Congressional Fellowship Report: Congressional Tools in Foreign Policy: Rock, Paper, orScissors? War Games of the Legislative BranchAuthor(s): Julie GoodmanSource: PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Jan., 2009), pp. 225-227Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20452411 .

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CONGRESSIONAL FELLOWSHIP REPORT

Congressional Tools in Foreign Policy:

Rock, Paper, or Scissors? War Games

of the Legislative Branch Julie Goodman, 2007-08 Congressional Fellow

T here are the telltale signs: men with squiggly earpieces emerge from SUVs with dark-tinted windows

and government license plates, and head ing stoically through the corridors of the Rayburn House Office Building. This is the unmistakable advance of the executive branch, with its flashiest U.S. Defense and State Department officials, and their con vergence on their legislative counterpart to appear humbly before watchdog-minded committee chairs.

Congress can claim varying degrees of success when duking it out with the execu tive branch on everything from the housing fiasco to the Roger Clemens steroid kerfuffile. But in the world of foreign relations, the administration has the trump card when it comes to setting policy and, depending on the president, it is often played with resound ing emphasis.

High-profile officials appearing before congressional panels include general David Petraeus, ambassador Ryan Crocker, secre tary of state Condoleezza Rice and others, and they partake in discussions on Status of Forces Agreements, wartime funding, refugee policies, or foreign aid reform. Hearings are one of the main tools Congress uses to wield its influence. They are public forums with clearly defined platforms, testy exchanges, and freshly excavated intelligence. But the waters of congressional power in this world become murky when looking at the impact those tools have.

Congress's influence on foreign policy is often difficult to gauge. Some tools are

more effective than others; some are off the public radar. Impactvaries depending on the member and the receptiveness of the audi ence. By nature, Congress is a fractured body, and its myriad competing interests dilute its

Julie Goodman was a Congressional Fellow with the

Subcommittee of the Middle East and South Asia, of

the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee. She isnow a

mutualfundsreporterin New YorkforBoardIQ, a Finan

cial Times service.

strength. But it can fight back. Through a cursory look at its foreign policy tools and their effectiveness, we can see how.

Congress' foreign policyweapons run the gamut, starting on one end with something as small as a staffer getting on the phone with a legislative affairs contact at the U.S. State Department and urging policy change through quiet-or not so quiet-suggestion. On the other end is the weighty arsenalwhere legislators cut off war funding or pass the ultimate "the president shall.. ." wording to restrict the administration's foreign policy. The Senate can horse trade nominations and ratify treaties. However, influence is often subtler than a binding law and the big guns of compulsory language aren't often fired, leaving foreign policy to be shaped largely by the tools in the middle range.

In between there are hearings, markups, member briefings, office visits, member phone calls, investigative reports, staffbrief ings, and interviews with reporters. There are congressional and staff delegations to foreign countries, where participants meet privately with foreign dignitaries to hash out policy. Members can seek the help of outside groups, or issue statements, forming public platforms to criticize administration policy. There are the requisite "Dear Col league" letters, and the pursuit to gamer as

many signatures as possible to demonstrate strong support.

There are nonbinding resolutions with expressions of congressional sentiment.

While the administration doesn't usually take a position on the resolutions, they'll occasionally cause some pushback. In some cases, a president could regard the language as justification for use of force. Aside from the tangible instruments of foreign policy, it is argued that Congress has one very impor tant invisible weapon: "the law of anticipated actions." This is the notion that the executive branch will be deterred from some actions because someone will say authoritatively, "this won't fly on the Hill." The threat of congressional oversight alone becomes a

powerful block. Hearings are great stages for public expo

sure and embarrassment, both ofwhich can be used as deterrents. But these forums also can flesh out policies important to Congress and to foreign countries. With U.S. State Department or Defense Department offi cials, they are a chance to force the admin istration to report publicly on activities. The timing of a hearing can be key-and whether it coincides with the release of a report, the scheduling of an international meeting, or visit from a foreign dignitary. Other strategic decisions also have impact, such as whether a committee invites a secretary or a depu ty secretary to testify, or whether a hearing includes witnesses from other government agencies.

