FE D. QUITA,petitioner,vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,*respondents.D E C I S I O NBELLOSILLO,J .:FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941.They were not however blessed with children.Somewhere along the way their relationship soured.Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties.On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce.Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce.Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.On 16 April 1972 Arturo died.He left no will.On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to asBlandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter.Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon.On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo.Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate.At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice.On the same day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution.The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.The trial court invokingTenchavez v. Escao[1]which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreedaftertheeffectivityof the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,"[2]disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo.Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972.Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval.[3]On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her.As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo.On 27 November 1987[4]only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo.Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs.[5]On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth.Thus on 15 February 1988[6]partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half.[7]Private respondent was not declared an heir.Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides thatif there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings.[8]On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.[9]Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings?Petitioner insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to their respective shares in the intestate estate of the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on established facts and admissions of the parties.We cannot sustain petitioner.The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear:If there is acontroversybefore the court asto who are thelawful heirs of the deceased personor as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversyshall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;[10]nor as to their respective hereditary shares.But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo.The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried.She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule.[11]To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained.[12]Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo.This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship.The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence.Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applyingthe ruling inTenchavez v. Escao.Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling inVan Dorn v. Romillo Jr.[13]thataliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing.[14]Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship.[15]The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines."[16]It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction.We deduce that the finding on their citizenshippertainedsolelytothe time oftheirmarriageasthetrial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of theirdivorce.Thedoubtpersistedas to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed.The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect.Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce,Van Dornwould become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship;[17]it did not merit enlightenment however from petitioner.[18]In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent.She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court.When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954.[19]Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year.Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court.Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse.Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved bythe trial court.She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo wassubsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.[20]As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping,[21]the same lacks merit.For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances.There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue.[22]The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo.Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs isAFFIRMED.The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brotherRuperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED.The Court however emphasizes that the reception ofevidence by the trial courtshould be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present petition for forum shopping isDENIED.SO ORDERED.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO,petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO,respondent.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN,J.:A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.The CaseBefore us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision[1]and the March 24, 1999 Order[2]of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF.The assailed Decision disposed as follows:WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties.[3]The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.The FactsRederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4]They lived together as husband and wife in Australia.On May 18, 1989,[5]a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government.[6]Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.[7]In theirapplicationfor a marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino.[8]Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.[9]On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage[10]in the courta quo,on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994.She claimed that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriageandits subsequent dissolution.[11]He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989;[12]thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.[13]Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action.[14]The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.[15]The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.[16]After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.[17]Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.Ruling of the Trial CourtThe trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines.It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is,respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry.Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.Hence, this Petition.[18]IssuesPetitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:1The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondentipso factoterminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.2The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent3The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.4The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.5The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australiaipso factocapacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts.[19]The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.The Courts RulingThe Petition is partly meritorious.First Issue:Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha SamsonPetitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson.CitingAdong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20]petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself.She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (thelex loci celebrationis).In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion.Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.[21]A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15[22]and 17[23]of the Civil Code.[24]In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26[25]of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[26]A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.[27]A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made.Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.decreesthat aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.[28]Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[29]Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.Divorce as a Question of FactPetitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code.These articles read as follows:ART. 11.Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:x x xx x xx x x(5)If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;x x xx x xx x xART. 13.In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required toART. 13.In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage.x x x.ART. 52.The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a written official act of an Australian family court.Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.Respondent is getting ahead of himself.Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.[30]A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.[31]The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.[32]Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested[33]by the officer having legal custody of the document.If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.[34]The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.[35]However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.[36]The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification.[37]Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge.Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.[39]Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.[40]Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries.By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and thevinculum juristhat had tied him to Philippine personal laws.Burden of Proving Australian LawRespondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment.He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time.Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.We are not persuaded.The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.[41]In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.[42]Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.[43]Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.[44]The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.Second Issue:Respondents Legal Capacity to RemarryPetitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994.Hence, she concludes that their marriage was voidab initio.Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.Respondents contention is untenable.In its strict legal sense,divorcemeans the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage.But divorces are of different types.The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce ora vinculo matrimoniiand (2) limited divorce ora mensa et thoro.The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.[45]There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce.It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.[46]Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage.Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again.The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.[47]On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:1.A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.[48]This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted.It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorceipso factorestored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39[49]of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.Significance of the Certificate of Legal CapacityPetitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license.According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.We clarify.To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned.The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court.A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner.A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint;[51](b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;[52](c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;[53](d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;[54]and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55](2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer;[56](b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;[57](c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[58](d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;[59]and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.[60]Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994.We agree with petitioners contention that the courta quoerred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy.After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner.Failing in that, then the courta quomay declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, weREMANDthe case to the courta quofor the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed.No costs.SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,G.R. No.154380

- versus -Present:Davide, Jr.,C.J.,(Chairman),Quisumbing,Ynares-Santiago,Carpio, andAzcuna,JJ.

CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,Respondent.Promulgated:October 5, 2005

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xDECISIONQUISUMBING, J.:Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails theDecision[1]dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and itsResolution[2]dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The courta quohad declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. Thefalloof the impugned Decision reads:WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.[5]Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.[6]For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.[7]At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:RULE 63DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIESSection 1.Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.. . .The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.[8]This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?Brief Historical BackgroundOn July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9]on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:1.The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.2.This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)Legislative IntentRecords of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of theCivil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case ofVan Dorn v. Romillo,Jr.[10]TheVan Dorncase involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case ofQuita v. Court of Appeals.[11]InQuita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way ofobiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.[12]If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:1.There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and2.A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenshipat the time a valid divorce is obtained abroadby the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.[13]Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that hiswife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[14]Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.[15]Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.ACCORDINGLY,the petition by the Republic of the Philippines isGRANTED. The assailedDecisiondated May 15, 2002, and Resolutiondated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are herebySET ASIDE.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,P e t i t i o n e r ,-versus-CRASUS L. IYOY,R e s p o n d e n t.G.R. No. 152577Present:PUNO,Chairman,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CALLEJO, SR.,TINGA, andCHICO-NAZARIO,JJ.Promulgated:September 21, 2005

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xD E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:In this Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,[1]affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,[2]declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint[3]for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4]with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount ofP90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely theP90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,[5]the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his Complaint;[7](2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;[8]and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husbands surname, Micklus.[9]Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10]and, later on, a Motion,[11]to take the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders[12]and Commissions[13]issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,[14]considering Fely to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and voidab initio, on the basis of the following findingsThe ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another country.Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and voidab initio.[15]Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to witDefendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriageArticle 26 of the Family Code provides:Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husbands citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.[16]After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,[17]denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following arguments/groundsI. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do notper seconstitute psychological incapacity.II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.[18]In his Comment[19]to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys psychological incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.IThe totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, readsART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.InSantos v. Court of Appeals,[20]the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated[21]The psychological incapacity must be characterized by(a)Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;(b)Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and(c)Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.[22]More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court inRepublic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[23]which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of thedefensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.[24]A later case,Marcos v. Marcos,[25]further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a conditionsine qua nonfor the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.[26]Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.[27]As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[28]The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling inMarcos v. Marcos,[29]respondent Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down inRepublic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[30]that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.[31]No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.[32]IIArticle 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the PhilippinesWhere a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated.By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United Statesin 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizensince 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely wasstill a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.IIIThe Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 providesART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government.[33]His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.[34]The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals.[35]While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case ofAncheta v. Ancheta[36]In the case ofRepublic v. Court of Appeals[268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of thedefensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]This Court in the case ofMalcampo-Sin v. Sin[355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement inRepublic v. Court of Appeals[Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State[37]Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[38]which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reproduced belowSec. 5.Contents and form of petition.(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.Sec. 18.Memoranda.The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.Sec. 19.Decision.(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.Sec. 20.Appeal.(2)Notice of Appeal.An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.[39]WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.SO ORDERED.

EDGAR SAN LUIS,G.R. No. 133743Petitioner,Present:- versus -Ynares-Santiago,J.(Chairperson),Austria-Martinez,Callejo, Sr., andChico-Nazario,JJ.FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,Respondent.x ---------------------------------------------------- xRODOLFO SAN LUIS,G.R. No. 134029Petitioner,- versus -Promulgated:FELICIDAD SAGALONGOSalias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,Respondent.February 6, 2007x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- xDECISIONYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995[2]and January 31, 1996[3]Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and itsMay 15, 1998Resolution[4]denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of theProvinceofLaguna.During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages.His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit onMarch 17, 1942out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. OnAugust 11, 1963,Virginiapredeceased Felicisimo.Five years later, onMay 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.However, onOctober 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce[5]before the Family Court of the First Circuit,State of Hawaii,United States of America(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody onDecember 14, 1973.[6]OnJune 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian atWilshire Boulevard,Los Angeles,California,U.S.A.[7]He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death onDecember 18, 1992.Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate.OnDecember 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration[8]before theRegionalTrialCourtofMakatiCity, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued atP30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.OnFebruary 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss[9]on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action.Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in theProvinceofLagunabecause this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death.He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.OnFebruary 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal[10]of the petition.OnFebruary 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order[11]denying the two motions to dismiss.Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed onMarch 5, 1994her opposition[12]thereto.She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house inNewAlabangVillage, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State ofHawaiito prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2,[13]Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down inVan Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[14]Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss.[15]They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256[16]of the Family Code.OnApril 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.OnOctober 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order[17]denying the motions for reconsideration.It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid.Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic[18]because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.Mila filed a motion for inhibition[19]against Judge Tensuan onNovember 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration[20]from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.OnNovember 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order[21]granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.OnApril 24, 1995,[22]the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition.OnMay 5, 1995, Edgar manifested[23]that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14,[24]andJune 20,[25]1995, respectively.OnSeptember 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration.It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of theProvinceofLaguna.Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not inMakatiCity.It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, voidab initio.It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in thePhilippinesand did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen.It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.Respondent moved for reconsideration[26]and for the disqualification[27]of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied.[28]Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision datedFebruary 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.[29]The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term place of residence of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile.It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa.Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed inMakatiCity.The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings inVan Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[30]andPilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[31]It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State ofHawaii.As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with