Manager of the PTA and thereafter Pres. Aquino appointed Jose A. Capistrano as General Manager of PTA.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioner had been removed without just cause in violation of security of tenure

HELD:

No, the designation is considered only on an acting or temporary appointment which does not confer security of tenure.

Section 23-A of the P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority provides that “The General Manager shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term of six years unless sooner removed for cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as such until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified.”

It is not disputed that the petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines but only designated by the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction between appointment and designation that the petitioner has failed to consider. Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official as in this case where the Secretary of Tourism designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the PTA.

Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure of the person named.

The decree also provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the PTA shall be made by the president, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President.

In Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, the doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the President of the Philippines when “performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,” which was true of the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds that such acts shall be considered valid only if not “disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,” as also happened in the case at bar. With this ruling, it can be said that petitioner's designation is an unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did not acquire valid title to the position in question.

SARMIENTO VS MISON AND CARAGUE

FACTS:Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA (Commission on Appointments).

ISSUE:Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison, without submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the consent and confirmation of the CoA.2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Mary Conception Bautista vs Jovito Salonga G.R. No. 86439

FACTS:

On August 27, 1987, President Cory Aquino appointed petitioner Bautista as permanent Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). Bautista took her oath of office on December 22, 1988 to Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan and immediately acted as such.

On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments (CoA) wrote a letter to Bautista requesting for her presence along with several documents at the office of CoA on January 19. Bautista refused to be placed under CoA's review hence this petition filed with the Supreme Court.

While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino appointed Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights" but he was not able to sit in his appointive office because of Bautista's refusal to surrender her post. Malilin invoked EO 163-A which provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR should be at the pleasure of the President thus stating that Bautista shall be subsequently removed as well.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the President's appointment is considered constitutional.

2) Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.

3) Whether or not President should extend her appointment on January 14, 1989.

HELD:

The Court held that it is within the authority of the President, vested upon her by the Constitution, that she appoint Executive officials. The second sentence of the provision Section 16, Article VII provides that the President is authorized by law to appoint, without confirmation of CoA, several government officials. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides the appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. It therefore follows that the appointment of the Chairman of CHR by the President is to be made and finalized even without the review or participation of CoA. Bautista's appointment as the Chairman of CHR, therefore, was already a completed act on the day she took her oath as the appointment was finalized upon her acceptance, expressly stated in her oath.

Furthermore, the Court held that the provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutional and thus cannot be invoked by Mallillin. The Chairman of CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the President for it is constitutionally guaranteed that they must have a term of office.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is thus GRANTED and the restraining order for Mallillin was made permanent.

TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES VS COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

FACTS:

Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a sectoral representative for women in 1988. Their appointment was done while Congress was in session. They were subsequently scheduled to take their oath of office but the Commission on Appointments (COA) filed an opposition against Deles et al alleging that their appointment must have the concurrence of the COA.

Deles then questioned the objection of the COA. She said that her appointment does not need the concurrence of the COA. This is in pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, which does not require her appointment to be confirmed by the COA to qualify her to take her seat in the lower house.

ISSUE:

Whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives should be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

HELD:

Yes. There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

Only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII (or the first group abovementioned) are to be reviewed by the COA, namely, ‘the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.’ All other appointments by the President are to be made without the participation of the Commission on Appointments.

Sectoral representatives belong to the phrase “and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution“. The provision of the Constitution which provides power to the president in this regard is Section 7, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution:

Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution.

Peter John Calderon vs Bartolome Carale

FACTS:

In 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA).

Pursuant to the said law, President Corazon Aquino appointed Bartolome Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC. The appointments were however not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Peter John Calderon questioned the appointment saying that without the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon insisted that RA 6715 should be followed as he asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec. 16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President in addition to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Congress may, by law, expand the list of public officers required to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointment as listed in the Constitution.

HELD:

No. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General: confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional Commissions (first group). With respect to the other officers (second to fourth group) whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required.

“Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose appointments must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the Constitution would have said so by adding the phrase “and other officers required by law” at the end of the first sentence, or the phrase, “with the consent of the Commission on Appointments” at the end of the second sentence. Evidently, our Constitution has significantly omitted to provide for such additions.

This jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution

1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).

2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.

Jesus Armando Tarrosa vs Gabriel Singson

Facts:

Gabriel C. Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos. Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a "taxpayer", filed a petition for prohibition questioning the appointment of Singson for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (CA). Tarrosa invoked Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7653 which provides that the Governor of the BSP if appointed is subject to the confirmation of the CA.

In his comment, Singson claimed that the Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the CA of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. He contended that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, citing Section 16 of Article VI of the Constitution.

Issues:

1 Whether or not Tarrosa has the locus standi to challenge the appointment.

Held:

1. Tarrosa has no legal standing to question the appointment. The petition is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of Governor of the Bangko Sentral. Such a special civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a "person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another."

In Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 637 (1992), the court held that the petitioner therein, who did not aver that he was entitled to the office of the City Engineer of Cabanatuan City, could not bring the action for quo warranto to oust the respondent from said office as a mere usurper.