Hearings held by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, or by its full panel, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, have ranged in 2008 from energy policy and sovereign wealth funds to diplomacy in Pakistan and international coordination inAfghanistan. Some hearings have had what is referred to as the "mega phone effect." This occurs when the panel draws interest from the foreign press corps and the discussion resonates more with the country the hearing is addressing than with the American public or other members of Congress. The effect on policy is then indirect as increased attention in a foreign country forces people stateside to take more notice of that issue. Oftentimes hearings are nota ble for their lack of administration witness es. The discussion is less stilted, less tied to talking points or administration policy, and can offer a broader conversation about what policy ought to be and why.

Hearings in 2008 were influential in changing U.S. policy toward Iraqi refugees. Congressional Democrats were instrumental in drawing attention to what they saw as a flawed refugee policy-pointing to the U.S. occupation of Iraq that gave rise to more than four million refugees and internally dis placed people and the Bush administration's

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Association News

limited response. Ultimately, the number of visas issued by the U.S. government was increased and new facilities to review appli cants were added. Congress also increased the expenditure of additional funds for the Office of the United Nations High Commis sioner for Refugees.

Congressional efforts to help Iraqi refu gees received extra stimulus after key players on the Hill watched a 6oMinutes report on the growing refugee problem in the Middle East. Calls to the U.S. State Departmentwere made, and the department participated in congressional staff briefings. Staffers and members began to look at options to address the problem, and scheduled hearings involv ing staff from the House Foreign Affairs, Judiciary and Armed Services committees. Aworking group was formed to help draft a legislative response. Legislationwas crafted, and several bills also were advocated in a number of "Dear Colleague" letters.

According to one Democratic staffer, the major obstacle was the Bush administra tion, which refused to recognize its role in resolving the refugee problem and failed to commit the needed resources. In this case, compelling testimony from witnesses out side the administration played a role in turn ing around policy. Anders Lago, the mayor of Sodertalje, Sweden, testified on April lo, 2008, before the U.S. Commission on Secu rity and Cooperation in Europe, a panel of Senate and House members also known as the Helsinki Commission. He told of the influx of Iraqi refugees his country had seen since the start of the Iraq war-taking in more refugees than the United States and Canada combined. "We did not start the war in Iraq, howeverwe assume a huge responsibility for those people who are affected," he stated. "I am not a president; I am not an ambassador; but I know that we must create a new future for the children fleeing from war" (Com

mission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 2008).

After changes were launched, Richard Albright, senior coordinator for refugee issues for the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, made a statement to the news media, calling the new program "a significant step toward frilfilling our obligation of providing safehaven for those brave Iraqi citizens who risked their lives in order to serve the United States and a free Iraq" (Associated Press 2008). "It is a response to the view that we have special obli gations to Iraqis who have been employed by us."

But the discussions in hearings can often reflect the disjointed and divided nature

of Congress. One congressional staffer described foreign affairs hearings this way: "You have half the table saying, 'Why aren't you doing X?' And you have the other half of the table saying, 'Stop doing X.' And we have 6o members and it's a ping-pong match ... So what does an administration witness walk away from that with?-'Well, Congress is divided. Our policy is intact. You know, I had a rough afternoon."'

On the other hand, when then-secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld was hauled before the Senate Armed Services Committee after the Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse scandal, he was blasted by most of the mem bers on the panel. Congress has fought manywould argue unsuccessfully-President Bush's uncanny ability as commander-in chief to broaden the presidential powers extraordinarily. But, in this case, the criti cism was pointed and grabbed the admin istration's attention, and arguably helped changed the U.S. detention policy.

