1. Gothenburg congestion charges Maria Brjesson Docent Transport systems analysis Deputy Director Centre for Transport Studies, Royal Institute of Technology

2. OSLO MALM STOCKHOLM Swedens second largest city 500 000 inhabitants Freight hub Land use low density River with only 3 4 crossings Railway station dead-end 3. Outline Gothenburg congestion charges Stockholm paved the way Effects on flows Effects on travel times Effects on public transportation Single issue political party and GT newspaper referendum initiative Media attention and discussion Public Acceptance 4. Congestion charging in Stockholm paved the way Jan-July 2006 Trial Sep 2006 Referendum August 2007 Permanent introduction Cordon based Time differentiated 1-2 per passage Delimited by water 18 entry points sufficient Bypass exempted from charging 5. A brief history of the Stockholm charges Discussed since early 1990s, but no public or political support Idea floated before election 2002 causing the Social democratic leader to promise no charges Green party forces through charges anyway after the election Liberal/conservatives rejoice, charging supporters mistrust Charges introduced January 2006, abolished August 2006, referendum September Small majority in favour of charges! Charges reintroduced permanently August 2007 Large majority in favour now (60-70%) 6. Factors for political support Main reasons for previous political opposition: Who decides about scheme design? Who decides about revenue use? What happens with national infrastructure grants? In Stockholm solved through package approach Gothernburg also wanted congestion charges 7. Non-financed wishinglist of investment: Vstlnken - Rail tunnel under the city 2 billion Marieholmstunneln - Road tunnel under the river 0.5 billion A broad coalition was formed from left to right supporting congestion pricing 8. Objectives and constraints 80 million net revenue in 2015. Congestion reduction (required by the law) Fit under the existing legislation Logical and easy to understand for users. ANPR (Automatic Number Plate Recognition) technology from Stockholm Tax to be paid 06.00 am 18.30 pm. Same fare for all non-exempted vehicles 9. ANPR Very effective No driver action necessary Invoice each month can pay either manually or automatically 10. Gothenburg: Designing charges is difficult 11. Working days (6:00 -18:29) Max 60 Kr per day One payment (the highest) when passing multiple times within 60 min) Gothenburg congestion charges 12. Traffic flows 13. Traffic flows across the cordon 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 350,000 400,000 450,000 500,000 550,000 600,000 650,000 700,000 750,000 800,000 850,000 v 2 v 3 v 4 v 5 v 6 v 7 v 8 v 9 v 10 v 11 v 12 v 13 v 14 v 15 v 16 v 17 v 18 v 19 v 20 v 21 v 22 v 23 v 24 v 25 v 26 v 27 v 28 v 29 v 30 v 31 v 32 v 33 v 34 v 35 v 36 v 37 v 38 v 39 v 40 v 41 v 42 v 43 v 44 v 45 v 46 v 47 v 48 v 49 v 50 v 51 v 52 Volume accross the cordon weekdays charged hours Charged hours 2012 Charged hours 2013 0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000 100,000 110,000 120,000 130,000 140,000 150,000 v 2 v 3 v 4 v 5 v 6 v 7 v 8 v 9 v 10 v 11 v 12 v 13 v 14 v 15 v 16 v 17 v 18 v 19 v 20 v 21 v 22 v 23 v 24 v 25 v 26 v 27 v 28 v 29 v 30 v 31 v 32 v 33 v 34 v 35 v 36 v 37 v 38 v 39 v 40 v 41 v 42 v 43 v 44 v 45 v 46 v 47 v 48 v 49 v 50 v 51 v 52 Volume accross the cordon weekdays morning peak 06.30-08.30 Morning peak 2012 Morning peak 2013 14. The model over predicted the effect 14 Cordon AM Peak Day Traffic flow over cordon -20,4% -14,2% 15. Departure time choice 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 0 45 130 215 300 345 430 515 600 645 730 815 900 945 1030 1115 1200 1245 1330 1415 1500 1545 1630 1715 1800 1845 1930 2015 2100 2145 2230 2315 Time of Day Volume accross the cordon weekdays 2012 2013 16. Large route choice effects -35% -30% -25% -20% -15% -10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839 reduction at different checkpoints 17. Large route choice effects Difficut to model: The predicted effect is very sensitive to the value of time in the route choice 18. Route choice October 20, 2011 18 Difficut to model: The effect become very sensitive to the value of time in the route choice 19. 78 million Slightly less than forecast Revenues 20. Travel times 21. Travel times 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 E6 Syd [Torrekulle - Tingstadstunneln] 2012 - Median 2013 - Median 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 E6 Norr [Kunglv-Tingstadstunneln] 2012 - Median 2013 - Median On the most congested link there is some effect . But on all other links the effect is almost negligible... 