Connor Cold war writeup

8/12/2019 Connor Cold war writeup

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Soviet pursuit of the atomic bomb 1942-1949

Cody deVilliers

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In a time of great conflict where the world is held in a fragile balance with an uncertain

future; any new discovery can have untold effects. The discovery of nuclear fission was a no small

discovery by any means. This monumental discovery was magnified by the present state of the world

during World War II. Initial excitement of this new discovery led to a global scientific community

working together to reshape the world was quickly silenced when the realization that this technology

could result in catastrophic destruction. xcitement was coupled by fears that rival nations were

producing the same fearful weapon and this began the nuclear arms race. !owever" there was an

omnipresent lingering doubt about the feasibility of such a weapons successful development.

#vercoming many obstacles the $oviet %nion would follow the %nited $tates and become the second

country to successfully test the atomic bomb. The successful discovery and testing of which would

bring about numerous technological applications along with incredible destructive power.

$oviet interest in nuclear energy began after nuclear fission was discovered in &erlin in

'ecember ()*+.,$oviet -hysicists were as quick as their counterparts in other countries to see that one

of its potential applications was the creation of a bomb with unprecedented destructive force. /0effler

and -ainter )123fter the discovery of nuclear fissiona new direction of $oviet research was adopted"

primarily in 0eningrad. Igor 4urchatov was the head of the -hysicotechnical Institute in 0eningrad and

would later be the scientific director of the atom pro5ect. /0effler and -ainter )627uclear physics

during the ()*89s was the epitome of international scientific cooperation. :esults were shared between

several countries and spectacular progress was made. 'ue to the tremendous results leading up to ()8

4urchatov wrote to both the -residium of the 3cademy of $ciences and the government urging the

expansion of nuclear research. !e explicitly detailed the possibility of the results of this research

leading to the creation of a bomb" ,the destructive power of which would be incomparably greater than

that of any existing explosive. !owever" 4urchatov received no response and subsequently the


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The $oviet pursuit of the atomic bomb gained momentum in ()=. The $oviets had

received information about &ritish" 3merican" and uchs.

!owever" the important realization that the 3mericans must be working on a bomb was brought before

$talin by lyorov; one of 4urchatov9s former students. In ()8 >lyorov had aided the discovery

of spontaneous fission and a note about this discovery had been published in the 3merican 5ournal

-hysical :eview. In ()= >lyorov visited a ?oronezh %niversity library to look at physics 5ournals to

see what had developed as a result of the discovery. !e was startled to find that there had been no

response and that the ma5or names in the field of study had ceased publishing on the sub5ect. ,!e

concluded" rightly" that research was now secret and that the 3mericans must be working on an atomic

bomb. /0effler and -ainter )+2 Throughout ()= $oviet leadership consulted with scientists about the

development of an atomic bomb and" despite estimates that the pro5ect would cost as much as the entire

war effort" production began in early ()*. /0effler and -ainter ))2

$talin9s decision to begin construction of the bomb was met with critics who felt that it was

a waste of time and resources. It was estimated that it would take between (8@=8 years to complete.

,$talin could hardly have thought that a $oviet bomb could be built in time to affect the outcome of the

war. /0effler and -ainter ))2 :egardless of the impact the bomb would have on the outcome of the

war it would definitely prove to be an invaluable source of diplomatic and military strength in the post

war period. -erhaps most important benefit of the production of the atomic weapon by the $oviets was

to counter the 3merican bomb and therefore prevent a monopoly on such devastating power after the


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this new discovery could lead to a devastating weapon the global scientific community disappeared.

This was a result of government actions to keep the information secret from their enemies and as a

result gain massive political and military advantages. >or various reasons" the desire for the world to

have this information was still inherent within many scientific minds. This was the case with 3merican

scientist Theodore /Ted2 !all.

Ted !all was the youngest scientist working on the Aanhattan -ro5ect at the age of (). !e

witnessed the first test of the 3merican atomic bomb on the (1thof Guly " ()D. In an interview many

years later Ted statedB ,I decided to give atomic secrets to the :ussians because it seemed to me that it

was important that their should be no monopoly that could turn one nation into a menace...the right

thing to do was to break the 3merican monopoly /Cold War international !istory pro5ect =B(82 Ted

!all was never charged due to a lack of evidence" however" other known defectors were sentenced to

death during this time period.

'efectors were considered traitors to their home countries and never fully trusted by the nations

that they defected to. They believed in their cause" they knew the risks involved" and they defected

regardless of the dangers. $ome defected for personal gains but others simply understood that the

power of the weapon that was being developed coupled with the dangers of this power being

monopolized in the wrong hands far outweighed the dangers inherent in defecting or divulging detailed

secrets to the other side.

The $oviets had several agents within the 3merican and &ritish operations who were unaware

of each other. The most historically recognized is 4laus >uchs due to his high level of involvement

with critical scientific data. 'r >uchs was the head of theoretical physics at the 3tomic nergy

:esearch stablishment" !arwell. ,In fact" there had always been doubts about >uchs9 security

clearance" but Ainistry of $upply civil servants had decided to ignore them precisely because 9the


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advantages gained by !arwell through the undoubted ability of 'r >uchs outweigh the slight security

risk.9 /uchs and Ted !all passed along detailed information to the $oviets

about the principle of ,implosion to trigger the device. This principle was so new to the :ussians that

they did not have an equivalent :ussian word for the term. This is another important example of how

$oviet atomic research was streamlined and greatly advanced by using information obtained through

the difficult and dangerous efforts of others. The :ussians were able to use this information to bypass

dangerous stages of research that had claimed the lives of 3merican scientists. >oreign intelligence data

is said to have advanced $oviet atomic capabilities by at least two years.

This casual attitude was also due to an underestimation of the utility the $oviets would be

able to obtain from any information that was leaked. In $eptember ()DB ,Goint Intelligence Committee

Chairman William !ayter asked" 9If it were to be assumed that the :ussians were obtaining a continual

flow of information from well placed sources in 3merica" would Hit in time materially alter the

estimates of :ussian Hatomic productionJ9 The answer" from Aichael -errin" surprising now given the

benefit of hindsight " was 9that it was unlikely that any information that was disclosed to the :ussians

would materially alter the estimates.9 /pg. D) K $pying on the 7uclear &ear2 This underestimation is

definitely surprising in hindsight" however" it was also a surprising decision in the context of what was

known at the time it was made. Intelligence was an incredibly powerful weapon during this period of

the cold war and this casual attitude to such sensitive matters had the direct effect of drastically

shortening the window of time that the 3merican9s held a monopoly on atomic weaponry" however" this


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is arguably a good thing in the grand scope of history. In the end espionage played an important role in

the speed at which the $oviets produced their bomb and this shortening of the time frame on the

3merican monopoly had incalculable effects upon the world.

3fter the end of World War II the world had witnessed the incredible and terrifying power

of the 3tomic bomb as it was unleashed upon !iroshima and 7agasaki. $talin understandably

increased the priority of developing an equivalent bomb. This added pressure that came as a result of

bearing witness to !iroshima forced the pro5ect to gain considerable resources. ,The $oviet leaders

regarded the use of the bomb in Gapan as part of an effort to put pressure on them" as a demonstration

that the %nited $tates was willing to use nuclear weapons. $oviet security now seemed to be at risk

from a new threat. /0effler and -ainter (8(2 3fter


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The pursuit of atomic weapons after the discovery of nuclear fission was an extremely

critical period of time not only for the ma5or powers involved but also for the rest of the world. The

implications of an atomic weapon were terrifying and tremendously profound. It presented a conflicted

humanity with the ability to completely eradicate itself if it was not careful to avoid such a catastrophe.

>ears of such a power falling into the wrong hands acted as a significant motivation to place the atomic

pro5ect on high priority. The $oviets had to overcome the


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