Conflict Reading List - GSDRC
Transcript of Conflict Reading List - GSDRC
Conflict Reading List Prepared for DFID Conflict Advisers
Peter Uvin, Tufts University
May 2008
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Introduction
We are pleased to be able to offer this reading list to DFID conflict advisers, and to
other HMG staff and consultants working on conflict matters.
As you know, conflict was one of the key priorities that the Secretary of State for
International Development and his ministerial team stressed when they took up their
posts in mid-2007. This reading list aims to provide users with a comprehensive range
of materials covering the principal policy issues confronting us. Its aim is to help you
deepen your technical knowledge to help you in your work.
The list was initially started by GSDRC and was then further developed by Prof Peter
Uvin of Tuft‘s University, Boston and his colleagues. However, although they have
provided us with a very comprehensive list, inevitably it remains a work in progress as
the field of conflict studies is still relatively new and evolving.
The list comprises HMG policy documents, core readings and supplementary readings
grouped under headings and sub-headings relating to the technical competencies for
DFID‘s conflict advisers. For your ease of reference, we are providing summaries of
each of the core readings, and there are either abstracts or summaries for the
supplementary readings.
This reading list pack is part of a set of new professional development tools designed
and developed to support conflict advisers. These are aimed at equipping advisers with
the right knowledge, background and skills that they need to carry out their work to the
best effect. The tools include the new technical competency framework for conflict
advisers, a training guide, and new conflict courses that are being designed specifically
for DFID advisers. In view of the importance of cross-Whitehall working on conflict
matters, these training tools are being made available to colleagues in FCO, MOD and
Stabilisation Unit.
I hope that you find this product a useful and worthwhile resource. Feedback about the
list from users will be very welcome and will help us to improve the product. Please
send any comments you have to Darren Boyling, [email protected] .
Joelle Jenny
Deputy Head of Governance and Conflict Profession
Department for International Development (DFID)
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Acknowledgements
This list was developed by Prof Peter Uvin (Tuft‘s University, Boston) and his
colleagues. It is based on initial research by Zoe Scott (Governance and Social
Development Resource Centre (GSDRC)). All summaries were produced by the
GSDRC. All abstracts are author‘s own.
This reading list is available online at: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/conflict-reading-list
Summaries of documents should not be reproduced without permission from the
Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC).
Ordering Documents
Some of the materials recommended in this reading list aren‘t available online (for
instance book chapters and journal articles), but they can be accessed as follows:
DFID staff can obtain any of the materials contained on this list by contacting the
DFID e-Library, who can arrange for individual articles to be delivered via email, or
books to be delivered in hard copy. Further information on using the e-library is
available on insights: http://insight/eLibrary, or you can email the library with your
request at [email protected] There is no charge for using this service.
Public users with no alternative access can order documents through the British
Library for Development Studies‘ Document Delivery Service. Further details are
available online at http://blds.ids.ac.uk/ or by emailing [email protected].
Organisations in developing and transition countries can use this delivery service at no
cost.
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Contents
Part 1: Conflict Analysis
1. Theories of (the causes of) Conflict Escalation and De-escalation ....................................... 7
1.1 Economic and social causes of violent conflict .............................................................. 7
1.2 Political analysis (power relations, political systems and institutions, elections etc.) .. 25
1.3 De-escalation of violent conflict ................................................................................... 36
1.4 Human rights, international humanitarian law and other relevant legal standards ....... 43
1.5 The role of gender in conflict issues ............................................................................. 51
2. Tools for Conflict Analysis and Monitoring Conflict Escalation and De-escalation .......... 56
2.1 Conflict tools, methodologies, theory and practice, (Strategic Conflict Assessments and
other analytical tools) .......................................................................................................... 56
2.2 Techniques for monitoring and evaluation (of conflict escalation and de-escalation) .. 67
2.3. Conflict sensitivity of development programmes in Fragile States (theoretical focus) 71
3. HMG and International Conflict Architecture, Particularly UN and IFIs ........................... 86
Part 2: Conflict Prevention
1. Conflict Prevention and Conflict Sensitive Development ................................................... 96
1.1 Conflict prevention........................................................................................................ 96
1.2 Early warning and early response systems .................................................................. 104
2. Conflict Sensitive Design of Poverty Reduction Programmes .......................................... 107
3. Conflict-sensitive Design, Monitoring and Evaluation of Programmes Aimed at Preventing
Violence ................................................................................................................................. 115
4. Do no Harm and Similar Approaches................................................................................ 133
5. Role of State and non-state Actors in Promoting Peaceful Transformation, in Supporting
Country/state Resilience and in Building State Capacity ...................................................... 137
Part 3: Conflict Response
1. Direct and Third Party Peace Processes, Ceasefires, Mediation and Peace Agreements –
Formation, Implementation and Consolidation ..................................................................... 151
2. Understanding Peacebuilding and Statebuilding ............................................................... 160
3. Post-conflict Stabilisation, Assessment and Planning ....................................................... 179
4. Transition from Humanitarian Assistance to Full Recovery ............................................. 187
5. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants ........................ 192
6. Transitional Justice and Reconciliation and their Role in Mitigating Risks of Violence .. 202
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7. Security Sector and Justice Sector Reform and their Role in Mitigating Risks of Violence
............................................................................................................................................... 213
7.1 Security sector ............................................................................................................. 213
7.2 Justice sector ............................................................................................................... 226
8. Small Arms and Light Weapons Programmes and their Role in Mitigating Risks of Violence
............................................................................................................................................... 239
Part 4: International Development System
1. Aid Instruments ................................................................................................................. 247
2. Development Effectiveness (Policy Coherence, Donor Alignment, Harmonisation) ....... 254
3. DFID‘s Governance Agenda and Competencies ............................................................... 267
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Part 1: Conflict Analysis
Contents
1. Theories of (the causes of) Conflict Escalation and De-escalation ....................................... 7
1.1 Economic and social causes of violent conflict .............................................................. 7
1.2 Political analysis (power relations, political systems and institutions, elections etc.) .. 25
1.3 De-escalation of violent conflict ................................................................................... 36
1.4 Human rights, international humanitarian law and other relevant legal standards ....... 43
1.5 The role of gender in conflict issues ............................................................................. 51
2. Tools for Conflict Analysis and Monitoring Conflict Escalation and De-escalation .......... 56
2.1 Conflict tools, methodologies, theory and practice, (Strategic Conflict Assessments and
other analytical tools) .......................................................................................................... 56
2.2 Techniques for monitoring and evaluation (of conflict escalation and de-escalation) .. 67
2.3: Conflict Sensitivity of Development Programmes in Fragile States (theoretical focus)71
3. HMG and International Conflict Architecture, Particularly UN and IFIs ........................... 86
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1. Theories of (the causes of) Conflict Escalation and De-escalation
1.1 Economic and social causes of violent conflict
Core readings
Beyond Greed and Grievance and not too soon
M Berdal (2005)
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Summary
Can civil wars be explained simply in terms of rebel greed? This essay from the
Review of International Studies reviews four books on the causes of civil war:
Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, The Political
Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, War Economies in a
Regional Context and, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism. These
reveal the concept of greed versus grievance to be unhelpful. Qualitative case studies
show that the processes of civil war are dynamic and context-dependent.
The ‗greed thesis‘ of civil wars stems from Paul Collier‘s work in the late 1990s.
Drawing on statistical data of civil wars since the mid-sixties, he concluded that
grievance-based explanations were wrong; the key to understanding the outbreak of
civil wars lay in greed and the quest for loot by rebels. This was an attractive idea for
policymakers because it simplified conflict. It had particular impact within the United
Nations. The books under review highlight the narrow focus of quantitative methods
and see polarisation of greed and grievance as too simplistic. This work has, however,
sharpened debate and encouraged qualitative and more historically informed research
into civil wars.
Several insights arise from the books reviewed:
Economic opportunities have not been the only or even the primary cause of
the armed conflicts studied. Rather, they interacted with socio-economic and
political grievances, interethnic disputes and security dilemmas in triggering
the outbreak of warfare.
Economics are, however, important. Non state actors and corrupt rulers have
been able to exploit opportunities presented by globalisation. These include
the deregulation of international markets and key industries and ease of access
to illicit markets.
Intra-regional economic, military, political, criminal and social links cut across
national borders and help sustain conflict. ‗Marginalised borderlands‘ are
areas that serve as reservoirs of violent resistance to the reassertion of the state
or ‗no-go areas‘.
Conventional wisdom suggests that diasporas (dispersals of populations from
their homelands) are predictors of civil war. Case studies show that diaspora
and migrant remittances can fuel conflict, but can also mitigate destabilising
socioeconomic divisions.
Evidence from Somalia challenges the notion of a conflict trap in which war
wrecks the economy and increases the risk of further war. While government
has not been revived in Somalia, local and informal governance has seen
striking success in disarmament and demobilisation.
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There are implications for future work on the causes of conflict:
The dynamics of many contemporary civil wars can only be fully understood
by references to global and regional economic changes. Though these
sometimes originate in the 1970s and 1980s, they accelerated dramatically in
the 1990s.
The notion of ‗marginalised borderlands‘ is worthy of more research and
policy attention. External actors (including the UN in West Africa) need to
place ‗civil‘ or internal wars firmly within their wider regional context.
In conflict zones where aid has dried up, diaspora revenues may provide
essential resources to marginalised groups. Curtailing the flow of funds from
expatriate communities may increase conflicts by encouraging predation on
vulnerable civilian populations.
By focusing on recreating a strong centralised state, some interventions have
been misguided. International systems remain state-centric. Central
government and local governance should not be lumped together and local
polities and informal social pacts should be recognised.
Source: Berdal, M., 2005, 'Beyond Greed and Grievance and not too soon', Review of
International Studies, 31(4) pp. 687-698
Climate Change and Conflict: The Migration Link
N Gleditsch and I Nordas (2007)
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Summary
This paper from the International Peace Academy argues that climate change is likely
to lead to mass exodus from uninhabitable areas, placing significant burdens on
migrant receiving areas, although adaptation is more likely than armed conflict in the
absence of exacerbating political and social factors. Climate change warrants
consideration by the United Nations (UN) as a potential security threat. Responses
should include improving disaster preparedness, mitigating the risks of refugee flows,
supporting migrant receiving areas and a new UN international agreement on
migration.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) presents a majority viewpoint
that recent temperature rises are unprecedented and hard to explain without reference
to human activity. Impacts on biodiversity, agriculture and water supply will certainly
alter patterns of consumption, production and settlement. It is plausible that violent
conflict could emerge as a result.
Long, uncertain causal chains from climate change to conflict lead policy advocates to
speculation. While it is impossible to assign credible probabilities to extreme
outcomes, preparation must be rooted in firm theoretical foundations.
Worst case scenario: Relatively abrupt changes in temperature could lead
wealthy nations to fortify their borders to preserve resources. Less fortunate
countries may initiate struggles over food, water or energy.
Best case scenario: A minority of scholars argue that the evidence for long-
term temperature rise is not enough to act at present. Human welfare would be
better served by health measures that promise to save thousands of lives at low
cost.
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Middle scenario: This assumes IPCC forecasts are correct and that a
substantial element of warming is due to human activities. Though
consequences may be less dramatic than the worst case scenario, action is
needed to preserve economic growth, meet basic needs and mitigate negative
effects.
Recommendations focus on what can be done to prevent environment-induced
migration leading to conflict:
Responding to environmental pressures and preparing for shifting settlement
patterns should be high on the UN agenda. Calling a special session of the UN
General Assembly would foster global dialogue.
Referring the matter to the Security Council would imply a wider
interpretation of security. The UN should face climate change as a crisis that
threatens the security of its member states and humanity, even if armed
conflict is not a major component of that threat.
Relevant policy measures include: Moving people from flood plains,
developing cleaner energy technologies, fostering efficient irrigation and water
consumption and improving shelters, disaster preparedness and response.
Locating refugees away from conflict zones and preventing infiltration of arms
into refugee communities would mitigate the risks of environmental refugee
flows. Productive employment would provide a meaningful alternative to
violence.
Dialogue with local communities would address economic and social concerns
in areas receiving environmental migrants. Steps may include preventing
discrimination in the workplace, ensuring access to services, revising
citizenship laws, promoting tolerance and facilitating civic awareness among
immigrant communities.
The UN needs a new international agreement on migration including legal
measures on the rights of migrants, refugees from combat zones and
environmental migration. The current UN Refugee Convention is outdated and
ambiguous.
Source: Gleditsch, N.P., Nords, R. and Salehyan, I. 2007, 'Climate Change and
Conflict: The Migration Link', Coping With Crisis Working Paper Series, New York:
International Peace Academy, New York
Minorities, Nationalists, and Islamists: Managing Communal Conflict in the
Twenty-first Century
T Gurr (2007)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
Fewer communal conflicts are being fought today than at any time since the early
1970s. What are the strategies that have brought about this trend? And how can the
more intractable conflicts be managed? This research, by the University of Maryland,
shows that a doctrine of international good practice is responsible for the resolution of
many conflicts. However, it argues that new strategies are needed to deal with the
threat of international terrorism. These should look at the root causes of terrorism and
establish effective responses to it.
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Between 1991 and 2004, the number of wars of self-determination has declined by
half. During that time, 20 separatist wars were settled by negotiated agreements and 23
others were halted by ceasefires and ongoing negotiations. Discrimination eased for
many minority groups. These trends can be explained by several factors. Since the end
of the Cold War the international community has moved from sponsoring proxy wars
towards promoting the accommodation of competing interests. International
management of communal conflict has reinforced domestic efforts at reducing
communal tensions. There is also a trend towards accommodation of communal
demands that have not yet escalated into armed conflict.
Relations between communal groups and governments have changed since the early
1990s because of a new doctrine of international good practice for managing
communal conflict. It has six principles: (1) the recognition and promotion of group
political, cultural and economic rights, (2) the recognition of the right of regional
minorities to sub-state autonomy, (3) the use of democratic institutions and power
sharing to protect group rights, (4) the use of mutual accommodation for managing
civil conflicts, (5) the use of international engagement to promote negotiated
settlements of communal conflicts and (6) the necessity of coercive intervention in
situations of gross violations of human rights.
Some parts of the world, where states and communal movements reject these six
principles, will continue to experience communal warfare and repression.
The new doctrine of managing communal conflict depends on whether it is
accepted by those whose conflicts are to be managed and on the ability of
regional and international organisations to implement it.
International and regional organisations are likely to pursue effective
preventive strategies in regions where Western powers have interests.
African and Asian conflicts are more resistant to external influence.
Regional organisations need to use all means at their disposal and should be
assisted to do so.
When preventive strategies fail, or are not pursued, the international challenges
become how to provide humanitarian aid and how to contain regional spillovers
of conflict.
Militant Islam poses a new and different threat, which comes not from states or
communal rivals but from dispersed terrorists who would wage war on the
West and its agents.
New strategies are needed for the new types of threat. Officials and experts at the
International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security in 2005, proposed a
comprehensive response with three dimensions. These were:
Recommendations for long-term reduction of the root economic and political
causes of the conflicts that give rise to terrorism.
Specification of optimal strategies for policing, intelligence gathering, military
responses and control of terrorist financing.
An exploration of how the foundations of democratic governance can be used
as assets in the international struggle against extremism.
Source: Gurr, T. R., 2007, ‗Minorities, Nationalists, and Islamists: Managing
Communal Conflict in the Twenty-first Century,‘ in Crocker, C., Hampson, F. O., and
All, P. (eds), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World,
Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, pp. 131-160
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Poverty and Conflict: The Inequality Link
R Kanbur (2007)
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Summary
How do poverty and inequality causally interact with conflict? While there is a general
view that poverty and inequality can lead to conflict, the nature of the links are less
well appreciated. This paper draws out the links based on the recent economics
literature and discusses their implications for policy. While inequality is a natural
concomitant of economic processes, particularly those driven by the market, its
implications for security emerge when unequal outcomes align with socio-political
cleavages.
The causality from poverty and inequality to conflict is ambiguous. Whilst violent
conflict is a feature of poorer rather than richer societies, wealth can provide the means
to conflict as much as take away the reason for it - the balance of forces is delicate and
country specific. A careful assessment of the intersection between economic outcomes
and social divisions is necessary in designing policies and interventions for growth and
poverty reduction.
Two factors are important to explain why low levels of tension escalate into group
violence: a background of inequality and sharp increases in inequality in directions that
play into other socio-economic factors.
The global trend on poverty is at too high a level of aggregation to explain the
incidence of conflict.
Increase in inequality within countries means richer individuals and richer
groups are getting richer faster than the poor - raising the prospect of group
tensions.
If conflict can be related to perceived and actual differences between groups
then it is the between-group component of inequality that is key.
Polarisation of society into groups with distinct identities can be a cause of
conflict on its own but this is exacerbated if in addition there are average
income differences between the groups.
A decline in national poverty can be accompanied by growing group tensions
as some groups do better than others in poverty reduction.
If processes of economic growth create group inequality this can engender
conflict sufficient to negatively affect the growth process itself.
There is not a one size fits all blueprint for action because of the historical and social
differences between countries that can underlay the potential for conflicts to develop.
Intermediate policy aims should attempt to:
Systematically reduce inter-group inequality between salient groups so that the
initial conditions are not favourable to conflict.
Build a thick set of associational links between groups, so that the inevitable
sparks that arise in the course of social and economic life do not ignite into
conflict.
Design economic policy packages that do not sharply increase inequality
across salient groups.
UN and international agencies should advocate policies that:
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Address structural cleavages by attacking discrimination and supporting
positive discrimination.
Support cross-communal associational life financially and politically.
Balance conventional economic efficiency with the need to maintain a balance
in cross-group income differences.
Source: Kanbur, R., 2007, ‗Poverty and Conflict: The Inequality Link‘, International
Peace
Academy, New York
Social-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict
H Kelman (1997)
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Summary
What insights can a social-psychological understanding of international conflict
provide? This United States Institute of Peace Press paper argues that psychological
factors are pervasive in international conflict and can help to explain certain
phenomena for which other approaches cannot adequately account. It explores the
social-psychological processes that generate and perpetuate conflict and, in turn, how
these can be reversed.
A social-psychological perspective enriches the analysis of international relations by
exploring the subjective factors that set constraints on rationality. It does this by:
opening the ‗black box‘ of the state as a unitary actor and analysing the processes
within and between societies that underlie state action; by broadening the range of
influence processes (and, indeed, of definitions of power) that play a role in
international politics; and by conceiving international conflict as a dynamic process,
shaped by changing realities, changing interests, and changing relationships between
the conflicting parties.
Social-psychological analysis can be particularly helpful in explaining why and how,
once a conflict has started, powerful forces are set in motion that promote the
escalation and perpetuation of conflict. Examples of forces perpetuating conflict
include the:
Formation of collective moods: public opinion on issues relating to a
protracted conflict is marked by shifts in collective mood. At different times
the mood may be optimistic or pessimistic, defiant or resigned, angry or
conciliatory.
Mobilisation of group loyalties: the arousal of nationalist and patriotic
sentiments by political leaders is a powerful tool in mobilising public support.
The display of national symbols evokes a strong emotional reaction that often
translates into automatic endorsement of leaders‘ policies.
Negotiation and bargaining processes: the norms governing political behaviour
in long-standing conflicts strongly encourage zero-sum thinking. As a result,
even when the parties have concluded that negotiations are in their own
interest, their actions inside and outside of the negotiating room often
undermine the process.
Formation of mirror images: when both parties, in mirror-image fashion,
perceive the enemy as harbouring hostile intentions in the face of their own
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vulnerability, their interaction produces a self-fulfilling dynamic. Under these
circumstances, it is difficult to discover common and complementary interests.
Resistance of images to contradictory information: conflict based interactions
– within and between the parties – inhibit the perception and the occurrence of
change in the other, and thus the opportunity to revise the enemy image.
Therefore the barriers to conflict resolution are strengthened by the escalatory, self-
perpetuating dynamic that characterises the interaction between conflict parties. To
overcome these barriers requires the promotion of a different kind of interaction, one
that is capable of reversing this conflict dynamic.
At the micro-level, problem solving workshops and similar approaches to
conflict resolution can help to encourage the parties to penetrate each other‘s
perspective, to differentiate their image of the enemy, to develop a de-
escalatory language and ideas for mutual reassurance, and to engage in joint
problem solving designed to generate ideas for resolving the conflict that are
responsive to the fundamental needs and fears of both sides.
At the macro-level, reversal of the conflict dynamic depends on the
establishment of a new discourse among the parties, characterised by a shift in
emphasis from power politics and threat of coercion to mutual responsiveness,
reciprocity, and openness to a new relationship.
Source: Kelman, H., 1997, 'Social-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict',
in Zartman, I.W. and Rasmussen, L. Peacemaking in International Conflicts: Methods
and Techniques., United States Institute of Peace Press, New York, pp. 192-237
Conflict Prevention and Peaceful Development: Policies to Reduce Inequalities
and Exclusion
A Langer (2007)
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Summary
What is the role of culture in violent conflict? Research on the causes of conflict has
focused on political and economic grievances. This paper from the Centre for Research
on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity relates conflict to horizontal inequalities
(inequalities between culturally defined groups). It identifies differential treatment and
recognition of groups‘ cultural practices and norms by the state as cultural status
inequalities. The most dangerous situations exist where all three dimensions of
horizontal inequality (HI) – socioeconomic, political and cultural status – run in the
same direction.
In many conflicts, political and economic issues are complemented by perceptions of
cultural discrimination, exclusion or inequality of treatment. Culture plays a
fundamental role in framing socioeconomic and political HI‘s, since it is a common
culture of identity which binds groups together. But the way different cultures are
treated by the state (and others) also forms an important HI. This can contribute to
group mobilisation independently of political or socioeconomic HI‘s or exacerbate
other factors.
There are three aspects to cultural status inequality:
Recognition of religious practices and observances: Official state religion,
state support for different religions, religious schooling and differing religious
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freedoms and rights contribute to inequality. Informal practices can also
privilege certain religions over others, even when the state is officially neutral
or secular.
Language and language recognition: The privileging of a language can signal
the dominance of those for whom it is a first language. Governments may
actively penalise the use of a minority language or designate a ‗national
language‘. Conflicts revolving around language have been notable in India,
where linguistic diversity has created status problems since independence.
Recognition of ethnocultural practices: State support for certain cultural
practices may be expressed in rituals of governance, recognition of customary
law, dress and appearance, national ‗heroes‘, festivals and holidays. State
attempts to remain neutral may be interpreted as de facto dominance of the
majority culture.
Cultural status inequalities are an important source of group mobilisation and
potentially violent conflict.
If the state attributes inferior status to certain cultural identities, members of
these groups are more likely to feel alienated from the state. They are also
more likely to mobilise along cultural lines to improve their groups‘ cultural
status.
Severe socioeconomic horizontal inequalities can persist for decades without
raising violent responses. But changes in cultural status inequalities can be
important in the politicisation of inequalities and can be a factor in group
mobilisation for violence.
The simultaneous presence of severe cultural status inequalities alongside
political and socioeconomic HI‘s represents an explosive situation. The
excluded political elites not only have strong incentives to mobilise their
supporters for violent conflict along cultural lines, but are likely to gain
support among cultural constituencies relatively easily.
Cultural status inequalities are potent triggers for group mobilisation because
of their inherent link to group identity. Symbolic events which reinforce
cultural status inequalities, such as the OrangeMarches in Northern Ireland,
can trigger group violence.
As mobilising agents, cultural status inequalities have direct resonance with
people. Environmental protests in Malaysia in the 1980ss generated little
mobilisation except where activists drew on ethnic discontent. The
relationship between cultural status inequalities and (violent) group
mobilisation can be more direct than other HIs because of the cultural
dimension of grievances.
Source: Langer, A. & Brown, G., 2007, 'Conflict Prevention and Peaceful
Development: Policies to Reduce Inequalities and Exclusion?', CRISE Working Paper
No. 41, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Oxford
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'The Frightful Inadequacy of Most of the Statistics': A Critique of Collier and
Hoeffler on Causes of Civil War
L Nathan (2005)
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Summary
Can recent cross-national statistical studies on the causes of civil war be trusted? The
most influential studies have been by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (C&H). This
paper from the Crisis States Research Centre argues that their research is filled with
empirical, methodological and theoretical problems that lead to unjustified
conclusions. They seek to ascertain the causes of civil war and the motives of rebels
without analysing civil wars and rebels.
C&H distinguish between political science, which relates rebellion to grievances, and
economic theory, which sees rebellion as motivated by greed. Statistical analysis leads
them to conclude that economic variables have more explanatory power than political
and social variables. Their findings have been reported in the media and cited in
governmental and international reports. But their unsubstantiated explanations of
results, incomplete, inaccurate and statistically biased data and analytical flaws
preclude an adequate understanding of the causes of civil war. The idea that
dependence on natural resources heightens a country‘s risk of war because it affords
rebels opportunity for extortion is not based on evidence; it is an inference drawn from
a correlation between the onset of civil war and the ratio of primary commodity
exports to Gross Domestic Product.
C&H‘s approach has numerous flaws:
To conduct a statistical analysis of the causes of civil war, C&H must find
numerical indicators for each of their variables. Many cannot be easily
captured numerically, leading to the use of arbitrary proxies.
In several cases, the proxies do not capture the relevant variable. Some
measures intended to test for opportunity could just as well be indicators of
grievance. Not one of C&H‘s variables entails an observation of rebel
behaviour.
Correlation does not imply causality. Relationships cannot be explained
without thorough investigation of context. The conclusions drawn by C&H
from their statistical analysis are speculative and based on untested
assumptions.
Problems of geographical scale, statistical bias and inaccurate and missing
data make C&H‘s study vulnerable to serious measurement errors and
artificial findings. As well as suspect interpretation, the correlations
themselves may be misleadingly false.
This critique is relevant to future attempts to analyse the causes of civil war:
Grievance and opportunity should not be seen as competing explanations for
rebellion. Opportunity can be created, seized, spurned or ignored depending on
motives and other causal factors.
C&H‘s quantitative method does not enable them to observe rebel behaviour
directly. They disregard evidence on the sources and cost of weaponry,
support from foreign governments, recruitment and financing of rebel soldiers
and documented cases of rebel extortion.
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C&H‘s information about the wars in their sample is similarly limited. They
do not examine the intensity and scope of the war, the way it is fought, events
leading up to it, rebel demands and popular support.
Limited to numerical data at the structural level, C&H ignore politics, history,
ideology, government decisions, regional contexts and repression. All are
critical to the causes and incidence of civil war.
In reality, civil wars have a range of different types of causes: structural
conditions, dynamic causes, catalytic events, actors‘ decisions and soldiers‘
motives. This framework highlights how narrow C&H‘s focus is.
Source: Nathan, Laurie, 2005, "The Frightful Inadequacy of Most of the Statistics": A
Critique of Collier and Hoeffler on Causes of Civil War, Crisis States Development
Research Centre, Discussion Paper no. 11, London School of Economics, London
War Economies in a Regional Context: Overcoming the Challenges of
Transformation
K Studdard (2004)
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Summary
What is the relationship between the regional dimensions of war economies and
peacebuilding in post-conflict situations? This report, published by the International
Peace Academy, argues that the failure to consider the regional dynamics of war
economies undermines peacebuilding efforts. Policy-makers should distinguish
between economic activities that pose a threat to peace processes and activities that
contribute to social and economic stability. Certain informal regional economic
activities that are presently ignored or criminalised should be incorporated into
peacebuilding and reconstruction strategies.
In the post-Cold War environment, the decline in superpower support has shaped the
self-financing nature of contemporary civil wars. Various actors have turned to the
exploitation of lucrative natural resources, illicit trade networks and informal
economies to support military efforts. Policymakers recognise that economic factors
may exacerbate and perpetuate civil conflict. However, little attention is paid to the
economic ‗spill over‘ or ‗spill into‘ effects of internal conflicts on neighbouring states.
A distinction is needed between informal regional economic networks that perpetuate
conflict and economic activities that contribute to peacebuilding efforts. A more
nuanced and complex understanding of the regional war economies should include the
following elements:
The combat economy, which exploits natural resources and illicit goods such
as drugs and small arms to sustain conflict and profit from war.
The shadow economy, which is motivated by the economic opportunism of
actors who thrive on the ability to operate outside the formal economy, but are
not necessarily committed to the pursuance of conflict.
The coping economy, which consists of individuals who seek to maintain a
basic level of economic subsistence in the absence of a functioning state.
The three-fold distinction between conflict, shadow and coping economies
simplifies a complex reality because war economies are intertwined and
coexist at various levels.
17
War economies are extremely resilient and rarely dissipate after the official
end of conflict. For example, ‗spoilers‘ that are marginalised by peace
processes continue to exploit weaknesses in the informal sector through
regional networks.
Shadow economies may become stronger in post-war situations if the state is
unable to govern effectively. In addition, members of the coping economy
often rely on war economies to provide for their economic and social
livelihoods.
Certain informal regional economic activities may contribute to social and
economic stability, including: shadow networks that can be incorporated into
the formal economy; natural resource industries; and informal economic and
trade activities, particularly traditional activities.
The failure to consider the regional dynamics of war economies undermines the
effectiveness of conflict management and peacebuilding efforts. Policy-makers should
adopt specific measures to integrate the regional aspects of war economies into post-
conflict strategies by:
Remedying the state-centric bias of peace processes by incorporating non-state
local and regional actors into peacebuilding efforts, particularly, actors from
regional formal and informal economies.
Devising strategies to deal with spoilers, which may involve co-opting spoilers
with a view to reintegrating them into the formal economy.
Improving regulatory effectiveness through region-wide economic
development programmes to address transnational shadow networks and
creating regional regulation that identifies the specific conflict commodities
that plague a region.
Addressing insecurity in borderland regions where marginalised populations
often rely on shadow activities for their survival. In the absence of formal
coping mechanisms, borderlands can be seized by those who resist peace.
Assisting war-torn societies to establish a functioning state with the capacity to
control its own finances, social programmes and institutional decision-making.
Recognising the limitations of donor policies that encourage minimal states.
Policies aimed at privatisation, foreign direct investment and deregulated
markets may have debilitating effects on peacebuilding.
Source: Studdard, K., 2004, 'War Economies in a Regional Context: Overcoming the
Challenges of Transformation', International Peace Academy, New York
The Inequality of Violence: On the Discovery of Civil War as a Threat to 'the
North' in the 1990s and the Debate over Causes and Solutions
S Woodward (2008)
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Summary
How has the new world order influenced Western understanding of economic
inequality and difference in the developing world? Poverty and cultural diversity have
emerged as two universalising explanations for violence in the contemporary world.
This paper traces the emergence of that school of thought and the study of civil war
which that critique is generating. There is an increasing distance between that research
and the public policies currently aimed at preventing or ending civil war.
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The interest, both public and academic, in armed conflict and civil war is being driven
by the security concerns of governments and citizens in the United States and other
wealthy, powerful countries of the North. The past 15 years have seen a transformation
in the perception of the poorer, less powerful countries of the South as a threat to
security in the North. The data do not support that view; warfare has been declining
since World War II – with the exception of wars instigated and led by the United
States.
The academic critique of the ethnic conflict and resource-predation arguments has not
only generated methodological advances but also our substantive knowledge about
civil war and political violence. Three trends are especially important:
A recognition that violence has characteristics of its own that cannot be
analysed in the same ways as politics in peacetime.
A search for alternative concepts and measures of inequality and cultural
difference.
A move to political explanations and an analysis of power.
However:
Political and criminal violence in the former East and the South remains
largely invisible in the study of conflict, separated from international relations
by sovereign borders.
Schools of thought that promote ethnic-conflict and economic causes do not
understand the violence of civil war.
The social relations of inequality are both economic (class) and cultural
(status) and the balance among these elements in a particular conflict depends
on the organisation of political power.
The processes leading to the breakdown in security and the mechanisms for its
restoration are little understood, still left to a security field that studies
militaries or a public policy world focusing on police.
Conclusions drawn from this paper include the following:
How political power shapes peoples‘ means and opportunities for satisfying
their material needs is particularly important.
The dynamic of power relations between the state and insurgents is beginning
to get the direct attention necessary in theory and research on civil war and
armed conflict.
Political factors turn out insignificant in quantitative studies because proxies
used to capture political factors are poorly measured.
Governments in developing countries are increasingly under US pressure to
develop capacity for the war on terror whilst public security within their
countries is increasingly deprived of financing.
Few ask why poor countries‘ export earnings are so high in natural resources
or how that gain is realised - the demand for such commodities and the market
links all come from the North.
Source: Woodward, S., 2005, 'The Inequality of Violence: On the Discovery of Civil
War as a Threat to "the North" in the 1990s and the Debate over Causes and Solutions',
Conference Paper, Conference on Difference and Inequality in Developing Societies,
April 21-23, 2005, American Political Science Association
19
Supplementary readings
Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political
Economy of Armed Conflict K Ballentine and H Nitzschke (2003)
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Abstract
This policy report provides a synopsis of the key findings from case studies on the
political economy of armed intra-state conflicts, commissioned by the International
Peace Academy‘s program on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (EACW). These
findings offer lessons for improved policies for conflict prevention and resolution.
Source: Ballentine, K., and Nitzschke, H., 2003, ‗Beyond Greed and Grievance:
Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict‘,
International Peace Academy, New York
Greed and Grievance in Civil War
P Collier and A Hoeffler (2000)
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Summary
Are civil wars really caused by political repression, inequality, or religious and ethnic
differences? What roles do factors other than grievance play in rebellion? This paper
for the World Bank looks at the causes of civil war, using a new data set of wars
during 1960-99.
Civil wars are now more common than international conflict. Of 25 armed conflicts in
2000, 23 were internal. Rebellion needs both motivation and opportunity. Political
science explains conflict in terms of motive. When grievances are sufficiently acute,
here is violent protest. Such grievances include inequality, oppression, religious and
ethnic tensions. A much smaller literature from economic theory models rebellion as
an industry that generates profit from looting.
Greed, not grievance, is the driving force, and opportunity is more important than
motive. The authors develop an econometric model for predicting the incidence of civil
wars, resting on the following factors:
Availability of finance. Dependence on primary commodity exports creates a
high risk of civil strife as rebels have opportunities for extortion. Diasporas
provide funding for rebel groups, and increase the risk of conflict renewal.
The cost of rebellion. Low income means there is less to lose by fighting.
Male secondary education enrolment, per capita income and growth rates have
statistically significant effects on conflict risk.
Military advantage. Dispersed populations, and mountainous terrain increase
the risk of conflict.
The risk of conflict is proportional to population. Opportunities increase with
population. Diversity also increases, but measurable aspects of this were not
found to contribute to civil war.
Ethnic tension. In the case of domination by one ethnic group, conflict risk
increases. This is the only grievance-based cause. Without a dominant ethnic
group, rebel cohesion becomes more costly and conflict risk goes down.
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Considering the opportunities for rebellion is more useful than using political,
grievance-based approaches. The economic model gives objectively verifiable
indicators, and is robust to a range of tests for outliers, alternative variable definition,
and variations in estimation method. Policy implications of this are implied, not stated:
Analysis of funding of rebels is crucial. Donors also need to consider how to
deal with and include diasporas to prevent conflict renewal.
Programmes that target male secondary education will reduce conflict risk by
increasing the costs of war.
Macro, meso, and micro level economic programmes will also reduce conflict
risk in this way. The reports findings may imply that wealth creation is more
significant than poverty reduction.
Where there is ethnic diversity, donor programmes should reduce or negate
dominance by one group.
Source: Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., 2000, ‗Greed and Grievance in Civil War‘, World
Bank, Washington DC
Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War
P Collier et al (2006)
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Summary
A key distinction among theories of civil war is between those that are built upon
motivation and those that are built upon feasibility. This article from the Centre for the
Study of African Economies explores this distinction by analysing a comprehensive
global sample of civil wars between 1965 and 2004. The results substantiate the
‗feasibility hypothesis‘ which contends that where civil war is feasible, it will occur
without reference to motivation.
The defining feature of a civil war is large scale organised violence on the part of a
rebel army. In most circumstances, the establishment of a rebel army is prohibitively
expensive and extremely dangerous. The relatively rare circumstances in which
rebellion is materially feasible are therefore likely to constitute an important part of
any explanation of civil war. The article‘s ‗feasibility hypothesis‘ proposes that where
rebellion is materially feasible, it will occur, whilst the factors that explain rebel
agendas or grievances are incidental to the explanation of civil war.
The core results of previous analyses survive. Economic characteristics, such as the
level, growth and structure of income, matter. However, in the present analysis, three
new variables are included that have unambiguous interpretations:
Countries not under the French security umbrella: Between 1965 and 2004,
the former French colonies of Africa faced a risk of conflict of 2.9 per cent
(given the estimated coefficient), while they would have suffered a civil war
risk of 7.6 per cent if they had all the same characteristics except that of being
Francophone.
The proportion of young men in the population: A doubling in the proportion
of males aged between 15-29 increases the risk of conflict from 4.7 per cent to
31.9 per cent.
The proportion of terrain which is mountainous: War start observations are
characterised by a higher proportion of mountains (20.87 per cent) than
peaceful observations (15.71 per cent).
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These variables all have substantial effects. Two hypothetical and similar countries
without and with all these variables faced a respective risk of 0.5 per cent and 52.8 per
cent of civil war. These findings have a number of important implications for
policymakers:
Economic development remains critical for reducing the incidence of civil war
More attention needs to be paid to the feasibility of civil war, as opposed to
the grievances of the involved parties
International trade in primary commodities carries particular risks and so
warrants special measures, such as the Kimberley Process
If the incidence of civil war is to be reduced, it will need to be made more
difficult.
Source: Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Rohner, D., 2006, 'Beyond Greed and Grievance:
Feasibility and Civil War', CSAE Working Paper Series, no. 10, Centre for the Study
of African Economies, University of Oxford, Oxford
Inequality and Conflict: A Review of an Age-old Concern
C Cramer (2005)
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Summary
What are the links between inequality and conflict? This United Nations Research
Institute for Social Development programme paper gives an overview of the main
currents of thinking in this field, and highlights the empirical weakness of the majority
of claims made. It goes on to argue for a relational analysis, and emphasises the role of
late development in understanding inequality and its consequences.
Claims about links between inequality and conflict are linked to different underlying
approaches to understandings of the origins of conflict. These links are not always
explicit, and this lack of clarity may lead to a problem of how elements of different
fundamental approaches may be combined.
There are three particularly useful ways of distinguishing between theories of violent
conflict:
(i) Theories prioritise either the role of contingency, or of inherent propensities
to violence
(ii) Theories are divided between ‗deprived-actor‘ explanations and ‗rational
actor‘ explanations
(iii) Theories emphasise either behaviour, ideas or relations.
Neoclassical economic theories of conflict are also notable, representing one strand of
rational-actor theory. They are somewhat inconsistent and allow for varying
distributional arguments.
Many claims have been made about the relationship between inequality and conflict,
generally based on looking for observable event regularities on the basis of
multicountry samples. This tests cross-sectional distributional data against the
incidence of various forms of violence. These claims tend to suffer from significant
empirical weaknesses.
Studies have found a linear relationship, arguing, for example, that inequality
harms growth by causing political instability. Other studies posit curvilinear
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relationships, which can take the form of a ‗u‘ or an inverted ‗u‘, exactly
mirroring each other.
Others emphasise local inequalities, and others claim inequality is not a
significant variable. There is also a distinction between those emphasising land
inequality and those emphasising income inequality.
The empirical problems with this kind of quantitative analysis are extreme.
Rankings among countries in terms of conventional inequality data are often
driven by variations in the quality, coverage and treatment of the data.
It is also difficult to empirically analyse violent political conflict: Reporting of
violence during conflict can suffer as systems that would record deaths often
break down, and there are also complications of interest.
There are also problems of how to classify events such as ‗civil wars‘, and
variations in classification can lead to substantial differences in the results of
regressions. It may also make sense to analyse a wider range of phenomena of
violence.
This leads to the conclusion that there are no grounds for accepting any ―event
regularity‖ across countries, that the pursuit of such claims is unlikely to be successful
and that the methodology is inappropriate. Instead, it is worth looking into the
processes, mechanisms and relations that generate inequality.
Hirschman proposed the working of a ‗tunnel effect‘ whereby envy was
suppressed as greater inequality gave information about social change that
could be interpreted as a signal of hope.
Stewart‘s idea of ‗horizontal inequality‘, meaning that between different
collective groups in society, emphasises the role of discriminatory social
relationships.
Tilly discusses tolerance for inequality, and inequality between social pairings
such as men and women, black and white being sustained by social
mechanisms and exploitation. In this approach, exclusion is not simply a
negative, but a relational factor.
However, even in these relational accounts the fundamental developmental
perspective is not emphasised. During development the fundamental
institutional arrangements of power and exploitation may be in flux and at
stake. They may be seen in class terms, although political mobilisation often
takes other identity forms.
Source: Cramer, C., 2005, 'Inequality and Conflict: A Review of an Age-old Concern',
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Geneva
Globalization, Transborder Trade, and War Economies
M Duffield (2000)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
This chapter is concerned with the relation between globalization and the development
of protracted internal and regionalized forms of conflict in the South. In particular, it
analyzes what can be called war economies in terms of them being adaptive structures
based on networked forms of parallel and trans-border trade. Although globalization
has not caused war economies, market liberalization has encouraged the deepening and
expansion of all forms of transborder activity. The extralegal mercantilist basis of most
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war economies gives them a number of shared characteristics. Apart from illiberalism,
these include a dependence on external markets for realizing local assets and,
importantly, as a source for all forms of essential nonlocal supplies and services. This
dependence raises the prospect of developing new forms of market regulation as a
structural means of conflict resolution. So far, this remains a relatively underdeveloped
area of inquiry.
Source: Duffield, M., 2000, ‗Globalization, Transborder Trade, and War Economies,‘
In Mats Berdal and David M, Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas
in Civil Wars, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 69-89
Causes and Consequences of Conflict-Induced Displacement
S Lischer (2007)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
Violent conflict causes millions of people to flee their homes every year. The resulting
displacement crises not only create logistical and humanitarian nightmares, these crises
threaten international security and risk the lives of displaced people, aid workers, and
peacekeepers. Despite the dangers posed by conflict-induced displacement, scholars,
policy makers and international organizations usually have only a partial understanding
of these crises. Conflict-induced displacement consists of two main factors: 1) The
violence that caused the displacement and 2) The characteristics of the resulting
displacement crisis. Many observers fail to disaggregate each factor; rather lumping all
types of violence together or viewing displaced people as an undifferentiated mass.
This paper demonstrates that disaggregation of both concepts-causes of conflict-
induced displacement and characteristics of a crisis - is necessary to understand fully
the importance of displacement in international politics. The paper develops typologies
to analyze those concepts and discusses the implications for future research on
conflict-induced displacement.
Source: Lischer, S. K., 2007, ‗Causes and Consequences of Conflict-Induced
Displacement‘, in Civil Wars, vol. 9, no. 2 (June), pp. 142-155
What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?
M Ross (2003)
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Summary
What is the relationship between natural resources and violent conflict? What causal
mechanisms produce these outcomes? This study by the University of California
reviews recent cross-national econometric and qualitative studies. It suggests that
collectively they imply four underlying regularities in the relationship between natural
resources and civil war. There is a wealth of data on causal links in specific conflicts
but it is difficult to generalise. There are plausible theories behind each of the patterns,
though efforts to test them are still in their infancy.
Since the late 1990s, there has been a flood of research on natural resources and civil
war. There is little agreement on the validity of the resource-civil war correlation.
Quantitative studies of natural resources and civil war have been shadowed by
24
concerns about misspecification. The natural resource-civil war correlation could be
spurious: both civil war and resource dependence might be independently caused by
some unmeasured third variable, such as the weak rule of law. Several studies have
emphasised that we still know little about the processes that tie natural resources to
conflict. Observers often claim that resources have "fuelled" a given conflict but are
vague about how this occurred. General, cross-national studies often suggest causal
mechanisms but provide little evidence to back them up.
The process of resource extraction sometimes leads to low-level violence but these
low-level conflicts rarely lead to larger civil wars. Resource rents may increase the
desire of nascent rebels to capture the state, but not their ability to do so or even to
initiate a civil war. Rebel groups often face credit constraints: just because the value of
victory is high does not mean rebels can raise more money for arms and men. A
resource-rich government may also be better able to suppress rebellions. Oil
dependence and non-fuel mineral dependence tend to increase government spending on
the military.
The weight of the evidence available so far suggests several regularities. Not every
cross-national study fits these regularities. Nevertheless, they are the strongest findings
to emerge so far from this rapidly growing field:
Oil dependence appears linked to the initiation of conflict, but not conflict
duration.
There is some evidence that oil dependence (and possibly mineral
dependence) is more strongly associated with separatist conflicts than other
types of conflicts.
Gemstones, opium, coca, cannabis, and other lootable goods are not linked to
the initiation of conflict, but they do seem to lengthen pre-existing wars.
Timber's role remains untested.
There is no statistical evidence and very little case study evidence linking
agricultural commodities to either the initiation or the duration of civil war.
The claim that primary commodities are associated with the onset of civil war
is not robust.
Some of the differences in quantitative studies are due to variations in the ways
databases code civil wars. Reconciling these findings would help identify which of the
resource-conflict relationships are truly robust. Research that contributes to better
policies is needed. This includes:
Well reasoned arguments about what can and should be done to sever the link
between commodities and conflict must be systematically tested.
A comprehensive study of how civil wars in resource-exporting states may be
linked to other elements in the resource curse.
Testing how the physical qualities of a resource, and its geographic location,
influence the likelihood it will produce conflict.
Source: Ross, M., 2003, 'What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil
War?', University of California, Los Angeles
25
1.2 Political analysis (power relations, political systems and
institutions, elections etc.)
Core readings
Countries at Risk of Instability: Risk Factors of and Dynamics of Instability
UK Cabinet Office (2005)
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Summary
What makes a country at risk of instability? This paper from the Prime Minister‘s
Strategy Unit looks at factors driving political, economic and social instability. These
include country capacity, risk factors, external stabilising factors and the feedback loop
of instability into risk factors. Evidence of instability reveals the importance of elites,
institutions and natural resources. The number and intensity of conflicts can and has
been reduced through short-term preventative measures, long-term economic
development and the creation of democratic political institutions.
Describing a country or region as unstable suggests the presence of political,
economic, or social upheaval. A simple framework can be used to structure analysis of
stability. This focuses attention on risk factors and the vicious cycle of conflict eroding
country capacity and thus reducing stability. In order to meet the challenges posed by
countries at risk of instability, we need to understand what drives political instability,
poor economic performance and violent conflict.
Long term factors like trade and geography and medium-term factors such as
political and economic institutions determine economic success and failure.
Political and economic institutions are shaped by the actions of elites.
Countries undergoing political transitions face a high risk of instability.
Constraints on ruling elites and the degree of public participation in polity are
important in determining political stability. Bureaucracies can help preserve
stability.
Economic development often precedes democracy but is not sufficient for it to
take root. This is partly due to natural resources. Petrowealth, for example, can
retard democratisation.
Poverty, fragile political institutions and recent violent conflict are all
associated with intra-state violence. Elites draw on group identities and
grievances to further their interests. Civil conflict breeds its own conditions by
criminalising the economy and weakening institutions that can mediate social
conflict.
Economic growth requires good quality political and economic institutions.
Institutions set the incentives for elites and constrain their behaviour so they
act in the interest of the majority.
‗Point source‘ natural resources (e.g. oil and minerals) can contribute to
economic stagnation or decline. While natural resources can have a positive
effect on growth, this is often outweighed by indirect misallocation effects and
indirect political economy effects.
Lessons emerge for conflict prevention and peacebuilding:
Instability depends on a complex chain of events and interactions. But
assessment and monitoring of risk factors enables early response. Increasing a
26
country's capacity to manage and adapt to change is at the centre of creating
stability.
In the short term, conflicts can be shortened and reduced in intensity through
preventative diplomacy, mediation, peacekeeping, and cutting financial flows
to protagonists.
In the long run, a twin-track approach of economic development and the
creation of democratic political institutions is best for conflict prevention.
While good policies are important for growth, long-term changes in income
levels are not achievable without strong political and economic institutions.
When faced with resource allocation decisions, the high risk of civil war in
post-conflict countries justifies a focus on preventing conflicts recurring.
While capacity is low in these situations, there is a greater opportunity to
reshape institutions.
Donors have sometimes proffered misleading advice by being inflexible over
the forms of institutional reform they will support. Donors may also have
induced instability through the timing of their support.
Source: Prime Minister's Office Strategy Unit, 2005, Countries at Risk of Instability:
Risk Factors of and Dynamics of Instability', Cabinet Office, London
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
J Fearon and D Laitin (2003)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
What factors lead to civil war? Is there a link between civil conflicts and ethnicity? In
contrast to traditional views, this paper from Stanford University argues that the
current prevalence of civil wars results from the steady accumulation of protracted
crises from the 1950s and 1960s onwards, rather than recent changes in the post-Cold
War world system. Moreover, issues such as poverty, political instability and weak
states contribute to the outbreak of civil wars as they favour rebel recruitment and lead
to corrupt counterinsurgency practices.
Between 1945 and 1999, there were over 127 civil wars - leading to a significantly
higher number of deaths and refugee flows than interstate conflicts. However, civil
wars have been given less attention than interstate wars. Ethnicity, political grievances
and the end of the Cold War have historically been cited as factors leading to civil
wars. However, civil conflict can be viewed in terms of insurgency that is
characterised by small, lightly armed groups engaged in guerilla warfare from rural
bases.
Civil conflict has emerged as a result of long-term trends and as an
accumulation of protracted tensions, rather than sudden changes in the post-
Cold War international system.
The existence of poverty, weak states, political instability and large
populations leads to conditions that favour insurgency and recruitment to rebel
groups.
Fragile states are unable or unwilling to control internal conflicts due to weak
local policing and corrupt counterinsurgency practices.
27
Ethnic and religious diversity does not necessarily lead to civil conflict in a
country, despite the fact that rebel groups are often mobilised along ethnic
lines during warfare.
There is little evidence that the absence of democracy and respect for civil
liberties and minority groups leads to the outbreak of civil war.
Further research is needed on the factors that lead to internal conflicts. Donors and
policy-makers should reconsider traditional assumptions about the factors that lead to
civil wars. This should include:
Understanding the structural conditions that give rise to insurgency such as
weak states and high levels of poverty.
Promoting democracy and respect for ethnic and religious minorities as
legitimate foreign policy goals, but at the same time, recognising that there
may not be an immediate link between these objectives and the prevention of
civil wars.
Funding anti-corruption measures in developing countries and encouraging
legal accountability within the military and police.
Making aid to governments fighting civil wars conditional on guarantees that
counterinsurgency practices will discourage the recruitment of militias by
rebel groups.
Monitoring the counterinsurgency policies of developing countries. Countries
which perpetuate civil war should be viewed as candidates for "neo-
trusteeship" under the United Nations or regional organisations such as NATO
and the European Union.
Reviewing existing trusteeships such as Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor to
improve internal coordination among the diverse actors involved in these
operations.
Source: Fearon, J. and Laitin, D., 2003, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,
American Political Science Review 97(1):75-90
The State and Internal Conflict
R Jackson (2001)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
What are the causes of contemporary international conflicts? How does current
perception of them affect international conflict resolution efforts? This paper by
Manchester University suggests that internal conflict is a 'normal' aspect of weak state
politics. It argues that conflict resolution must be focused on state reconstruction
activities, rather than on saving failing states. It also suggests that there are likely to be
many more internal conflicts that demand international action in the future.
Internal conflicts have their origin in domestic rather than systemic factors and involve
politically-motivated violence, primarily within the boundaries of a single state. They
can become a threat to international peace and security when the fighting spills over
into neighbouring states or refugee flows upset regional stability. Once confined to
'area studies', research into the causes and outcomes of internal conflicts has recently
emerged as an important focus of international relations. Today, internal conflicts are
conceived of as irrational outbursts of 'ethnic' hatred, or the breakdown of normally
peaceful political systems. However, internal conflicts are, in fact, located in the
28
structures of weak states and the actions of weak state elites, who may deliberately
engender conflict as a rational response to the internal and external demands brought
on by the intrusive processes of globalisation.
The weak state framework not only provides a more satisfying explanation of internal
conflict, but it has profound implications for conflict resolution.
Internal conflicts are now the primary security threat in international relations.
The international conflict resolution system, based as it is on diplomacy,
intergovernmental organisations, and international legal processes, is proving
inadequate for dealing with internal conflicts.
The present system is state-centric in focus and so poses formidable problems
for dealing with conflicts involving non-state actors.
It is also oriented towards the short-term goal of conflict management, rather
than the more durable long-term goal of conflict resolution.
The most important consequence of this approach is the frequent failure of
negotiated political settlements— conflict management—to prevent the
continuation or re-eruption of internal violence in the political life of weak
states.
Presently, Sudan, Angola, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Israel are in
the grip of post-settlement conflict. Bosnia, Georgia, Cambodia, Mozambique,
and Chad, exist in a precarious condition, perpetually on the brink of a return
to large-scale conflict.
It is now clear that what is required is an integrated approach which can deal with both
the manifestations of conflict (e.g. the violence) and its underlying cause—the weak
state.
Getting to the root of internal conflict involves reconstructing weak states and
weak state politics.
Clearly, such an approach entails the commitment of vast amounts of
resources, not to mention political will.
However, in the long run, such an effort would prove more cost-effective than
mounting numerous costly humanitarian interventions of the kind attempted in
Somalia and East Timor.
Although many of the strategies are already being tried in internal conflicts
around the world, they are being undertaken as adjuncts to diplomatic efforts,
and in a piecemeal manner.
As long as state reconstruction strategies are secondary to international
conflict resolution efforts in weak states, durable peaceful solutions will
continue to remain elusive.
Source: Jackson R., 2001, ‗The State and Internal Conflict‘, Australian Journal of
International Affairs, vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 65-81
29
Turbulent Transitions: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War in the Twenty-
first Century
E Mansfield and J Snyder (2007)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
Is democratisation to best way to promote peace? This research from the United States
Institute of Peace argues that the world would probably be safer if there were more
mature democracies but, in the transition to democracy, countries become more
aggressive and war prone. The international community should be realistic about the
dangers of encouraging democratisation where the conditions are unripe. The risk of
violence increases if democratic institutions are not in place when mass electoral
politics are introduced.
When authoritarian regimes break down and mass politics begin, democratic
procedures are likely to be manipulated by both rising and declining elites to rally
support from the newly empowered masses. Nationalist or other populist ideologies,
occurring at early stages of democratic transition, can lead to international and internal
violence. Incomplete democratisation occurring in the face of weak government
institutions undermines the state‘s ability to manage elite interests and newly
politicised mass groups. Political institutions are unable to resolve conflicts of interest
growing from demands for political participation, thereby creating the conditions for
violent conflict. Unless the state inherits strong political institutions at the outset,
turbulence is hard to avoid during the first step on the road to democracy.
Several key factors influence the tendency towards violence in transitional
democracies.
Democratising states are often initiators of war, not because war is popular with
the public but because domestic pressures create incentives for threatened elites
to inflame nationalist sentiment.
A weakening of the state‘s authority in the early stages of democratisation
deepens the political paralysis and leads to recklessness among the ruling elite.
Nationalism unites elites and masses, distracting attention from class divisions.
The masses, once mobilised by passionate nationalist appeals, are difficult to
control.
Premature electoral competition is often an occasion for violence and plays into
the hands of nationalist demagogues.
Unleashing Islamic mass opinion through democratisation might raise the
likelihood of war, since the institutional preparations for democracy are weak.
Although countries are more likely to go to war in the transition to democracy, this
does not mean that democratisation should be halted for the sake of peace. However,
proponents of democratisation should advance cautiously.
The timing of efforts to promote democracy should be carefully weighed. It
should focus on countries where conditions are ripe.
The sequence of transition should begin with institution building and end with
open electoral competition. This sequence is likely to minimise the undesirable
side effects of democratisation.
It is important to study states such as Britain and South Africa where
democratisation occurred without triggering nationalist mobilisation.
Where institutions are lacking they can sometimes be easily built, for example
in richer countries with high literacy and high citizen skills or where there is a
legacy of legal, administrative or journalistic institutions.
30
Source: Mansfield, E.D., J. Snyder, 2007 'Turbulent Transitions: Why Emerging
Democracies Go to War in the Twenty-first Century', in Crocker, C., F.O. Hampson,
and P. All (eds.), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided
World, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, pp. 161-176. United States
Institute of Peace Press
Political Underdevelopment: What Causes Bad Governance?
M Moore (2001)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
What are the causes of bad governance? Is political underdevelopment largely due to
the ways in which interactions with the ‗metropolitan countries‘ have shaped, and
continue to shape, poor countries? This paper from the Institute of Development
Studies argues that ‗bad governance‘ is made, not born, and ‗we‘ (in the North) play a
part in creating and maintaining it.
The political underdevelopment that is characteristic of much of the ‗South‘ largely
results from the ways in which states have been created and political authority shaped
through interactions with the wealthier ‗core‘ countries in the context of global
economic and political systems. Political underdevelopment stems, to a large degree,
from low levels of dependence of state elites on their own citizens. Poor world states
are relatively homogenous in their formal organisational characteristics. The
heterogeneity in the actual functioning of states stems largely from wide differences in
patterns of state-society relations.
The degree of dependence of states on citizens is the most significant element in this
pattern. Low levels of dependence of states on citizens are found in three main types of
circumstances. These circumstances overlap a great deal in practice, but are best
treated as separate for analytical purposes:
Where state elites enjoy strong external financial and/or military support even
when they are in conflict with many of their own citizens.
Where states are dependent on ‗unearned income‘. ‗Earned income‘ is when
the state has to put in organisational and political effort in working with
citizens to get its money. Unearned income generally comes from mineral
revenues or overseas aid.
Where state elites, and sometimes their challengers, have abundant resources
and scope to purchase supportive military force that can be used against their
own citizens.
In some countries it has been relatively easy in recent decades to exercise a
kind of state power by purchasing military force with the proceeds of sales of
valuable commodities on global markets.
The low dependence of poor-world states on their own citizens, in any of these forms,
is possible only because of the great political and economic inequalities between states
at the global level. Poor-world states have been created and shaped through
interactions with the wealthier and more powerful ‗core‘ countries. Several evident
policy implications arise from this:
31
Poor countries need to tax themselves more. There is no convincing evidence
that, on a country by country basis, increases in aid levels actually reduce the
effective tax effort.
However, it is clear that in aggregate governments of poor countries reap an
unusually low proportion of GNP in the form of taxes.
Doing something about that would also provide the (reliable) resources they
need to tackle poverty and deprivation.
There is a need for more effective restrictions on international arms sales and
on international purchases of commodities from ‗tainted‘ sources.
We should be less concerned with manipulating state institutions of poor
countries in the name of ‗good governance‘, and put more effort into creating
the environmental conditions that will encourage the emergence of more
productive state-society relations.
Source: Moore, M. 2001, 'Political Underdevelopment: What Causes Bad
Governance?', Public Management Review, vol. 1, issue 3, pp. 385-418.
Supplementary readings
State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure
M Ayoob (2007)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
This book assesses the nature and extent of the changes wrought by 9/11 and its
aftermath, and explores their wide-ranging implications. For the United States, of
course, the changes have been dramatic. It has engaged in a war on terrorism and has
become both a third party in certain conflict arenas and a direct party to the conflict in
Iraq and Afghanistan. But these events have also affected other actors, from the United
Nations to humanitarian NGOs to collective defense and security organizations such as
NATO and the OSCE.
At the same time, some things have not changed. Failed states, economic stagnation,
weapons proliferation, nuclear missiles, and identity-based conflicts continue to
threaten global security. Looking at the combination of old and new threats, are
traditional instruments of negotiation, mediation, peacekeeping and peace enforcement
still effective in managing and resolving conflict? How do conflict management efforts
and the campaign against terrorism interact in various security environments? Are our
institutions—be they states, coalitions of the willing, international organizations, or
NGOs—capable of creating and implementing a peacemaking strategy? All these
questions are addressed in this new volume.
Source: Ayoob, M, 2007, ‗State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,‘ in
Crocker, C., Hampson, F. O., and All, P. (eds), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict
Management in a Divided World, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace,
pp. 95-114.
32
On the Etiology of Internal War
H Eckstein (1972)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
Internal war" is a resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution,
rulers, or politicies; it is the genus of which revolution, uprising, Jacquerie, etc., are
the species. The historical literature on the causes of internal wars is chaotic because
historians have simply produced facts about any aspect of pre-revolutionary society
which intuitively seemed significant. The real significance of these facts can only
emerge from broader comparative studies. Such studies should be focussed on the
preconditions of internal war rather than the (inevitably unique) precipitants and on
changes in the elite holding power. Obstacles to internal wars must also be considered.
Only a theory comprehending both positive and negative forces will prevent piling up
of unrelated ad hoc theories and unhistorical disregard for special forces in particular
cases.
Source: Eckstein, Harry. ‗On the Etiology of Internal War,‘ in Anger, Violence and
Politics. Ivo Feierabend. Prentice Hall, 1972, ch 1.
Roots of Civil War: Tick ‘all of the above’
J Hanlon (2007)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
More than two hundred wars have been fought in the past half century. Nearly all have
been civil wars, and at the beginning of the twenty-first century, more than thirty civil
wars were being fought. The ―rules‖ of interstate war do not apply; each atrocity
provokes retribution, and civil war takes on a brutal dynamic of its own. Civil War,
Civil Peace challenges common but simplistic explanations of war, including greed,
gender, and long-standing religious or ethnic hatreds, which ignore that these groups
have lived together in peace for centuries. When a cease-fire is arranged, aid workers,
military personnel, diplomats, and others pour in from the United States, Europe, and
international agencies. Outside help is essential after a war, but too often, well-
intentioned interveners do more harm than good. A half of civil wars have resumed
after failed peace agreements. Each war is different, and there can be no intervention
handbook or best practices guide. Aimed at practitioners and policy makers, and
essential reading for students of war, humanitarian intervention, peace building, and
development, Civil War, Civil Peace provides a comprehensive examination of how
interventions can be improved through a better understanding of the roots of war and
of the grievances and interests that fueled the war.
Source: Hanlon, J., 2007, ‗Roots of Civil War: tick ‗all of the above‘. In Yanacopulos,
H. and Hanlon, J. (eds.), Civil War, Civil Peace. Open University in association with
James Currey, Oxford and Ohio University Press, Athens OH, pp. 72-94
33
The Ontology of Political Violence
S Kalyvas (2003)
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Abstract
I discuss several conceptual problems raised by current understandings of political
violence, especially as they pertain to actions, motivations, and identities in civil wars.
Actions ―on the ground‖ often turn out to be related to local and private conflicts rather
than the war's driving (or ―master‖) cleavage. The disjunction between dynamics at the
top and at the bottom undermines prevailing assumptions about civil wars, which are
informed by two competing interpretive frames, most recently described as ―greed and
grievance.‖ Rather than posit a dichotomy between greed and grievance, I point to the
interaction between political and private identities and actions. Civil wars are not
binary conflicts, but complex and ambiguous processes that foster the ―joint‖ action of
local and supralocal actors, civilians, and armies, whose alliance results in violence
that aggregates yet still reflects their diverse goals. It is the convergence of local
motives and supralocal imperatives that endows civil wars with their particular and
often puzzling character, straddling the divide between the political and the private, the
collective and the individual.
Source: Kalyvas, S.V., 2003, ‗The Ontology of Political Violence.‘ In Perspectives on
Politics, Vol. 1:3 (September), pp. 475-494.
Power, Social Violence, and Civil Wars
C King (2007)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
This book assesses the nature and extent of the changes wrought by 9/11 and its
aftermath, and explores their wide-ranging implications. For the United States, of
course, the changes have been dramatic. It has engaged in a war on terrorism and has
become both a third party in certain conflict arenas and a direct party to the conflict in
Iraq and Afghanistan. But these events have also affected other actors, from the United
Nations to humanitarian NGOs to collective defense and security organizations such as
NATO and the OSCE.
At the same time, some things have not changed. Failed states, economic stagnation,
weapons proliferation, nuclear missiles, and identity-based conflicts continue to
threaten global security. Looking at the combination of old and new threats, are
traditional instruments of negotiation, mediation, peacekeeping and peace enforcement
still effective in managing and resolving conflict? How do conflict management efforts
and the campaign against terrorism interact in various security environments? Are our
institutions—be they states, coalitions of the willing, international organizations, or
NGOs—capable of creating and implementing a peacemaking strategy? All these
questions are addressed in this new volume.
Source: King, C, 2007, ‗Power, Social Violence, and Civil Wars.‘ in Crocker, C.,
Hampson, F. O., and All, P. (eds), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in
a Divided World, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, pp. 115-130.
34
The Politics of Violent Opposition in Collapsing States
W Reno (2005)
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Abstract
In violent conflicts in places like Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone, economic interests
have crowded out ideologically articulate mass-based social movements for reform or
revolutionary change to a degree that was not apparent during earlier anti-colonial
struggles. Some scholars offer a ‗looting model‘ of rebellion that explains the
predations of politicians and warlords but it is not clear why people who receive few
benefits from this – or even suffer great harm from them – fail to support ideologues
instead, or why self-interested violent entrepreneurs do not offer political programmes
to attract more followers. Yet some groups defy this ‗looting model‘. Explaining why
armed groups vary so greatly in their behaviour provides a means to address important
questions: is it possible to construct public authorities out of collapsed states in the
twenty-first century, or do local predations and global conditions preclude indigenous
state-building in these places? Why do social movements for reform there seem so
ineffective? What conditions have to be present for them to succeed? This article
considers the nature of rebellion in failing states, focusing on Nigeria to find clues to
explain variations in the organization of armed groups.
Source: Reno, W., 2005, ‗The Politics of Violent Opposition in Collapsing States‘,
Government and Opposition, vol. 40, no. 2 (spring), pp. 127-151
Pathway of the Political: Electoral Processes after Civil War
T Sisk (2008)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
No abstract available
Source: Sisk, T. D., 2008, ‗Pathway of the Political: Electoral Processes after Civil
War‘ in The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar
Peace Operations (Routledge, forthcoming in 2008).
Democratisation and Armed Conflict
M Soderberg Kovacs and T Ohlson (2003)
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Summary
What is the relationship between democratisation and armed conflict? What role can
development assistance play in relation to this? This paper by Uppsala University
seeks to challenge prevailing conceptions about the process of democratisation and to
analyse how that process relates to state building, institution-building, civil society and
the security sector. The focus is on the potential for political violence in the context of
democratisation processes. It concludes that there is a need for a general reassessment
among donors.
The recipe for transitions to democracy and liberalisation has up to now been a fairly
streamlined one, aimed at attaining the Weberian state model. However, recent
findings on democratic transitions suggest that there is nothing automatic about the
35
process of democratisation. The realisation of normative goals depends crucially on a
number of things, such as the presence of rule of law, general conditions for a mutually
reinforcing alliance between an entrepreneurial class, a vibrant civil society and a vital,
strong and proactive state apparatus. Success depends on whether or not the specific
conditions into which a process of transition towards democracy is introduced are
being taken into account. Consequently, the achievement of a responsible and
legitimate system of rule is a complex and hazardous process.
The nature of the problem of democratising weak states has several interlinked
dimensions:
While democracy is a method of resolving societal conflicts in a non-violent
manner, the route to it is a conflict-generating process.
The structural conditions for moving from democratisation to democracy are
often lacking in weak states. The conflict potential is entrenched in structurally
conditioned grievances.
If there is no harmony between a political culture and political structure, the
imposition of an alien political structure is doomed to fail.
The suggested political structure is simplistic and generalised, whereas the
political culture into which it is inserted has certain perverse and counter-
productive features.
Proposed structure and existing culture have to be modified to achieve success
in the transition to democracy. Such modifications are also conflict generating.
Systems of patronage constitute a formidable societal force. It is important to
make the positive elements part of the solution, rather than the key problem to
be eliminated.
There are powerful arguments for continuing assistance to the democratisation process.
However, donors must reassess how, with what purposes and with which effects, their
funds are spent.
The risk of generating counterproductive outcomes such as facade democracy,
autocracy or war must be minimised. It is dangerous to move to multi-party
elections too fast and to export a particular democratic structure.
The debate on whether the state or civil society should be supported in a
democratisation process should be terminated. It is necessary to support both.
Processes of decentralisation should only be supported under certain
conditions. A state apparatus that is an empty shell is pointless to decentralise.
Donors should seek to assist in curbing the negative effects of
neopatrimonialism, including political exclusion, rewarding loyalty instead of
efficiency and corruption.
The security sector and its role in the process of democratisation should be
effectively managed. The emergence of a just taxation system, improved
administrative capacities and the rule of law should be assisted.
The likelihood of successful donor support would increase immensely if there
could be more coordination and less chauvinism and ignorance among donors.
Source: Soderberg Kovacs, M. and Ohlson, T., 2003, ‗Democratisation and Armed
Conflict‘, Swedish International Development Agency, Sweden.
36
Inside Insurgencies: Politics and Violence in an Age of Civil War
S Tarrow (2007)
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Abstract
―Inside Insurgencies‖? An odd title for a review of four books that deal with one of
the most wide-ranging, violent, and protracted forms of contentious politics the world
has known—civil wars. Should we not care more about their impact on citizens at
large, their effects on national politics, and their creation of instability in the
international system than on their interior lives? But think of the conflicts among
communists, anarchists and others in the Spanish Republic: They inhibited the
republic's capacity to resist the assaults of Franco's forces. No adequate understanding
of that country's civil war could have excluded these ―internal‖ relations.
Source: Tarrow, Sidney, 2007, "Inside insurgencies: politics and violence in an age of
civil war", Vol.5, No.3, September 2007, Perspectives on Politics.
1.3 De-escalation of violent conflict
Core readings
What's in a Figure? Estimating Recurrence of Civil War
A Suhrke and I Samset (2007)
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Summary
It is often said that a country that has experienced civil war has a 50 per cent chance of
sliding back within five years. Indeed, the UN has used this figure in preparation for its
Peacebuilding Commission. However, the authors of this figure have since revised
their original estimate to 23 per cent. This paper examines the process whereby
academic findings become accepted wisdom and warns against the wholesale adoption
of such figures by policymakers.
In the UN system, forces favouring a stronger international peacebuilding regime
seized upon the work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. In 2002, they published an
article which investigated ‗peace duration‘, defined as ‗the number of months since the
end of the previous conflict, or since 1945‘. It concluded that ‗shortly after a conflict,
on average, countries face a 50 per cent risk of renewed conflict during the next five
years‘. However, changes in definition and methodology can produce radically
different estimates. In such cases, we need to understand why this is so, what the
changes imply and which estimates, and in what form, are presented to policymakers.
If the figure expresses the average risk of recurrent war with the civil-war group
within a given period then a significantly lower figure is produced. Taking this
definition and using the same data set as Collier and his team covering the period
1960-99, the results are as follows:
Of the 49 countries listed, civil war did not recur at all in about half the cases
within the entire 40-year period
37
Of the remaining cases, a second civil war did occur in 12 countries but after
the first five-year period of peace. For example, after 1962, Algeria did not
experience another war until 1991
In only 13 cases did a second civil war recur within the first five-year period
giving a recidivism rate of around 26 percent.
Similar work by Barbara Walter using the same data set but for a longer period (1945-
96) also estimated a lower recurrence rate. She concluded that single wars rather than
recurrent conflict was the norm. Collier and his associates have continued to work on
civil war recurrence. Based on the changes in methodology and data in a 2006 study,
they estimated a recurrence rate of 20.6 per cent for the first four years after the
previous war had ended. In the revised version of the same paper two months later, this
figure came out at 23 per cent. Yet, these new figures have received little comment
even though changes in conclusions of this kind have important ethical and policy
implications.
Policymakers may not wish to know about the finer points of methodology, but
they do need proper caveats about the soundness and durability of a given
formula.
Findings should be interpreted with great caution in areas where little work has
been done and where a particular set of authors has dominated the agenda.
Researchers have a responsibility to present their methods and data for
evaluation and scrutiny by others. They also need to explain any divergence
between previous figures.
The lower figures produced by the revised data would point towards a less
intrusive model of international peacebuilding.
Source: Suhrke, A. and Samset, I., 2007, 'What's in a Figure? Estimating Recurrence of
Civil War', International Peacekeeping, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 195-203
Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Decline
A Mack (2007)
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Summary
Why are there fewer conflicts today? This paper, published by the International Peace
Academy, reviews global trends in political violence since the end of World War II
and examines the decline in conflict numbers following the end of the Cold War. The
single most compelling explanation for the decline in conflict is the upsurge in
peacemaking and peacebuilding activities begun in the early 1990s by international
institutions, donor governments and civil society organisations.
The incidence of violent conflict has fallen rapidly following the end of the Cold War;
falling by some 40% between 1992 and 2005. There has also been a decline in the
number of genocides, wars between countries and military coups. This global pattern
has gone largely unnoticed in the media, much of the policy community and also parts
of the research community.
During the Cold War, armed conflict included wars between government and non-state
actors and extra-state wars of liberation from colonial rule. The overwhelming majority
of post-Cold War armed conflicts have been intrastate, or civil, wars.
38
Wars have become less deadly. The average number of battle deaths per conflict per
year was 38,000 in 1950 and 700 in 2005 – a 98% decrease. However, post-Cold War
civilian deaths, including humanitarian workers, account for 90% of total deaths,
compared with 50% in World War II.
International terrorism has altered the post-Cold War conflict landscape. After an
increase in international terrorism from 1968-1991 and a subsequent decline by the end
of the 1990s, there were four times as many terrorist incidents in 2004 as there were in
2000. Global incidence of domestic terrorism also increased dramatically over the
same period.
There are three major reasons for the post-Cold War decline in armed conflict:
The end of colonialism removed a major source of political violence from the
international system. Anti-colonial struggles were replaced in some cases by
struggles for control of the new post-colonial states, but many of these had
been resolved by the end of the 1980s.
The end of the Cold War removed another source of conflict – ideological
rivalry – from the international system. Washington and Moscow stopped
fuelling proxy wars in the developing world; the threat of war between major
powers vanished.
The single most compelling explanation for the decline in combat is the
substantial increase in missions of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and
peace operations. The success rate of many of these missions has not been
impressive; however, even low success rates are an improvement over the
Cold War years when such activities were notable for their absence.
However, there are still substantial reasons for concern about current conflict around
the world:
A total of 56 conflicts are currently active.
With the exception of Sub-Sahara Africa, all other regions saw an increase in
conflict between 2002 and 2005.
A significant number of current peace agreements are certain to fail.
―Root cause‖ drivers of conflict, such as weak state capacity and extreme
social and economic inequality, remain unchanged or are worsening.
Peacemaking and peacekeeping operations remain under-resourced and risk
being overstretched.
Despite the decline in armed conflict since the end of the Cold War, there is no
room for complacency; it could be reversed in the near future.
Source: Mack, A., 2007, 'Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War
Decline', Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy,
New York
Conflict, Social Change and Conflict Resolution. An Enquiry
C R Mitchell (2005)
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Summary
What is the relationship between conflict and change? How can an understanding of
this relationship help resolve conflicts? This paper from the Research Centre for
Constructive Conflict management sets out a framework for thinking systematically
39
about conflict and change. This distinguishes between change that: produces conflict,
exacerbates conflict, reduces conflict or resolves conflict. While protracted conflict
imposes numerous constraints, one universal factor can lead to change: the fact that
human beings learn and, through learning, change.
As the term ‗protracted conflicts‘ suggests, many deep-rooted social conflicts become
trapped in a repetitive pattern of interaction; usually the exchange of violent behaviour.
The conflict continues because it was there yesterday. In order to bring about changes
in the minds of decision makers and opinion leaders, they must be in an environment
where they can contemplate new ideas, innovative alternatives and realistic options.
Change can relate to conflict formation, escalation, mitigation or resolution.
Three aspects of change are important in generating conflict: The nature of the
change, the intensity of the change and the rapidity of the change. Major,
sudden, unexpected, rapid or irreversible changes are likely to have the most
effect on generating or modifying protracted conflicts.
Escalation refers to changes in the intensity and frequency of coercive and
violent behaviour. Other dynamics involved in the intensification of conflict
include: mobilisation, enlargement (pulling in other parties), polarisation and
dissociation.
Another dynamic of protracted conflicts is entrapment. Parties (especially
leaders) become trapped in a course of action than involves continuing or
intensifying conflict, with little chance of changing policy.
In theory, de-escalation, de-mobilisation, de-isolation, disengagement, re-
communication and de-commitment are conflict mitigating dynamics. There
will obviously be obstacles to the shift from an exacerbating dynamic to a
mitigating one.
There are four types of obstacles to change as a means of overcoming conflict:
Policy determinants, psychological determinants, social determinants and
political determinants.
Basic methods are suggested for bringing about change that is likely to lead towards
conflict resolution or transformation:
Changing leaders: ‗Regime change‘ seems to bring about more conflicts than
it resolves. But the change from one leadership group to another can bring in
individuals who are not as tied to past policies as their predecessors.
Changing leaders‘ and followers‘ minds: This is likely a problematic and
drawn out process. People do learn and change, especially if placed in an
appropriate environment. But conflicts are the worst environment for bringing
about changes in goals, interests and underlying beliefs.
Changing strategies, policies and behaviour: This is linked to changing
people‘s minds, but there is debate over what comes first. The public nature of
this behavioural component puts it centre stage in initial resolution efforts.
Conciliatory gestures are sought, communication channels opened and truces
negotiated.
Changing parties‘ environments: Some obstacles will be removed by major
structural changes in the parties‘ environment. These may change the
availability of whatever is in dispute, render it irrelevant, remove threats of
render other problems more pressing.
Tasks have to be carried out by a number of change agents working together
to overcome obstacles to resolution. These include monitoring, exploring,
unifying, developing skills, initiating and facilitating talks, providing
40
resources and legitimacy, reassuring adversaries and imposing any necessary
sanctions.
Source: Mitchell, C.R., 2005, 'Conflict, Social Change and Conflict Resolution. An
Enquiry', Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, Berlin
Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On Using Knowledge to Improve
Peacebuilding Operations
S Woodward (2007)
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Summary
A focus on ―root causes‖ of civil war would not improve peacebuilding interventions
and could even be counterproductive. This paper, published by the Journal of
Intervention and Statebuilding, disputes the explanation that interventions fail in part
because they fail to address root causes of civil war. The most pressing question for
peacebuilding missions is not why civil war occurs, but how we intervene and improve
on currently inadequate results.
A debate is now taking place among scholars about whether international interventions
in civil wars in the 1990s were successful. Interventionists argue that the recent decline
in armed conflicts is due to the increased use of peacebuilding missions. Realists argue
that while wars may have declined, armed conflict has increased. More peacekeeping
missions (including second-tour missions) are evidence that the problem is the failure
to intervene successfully.
Both sides are correct: A normative consensus on intervention now exists. The current
problem is inadequate intervention outcomes.
A major obstacle to addressing outcomes is the conventional explanation that the cause
of intervention failure is the failure to address the root causes of conflict. This
explanation has two difficulties: 1) it is so widespread that it prevents careful research
on intervention policies, practices and consequences and 2) it is probably wrong.
There are three reasons, based on academic research, why a focus on root causes of
conflict will not improve the outcomes and effectiveness of peacemaking
interventions:
Knowledge on the causes of civil war: Research in the 1990s argued that civil
war is caused, inter alia, by ethnic conflict, rebel movements seeking
economic gain and authoritarian rule. These arguments have had a significant
influence on development policies. While they have been discredited or
superseded by newer scholarship, the policy world has not adjusted to the
criticisms and newer research.
Causes vs. outcomes: emerging knowledge: New academic research argues
that two other aspects of war are more important than root causes: 1) changes
wrought by war itself (social, economic and the effects of violence), and 2) the
political arrangements necessary to settle power struggles and limit the use of
violence.
Motivations for intervention: Motivations for intervention are generally based
on ideology, national security, strategic and bureaucratic interests. They have
nothing to do with the causes of conflict and will always take priority.
Programme strategies, objectives and templates are pre-determined. Time
41
pressures abound; even practitioners interested in investigating root causes and
designing programmes to respond to them do not have the time to do so.
We have seen a substantial increase in our knowledge of the causes of civil war, the
politics of intervention and the consequences of current policies of post-war
reconstruction and stabilisation. The assertion of failure to address root causes of civil
war in peacekeeping processes is certainly amenable to examination. But international
intervention can be productive without confronting the invariably contested causes of
war; there is need for much more research on the causes of peace and their policy
implications.