22. What happened to disappearing traffic? Trips Work - to transit Work - remaining Professional traffic - remaining Discretionary - to Ess.Discretionary - "disappeared" Professional traffic - "disappeared" Discretionary - remaining Public transport increase 5- 7% across the cordon 23. Occupancy on express busses 24. Acceptability 25. Media attention and discussions 26. Trying to avoid paying 27. Achieving public support Initial support very low the most expensive and painful way to commit political suicide ever devised Changed once effects were apparent: 53% in the referendum Increased further over time: now 65-70% support Charges heading for the ditch Bypass threatened by chaos Charging chaos continues Stockholm loves the charges Charges a success Thumbs up for the charges 28. Vgvalet, Referendum autumn 2014 Over 50 000 people have signed their support to a referendum on congestion charging. The highest number ever in Sweden newspapers say. The arguments used: The issue was never taken up by politicians in a realistic, normal way The revenues go largely to a tunnel with a negative social benefit Other taxations are a cheaper to raise revenue Scheme design is unfair to Hisingen 29. Customer service centre Most asked questions Why are the checkpoints placed there where they are placed Is the congestion tax, tax deductible Why isnt there a free alternative like in Stockholm 30. Acceptability Gothenburg 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 Definately Yes" Possibly Yes I cannot say Possibly No" Definately No 2013 2014 Support Nov 2012 33% Nov 2013 50% Stronger support in the city of Gothenburg than in the surrounding municipalities 31. Identical survey in Stockholm, Lyon, Helsinki in spring 2011 Questions about travel behaviour, socioeconomics, and attitudes to transport pricing, fairness, and congestion pricing in particular In Gothenburg autumn 2012 and 2013 How is attitudes to congestion pricing formed? What is the role of experience? 32. Self-interest winners/losers [political economists] Long-term attitudes to [psychologists, sociologists] pricing as an allocation mechanism taxes and public interventions in general environmental problems Equity issues Socioeconomics Experience Factors that may affect acceptability 33. Indicators of attitudes 34. Indicators of attitudes 35. ENV RIGHT PRICING RED Considerably more resources should be used to protect the nature. + Automated speed cameras is a good way to save lives + Traffic congestion is one of the worst problems in Gothenburg + Car traffic is one of the worst threats to the nature. + - It is too Expensive to own, drive and park cars. + Taxes are too high. + Airplane tickets should cost more. + Charter operator raises its prices when weather is bad. + Space on a ferry is allocated by pricing. + + Space on a ferry is allocated by assessed need. + The state should prioritize reducing differences between rich and poor. + + Low-income drivers get a discount on congestion charges + Factor Analysis 36. Number of estimated parameters: 41 39 39 Number of observations: 3008 1582 1426 Final log-likelihood: -3892.31 -1955.10 -1913.43 Likelihood ratio test: 1897.77 1182.05 763.26 Rho-square: 0.20 0.23 0.17 Name Value Robust t-test Value Robust t-test Value Robust t-test B_Bike_freq 0.11 2.64 0.08 1.4 0.14 2.3 B_Car_freq -0.13 -2.46 -0.14 -1.95 -0.11 -1.41 B_PT_freq 0.16 3.69 0.13 2.17 0.18 2.9 B_Cars1 -0.31 -2.71 -0.33 -1.99 -0.35 -2.19 B_Cars2 -0.51 -1.9 -1.31 -2.64 0.14 0.45 B_Effect PT Congestion -0.05 -1.44 -0.04 -0.92 -0.07 -1.29 B_Effect Quallity PT 0.31 7.98 0.33 6.79 0.27 4.19 B_Effect Volume 0.07 1.69 0.08 1.47 0.06 0.9 B_Effect Shopping -0.13 -4.29 -0.10 -2.57 -0.18 -3.31 B_Effect Travel Time 0.21 5.11 0.16 3.1 0.31 4.48 B_Female -0.18 -1.92 -0.20 -2.07 0.25 2.36 B_CompanyCar 0.36 2.1 0.18 0.71 0.50 1.95 B_Income 0.12 3.61 0.09 1.95 0.17 3.42 B_PT satisfaction 0.11 5.2 0.11 3.8 0.11 3.6 B_Toll_freq1 0.01 0.12 0.00 0 0.02 0.16 B_Toll_freq2 -0.20 -1.69 -0.19 -1.13 -0.20 -1.19 B_Toll_freq3 -0.28 -2.36 -0.31 -1.95 -0.24 -1.32 B_WTP1 0.24 3.17 0.37 3.47 0.11 1.07 B_WTP2 0.20 4.56 0.14 2.3 0.26 4.21 B_WTP3 -0.47 -0.91 0.52 0.6 -1.21 -2.02 Const 0.91 1.9 0.82 1.27 0.92 1.33 ENV 0.02 5.53 0.02 4.66 0.0119 2.94 EQUI 0.00 0.08 -0.01 -0.85 0.00711 0.89 RIGHT -0.18 -18.61 -0.18 -13.28 -0.172 -13 SCARCE 0.02 2.37 0.02 1.68 0.0154 1.69 Female13 0.47 3.26 Year13 -0.06 -0.26 tau1 tau2 1.36 27.91 1.44 21.06 1.30 18.03 tau3 2.26 37.42 2.34 27.04 2.20 24.94 tau4 3.97 47.03 4.21 33.06 3.84 32.17 37. Create many winners, few losers Smart scheme design => large congestion relief Do not focus on taxing and revenues Pricing viewed as a natural mechanism Play the environment card Many burn for the environment few burn for efficient use of road space The equity argument does not seem to be important Acceptability not on the normal right-left political spectrum Achieving acceptability 38. Congestion Pricing without congestion to finance new infrastructure. Increase PT use (!) Volume reduction Small travel time reductions Non-work trips vanish (do not diver to other modes). Stable effect after 8 month But less accurate predictions than ins Stockholm More route choice effects? The 1 hour rule? Summing up: