1. Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)FACTS:The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in

Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights. 

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

2. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay  GR No. 171947-48 December 18, 2008  

FACTS:The  complaint by the residents  alleged  that  the  water  quality  of  the  Manila  Bay had  fallen  way below  the  allowable  standards   set  by  law,  specifically Presidential   Decree  No.  (PD)  1152  or the  Philippine  Environment  Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.  

ISSUES:(1) WON Sections 17 and  20 of  PD 1152  under the headings, Upgrading  of  Water Quality  and  Clean-up  Operations, envisage  a  cleanup  in general   or  are  they limited only  to  the  cleanup  of  specific  pollution  incidents; (2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay. APPLICABLE LAWS:PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section   17.  Upgrading  of   Water  Quality.–– Where  the  quality   of   water  has  deteriorated  t o  a degree  where it s  state will   adversely  affect   its  best  u sage,  the government   agencies concerned  shall take such   measures  as  may   be  necessary   to  upgrade  the  quality   of   such   water to  meet   the prescribed water quality  standards. Section  20. Clean-up Operations.––It   shall  be  the responsibility   of  the  polluter to  contain , remove and  clean - up water  pollution   incidents  at   his  own   expense.  In case  of   his  failure  to  do  so, the government  agencies  concerned shall   undertake  containment, removal and clean-up  operations and expenses incurred in  said operation shall  be  charged against  the persons and/ or entities responsible for  such  pollution.      

HELD:(1) Sec.  17  does   not  in  any  way  state  that the  government  agencies concerned ought  to  confine  themselves   to  the  containment, removal,  and cleaning operations   when a  specific  pollution incident  occurs.  On the  contrary, Sec.  17 requires   them  to  act  even  in  the  absence  of  a  specific  pollution  incident,  as   long  as water quality “has  deteriorated to a degree where its  state will  adversely affect its  best usage.”  Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact  that the pollution of  the Manila Bay  is   of such magnitude  and  scope  that  it  is   well -nigh impossible  to  draw  the line between  a  specific  and  a  general   pollution  incident. (2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the implementation of  the MMDA's   mandated  tasks   may  entail a decision-making  process, the enforcement  of  the law or the very  act  of  doing  what  the law exacts   to  be  done  is   ministerial   in  nature and  may be  compelled  by mandamus.  Under  what  other  judicial   discipline  describes   as   “continuing mandamus ,” the Court  may,  under  extraordinary circumstances,  issue  directives with  the end in view  of ensuring that its  decision  would not be set to naught  by administrative inaction or indifference. NOTE:  This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the rules of procedure for environmental cases. 

20 days – Temporary restraining order  

3. Pamatong vs. Comelec

Prefatory Statement:Last December 1 was the deadline for the filing of Certificate of Candidacies (COCs) for the 2010 Elections. In the end, a total of 99 filed their COCs for President. Among the lesser known presidentiables include someone called "Manok" (because apparently he can mimic a cock's crow), a six-star general, and a future "emperor of the world." Considering that we would be having automated elections next year and the list of all candidates are to be written in the ballots while voters are supposed to shade the circles corresponding to their choices, would all 99 candidates be included? No. Aside from disqualification petitions filed against the aspirants, the Comelec can also motu propio deny due course to the COCs. Aside from the qualifications set forth under the Constitution, a candidate should also have the capacity and resources to launch a national campaign.

Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service xxx." Would the Comelec's act of disqualifying the so-called "nuisance" candidates violate this constitutional provision?

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on ElectionsG.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix

candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.

4. Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed thereto by local optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following conditions: (1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store; (2) It  cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of optical clinics; (3) It cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by an independent optometrist or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames; (5) It is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist.On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI lodged a complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. On July 19, 1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said date and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.

Issue:  Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid exercise of police power, in the grant of business permits

Ruling: Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the law.In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to petitioner was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the Court of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such special conditions in its permit as the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public respondents and private respondent SOPI are one in saying that the imposition of said special conditions is well within the authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police power.The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.

What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business permit could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to produce a valid certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.

5. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitionervs Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.

Facts: MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners of Bel-Air Villagee in Makati City. Bel-Air is the registered owner of the Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.

December 30, 1995 Bel-Air received a notice from MMDA requesting Bel-Air to open Neptune St. to public vehicular traffic. On the same day, MMDA apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

January 2, 1996, MMDA instituted a case for injunction against Bel-Air; and prayed for a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining Neptune St. and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. Court issued a TRO the next day.

After due hearing, RTC denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction. MMDA question the denial and appealed to the CA. CA conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune St. then issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the MMDA proposed action. 

On January 27, 1997, appellate court rendered a decision finding MMDA no authority to order the opening of Neptune St. It held that the authority is in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.

The motion for reconsideration is denied hence this recourse.

Issues: (1) MMDA has the authority to mandate the opening of Neptune St. to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers? (2) Is passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA may order the opening of subdividion roads to public traffic? (3) Is Bel-Air estopped from denying the authority of MMDA? (4)Was Bel-Air denied of due process despite the several meetings held between MMDA and Bel-Air? (5) Has Bel-Air come to court with unclean hands?

MMDA: it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an agent of the Government endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From the premise of police powers, it follow then that it need not for an ordinance to be enacted first. 

**Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature, which the latter can delegate to the President and administrative boards, LGU or other lawmaking bodies.

**LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a legislative body empowered to enact ordinances, approved resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality. 

**Metro Manila is declared as a special development and administrative region in 1995. And the administration of metro-wide basic services is under the MMDA.Which includes, transport and traffice management. It should be noted that MMDA are limited to the acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies and

installation of a system and administration. MMDA was not granted with legislative power.

Ruling:(1) The basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune St.

(2) The MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.

(3) Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMA's jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power.

Petition Denied.