Source: Woodward, S.L., 2007, 'Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On Using
Knowledge to Improve Peacebuilding Operations', Journal of Intervention and
Statebuilding, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 143-170
Supplementary readings
Post-Conflict Risks
P Collier et al (2006)
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Summary
What are the most important factors in determining the durability of peace in post-
conflict countries? This paper from the Centre for the Study of African Economies
(CSAE) reports on the results of a statistical study of post-conflict risks and the impact
of military, political, social, economic and temporal factors on peace. While post-
conflict political design of constitutional structures and elections may have intrinsic
value, they do not increase the probability of enduring peace. Rather, peace appears to
depend on robust external military assistance sustaining gradual economic recovery.
The predominant theory of conflict emphasises conditions that determine the feasibility
of rebellion as more important than motivation. The most important indicators of
feasibility of rebellion are low per capita income, slow economic growth and large
exports of natural resources. Yet current post-conflict policy addresses the risk of
return to conflict primarily through political design, implying that motivation -
grievances based on political exclusion - is the chief cause of conflict. If the feasibility
theory of conflict is applied to post-conflict situations, economic and military
instruments might be more important than political mechanisms in reducing the risk of
a return to conflict.
The lower the per capita income of the country at the end of the conflict, the
more likely it is that it will return to conflict. Economic development reduces
risks, but it takes a long time.
Peacekeeping expenditures significantly reduce the risks of further conflict.
Post-conflict elections neither increase nor decrease risk of conflict. During an
election year the society experiences a lull that is followed by a resurgence of
risk. Elections can also generate a misleading signal of calm.
The degree of democracy or autocracy has no significant effects on risks. In
fact, severe autocracy appears to be highly successful in maintaining post-
conflict peace.
42
The risk of a return to conflict during the first four post-conflict years is 23%.
During the subsequent six years it is 17%. For policy purposes, the entire post-
conflict decade faces a high level of risk.
These findings have a number of policy implications:
International post-conflict efforts should be concentrated disproportionately in
the poorest countries and should focus heavily upon economic recovery.
Elections should not be treated as a systemic solution to the problem of post-
conflict risk. They should be promoted as intrinsically desirable rather than as
mechanisms to improve the chances for peace.
There are limits to how much past conflict situations can be a guide to the
future. Nevertheless, because post-conflict issues are so burdened with
ideology and political glamour, statistical analysis can be a useful antidote to
other influences on post-conflict policy.
Source: Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Soderbom, M., 2006, ‗Post-Conflict Risks‘,
CSAE Working Paper Series no. 12, Centre for the Study of African Economies,
University of Oxford, Oxford
True Worlds: A Transitional Perspective
J Galtung (1981)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Source: Galtung, J., (1981) ‗True Worlds: A Transitional Perspective‘, New York:
The Free Press, pp. 1-4, 19-24, 41-79.
Destructive Escalation
M Maiese (2003)
Access full text online
Abstract
Escalation refers to an increase in the intensity of a conflict and in the severity of
tactics used in pursuing it. It is driven by changes within each of the parties, new
patterns of interaction between them, and the involvement of new parties in the
struggle. When conflicts escalate, more people tend to become involved. Parties begin
to make bigger and stronger threats and impose harsher negative sanctions. Violence
may start, or if violence has already occurred it may become more severe and/or
widespread as the number of participants involved in the conflict increases, and a
greater proportion of a state's citizens actively engage in fighting. Destructively waged
conflicts typically involve great losses for one or more of the contending parties, and
tend to persist for a long time. To avoid these negative consequences, a better
understanding of the dynamics of escalation is needed.
Source: Maiese, M., 2003, ‗Destructive Escalation‘, Burgess, G. and Heidi Burgess,
H., (eds), Beyond Intractability, Conflict Research Consortium, University of
Colorado, Boulder
43
1.4 Human rights, international humanitarian law and other relevant
legal standards
Core readings
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights: Similarities and Differences International Committee of the Red Cross (2003)
Access full text online
Summary
What are the similarities and differences between international humanitarian law (IHL)
and international human rights law (IHRL)? This paper from the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) explains the main principles behind IHL and
IHRL, briefly outlining when and how they are applied, who is bound by them and
who is protected by them. Both IHL and IHRL strive to protect the lives, health and
dignity of individuals, albeit from a different angle.
While very different in formulation, the essence of some of the rules is similar, if not
identical. Rules of IHL deal with many issues that are outside the purview of IHRL,
such as the conduct of hostilities, combatant and prisoner of war status and the
protection of the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems. Similarly, IHRL deals with
aspects of life in peacetime that are not regulated by IHL, such as freedom of the press,
the right to assembly, to vote and to strike.
International humanitarian law:
Is a set of international rules, established by treaty or custom, which are
specifically intended to solve humanitarian problems directly arising from
international or non-international armed conflicts.
Is applicable in times of armed conflict, whether international or non-
international.
Binds all actors to an armed conflict - it lays down rules that are applicable to
both state and non-state actors.
Imposes obligations on individuals and also provides that persons may be held
individually criminally responsible.
Aims to protect persons who do not, or are no longer taking part in hostilities.
Is supervised by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,
which ensures protection and assistance to victims of war, encourages states to
implement their IHL obligations and promotes and develops IHL.
International human rights law:
Is a set of international rules, established by treaty or custom, on the basis of
which individuals and groups can expect and/or claim certain behaviour or
benefits from governments.
Can be applied (in principle) at all times. Although, some IHRL treaties permit
governments to derogate from certain rights in situations of public emergency
threatening the life of the nation.
Lays down rules binding governments in their relations with individuals.
Does not impose specific duties on individuals but does provide for individual
criminal responsibility for violations that may constitute international crimes.
Has a supervisory system consisting of bodies established either by the United
Nations Charter or by the main IHRL treaties.
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Source: ICRC, 2003, ‗International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights –
Similarities and Differences?‘ Geneva.
Human Rights: A Source of Conflict, State Making, and State Breaking
M Lund (2006)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
How can international legal standards for human rights be enforced during intrastate
violent conflicts? Can human rights violators be brought to justice after wars have
ended without causing more conflict? This research by the Woodrow Wilson Center
argues that the risk of intrastate conflict needs to be approached in a more
dispassionate, contextualised and multidimensional way. A higher priority should be
given to the desire for improved livelihoods and the need for security, instead of
instant democracy and civil and political rights.
Many developing countries have been caught in the global conflict between political
and economic patrimonialism and greater pluralism. Although most developing and
post-Soviet societies have democratised peacefully, new destructive conflicts have
arisen over the changes. Violence has occurred where the change from the old system
to a more pluralistic system could not be managed through existing or emerging
institutions. Differing human rights come into conflict with one another and the
discourse of human rights can contribute to violent conflict.
The weakness of the postcolonial and post-Cold War institutions in the countries
succumbing to conflict can be traced in part to a precipitous and often chaotic adoption
of democratic and economic institutions and policies.
Many of the states achieved statehood through the unilateral policy decisions
of more powerful states.
Hampered by debt, high oil prices and a lack of competitive exports, they
lacked the resources for governing through providing public services to their
populations.
Rather than being failed states, many are unformed nations - they have not
developed enforceable laws, constitutionally based institutions, national
markets and internalised cultural incentives for cross-societal cooperation.
Though liberal policies may eventually be beneficial, in the short run the shift
toward more political and economic openness has led to violent conflict.
These countries have not been given the time to develop a liberal state, which
is a distinct form of social order and is built up over time through a particular
choice of government policies.
The challenge for the international community is to reconcile competing notions of
rights as old orders are giving way to new ones, so that the tensions and disputes that
arise do not lead to the outbreak of violent conflict but instead lead to peaceful change.
Outside parties must avoid viewing conflicts as a clash of right versus wrong
rather than a clash of competing concepts of rights in a larger global process of
modernisation.
Well-intentioned advocacy for human rights on behalf of a vulnerable group
may put that group at greater risk by tempting more powerful forces to react.
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A gradualist yet activist approach to liberalisation is required involving more
money behind smart forms of economic and political development.
Prioritising social and economic rights and the protection of human life may
be more effective than promoting full democracy, especially if that means
violent upheaval.
Incentives for evolutionary change are likely to be more effective than forceful
intervention.
Individual countries need to be assessed as to how much conflict they can
manage successfully. A standardised approach should be avoided.
Source: Lund, M., 2006, 'Human Rights: A Source of Conflict, State Making, and State
Breaking', in Mertus, J.A., and J. Helsing (eds.), Human Rights and Conflict:
Exploring the Links between Human Rights, Conflict, and Peacebuilding, USIP Press,
Washington
Exploring the Intersection between Human Rights and Conflict
J Mertus and J Helsing (2006)
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Summary
What is the relationship between human rights and conflict? This book, edited by the
American University, brings together a range of views from authors in different fields
to analyse the complexities and dynamics of how the two are connected. Human rights,
humanitarian law and conflict resolution approaches prioritise individual human
dignity, humane conduct in war and the promotion of peace respectively. Whilst
sometimes these different priorities compete and tradeoffs are necessary, the book
considers ways that they can also complement one another.
Violent conflicts grow out of the quest for self-determination, demands for fair access
to resources and resistance to discrimination. Human rights abuses create cycles of
dehumanisation based on fear. The denial of human rights can engender and intensify
conflict and so can the demand for those same rights. The state‘s inability to protect
basic human rights and provide mechanisms for the civil resolution of conflict may
prompt groups to use force in pressing their demands.
There are three main schools of thought on the relationship between human rights and
conflict. The human rights approach stresses the importance of exposing the truth
about governmental abuses and bringing an end to injustices. The conflict resolution
perspective focuses on resolving, managing, preventing or transforming violent
conflict through mediation, negotiation or use of force. The humanitarian law approach
is concerned with the conduct of war and the protection of civilians during armed
conflict.
Viewed from these different angles, several important connections emerge in the
relationship between human rights and conflict.
If human rights abuses and injustice are buried, conflict resolution and
reconciliation will be undermined.
Truth and reconciliation commissions enable divided societies to reunite more
easily than courts.
46
Refugees can destabilise a region by upsetting social balances and changing
economic and demographic distributions and thereby precipitating new human
rights abuses.
Efforts to ensure effective human rights protections during the peace process
may run counter to the conflict resolution strategy. Human rights can become
a tool between groups competing for political power.
Neutrality may not always be possible in delivering humanitarian relief and
protecting human rights.
The different approaches share a commitment to maximising human dignity and
minimising civilian harm. The challenge is to integrate their perspectives in a way that
best responds to the nature of conflict.
For human rights and conflict resolution to complement each other, it is
important not to focus solely on respect for human rights while ignoring the
need to end violent conflict.
Human rights must be combined with efforts to produce a more productive
economy and a more legitimate and effective government.
Donors need to help develop the capacity of local institutions and governments
to provide and deliver humanitarian relief and protect human rights.
While force can be an effective means of preventing genocide, restraint should
be exercised in using armed force to respond to humanitarian crises. It is
dangerous for powerful states to act unilaterally.
The international community can help build civil society institutions, develop
justice mechanisms and fund human rights education. It must understand the
unique circumstances of each conflict.
Source: Mertus, J. A., and J. Helsing, 2006, 'Introduction: Exploring Intersection
between Human Rights and Conflict', in Idem (eds), Human Rights and Conflict:
Exploring the Links between Human Rights, Conflict, and Peacebuilding, USIP Press,
Washington
DFID Human Rights Review: A Review of how DFID has Integrated Human
Rights into its Work
L-H Piron and F Watkins (2004)
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Summary
What lessons can be learned from the UK Department for International Development
(DFID)'s human rights work in a range of sectors and initiatives, particularly at the
country level? How can human rights make a contribution to poverty reduction? This
paper from DFID's Reaching the Very Poorest Team in the Policy Division documents
DFID's human rights activities in a number of domains. It is designed to serve as a
reference document, and contains a number of practical recommendations.
Until the end of the Cold War, human rights and development were kept as separate
domains. From the late 1990s onwards, a number of international development
agencies and non-governmental organisations have attempted to integrate human rights
or have officially adopted human rights-based approaches to development. There is
now a large body of work integrating human rights into development policy and
programmes supported by DFID at the international, national and sectoral/thematic
47
levels and in different country contexts, and an important constituency of DFID staff
developing innovative approaches and activities in this area.
DFID's experiences with human rights at central, country and sectoral level show that
human rights add value for poverty reduction at several levels:
Normative: They provide a normative framework at international, national and
regional levels and help to hold state and other actors accountable; aim to
transform state-society relations and put people at the centre of development
processes; make a unique contribution to policy debates and can lead to more
effective poverty eradication.
Analytical: They can help in setting development objectives and identifying
the causes and characteristics of poverty; emphasise power relations,
participation and related issues; provide a framework for identifying
obligations and provide tangible benchmarks to be achieved.
Operational: They provide standards for framing discussions that can
challenge the status quo; highlight the importance of linking supply and
demand-side initiatives; can influence the design of aid instruments to gain a
sharper focus on gains for the poor; help to put in practice an approach best
suited to the local context.
There needs to be greater coherence in DFID's work on human rights. The overall
policy framework and DFID's own human rights obligations should be clarified,
developing greater consistency of knowledge and application of human rights across
the organisation. DFID should also promote an aid coherence agenda across UK
government agencies, which puts human rights for all the centre of the impact of UK
policies on developing countries. Other specific policy recommendations for DFID are:
Develop mechanisms to learn better and more systematically from ongoing
activities (in particular in relation to country programmes, international
organisations and civil society).
Undertake reviews to synthesise knowledge to date in key areas.
Undertake work on human rights indicators and other ways of measuring
progress.
Prepare practical guidance for staff (including training, a 'live' resource,
effective support to country and policy teams, and ongoing learning with
external actors).
Develop more policy and research around economic and social rights, the link
between governance and the realisation of human rights for all and an
understanding of experiences with the implementation of conditionality.
Source: Piron, L-H. and Watkins, F., 2004, 'DFID Human Rights Review: A Review of
How DFID Has Integrated Human Rights into its Work', Overseas Development
Institute, Report prepared for the Department for International Development
Supplementary readings
The Laws of War on Land
G Aldrich (2000)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Source: Aldrich, G.H., 2000, ‗The Laws of War on Land,‘ in American Journal of
International Law, vol. 94, no. 1 (January), pp. 42-63.
48
Practical Guidance to Implementing Rights Based Approaches, Human Rights
Analyses for Poverty Reduction and Human Rights Benchmarks
E Filmer-Wilson
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Summary
To what extent are human rights being incorporated into development programmes?
How can a human rights-based approach best be developed? This report, by the UK
Government Department for International Development (DFID), brings together
material collated from development organisations in four key areas: practical guidance
on rights-based approaches, including case studies and checklists; analytical tools
which feature human rights for understanding the causes and characteristics of poverty;
human rights impact assessment; and human rights indicators to measure development
progress.
Because of different working contexts, development organisations vary in their
approach to human rights and to the human rights-based approach to development
(RBA). Some prefer tools and methodologies that focus on issues such as "global
governance" and "social accountability", which reflect and include key human rights
principles. Many bi-lateral development organisations recognise the potential
contribution of rights-based approaches and have formulated policy to reflect this.
However, most agencies are only beginning to explore ways to implement their rights-
based policy and have not yet developed their own tools. There is broad agreement,
from both the Donor and NGO community that a lot more work needs to be done at a
practical level. So far:
A few basic tools for human rights analyses of poverty have been developed
and are being used in the field.
These tools have helped staff to focus on the relationship between the right-
holders and duty-bearers in their poverty alleviation work.
Most development organisations have separated gender and social exclusion
from human rights and have produced specific tools for each area.
Human rights impact assessment is an area of increasing interest. Yet
assessment tools are only now being developed and pilot tested.
Almost no work has been done on the use of human rights indicators in
development projects.
No donor governments are yet using human rights indicators as a basis for
dialogue with recipient governments, although a number are exploring ways of
doing this.
Before human rights indicators can be used, a conceptual and methodological approach
to human rights indicators needs to be developed. Below is a summary of the key
recommendations from development staff on practical guidance for implementing a
RBA. Many of the guidelines included in this report are still at the pilot stage.
An integrated approach to human rights mainstreaming is needed: staff want a
single tool that includes gender, social exclusion.
Simply providing training designed to introduce staff to the RBA and its
implications, and then leaving people to get on with developing programmes
from a RBA, is not sufficient.
It is not possible to programme by just using human rights principles. This can
easily become very legalistic and dogmatic.
49
There need to be clear incentives to integrate a RBA. Staff performance
appraisals, for example, should reflect RBA.
Better co-ordination across portfolios is needed: strong linkages across
projects would bring great value.
Agencies could establish a standing RBA team, which would work to
mainstream human rights in the programme. To do this effectively, staff would
need sufficient resources and formal recognition of their roles.
Source: Filmer-Wilson, E., 2005, ‗Practical Guidance to Implementing Rights Based
Approaches, Human Rights Analyses for Poverty Reduction and Human Rights
Benchmarks‘, Report prepared for the Department for International Development
(DFID), London
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols Original Texts
(1949)
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Abstract
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are part of international
humanitarian law – a whole system of legal safeguards that cover the way wars may be
fought and the protection of individuals. They specifically protect people who do not
take part in the fighting (civilians, medics, chaplains, aid workers) and those who can
no longer fight (wounded, sick and shipwrecked troops, prisoners of war).
The Conventions and their Protocols call for measures to be taken to prevent (or put an
end to) what are known as "grave breaches"; those responsible for breaches must be
punished.
200 Wars and the Humanitarian Response
J Hanlon (2007)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
More than two hundred wars have been fought in the past half century. Nearly all have
been civil wars, and at the beginning of the twenty-first century, more than thirty civil
wars were being fought. The ―rules‖ of interstate war do not apply; each atrocity
provokes retribution, and civil war takes on a brutal dynamic of its own. Civil War,
Civil Peace challenges common but simplistic explanations of war, including greed,
gender, and long-standing religious or ethnic hatreds, which ignore that these groups
have lived together in peace for centuries. When a cease-fire is arranged, aid workers,
military personnel, diplomats, and others pour in from the United States, Europe, and
international agencies. Outside help is essential after a war, but too often, well-
intentioned interveners do more harm than good. A half of civil wars have resumed
after failed peace agreements. Each war is different, and there can be no intervention
handbook or best practices guide. Aimed at practitioners and policy makers, and
essential reading for students of war, humanitarian intervention, peace building, and
development, Civil War, Civil Peace provides a comprehensive examination of how
50
interventions can be improved through a better understanding of the roots of war and
of the grievances and interests that fueled the war.
Source: Hanlon, J, 2007, ‗200 Wars and the Humanitarian Response.‘ In Yanacopulos,
H. and Hanlon, J. (eds.), Civil War, Civil Peace. Open University in association with
James Currey, Oxford and Ohio University Press, Athens, OH, pp. 18-48.
International Humanitarian Law – Answers to your Questions
ICRC (2002)
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Abstract
This report defines international humanitarian law in answer to questions regarding its
origins, characteristics and implementation.
Source: ICRC, 2002, ‗International Humanitarian Law – Answers to your Questions,‘
International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva (October).
Human Rights and Sustainable Peace
T Putnam (2002)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
Why do some peace agreements successfully end civil wars, while others fail? What
strategies are most effective in ensuring that warring parties comply with their treaty
commitments? Of the various tasks involved in implementing peace agreements,
which are the most important? These and related questions--life and death issues for
millions of people today--are the subject of Ending Civil Wars.
Based on a study of every intrastate war settlement between 1980 and 1998 in which
international actors played a key role, Ending Civil Wars is the most comprehensive,
systematic study to date of the implementation of peace agreements--of what happens
after the treaties are signed. Covering both broad strategies and specific tasks and
presenting a wealth of rich case material, the authors find that failure most often is
related not only to the inherent difficulty of a particular case, but also to the major
powers' perception that they have no vital security interest in ending a civil war.
Source: Putnam, T.L. (2002) ‗Human Rights and Sustainable Peace‘, in Stedman , S. J.
et al. (eds), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Boulder
CO: Lynne-Rienner Publishers, pp. 237-272.
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1.5 The role of gender in conflict issues
Core readings
Gender Equality and Civil Wars
M Caprioli (2003)
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Summary
What is the link between gender equality and civil war? This paper published by the
World Bank reports on a study measuring gender inequality against the occurrence of
intrastate conflict. Applying a number of theories on gender inequality and violence,
the study tested the hypothesis that the higher the fertility rate, the greater the
likelihood that a state will experience intrastate conflict. Results indicate that states
with high fertility rates are twice as likely to experience internal conflict as states with
low fertility rates.
Gender determines, inter alia, roles and power relationships. Women in all countries
suffer from some degree of gender inequality and discrimination and are subject to
varying degrees of exploitation, control, fragmentation and marginalisation. Extreme
and systematic inequality leads to political violence.
Structural violence (systematic exploitation that becomes part of the social order) and
cultural violence (including violent relations between men and women) create the
justification for violence. Gender is an integral aspect of both forms of violence, as it
forms the basis of structural inequality in all countries.
Nationalism is not gender neutral. Gendered nationalistic rhetoric has traditionally
framed gender roles: Briefly put, women are biological reproducers (group survival)
and men are defenders of the country (national survival). High fertility rates are
themselves a result of gender discrimination.
This study finds that gender inequality increases the likelihood that a state will
experience internal conflict. Fertility rate is highly significant: States with high fertility
rates are twice as likely to experience internal conflict as states with low fertility rates.
Other findings include:
A state with an at-risk minority is nearly three and a half times more likely to
experience internal conflict.
When the regime type measure isolates regimes in transition between
autocratic and democratic forms of government, these regimes are more likely
to experience conflict.
The state capability score is not significant, nor are GDP per capita and
average GDP per capita growth rate.
The most important implication of this study is the need to lower fertility rates in order
to improve the health of women and increase their ability to participate in paid labour.
This improved economic position will help women develop a sense of empowerment
and, ultimately, contribute to increased gender equality.
However, lowering fertility rates is only part of the larger problem of gender
inequality. Other recommended responses to the implications of this study include the
following:
52
Provide opportunities for women within state-level organisations and through
policies such as micro-level economic loans to women.
Develop state economic growth policies that target women.
Clarify the rights of women in international law and policy.
Enforce existing international law and policies on the protection of women‘s
rights within states.
Support the international tracking of women‘s rights and aggressively target
women‘s issues.
To better understand the link between gender inequality and violence, gather
and disseminate better measures of women‘s equality relative to men.
Source: Caprioli, M., 2003, 'Gender Equality and Civil Wars', World Bank Conflict
Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, Working Paper No. 8. World Bank, Washington
Women, Peace and Security
United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force (2002)
Access full text online
Summary
How does armed conflict impact on women? What role do women play in the peace
process? This study is an initiative undertaken in response to Security Council
resolution 1325 on women, peace and security adopted in October 2000. While it
shows that many positive steps have been taken to implement the resolution, women
still form a minority of those who participate in peace and security negotiations, and
receive less attention than men in post-conflict agreements, disarmament and
reconstruction.
In contemporary conflicts civilians are targets and as such have been subjected to high
levels of violence. The specific experience of women and girls in armed conflict is
linked to their status in societies. Where cultures of violence and discrimination against
women exist prior to conflict, they will be exacerbated during conflict. This study
draws on existing research and includes input from the UN and local international
NGOs. The challenge remains the full implementation of the landmark document that
resolution 1325 represents.
Changes in armed conflict over the last decade have affected women and girls:
Women are often viewed as bearers of cultural identity and become prime
targets of violence.
Women and girls are not only victims of armed conflict; they are also active
agents and participants in conflict.
Even where women and girls were actively involved in sustaining and
rebuilding local economies and communities throughout the conflict they are
frequently pushed to the background when formal peace negotiations begin.
Conflict may create space for a temporary redefinition of social relations, but
often does not change them fundamentally. Gains made are usually reversed
after the end of the conflict.
A focus on gender mainstreaming in conflict and post-conflict situations
involves recognising that women, girls, men and boys participate in and
experience conflict, peace processes and post-conflict recovery differently.
53
Women are often actively involved in informal peace processes, but are often
largely absent from formal peace processes.
The increased participation of women within humanitarian, peacebuilding and
peacekeeping operations is crucial if UN goals and mandates regarding gender
equality, non-discrimination and human rights are to be realised.
The United Nations and international agencies should:
Recognise the extent of violations of the human rights of women and girls
during armed conflict and take measures to prevent such violations.
Incorporate information on the impact of armed conflict and the impact of
interventions on women and girls, and on the roles and contributions of
women and girls in conflict situations into all training provided to staff.
Take steps to ensure that victims of gender-based and sexual violence and any
other forms of violence during armed conflict have the right to reparations for
damages incurred.
Prosecute all perpetrators of crimes of gender-based and sexual violence
directed at women and girls in situations of armed conflict, including UN
international and local personnel.
Ensure full involvement of women in negotiations of peace agreements at
national and international levels, including through provision of training for
women and women‘s organisations on formal peace processes.
Incorporate gender perspectives explicitly into mandates of all peacekeeping
missions.
Source: United Nations, 2002, 'Women, Peace and Security', Study submitted by the
Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), United
Nations, New York
Supplementary readings
Human Security and Peacebuilding Through a Gender Lens
H Hudson (2006)
Access full text online
Summary
Why is it so difficult to translate an awareness of gender injustice into workable plans
for post-conflict reconstruction? Evidence shows that while women are largely absent
from formal peace negotiations, they do make a significant contribution at the
grassroots level. Yet this gender awareness has not been incorporated into practice.
This paper from the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) draws on African
feminism to argue for a balanced position between cultural relativism and a ‗one size
fits all‘ solution to this problem.
Under a people-centred approach to security, peacebuilding must be assessed in terms
of freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to choose. Both liberal feminist
approaches (which pursue equality) and standpoint feminism (which tends towards
gender stereotyping) offer unsatisfactory explanations of women‘s role in
peacebuilding. Alternative approaches can risk cultural relativism - an over reliance on
difference which weakens women‘s ability to speak for each other. Finding a balance
between these two extremes may offer an approach that is culturally relevant but not
54
deterministic. African feminists use the concept of ‗womanism‘, which emphasises
cultural context, the centrality of the family and importance of cooperation with men.
Examining the role of women in times of war and peace, particularly in African
countries, reveals that:
Though sexual violence is high during conflict, making assumptions about
women‘s roles, needs and priorities can reaffirm victimhood and ignore
context-specific factors. It is a myth to assume that women are not associated
with violence.
Gains made in gender relations during conflict are easily reversed in the
aftermath. Reconstruction and rehabilitation often implies going back to how
things were. The conflict to peace transition is therefore crucial, but also
complex.
Gender-related issues can threaten this transition. Women activists may be
preoccupied by human rights violations and basic service provision, leaving
warring parties to strike deals without them.
Gender perspectives are not systematically included in the planning,
implementation, monitoring and reporting of any area of peace and security
work.
The pursuit of gender equality is part of developing accountable, transparent
governance. Peace agreements brokered under the guidance of the West often
concentrate on civil and political rights, with human rights added as an after-
thought.
Progress has been made in developing a rights-based international framework that can
guide work in this area. The challenge is to translate policies into meaningful context-
specific action. Recommendations include:
The creation of an international women‘s agency within the UN. This should
overcome the UN‘s fragmented dealings with women‘s issues and women‘s
human rights.
The establishment of a Council of African Women Mediators comprising
women from civil society and women who no longer hold government
positions. Such a group could liaise between the African Union and the
African Women‘s movement.
Before negotiations, efforts should be made to increase women‘s participation
in peace talks, planning of demilitarisation, demobilisation and reintegration
(DDR) and determining governance and security structures.
Governments of societies in transition should ensure policies are firmly
grounded in a gender equality and human rights framework. It is important
that women are empowered in governance and citizenship and that women‘s
organisations are supported.
Source: Hudson, H., 2006, 'Human Security and Peacebuilding Through a Gender
Lens', DIIS Working Paper no. 2006/ 37, Danish Institute for International Studies,
Copenhagen
Engendering Development: Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and
Voice
E King (2001)
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Access full text online
Abstract
"Engendering Development - Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and
Voice" is a Policy Research Report by the World Bank focusing on gender issues and
their broad economic and social implications in developing and transitional countries.
The report examines the conceptual and empirical links between gender, public policy,
and development outcomes. The evidence presented shows that societies that
discriminate by gender tend to experience less rapid economic growth and poverty
reduction than societies that treat males and females more equally. To promote gender
equality, the report proposes a 3-part strategy emphasizing (i) institutional reforms that
promote equal rights for women and men; (ii) policies for sustained economic
development; and (iii) active measures to redress persistent gender disparities.
Source: King, E., 2001, Engendering Development: Through Gender Equality in
Rights, Resources, and Voice, World Bank Policy Research Report, New York:
Oxford University Press.
Women and War – An Overview
C Lindsey (2000)
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Abstract
This article aims to draw attention to the multifaceted ways in which women
experience armed conflict and, to a limited extent, to some of the activities of the
International Committee of the Red Cross to assist and protect women.
Source: Lindsey, C., 2000, ‗Women and War – An Overview.‘ In International Review
of the Red Cross, No. 839, pp. 561-579.
Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Issues and Sources
B Sorensen (1998)
Access full text online
Abstract
Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Issues and Sources is a review of literature
dealing with political, economic and social reconstruction from a gender perspective.
One of its objectives is to go beyond conventional images of women as victims of war,
and to document the many different ways in which women make a contribution to the
rebuilding of countries emerging from armed conflicts. Special attention is given to
women's priority concerns, to their resources and capacities, and to structural and
situational factors that may reduce their participation in reconstruction processes. A
second aim is to shed light on how post-war reconstruction processes influence the
reconfiguration of gender roles and positions in the wake of war, and how women's
actions shape the construction of post-war social structures.
Source: Sorensen, B., 1998, ‗Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Issues and
Sources‘, WSP Occasional Paper #3, Geneva: UNRISD.
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2. Tools for Conflict Analysis and Monitoring Conflict Escalation and
De-escalation
2.1 Conflict tools, methodologies, theory and practice, (Strategic
Conflict Assessments and other analytical tools)
UK Government Policy
Public Information Note: Drivers of Change
DFID (2004)
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Summary
How can donors improve their knowledge to support effective change in developing
countries? This note explains the Drivers of Change approach and its impact on the
Department for International Development‘s (DFID) policies and programmes. Drivers
of Change analysis recognises that institutional performance is important to
understanding change processes and how they impact upon the poor. It focuses on
formal and informal rules, power structures, vested interests and incentives within
institutions.
A single blueprint approach to Drivers of Change analysis is inappropriate. DFID
country offices were encouraged to ask themselves a structured set of questions about
the dynamics of pro-poor change. These were loosely grouped into one of six levels:
basic country analysis; medium-term dynamics of change, including policy processes;
role of external forces, including donors; links between change and poverty reduction;
operational implications, covering how to translate understanding into action; and how
DFID works, including organisational incentives affecting the retention of country
knowledge.
A conceptual model was developed to incorporate and better understand the interaction
between components affecting both positive and negative change. Agents can affect
structural features and vice versa. However, the impact of one on the other is mediated
through institutions:
Agents refers to individuals and organizations pursuing particular interests,
including political elites; civil servants; political parties; local government;
judiciary; military; faith groups; trade unions; civil society; media; private
sector; academics; and donors.
Structural features includes the history of state formation; natural and human
resources; economic and social structures; demographic change; regional
influences and integration; globalisation, trade and investment; and
urbanisation. These are deeply embedded and often slow to change.
Institutions include the rules governing the behaviour of agents, such as
political and public administration processes. They include the informal and
formal rules. Institutions are more susceptible to change in the medium term
than structural features.
Individual country studies and reports, in addition to a range of services, tools and
training courses, have enabled a critical mass of DFID country offices to adopt a
Drivers of Change approach. The reported benefits have included:
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Making explicit and challenging the assumptions behind current programmes.
Making clear the extent of ‗political will‘ for reform and determining the risk
this poses to a programme‘s success.
Prompting country teams to revise and extend programme timetables to take
account of the country context.
Identifying the role that non-poor groups have in change processes, including
collaboration with non-traditional partners.
Prompting a country team not to pursue a programme of work by providing
evidence that it is unlikely to succeed at present.
Enabling staff from different disciplines and backgrounds to debate and share
diverse perspectives. This has contributed to team building and goal sharing
and is anticipated to also strengthen the institutional memory of offices.
Source: Department for International Development, 2004, 'Public Information Note:
Drivers of Change', DFID, London
Strategic Conflict Assessments: An Initial Review
DFID 2005
Document is restricted to DFID only access – please contact e-library
Department for International Development, 2005, ‗Strategic Conflict Assessments: An
Initial Review‘, DFID, London
Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes
J Goodhand, T Vaux, and R Walker (2002)
Access full text online
Summary
The vast majority of serious armed conflicts today are not between states but are
internal or regional in nature. This makes conflict analyses complicated, but all the
more crucial for any intervention in a country experiencing conflict. How best to
proceed?
These guidance notes from the Department for International Development (DFID)
explain the principles and methodology of conducting effective strategic conflict
analyses (SCAs). DFID's SCAs have three key aims: to map out causes and trends in a
conflict; analysis of international responses to it; and development of future policy
options. An abridged example is given as an appendix to the guide, along with sources
of further information. SCAs should include international factors, risks and impacts of
development interventions, and suggestions for making policies more conflict-
sensitive. Flexibility is key: adapt SCAs to the end user's needs; be aware of the nature
and phase of conflict; identify particular actors and triggers which could cause latent
tensions to erupt into conflict.
A multi-leveled approach to SCAs is advocated because conflicts have multiple
structural causes, and actors and interests all may vary over time. Root causes can
become less relevant in protracted cases where the conflict itself has generated new
dynamics.
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A political economy approach is useful. Analyse the interests of those
involved in conflict and their motivations for continuing/desisting in terms of
'greed' (opportunities for predatory accumulation) and 'grievance' (negative
reactions from disadvantaged).
Analyse structures: underlying political, economic, military and social factors.
Analyse actors: specific interests, capacities, peace agendas and relationships
between them; also what incentives could encourage peace- making.
Analyse dynamics: long-term trends, triggers for violence, capacities for
containing conflict, likely future scenarios.
Conduct all of the above at local, national, regional and international levels
and determine key factors for each.
Map international responses in a similar fashion - different actors, even within
governments, often have different interests and their policies may undercut
each other in the field.
Analysis should not only describe the conflict situation itself, but also the relationships
between conflict and development or aid interventions. Typically, interventions work
around conflict, seeing it as an obstacle to be coped with. This considers the impact of
conflict on interventions, but not vice-versa. Instead they should work in conflict
ensuring that interventions do not inadvertently exacerbate tensions or on conflict
actively seeking to contain or end it. SCAs provide the basis for coordinating and
developing appropriate responses to conflict:
Determine whether existing interventions are likely to have a negative effect on
tensions through opportunities for greed and grievance.
Consider whether development funding is significant compared to other
finances and whether conflict actors are therefore susceptible to pressure.
Look for structural tensions such as poor governance or inequitable distribution
of development benefits which interventions could influence.
Share analysis, forge common approaches with other external actors, and aim
to sensitise them to conflict issues. An economic policy prescription may be
good in a general analysis, for instance, but could trigger conflict in a particular
situation.
Identify gaps in current responses and encourage better coordination amongst
actors.
Goodhand, J., Vaux, T., and Walker, R., 2002, 'Conducting Conflict Assessments:
Guidance Notes', Department for International Development, London
Core readings
Conflict Analysis
FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld (2004)
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Summary
What is conflict analysis and why is it important? This chapter from the resource pack
Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace
Building places conflict analysis at the foundation of a conflict sensitive approach.
Without understanding the context in which interventions are situated, organisations
implementing them may unintentionally fuel conflict. While conflicts are too complex
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for a single process to do them justice, key features of analysis are conflict profile,
causes, actors and dynamics.
Conflict sensitivity is about understanding the context of interventions and acting upon
this understanding to maximise positive impacts. Conflict analysis informs conflict
sensitive programming, with particular relevance to the interaction between
intervention and context. It helps define new interventions and conflict-sensitise
existing interventions at the planning stage. It informs project set-up and decision
making at the implementation stage. At the monitoring and evaluation stage, conflict
analysis helps measure the interaction of interventions and the conflict dynamics in
which they are situated.
There are key questions within each area of analysis:
Profile: What is the political, economic and socio-cultural context? What are
the emergent issues? What conflict affected areas can be situated within the
context? Is there a history of conflict?
Causes: What are the structural causes of conflict? What can be considered
proximate causes of conflict? What triggers could contribute to the outbreak,
escalation or prolonging of conflict? What factors can contribute to peace?
Actors: Who are the main actors? What are their interests, goals, positions,
capacities and relationships? What capacities for peace can be identified?
What actors can be identified as spoilers and why?
Dynamics: What are the current conflict trends? What are the windows of
opportunity? What scenarios can be developed from the analysis of the
conflict profile, causes and actors?
Recommendations for good practice are based on consultations in Kenya, Uganda and
Sri Lanka:
Building capacity for conflict analysis may involve: Helping staff better
understand the context in which they work, prioritising and integrating conflict
analysis into established procedures and budgeting for conflict analysis.
Conflict analysis can be undertaken for a number of purposes: Promoting
participation, developing a strategy for engagement, decisions on further
project activities and project monitoring. These determine who conducts the
analysis: Members of the community, local project staff, national or
international staff.
When planning to use a specific conflict analysis framework, consider
strengths and weaknesses. Tools are not a substitute for detailed local
knowledge and should not stifle creative thinking. Organisations can
customise tools to specific needs, objectives and capacities.
Gather information from a wide range of sources and listen to many different
actors to broaden understanding of context. Not all information will be
available, reliable and unbiased. Research methods such as triangulation aim
to reduce such limitations.
Conflict analysis itself needs to be conflict sensitive. It is good practice to get
stakeholders on board early and avoid antagonising potential spoilers.
Source: FEWER, International Alert, and Saferworld, 2004, 'Chapter 2: Conflict
Analysis', Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance,
and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack, London
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Effective Conflict Analysis Exercises: Overcoming Organizational Challenges
S Sardesai and P Wam (2006)
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Summary
Understanding the social and economic factors that affect conflict improves the
effectiveness of development strategies and programmes. This paper, published by the
World Bank, examines the process of conducting conflict analyses and recommends
how they should be organised, applied and disseminated. Creating buy-in for the
analysis by country teams, use of local partners and dissemination of analysis findings
are key to executing an effective conflict analysis.
In a country affected by conflict, where stakes are high and the situation often fluid,
understanding social and economic contexts is critical to effective aid delivery.
Development organisations are now making a systematic effort to conduct conflict
analyses and integrate findings into their strategies and programmes.
A conflict analysis consists of: 1) the process by which the analysis is planned,
organised, conducted and applied; and 2) the content of the analysis, including its
thematic focus and scope. This study examined a number of completed analysis
processes and recommends ways to strengthen the organisation and application of the
exercise.
Key findings of the study are:
Most conflict analyses studied arose from need to better understand conflict
dynamics and improve the effectiveness of country strategy and programme
formation.
To acquire knowledge on conflict escalators and de-escalators, the analyses
used techniques such as desk research, expert input, workshops, studies and
fieldwork.
Single-agency analyses were usually conducted when there was a need for
quick and confidential analyses for internal use. However, multi-agency
analyses were increasingly the norm, leading to shared analysis and improved
understanding between participating agencies.
Local partners have increasingly been more involved in conflict analysis
exercises.
Use of analysis findings was weak in some cases due to limited country-team
buy-in and lack of follow-up by analysis teams. Analysis dissemination
appears limited, due to lack of strategy and resources.
Typical organisation and implementation challenges included time and
funding constraints, limited capacity, unstable and volatile security climates
and political sensitivities encountered in preparation of the analysis.
There are serious organisational challenges that should be addressed to prevent
problems during analysis implementation. It is important to:
Create buy-in for the analysis by a range of actors;
Select an analysis team that includes skills in conflict analysis, local expertise
and specific technical fields;
Forge a partnership between local and international partners and involve or at
least inform the host government of the exercise;
Consider the host government‘s sensitivities to conflict findings, i.e., focus on
factors rather than actors, if feasible;
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Prepare contingency plans to deal with volatile and fluid environments; and
Emphasise the need for dissemination of the analysis as part of a longer-term
process of promoting findings and encouraging their inclusion in programs and
strategies.
Use of conflict analysis has broader implications beyond a one-time-only
approach. In order to apply the conflict perspective into other programme areas,
it would be helpful to:
Establish conflict analysis exercises as the entry point in conflict-affected
countries; make the analysis operationally relevant.
Test and mainstream conflict impact assessments for development
interventions.