There are some tools Congress does not have a history of using effectively, namely declaringwar, or authorizing the use of force in advance of conflict or shortly thereafter. It never authorized the war in Kosovo, for example, and has not declared war since

World War II. It is here where Congress's divided and somewhat incoherent ways are

perhaps most pronounced, and its split views on how to conduct foreign policy are, accord ing to some, most paralyzing. In some cases, Congress's lack of unity is blamed-among Democrats and Republicans-on members of the president's party for giving the admin istration the benefit of the doubt when it comes to military operations. In other cases, the blame is placed on the executive branch for lacking respect for its co-equal. But oth ers might say there is a myth of cooperation on foreign policy between the two branches that is not really grounded in history, even with unified governments when congres sional majorities and the White House are under the same party. It is a constitutional gray area that has the executive and legis lative branches at odds with each other. In any case, Congress is left with the option of cutting off funding for a military operation, a recourse it is reluctant to use as evidenced by the recent developments with the war in Iraq. Congress would need to be united to cut off funding and would require a two-thirds super majority to override a likelyveto. But presidents also know they risk impeachment if they anger Congress with risky wartime decisions. For example, the proposed articles of impeachment against President Nixon

mentioned his secret approval ofU.S. bomb ing in Cambodia. Most recently, Congress has been criti

cized for its inability to help strengthen the world's fragile states, with obstacles in legal, structural, and perceptual areas, or the ten sions that result from long-practiced rou tines between the two branches, according to A Steep Hill, Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States, a March 2008 publi cation of the Center for Strategic and Interna tional Studies (C SIS). The failing?According to CSIS, it is the inability of Congress and the executive branch to work together as partners. "The current legislative-executive relationship is fraught with suspicion and distrust," the report says. "Congress needs to play a more active role in driving policy on this important national security priority; and the executive branch must change the way it engages Congress" (Chollet, Irvine, and, Larson 2008).

The report goes on to say that Congress, however, has some mechanics that limit its abilities. "Congressional shortcomings in dealing with stabilization and reconstruc tion operations are representative of the broader, and somewhat deliberately designed, limitations in how the legislative branch of government shapes U.S. foreign policy. The constitutional powers of Congress are often too blunt, reactive, and slow for the complicated trade-offs of diplomacy, trade, and security," (Chollet, Irvine, and Larson 2008) .And, the reports adds, while Congress has been accused of going soft on oversight during the Bush administration, especially in the area of foreign and national security policy, the body is not irrelevant as some of its stabilization and reconstruction efforts have forced the executive branch to act.

In the world of policy through autho rizations, Congress has not been a model student, largely because the role of autho rizing committees has been historically upstaged by their appropriating brethren. It has been years since Congress passed a U.S. State Department authorization bill. It also has not successfully re-authorized the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act since 1985. By some calculations, this is a the result of a sort of triage, as leadership on both sides conclude that the appropriations vote for foreign assistance is the only one the pub lic can tolerate as aid to foreign countries is not always a popular cause. Foreign policy legislation in the past has been a target for

"poison pill" amendments, whose toxins can kill an entire bill. This tactic has been used by Democrats trying to pass an American troop

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withdrawal date in an Iraq spending bill. The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act is a

rather generic authority that does not expire and gives the president pretty much all the authority he needs to spend money in the different foreign aid accounts. So the act itself does not need to be changed everyyear, but the fact that it has not been substantively changed in more than two decades becomes more and more relevant as the United States takes on new stabilization and reconstruc tion projects around the world. This is one reason U.S. Rep. Howard Berman, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has made foreign aid reform the signature initia tive ofhis new leadership role. A reconfigura tion of the bureaucratic powers could make Congress relevant again in the area of foreign aid. The legislation could serve to enhance the role of authorizing committees as policy vehicles for Congress if it gives the body more of a say in where the money goes.

Authorizing legislation has, however, been effective, particularly with the Afghani staii Freedom Support Act of 2002, which gave the administration some direction in Afghanistan. And recent changes to the U.S. President's Emergency Plan forAIDS Relief, an administration initiative on global HIV/

AIDS that the House Foreign Affairs Com mittee was instrumental in expanding, are also viewed as congressional victories.