Likewise in Greene v. Knox, 175 N.Y. 432 (1903), 67 N.E. 910, it was held that the question of title to an office, which must be resolved in a quo warranto proceeding, may not be determined in a suit to restrain the payment of salary to the person holding such office, brought by someone who does not claim to be the one entitled to occupy the said office.

FLORES V DRILON

FACTS

Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”

ISSUES

(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted circumstance.

(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to another post.

(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President.

(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which he may have received pursuant to his appointment.

HELD

(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constitutents.

(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.

(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.

(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office.

(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits.

Luego vs CSC, 143 SCRA 327

Facts:

Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as “temporary,” subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.

Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor.

The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the respondent’s appointment.

Issue:

WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement.

Held:

No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.

Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power to “…approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service… ….and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.”

The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws.

CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

HERMOGENES P. POBRE vs. MARIANO E. MENDIETA

Facts:

The controversy began on January 2, 1992, when the term of office of Honorable Julio B. Francia as PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A. Mendieta was the senior Associate Commissioner and Hermogenes P. Pobre was the second Associate Commissioner of the PRC.

On February 15, 1992, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed the petitioner, then an Associate Commissioner, as the PRC Commissioner/ Chairman. He took his oath of office on February 17, 1992.

Even before Commissioner Pobre's appointment, the private respondent, Mariano A. Mendieta, as the Senior Associate Commissioner, filed a petition for declaratory relief against Commissioner Pobre, Executive Secretary Drilon, and Acting Secretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro, praying that they be enjoined from appointing, or recommending the appointment of Associate Commissioner Pobre as Chairman of the PRC because under Section 2 of P.D. No. 223, he (Mendieta), as the senior Associate Commissioner, was legally entitled to succeed Francia as Chairman of the PRC. His prayer for a restraining order was set for hearing on February 19, 1992 at 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

On August 19, 1992, she issued a writ of prohibitory injunction directing the Deputy Sheriff of Manila to stop Pobre from discharging the functions and duties of the Chairman/Commissioner of the PRC, and from enjoying the rights and privileges of that office.

In due time, Pobre came to this Court for relief by a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order which the Court issued on September 5, 1992, ordering respondent Judge to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing the decision dated August 5, 1992 and the writ of prohibitory injunction dated August 19, 1992; and respondent Mariano A. Mendieta to cease and desist from exercising the powers and duties of the Office of the PRC Chairman/Commissioner (G.R. No. 106696).

Issue:

Whether or not the issue regarding the proper construction of the Provision in Section 2 of P.D. No. 223 that: ". . . any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the unexpired term only with the most Senior of the Associate Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner at the expiration of his term, resignation or removal," whereby the legality of Pobre's appointment as PRC Chairman may be determined.

Held:

Yes. Section 10, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution which took effect on January 17, 1973 (per Proclamation No. 1102) was the source of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos' authority to issue P.D. No. 223 on June 22, 1973, because under that constitutional provision, the President was empowered to "appoint the heads of bureaus and offices." The chairman of the PRC is the head of an office.

Section 10, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution was modified by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers' lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

This provision empowers the President to appoint "those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint." The law that authorizes him to appoint the PRC Commissioner and Associate Commissioners, is P.D. 223, Section 2, which provides that the Commissioner and Associate Commissioners of the PRC are "all to be appointed by the President for a term of nine (9) years, without reappointment, to start from the time they assume office . . . .

Since the appointment of the petitioner as PRC Chairman/Commissioner to succeed Julio B. Francia, Jr. at the expiration of his term did not violate any provision of P.D. No. 223 and in fact conforms with the Chief Executive's interpretation and implementation of the law, the legality of said appointment should be upheld.

ARTURO DE CASTRO VS JBC AND PRES. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO

FACTS:

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas. Resulting to the filing of petitions involving several issues and one of which is in relation to the incumbent President’s authority to appoint Chief Justice’s successor, considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

ISSUES:

1. Can the incumbent President appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement or is the incumbent President prohibited from making appointments within two months immediately before the coming presidential elections and during the election ban?

2. Does Section 15, Article VII only apply to appointments to the Executive department?

HELD:

1. Yes. Because the act of the President in appointing the successor of Chief Justice Puno is not in violation of Section 15, Article VII as it relates only to executive positions which is of course in the Executive department. The act of appointing a successor to the Chief Justice will be in consonance with Section 4(1) and Section 9 of, Article VIII making the act valid and constitutional.

2. Yes. While, Section 15. Article VII, provides that: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

It seems to be in conflict with Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandating the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. While Section 9, Article VIII stipulates that the Members of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

The provisions of Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. Which in any event meaning it does not matter if the vacancy occurs during the election ban. The provisions clearly refers to the authority and the mandate of the President in appointing a Chief Justice in case of vacancy. Thus, making it clear as regards the vagueness of Section 15 of Article VII extends to the banning of appointment in the Judiciary.

There being no obstacle to the appointment of the next Chief Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the incumbent President to make within the 90-day period from May 17, 2010, there is no justification to insist that the successor of Chief Justice Puno be appointed by the next President.

In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the conclusion is ineluctable that only the President can appoint the Chief Justice.