Use the conflict lens to strengthen country social analyses. Integrate a
systematic conflict perspective into studies such as poverty, participatory
assessments and livelihood analyses.
World Bank, 2006, 'Effective Conflict Analysis Exercises: Overcoming Organizational
Challenges?', Report No. 36446-GLB, 21 June 2006, The World Bank, Washington
DC
Supplementary readings
Conducting Conflict Assessments: Aid, Conflict and Peace Building in Sri Lanka
J Goodhand (2001)
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Summary
Donors increasingly recognise the need to understand better the links between
development, conflict and poverty, and to design programmes that address the roots of
conflict. This report for the Conflict, Security and Development Group at the
University of London analyses how donors could improve their strategies in Sri Lanka,
where violent conflict has prevented the country from reaching its potential.
While the high-profile conflict between Tamil rebels and government forces was
concentrated in the northeast of Sri Lanka, the whole island has been affected by
militarised violence. Conflict has incurred huge costs in terms of physical, financial,
human and social capital. Yet most aid donors have not adequately considered the
interaction between their work and conflict. In countries like Sri Lanka, ignoring
conflict or regarding it as a disruptive factor to be avoided can exacerbate tensions.
There is a growing trend, particularly among bilateral donors, to explore the
possibilities of reducing or managing conflict. The donor community should learn from
positive examples where aid has supported reconciliation processes, and incorporate
these lessons into mainstream practice.
The key challenge for donors is to make their assistance more sensitive to conflict,
while amplifying the benefits of aid with a focus on conflict reduction. The report
identifies four factors that are important for working effectively in and on conflict:
Integrating conflict sensitivity. This includes developing a more balanced
approach to reform and transition processes, placing greater focus on social
safety nets and equity, and addressing regional imbalances.
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A politically informed approach. Donors should analyse the political system
and incentives of political actors, using this information to influence choice
and design of programmes.
A co-ordinated and comprehensive approach. Existing instruments should be
put to optimal use. Donors should aim to make their mechanisms more
complementary and to develop strategic co-ordination.
Long-term strategic engagement. Donors recognise the need for such an
approach, yet mandates and funding remain short term. They should switch
from supporting projects to sustaining strategies and processes.
A set of policy options is outlined for development actors in Sri Lanka. It is argued that
the international community should pay more political attention to the conflict, and
that donor governments should work to co-ordinate arrangements and share
information. Other recommendations for donors include:
Developing a tighter form of aid co-ordination within a strategic framework
approach. Models used elsewhere should be examined for their applicability to
Sri Lanka, and current initiatives assessed.
Developing a more co-ordinated and pro-active approach to lobbying on
conflict, humanitarian and human rights concerns.
Becoming more sensitive to conflict issues (particularly larger agencies).
Donors must determine what this means in practice for programmes.
Learning from the work of agencies operating in the northeast. Their efforts to
develop codes of conduct frameworks to ensure they do no harm and an aid
ombudsman are relevant to agencies in the south.
Amplifying the impact of programmes that focus on peacebuilding and
reconciliation. This includes strengthening initiatives to build a legitimate and
responsive state, and encouraging more open political debate.
Developing strategies, processes and linkages instead of focusing on projects.
Donors should map and assess the impact of current initiatives to draw out
their lessons. They should also share their conflict analysis.
Goodhand, J., 2001, 'Aid, Conflict and Peace Building in Sri Lanka', Conflict
Assessments, Security and Development Group, University of London, London
Conflict Assessments: A Synthesis Report: Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Nepal and Sri
Lanka
J Goodhand (2001)
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Summary
The issues associated with addressing conflict through development and humanitarian
programmes have not yet been identified and analysed in a consistent way. This report
from the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College London presents case studies on
Moldova, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Kyrgyzstan and develops a set of guidelines for the
conduct of Conflict Assessments. It argues that a range of policy instruments need to
be applied in a coherent and coordinated fashion to address conflict dynamics more
effectively.
Development and humanitarian programmes are increasingly implemented in
situations of latent or open conflict. However, there is insufficient understanding of the
risks associated with such programmes and their potential to prevent, mitigate or
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resolve violent conflict. Even where conflict issues have been identified and analysed,
this has not led to any generic guidance for working in conflict situations. Conflict
Assessment (CA) is a means of predicting and assessing the potential or actual impacts
of development assistance in the dynamics of peace and conflict. It is an overarching
term that includes strategic conflict assessment (SCA) and programme/project level
conflict assessment (PCA).
There is considerable scope to address conflict dynamics more effectively if different
policy instruments are applied in a coherent and coordinated fashion. However, this is
not currently the case.
The framework for development assistance and the hierarchy of priorities is
dominated by the market economy model and international financial
institutions. A few major donors have substantial leverage to steer overall aid
policy.
Although donor coordination mechanisms function in all four case study
countries, the frameworks designed to coordinate and deliver aid are under-
institutionalised and there is limited coordination at the strategic level.
The main donors tend to work "around"conflict (treating it as an impediment
or negative externality to be avoided), which often either exacerbates tensions
or means missed opportunities to mitigate or resolve violent conflicts.
A number of bilateral donors in each country are attempting to work more
effectively in (recognising the links between programmes and conflict and
making attempts to minimise conflict-related risks) and "on" conflict (making
conscious attempts to design programmes to do good).
There is a need to develop policy and practice that is more sensitive to conflict issues.
Donors need to appreciate and understand a number of factors, including:
The political impacts of aid need to be explicitly recognised as part of conflict
analysis.
Conflict is related to processes of enrichment as well as those of
impoverishment. Therefore, donors need to consider approaches which limit
the opportunities for greed.
The importance of timely and early intervention. Donors need to be more
attuned to local conditions and adapt their policies accordingly.
The breakdown of interventions capable of managing or mitigating violent
conflict is a critical factor. Donors need to identify and support processes and
structures that can facilitate a shift from violence to politics.
There should be a shift towards a greater emphasis on addressing the external
causes of conflict and supporting internal responses and solutions.
A critical challenge for the more conflict sensitive bilateral donors is to
influence the major multilateral donors and encourage them to take conflict
more seriously.
There is a need for coordination arrangements that enable international actors
to move towards joint diagnosis and joint prescriptions.
Source: Goodhand, J., 2001, 'Conflict Assessments: A Synthesis Report: Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Nepal and Sri Lanka', Conflict, Security and Development Group, University
of London, London
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Conducting a Conflict Assessment. A Framework for Analysis and Program
Development
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2004)
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Summary
What can international donors do to help prevent conflict? This paper from the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) presents a conflict assessment
framework. It is designed to help USAID Missions gain a deeper understanding of the
causes of conflict and think about how to use development assistance more
strategically in order to address them. It emphasises the interactions between the
motives, means and opportunities for conflict, and recommends that donors take an
integrated approach.
Internal or civil conflicts have become the dominant mode of violence in the post-Cold
War era. While conflict can be an inherent and legitimate part of social and political
life, in many places the costs and consequences of violent conflict have become
unacceptably high. Increasingly, the costs of civil conflict are not limited to the
country where it is fought, but spill over borders and reduce growth and prosperity
across entire regions. Conflict also has a damaging effect on global stability.
Violent conflict disrupts traditional development. Many of the most important causes
of violence, such as a stagnant or deteriorating economy, weak or corrupt political
institutions, or competition over natural resources, are already at the heart of traditional
development assistance. However, although development and humanitarian assistance
programmes are increasingly implemented in situations of open or latent conflict, most
still do not explicitly incorporate a sensitivity to conflict in their design or execution.
Conflict is extremely complex. It happens when causes found at multiple levels come
together and reinforce each other.
Root causes shape motives or incentives for participating in violence. Many of
these factors feed into a strong sense of grievance, but greed is another
powerful reason for turning to violence.
Without the means or resources to organise and execute conflict on a wide
scale, widespread violence cannot be sustained.
Political and social institutions are the filter through which all other causes
have to pass. The opportunity structure for violence is deeply affected by the
relative strength and health of institutions.
Forces at the regional and international level are increasingly important, and
often reinforce internal causes.
If all these causes are in place, there will be windows of
Vulnerability, when particular types of events may trigger the outbreak of full-
scale violence.
Effective interventions must be based on consideration of how problems manifest
themselves at all levels, and how solutions can be strengthened or built at each of the
levels. International donors should:
Facilitate dialogue between and within groups.
Identify the economic agendas that sustain violence and work to raise the costs
of pursuing them, for example by encouraging partnerships between
multinational companies and local civil society groups.
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Assist the diversification of national economies that are heavily reliant on one
or two commodities, to remove the monopoly on economic opportunity.
Increase the number of economic options available to those population groups
at high risk of being recruited to support elites in executing violence.
Engage the private sector in conflict management.
Focus on civilian oversight of the security sector, community policing and
civil-military relations in pre-conflict settings.
Strengthen civil society's role in all areas of conflict management and
peacebuilding.
Carry out an analysis of how civil society groups are either reinforcing or
bridging lines of division, and support organisations that cross ethnic,
economic or political fault lines.
Source: USAID, 2004, Conducting a Conflict Assessment. A Framework for Analysis
and Program Development, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), Washington DC
The Stability Assessment Framework
S Verstegen and L van de Goor (2005)
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Summary
Since the early 1990s the international community has increasingly recognised that
instability threatens security and development. Dealing with such situations is
unavoidable and many organisations struggle to deal with the complexity of both
problems and solutions. This paper by the Clingendael Institute and the Netherlands
Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlines a Stability Assessment Framework (SAF) to help
development agencies face these challenges. It provides an analytical tool for
developing an integrated policy response in a particular country.
The connections between security and development mean that development
organisations are taking on a larger role in conflict situations. The overall objective of
this role is to establish sustainable security, which has three main aspects: (i)
Governance: the state upholds the rule of law, provides equitable social service
delivery and is perceived as legitimate (ii) Security: The state holds the monopoly on
violence through democratically controlled security forces (iii) Socioeconomic
development: economic development, natural resource management and basic social
services are provided. Organisations need to apply an integrated approach that tackles
all three areas simultaneously.
The first step is to develop the terms of reference to customise the SAF to an
organisations' specific goals and expectations. The second step is to compose a draft
reference document, which includes mapping and analysing:
Indicator trend lines. This presents trends over time rather than a 'snap shot'. It
includes 12 indicators that capture and present social, economic, political and
military conditions in a concise, graphic format.
Institutional capacity. Five selected state institutions are analysed: the military,
police and corrections system, the judiciary, civil service and parliament.
Political actors. Individuals and groups can have a disproportionate effect in
driving change as spoilers or partners.
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Policy interventions. Existing networks, activities and approaches need
frequent evaluation and adaptation to fit changing conditions.
The document should make clear the linkages between these domains, discussing
important trends, indicators and actors, windows of opportunity, threats and
challenges.
The third and final step is the consolidation of the final reference document. Part two
mainly involves consultants but this stage is an inclusive process involving
international policy makers, staff members and local partners.
A workshop is most appropriate for developing conflict awareness and
response capacity. It is a good opportunity for dialogue and sharing
information with partner organisations and breaking through the factionalised
approaches of specialised organisations.
It will help build consensus around key issues and provide a platform to
address differences of opinion.
Organisations must think carefully about using the framework as a tool for
dialogue: discussing these issues with government and civil society can be
politically sensitive.
Developing a strategy for sustainable stability promotion will involve a more
limited number of participants from the staff of own and partner organisations.
There are three steps in this process: Prioritising core needs and actors;
identifying gaps, requirements and partners; identifying niches, defining
constraints and discussing options.
The various parts of the SAF can be used for: Stability assessment and context
analysis, as a tool for political dialogue, to develop conflict sensitive policy
and implementation schemes or to enable multi donor cooperation.
Source: Verstegen, S. and van de Goor, L., 2005, 'The Stability Assessment
Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and
Development', Clingendael Occasional Paper, prepared for the Netherlands Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, The Hague
Advancing Practice in Conflict Analysis and Strategy Development
P Woodrow (2006)
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Abstract
This article reviews the status of RPP efforts in relation to conflict analysis, one of the
key areas for focused collaborative learning. RPP has been working with groups of
peace practitioners in the Balkans and Central Africa, trying out a variety of methods
for joint conflict analysis and moving from there into program strategies. The goal of
these activities, as with all of RPP‘s efforts, has been to increase the effectiveness of
peace programs. Preliminary results show promise for incorporating systems thinking
into more traditional methods of conflict analysis. RPP is continuing to work with
groups on making the link between good analysis and effective program strategies.
Source: Woodrow, P., 2006, ‗Advancing Practice in Conflict Analysis and Strategy
Development‘, Reflecting on Peace Practice, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects,
Cambridge.
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2.2 Techniques for monitoring and evaluation (of conflict escalation
and de-escalation)
Core readings
Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy
D Carment (2003)
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Summary
In anticipating state failure, effective response and accurate analysis are equally
important. But does the international community have an analytical basis for
generating good response strategies? This paper by Carleton University argues that
explanations of state failure are inadequate analytical tools for risk assessment and
early warning. The disparate analytical approaches constitute a useful tool-kit but there
is a gap in understanding between academics and practitioners. Future funding efforts
should emphasise the integration of analytical findings and the methodologies of
research programmes.
Debates on state failure have mainly focused on definitional issues, the strengths and
weaknesses of contending methodologies and evaluation procedures and the causes,
manifestations and processes of state failure. Much less attention has been paid to the
question of how to link theoretical insights to policy options. To date, states and
international organisations have done little towards the creation of working and useful
conflict prevention regimes at the regional and global level. While there is no lack of
rhetoric on the necessity of prevention, serious attempts to give organisations the tools
to put preventive systems into place are modest at best.
Understanding and responding to state failure requires a multifaceted, multilayered and
multi-actor methodology. This approach entails two levels of analysis - relative
performance measures and an appreciation of the dynamic processes of conflict. The
ramifications of such an approach are:
Policy preferences for solutions to state failure will depend on the explanations
we accept for their decay and potential collapse.
By emphasising the root structural causes (economic, social and political
composite indicators), the range of solutions expands to long-term,
developmentally orientated structural prevention.
By emphasising medium- and micro-level political configurations and
interactions, the range of solutions might include partition, power sharing,
democratisation or constitutional entrenchment of ethnic or minority rights.
It might also include more specific operational responses such as sanctions,
peace enforcement and long-term institution building.
Those who develop methodologies to assess the risk of state failure should be clear
about the array of political instruments available to provide an effective response.
Ultimately, anticipating state failure is a process-based approach requiring
sound analysis as well as an explicit connection to policy options for
preventive measures.
A process-based approach means that the method and format of applied early
warning is shaped directly by the operational focus of the process itself, in this
case preventative action as opposed to preparedness.
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All of these elements point to the relevance of basic policy analysis and
planning methods to close the warning–action gap.
Such methods incorporate the structuring of problems, the application of
appropriate analytical tools to solve these problems and the communication of
analysis and recommendations in a format useful to decision makers.
In short, policy planning is a type of decision-support procedure. Such an
approach requires that organisations have a better sense of their own
institutional needs and capabilities.
Such activities should have a built-in evaluative process or impact assessment
capability that will ensure self-monitoring and provide policy guidance. At the
very minimum, activity in an economically and politically fragile society
should not further destabilise that society.
Source: Carment, D., 2003, ‗Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and
Policy‘, Third World Quarterly, vol. 24, no.3, pp 407-427
Monitoring and Evaluation in Post-Conflict Settings
States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2006)
Access full text online
Summary
How does monitoring and evaluation (M&E) differ in post-conflict settings? This
report produced for USAID reviews recent experience, literature and lessons regarding
M&E in post-conflict settings, with particular emphasis on Iraq and Afghanistan. The
report‘s main aims are to clarify the unique features that distinguish M&E in post-
conflict settings and to present emerging best practices for responding to these
challenges.
The report identifies various constraints and challenges that USAID and its partners
face in enforcing sound M&E standards and practices in post-conflict societies,
particularly in those where the United States has major strategic interests.
Understanding these constraints is essential to the development of an effective system
that can realistically monitor performance of USAID-funded projects and programs.
The report documents ―best practice‖ examples in key sectors and sub-sectors that can
inform future performance M&E functions.
The failure to establish clear programmatic objectives is the biggest single obstacle to
effective M&E in post-conflict settings. There is almost always tension in post-conflict
programmes between pressures for immediate impact and reconstruction and the need
for longer-term capacity building and structural reform.
Tensions between sector-specific outcomes and outcomes relating to the
reduction of fragility often result in trade-offs between results relating to the
perceived effectiveness of the host government and its legitimacy.
Data systems are weakened, destroyed, or discredited in many post-conflict
situations, by their association with a deposed government.
The development of monitoring information and databases is complicated by a
lack of consistent place descriptors, reluctance to share security-sensitive
information, and absence of an agreed information integrator.
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Problems of institutional complexity are particularly difficult in post-conflict
settings given the larger than usual number of international agencies and the
need to coordinate across multiple types of implementing partners.
The focus on outputs is not in lieu of monitoring and assuring technical quality
in infrastructure.
Recent experience with M&E in post-conflict settings supports the following
conclusions on approaches that work—and work better with improved understanding
of how M&E approaches in post-conflict settings differ from normal M&E models:
Early development and approval of a strategy and results framework
contribute to strong monitoring, even in post-conflict environments.
Output indicators (rather than outcome indicators) are often effective and
legitimate monitoring measures during early efforts at stabilisation. Assessing
the quality of outputs is important.
Systematic tracking of public opinions and perceptions adds an important
dimension - given the emphasis in post-conflict settings on stabilisation,
recovery, and government legitimacy.
Establishing effective multi-sector (and ideally, multi-agency) databases is
critical for providing timely data.
Evaluation in post-conflict settings is most effectively viewed and
implemented in a broader perspective than the traditional evaluation model for
international development programmes.
High-level leadership is indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of
effective M&E in post-conflict settings.
Source: USAID, 2006, 'Monitoring and Evaluation in Post-Conflict Settings', produced
by Management Systems International for the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), Washington, DC
Supplementary readings
Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction
C Cohen (2006)
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Abstract
The success of efforts to stabilize and reconstruct failed states and war-torn societies is
heavily dependent on proper assessment tools and reliable measures of progress.
Establishing an objective process for evaluating the challenges involved and evaluating
progress toward stabilization is vital for success in these interventions. The main
barrier to measuring progress is political, not conceptual. A system for measuring
progress requires clear and well-integrated goals that are based on an accurate baseline
assessment and are directly linked to strategic planning. Progress in stabilization and
reconstruction efforts should be based on the mission's ability to reduce the means and
motivations for violent conflict in a society and to build local and state capacity to
sustain peace.
Source: Cohen, C., 2006, ‗Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction‘,
USIP Special Report, Washington, DC: USIP.
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An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices: Using Results-based
Frameworks in Fragile States
UNDG (2005)
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Abstract
The Transitional Results Matrix (TRM), also referred to as a Transitional Calendar or
Results-Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF), is a planning, coordination, and
management tool that national stakeholders and donors can use to better prioritize
actions necessary to achieve a successful transition in fragile states. The TRM helps
launch a poverty reduction strategy (PRS) approach in these environments, either by
acting as an early framework to lay the groundwork for a PRS or, later, as a way to
operationalize poverty reduction strategies in low capacity countries.
Source: UNDG, World Bank, 2005, ‗An Operational Note on Transitional Results
Matrices: using results-based frameworks in fragile states‘, United Nations
Development Group (UNDG) and the World Bank, Washington, DC
Post Conflict Performance Indicators (PCPIs)
World Bank (2004)
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Abstract
The Post-Conflict Performance Indicators (PCPI) ratings framework is designed to
measure change in countries that are eligible for exceptional post-conflict allocations
from IDA.
The PCPIs measure progress in critical aspects of post-conflict recovery. In many
instances the PCPI indicators are similar to, or cover the same areas as the CPIA (e.g.,
transparency and corruption in the public sector, or revenue mobilization). However, in
these areas, performance and the results that can be expected in an early post-conflict
setting may be different or less ambitious than in non-conflict situations. In addition to
indicators that overlap with the CPIA, the PCPIs measure progress in areas that are
critical for fragile transition processes, but are not captured in the CPIA—security;
demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; political and reconciliation
processes that are normally enshrined in post-conflict agreements; and reintegration of
displaced populations.
Source: World Bank, 2004, ‗Post Conflict Performance Indicators (PCPIs)‘, The
World Bank, Washington, DC
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2.3. Conflict sensitivity of development programmes in Fragile States
(theoretical focus)
UK Government policy
Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: A Strategy for Security and
Development
Department for International Development (DFID) (2005)
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Summary
What is the link between security and development? What is the best way to achieve
both? This strategy paper by the United Kingdom Department for International
Development (DFID) outlines how DFID, through its commitment to fighting poverty,
can help tackle insecurity among the poor. It explains the complex connections
between security and development and sets out how DFID can build security by
working with poor people, their governments and international partners.
In today's world, security is a global need and countries must work together to achieve
it. Insecurity, lawlessness, crime and violent conflict are among the biggest obstacles
to achieving the Millennium Development Goals; they also destroy development.
Poverty, underdevelopment and fragile states create fertile conditions for conflict and
the emergence of new security threats, including international crime and terrorism.
2005 provides an unprecedented opportunity to make real progress in tackling some of
the most important challenges to our collective security and well-being, including
poverty, disease and climate change. Poor people cite safety and security as a major
concern; they say it is as important as hunger, unemployment and lack of safe drinking
water. They explicitly link security to personal security.
Given its importance to the well-being of the poor, physical security is a vital part of
reducing poverty.
DFID's role is to promote the security of the poor locally, nationally and
internationally, as part of their work in reducing poverty.
DFID contributes to post-conflict peace building and is strengthening its work
in fragile states. But reducing conflict and promoting poor people's security is
not yet a regular feature of programmes or partnerships.
This does not mean subordinating poverty reduction to short-term political
interests or to work on anti-terrorism.
Nor does it mean big shifts in the existing allocation of UK development
assistance – this will continue to remain focused on the world's poorest
countries and people. It means bringing poor people's security more squarely
into DFID's work.
Aid alone is not enough. Development cannot progress where there is
instability. The security community on its own cannot build the institutions
and opportunities necessary to prevent conflict.
There needs to be better collaboration between development, defense and
diplomatic communities to achieve respective and complementary aims.
It is important that conflict reduction and the security of poor people are considered in
bilateral and multilateral programmes. There are a number of ways to do this. These
include:
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Paying greater attention to the regional and global dimensions of conflict and
insecurity, as well as to countries that play a critical role in promoting regional
stability – or instability.
Considering security as a basic entitlement of the poor and re-focusing work
on governance to include more direct support for the security of the poor.
Integrating more elements of conflict reduction work into programmes.
Making more use of political and conflict analysis in programme design.
Engaging with a wider range of civil society organisations.
Responding as far as possible to requests from new countries for support in
implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
Source: Department for International Development, 2005, 'Fighting Poverty to Build a
Safer World: A Strategy for Security and Development', Strategy paper, DFID, United
Kingdom
Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States
Department for International Development (DFID) (2005)
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Summary
Why has aid not reduced poverty in fragile states? Why do donors need to work more
effectively in fragile states, and how should they go about this? This policy paper from
the Department for International Development (DFID) brings together the latest
analysis from DFID and others on how to make development more effective in fragile
states. It sets out some objectives and makes commitments about how DFID will work
differently in the future.
Fragile states cannot or will not deliver what citizens need to live decent, secure lives.
They cannot or will not tackle poverty. They are the most difficult environments in the
world and working with them is complex, costly and carries significant risks. As a
result, donors have often avoided aiding them or relied on humanitarian responses,
which do nothing to address chronic state weakness. An emphasis on rewarding
countries with relatively effective governments and stable macroeconomic policies has
led to further neglect of fragile states, and aid that has been given has often been
delivered badly.
Fragile states matter because poverty is so widespread; because they can destabilise
regional and global security; and because the costs of late response to crisis are high.
Aid has failed to reduce poverty in fragile states because there has not been enough,
the aid provided has been delivered at the wrong time and it has been delivered in
ineffective ways. However, there is significant potential to improve aid effectiveness in
fragile states, through:
Better early warning systems (and early response).
Understanding the political economy (the drivers of change approach).
Recognising the importance of regional relationships and institutions.
Combining aid with diplomacy, security guarantees, human rights monitoring,
trade policy, and technical assistance.
Better donor coordination, including establishing an international mechanism
to decide which donors do what and where.
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Support, in the first instance, for ˜good enough governance" - the minimum
institutions and capacity needed to get the job done.
The most urgent governance reforms are those that directly address aspects of state
failure with the greatest potential to increase fragility. Initial success on an achievable
reform package can be critical to the states legitimacy and to the political will that is
necessary to carry through further reform. Other policy pointers are:
Failure to protect people and their property, security sector reform, public
financial management, and improving service delivery are key areas.
Donor agreement on setting achievable objectives to reduce state fragility is
important to stop overloading fragile states with overly optimistic reform
programmes.
There are ways of increasing access to services through international or local
providers that do not undermine the state and may even strengthen it.
The starting point in delivering services in fragile states should be to
strengthen what works.
Approaches need to be flexible enough to ensure a smooth transition from
humanitarian to development assistance; supporting livelihoods is a very
effective means of doing this, and social protection measures can be
particularly useful.
There are times when it will be necessary to bypass the state altogether, but the
possibility of eventual transfer to the state, at least of the regulatory function,
needs to be built into programme design.
Source: Department for International Development, 2005, Why we Need to Work
More Effectively in Fragile States, DFID, London
Core readings
Development Aid: Conclusions and Paths for Reflection
P Uvin (1998)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
What was the role of development aid in the processes that led to genocide in Rwanda?
This study suggests that aid is both external to the political processes that caused the
genocide and constituent of them. It argues that all development aid is a form of
political intervention. Change should, therefore, be about a different vision of what
development is and how it is achieved.
It is difficult and artificial to separate the aid enterprise from the broader foreign
relations between Rwanda and Western countries. The mechanisms through which aid
interacted with structural violence and the blindness to its consequences are profoundly
ingrained in the institutional, ideological and political fundaments of the development
enterprise. Aid behaves in the same way throughout Africa, largely with the same
effects. Faced with the disintegration of
Rwandanese society, this paper argues that the development community should have
tried to rethink its mission and reorient its actions:
The development aid milieu did not react much to the human rights abuses,
racism and militarisation of society that were constitutive elements of the drive
to genocide, neither did the international diplomatic community.
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The military and diplomatic support to the regime by some countries
facilitated, if not encouraged, the forces of genocide to reach their final
conclusion.
Most Western aid agencies are legally obliged to act when faced with human
rights violations. Here, rhetoric and practice differ markedly, although they
may have considered that their support for democratisation and peace was
sufficient to end the human rights violations and racism.
If the international community had used aid conditionality to wrestle more
than small concessions from the Rwandan government, it is by no means sure
that it would have been successful.
Most development aid shared the ethnic biases or did not consider them
serious enough to warrant profound changes in the way the development game
was played.
With a few exceptions, aid was an active and willing partner in the
construction of structural violence in Rwanda, as it is elsewhere in Africa.
The notion of 'development' defined as economic growth mainly at the macro level is
meaningless if it can coincide with increases in inequality, disempowerment,
alienation, violence and frustration.
The concept of development should be broadened to one that includes the
eradication of features of structural violence.
Such a vision can be constructed but its widespread adoption in practice is still
a major challenge.
Apolitical development is not only ineffective but also oppressive and often
regressive.
If foreign policies of donor countries are unfavourable for development goals,
then people committed to development should try to modify these policies.
If there is no genuine, popularly based, clear alternative to the status quo,
external pressure for political change may only yield more of the same or even
exacerbate the situation.
Both negative and positive conditionality should be used, whereby aid
resources strengthen the social and political conditions for improved policies
rather than forcing governments to adopt such policies.
Source: Uvin, P., 1998, ‗Development Aid: Conclusions and Paths for Reflection‘, in
Aiding Violence: the Development Enterprise in Rwanda, Kumarian Press, West
Hartford.
The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict
P Uvin (2001)
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Summary
How can donors better use Official Development Assistance (ODA) to create
incentives and disincentives to reduce violent conflict and build durable peace? This
paper from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
presents the results of two workshops held in 1999, which reviewed case studies on
Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda and Sri Lanka, and relevant policy
research. It argues that the most important issue is how to manage (dis)incentives so as
to promote conditions and dynamics propitious to non-violent conflict resolution.
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The end of the Cold War led to far-reaching political changes that culminated in a
great rise in civil wars, as well as a willingness by international donors to promote
democratic and peaceful change in those same regions. However, the context of deep
social divisions and weak governance in affected countries has meant an extended need
for humanitarian assistance and development aid, under extremely difficult conditions.
Incentives for peace refer to all purposeful uses of aid that strengthen the dynamics that
favour peace by influencing actors' behaviour; strengthening pro-poor actors'
capacities; changing the relations between conflicting actors; and influencing the social
and economic environment. Disincentives do the opposite: they strengthen and
encourage the dynamics that favour violence.
All aid, at all times, creates incentives and disincentives, for peace or for war, before,
during or after war ( regardless of whether these effects are deliberate, recognised or
not).
The issue is not whether or not to create (dis)incentives but, rather, how to
manage them so as to promote conditions and dynamics propitious to non-
violent conflict resolution.
Aid managers need to face up to the political nature of all aid. This involves
recognising that perceptions matter as much as facts in aid impacts.
Aid alone usually has limited capacity to determine the dynamics of violent
conflict; it is often weak compared to the range of pressures and interests
emanating from international, national, regional and local actors, both public
and private.
The impact of ODA on the dynamics of peace and violence in recipient
countries takes place within the broader, often volatile, environment of the of
the country's international relations.
Donors should work with non-ODA actors to develop a coherent and comprehensive
policy involving diplomacy, military relations, finance and trade. They should also
develop and implement innovative approaches to maximise and fine tune the capacity
of ODA to create (dis)incentives for peace for particular actors. Key components of
this will be:
The use of ODA in new domains, including politically sensitive areas such as
the judiciary and security.
Explicit attention to the way project design influences the dynamics of
violence and peace.
Investment in new kinds of knowledge and human resources for understanding
the histories and social dynamics of inequality, division and violence in
societies, and the role of external actors therein.
The creation of more decentralised decision-making, allowing for timely and
more locally-owned and coordinated responses to unfolding dynamics.
The targeting of incentives and disincentives for peace at all parties to
conflicts, including non-state and sub-state actors.
Development of explicit regional strategies.
An awareness that conditionality does not usually work. There are a range of
alternatives available including long-term constructive engagement, principled
behaviour and negotiated benchmarks.
Source: OECD, 2001, ‗The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict‘,
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Conflict
Prevention and Development Co-operation Papers, DAC Journal, vol. 2, no. 1
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The Development / Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing
Paradigms
P Uvin (2002)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
The nexus between development and peace has become a central focus of development
thinking and practice. What should the relationship between development aid and
peace building be? This article from the Journal of Peace building and Development
presents and critiques a typology of seven ways in which this interaction has
historically been conceived.
Two key variables underlie the typology of the relationship between development and
peace building: (i) how far conflict matters are incorporated into development, and (ii)
how far the development enterprise engages in the political realm.
Seven ways of conceiving the relationship between development and peace building
are identifiable. These increasingly take steps away from the traditional development
paradigm:
Development by definition promotes peace (so simply more aid is required).
This causal link does not stand up to scrutiny.
Military conditionality. Threats of reduced aid to countries engaged in war
have persisted but been inconsistent. Significant competence in security sector
reform has been acquired by some donors.
Post-conflict assistance. This prioritises areas that had been off the
development agenda, such as governance and representation, justice and
security, prejudice and reconciliation. It may be too ambitious, broad,
scattered and unrealistic, due to shortages of resources and knowledge.
Ethically, problems include the cost of error borne by local people and a
potentially unrestrained licence to intervene.
'Do No Harm'. This practical approach highlights that aid resources can be
stolen and spent on weapons, aid can affect markets and inter-group
relationships, support civilians thereby freeing resources for conflict, and it
can legitimise people and agendas. This approach touches less on the root
causes of conflict.
Conflict prevention. This follows logically from earlier approaches, but
constitutes an enormous expansion of the development and uses an explicit
political lens. In terms of implementation, it matches the post-conflict agenda.
Human security. This focuses on the human dimensions of security such as
child soldiers, landmines and small arms, or more broadly, threats to lives,
livelihoods and dignity, stating 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'
are inseparable. This may find little support in military establishments and is
hard to measure.
Global system reform. This final level views rich countries' and corporations'
behaviour in the military, political and economic realms as having potential to
minimise conflict. It is an attempt to moralise all international relations. The
most radical arguments advocate structural reform of the world economy.
The intellectual and operational gap between development and security has shrunk
significantly. However, problems are caused by the weakness of the knowledge and
77
ethical base on which this work rests, its breadth, paucity of resources and lack of
prioritisation mechanisms. Without changes, the new agenda may be only rhetoric with
continuing ignorance, inconsistency and irrelevance.
To avoid intrusiveness and political sensitivities, the reach of the international
community should be minimised but its impact maximised. The list of
objectives and domains of intervention must be limited by new mechanisms to
allow for appropriate choices to be made in each case.
Donors must take their engagements more seriously and behave more
consistently across cases. Control, accountability and assessment mechanisms
are needed.
This work needs to be more anchored in the societies involved, with greater
discussions, knowledge generation, transparency and local dialogues to guide
donor policy.
Source: Uvin, P, 2002, 'The Development / Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and
History of Changing Paradigms', Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, vol.1,
no.1
Supplementary readings
Aid and Conflict in Uganda
S Bayne (2007)
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Summary
Since independence, Uganda has experienced a history of conflict and violent
uprisings, including the ongoing insurgency in the north of the country. This paper
from Saferworld examines the extent to which armed conflict and violence are being
addressed through, and have been integrated within, development frameworks in
Uganda. It focuses primarily on the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) of the
Government of Uganda (GoU).
Whilst the GoU and donors both recognise the need for the development effort to
address conflict and armed violence, they need to translate this recognition into
concrete action. The GoU‘s limited progress in this area may reflect its limited
capacity and lack of commitment to addressing the causes of conflict. It may also
reflect the limitations of using technical measures to address essentially political
issues. Notwithstanding, the PEAP provides a reasonable framework for integrating
conflict issues into the development process. Thus, the GoU, civil society and donors
must co-operate to ensure a coherent approach to addressing conflict throughout
Uganda through support to the PEAP.
Donor relations with the GoU are characterised by high levels of harmonisation with
the PEAP. Most donors align assistance with government priorities via budget support
and the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS). Meanwhile, donors are also seeking
to address conflict and armed violence within new development programmes and
strategies. Nevertheless, whilst conflict and security issues are recognised as a high
priority in the PEAP - with Pillar 3 dedicated to Security, Conflict Resolution and
Disaster Management (SCD) - there remain some issues of concern:
78
The GoU has established SCD as a new sector with a secretariat in the Office
of the Prime Minister. Some observers feel that this hinders the mainstreaming
of these issues across sectors.
Donors‘ decisions to provide most assistance via budget support reflect
confidence in the GoU. Concerns over democratisation and GoU commitment
to conflict resolution in the north call into question the basis for this
confidence.
The needs of conflict-affected areas in the north are addressed largely through
donor-funded projects separate from the PEAP. This risks undermining the
GoU‘s role in service provision and reinforcing perceptions of government
neglect there.
Donors are doing little to encourage the integration of conflict and armed
violence issues across sectors. Potential for conflict in areas other than the
north is not being adequately addressed due to the lack of a systematic
approach to conflict-sensitivity.
To address these issues, the GoU should make conflict prevention and peacebuilding
central to its poverty reduction strategies. It should build capacity to adopt conflict-
sensitive approaches to development, strengthen the coherence between different
government ministries on conflict and security issues, and undertake further research,
including a conflict assessment. Civil society should monitor progress in implementing
Pillar 3 of the PEAP. It should also engage in dialogue with donors, conduct research
and advocacy on conflict and development, and provide practical support to the GoU.
For their part, donors should:
Ensure that the GoU‘s approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding are
central to decisions on budget support to Uganda
Ensure that donor assistance strategies address the links between conflict,
armed violence and development and are informed by conflict analysis
Support efforts to implement Pillar 3 of the PEAP, by establishing the SCD
sector, mainstreaming actions to address conflict across sectors, pursuing other
entry points on initiatives to support the GoU, and evaluating the sustainability
of technical assistance
Strengthen joint analysis and monitoring of conflict and armed violence
among donors to inform assistance strategies, dialogue and programming.
Source: Bayne, S., 2007, 'Aid and Conflict in Uganda', Saferworld, London
Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The Case of Burundi
J Brachet and H Wolpe (2005)
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Abstract
This paper notes eight principles to guide development assistance: (i) ―do no harm‖
particularly to avoid reinforcing or triggering conflict causes; (ii) make peace
dividends visible to the population; (iii) include short-term issues, especially the
restoration of security; (iv) limit the potential for mass mobilization; (v) address the
structural causes of conflict; (vi) address the perceptual and attitudinal legacy of the
conflict; (vii) ensure that development assistance is consistent and sustained; and (viii)
consider the regional context.
The paper reviews a number of development areas where there are opportunities to
incorporate the above principles.
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Source: Brachet, J., H. Wolpe, 2005, ‗Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The
Case of Burundi‘ Paper No. 27, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit,
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Aid Instruments in Fragile States
N Leader and P Colenso (2005)
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Summary
What type and mix of aid instruments are currently being used in difficult
environments? How can donors work more effectively in fragile states? This paper by
the UK Department for International Development describes the limitations of current
approaches to aid instruments and discusses the emerging understanding of their use
within fragile states. In addition, a selection of aid instruments that may be more
effective in achieving objectives in difficult environments is highlighted.
Donors need to work more effectively in fragile states to meet immediate needs,
support pro poor political reform and develop sustainable systems for delivering
services. The current approach to the selection of aid instruments emphasises: less
money, disbursing through projects, shorter time commitments and a shift away from
projects towards budget support as performance increases. However, this approach
does not fit with the variety of situations in fragile states and there are examples of
successful use of different aid instruments in such cases. Furthermore, it does not
reflect the research and understanding of aid effectiveness, specifically aid as a cost-
effective means of preventing conflict.
Donors should use an improved approach to the selection of aid instruments,
acknowledging that:
There is no single approach and a'one-size fits all' mentality should be
avoided. Working in fragile states requires experimentation and flexibility
based on local knowledge.
Risk can be reduced but not eliminated. Concerns over state legitimation and
fiduciary risk will be a determinant of the choice and use of aid instruments.
An approach is needed that acknowledges both high risk and high returns.
There is a need to think and plan programmatically from the outset and then to
work out implementation methodologies. Such programmes should involve
partnerships between the state, UN, civil society and the private sector.
Better frameworks are needed for improved coherence between security,
development and diplomatic interventions.
General principles of aid effectiveness should also be applied to fragile states.
Aid should be coordinated to be harmonised and aligned. Where there is no
commitment to poverty reduction, aid actors should seek to 'shadow align.'
Supporting political reform is difficult but possible. The choice of aid
instruments should be based on broader political strategies and a political
economy analysis of potential winners and losers.
Aid should be used appropriately to the context. There have been some promising uses
of aid instruments in fragile states so far. Overall:
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Budget support has been effective via trust funds in early stages of formation
and direct to government in more established post-conflict countries. Social
funds can strengthen local accountability and contribute to political reform.
Pooled funding can promote a more programmatic and long term approach and
reduce the tendency for projectisation. However, projects within a strategic
framework can demonstrate aid effectiveness.
Where there is state capacity but no commitment to poverty reduction off-
budget joint, national or regional programmes should be considered. Key
reformers in government should be supported.
Where there is both little capacity and commitment the focus should be on
local government, communities, civil society and the private sector.
Where there is commitment but little capacity a strategic framework should be
in place between government and donors covering political, security and
development aspects.
Source: Leader, N. and Colenso, P., 2005, ‗Aid Instruments in Fragile States‘, Poverty
Reduction in Difficult Environments Team Working Paper no. 5, Department for
International Development, London
Peace and Conflict Sensitivity in International Cooperation: An Introductory
Overview T Paffenholz (2005)
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Summary
Peace and conflict sensitivity has successfully entered the mainstreaming agenda of
development donors and agencies and there has been a tremendous institutionalisation
and conceptualisation of the topic. In practical terms however, a co-ordinated system
for peace and conflict sensitive aid implementation remains a long way off. This
article, published in the the journal International Politics and Society, explores the gap
between rhetoric and practice and identifies some of the challenges ahead.