As for recommendations for the future, A Steep Hill suggests three reforms to fun damentally alter the relationship between the two branches: "Committee organiza tions, budgets, and authorities should be reengineered and streamlined," and com munication between the branches should be improved (Chollet, Irvine, and Larson 2008). The report also says that the govern ment should stop approaching stabilization and reconstruction operations in an ad hoc manner.

Recent years have shown that a tension that exists between the legislative and the executive branches, and an inevitable game of boundary pushing, is always at play-a game that the courts have traditional avoided. Some say that an atmosphere of fear in the wake of the September 1i attacks empow ered the administration, and contributed to Congress's hesitancy. The future balance of power between the branches and its impact on foreign policywill depend on how much Congress can preserve its institutional integ rity. Of course, its success also will depend on the dynamics of a new unified government,

and whether access to senior administration officials in the U.S. State Department and Defense Department improves. But even then, a Democratic Congress, reacting to years of profound partisanship, could become recalcitrant under an Obama administration and reject any semblance of a lapdog role. The dynamics, forever in flux, are ones that promise to keep us intensely engaged. .

NOTE

Iconducted interviews with congressional staffersfor backgroundinformation. Topreserveconfidentiality, sources ofnon-publicinformation will not be revealed. I also interviewed Dr. CharlesA. Stevenson,professorial lecturer in Americanforeign policy at the Paul H. Nitze School ofAdvanced nternational Studies ofJohns Hop kins University. The observations in this essay are solely mine and do notrepresent the views ofthe Subcommittee, its staff, orthe U.S. House ofRepresentatives.

REFERENCES

Associated Press. 2008. "Visa Program Expanded for Iraqis Who Worked for U.S." July 24.

Chollet, Derek, Mark Irvine, Bradley Larson. 2008. "A Steep Hill, Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strength en Fragile States." Center for Strategic and Inter national Studies, March.

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 2008. "OSCE Partner States and Neighbors Over whelmed by Iraqi Refugees: Band-aid Solutions to Implosion in the Middle East?" The United States Helsinki Commission, April lo.

CONGRESSIONAL FELLOWSHIP REPORT

Changes in Latitudes, Changes in Attitudes:

Two Professors Back in the Classroom in

Washington, D.C. Pamela Camerra-Rowe, 2008-09 Congressional Fellow Anne Daugherty Miles, 2008-09 CongressionalFellow

'An incredible opportunity to hear speakers, read articles, and engage in a diverse range of discussions prior to actually working on the Hill. Great background andfun mid-career opportunity to 'think' aboutgovernment."

-Marja Verloop, Foreign Service Officer and 2008-09 APSA Congressional Fellow

Last fall, we had the opportunity to return to the classroom as students. We were invit

Painela Camerra-Rowe is an associateprofessor of

political science atKenyon College.

Anne Daugherty Miles is a USAFretired adjunctprofes

sor, National Defense Intelligence College and StMary's

College ofMaryland.

ed by the American Political Science Asso ciation to take a course titled Congress and the Making of Foreign Policy at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Interna tional Studies (SAIS) in Washington, D.C. The course, which was taught by professor Charles Stevenson, met twice weekly dur ing September and October, prior to the start of APSA's Congressional Fellowship Program in November. The course was designed to give APSA Congressional Fel lows and SAIS students an overview of the role that Congress plays in the foreign poli cymaking process. Since both of us teach a course on Congress, much of the course

was an excellent refresher for us. But it also differed in important ways from the cours es we teach at our respective schools. It is these differences that deepened our under standing of Congress and the foreign poli cymaking process and provided an impor tant introduction to our work as APSA fellows on Capitol Hill.

The course covered a wide range of tra ditional topics including Congress's con stitutional underpinnings and institution al evolution, campaigns and elections, the committee system, the perennial struggle to balance competing interests, the budget process, executive-legislative relations, and

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