Peace and conflict sensitivity in international co-operation involves integrating the
peace and conflict dimension into development policies and programmes. Following
the Rwandan genocide of 1994, a major debate began amongst development actors
about the role of development in conflict affected areas. This largely political debate
then shifted to a tool-based discussion and in recent years, a variety of conflict
sensitive approaches have been developed, such as ‗Do No Harm‘.
The limitations of many ‗Do No Harm‘ activities have since become apparent. Without
a clear political strategy, donors have been unable to influence conflict situations in a
timely and constructive way.
In Nepal, despite 30 different conflict analysis reports and assessments, donors
have been unable to come up with a joint assessment that could lead to a joint
response.
In Sri Lanka, the many private aid organisations specially founded for tsunami
aid have no experience in international co-operation, and therefore no idea
about peace and conflict sensitivity.
The opposition party-controlled areas in the north and east of Sri-Lanka are
getting far less tsunami aid than the south because agencies there have to work
with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which takes longer. Most
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professional agencies are aware of this, but do not see any other way of coping
with these huge resource allocations.
In order to help improve the practice of peace and conflict sensitivity in international
co-operation, policymakers need to:
Politicise the debate around peace/conflict sensitivity. Peace and conflict are
political issues and this fosters the need for better co-operation between
diplomatic and development actors
Change from a tool-based strategy to a more holistic approach, which aims at
systematic peace and conflict sensitive programme management
Ensure more modesty in the debate on assessing the impact of peace-building
interventions. It is difficult to assess the impact of a single intervention on the
macro peace process in isolation
Invest in a good planning process. Donors should emphasise evaluations of
peace programmes and include funds for training courses in participatory
planning for peace partner organisations
Establish training partnerships with southern institutions to create ownership
and make use of local knowledge. A north-only agency and consultant drive
approach should be avoided
Standardise planning and evaluation guidelines. It would make sense for
researchers, governmental and non-governmental actors from the north, south
and east to develop standard guidelines in the context of an international
framework.
Source: Paffenholz, T., 2005, 'Peace and Conflict Sensitivity in International
Cooperation: An Introductory Overview', International Politics and Society, issue no.
4, pp. 63-82
Policies towards Horizontal Inequalities
F Stewart et al (2007)
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Summary
Severe horizontal inequalities (HIs), or inequalities among groups, are undesirable in
themselves and can lead to violent conflict. So, what can be done to reduce them? This
paper from the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity
(CRISE) reviews a range of policies which could contribute to reducing HIs in the
political, socio-economic and cultural status dimensions. Considerations of HI are
frequently ignored in policy-making, and need to become an important part of policy
discussions in multicultural societies.
Policies across all three dimensions can take either a direct or indirect approach
towards correcting group inequality. Relevant policies depend on the context and
hence a first requirement is a careful assessment of the nature and causes of HIs in the
particular society. If possible, policies should be adopted which reduce rather than
increase the salience of identities. Policies which correct HIs can be provocative,
leading to mobilisation (sometimes violent) by previously privileged groups, so that
caution is needed in design and implementation. The successful socio-economic cases
are shown to have tackled both social and economic inequalities, while success in
reducing political HIs requires political inclusivity at many levels of the political
system.
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HIs are most likely to contribute to conflict where:
They are durable and widen over time
Group boundaries are relatively impermeable, meaning inequalities are more
difficult to overcome
There are fairly large numbers in different groups
Inequalitites are consistent across dimensions, for instance where lack of
political power is combined with economic deprivation
Aggregate incomes are stagnant/slow growing and there is very little
improvement in the absolute economic and social position of deprived groups
Groups are sufficiently cohesive for collective action to emerge
Leaders emerge and are not co-opted into the ruling system, and government is
irresponsive or violently repressive.
Policies towards HIs need to be combined with policies to aid in the reconstruction of
economic and social infrastructure, demobilisation and economic growth.
Policies need to address political as well as economic/social HIs. Policies
which aim for equality of outcomes are likely to be more successful than those
only aimed at equality of opportunities or equality of resource access.
Policies may need to address discriminatory processes, directing assistance to
particular groups or introducing targets and quotas for education, land
distribution etc (affirmative action). Government action will have more effect
on HIs in the public rather than the private sector.
Policies should be designed to enhance efficiency and improve income
distribution to avoid the possibility of adverse impacts on efficiency and intra-
group equity.
Political HIs can be addressed through a federal constitution, addressing the
extent and nature of decentralisation, voting systems and elected assemblies.
Other areas for attention include seat reservation for particular groups, job
allocation within government, citizenship rights, the nature of political parties
and human rights protection.
Differences in cultural status or recognition can also be an important aspect of
group grievances which can potentially contribute to the emergence of violent
conflict. Multicultural societies can adopt a wide range of formal policies as
well as informal practices in order to mitigate perceptions of cultural
exclusion, discrimination or inequality of treatment among certain cultural
groups.
Careful attention also needs to be paid to the risk that affirmative action can
entrench ethnicity. In addition, policies to correct HIs can in themselves
provoke violence. In some cases action to correct political HIs may need to
precede economic action.
Source: Stewart, F., Brown, G., and Langer, A., 2007, 'Policies towards Horizontal
Inequalities', CRISE Working Paper, no. 42, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford
University
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The Implications of Horizontal Inequality for Aid
G Brown and F Stewart (2006)
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Summary
How should the reduction of horizontal inequalities (HIs) inform aid policy in
culturally diverse countries? This paper from the Centre for Research on Inequality,
Human Security and Ethnicity outlines the various instruments and outcomes of aid
policies aimed at addressing HIs. Drawing on case studies from Ghana and Nepal, it
argues that donors must make reducing HIs a more central objective by directing more
aid to heterogeneous countries and engaging in more policy dialogue with partner
governments.
HIs are economic, social and political inequalities between culturally defined groups.
Such disparities have direct consequences: a group‘s relative impoverishment can
impair individuals‘ self-perceptions and wellbeing. HIs also have instrumental
significance: they can reduce the efficiency of an aid programme and encourage
violent conflict.
Aid programmes that do not prioritise HIs may exacerbate them. Poverty reduction
programmes may succeed in more developed, urban areas, but fail to reach more
underprivileged groups. Aid initiatives may be distorted by the discriminatory
practices of governments or elites that fail to counter existing disparities.
There are several challenges and possibilities for aid programmes targeted at reducing
HIs:
Mapping HIs is complex: populations are sub-divided along a variety of
cultural lines and disaggregated data is often sparse. Aid organisations should
monitor the categories which coincide with the sharpest socio-economic
disparities and, in the absence of direct data, use regional or linguistic proxies.
Heterogeneous countries receive relatively less aid than homogeneous
countries: this pattern should be reversed to compensate for disadvantages
associated with cultural diversity. Countries willing to tackle HIs should
receive general budgetary support. Less willing governments should receive
conditional aid, project support directed at excluded groups or support for
other objectives, acceptable to the government, which would also assist these
groups.
In Ghana, the greatest inequalities exist, for historical and economic reasons,
between the poorer North and the richer South. Since aid accounts for a large
proportion of government expenditure, donors could have a big impact on
these disparities, but their policy statements make little reference to HIs.
Indeed, recent aid has exacerbated North / South disparities which may
promote future conflict.
In Nepal, the recent communist insurgency was driven by persistent socio-
economic and political HIs. Although donors have belatedly acknowledged
this and focused on HIs, earlier measures targeted at reducing these
inequalities might have averted conflict in a country heavily development on
foreign aid.
Aid can play a central role in reducing HI, especially in countries with heavy aid
dependence. Donors must acknowledge the importance of HIs and implement
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proactive policies to reduce these inequalities, even if it means trading off other
objectives, like short-term growth and poverty reduction:
Despite current rhetoric on country ownership of development strategies,
donors should be prepared to influence the development objectives of
governments unwilling to reduce HIs.
Donors should direct aid instruments like Poverty Reduction Budget Support
and Sector Wide Approach programmes towards addressing HIs.
Donors should encourage partner governments to prioritise HIs in Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers and in policy dialogue.
A human rights and social exclusion approach to aid may support HI reduction
policies, but these strategies must be more precisely interpreted in line with HI
objectives.
Aid agencies should implement proactive policies to reduce HIs before they
become a cause for conflict.
Source: Brown, G. and Stewart, F., 2006, 'The Implications of Horizontal Inequality
for Aid', paper presented at WIDER Conference on Aid: Principles, Policies and
Performance, 16-17 June, Helsinki
Fragile States Strategy
USAID (2005)
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Summary
What factors should donors consider when identifying an approach to reverse decline
in fragile states? How do fragile states differ from those that are stable and able to
pursue development? This paper by the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) outlines a strategy for its engagement with fragile states. It
details how USAID can respond effectively by identifying strategic priorities, initial
directions for programming and a new management and administrative approach.
Fragile states occur where development and governance has failed, the consequences
of which can have a worldwide effect. USAID's fragile states strategy was developed
in response to addressing security issues, an increased interest in reducing poverty and
a need for greater contextual understanding. Based on an analysis of previous
experience and an identification of gaps in current responses to fragile states, USAID
have identified a more strategic approach.
This approach has four main aspects:
Analysing and monitoring the internal dynamics of fragile states. This will
enable an informed assessment of risk, allow strategic priority setting among
and within countries and more effective targeting of the sources of fragility.
Identification of priorities that reflect the realities within fragile states:
security, stability, reform and capacity of institutions. The uniqueness and
complexity of fragile states will call for a careful analysis of the context and
subsequently developing appropriate strategies.
Strategic programming focusing on priorities identified, sources of fragility,
both short and long term impact, appropriate measurement systems and
importance to US foreign policy. These will differ depending on whether the
state is vulnerable or in a crisis.
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Use of a fragile states business model to bring the vision to reality. The main
features include a more effective response in strategic planning, reporting,
budgeting, operational response and administrative procedures.
USAID has considerable experience in fragile states and has identified the following
key lessons from past experience and through identifying gaps in current responses:
Security is essential for progress within fragile states. USAID is currently
constrained by a number of security issues.
Weak governance is at the centre of fragility. USAID need to address this as
one of the sources of the problem. Weak institutions with limited capacity
contribute to weak governance, however, USAID tends to be focused on
policy reform rather than institution building.
There needs to be more research into what enables turnaround in fragile states
and the most effective role for the donor in the process.
An integrated analysis, response strategies and operations and shared
responsibility for decisions are required. An effective response to fragile states
requires a coherent relationship with agencies of the U.S. Government and
effective relationships with other partners.
Fragile states need a stable funding source but with flexibility in the
deployment of funds.
It is vital to have an early warning system to prompt a rapid response to fragile
states showing vulnerability.
USAID, 2005, ‗Fragile States Strategy‘, United States Agency for International
Development, Washington DC
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3. HMG and International Conflict Architecture, Particularly UN and
IFIs
Core readings
Consolidating the Peace? Views from Sierra Leone and Burundi on the United
Nations Peacebuilding Commission
A Street and J Smith (2007)
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Summary
How successful has the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) been in its
first year of activity? What challenges confront the PBC? This report from ActionAid,
CAFOD and Care International UK assesses the first year of the PBC's work in Sierra
Leone and Burundi. It finds that the PBC's impact has been largely positive and well
received, but that important challenges remain.
In Sierra Leone and Burundi the PBC has made significant progress in overcoming
stakeholders' initial reservations and the problems of establishing its work. The PBC
has also experienced a number of challenges in delivering on its mandate and
objectives. The PBC should emphasise the Strategic Peacebuilding Framework (SPBF)
as a political instrument to facilitate commitment, consensus and action on confronting
governance-related challenges. To complement the political process, the Peacebuilding
Fund (PBF) should tackle gaps and challenges in peacebuilding efforts, rather than just
provide funds for existing strategies.
Conclusions on the PBC's work in Sierra Leone and Burundi include that:
The PBC has made an important contribution to Sierra Leone in terms of
international attention and financial support. Additional resources may be
mobilised due to PBC engagement, which is encouraging given the country's
chronic poverty.
The PBC and PBF have missed opportunities to maximise their effectiveness in
Sierra Leone. For example, the immediate focus on PBF money detracted from
the more important role of the SPBF.
Much of the PBC process in Burundi has focused on PBF funding, with
dialogue and strategic and political issues coming second. While this is
understandable, it is important that the PBC is involved in political processes
taking place in the country.
The PBC/PBF process has generally been useful in Burundi, with the
international community successfully implementing a shared vision of
progress. It was limited, however, in that it excluded Burundian civil society
and the political opposition.
The PBC focus on Burundi has the potential to provide an international
spotlight on the positive peacebuilding processes taking place. This could lead
to more donor funding, due to greater confidence, and the potential of foreign
direct investment.
The lessons learned from the PBC's experience in Sierra Leone and Burundi should
inform future PBC policies and operations there, and in future focus countries. The
PBC should:
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Sequence the SPBF and the PBF appropriately. In late post-conflict/early
development phases, greater emphasis should be placed on political strategy,
with PBF funding as an incentive to encourage political consensus;
Give greater attention to accountability, monitoring and follow-up.
Mechanisms and processes should be developed to assess genuine contributions
to peace, rather than project outputs, across programme and political levels;
Focus on the critical gaps and political challenges in peacebuilding processes.
The PBC's greatest potential to provide added value to peacebuilding efforts
lies in promoting political consensus and commitment to addressing difficult
issues;
Identify criteria for 'PBF only' scenarios. Criteria should be developed to ensure
that the use of PBF funding in early post-conflict stabilisation adds real value
and does no harm; and
Rethink the PBF timeframe. The one- to two-year period for PBF
implementation should be reviewed, since sustainable peace cannot be
achieved, nor impact evaluated, within this timeframe.
Source: Street, A., Smith, J. and Mollet, H. 2007. 'Consolidating the peace?: views
from Sierra Leone and Burundi on the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission',
ActionAid, CAFOD and CARE International
Greater than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing 'Whole of Government' Approaches
to Fragile States
S Patrick and K Brown (2007)
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Summary
Promoting security, good governance and recovery in weak, failing and war-torn
countries requires integrated, coherent approaches. Many international donors are
adopting ‗whole-of government‘ approaches that bring together their diplomatic,
defence and development instruments: the 3Ds. This report from the International
Peace Academy examines these approaches in seven leading donor countries. It argues
that policy coherence remains a work in progress.
Fragile states represent both the crux of today‘s development challenge and an
increasing source of threats to international security. Because building effective states
in the developing world requires addressing both development and security concerns,
there is a growing recognition that development agencies must ‗join up‘ with other
departments with comparative advantages and unique capabilities, particularly
diplomatic and defence ministries.
This study examines efforts to promote policy coherence toward fragile states by seven
donor Governments: the UK, the US, Canada, Australia, France, Germany and
Sweden. In looking at each country, the report attempts to glean insights into the
motivations, assumptions and rationales behind this new strategic reorientation.
Laudable strides have been made towards policy coherence in select countries.
However, the quest for coherence in donor policies toward fragile states has a long
way to go:
The concept of state fragility remains contested and controversial. There is
little consensus on what constitutes a fragile state, much less a common,
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government-wide strategic vision on priority objectives in weak and failed
states.
The development community remains deeply ambivalent about policy
coherence. Integrated approaches may garner increased attention and resources
for fragile states. However, they can subordinate the goal of poverty-
alleviation to short-term security imperatives.
There is a dearth of strong co-ordinating entities and dedicated funding
streams to address the specific challenges of engaging in fragile states.
Standing inter-agency units can help create a focal point for cross-
departmental collaboration within donor governments. However, they often
suffer from a lack of bureaucratic heft and dedicated resources.
Where advances have been made, these have often been in responding to
crises and assisting post-conflict recovery, as opposed to preventing state
failure and violent conflict to begin with.
The fate of fragile states will be shaped primarily by the commitment and capacities of
their own governments and citizens. By getting their own house in order, however,
donor governments may be able contribute to these efforts. Donors should:
Commit to open dialogue, both internally and with other donor governments,
about how to balance the multiple goals and objectives involved in working in
fragile states.
Develop a unified country strategy for each fragile state in which they plan to
engage. This strategy should drive a comprehensive assistance strategy, with
flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances. A starting point for policy
coherence must be an institutionalised, integrated system for early warning
and assessment, and an evaluation of the impact of donor interventions.
Give high-level political commitment, guidance and departmental leadership
to advance this agenda within donor governments. Without buy-in at senior
levels, even well intentioned co-ordinating units or mechanisms can be
sidelined and proven ineffective.
Devote a greater share of foreign assistance to fragile states, as well as create
common pools to stimulate cross-departmental co-operation.
Ensure that the development of integrated fragile state policies within donor
governments does not preclude harmonisation of international efforts and
alignment with host government priorities.
Source: Patrick, S. and Brown, K., 2007, 'Main Findings and Recommendations' in
Greater than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing "Whole of Government" Approaches to
Fragile States, International Peace Academy, New York, pp 128-141
A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility
United Nations Secretariat (2004)
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Summary
The changes that have taken place in the world since the Millennium Declaration
demand that consensus be revitalised on key challenges and priorities. What are these
and how can they best be achieved? This report, by United Nations Secretariat, argues
that security, development and human rights must be advanced together, otherwise
none will succeed. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) can be met by 2015,
but only if all governments dramatically increase their efforts.
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There can be no security without development, nor can there be development without
security. Mostly importantly, there cannot be either security or development without
respect for human rights. The world needs strong and capable states, effective
partnerships with civil society and the private sector. It also needs agile and effective
regional and global intergovernmental institutions to mobilise and coordinate
collective action. The United Nations must be reshaped in ways not previously
imagined and with a boldness and speed not previously shown. The cause of larger
freedom can only be achieved by broad, deep and sustained global cooperation among
states.
The last 25 years have seen the most dramatic reduction in extreme poverty the world
has ever experienced. Yet dozens of countries have become poorer.
More than a billion people still live on less than a dollar a day. Each year,
three million people die from HIV/AIDS and 11 million children die before
reaching their fifth birthday.
The threats to peace and security include not just international war and
conflict, but terrorism, organised crime and civil violence. They also include
poverty, disease and environmental degradation.
These threats can cause death or lessen life chances on a large scale. All of
them can undermine the state as the basic unit of the international system.
A great deal has been achieved since 1997 in reforming the internal structures
and culture of the United Nations, but changes are needed, both in the
executive branch and in the UN's intergovernmental organs.
In 2005, a global partnership for development needs to be fully implemented. The
following are priority areas for action:
Each country with extreme poverty should begin to implement a national
development strategy bold enough to meet the MDG targets for 2015. Global
development assistance must be more than doubled.
The Doha negotiations should fulfil their development promise and be
completed by 2006. Debt sustainability should be redefined as the level of debt
that allows a country to achieve the MDGs without increasing debt ratios.
States should commit to an anti-terrorism strategy. The Security Council should
adopt a resolution on the principles relating to the use of force. Progress should
be made on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
Member states should create an inter-governmental Peacebuilding Commission
so that the UN can help countries complete the transition from war to peace.
The international community should acknowledge the responsibility to protect.
The human rights treaty bodies of the UN should be more effective and
responsive.
The Secretary-General will create a cabinet-style decision-making mechanism.
He requests Member States to give him the authority and resources to do this.
United Nations Secretary General, 2004, 'A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility', Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change
Source: United Nations Secretary General, 2004, 'A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility', Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change
90
Supplementary readings
Donors and the 'Fragile States' Agenda: A Survey of Current Thinking and
Practice
D Cammack and D McLeod (2006)
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Summary
What are the challenges associated with implementing the fragile states (FS) agenda?
This report commissioned by the Japan International Corporation Agency (JICA)
outlines the FS agenda as it relates to international development and aid. It focuses on
the experiences of three key donors - the United States (US), the United Kingdom
(UK) and Germany - and explores the operationalisation of the agenda in Afghanistan,
Cambodia and Nepal. To date, implementation efforts have remained largely
uncoordinated and incomplete. Coherence and ‗joined-up‘ approaches are therefore a
priority for the wide variety of actors involved.
The term ‗fragile states‘ has no precise meaning. Fragility is variously defined in terms
of the functionality of states, of their outputs (including insecurity), or of their
relationship with donors. The international development community came to the
fragile states agenda from three different directions: (i) an emphasis on human security
and peacebuilding; (ii) a concern with poor development performance and state
effectiveness; and (iii) a belief that underdevelopment and insecurity are related.
These challenges are now combined in a new constellation, addressed in single
programmes, with a multitude of actors having to learn to plan and work together.
Moving the harmonisation and alignment agenda from theory to practice has been slow
and difficult for donors whose traditional way of working is based on self-motivated,
autonomous planning and independent projects.
The US is primarily motivated by guaranteeing national security.
Humanitarian and development goals have been subordinated since 9/11.
Countries that the government finds particularly threatening (namely
Afghanistan and Iraq) have seen funding levels rise dramatically.
The UK has deliberately maintained a division between its security and
development agendas. The former is pursued by the Ministry of Defence and
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the latter by the
Department for International Development (DFID). Nevertheless, DFID is
quite advanced in analysing the linkages between conflict, poverty and
governance.
Germany has peacekeeping as its central focus, on which the Ministry of
Economic Cooperation and Development has taken the lead. However, the rest
of the federal government appears sympathetic to the view that tackling
poverty via development aid is instrumental to combating instability.
There is little evidence that the FS agenda is being implemented with any consistency
in the field. In Afghanistan, for example, the failure of donors to support the
government has undermined the process of nation building. Nevertheless, donors are
keen to redesign their aid programmes to take account explicitly of state fragility and
conflict. In future, donors should:
Determine the causes of state fragility, develop a list of fragile states, and
adopt or design appropriate analytical tools to measure and monitor their level
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of fragility . This should result in interventions that tackle the perceived causes
of fragility.
Ensure that fragile states programming remains flexible and responsive to the
country context and to constraints acting on the international aid community.
Not all interventions are possible because actual conditions on the ground in
difficult working environments can undermine policy design.
Consider a list of practices that are common to good aid programming, as well
as some that are specific to working in fragile states. This might include, for
example, careful attention by both donors and domestic actors to prioritising
and sequencing interventions (including governance reforms) while
maintaining a realistic sense of what is achievable.
Source: Cammack, D. et al., 2006, 'Donors and the 'Fragile States' Agenda: A Survey
of Current Thinking and Practice' ODI Report for the Japan International Cooperation
Agency, Overseas Development Institute, London
New Challenges for Peacekeeping: Peacebuilding, Protection, and the ‘War on
Terror’
R Gowan (2007)
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Abstract
In spite of the variety and complexity of the peacekeeping challenges experienced over
the last year, it is possible to identify a variety of strategic issues which may prove
―pertinent‖ to future peace operations. Some of these are potentially global in scope:
the consolidation of a broader concept of security in international affairs,
encompassing human security and an emerging responsibility to protect; a growing
recognition of the potential of long-term
peacebuilding and state-building as contributions to collective security; and the
centrality of the fight against terrorism to global security policy. Other factors—such
as the emergence of a new African security architecture, and Australia‘s deployment of
a series of missions in the Pacific—are regional, raising the question of whether
peacekeeping will now follow divergent patterns in different parts of the world. This
paper gives a brief overview of the operational and political evolution of peacekeeping
from the mid- 1990s to the present. It provides a detailed analysis of the conceptual
and normative context for current and future operations. It also maps regional trends in
the supply of and demand for peacekeepers.
Source: Gowan, Richard, and Johnstone, Ian, 2007, New Challenges for Peacekeeping:
Peacebuilding, Protection, and the ‗War on Terror,‘ International Peace Academy,
New York, March.
European Union Policy Approaches in Protracted Crises
T Mowjee (2004)
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Summary
What challenges face the European Union (EU) in developing coherent strategies for
protracted crises? This study for the Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas
Development Institute (UK) examines the evolution of the EU‘s policy approaches in
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protracted crises. It finds that overlaps of responsibility between the Commission and
the Council, and within the Commission, have hindered the development and
implementation of coherent, comprehensive strategies.
The European Union has struggled with both policy definition and implementation
regarding protracted crises since the Commission‘s 1996 Communication on the links
between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD). This adopted a continuum
approach to LRRD, although simultaneously acknowledging the difficulties of this
model in complex emergencies. None of its main recommendations were implemented.
The second Communication on LRRD in 2001 adopted a ‗continuum‘ approach –
meaning that different funding instruments were used simultaneously without uniform
patterns of chronological transition between them. A ‗road map‘ process for LRRD
was adopted, focusing on health and food security.
Problems have arisen because different services embrace the LRRD process to
different extents and give it different priorities. Other measures stemming from the
2001 Communication proposed or adopted by the EU to address LRRD in complex
emergencies are:
A narrower focus on immediate emergency needs for ECHO (the
Commission‘s humanitarian aid organisation)
The ‗Humanitarian Plus‘ programme, which uses EDF money for
humanitarian activities that support peace processes and preparing the ground
for development activities
The use of EDF funds for peacekeeping, particularly the Africa Peace Facility.
Money is to be used for non-military costs
A European Voluntary Humanitarian Corps to enable young Europeans to
participate in humanitarian aid operations. This has been opposed by
organisations within and outside the EU as dangerous and unprofessional.
LRRD has been an internal organisational issue for the EU, rather than a policy
adapting its relationship to other actors in protracted crises. Policy development has
been the product of bureaucratic pressure and wider political processes. Some of the
severe problems facing the EU are:
Overlaps of responsibility between the Commission and the Council, and
within the Commission, have hindered the development and implementation
of coherent, comprehensive strategies
There is a danger that the CFSP will subordinate aid to trade and foreign
policies, in opposition to the neutrality of the Commission‘s humanitarian
assistance
Security has been linked to development, but lack of clarity as to how the
goals for the use of military force can be applied has hampered policy
articulation
Conflict prevention (CP) has proved more successful, especially in the
Balkans. However, humanitarian aid is not used as a CP tool and
mainstreaming the process in other policy areas has been slow
It is likely that with the acquisition of 10 new countries, the EU‘s focus will be
on regional issues with aid directed at transition/middle-income countries in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
Source: Mowjee, 2004, 'European Union Policy Approaches in Protracted Crises',
Overseas Development Institute, London
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Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools: Strengthening the United Nations
P Robert (2004)
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Summary
What is the effect of the Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) on international efforts to
prevent conflict? Did CPP-funded measures mobilise more effective efforts by
international partners to tackle the conflicts in Sudan, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan or the
former Soviet Union? This study by the United Kingdom Department for International
Development (DFID) assesses the success of the "Strengthening the United Nations
(UN) Strategy" and makes recommendations on how DFID can improve its
contribution.
The UN Strategy under the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) is an important
part of the Conflict Pools system. This agenda has been laid out in reports by Kofi
Annan, and by Lakdar Brahimi. The GCPP UN Strategy has been directed to securing
improvements against the benchmarks provided in these reports, though it has so far
concentrated most explicitly on the Brahimi report. Support for peacekeeping and
international policing has been among its main priorities. The UN strategy has also
been active in support of the UN Development Program (UNDP) strategic planning
and the special needs of women and children, issues canvassed in Annan's report.
The existence of the GCPP appears to have brought added value to UK support for UN
reform in the area of conflict prevention by bringing the three ministries together to
develop a joint UN Strategy. However, the Strategy:
Has not been developed on the basis of a well-developed set of intermediate
objectives, risk assessments, or timelines for achieving its objectives. It has
been affected by unclear procedures and by the absence of proper training.
Has not been the object of a wide discussion. Input from posts and officials
with specialist knowledge of UN agencies based outside New York has been
limited.
Arguably, has been no more successful than if the projects had been
implemented outside a GCPP framework. There is however considerable
potential within the CPP systems for more effective interdepartmental
collaboration.
Meant that projects are managed tightly and are resulting in good value for
money in terms of project-specific outcomes.
Could achieve more careful financial management if the key strategy
document itself was improved by being much more explicit in terms of
intermediate objectives, incremental steps and timelines for achieving
outcomes.
The UN Strategy should identify the full range of reforms needed and rank them
according to priority. It should then canvas the opportunities for the UK to make a
meaningful contribution to the highest priority issues.
There may be room to shift the balance toward the Annan recommendations.
There could be reappraisal of the share of GCPP money allocated in support of
peacebuilding compared with the share going toward preventive action.
The broader UN system should be taken into account in refining the Strategy.
Consultations on the strategy within HMG should involve more posts than is
currently the case.
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Geographic strategy managers should be consulted in shaping the UN
Strategy. UN training systems should be used to address the training deficit for
HMG staff working on the CPPs.
The GCPP Strategy should be reviewed in light of the overall aims of the UK
in relation to the UN.
A different allocation of staff resources and a different set of structures and
processes is needed than those in place at present.
It is difficult for the three Steering Group staff members to be able to deliver
the analysis, monitoring and review functions implied by the above findings
and recommendations.
Source: Robert, P., 2004, Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools: Strengthening
the United Nations, Report prepared for the Department for International Development
Low-Income Countries Under Stress: Update
World Bank (2005)
Access full text online
Abstract
This report summarizes progress to date under the Low-Income Countries Under Stress
(LICUS) initiative, and priorities going forward.
Source: World Bank, 2005, ‗Low-Income Countries Under Stress: Update‘, Operations
Policy and Country Services, Washington, DC.
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Part 2: Conflict Prevention and Conflict-
sensitive Development
Contents
1. Conflict Prevention and Conflict Sensitive Development ................................................... 96
1.1 Conflict prevention ........................................................................................... 96
1.2 Early warning and early response systems ..................................................... 104
2. Conflict Sensitive Design of Poverty Reduction Programmes .......................................... 107
3. Conflict-sensitive Design, Monitoring and Evaluation of Programmes Aimed at Preventing
Violence ................................................................................................................................. 115
4. Do no Harm and Similar Approaches................................................................................ 133
5. Role of State and non-state Actors in Promoting Peaceful Transformation, in Supporting
Country/state Resilience and in Building State Capacity ...................................................... 137
96
1. Conflict Prevention and Conflict Sensitive Development
1.1 Conflict prevention
UK Government policy
Preventing Violent Conflict
Department for International Development (DFID) (2007)
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Summary
How can government development agencies play a part in tackling the problems that
contribute to violent conflict? This paper by the UK Department for International
Development (DFID) seeks to show how DFID understands and responds to conflict
across the breadth of its work. It proposes to place a greater emphasis on resolving
conflict before it becomes violent, to make its response to armed conflict more
effective by improving its support to peace processes and enhancing the conflict-
management capacity of relevant bodies, and to make its development work more
‗conflict-sensitive‘. The paper includes case studies from Brazil, Indonesia, Colombia,
Uganda, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Afghanistan, Nepal, Sudan and Yemen.
Conflict is the pursuit of contrary or seemingly incompatible interests between
individuals, groups or countries and exists in all societies at all times. Conflict can be
managed peacefully and can be a force for positive social change. However, where
there is poor governance, conflicts are likely to become violent. The costs of violent
conflict range from the immediate toll on lives and property to development goals such
as improving education and health. All countries in the international community have
an interest in reducing violent conflict due to the consequent economic and security
benefits.
Although the number of violent conflicts has fallen in recent years, there are current
trends that may increase the risk of violence that should be dealt with at the
international level:
The scarcity of natural resources, compounded by greater environmental
degradation relating to climate change;
Migration, which both stems from and further compounds resource scarcity;
Abundances of resources such as oil or minerals that can create competition to
control profits that can turn violent; and
The availability of conventional weapons and small arms in particular, which
can make it easier for a conflict to turn violent.
Dealing with the mixture of underlying causes and immediate events that often trigger
conflicts often takes DFID into difficult, highly political territory. To minimise the
political risk involved in dealing with national governments and international
organisations, DFID works with other departments such as the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office. This paper sets out how to reduce violent conflict so as to
reduce poverty:
DFID will place greater emphasis on preventing conflict before it turns, or
returns, to violence. DFID will support local, national and international
mechanisms to manage and resolve disputes peacefully;
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DFID will make its response to armed conflict more effective by improving its
practical and political support to peace processes. It will also assist in building
the capacity of international and regional organisations and civil society, as
well as national governments, so that they can manage conflicts better. What
DFID does when conflict breaks out will be tied more closely to dealing with
the underlying causes; and
DFID will make its development work more ‗conflict-sensitive‘ through its
Country Government Assessments. It will develop better corporate approaches
and systems to support its work in countries affected by conflict. This will be
achieved by strengthening its staff capacity, expertise and deployability, and
by improving the way it assesses and deals with risk in planning country
programmes.
Source: DFID, 2007, 'Preventing Violent Conflict', UK Government Policy Paper,
DFID, London
Investing in Prevention: An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability
and Improve Crisis Response
Prime Minister's Strategy Unit (2005)
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Summary
How can the UK improve its strategic approach to countries at risk of instability? This
paper from the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit outlines the challenges and risks of
instability. It identifies practical steps the UK Government can take to improve its
prevention and response strategies in partnership with other international actors. It
argues that more effective action will require common or aligned strategic approaches
across all countries and key international agencies.
Instability is likely to be part of the international landscape for the foreseeable future.
The cost of crisis is very high, especially in human terms, and insecurity around the
globe also affects our own security and prosperity. The international community
therefore needs to reduce the risks of instability, to prevent crises. Although it is
common wisdom that prevention is better than cure, the international community has
found it difficult to translate this into practice. Understanding the causes and dynamics
of instability means looking at three sets of factors: (1) A country's internal capacity
and resilience, (2) Underlying factors associated with instability, and (3) External
stabilisers.
Preventing crises means effectively managing risks. The focus on lack of political will
has obscured what can be done at earlier stages to reduce risks, such as investment in
country and international capacity. In addition:
Increased commitment and coherence of action is needed. A sophisticated
understanding of country situations; an increased scale of engagement;
sustained support; and coherent engagement across different types of actors
are all necessary.
Investment is needed to build country capacity, and the roles of all key
international and domestic actors need to be set out and aligned behind a long-
term agenda. It is especially important that incentives of domestic governing
and other elites be aligned with stability.
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Response to crisis should be improved by increasing multilateral capacities,
tackling conflict funding and improving peace support operations.
International responsibility should be increased in tackling drivers of
instability such as HIV/AIDS, nuclear proliferation and global warming.
A more effective approach to prevention will require a coherent government
and international system-wide response.
A wide range of international actors have roles to play, and these roles should
be defined by their respective capability and willingness to be involved.
There are a number of concrete steps the UK government should undertake:
It should continue developing the Instability Framework with a view to
disseminating it amongst partners. It should also be coherent in its policies
towards countries at risk of instability, making use of the 'Partnerships for
Stability'.
It should, with its partners, develop better methods for understanding internal
political dynamics; enhance support for the European Neighbourhood Policy;
and work with partners to better support the AU.
Creating a positive international environment is crucial: The UK should
continue its advocacy of the International Finance Facility; expand work with
the EU and IFIs to ensure the impact of trade reform on stability; and continue
to work towards a more comprehensive approach to HIV/AIDS.
It should increase support for UN efforts to set out norms to ensure that
foreign direct investment contributes to stability; work with partners to tackle
climate change; and ensure that policies on nuclear energy and proliferation
are aligned with stability concerns.
Crisis response will still be crucial: The UK should make the case for a
substantial increase in deployable troops for Peace Support Operations;
strengthen work with partners to improve early warning analysis and continue
work on a cross-departmental Generic Planning Framework to align activities.
Source: Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, 2005, 'Investing in Prevention: An
International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response',
Cabinet Office, London
Core readings
Conflict Prevention: Policy and Practice in Search of a Theory
M Lund (2008)
Not published at time of writing – forthcoming in 2008
Source: Lund, M., 2008, ‗Conflict Prevention: Policy and Practice in Search of a
Theory‘, draft for publication as a chapter in Jacob Berkovitch, Viktor Kremenyk, and
William Zartman, eds., Handbook of Conflict Resolution, Sage Publications, London,
forthcoming in 2008.
99
Prevention: Concept and Scope
B Rubin (2002)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
Given the dramatic loss of life, the fallout in terms of refugees and other serious
problems, and the attacks that deadly conflict inflicts on our fundamental values,
preventing such conflict and the disorder it sows should be a much higher priority for
the United States, other governments, international organizations, and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). So concludes Barnett R. Rubin in Blood on
the Doorstep: The Politics of Preventive Action.
Combining hard-headed commentary with expert analysis of recent deadly conflicts in
Somalia, Rwanda, the Balkans, and Afghanistan, Rubin shows that violence arises not
only from internal conflicts within poverty-stricken societies, but also from external
political manipulation and failures of global institutions. He explores other factors that
contribute to conflict and lead to violence, such as the demand for illegal drugs, weak
banking regulations that facilitate looting by corrupt rulers, arms trafficking by
terrorists, and the economic marginalization of entire populations.
Because the prevention of deadly conflict requires intervention in political conflicts,
preventive action must itself be viewed as political, with all the struggles and
compromises that entails. According to Rubin, the solution lies in coalitions of
international organizations, NGOs, and states prepared to take political action, and not
in a new ―institutional architecture‖ or ―global governance.‖
Source: Rubin, B., 2002, ‗Prevention: Concept and Scope‘, Blood on the Doorstep:
The Politics of Preventive Action, New York: The Century Foundation Press
Development Dimensions of Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building
B Wood (2001)
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Summary
Despite lessons learned and periodic policy and programme adjustments, the overall
performance by the international system in conflict situations remains weak and
inconsistent. This paper, published by the United Nations Development Programme,
discusses the link between conflict and development and recommends concrete ways
in which development cooperation can respond to conflict most effectively.
Development processes need to give primacy to the internal dynamics and potential of
societies they assist and recognise both the contributions and limitations of the
assistance they provide.
International actors in conflict prevention and peace-building situations face
increasingly common states of protracted conflict and instability, complex global
influences and lack of clear outcomes. They also face tough questions about how to act
in certain conflict situations and shifting political priorities about whether to act. In
addition, political and economic interests often prevail, despite the laudable objectives
of building peace and preventing conflict.
100
The development perspective recognises that the goal is not the illusory ambition of
trying to prevent conflict altogether, but to prevent the slide into violent conflict.
Peace-building should not aspire to impart solutions for people in affected countries,
but to help them strengthen their capacity to create their own solutions. Development
cooperation needs to improve its flexibility and practices in order to recognise its limits
and maximise its contributions.
Specific areas of development assistance that link development to conflict prevention
and peace-building include, inter alia, economic development, improved governance
and public participation, strengthening the rule of law and respect for culture and
identity.
There are several situations that development cooperation can encounter in conflict-
affected countries. These situations range from ―normal‖ through conflict-prone, rising
tensions and violent conflict to transitions to peace and restoration of development.
Each situation calls for different a set of development responses.
Development cooperation could enhance its impact and effectiveness by conducting
thorough, consistent assessments keyed to specific country situations. Such an
assessment should include:
Analysis of the situation and needs for international support;
Identification of what types of development and other forms of assistance are
appropriate and should have priority in the specific type of situation;
Assessment of what types of relationship prevail within the country and
among the variety of international actors who are likely to be involved;
Acceptance that there are no simple formulas in these complex situations and
that hard choices need to be identified and confronted.
All partners in development need to recall the guiding principles of development
cooperation that provide the foundation for effective development policies and
programmes:
Maximise indigenous ownership; minimise dependency by supporting local
capacity-building.
Maintain engagement and trust; avoid making promises of aid that cannot be
delivered or sustained.
Seek to redress the dangers of violent conflict and mitigate its results; work for
respect for human rights.
Preserve a commitment to development values and goals; strengthen
coordination and coherence with other external actors.
Improve responsiveness and flexibility; learn about specific country situations,
lessons learned and good development practices elsewhere.
Promote development-friendly policies and practices in fields beyond
traditional development assistance, such as trade, finance and international
crime-fighting, which impact upon development and peace-building.
Source: Wood, B., 2001, 'Development Dimensions of Conflict Prevention And Peace-
Building', Independent study prepared for the Emergency Response Division, United
Nations Development Program, New York
101
Supplementary readings
Executive Summary of the Final report on Preventing Deadly Conflict
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997)
Access full text online
Abstract
Three inescapable observations form the foundation of this report. First, deadly
conflict is not inevitable. Violence on the scale of what we have seen in Bosnia,
Rwanda, Somalia, and elsewhere does not emerge inexorably from human interaction.
Second, the need to prevent deadly conflict is increasingly urgent. The rapid
compression of the world through breathtaking population growth, technological
advancement, and economic interdependence, combined with the readily available
supply of deadly weapons and easily transmitted contagion of hatred and incitement to
violence, make it essential and urgent to find ways to prevent disputes from turning
massively violent. Third, preventing deadly conflict is possible. The problem is not
that we do not know about incipient and large-scale violence; it is that we often do not
act. Examples from "hot spots" around the world illustrate that the potential for
violence can be defused through the early, skilful, and integrated application of
political, diplomatic, economic, and military measures.
Source: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997, ‗Executive
Summary of the Final report on Preventing Deadly Conflict‘, NY: Carnegie
Corporation of New York.
Helping Prevent Violent Conflict
OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) (2001)
Access full text online
Summary
All development cooperation strategies and programmes must help societies to manage
tensions and disputes without resorting to violence. How can international donors best
promote peace-building and post-conflict reconciliation? A task force, established in
1995 by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, has produced detailed
guidelines covering the design and implementation of development cooperation for
conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery. Development cooperation must be
coherent, comprehensive, integrated and aimed at helping address the root causes of
conflicts.
Donors should nurture local conflict resolutions and not impose externally generated
solutions. Development agencies must encourage the broader inclusion of societal
groups, in particular women, in discussion and negotiation processes. Priorities for
post-conflict reconstruction include: Restoring internal security and the rule of law;
legitimising state institutions; improving food security and social services; and creating
the basis for broad-based economic growth. Assistance must be seen to benefit the
entire population rather than specific groups, such as refugees and ex-combatants.
Development assistance can help consolidate fragile peace processes by supporting
societal reconciliation, political development and physical reconstruction. Aid also
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risks aggravating competition between disputing parties by raising the stakes of
political control.
To avoid increasing tensions, donors should develop their ability to identify,
monitor and analyse the long-term underlying causes of conflict, the current
socio-political context and the impact of aid distributions
A society with well-balanced social and economic resources is better able to
manage tensions and avoid institutional and social breakdown than one
suffering destabilising conditions, such as extreme poverty and large socio-
economic disparities
Donor payments for 'protection services' provide incentives for factions to
maintain insecurity and ransom humanitarian aid
Excessive reliance on international NGOs may weaken the development of
effective governance and of problem-solving and self-governing capabilities
Donors must promote institutions and processes which will stimulate and
sustain democratisation within the state and civil society
Post-conflict reconstruction depends greatly on the participation of returning
refugees and internally displaced persons.
External assistance must build on rather than substitute national capacities, resources
and initiatives, using local ownership and building on in-country experience. Long-
term planning for assistance should be introduced early to promote self-reliance and
avoid creating dependencies on external aid.
Coherence and coordination between all policy instruments (diplomacy,
military, trade, development aid), based on their own comparative advantage,
must be encouraged on a national, international and multilateral basis
Effective aid cooperation requires a common strategic framework; flexible
resources and procedures; leadership among international actors; mechanisms
for operational consultation; and resources ear-marked for coordination
purposes
'Gender aware' aid strategies, recognising and responding to the different
vulnerabilities of men and women, can result in higher-impact and more cost-
effective assistance
Donors must avoid over-centralising aid to strengthen government institutions
if this lessens their dependence on local groups, making them less likely to
promote dialogue and cooperation
Early planning for demobilisation programmes can help them respond to
political developments and avoid delaying the implementation of the peace
process
Donors should encourage regional organisations to develop frameworks for
conflict prevention and peace-building and help them to act as a bridge
between the international community and the region's states.
Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2001, 'Helping
Prevent Violent Conflict', OECD, Paris
103
Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary
General
United Nations Secretary General (2006)
Access full text online
Summary
While a culture of conflict prevention is taking hold at the United Nations (UN), an
unacceptable gap remains between rhetoric and practice. This progress report by UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan examines the current status of conflict prevention at
international and national operational, structural and systemic levels. All relevant
actors need to accept and act upon the principles of shared vulnerability and mutual
responsibility so that conflict prevention becomes a deeply-rooted norm embraced at
all levels of the community of nations.
While direct responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national governments, it is
also one of the UN‘s chief obligations. Despite the decreasing number and severity of
armed conflicts worldwide, the international community still spends vast sums of
money on conflicts that might have been prevented.
The late 20th century saw the development of an international legal framework,
including the International Criminal Court and a UN commitment to protect
populations against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. A number of regional initiatives against violent overthrow of legitimately
elected governments were implemented and the importance of constitutions,
participatory elections, civil society and open communication and dialogue was
reaffirmed. National and international actors came together to address sources of
tension and the infrastructure of peace.
The UN has contributed to advancing the conflict prevention agenda through increased
efforts to engage all stakeholders in potential conflict areas and increased attention to
the root causes of conflict. Since 2003, it has undertaken missions in potential or actual
conflict areas in West and Central Africa, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Haiti, the
Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo and peacekeeping operations in Liberia,
Côte d‘Ivoire, Haiti, Burundi and the Sudan.
Nevertheless, a number of weaknesses still exist within the UN system, including:
A lack of intimate knowledge of political, cultural and geographic realities
Insufficient groundwork to build critical local relationships, trust and capacity
The lack of a conflict prevention strategy in existing co-ordination
mechanisms
Generally weak capacity for early warning, information collection and
analysis
A lack of full application of leverage with other actors to prevent armed
conflict
Inadequate and insecure conflict prevention funding.
In the interest of solidifying both intra-state and UN conflict prevention, Member
States should:
Address sources of tension more comprehensively, including issues of: natural
resources; trade; illegal narcotics; illicit flows of small arms, light weapons
and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; the spread of HIV/AIDS;
environmental degradation; and respect for human rights
Address corruption - a particularly insidious obstacle to good governance
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Adopt a more strategic approach to democracy building, elections and
constitutional capacity and recognise the potential of national dialogue and
consensus-building processes
Comply with international human rights, humanitarian and other legal
instruments relevant to the prevention of armed conflict
strengthen UN capacity to analyse conflicts and co-ordination among UN
departments
Avoid ending UN peace operations prematurely
Consider more creative, constructive use of sanctions as a conflict prevention
tool
Provide predictable UN conflict prevention financial support equivalent to a
percentage of the annual UN peacekeeping budget.
Source: U.N, 2006, 'Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of
the Secretary General', United Nations, New York
1.2 Early warning and early response systems
Core readings
The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive
Diplomacy
A L George and J E Holl (1997)
Access full text online
Summary
Obtaining early warning of crises is critical if preventive action is to have any chance
of success. This Carnegie Commission report highlights the need for more emphasis on
developing effective responses for preventive action. It argues that the design and
management of early warning systems should be intimately connected with the task of
responding to a warning. Rather than specific policy recommendations, the report
provides a conceptual approach through which to analyse the warning-response
problem. It also discusses how warning and response interact in policymaking.
Given the rapidly contracting nature of global interactions, unfolding crises are
increasingly knowable, yet frequently have not been prevented. Efforts to develop
improved warning indicators have often failed to link them with appropriate responses.
There is a need for intelligence analysts and policymakers to work within an integrated
―warning-response‖ framework. Early warning will not ensure successful preventive
action unless there is a fundamental change in attitude by governments and
international organisations.
Receptivity and response to warning are not only determined by the warning itself. The
expectations of decision makers and the rewards and costs associated with recognising
and correctly appraising an emerging threat may be more important:
Decision makers will often deter taking preventive action either because the
warning is not taken seriously or because it is taken very seriously but requires
a choice of unpalatable responses.
Early warning does not necessarily make for easy response as it often forces
policymakers to confront difficult decisions. Whilst the logic of warning
demands action, policymakers generally prefer to put off hard decisions.
105
Difficult policy choices in a crisis may lead decision makers to discredit
information that contradicts existing expectations, preferences or policies.
Early warning indicators are often equivocal and subject to diverse
interpretations. Uncertainty regarding likely outcomes and the stakes
perceived to be at risk, along with an overload of potential crises, can result in
inaction.
As unambiguous warning is so difficult to obtain, policymakers must consider which
responses are useful and acceptable, even if the warning is equivocal. Once the
problem of warning is linked with implications for action, it becomes significantly
redefined:
Warning-response systems must consider the possible costs and expected
benefits of a response against the costs and benefits of inaction.
Trade-offs exist between costly responses that promise a great deal and more
modest but useful responses that do not pose large costs. This can be partially
addressed through a calibrated warning-response system in which the level of
readiness response increases with the level of warning.
A systematic and practical early warning system should be combined with
consistently updated contingency plans for preventive action that provide
leaders with a repertoire of responses.
Possible responses to warnings include: gather more information; reduce
vulnerabilities; reinforce commitments; engage in sustained dialogue; conduct
consultations; conduct decision rehearsals; clarify commitments to take action;
review contingency plans; and initiate formal negotiations.
Statements that missed opportunities occurred in cases of failure of preventive
diplomacy must be evaluated carefully to distinguish highly plausible from
implausible or barely plausible claims.
Source: George, A., Holl, J., 1997, 'The Warning-Response Problem and Missed
Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy', The Carnegie Commission on Preventing
Deadly Conflict, New York
Supplementary readings
Developing Early Warning Systems: A Checklist
Third International Conference on Early Warning: From Concept to Action (2006)
Access full text online
Abstract
This document aims to present a short, simple checklist of basic elements, actions and
good practices associated with effective early warning systems. It is intended to be a
nontechnical reference tool rather than an extensive ‗how to‘ list for the design of early
warning systems.
Source: Third International Conference on Early Warning: From Concept to Action,
2006, ‗Developing Early Warning Systems: A Checklist‘, 27-29 March 2006, Bonn,
Germany.
106
Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas
A Matveeva ( 2006)
Access full text online
Abstract
This paper is the first in the series of studies into issues in conflict prevention and
peacebuilding by civil society by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed
Conflict (GPPAC). It is based on a literature review, the author‘s experiences as a
practitioner and discussions held at the workshop with WANEP in Accra in February
2006. The purpose of this research is to close some gaps in methodological questions
and to highlight practical dilemmas involved in early warning / response initiatives,
extracting general lessons and points for reflection.
Source: Matveeva A., 2006, ‗Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and
Empirical Dilemmas‘, Issue Paper 1, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed
Conflict (GPPAC), Eurpoean Center for Conflict Prevention, The Hague.
107
2. Conflict Sensitive Design of Poverty Reduction Programmes
Core readings
Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing
Countries
C Cramer (2006)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
Violence is a means of communication. And its outcomes are not always purely
destructive. This research from London University argues that the study of war and
violence in developing countries provides understanding of development in general
and the shortcomings of traditional techniques for analysing it. The study of both war
and development need to proceed by means of a political economy approach rooted in
actual historical experiences.
The traditional liberal interpretation of war considers violence to be caused by the
distortion of the natural political and economic order. It is seen to be due to the narrow
vested interests of military elites. Barriers to market entry and the general lack of free
trade are also said to interfere with people‘s ability to pursue their natural inclination to
peaceful development. This traditional view sees the solutions to war as
straightforward. What is required is a project of political and economic liberalisation.
Furthermore, war is assumed to be exclusively negative in its economic consequences.
However, this interpretation of war is unsuitable for understanding and responding to
the violence and war that is prevalent in developing countries and integrated in various
ways into the world economy.
War and violence often provide an enabling environment for the accumulation
of wealth, social organisation and the institutional and technical change that
feed development.
Developing countries are urged to liberalise their trade regimes while Western
creditor countries continue their protectionism. Indeed, capitalist expansion
has always been based on protectionism, at least initially.
Violence and war are not exclusively a problem of the vested interests of
elites. They enable various agendas of political and social conflict and provide
employment for a large number of ordinary people.
Violence in poor countries is connected with actions taken by rich countries.
These include forcing unsuitable economic policies on these countries and
supporting military elite governments.
Contemporary violence is a phenomenon of class to the extent that it is bound
up with the transition to competitive capitalist economic organisation.
Although individual incentives for violence are important, they are not the
only reasons for joining conflicts. Furthermore, motivations are not always
restricted to individual material returns.
The traditional liberal argument is that economic growth brings peace. However if
growth is to bring peace, it requires regulation, a state capable of making effective
interventions both to stimulate growth and to shape its social and political character
and a set of institutions allowing for political voice and conflict.
108
The challenge is to secure social and economic transformations while
minimising the destruction.
Where conflict has become violent it is important not just to minimise its
damage but to maximise any potential for positive change that might arise in
the course of that conflict.
Policy makers need to develop a broader range of possible interventions. UN
member states need to make more credible threats and regulate more
effectively corporations that profit from violence and war.
Greater incentives are needed for companies involved in developing country
transitions to encourage them to invest in sectors generating employment and
export revenue.
Source: Cramer, C, 2006, Conclusion in 'Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting
for Violence in Developing Countries', Hurst, London
National Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSPs) in Conflict-Affected Countries in
Africa
A Evans, E Coyle and Z Curran (2003)
Access full text online
Summary
One in three Africans is directly or indirectly affected by violent conflict. Conflict
destroys lives, assets, infrastructure, social cohesion and education, posing major
difficulties for poverty reduction efforts. A briefing note from the PRSP Monitoring
and Synthesis Project at the Overseas Development Institute assesses the synergies and
trade-offs between poverty reduction strategies and conflict prevention strategies. In
particular it considers how governments and donors can best take advantage of the
synergies to promote long-term development.
The study includes case studies of countries currently or recently engaged in conflict,
and which are also engaged in or considering a PRSP. The PRSP approach generally
assumes a state with at least a minimal functioning capacity - political authority and
legitimacy, a commitment to peace and poverty reduction and the institutions and
climate for civil society engagement. These factors are often largely or entirely absent
in conflict-affected societies, so PRSPs must contribute to (re) building them, not just
enhancing them.
Conflict needs to be considered even after the cessation of hostilities - the
subsequent few years carry a high risk of the conflict re-igniting.
The relationship between conflict and poverty reduction can be counter-
intuitive. Violence can be the necessary catalyst for social change, and peace
settlements may sometimes entrench exploitative structures.
Similarly, poverty reduction strategies themselves may be incendiary - radical
changes to social structures need to be accompanied by care for people made
vulnerable by them.
There is a danger that in countries still in conflict, governments adopt the
PRSP process purely as a means to access concessional funds, with no real
commitment to peace or reducing poverty.
No donor engagement can have an entirely neutral political impact; aid may be
seen as reward for one or more actors, it may be diverted to fuel conflict
directly, or indirectly by freeing up internal resources.
109
Inclusiveness of participation is hard to gauge in societies where there may
still be unresolved tensions - but all the more critical. It may also hampered by
tight government control over any debate.
The existence of conflict does not necessarily rule out engagement by donors, though
their priorities and the nature of their engagement vary. A proper analysis of the
political economic context is essential to deciding whether and how to engage.
The decision to engage is primarily political amongst bilateral and multilateral
donors - is the government committed to pro-poor policies? Will the PRSP
process be transparent and inclusive?
International financial institutions (IFIs) are constitutionally bound to consider
economic, not political issues, so until recently their strategies for conflict
situations have closely resembled those for other low-income countries
Closer coherence is urged, both between bilateral/multilateral donors and the
IFIs, and within individual agencies, where policy is often the result of tough
negotiations between actors with divergent interests.
Where it is too early for a PRSP, an intermediate phase may be possible -
offering diplomatic and humanitarian support, and encouraging political
dialogue on poverty with government and civil society.
In situations of localised or recently-ended conflict, state capacity may still be
too weak to deliver on PRSP strategies; non-governmental actors may be
considered as alternative delivery vehicles for the short term.
A PRSP can be an entry point, aiming for short-term reconstruction first, but
with a strategy for pursuing long-term goals when security is better
established.
Source: Evans, A. with Coyle, E. and Curran, Z., 2003, 'National Poverty Reduction
Strategies (PRSPs) in Conflict-Affected Countries in Africa', PRSP Monitoring and
Synthesis Project briefing note 6, Overseas Development Institute, London.
Supplementary readings
Fighting Poverty in Africa: Are PRSPs Making a Difference?
D Booth (2004)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
Does the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process represent a significant
change in approach to lending by international financial institutions (IFIs) and donors?
Has it increased national ownership and effectiveness of poverty reduction efforts?
This book, based on a study commissioned by the Strategic Partnership for Africa and
published by the Overseas Development Institute, examines these questions through
case studies of seven Sub-Saharan African countries (Benin, Tanzania, Malawi,
Mozambique, Mali, Rwanda and Kenya). It finds that, while there are some grounds
for optimism, full national ownership of the process has not yet been achieved.
The study shows that the PRSP process has contributed to bringing national poverty
reduction efforts into the mainstream. Ownership of the process is quite strong within
technocratic ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance, although this is not often
shared by local government or regional agencies. However, political commitment to
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the PRSP process is highly variable, which poses difficulties where PRSP
implementation depends on overcoming political obstacles. The study also shows that:
PRSPs have greater potential as instruments of change where complementary
reforms, such as the introduction of Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks,
are already underway.
The PRSP process has had some qualified successes in creating new spaces for
domestic policy dialogue. These successes may be amplified in the second
round of PRSPs.
Most PRSPs have insufficient mechanisms for monitoring progress towards
final outcomes. Appropriate progress benchmarks could liberate countries
from external accountability and provide feedback into strategic debate.
Serious concerns remain where even PRSPs with a moderately high degree of
national ownership (such as Tanzania‘s) may not prove effective instruments
for poverty reduction.
The study also argues that PRSPs present an opportunity for a substantial
transformation of the aid relationship. While this will depend on improving the quality
of the national policy process, donor behaviour can also promote positive change.
Donors should:
Work with greater transparency and openness, to increase public trust and
maximise synergies.
Assist broad-based, consistent, long-term support to participatory policy
making.
Be prepared to take greater fiduciary risks if they are to realise the potential
developmental benefits.
Accelerate the harmonisation of performance frameworks and conditionalities
related to PRSPs.
Benchmark their own performance and agree definite timetables for the next
steps in the PRSP process.
Source: Booth, D. (ed), 2004, 'Fighting Poverty in Africa: Are PRSPs Making a
Difference?', Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London
Strategic Framework for Engagement in National PRSs in Conflict-Affected
Countries
H McLean , L Evans, A Norton, L.H Piron and E Coyle (2003)
Access full text online
Summary
Violent conflict destroys lives, assets, infrastructure, social cohesion and education,
posing major difficulties for poverty reduction efforts. This strategic framework from
the Overseas Development Institute aims to help DFID country teams to analyse their
strategies. It explains how to analyse the country context, assess the opportunities,
risks and likely impacts of donor engagement, and how to design an effective PRSP
engagement strategy. Checklists of key considerations are provided to assist this.
Assistance to a conflict-affected country will almost always be positive to some extent,
but donors must be aware of the existing political dynamics, and how their own
involvement can create (dis)incentives for peace and poverty reduction. Analysis of the
context is the key to engagement, and is the central concern of this paper. Key points
are:
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The nature of the current involvement of DFID and other donors with the
country; the relationship between DFID and other donors.
The conflict and security situation: identifying underlying causes of conflict,
key actors and interests; assessing likely impacts of assistance on these
dynamics.
Government legitimacy, its role in the conflict and in wider regional
instabilities: does it have secure control over its territory? Does it respect
human rights? Political freedoms? Are there checks on executive power?
Government commitment to peace-building and poverty reduction: is it
addressing the legitimate concerns of its opponents? Are pro-poor policies
inclusive? Are they affected by corruption or vote-buying?
Institutional capacity: how sound is the country's economic management? Can
it collect and assess reliable poverty data? Can it translate this into sound anti-
poverty actions? At local/sector/central level?
Quality of the PRSP process: political and technocratic commitment; links
with other policy processes; quality of poverty diagnosis, civil society
participation; quality and relevance of strategy.
Based on this analysis, donors must develop a coherent strategy, balancing the risks
and needs of engagement - the risk of funds fuelling the conflict versus the need for
humanitarian assistance, for instance. Strategies will vary, and donors should be
prepared to seize opportunities as and when they arise. Some common strategy
guidelines include setting realistic objectives, building local capacity, not rushing, and
tailoring solutions to the phase and type of conflict. This then needs translating into
action:
Direct support for the PRSP unit or for consultations with civil society;
helping with diagnostic work; improving information and expenditure
management systems.
Improving the technical quality of the PRSP, with sensitivity to needs thrown
up by the conflict - it may require specific post-conflict rehabilitation
measures rather than "normal" anti-poverty measures.
Structural reforms must also be designed so as not to inflame existing
tensions: for example, when considering decentralisation, could the locations
of resources and regional power centres cause or exacerbate problems?
Influencing international financial institutions (IFIs) and other donors:
coordination can reduce administrative demands on the country; acting as
counterweight to the purely technical assessments of the IFIs.
Selecting aid instruments according to the capacity of the state and other
actors to deliver. Budget support builds local capacity, but in post-conflict
situations it is crucial that the population sees an early peace dividend.
If a PRSP is not appropriate yet, assistance can still be provided in the form of
humanitarian relief, diagnostic work, support for civil society, and initiating
dialogue about poverty.
Source: McLean Hilker, L., Evans, A., and Norton, A., with Piron, L.H. and Coyle, E.,
2003, 'Strategic Framework for Engagement in National PRSs in Conflict-Affected
Countries', attachment to PRSP Monitoring and Synthesis Project Briefing Note 6,
Overseas Development Institute, London
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Developing Poverty Reduction Strategies in Low-Income Countries Under Stress
(LICUS): Final Report
N Thornton and M Cox (2005)
Access full text online
Summary
This study is a rapid assessment of the experience of Poverty Reduction Strategies
(PRS) in LICUS to date, including a Synthesis Report and six case studies. It assesses
the applicability of the PRS approach in the LICUS context. It concludes that PRS
principles are applicable in LICUS, and should be progressively introduced as
conditions allow. However, experience to date suggests that Donor Partners should not
have high expectations of first-round PRSPs, but should view them as the beginning of
longer-term, iterative processes of change.
LICUS are a difficult environment for achieving poverty reduction, both because of the
weak institutional environment and because donor engagement tends to be limited and
politicised. There is no consensus on whether and in what circumstances to attempt
PRSs.
The PRS is an important instrument in LICUS for disciplining both donor and
government behaviour, wherever the government is willing and able to take on the
initiative. Where a PRS is not feasible, it may be possible to introduce some PRS
practices through other mechanisms, such as Transitional Results Matrices (especially
in post-conflict environments) or by pursuing 'zero-generation reforms' (in closed
political environments).
When implementing PRSs in LICUS there are a number of issues and potential
challenges that need to be considered:
The PRS approach is a complex package of government and donor practices,
which need to be introduced gradually into LICUS.
PRSs competes for time and attention with other agendas and political
priorities in LICUS. Whatever their technical merits, they may fail to change
actual government behaviour. There is a danger in LICUS that attention
becomes absorbed in producing strategy documents, to the exclusion of
implementation.
Ownership of the process needs to be built up gradually over time, with the
aim of mainstreaming the PRS approach into government practices.
Participatory processes need to be sustained beyond the completion of the strategy.
LICUS governments should be encouraged to develop permanent structures for
dialogue with social partners.
PRSs in LICUS should focus more on governance reforms and the institutional
requirements for poverty reduction. LICUS should identify a few key
governance reforms required to kick start PRS implementation.
Despite the difficulties, donors need to press ahead with donor harmonisation
and alignment around the PRS.
LICUS governments need to be supported with hands-on involvement from
donor staff, to reinforce the principles and benefits of the PRS approach.
Donors need to allocate enough staff resources in-country to support the
process.
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Source: Thornton, N. and Cox, M., 2005, ‗Developing Poverty Reduction Strategies in
Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS): Final Report‘, Agulhas Applied
Knowledge, London
Toward a Conflict-sensitive Poverty Reduction Strategy : Lessons from a
Retrospective Analysis
World Bank (2005)
Access full text online
Summary
The PRSP has become the primary tool for articulating a vision for growth and poverty
reduction in nearly 60 low-income countries. Some 15-20 of these countries are
affected by conflict, and other conflict-affected countries are still to begin the process.
In what ways do Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSPs) in conflict-affected countries
take account of their particular contexts? To what extent have assessments of the
sources of conflict and the ways they interact with poverty informed the strategies?
This report from the World Bank aims to contribute to more effective poverty
reduction in countries affected by conflict by analyzing these questions.
The report presents key experiences from nine conflict-affected countries - Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Georgia, Nepal, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and
Sri Lanka - as they developed their first PRSP. It assesses how conflict has been taken
into account in PRS participation, poverty diagnostics, policy actions, institutional
arrangements, and donor behavior. It analyses how groups that were socially excluded
or especially conflict-affected participated in the process and how the countries
planned to address sources of conflict and deal with the destructive consequences of
violence. It also asks how governments organised the PRSP preparations in divided
societies, and how international donors engaged with the process.
Based on lessons from the nine countries, the report makes several suggestions of how
to make PRS more effective in conflict-affected countries, including:
PRS participatory processes: systematically include war-affected groups in
socio-economic and policy dialogue; use media and strategic communications
to disseminate information on the PRS to remote and conflict-affected
communities, and channel feedback to policy levels to enhance the voices of
those most affected by conflict.
Poverty diagnostics: focus on a discussion of conflict-induced poverty, and
systematically integrate conflict analysis tools with poverty diagnostics to
undertake systematic analysis of the interrelationship of poverty, poor
governance, marginalization, and conflict.
Policy actions: use a ―conflict lens‖ to guide the selection, prioritization and
content of the policy actions, address underlying sources of conflict if feasible,
and assess and monitor the potential impacts of policy actions on the conflict
dynamics, for example, the distributional impacts of a growth strategy.
Institutional arrangements: consciously design arrangements on basis of
conflict factors, stress transparency and inclusion in design and
implementation, and devolve power and transfer resources to support the
implementation of PRSPs.
Donors: make concerted effort to prioritize country ownership over promotion
of own priorities, strengthen the country‘s capacity to ensure that conflict
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issues are carefully considered, and help create an environment that enables
countries to deal with conflict-related sensitivities.
A PRSP needs to be specific to the country context and flexible in responding to
changing circumstances:
Country specific: The most fruitful PRSP design is based on good contextual
analysis which includes specific conflict factors. The PRSP should draw on in-
country processes such as peace agreements, joint needs assessments, and
transitional results frameworks.
Nimble and flexible: The PRSP should allow conflict-affected and vulnerable
countries to respond quickly to changing situations by being flexible in their
design and implementation, and produce alternative implementation options
when changes render measures irrelevant. Flexibility should be seen as the
ability to develop unique and innovative methods not as a laissez-faire
approach.
Source: World Bank, 2005, 'Toward a Conflict-sensitive Poverty Reduction Strategy :
Lessons from a Retrospective Analysis', Report no. 32587, World Bank, Washington
115
3. Conflict-sensitive Design, Monitoring and Evaluation of
Programmes Aimed at Preventing Violence
Core readings
Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners
M B Anderson and L Olson (2003)
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Summary
How can peace practitioners improve the effectiveness of their work? This book from
the Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) offers clarifications on what does
and what does not represent peace practice. It aims to reinforce the dedication that so
many peace practitioners exhibit by presenting lessons learned through field
experiences. In addition, new insights are included to contribute towards more
effective peace practice.
The Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) project involved over two hundred
international, national, and local peace agencies around the world, pooling their
experiences to learn more about peace practice. It is clear that not all good programmes
are peace programmes and that not all peace programmes are effective. The potential
of the wide range of efforts to promote peace is not being fully realised. So long as
people continue to suffer the consequences of unresolved conflicts, there is urgency for
everyone to do better.
If peace practice is to be improved, we first have to know how it is done now. The
RRP project found clear patterns in practice and identified specific gaps that
undermine effectiveness:
Though peace practitioners emphasise the importance of full and ongoing
context analysis, in many cases only partial analysis takes place. Practitioners
often overlook important aspects such as areas of consensus between opposing
sides, the wider regional and international context, and the results of previous
efforts.
All peace work can be mapped onto a four cell matrix that reveals the basic
theories or beliefs about how peace is achieved. Organisations too often stay
within one quadrant of the matrix.
Most peace agencies work with people who are comparatively easy to engage,
such as children and women. Few agencies ever reach beyond these actors.
Much peace practice is focussed on doing good rather than stopping bad.
There remains no agreement on what or how much needs to be built to create a
peaceful society. Ultimately, peace means different things to different people.
To improve the effectiveness of their work, individuals or agencies undertaking any
form of peace practice should consider the following questions:
How should we focus our work to be most effective? Effective peace practice
can remove the motivations and opportunities for waging war and strengthen
those factors which promote peace and justice. Context analysis should
highlight each side of this equation in ways that provide a reasonable and
accurate basis for programme design and implementation.
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How can individual programmes have wider impacts? Any individual peace
programme will have more impact if its effects transfer to other quadrants of
the four cell peace programme matrix.
Who needs to be reached for improved effectiveness? To end war or prevent it
through sustainable peace requires engaging with those who hold power and
those who must agree to the systems that sustain it, namely governments and
combatants or so-called hardliners.
Source: Anderson, M., and Olson, L., 2003, 'Confronting War: Critical Lessons for
Peace Practitioners', Reflecting on Peace Practice Project, The Collaborative for
Development Action Inc., Cambridge, MA
Institutional Capacity Building for Conflict Sensitivity
FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld (2004)
Access full text online
Summary
How can practitioners begin the process of mainstreaming conflict sensitivity into an
organization? All practitioners at all levels are both impacted by, and can impact, the
development of their institution‘s capacity for conflict sensitivity. This chapter from a
resource pack on conflict-sensitive approaches explores how to mainstream conflict
sensitivity in a systemic way, using a six-step framework.
Institutional capacity for conflict sensitivity means the ability of an organisation to
develop and use the sum of its human and organisational capital to minimise negative
and maximise positive impacts on the conflict dynamics of the environment/s where it
works. An organisation should aim to be conflict sensitive as it will increase the
effectiveness of its programming by minimising the risks to actors involved and
mitigating the risk of occurrence or escalation of violent conflict.
There are some very real institutional challenges that need to be addressed, even in the
most capable organisations, if conflict sensitivity is to become a reality in terms of
organisational strategy and operational practice. Five essential prerequisites include:
Institutional commitment: indispensable in making conflict sensitivity a
reality; without support from the top, organisational change will not happen.
Willingness to make changes in organisational culture and institutional
structures: such changes are likely to be needed if a conflict-sensitive approach
is to take hold.
Support for capacity development: this is needed to keep and build momentum
as a process for change in organisational culture and institutional structures
starts to occur.
Conducive external relationships: these are needed in the implementing area
and outside it.
Accountability mechanisms: which are needed to underpin and reward staff
and teams who incorporate conflict sensitivity in their daily practice.
Building on the above five key aspects, an organisation can begin the process of
mainstreaming conflict sensitivity including deciding whether a minimalist or a more
comprehensive approach is required. The six steps are:
Assess your organisation‘s institutional capacity for conflict sensitivity. There
are various aspects of the make-up of any organization that will impact on its
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ability to behave in a conflict sensitive manner. Grouping these aspects under
the prerequisites outlined above will help develop an understanding of the
existing capacity and opportunities for conflict sensitivity.
How, if at all, do the different elements of the organisation‘s capacity connect?
Some aspects of conflict-sensitive capacity may be well developed and others
less so. It is important to understand how these different aspects connect.
Reflect on one‘s own and others‘ experiences.
Reflecting on why and how others‘ experiences might or might not work for
one‘s own organization can provide useful insights.
In light of the results from the above step, identify the key opportunities and
possible challenges. What are the key needs for institutional capacity building?
Where do the key strategic and operational opportunities lie? How can these
opportunities be realised?
Prioritise, develop and implement a plan of action. Once the analysis phase is
over, it is important to link it to a plan of action.
Monitor and evaluate results and review plan of action. What impacts have the
capacity building steps had on your organisation? What went well, less well
and, most importantly, why?
Source: FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, 2004, ?Institutional capacity
building for conflict sensitivity,? Chapter 5 in Resource Pack on Conflict-Sensitive
Approaches, FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, London
Integrating Conflict Sensitivity into Sectoral Approaches
FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld (2004)
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Summary
What is meant by sectoral approaches and how can conflict sensitivity be incorporated
into their development and implementation? This chapter from a resource pack on
conflict sensitive approaches argues that assistance to a country or sector will have an
impact (either positive or negative) on conflict risks and dynamics particularly in
countries which are affected by, or at risk of, violent conflict. It is therefore imperative
that this assistance be implemented in a conflict-sensitive way.
Sectoral approaches involve a partnership between donors and governments based on a
government-led national poverty reduction framework, within which there are
programmatic priorities for specific sectors (for example, health or education). Donor
assistance aims at helping the government to improve its performance generally, or the
performance of a specific sector or sectors. A conflict-sensitive sectoral approach is
one that is developed and implemented so as to minimise possible negative impacts
and maximise positive impacts on the context and its dynamics, and vice-versa.
Conflict sensitive sectoral approaches should be characterised by:
Stakeholder consultation, which is a core principle of sectoral and conflict
sensitive approaches and should take place at all stages. Consultation can:
bring to bear local perspectives on the plans for the sector in a particular
region; ensure it is informed by local realities; highlight any likely sources of
tension or insecurity; and suggest approaches to managing that tension.
An informed understanding of the overall context and its impact on the
development process in the country. This can be derived from a conflict
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analysis at the national level, preferably undertaken jointly by donors and
governments.
A shared understanding by donors and governments of the conflict issues
affecting a country in order to develop a conflict-sensitive partnership
environment at the national level. It also implies ensuring that this
understanding is informed by and reflects the perspectives of other actors such
as civil society and local governments.
Integrating conflict sensitivity at the sector level at all stages – assessment and
planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. This is dependent
on a conflict-sensitive approach being applied at the national level.
In implementing conflict-sensitive sectoral approaches, practitioners should bear some
wider lessons in mind:
A conflict-sensitive sectoral approach requires an understanding of the context
not only in the development, implementation and evaluation of the sectoral
approach itself but also in developing the national strategic framework.
Sectoral approaches have been adopted in post-conflict settings but it is
equally important to ensure that sectoral approaches are conflict sensitive in
situations of peace. Insensitive interventions can reinforce or exacerbate the
potential for violent conflict (for example, resettlement schemes that alter the
ethnic balance of a region and the access of different groups to resources).
Conflict sensitivity should not be restricted to the ‗obvious‘ sectors (military,
justice and police) - it needs to be integrated across all areas of activity, since
development assistance in any sector can have an impact on the context.
Many of the principles underlying sectoral approaches – local ownership,
capacity-building, participation, inclusiveness, accountability, coordination –
are also among the key principles for conflict-sensitive practice. Sectoral
approaches have the potential to contribute positively to the context if
undertaken in a conflict-sensitive manner.
FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, 2004, 'Integrating Conflict Sensitivity
into Sectoral Approaches', Chapter 4 in Resource Pack on Conflict-Sensitive
Approaches, FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, London
Applying conflict sensitivity at project and programme level
FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld (2004)
Access full text online
Summary
How does designing and implementing projects and programmes in areas where
conflict exits or threatens differ from more straightforward development contexts? This
chapter of a manual by FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld gives specific
tools and approaches for incorporating conflict-sensitivity into project and programme
planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).
Where aid is delivered in conditions of actual or latent violence even simple activities
such as vehicle purchase, training beneficiaries, and employing staff can have a
damaging effect on establishing or building peace. It is essential to follow the principle
of ‗do no harm‘ and be aware of the causes of actual or potential conflict, the
likelihood and severity of further conflict, and the capacity to work with partners to
reduce conflict or the potential for it. This conflict sensitivity is needed at planning,
119
implementation and M&E stages of the project/programme cycle in situations where
conflict exits or threatens.
The key aspects of conflict sensitivity in the project/programme cycle are that it
includes the additional elements of Conflict analysis at the planning stage. This
ensures that interventions do not exacerbate violence but serve to build and
consolidate peace.
Close scrutiny of the operational context at the implementation stage through
regularly updating the conflict analysis, and adapting project/programme
activities and processes accordingly.
Introducing an understanding of conflict actors, profile, causes and dynamics into the
traditional M&E process. This identifies required adjustments to projects or
programmes and ensures that the intervention has as positive an impact as possible on
conflict dynamics. Conflict-sensitive M&E is in its early stages of development
Conflict-sensitivity is needed at all points along the spectrum of conflict, from
structural violence to violent conflict, regardless of whether the project or programme
is for humanitarian aid, peace-building, or development. Key aspects to consider in
making projects and programmes conflict-sensitive are:
Incorporating conflict analysis into the assessment stage of project/programme
design can be done either by linking it to a separate needs analysis or by
integrating both into one tool. The first approach is easier to update and gives
an in-depth conflict analysis. The integrated approach saves time and resources
and makes project/programme design more inter-related.
Conflict analysis can be used to define an intervention, or to make a pre-
defined intervention conflict-sensitive
Key steps for conflict sensitive planning are defining the objective, defining the
process, developing indicators, linking the intervention to risk scenarios,
preparing contingency plans and designing a conclusion/exit strategy
The key elements of implementation are incorporating conflict-sensitivity into
management, monitoring, and adjustment. Considerable flexibility is needed,
and it may even be necessary to change fundamentals such as
project/programme approach
Issues of security and safety, trust, participation, transparency and
accountability are prime considerations during implementation.
Key steps in M&E are deciding when to monitor or evaluate, designing the
M&E process, collecting and analysing information, and
recommending/redesigning. M&E is often difficult in conflict conditions, and
there is not always a direct causal link between the intervention and its context.
FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, 2004, 'Applying conflict sensitivity at
project and programme level,‘ Chapter 3 in Resource Pack on Conflict-Sensitive
Approaches FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, London.
Third-Generation PCIA: Introducing the Aid for Peace Approach
T Paffenholz (2005)
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Summary
How can the Peace for Aid approach help to address the questions surrounding the
debate on Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)? This Berghof Research
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Centre for Constructive Conflict Management paper moves on the PCIA approach and
debate by presenting Aid for Peace. The Aid for Peace approach is a multi-purpose and
multi-level process that facilitates the planning, assessment and evaluation of peace as
well as aid interventions in conflict situations.
The widening development of the PCIA debate has ensured that it is difficult to define.
For a basic understanding it is necessary to distinguish between PCIA approaches such
as aid and peace interventions and project, programme and policy level approaches,
among others. There are also a number of open questions about PCIA. For example, is
a unified methodology/framework for PCIA needed or not? Is the purpose of PCIA
technical or political? Is it a Northerner‘s assessment tool or a Southerners‘
peacebuilding tool? Is it only useful for aid or also for peace interventions? How can
we define criteria and indicators for monitoring and assessing effects of interventions?
The Aid for Peace approach – a set of unified and inclusive methodologies that can be
used by a broad range of different actors for all sorts of interventions – provides an
answer to most of these questions. For example:
A unified framework is useful since it represents a common starting point for
all actors. Opting for a set of methodologies and a sequence of process steps,
avoids an overly rigid format and allows for the different needs of different
actors. Therefore, the approach can be used by Northerners and Southerners,
peacebuilders and development actors.
By breaking down the either/or decisions that dominated previous phases of
the PCIA debate, the approach is useful to interventions with different
purposes (namely development and peace) and on different levels (project,
programme, policy).
With respect to criteria and indicators to help better assess the effects of peace
building and development institutions, there is a wealth of criteria to be found
in the existing literature. These have been further developed and incorporated
into the Aid for Peace approach.
The Aid for Peace Approach will require further dissemination and development.
There also remain a number of challenges for the application of the PCIA debate to the
evaluation of peacebuilding interventions.
There should be more investment into planning as the current debate focuses
too much on evaluation of peace efforts. There should be more discussion
about better planning procedures for peace interventions that create the
conditions for good monitoring and evaluation.
It is difficult to assess the effects that project interventions have on a wider
peace process. In order to bridge this ‗attribution gap‘ it is advisable to
formulate standardised result-chains for frequently implemented types of
projects, and to disseminate these models together with participatory planning
methods.
Evaluation and impact assessment in peacebuilding needs to make more use of
existing knowledge. The field of peacebuilding can benefit from the ideas,
models and insights gathered in related fields such as policy analysis and
development practice.
It seems more promising to work towards a common standard in planning and
evaluation of peacebuilding interventions. Governmental and non-
governmental organisations should work together on such standardisation in
an international network.
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Source; Paffenholz, T., 2005, 'Third-Generation PCIA: Introducing the Aid for Peace
Approach', Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin
Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding
Activities: Toward DAC Guidance
M Anderson and D Chigas (2007)
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Summary
The past decade has seen growing numbers of governments and organisations devote
resources to interventions intended to avert or end conflict. How can these be
evaluated? This report from CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA) represents a
step in the development of practical evaluation guidance. Scope, conflict analysis,
impacts, skills and tools all need to be considered. Next steps should include donor
experimentation with evaluations, an annual review of evaluations and a policy review.
Conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions are efforts that adopt goals and
objectives aimed at preventing conflict or building peace. They are usually focused on
a particular conflict zone; an area affected by serious intergroup violence. This
definition helps distinguish between ―conflict-sensitive programming‖ and conflict
prevention and peacebuilding.
Areas and issues relevant to evaluation of these interventions include:
Scope: Policies or programs designed to make a difference to the driving
factors of conflict are legitimate subjects for evaluation. Donors may also wish
to examine the impacts on peace of interventions not originally intended to
address conflict.
Conflict analysis and theories of change: Just as conflict prevention and
peacebuilding activities should be based on analysis of driving factors and
actors within a conflict, so should evaluation.
Impacts: Preoccupation with the ‗remoteness‘ of impacts can divert attention
from assessing programme effects (intended or not). Evaluations should take
account of individual and cumulative impacts in the short and long term.
Evaluation as an intervention: Because they occur in the context of conflict,
evaluations are effectively interventions in the conflict. Evaluators lacking
conflict sensitivity and appropriate expertise may do harm.
Methodology, skills and tools: While there is no one right methodology,
inclusiveness, using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods and ethical
standards are useful principles. Teams need knowledge of the conflict
prevention and peacebuilding field, of evaluation methods and conflict-
sensitive style of working.
Joint evaluations and partner country roles: Involving several donors or
programmes can generate a fuller picture of impacts. The role of partner
countries in evaluation depends on the potential for bias and potential impact
of government involvement.
Next steps for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development -
Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) have implications for other
organisations:
Producing draft guidance: Feedback from this report will be incorporated into
a subsequent guidance document.
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Donor experimentation with evaluations: Draft guidance could be used as a
basis for a concerted effort by donors to evaluate as many conflict prevention
and peacebuilding programmes as possible over the next two years. This
should include individual, joint and cumulative evaluations.
An evaluation of evaluations: Accumulated evaluations could provide a basis
for a comparative evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding
evaluations. This could reveal what kinds of evaluation have proved useful
and which process and methods produced those lessons.
Annual reviews of conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations: To
facilitate learning, the OECD/DAC could convene an annual session to
examine a set of evaluations from the previous year.
Policy review: Over time, the review of interventions will provide evidence to
inform a review of the policies of individual donors, as well as OECD/DAC
policies.
Source: OECD-DAC, 2007, 'Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention
and Peacebuilding Activities: Toward DAC Guidance', A Joint Project of the DAC
Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation and DAC Network on
Development Evaluation, Paris
Supplementary readings
A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of
Development Projects in Conflict Zones
K Bush (1998)
Access full text online
Abstract
This study does not seek to develop the definitive evaluation tool for assessing or
anticipating the impact of development projects on the peace and conflict environment
within which they are set. The uniqueness of each project and the fluidity of their
environments conspire to frustrate attempts to impose a rigidly uniform framework.
Rather, this study develops an approach to guide our interpretation and assessment of
the impact of the widest range of development projects in a more systematic manner
than is currently the case. At this early stage in our efforts to develop a clearer
understanding of the nexus between development, underdevelopment, violent conflict,
and peace, this study is a call for more self-consciousness in the formulation,
implementation and evaluation of our development initiatives in regions characterized
by potential, latent, or manifest violence. PCIA is meant to empower individuals and
institutions both to understand better their work, and, more importantly, to induce the
changes necessary to amplify the positive impacts and to minimize negative impacts on
the peace and conflict environment.
Source: Bush, K., 1998, ‗A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
(PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones‘, Paper No. 1, The Peacebuilding
and Reconstruction Program Initiative & The Evaluation Unit, International
Development Research Centre, Ottawa.. See also the Berghof Handbook for Conflict
Transformation Dialogue Series on PCIA.
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The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Framing the State of Play
C Church (2002)
Access full text online
Abstract
Currently evaluation is an ad hoc process conforming to the needs of the moment and
limited by lack of skills, understanding and resources. As a result, INCORE has
undertaken a pilot project seeking to examine the current state and utilisation of
evaluation in conflict resolution interventions. A conflict-specific framework has been
developed to integrate the different aspects of an intervention that can be evaluated.
Source: Church, C., J. Shouldice, 2002, ‗The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution
Interventions: Framing the State of Play‘, Londonderry: INCORE.
The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions – Part II: Emerging Practice
and Theory
C Church (2003)
Access full text online
Abstract
This paper is the result of the second phase of the UNU/INCORE1 research project on
the evaluation of conflict resolution interventions. Phase Two of this project saw a
meeting convened of 24 individuals from around the world who are actively engaged
with issues related to conflict resolution and evaluation. Held in Northern Ireland, July
4-5, 2002 this meeting/workshop sought to advance the discussion around a number of
the questions and challenges raised during the original research. Throughout the two
days of intensive discussions four themes were identified as crosscutting through a
number of these questions and challenges. This paper not only captures the essence of
the discussion around these emerging themes but also aims to further develop the
issues through
research and analysis.
Source: Church, C., J. Shouldice, 2003, ‗The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution
Interventions – Part II: Emerging Practice and Theory‘, Londonderry: INCORE.
Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict
Transformation Programs
C Church (2006)
Access full text online
Abstract
This manual addresses the many challenges faced by conflict transformation
practitioners in their attempts to measure and increase the effectiveness of their work
with practical tips and examples from around the world.
Source: Church, C., M.M. Rogers, 2006, ‗Designing for Results: Integrating
Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs‘, Washington, DC:
Search for Common Ground.
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Promoting Institutional and Organisational Development: A Source Book of
Tools and Techniques
Department for International Development (DFID) (2003)
Access full text online
Summary
What models, tools and techniques are available to analyse and review institutional
development? Compiled for the Department of International Development, this paper
outlines some of the key tools used in DFID's own institutional work, including a
framework to encourage discussions between the various stakeholders involved in the
institutional reform process.
The source book incorporates tools covering institutional analysis and diagnosis,
review and design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. Most are either
simple models or checklists designed to work through the key issues of institutional
reform. They have rigorous theoretical underpinnings and are based on experience of
what works. None of the tools is intended to be a blueprint. All have their strengths and
weaknesses and should be adapted to reflect local contexts.
A number of tools and techniques address the initial stages of analysis, focusing on the
overall institutional framework and context:
The assessment of institutional capabilities: Provides a structured approach for
asking questions, analysing results and identifying critical institutional issues.
Impact analysis: Is useful for identifying objectives and predicted areas of
impact for follow-up evaluation and helps build stakeholder commitment to
reform through reaching consensus on objectives.
Change forecasting: Makes predictions based on the particular historical,
political, cultural and economic context, including the effects of donor support
and engagement.
The 7-S framework: Describes interdependent variables to examine an
organisation's internal dynamics.
SWOT analysis: Assesses an organisation in terms of internal strengths and
weaknesses and external opportunities and threats.
The organisational elements model: Is designed to demonstrate the
relationship between organisational efforts, results and external payoffs to
show linkages between all elements of the process from inputs through to
outcomes.
Problem tree analysis: Establishes the hierarchical relationship between cause
and effect by illustrating the linkages between various issues contributing to an
institutional problem.
Having assessed the institutional framework and the organisation within its
institutional context, further tools and techniques are available to design, implement
and monitor and evaluate:
Benchmarking contributes to a culture of openness, learning and continuous
improvement within and between organisations.
The risk management matrix analyses the likelihood of an adverse outcome
and the associated scale of impact.
Business process re-engineering involves the fundamental review and redesign
of an organisation's business processes.
125
There are various approaches to change management which all include the key
elements of change vision, change strategy, commitment and leadership,
capacity and culture.
Force field analysis is a technique for analysing the forces that help or obstruct
change and the Burke-Litwin model provides a link between an assessment of
the wider institutional context and the nature and processes of change within
an organisation.
Stakeholder management identifies the individuals or groups who will be
affected by changes or have the ability to impact on the change process.
The European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) Excellence
Model provides a framework for assessing all aspects of performance which
make an organisation successful, including measures for evaluating the impact
of change.
Source: Department for International Development, 2003, ‗Promoting Institutional &
Organisational Development: A Source Book of Tools and Techniques‘, DFID,
London
Nepal Country Assistance Plan: Monitoring in a Fragile State
Department for International Development (DFID) (2005)
Access full text online
Summary
The DFID Nepal Country Assistance Plan (CAP), published in February 2004, aims to
reduce poverty and social exclusion and help establish the basis for lasting peace. To
this end, CAP commits DFID Nepal to developing improved, locally accountable and
transparent systems for monitoring progress. This DFID paper describes the main
elements of the CAP Monitoring Framework (CAPMF), setting out how DFID Nepal
(DFIDN) proposes to monitor the operating environment for development activities
and measure progress towards outputs.
The new CAP Monitoring Framework (CAPMF) is designed to supplement the
Nepalese government‘s Poverty Monitoring and Analysis System (PMAS) launched in
May 2004. PMAS - not yet fully operational - will use both input/output and
outcome/well-being indicators, gathering data from management information systems
in sector ministries, public expenditure tracking, and periodic surveys.
The MF will form a comprehensive picture of programme performance and viability of
CAP objectives, addressing the specific monitoring needs for a country in conflict.
Complementing conventional project cycle monitoring, CAPMF will strengthen the
quality of decision-making at programme and strategic level, providing rigorous
evidence of impact on poverty and social exclusion. The MF is also designed to
rebalance DFIDN‘s effort between programme design/monitoring and between
activity/outcome reporting.
CAPMF findings will be reviewed both throughout each year, and annually. An annual
report will be disseminated widely amongst Nepal‘s development community.
Strategic direction and priorities for the following year will be agreed and integrated
into the programme. The MF comprises three main components:
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Conflict Impact Monitoring: A programme-based monitoring system to track
deliverability at an activity level. Quarterly surveys will be analysed for
project and staff risk, identifying overall trends across DFIDN‘s portfolio.
Livelihoods and Social Inclusion (LSI) Monitoring: DIFDN will produce bi-
annual reports analysing the impact of programmes on poor and excluded
groups, assessing changes in assets and access to services; voice, influence and
claiming rights; the ‗rules of the game‘ (based on socially defined identity) in
legal, policy and institutional processes. The bi-annual data will influence
future strategic priorities.
Context Monitoring: Assessing changes in the broader operating environment
for development in Nepal, incorporating the resources above with Embassy
reports, budgetary trends, fiduciary risk and other sources.
There is a need for continuing and robust analysis of the Nepal context, both in relation
to the conflict and also in relation to the wider politics of a state with weak institutions
and currently without democratic government. Context analysis is not to become the
basis for political conditionality, but to assist DFIDN in adapting aid instruments
appropriately in order to achieve greatest impact. A small group has been established
to monitor the following specific areas for contextual analysis:
Maoist tolerance of development activities: monitoring the possibility of
increased attempts to control or extort resources from the programme.
People movement: monitoring the incidence of forced relocation, possible
indications of worsening in the conflict signaled by increased migration.
Additionality and ability to monitor: monitoring donor support, and the
resources allocated by government to support the Poverty Reduction Strategy,
plus independent monitoring of programme performance on behalf of donors.
Rule of Law: monitoring the current culture of impunity in relation to human
rights abuse.
Ability to Deliver: monitoring the impact of conflict on community access and
security of staff, and how this affects the viability of ongoing programmes.
Fiduciary risk: monitoring the public sector and tracking progress in anti-
corruption and reducing fiduciary risk overall.
Source: Department for International Development, 2005, ‗Nepal Country Assistance
Plan: Monitoring in a Fragile State‘, Department for International Development,
London
Working ‘in’ and ‘on’ War
J Goodhand (2006)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
Individuals working ‗in‘ or ‗on‘ war cannot be considered as neutral actors because
their decisions have an impact on war itself. This chapter from a book, published by
the Open University, argues that those who intervene in conflict situations need to
think of themselves less as project managers and more as change agents who
understand and influence the conflict. Interveners need to look beyond the traditional
project-based approaches and engender a strategic shift from ‗development as delivery‘
to ‗development as leverage‘.
127
Practitioners have traditionally concentrated on their role as project managers and
focused on ‗what they can control‘, rather than addressing broader issues such as what
they can understand and influence. Logical framework planning tools and other
management systems create an illusion of control in rapidly changing circumstances.
These initiatives are important, but they may, paradoxically, undermine an
organisation‘s capacity to operate responsively in a situation of violent conflict,
especially if they lead to rigidity and a growing focus on internal processes, rather than
the external environment.
Development agencies‘ approaches to conflict include:
Working around war: This is a ‗conflict blind approach‘ which treats war as a
constraint on development. Donors work around war because they have limited
mandates or because their policies narrowly define security in terms of security
of investments or commercial contracts, rather than human security and
structural stability. Working around war is not good practice.
Working in war: This approach acknowledges the war and tries to mitigate war-
related risks and minimise the potential for programmes to exacerbate violence.
This may involve the use of codes of conduct, operating standards and robust
coordination mechanisms.
Working on war: Involves an explicit focus on programmes that address
conflict prevention, management or resolution. The few agencies that have an
explicit focus on war tend to support work on reconciliation and human rights
issues through civil society groups.
Practitioners should promote conflict-sensitive approaches by ‗working in war‘ or
‗working on war‘, depending on their mandate and context. This requires new levels of
analysis, particularly around the decision-making process, which is shaped by political
context, organisational environment and individual agency. In relation to this, key
policy implications are:
Practitioners intervening in highly political contexts will be perceived as
political actors. They must consider their own position in the political context
and the extent to which they can create political space or room to manoeuvre.
Practitioners need to consider the capacities and interests of their own
organisation and the wider institutional environment in which they operate.
Organisational matters (funding, capacity and management) force pragmatic
choices based on what is possible rather than upon what is desirable.
Practitioners are often viewed as the unwilling agents of wider political and
institutional interests. However, experience suggests that individuals do have
agency and that practitioners have the capacity to make a difference despite
organisational and political constraints.
Stakeholders should undertake systematic, shared and transparent conflict
analysis. Improved analysis does not necessarily guarantee better outcomes, but
it is a basic precondition for those aiming to work ‗in‘ or ‗on‘ violent conflict.
Practitioners must be able to convert analysis into practice. The risk-
opportunities matrix – which highlights the war-related risks for the
organisation or programme and peacebuilding opportunities – may be useful
tool to develop responses that are appropriate in different types of contexts.
No single approach will work in all conflict situations. The ‗do nothing‘
approach must always be retained and assessed, particularly in a high risk-low
opportunity scenario where the harm-benefit ratio may be high.
128
Source: Goodhand, J., 2006, ‗Working ‗in‘ and ‗on‘ War‘, in Civil War, Civil Peace,
Yanacopulos, H. and Hanlon, J., Open University in association with James Currey,
Oxford and Ohio University Press, Athens, OH.
Preparing to Intervene
J Goodhand (2006)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
Contemporary wars have exposed profound weaknesses in the way international
agencies conceptualise and respond to violent conflict. This chapter from a book,
published by the Open University, argues that conflict sensitivity should represent a
minimum standard for practitioners intervening in areas affected by open or latent
conflict. Violent conflict is less about breakdown, and more about reordering and
transformation, therefore practitioners must address organisational and relationship-
building challenges in their response.
Conflict-blind approaches are ineffective for contemporary humanitarian, relief and
development operations. Practitioners should adopt a peacebuilding lens by working
‗in‘ or ‗on‘ war, rather than working around war. ‗Working in war‘ refers to how
practitioners can minimise the negative effects of their actions. It involves a mix of ‗do
no harm‘ and ‗conflict-proofing‘ an agency‘s operations (reducing risk and deciding
when an agency should withdraw if the risks are too great). ‗Working on war‘ means
supporting peacebuilding efforts to strengthen peaceful coexistence and decrease the
likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence or continuation of violence.
There are three main categories of international response to violent conflict, loosely
described as loyalty, voice and exit.
Loyalty: involves leaving things as they are. Practitioners adopt a loyalty
response because they believe that they can do little to change the wider
institutional environment.
Voice: involves modifying the existing approach. This approach recognises
the wider political and institutional constraints, but tries to create ‗room for
manoeuvre‘ to generate positive changes and to widen the range of choices
open to practitioners.
Exit: involves rejecting the orthodox approach or proposing an alternative.
Some agencies have opted for exit strategies and seek to work outside the
system because they disagree with certain types of intervention (for example,
in Iraq) or because their room for manoeuvre seems to be shrinking.
The short-comings of the international response to violent conflict has led to a process
of ‗reordering‘ within the international aid system. ‗Voice‘ and ‗exit‘ offer the best
means for reconceptualising how we respond to war and more importantly, why we
respond. In addition to a new conceptual framework, working effectively ‗in‘ and ‗on‘
war requires a stronger emphasis on organisational and relationship-building
challenges by:
Fostering the right kind of relationships with stakeholders by building up
structured and ad hoc patterns of alliance and cooperation. Practitioners must
develop excellent networking, negotiation and brokering skills to
accommodate the increasingly complex web of actors involved in the
international aid system.
129
Interacting with multiple organisations and forging different kinds of working
relationships characterised by varying degrees of coordination, collaboration
and sometimes confrontation.
Fostering relations with ‗unlike-minded‘ actors, which is one of the principal
differences between working in war zones and working in development
settings. This requires a fine balance in terms of talking to rebel groups (or
rogue governments) without legitimising or being co-opted by them.
Evaluating the impact of peacebuilding efforts to judge the success of
activities underway and to minimise the possibility of fuelling or prolonging
conflict. There is a range of tools available such as: the ‗do no harm‘
framework, the peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) and the benefit-
harm analysis.
Developing peace-auditing methodologies to assess the capacities of
organisations to work effectively ‗in‘ or ‗on‘ war. A peace audit should
involve multiple stakeholders to set the criteria (particularly in relation to
programming, organisation and relationships) and assess the agency.
Source: Goodhand, J., 2006, ‗Preparing to Intervene', Civil War, Civil Peace,
Yanacopulos, H. and Hanlon, J., Open University in association with James Currey,
Oxford and Ohio University Press, Athens OH
Ten Steps to a Results-based Monitoring and Evaluation System
J Kusek and R Rist (2004)
Access full text online
Summary
Governments and organisations face increasing internal and external pressures to
demonstrate accountability, transparency and results. Results-based monitoring and
evaluation (M&E) systems are a powerful public management tool to achieve these
objectives. This handbook from the World Bank presents a ten-step model that
provides extensive detail on building, maintaining and sustaining a results-based M&E
system.
Results-based M&E systems can help build and foster political and financial support
for policies, programmes and projects and can help governments build a solid
knowledge base. They can also produce major changes in the way governments and
organisations operate, leading to improved performance, accountability, transparency,
learning, and knowledge. Results-based M&E systems should be considered a work in
progress. Continuous attention, resources, and political commitment are needed to
ensure their viability and sustainability. Building the cultural shift necessary to move
an organisation toward a results orientation takes time, commitment and political will.
The ten steps to building, maintaining and sustaining a results-based M&E system are
outlined below:
A readiness assessment should be conducted to determine whether
prerequisites for a results-based M&E system are in place. It should review
incentives and capacity for an M&E system and roles, responsibilities and
structures for assessing government performance.
Outcomes to monitor and evaluate should be agreed through a participatory
process identifying stakeholders‘ concerns and formulating them as outcome
statements. Outcomes should be disaggregated and a plan developed to assess
how they will be achieved.
130
Key performance indicators to monitor outcomes should be selected through a
participatory process considering stakeholder interests and specific needs.
Indicators should be clear, relevant, economical, adequate and monitorable.
Baseline data on indicators should be established as a guide by which to
monitor future performance. Important issues when setting baselines and
gathering data on indicators include the sources, collection, analysis, reporting
and use of data.
Performance targets should be selected to identify expected and desired
project, programme or policy results. Factors to consider include baselines,
available resources, time frames and political concerns. A participatory
process with stakeholders and partners is key.
Monitoring for results includes both implementation and results monitoring as
well as forming partnerships to attain shared outcomes. Monitoring systems
need ownership, management, maintenance and credibility. Data
collection needs reliability, validity and timeliness.
Evaluation provides information on strategy, operations and learning.
Different types of evaluation answer different questions. Features of quality
evaluations include impartiality, usefulness, technical adequacy, stakeholder
involvement, value for money and feedback.
Reports on the findings of M&E systems can be used to gain support and
explore and investigate. Reports should consider the requirements of the target
audience and present data clearly.
Findings of results-based M&E systems can also be used to improve
performance and demonstrate accountability and transparency. Benefits of
using findings include continuous feedback and organisational and
institutional knowledge and learning.
Good results-based M&E systems must be used in order to be sustainable.
Critical components of sustaining M&E systems include demand, clear roles
and responsibilities, trustworthy and credible information, accountability,
capacity and incentives.
Source: Kusek, J., and Rist, R., 2004, 'Ten Steps to a Results-based Monitoring and
Evaluation System', World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Aid for Peace: A Guide to Planning and Evaluation for Conflict Zones
T Paffenholz (2007)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
This guidebook provides conceptual thought and practical support. It leads both
practitioner and academic reader through a planning and evaluation process that helps
the user to better design development, humanitarian and Peacebuilding interventions in
conflict prone areas of the world. Written for a broad readership, Aid for Peace leads to
the creation of an appropriate policy, project or program design for working in conflict
zones.
Source: Paffenholz, T., Reychler, L., 2007, Aid for Peace: A Guide to Planning and
Evaluation for Conflict Zones, Portland: Nomos.
131
Monitoring, Evaluating and Learning for Fragile States and Peacebuilding
Programs, Practical Tools for Improving Program Performance and Results
R Sartorius and C Carver (2006)
Access full text online
Summary
How can organisations implement fragile states peacebuilding (FSP) programmes with
realistic development outcomes that can rapidly adapt to changing circumstances? This
guide from Social Impact aims to increase the effectiveness of FSP programmes
through more systematic approaches to Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (ME&L).
Stronger ME&L enables agencies and communities to understand what is effective,
how to consolidate best practice and how to increase accountability to stakeholders.
Monitoring is an assessment of how programmes are progressing towards planned
targets, activities and objectives, using mostly quantitative data. It asks ‗are we doing
the programme right?‘ Evaluation is a periodic assessment of the relevance,
performance, efficiency and impact of a programme. It asks ‗are we doing the right
programme?‘ and ‗how can we do it better?‘ ME&L leads to better programmes,
deeper learning and increases accountability, whether to donors or the affected people
or communities. ME&L in fragile states needs to be swift, safe and highly practical for
making management decisions in often unsafe and difficult-to-access environments.
FSP programmes may cover a broad range of objectives. These may range from local
governance and legislative reform to confidence building, advocacy, protection of
human rights, media strengthening and reintegration of ex-combatants. They require a
similarly broad range of ME&L tools that will be practical in very challenging,
politically volatile and rapidly changing environments.
Over past the 10 years there has been a good deal of innovation and learning
about performance and evaluation in FSP, with many examples of ME&L
good practices emerging from around the world. One example is the Cognitive
Social Capital Assessment Tool, which measures trust within and between
communities.
There is a need for ME&L approaches that assess programmes with ‗soft‘
objectives such as trust building. Evaluation approaches for traditional
development programmes are inadequate for such objectives. Instead, highly
context specific approaches are required to take into account perspectives that
are meaningful to the local groups on whom interventions centre.
Promising innovations have occurred in participatory ME&L (PME&L),
which emphasises collaborative analysis, action-learning and empowerment.
Such approaches are well suited to FSP, but to be most useful they must be
adapted to specific contexts and conflict situations.
Some recommendations are made for using this guide:
The guide can only offer a snapshot of promising ME&L approaches in a
rapidly changing field. Organisations using such approaches must continually
innovate and self-reflect so that more is learned about how programmes can
become most effective.
Involving local and community members in ME&L will enable them to
become better equipped to manage peacebuilding and transition activities. By
working with monitoring experts, local staff and community members can
gain critical skills for assessing progress and improving results. This can be
part of a legacy that donors and NGOs leave behind.
132
The ME&L guide will make the greatest contribution towards better quality
programmes if it is used throughout each stage of a programme‘s life cycle.
The guide can strengthen an organisation‘s strategic plan, programme and
project designs, and implementation through better ME&L.
Source: Social Impact, 2006, 'Monitoring, Evaluating and Learning for Fragile States
and Peacebuilding Programs, Practical Tools for Improving Program Performance and
Results', Social Impact, Arlington, Virginia
133
4. Do no Harm and Similar Approaches
Core readings
Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War
M Anderson (1999)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
How does the micro level of warfare relate to the macro level? What is the appropriate
relationship between outsiders and insiders in conflict areas? This study analyses the
experiences of aid workers in order to understand the challenges faced by development
agencies in conflict settings. It argues that aid should not be a substitute for the will of
governments to deal with violent warfare. Nevertheless, international agencies need to
find a way of insisting that appropriate political actions are taken, while remaining
nonpolitical in providing aid.
Civil wars provoke the most complex domestic situations in any country. Outside
forces sometimes perpetuate internal wars. Neighbouring countries pursue their
interests through policies and direct subsidies of money, weapons and fighters. The
world's larger socio-political and economic arrangements also shape crises that occur
within countries.
Furthermore, when international aid is given during violent conflict, it becomes a part
of that conflict. The role of aid workers, operating as foreigners in these situations and
taking responsibility for other people's welfare, is complicated and challenging. For aid
workers, civil wars pose the most complex moral as well as practical challenges.
But how do you bridge the gap between communities at war and the international
context in which civil wars take place? While there are no easy answers to this
question the following points should be born in mind:
Local actors are willing to accept outside involvement in their domestic
problems but only up to a point.
People in warring societies often invite outsiders‘ ideas and analyses of the
local situation.
There are advantages and disadvantages to the role of the outsider in a conflict
situation. He or she has an incomplete knowledge. On the other hand, he or she
is not partisan and can provide a different perspective.
Since aid has an impact on warfare, aid workers cannot avoid the responsibility
of trying to shape that impact.
The way in which they shape that impact represents outsider interference,
which means that aid workers can be accused of inappropriate action.
Aid may play a role in enabling people in war torn societies to gain the
international political assistance they need. This role will become increasingly
important as agencies and political forces interact in areas of unfolding crisis.
Clearly, it is better for aid to support non war attitudes and actions than to reinforce
and exacerbate conflict. Therefore, it is important to continue to learn how to play the
outsider role. Further experience is needed to determine how this is best done in each
134
setting, by different kinds of aid and by different aid workers. In the meantime, aid
workers should:
Try to identify local actors and local networks that can promote peace
Design their aid programmes to support local peacemakers and reinforce
positive networks
Question whether it is justifiable for outside actors to make judgements about
who or what is a local capacity for peace.
Be aware that making these judgments may constitute dangerous and
inappropriate social engineering.
Source: Anderson, M., 1999, ‗Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War‘,
Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA.
Options for Aid in Conflict: Lessons from Field Experience
M B Anderson (2000)
Access full text online
Summary
How can aid workers in conflict areas prevent assistance from being misused to pursue
political and military advantage? This report from the Collaborative for Development
Action (CDA) assesses the presence and impact of the misuse of aid in projects in
Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia, and provides lessons learned from workers in the
field. Understanding the contexts of conflict environments and applying a ‗Do No
Harm‘ (DNH) approach improves both delivery of aid and the chances for peace.
The DNH approach helps aid practitioners avoid misuse of aid and execute context-
specific programming. It includes analysis of: a) the specific context of the conflict; b)
dividers (sources of tension) between groups in the conflict environment; c) connectors
(shared attitudes, grievances and/or history) among groups; d) the local capacity for
peace; e) the aid programme‘s impact on dividers and connectors; and f) consideration
and choosing of programming options.
Aid resources can be misused or manipulated in a number of ways:
Targeting recipients can exacerbate conflict when one targeted sub-group
overlaps with another which is engaged in conflict.
The local staff hiring process can be seen as preferential.
Working through local partners can feed into inter-group tensions when
partnering organisations are partisan.
Decisions on goods and services provided, depending on the quantity
involved, can increase the potential for misuse.
The method of aid provision can significantly affect conflict among groups.
Aid can reinforce the illegitimate power of local authorities and their potential
for abuse of access to the aid project‘s goods and services.
To minimise the negative effects of aid provision, aid agencies should:
Include local representatives in the decision-making process, develop linkages
among sub-groups and redress substantive exclusions from the targeted
recipient list
Hire local staff from a range of sub-groups, institute a recruitment system and
vet hiring policies to assess potential perceptions about local staff hiring
135
Partner with organisations that cross group lines, work with groups from
different sides of the conflict and emphasise the project‘s neutral position
Provide aid to community-owned assets and community service organisations
and avoid giving aid to individually-owned entities
Include representatives of all sub-groups in programming decisions,
demonstrate transparency and commitment to community
Utilise people within the local governance system who concur with the
project‘s objectives and seek direct input from the public to broaden the
perspective of the project‘s programming beyond that of the local authority.
Source: Anderson, M., 2000, 'Options for Aid in Conflict: Lessons from Field
Experience', The Collaborative for Development Action Inc., Cambridge, MA
The Do No Harm Handbook (The Framework for Analyzing the Impact of
Assistance on Conflict)
Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) (2004)
Access full text online
Summary
How does development assistance interact with conflict? How can assistance be
provided without it being misused to pursue political and military advantage? This
handbook from the the 'Do No Harm' (DNH) Project offers a framework for addressing
these issues. It aims to help assistance workers deal more effectively with the
complexities of providing assistance in conflict contexts.
Whilst assistance can neither cause nor end conflict, it can be a significant factor in
conflict contexts. The DNH Project focusses on how those involved in providing
assistance can assume responsibility and hold themselves accountable for the effects of
their interventions. The DNH ‗Analytical Framework‘ was developed from the
programming experience of many assistance workers. It provides a tool for mapping
the interactions of assistance and conflict and can be used to plan, monitor and
evaluate both humanitarian and development assistance plans.
Those involved in DNH are often aware of the negative impacts of some of their
programmes, but see them as unavoidable. DNH is useful because it enables us to
identify a variety of programming options when things are going badly:
It prompts us to identify conflict-exacerbating impacts of assistance much
sooner than is typical without the analysis.
It heightens our awareness of inter-group relations in project sites and enables
us to play a conscious role in helping people come together.
It reveals the interconnections among programming decisions - about where
we work, with whom, how we see the criteria for assistance recipients, who
we hire locally and how we relate to local authorities.
It provides a common reference point for considering the impacts of our
assistance on conflict that brings a new cohesiveness to staff interactions, and
to work with local counterparts.
The framework is descriptive rather than prescriptive. It can also be used in other
ways, for example for Peace and Conflict Impact Analysis (PCIA). The framework has
seven steps:
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Identify which conflicts are dangerous in terms of their destructiveness and
therefore relevant for DNH analysis.
Analyse what divides groups. This is critical to understanding how assistance
programmes feed into, or lessen, these forces.
Identify how people might remain connected across sub-group lines despite
divisions created through the conflict. To assess the impact of assistance
programmes on conflict, it is important to identify and understand connecters
and local capacities for peace (LCPs).
Conduct a thorough review of all aspects of the assistance programme. For
example, where and why is assistance offered?
Analyse the interactions of each aspect of the assistance programme with the
existing dividers/tensions and connectors/LCPs. For example, who gains and
who loses from assistance?
Examine steps one to four and if assistance exacerbates inter-group dividers,
rethink how to provide the same programme in a way that eliminates its
negative, conflict-worsening aspects.
Once a better programming option has been selected, re-evaluate the impacts
of the new approach on the dividers and connectors.
Source: Collaborative for Development Action (CDA), 2004, 'The Do No Harm
Handbook (The Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Assistance on Conflict)', The
Collaborative for Development Action Inc, Cambridge, MA
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5. Role of State and non-state Actors in Promoting Peaceful
Transformation, in Supporting Country/state Resilience and in
Building State Capacity
Core readings
Community-Driven Reconstruction as an Instrument in War-to-Peace
Transitions
S Cliffe, S Guggenheim, and M Kostner (2003)
Access full text online
Summary
What is the best way forward for post-conflict reconstruction? How can it become a
foundation for sustainable development? This paper by the World Bank discusses the
role that community-driven reconstruction (CDR) projects play in promoting local
involvement. It looks at the experience of Timor-Leste and Rwanda and suggests that
CDR is an instrument of choice for post-conflict reconstruction.
The impact of violent conflict on a country‘s economy and society is profound and
multiple. It can be as highly visible as smashed buildings, maimed civilians, and burst
water mains. But the impact can also be invisible, such as happens with the collapse of
state institutions, the spread of mistrust in government and pervasive fear. In both
cases, needs are immense and urgent. However, only if both types of effects are
addressed adequately and simultaneously can post-conflict reconstruction lay the
foundation for a return to normalcy.
CDR has two principal objectives: (i) speedy and cost-effective delivery of
reconstruction assistance on the ground and (ii) building a governance structure that
stresses local choice and accountability. Community-driven reconstruction applies the
methodology of community-driven development (CDD) to a post-conflict setting.
Local populations and local institutions are the key players in project planning,
execution and monitoring. CDR approaches thereby provide one key foundation for
sustainable development in the longer-term.
The basic premise for demand-led approaches such as CDR is that local
communities are in a better position to identify their needs and corresponding
actions than higher administrative echelons, higher societal structures or
outside partners.
CDR also supposes that for a large number of short-term reconstruction needs,
local communities possess the core skills, incentives, and unity to implement a
large range of projects provided they are given the resources and a
management support system.
Empowering communities to identify their needs, decide on projects to address
these needs, manage resources and contracts, monitor implementation, and
evaluate outcomes from the outset is a more robust model for sustainable
growth.
CDR involves two policy choices: decentralisation and participation, which
aims to build a partnership between the population and the administration
around local planning and project implementation.
CDR projects have two key design elements: they support the democratic
selection of local community councils and they provide resources in the form
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of block grants directly to community councils such that they can plan and
manage their own reconstruction priorities.
In order to move from CDR to CDD, the elements outlined below need to be in place
when the reconstruction phase nears completion.
Local development structures that partner the population with the
administration need to have become a going concern. But, rather than
remaining outside of the government‘s formal structure, local development
councils should be an integral part of local government responsible for
community development.
They would also need to collaborate closely with local institutions charged
with political and administrative affairs. Capacities need to have been
strengthened beyond the community councils.
Broad-based capacity building that is tailored to local development needs has
the added benefit of providing community members with skills that enhance
their own development potential.
To sustain a community driven approach in the longer-term requires fiscal
decentralisation.
Annual block allocations should be made from the government‘s budget to the
communities‘ development budget (in addition to any possible donor funding.
Decentralised entities should also be entitled to levy taxes to ensure a steadier
stream of funds to finance community development plans.
Source: Cliffe, S., Guggenheim, S., Kostner, M., 2003, Community-driven
Reconstruction as an Instrument in War-to-Peace Transitions, CPR Working Paper No.
7, Social Development Department, World Bank
Signposts to More Effective States: Responding to Governance Challenges in
Developing Countries
M Moore (2005)
Access full text online
Summary
For decades, the development community has made unrealistic demands for poor
countries to build ‗best practice‘ institutions, with little understanding of the capacity
required to manage complex processes of change, or of the impact of donor
interventions on existing local incentives and relationships. Given the limited success
of transferring institutional models from rich to poor countries, should donors take
more account of the informal relations that underpin them? This paper, from the Centre
for the Future State, addresses how public authority in developing countries can best be
reshaped and reconstituted to meet the challenges of poverty reduction.
Effective public institutions evolve through a political process of bargaining between
the state and organised groups in society. Many developing countries have formal
institutions of representation, accountability and administration built on OECD
models. But they lack legitimacy and effectiveness because they were not forged
through a political process of state/society negotiation, and are not supported by socio-
economic structures that encourage organisation around broader, common interests.
For reasons explored in the research, the incentives for many developing countries to
engage with organised groups in their own societies are relatively weak. This in turn
reduces the opportunities and incentives for groups to take collective action. As a
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result, too many governments are still failing to deliver basic services and are
unresponsive to the needs of many poor and politically excluded people.
Key findings emerging from the research include:
Taxation really matters for accountability. State-society bargaining over tax is
central to building relations of accountability based on mutual rights and
obligations, rather than patronage. Recent changes in the fiscal environment
could encourage taxpayers to mobilise around broader, common interests, with
positive outcomes for governance.
The state itself helps to create the incentives and opportunities for different
groups to organise. The interaction of state and society over time can enhance
the effectiveness of both. Anti-poverty programmes and participatory
institutions can be designed in ways that encourage different groups to
organise. This suggests more scope for agency and for constructing common
interests than is commonly supposed.
It may be a long time before many poor countries can put in place effective,
accountable public institutions. But new forms of collaboration are emerging
between the state and citizens to provide services, often in unconventional
ways that blur the boundaries between public and private actors. Policymakers
should be more open-minded in their search for effective approaches to service
delivery.
Some implications for policymakers include:
External actors should pay much more attention to the impact of all their
actions on local state – society relations. In particular, they should give much
greater urgency to action to restrict the access of political elites in poor
countries to military support and rents, by outlawing corrupt business
practices, reducing opportunities for money laundering, controlling the
marketing of conflict diamonds and small arms, and encouraging measures
such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.
Taxation needs to be treated as a governance issue, not just a fiscal issue.
More public debate is needed about links between tax and spending, and more
honesty about the problem of aid dependency. Decisions about aid modalities
need to be more sensitive to local context.
The way state institutions are designed and public programmes negotiated and
implemented can provide incentives and opportunities for collective action,
including by the poor.
Civil society programmes need re-thinking, with much more recognition of the
diversity of interest groups, and the ways in which state and society are
mutually reinforcing.
Overall, there is a need to think less normatively about what ought to be
happening, and much more politically and historically about what is actually
happening, and how to build on what is already working.
Source: Institute of Development Studies, 2005, ‗Signposts to More Effective States:
Responding to Governance Challenges in Developing Countries‘, Institute of
Development Studies, Brighton
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Fostering Citizen Collective Action in Post-Conflict Societies
P Uvin and S Cohen (2006)
Access full text online
Summary
How do NGOs contribute to civil society development in post-conflict environments?
What role should the donor community play? This paper from the Woodrow Wilson
Centre describes the challenges involved in civil society development in post-conflict
Rwanda and Burundi. It concludes that in order to be successful, the donor community
must find more effective and constructive means of supporting citizen opportunities for
local learning and bargaining within the framework of the law. Promoting a culture of
citizenship is crucial to effective civil society promotion.
It is assumed that investments in strengthening civil society not only help to prevent
the outbreak of violence but also to deliver services and promote democracy. But
strategies for civil society–building come up against problems of state resistance,
internal divisions within and among the local NGO community, low internal
democratic values and the generalized failure of networks. The record of success in
promoting and supporting local organizations is poor.
In Rwanda and Burundi, the international development community engaged in civil
society development in three broad areas: Subcontracting aid to local-partner NGOs;
Promoting grassroots organizations; and Supporting local NGOs mainly in the human
rights field as tools for democracy. These efforts were made difficult by (among other
things) distrust, social division, the concentration of development communities in
capital cities and grassroots organizations being associated with elite interests.
There are four deeper reasons for the poor record of success in promoting and
supporting local organisations:
The societal context for development work is extremely complex and
challenging, and so oftentimes agencies overreach and establish over-
ambitious targets.
Project aid is a very weak tool for broad development –it is often short term,
typically inflexible and bureaucratically and paperwork driven.
Civil society building is politically very sensitive and difficult. Despite the
neutral and apolitical rhetoric, the goals of most development projects are
political in nature and often local NGO partners are selected based on their
opposition to a government—all nationals are smart enough to recognize this
and act accordingly.
Development partners often fundamentally misunderstand the domestic
dynamics of civil society development. A simplistic understanding of what
local organizations do and of their political characteristics undermines project
success.
The complex task of building a civil society extends beyond funding ―nice‖ local
NGOs. Building a civil society requires processes that allow people at all levels of
society to engage in collective action, learn to build their own capacities and act as
citizens.
What is needed is a transition from a set of highly personalized relationships,
in which individuals and organizations seek access to ad hoc benefits as
clients, to a system of transparent, institutionalized relationships.
Civil society–building should focus on creating capacities for citizenship
through the provision of opportunities for social bargaining and social learning
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within post-conflict societies. Efforts should be go beyond capital cities and
more inclusively engage poor communities and individuals.
A concrete civil society strategy should create incentives for poor people to
engage in collective action as citizens rather than as clients of either political
power-holders or the development machinery. Such a strategy would be
structural, medium term and cut across all fields of development.
A healthy dose of scepticism regarding best practices is needed. Most amount
to little more than platitudes. Every local context is different and ―best
practices‖ are often not generally applicable to distinctly different situations.
Source: Uvin. P., 2006. 'Fostering Citizen Collective Action in Post-Conflict Societies',
in What Really Works in Preventing and Rebuilding Failed States?, Occasional Paper
Series, Woodrow Wilson International Center, Washington, DC
Understanding Armed Groups
S Williams and R Ricigliano (2005)
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Summary
How can a third party understand an armed group well enough to be able to assist
constructively in the establishment of a peace process? This Conciliation Resources
article aims to provide starting points and helpful signposts that intermediaries can use
in this difficult but essential task. Understanding means more than having information
about a group. It means developing a deeper knowing of a group and some ability to
predict what it does.
In the world of violent conflict, parties in dispute do not usually have a shared system
for resolving their dispute and consequently there is generally an accepted need for
what is referred to as a ‗peace process‘. Authority and legitimacy are contested, and no
judge, court, tribunal, or bargaining process is acceptable to all sides. Hence there is
often an assumed need for a ‗third party‘, an individual or organisation outside of the
combatant groups, to assist in the establishment and management of the process.
The question of understanding armed groups involved two kinds of variables;
substantive (the information required) and procedural (the process of interaction with
groups in order to gather the information). Intermediaries need to be aware that:
Their task of understanding an armed group is affected by trust. If there is a
high degree of trust between an intermediary and an armed group, the amount,
quality and honesty of the information exchanged is much greater.
Their task is also affected by how they interact with an armed group. Once
engaged with the combatants, the intermediary becomes an actor in that
conflict system and has an impact (consciously or not) on the conflict
dynamics.
In gathering information, they need to pay attention to more than the spoken or
written positions of the parties. They must also be adept at reading actions and
the context within which armed groups operate. What the group does and says
about itself begins to describe and locate at least its aspirations or what it
believes suits its interests.
As with building trust, the understanding of whether a group is serious about
negotiating may need to develop over time, based on actions rather than
words. In general, what a group does is the best predictor of what it will do.
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Without understanding of an armed group it is difficult to identify common interests,
build confidence, or resolve differences. These are all vital steps in reaching an
agreement capable of ending violence and addressing the causes of conflict.
Much of an intermediary‘s success comes down to interpersonal and
contextual factors, which will be different in each conflict setting and even
each interaction.
Above all, it is crucial to remember that armed groups are dynamic
organisations whose strategies change in response to evolving circumstances.
Different elements in the group will enjoy prominence at different historical
moments, in response to internal tensions or external influences.
Intermediaries need to remember that their assessment of a group and its
attitude to political engagement is not definitive; at a different moment,
possibly with a different interlocutor, an intermediary with a different
approach may find openings that were previously undiscovered.
Despite attempts to define or systematise the task of understanding armed
groups, it is still a healthy mix of art and science.
Source: Williams, S., and Ricigliano, R. 2005, 'Understanding Armed Groups', Accord,
vol. 16, Conciliation Resources, London
Supplementary readings
Building Institutions in Post-Conflict African Economies
J Aron (2002)
Access full text online
Summary
The role of effective state and private institutions in promoting investment and growth
is back on the agenda of multilateral agencies. Institutional reform in poor countries,
especially in post-conflict countries where institutions have been altered or destroyed,
is needed to encourage development and economic growth. Yet, how is it that
institutional reform can have a positive impact on development? How do institutions
influence growth and recovery in post-conflict countries? What are the constraints on
the effective reforms of institutions?
Following North‘s institutional framework (defined as a combination of both formal
and informal rules and how effectively they are enforced), this WIDER discussion
paper establishes that well-functioning institutions may promote development. Using
empirical evidence of cross-country analysis, it is argued that weak institutions
increase transaction costs and discourage investment and productive activity. This
finding lends force to the need for institutional reform. Effective institutional reform
requires the creation or restructuring of organisations that can implement the laws,
state regulatory arrangements to oversee these organisations, and a facilitating
environment for various private sector watchdog bodies. However, in practice,
institution building in African post-conflict countries, as in other developing countries,
may be very limited because of often-severe factor and funding constraints. The
capacity to change is dependent on the available human capital and other resources in
organisations.
In capacity-constrained countries, the desired scope of sustainable reform has to be
traded-off against limited domestic resources. While fiscal resources may be
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supplemented by foreign aid, it is far harder to reverse sharply depleted capacity in
post-conflict countries. Other findings include:
Institutions are neither malleable nor able to respond rapidly to institutional
incentives. Change will tend to occur incrementally
The degree of institutional development achieved prior to conflict in post-
conflict countries is crucial to the institution building process. Institutional
memory may be more easily resuscitated than created
In post-conflict countries with little left of either formal or informal
mechanisms (e.g. Somalia and Sierra Leone), partial reform may be achieved
in the short to medium term by enacting minimal transparent rules, rather than
expensive and time-consuming reforms
Levels of reform should be matched to capacity, so that in due course, deeper
reforms can be implemented
Under resource constraints, more complex law codes can evolve by
importation of tried and tested foreign law, but practical experience suggests
that, to be acceptable, these laws should be carefully adapted using local
expertise.
Research on practical policy interventions towards institution building is still at an
early stage. Yet, the paper draws important policy implications:
Policy prescriptions for institutional reform should take into account practical
constraints in implementation
In post-conflict countries, concerted institutional reforms may be more
effective than piecemeal reforms
The importance of domestic demand for reform has to be emphasised to gain
momentum for reform
It is important to highlight the simultaneous relationship between growth,
investment and institutions, since causality may move in both directions
Domestic civil organisations have to be strengthened to regulate the state‘s
actions during implementation of reforms.
Source: Aron, J. 2002, Building Institutions in Post-Conflict African Economies,
WIDER Discussion Paper DP2002/124, UNU/WIDER, Helsinki.
Strengthening Democratic Governance in Conflict Torn Societies: Civic
Organisations, Democratic Effectiveness and Political Conflict
R C Crook (2001)
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Summary
The effort to resolve violent conflict within societies cannot rest solely on non-
political, non-ethnic, non-identity based civil society groups, but must also accept the
role of cultural, ethnic and religious groups which may, on the surface, appear to seek
to divide the state. If these groups can be mobilised and managed through a system of
conflict mediation they may in fact contribute to facilitating peace and democracy
within the state.
This paper first discusses the concept of civil society organisations (CSOs), arguing
that it is necessary to go beyond a traditional definition based in behavioural terms,
concentrating on pluralistic groups cutting across interest groups, to include
sociologically defined groups based on common interests, ethics, ethnicity, religion
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and other communities. It then examines this argument with respect to two countries
which exemplify ethnic and religious division, but which differ significantly in the
degree and manner of this division: Namely Uganda and Bosnia.
Civil society incorporates all communal identities and associations, whether they be
based on community, family, ethnicity, tribe, religion, class, intellectual capacity,
politics, or whatever, and no matter what the source of the group it has the ability to
provide a positive role in pacifying and democratising society.
In discussing the nature of CSOs, the following points are highlighted:
CSOs are both in conflict and at the same time interdependent within society
They are defined through their relations with the state, the policies of which
they seek to shape and from which they hope to derive power and influence
Democracy is at heart a tension between the theoretical equality of all within
society, and the actual inequalities which individuals and groups seek to
address
Civil society groups can be divided into three main categories: Policy-oriented
elites; locally organised grassroots groups; and social/cultural bodies. These
operate in distinctly differing manners.
In application to the case studies it was noted that in both Uganda and Bosnia civil
society has been traditionally weak and partial. Both societies have adopted a similar
strategy - decentralisation - to resolve the competition within the main (in this case
ethnically) partial CSOs.
The strength and potential influence of CSOs are related to the depth to which they are
embedded within society, and whether the CSO cuts across interest- or community-
groups or unifies these groups and provides them with a mouthpiece, they are a part of
society and must be accommodated. Denying the role of CSOs which appear to
represent division but which have genuine support will be counter-productive.
Additionally:
A CSO does not need to be 'democratically constituted' to be a significant
actor, as CSOs represent the institutionalisation of methods of interaction
within groups and between the group and the state
The importance of any particular CSO is measured more in the support it can
mobilise (be that support from within society, or externally from the wider
international community) than its independence as an actor
The methods employed by the CSO will be dependent on how far the CSO is
accepted by the state and allowed to participate and negotiate, as well as on the
traditions of the constituency itself
Where popular and legitimate CSOs are denied a voice they are likely to
become increasingly confrontational, and perhaps violent
Both civic and 'uncivil' (divisive) groups must be given a voice if they are seen
within society as representative. The structure of state-society interaction must
reflect the reality on the ground.
Source: Crook, R.C., 2001, 'Strengthening Democratic Governance in Conflict Torn
Societies: Civic organisations, Democratic Effectiveness and Political Conflict', IDS
Working Paper no. 129, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton.
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In Control of Their Future: Community-Led Reconciliation and Recovery
D Pottebaum and C Lee (2007)
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Summary
How can community-led reconciliation and recovery (CRR) programmes foster peace
among conflict-affected populations? What challenges confront such initiatives? This
working paper builds on lessons learnt in a CRR programme in Aceh, Indonesia to
establish general principles for effective CRR strategies. Strengthening leadership
capacity, reforming the mindset of war-torn communities and encouraging co-
operation between communities in conflict are central to the success of CRR
programmes.
CRR programmes aim to understand the systematic failures which are both caused by
and a cause of conflict, and to encourage warring communities to rediscover their
interconnectedness. The benefits of empowering communities to help formulate and
manage their own development policies have long been recognised. However, it is
difficult to transpose lessons learnt in community-driven development in stable
societies to initiatives in conflict-ridden countries. Communities in conflict often adopt
narrow, short-term perspectives in order to survive: they may be distrustful, violent and
unwilling to take proactive action. Wartime leaders may lack the skills or outlook
necessary to achieve reconciliation between conflicting parties.
CRR helps to transform the attitudes of populations in conflict and address the
challenges of peaceful transitions:
Communities are encouraged to replace the passive role they adopted during
wartime with active participation in recovery planning and resource
management.
Populations are encouraged to take a holistic worldview, taking responsibility
for the entirety of their social relations and local livelihoods rather than
following a fragmentary approach.
Effective leadership is strengthened through training and participation in the
recovery process.
Local organisational capacity is fostered to empower local leaders who may
otherwise be marginalised by government agencies and donors.
CRR comprises three main stages: 1) persuading communities in conflict to commit to
a common goal; 2) building trust between the parties; and 3) assembling leaders to
guide the recovery process. Several operational priorities are highlighted:
Adequate time, technical support and financial resources are required to build
trust between communities. Populations often find it easier to work through
third-party mediators (possibly originating from the local area), who should be
well-versed in local belief systems and comprise a large female component.
Leadership capacity is built through training and field-based events conducted
by all parties together and with the support of local leaders. Individuals receive
formal training in personal empowerment and transformational leadership, and
practical training in participatory planning, facilitation and communication.
District-level teams coordinate, support and monitor CRR work at the sub-
district level. Team building processes between community leaders from both
parties are conducted to foster common peacetime goals.
Regional leaders are trained to assist village leaders in the planning and
management of development activities. Cooperation between all sides of the
146
conflict develops leadership skills, improves livelihoods and provides tangible
evidence of peace.
Strong, accountable village organisations are established through direct local
funding and training. Village planning is organised via a five-year economic
plan and implemented by all sectors of the community.
Recent CRR efforts in Aceh, Indonesia highlight the importance of village-
level leadership in consolidating peace processes and promoting community
confidence and hope. Lessons learnt include the value of a peace agreement;
safe access to conflict-affected areas; control by regional leaders over local
leaders; donor willingness to cede control to local leaders; and consistency of
programming across all areas.
Source: Pottebaum, D. and Lee, C., 2007, 'In Control of Their Future: Community-Led
Reconciliation and Recovery', Paper presented at the World Bank Workshop, 'Moving
out of Poverty in Conflict Affected Areas', 16 April, World bank, Washington, D.C
Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International
Programmes Aimed at Building 'New' Societies
B Pouligny (2005)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
How should international agencies work with local civil society during peacebuilding
operations? This article from Security Dialogue analyses the relationship between aid
agencies and local NGOs and communities to identify problems in the way the
international community has traditionally undertaken peace operations. It argues that
international bodies need to reform their understanding of local civil society in order to
foster better local ownership of peacebuilding projects.
International agencies have recently sought to involve local NGOs in peacebuilding
programmes, but they have often underestimated the diversity of civil society in non-
Western contexts. Seeking to work with homogenous NGOs modelled along Western
lines, outsiders have often co-operated with local organisations which then become
patronage channels, disconnected from the concerns of their communities.
Western bodies have ―romanticised‖ local NGOs by overlooking their close links with
political groups. ―Invasions‖ of outside agencies during crises have weakened relations
between local and international NGOs, as outsiders‘ seizure of funding and symbolic
space marginalises the local groups.
There are six key problems identified in the approach international agencies take
towards local civil society:
International organisations neglect local knowledge during peacebuilding
interventions. They treat their arrival as a ―year zero‖, overlooking the role of
traditional practices in rebuilding conflict-ridden communities.
The international community misjudges the timing of its interventions. In
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the reduction in global aid after the war coincided
with a period of great difficulty for local NGOs.
International agencies impose inequitable demands on local NGOs during
funding and legitimisation processes. They require local civil society to attain a
level of accountability not reached by the international bodies themselves.
147
Reconstruction efforts prioritise formal political reform, but ignore substantial
meanings and identities. A rebuilt political infrastructure is hollow without
thought given to underlying cultural values.
Outside interventions deprive the state of its capacity to cultivate shared
purpose by placing faith in the ―invisible hand‖ of civil society.
International organisations seek to achieve stability in the short- to medium-
term but fail to strive for a long-term resolution, addressing the painful
processes of social transformation.
Various recommendations are made:
Outsiders must develop a community-oriented approach to local populations to
understand the complex changes in post-conflict societies. They should
identify local individuals who might act as agents of change.
Systems should be instituted to analyse the socio-political context of the local
community and monitor the impact of international agencies on local civil
societies.
All field workers should have clear guidelines outlining how conflict has
caused change in local social organisation and values.
The preparation, ongoing training, monitoring and psychological support of
international practitioners should be prioritised.
International NGOs should change the way they see themselves. They should
regard their role as unobtrusive mediators in the peacebuilding process and job
descriptions and assessments should reflect this.
Outsiders‘ accountability towards the local population needs to be improved
by the adoption of performance assessments and sanction systems.
Source: Pouligny, B., 2005, 'Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding:
Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building 'New' Societies', Security
Dialogue, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 495-510
Multi-donor Support to Civil Society and Engaging with 'Non-traditional' Civil
Society
F Tembo and A Wells (2007)
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Summary
Do multi-donor support mechanisms scale up and enhance the effectiveness of civil
society engagement with the state? This paper from the Overseas Development
Institute (ODI) analyses multi-donor support models and partnerships with ‗non-
traditional‘ civil society. The decision to move from bilateral to multi-donor support of
civil society organisations (CSOs) involves a trade-off between direct donor
management of project administration and politics, and leaving civil society advocacy
to run its own course.
This study is a response to the current lack of systematic analysis of different
approaches to supporting civil society, including which models work best in different
contexts. It includes a review of 25 Department for International Development (DFID)
programmes in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
Most multi-donor civil society support programmes are now managed by
intermediaries: international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), CSOs, local
148
foundations and community funds. Non-traditional CSOs include, among others, social
movements, political factions, faith-based groups and private sector and local
government associations. Strategies to reach out to non-traditional CSOs include
experimental funding to identify stronger organisations, selecting intermediaries who
have worked with non-traditional groups, brokering different funding mechanisms, and
differentiated grant-making to CSOs with limited management capacity.
There are a number of management and programme issues related to both CSO-driven
programmes and use of non-traditional CSOs:
Intermediaries may not have the same capacity as donors to mediate civil
society-state relations and absorb the inherent political risks.
The use of foundations needs to be carefully managed in fragile states, where
legal frameworks are often applied differently to donors, INGOs and local
CSOs.
Individual donors may continue to exert influence over programme priorities
and management, skewing accountability away from the CSOs.
Transition to a multi-donor system demands substantial short- to medium-term
investment of donor resources to resolve organisational and administrative
issues.
While non-traditional CSOs can be effective, donor funding/reporting
arrangements may impose formal structures on weakly institutionalised CSOs,
undermining their informal organisational dynamic.
A number of additional issues warrant further study, in particular in fragile states
contexts:
Intermediaries: the intermediary-CSO relationship, including the issue of
intermediaries acting as advocates; development of community funds as a step
beyond donor or INGO management; the role INGOs play once fund
management has transitioned to local intermediaries; engagement with private
foundations who have worked with mass-based organisations; and small grants
mechanisms as an instrument for coalition building.
Intervention design: quantitative comparison of transaction costs of multi-
donor and bilateral approaches; the potential for cost reductions by working
with smaller groups of donors; measurement of impact on accountability; and
sector-based approaches to civil society support.
Non-traditional civil society partners: the role of civic engagement in
reforming formal accountability mechanisms and the possibilities of civic
engagement through informal channels and alliances.
Source: Tembo, F. et al., 2007, 'Multi-donor Support to Civil Society and Engaging
with 'Non-traditional' Civil Society: A Light-Touch Review of DFID's Portfolio',
Overseas Development Institute, London
Towards a New Strategy for Civil Society Building in Rwanda
S Unsworth and S Uvin (2001)
Access full text online
Abstract
Most discussion about civil society in Rwanda focuses on existing civil society
organisations and how to ―strengthen‖ them. The resulting interventions often reflect
donors‘ corporate policies and a normative view of civil society based on Western
models. The result is a narrow range of actions designed to address perceived problems
149
directly through capacity building, various forms of training including civic education,
sensitisation, etc. This can produce worthwhile results. But the drawbacks are that it
addresses symptoms not causes, is expensive, produces benefits at the micro level
which are hard to scale up, and tends to have higher level objectives which are over-
ambitious in relation to the resources and strategies deployed.
This paper steps back and seeks to understand the broader, more structural, longer term
dynamics (social, political, economic and institutional) which shape the opportunities
for collective action within Rwandan society. It also looks at the way in which the state
itself helps to determine the incentives (or disincentives) for collective action, and the
opportunities for a more ―institutionalised‖ relationship between the state and civil
society, based not on people as clients seeking access to ad hoc benefits, but citizens
claiming rights.
Source: Unsworth, S. and Uvin, S., 2001, ‗Towards a New Strategy for Civil Society
Building in Rwanda‘, DFID, Kigali
150
Part 3: Conflict Response: Peacemaking,
Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding
Contents
1. Direct and Third Party Peace Processes, Ceasefires, Mediation and Peace Agreements –
Formation, Implementation and Consolidation ..................................................................... 151
2. Understanding Peacebuilding and Statebuilding ............................................................... 160
3. Post-conflict Stabilisation, Assessment and Planning ....................................................... 178
4. Transition from Humanitarian Assistance to Full Recovery ............................................. 186
5. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants ........................ 191
6. Transitional Justice and Reconciliation and their Role in Mitigating Risks of Violence .. 202
7. Security Sector and Justice Sector Reform and their Role in Mitigating Risks of Violence
............................................................................................................................................... 213
7.1 Security sector ............................................................................................................. 213
7.2 Justice sector ............................................................................................................... 226
8. Small Arms and Light Weapons Programmes and their Role in Mitigating Risks of Violence
............................................................................................................................................... 239
151
1. Direct and Third Party Peace Processes, Ceasefires, Mediation and
Peace Agreements – Formation, Implementation and Consolidation
Core readings
The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining
Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars
B Jones (2001)
Access full text online
Summary
International actors face recurrent challenges coordinating their efforts to implement
peace agreements to end civil wars. This InternationalPeaceAcademy paper identifies
strategic coordination amongst third-party actors as a critical element of successful
peace implementation. Incoherence and inconsistency in strategy can undermine the
viability or the effectiveness of implementation efforts. Strategic coordination is a
growing policy challenge due to the increasing proliferation of actors with overlapping
mandates, competitive relations and minimal accountability.
Strategic coordination is a critical to the capacity of implementers to stave off
opposition. Opponents of peace will tend to exploit divisions amongst implementers
and take advantage of confusion or disagreement. The ability of international actors to
meet the growing complexity of strategic coordination depends on their ability to
overcome three recurring challenges. These are: incoherence between the negotiation
and implementation phases of a peace process; divergence of strategies within a given
phase; and contradictory efforts to implement a given strategy.
The effectiveness of strategic coordination varies according to external conditions,
including: the difficulty of the implementation environment; the degree of commitment
of major and regional powers; and the correspondence of interests and objectives
among those powers:
Past cases show that specific features of the coordination mechanism employed
can help mitigate environmental constraints.
Strategic coordination of peace implementation will be easier where there is: a
clearly defined lead agency; continuity of third-party actors between
negotiation and implementation phases; and an established forum for policy
consultation amongst implementers.
Strategic coordination has been successful where implementation has been
guided by a lead state whose authority to establish priorities and resolve
disputes is recognised by other key implementers.
Although the lead state approach is unplanned by definition, positive past
experiences suggest it is an important alternative to United Nations (UN)
coordination.
Where the UN enjoys a central, authoritative role a Special Representative of
the Secretary General (SRSG) can provide important policy coordination. This
is best achieved where the SRSG is involved in both negotiation and
implementation.
Most cases of successful strategic coordination have featured "Friends Groups"
– the bringing together of key governments to ensure focus and commonality of
approaches.
152
Without effective coordination by the UN, a comparable regional or international
organisation, or a lead state, the effectiveness of implementation efforts will be heavily
constrained:
Ideally strategic coordination should establish clear lead actors to set and
pursue priorities, provide consistency across phases and resolve disputes.
Neither the UN nor any other actor is currently equipped to do this.
The capacity of the UN to perform essential strategic coordination functions is
constrained by its own weakened authority, the proliferation of third-party
actors and competition between powers. This is unlikely to change substantially
in the near future.
The UN and other international actors have experimented with different models
of strategic coordination. Within the UN two distinct models have emerged: the
Strategic Frameworks Initiative and the Integrated Mission.
Recent efforts to enhance structures for strategic coordination on the ground
have been frustrated by: the number of actors involved; the limited acceptance
of the coordinating authority of the UN, or an analogous body; and the absence
of policy-coordination at headquarters level.
Source: Jones, B.D., 2001, 'The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing
Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars',
International Peace Academy and Center for International Security and Cooperation,
Stanford University, New York
Dilemmas of Robust Peace Operations
I Johnstone (2006)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
The Center on International Cooperation‘s (CIC) Annual Review of Global Peace
Operations is the most comprehensive report of its kind, examining more than forty
UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions in 2005 including the Darfur region of the
Sudan, Afghanistan, Haiti, Liberia and Kosovo among others. Its purpose is to inform
policy-makers, members of the media, academics and peace-keepers in the field as the
international community debates the growing role of peace operations around the
world.
Source: Johnstone, I., 2006, ‗Dilemmas of Robust Peace Operations‘, Annual Review
of Global Peace Operations, Center on International Cooperation, Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, pp. 1-17.
Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)
L Brahimi (2001)
Access full text online
Abstract
The United Nations (UN) was founded to save communities and nations from the
scourge of war. Yet, over the last decade, the UN has repeatedly failed to meet the
challenge, and can do no better today. Why has the UN failed? What can be done to
accomplish the UN‘s mission?
153
The report commissioned by the UN Secretary-General assesses the shortcomings of
the existing peacekeeping system and makes recommendations for change. Force alone
cannot create peace; it can only create the space in which peace may be built. Member
states have to summon the political will to support the UN politically, financially and
operationally to enable the United Nations to be truly credible as a force for peace.
There is an urgent need to establish more effective strategies for conflict prevention
and peacekeeping, in both the long and short terms.
Findings from the report include:
Some UN operations in the past did not deploy into post-conflict situations but
tried to create them.
Factors that should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping include the
consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only for self-
defence.
Reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor has deeply damaged the
standing and credibility of UN peacekeeping.
The first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord are often the most
critical ones for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of a new
operation. Opportunities lost during that period are hard to regain.
The current approach to funding and staff for peacekeeping seems to confuse
the temporary nature of specific operations with the evident permanence of
peacekeeping and other peace operations activities.
Gaps in strategy, policy and practice impede the effective use of modern
information technology in missions.
Policy pointers to strengthen the permanent capacity of the UN to develop peace-
building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies
include:
Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force UN
contingents to cede the initiative of their attackers. Mandates should specify an
operation‘s authority to use force to stop violence against civilians.
A new information-gathering and analysis entity should be created to support
the informational and analytical needs of the Secretary-General and the
members of the ECPS.
The leadership of a new mission has to be assembled as early as possible at the
UN Headquarters, to participate in shaping the mission‘s concept of operation,
support plan, budget, staffing and Headquarters mission guidance.
Traditional peacekeeping operations should be rapidly and effectively
deployed. On-call lists of experts, military officers and police officers should
be created, and mechanisms to rapidly recruit civilian field personnel should be
put in place.
Headquarters support for peacekeeping should be treated as a core activity of
the UN, and therefore the majority of its resource requirements should be
funded through the regular budget of the Organisation.
Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTF) has to be created to plan new missions
and help them reach full deployment. Information technology has to be well
utilised to achieve the objectives.
Source: Brahimi, L. et al 2000, 'Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations', United
Nations, New York
154
The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments
W Zartman (2001)
Access full text online
Summary
How can the timing of peace initiatives help to resolve conflicts? This Global Review
of Ethnopolitics article argues that parties resolve their conflicts only when they are
ready to do so – when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory
result are blocked. Practitioners need to take advantage of this ‗ripe moment‘ when it
exists, or help produce it, or stand ready to act on it when it does not exist.
The concept of a ripe moment centres on the relative parties‘ perception of a Mutually
Hurting Stalemate (MHS), optimistically associated with an impending, past or
recently avoided catastrophe. The concept is based on the notion that when the parties
find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory, and
this deadlock is painful to both of them, they seek an alternative policy or a way out.
Diplomatic memoirs have explicitly referred to ripeness through its MHS component
and they provide examples of when a MHS has brought parties to seek a way out:
Chester A Crocker, US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa between 1981
and 1989, mediated an agreement for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from
Angola and of South African troops from Namibia, then to become
independent. It was only when military escalations ended in stalemate that the
position ‗ripened‘ paving the way for negotiation to begin.
Alvaro de Soto, Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs at the United
Nations (UN), also endorsed the necessity of ripeness in his mission to mediate
a peace in El Salvador. The conflict was ripe for a negotiated settlement only
when each side realised that they could not defeat each other and that its
persistence was causing pain that could no longer be endured.
In Yugoslavia, it took the 1995 Croatian offensive, coupled with NATO
bombing, to create a MHS composed of a temporary Serb setback and a
temporary Croat advance that could not be sustained.
Practitioners need to employ all their skills and apply the concepts of negotiation and
mediation to take advantage of the necessary but insufficient condition of ripeness.
Evidence suggests that perception of a MHS occurs either (and optimally) at a
low level of conflict, where it is relatively easy to begin problem-solving, or, in
salient cases, at rather high levels of conflict.
To ripen high level conflicts for resolution, practitioners must raise the level of
conflict until a stalemate is reached. Then further through the perception of
hurt, then to the perception of pain, and finally to create a perception of an
impending catastrophe. The ripe moment becomes the godchild of
brinkmanship.
A MHS can be a very fleeting opportunity, a moment to be seized lest it pass,
or it can be of a long duration, waiting to be noticed and acted upon. Failure to
seize the moment often hastens its passing, as parties lose faith in negotiating a
way out or regain hope in the possibility of unilateral escalation.
Unripeness should not constitute an excuse for second or third parties‘ inaction.
In the absence of a promising situation, either the ‗second‘ party that is alone in
feeling hurt or the third party should ripen or position themselves. Positioning
options include becoming an indispensable channel for negotiation.
155
Source: Zartman, I. W, 2001, 'The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and
Ripe Moments', The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 8-18
Supplementary readings
Securing the Peace: Guiding the International Community towards Women's
Effective Participation throughout Peace Processes
K Banaszak and A-M Goetz (2005)
Access full text online
Summary
How and why should women be involved in peace processes? This paper from the
United Nations Development Fund for Women highlights the importance of involving
women at every stage of peace negotiations and gives recommendations for how this
might be achieved in practice. It argues that when approaching the task of ending war,
the stakes are too high to neglect the resources that women have to offer.
Women are major stakeholders in the resolution of armed conflict: as victims,
survivors and even wagers of war. Women have much to offer peace efforts: Women‘s
organisations persistently advocate for peace; women often build foundations for peace
negotiations and build ties amongst different factions; they bring a different
perspective to negotiations; their involvement can lead to long-term advances for
gender equality; and they can foster reconciliation and provide an example for society
to move forward. The international community is in a critical position to support
women‘s participation at the peace table, to build women‘s capacity as participants and
to ensure that women‘s needs and contributions are not overlooked.
The report gives a number of recommendations on how to amplify women's voices and
create an enabling environment to allow their concerns to be addressed:
Women are more likely to have an impact when they organise as women with a
common agenda for peace. The international community should encourage
female delegates to meet with women‘s organisations; facilitate exchanges of
information between national stakeholders and international partners; and
convene nationwide consultations of women.
Identifying strategic entry points for women early in the peace process is vital
to enhance their access to negotiations and impact on the accords.
Recommendations include: Advocating for a minimum 30% women‘s
representation in delegations; brokering meetings between women‘s groups and
negotiating parties for women to request representation; assisting women‘s
groups in awareness-raising campaigns.
Structures and mechanisms within the office of the facilitator can enhance the
integration of a gender perspective in peace negotiations. The facilitator can be
crucial in getting women to the peace table.
Training on the importance of a gender perspective should be offered to
participants in negotiations, and gender sensitive rules of procedure should be
encouraged. There should be gender balance and expertise within the
facilitation team.
Women require specific forms of support to maximise their participation in
peace negotiations. They must enjoy protection from security threats; sufficient
156
resources to maximise their efforts; political space in which to organise; and
access to decision makers.
There are also often important capacity building needs, and courses should
include: Conflict resolution and gender-sensitive peace building; thematic post-
conflict issues; political issues and organisational skills.
Women‘s involvement must be sustained during implementation. Women have
specific needs, priorities and strategies that must be included in the peace agreement to
guarantee their fulfilment during implementation.
There should be gender balance and expertise on the drafting committee, and
clear provisions in the peace agreement to ensure women‘s participation in
post-conflict mechanisms.
After a peace agreement has been signed, there are opportunities to maximise
women‘s participation in implementation and monitoring. The international
community should establish mechanisms to guarantee women‘s involvement
throughout the implementation phase. Key facets of the agreement, such as
timeframe and distribution of funds should make reference to gender issues.
The international community is often invited to verify fulfilment of steps in the
accords to help prevent a return to violence. Women must be involved in these
processes.
International commitments to gender equality in peace processes are in place.
Necessary political will should now be exercised through provision of
technical, financial and moral support.
Source: Banaszak, K. et al (ed), 2005, 'Securing the Peace: Guiding the International
Community towards Women's Effective Participation throughout Peace Processes,'
United Nations Development Fund for Women
Leashing the Dogs of War
C A Crocker et al (2007)
Access full text online
Summary
Is it possible to fight war and manage conflict at the same time? This book from the
United States Institute of Peace (USIP) explores the causes of conflict and the critical
role of conflict management in volatile political environments. Peacemaking and
conflict management are essential for creating a less divided, less conflicted world
despite the complexities and high odds against success. The international community
can check hostile adversaries of the international order and make peace at the same
time.
When the Cold War ended, many hoped for the beginning of a more peaceful chapter
in world history. However, sectarian violence in the Balkans, Africa and the Middle
East, the emergence of a more lethal, global brand of terrorism and a growing cultural
divide between Islam and the West have put pay to such aspirations. Meanwhile,
international norms and institutions are eroding, and a number of states are on the
verge of crossing the nuclear threshold.
A new kind of strategic political resource in international relations is needed to leash
the contemporary dogs of war. ‗Smart Power‘ effectively engages the multiple assets
and instruments of official and non-official diplomacy and military power. It is
157
attentive to the timing of mediated, negotiated interventions and the resources,
capabilities and strengths that different actors bring to conflict management. As such, it
merits consideration as a comprehensive conflict management mechanism.
The current international conflict landscape is characterised by:
Security challenges: a heightened sense of insecurity in the international
system; anti-Western sentiment; the emergence of authoritarian regimes in
Latin America and the Middle East; the growth of paramilitary organisations;
continued regional instability; and an increasingly permissive violent
environment.
Global conflict trends: a decline in global conflicts and their lethality; a shift in
the locus of violence; the increasing risk that nuclear technologies may fall into
the wrong hands; and an increase in outside intervention and conflict
management.
Role of coercive force: the recognition that while military and economic tools
may be essential, some challenges may respond to a blend of coercive power
and political-diplomatic initiatives, including conflict management.
The role of institutions: Increased engagement of international institutions,
regional and sub-regional organisations and small-state/non-state actors in
peaceful resolution processes.
The role of state building and democratic governance: the recognition that it is
no longer acceptable to allow failed states to flounder; discussion about the role
of outsiders in building effective democratic polities.
Framing the conflict management challenge: global frames of reference are
diverging; there is a declining degree of consensus on priorities for conflict
management.
Conflict management in a time of transition: major powers, international
organisations and non-governmental organisations are now re-defining their
roles in providing security for their citizens and constituencies.
In this context, it is important to recognise that:
Military force alone can not deal effectively with the problems of failed and
ailing states
The international community needs to apply conflict management and
prevention to failed states and those regions where intractable conflicts endure
Official and non-official diplomacy are important to building international
coalitions, mobilising political will, building internal capacity to handle
conflict, securing political legitimacy and promoting negotiation and mediation
of interstate and intrastate disputes
Consensus and the support of the international community, including non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), is an important component of effective
action.
Crocker, C., Osler Hampson, F. and Aall, P., 2007, 'Leashing the Dogs of War',
Introduction in Crocker, C., Osler Hampson, F. and Aall, P. (eds.) 'Leashing the Dogs
of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World', United States Institute of Peace,
Washington, D.C.
158
Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements
S Stedman (2002)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
Why do some peace agreements successfully end civil wars, while others fail? What
strategies are most effective in ensuring that warring parties comply with their treaty
commitments? Of the various tasks involved in implementing peace agreements, which
are the most important? These and related questions--life and death issues for millions
of people today--are the subject of Ending Civil Wars.
Based on a study of every intrastate war settlement between 1980 and 1998 in which
international actors played a key role, Ending Civil Wars is the most comprehensive,
systematic study to date of the implementation of peace agreements--of what happens
after the treaties are signed. Covering both broad strategies and specific tasks and
presenting a wealth of rich case material, the authors find that failure most often is
related not only to the inherent difficulty of a particular case, but also to the major
powers' perception that they have no vital security interest in ending a civil war.
Source: Stedman, S.J., 2002, ‗Introduction.‘ In Stedman, S.J. et al. (eds.) (2002)
Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Boulder CO: Lynne-
Rienner Publishers, pp. 1-40.
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines
Un Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2007)
Access full text online
Abstract
This document aims to set out the guiding principles and core objectives of United
Nations peacekeeping operations as well the main factors contributing to their success
in the field. It also provides a basis for the development of training materials for
military, police and civilian personnel preparing to serve in the field. This document
was drafted in close consultation with field missions, Troop and Police Contributing
Countries, UN system partners and other key stakeholders. It also draws on seminal
documents such as "An Agenda for Peace", "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" and
"the Brahimi Report", as well as internal lessons learned materials, external research
and academic commentary.
Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2007, ‗United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines‘, Consultation Draft 29 June
2007, United Nations, New York.
International Mediation
W Zartman and S Touval (2007)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
This book assesses the nature and extent of the changes wrought by 9/11 and its
aftermath, and explores their wide-ranging implications. For the United States, of
159
course, the changes have been dramatic. It has engaged in a war on terrorism and has
become both a third party in certain conflict arenas and a direct party to the conflict in
Iraq and Afghanistan. But these events have also affected other actors, from the United
Nations to humanitarian NGOs to collective defence and security organizations such as
NATO and the OSCE.
At the same time, some things have not changed. Failed states, economic stagnation,
weapons proliferation, nuclear missiles, and identity-based conflicts continue to
threaten global security. Looking at the combination of old and new threats, are
traditional instruments of negotiation, mediation, peacekeeping and peace enforcement
still effective in managing and resolving conflict? How do conflict management efforts
and the campaign against terrorism interact in various security environments? Are our
institutions—be they states, coalitions of the willing, international organizations, or
NGOs—capable of creating and implementing a peacemaking strategy? All these
questions are addressed in this new volume.
Source: Zartman, W, and Touval, S., 2007, ‗International Mediation.‘ In Crocker,
Chester, Osler Hampson, Fen. and Aall, Pamela. (eds.) Leashing the Dogs of War:
Conflict Management in a Divided World, US Institute of Peace, pp. 437-454.
160
2. Understanding Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
Core readings
Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?
M Barnett and H Kim (2007)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
How is peacebuilding interpreted in meaning and practice? To what extent has it been
institutionalised? Peacebuilding is generically defined as external interventions
designed to prevent armed conflict. This article, published in Global Governance,
surveys twenty-four governmental and intergovernmental bodies that are active in
peacebuilding. It analyses how they conceptualise and operationalise their
peacebuilding mandate, along with mapping areas of potential concern. It finds that
most programmes have focused on the immediate or underlying causes of conflict, to
the relative neglect of state institutions.
Peacebuilding is increasingly institutionalised across the international landscape. An
impressive number of organisations use the concept to frame and organise their post-
conflict activities. However, there are critical differences among actors regarding the
conceptualisation and operationalisation of peacebuilding. There are even greater
divisions regarding the specific approaches that may achieve it.
Different agencies use a wide variety of terms related to but not necessarily
synonymous with peacebuilding. Some use the same term, peacebuilding, in slightly
different ways:
Different groupings clearly emerge: the United Nations (UN) Secretariat, UN
specialised agencies, European organisations and member states.
Although there are various reasons for differing priorities, organisational
mandates and networks are important parts of the explanation. This will heavily
influence an organisation‘s reception to, definition and revision of the concept
of peacebuilding.
Organisations are nested in structured relationships; those that are linked have
tended to converge on a consensus definition.
Different interpretations over the operationalisation of peacebuilding lead to
different strategies and priorities. The growing number of international
structures whose mandates include peacebuilding might easily mask essential
differences regarding the concept‘s meaning and practice.
There are three dimensions of post-conflict peacebuilding: stability creation;
restoration of state institutions; and addressing the socioeconomic dimensions of
conflict. To date there has been more focus on the kind of the state (the organising
principles that structure the relationship between state and society) being built, than the
degree of the state (its capacity to control society):
Some have argued in favour of a more sequenced and strategic peacebuilding
project that emphasises the establishment of security and stable institutions
before seeking liberalisation and democracy.
Agencies must focus more on creating state institutions that can deliver basic
public goods in an equitable manner. Although the state is not the only
161
institution that underpins stability, pursuing peacebuilding without an
institutional foundation is a recipe for failure.
How peacebuilding is implemented must be settled by recipient states
themselves, with support from international actors, rather than by bureaucratic
and political power.
Much of the interest in peacebuilding is at the level of rhetoric rather than
resources. There is a danger that it receives little meaningful financial and
political support relative to the costs of renewed conflict.
The proposed UN Peacebuilding Commission is mandated to help coordinate
the post conflict activities of relevant agencies. This is likely to both improve
the implementation of peacebuilding activities and clarify differences among
agencies.
Scholars and policymakers need to monitor which version of peacebuilding is
being institutionalised and ensure that alternative understandings are kept alive
to enable reasoned choices.
Source: Barnett, M., Kim, H., O'Donnell, M., and Sitea, L., 2007, 'Peacebuilding: What
is in a Name?', Global Governance, 13, pp. 35-38
Ending Wars and Building Peace
C Call and E Cousens (2007)
Access full text online
Summary
How effective are international efforts to build peace? This paper, published by the
International Peace Academy, assesses the status of international peace efforts and
highlights chronic weaknesses in peacekeeping processes. In recent years, international
and bi-lateral institutions have made efforts to fine-tune their peacebuilding processes.
However, systemic issues of international political will and attention, resource
allocation and a failure to recognise local contexts continue to affect the ability of
international and national actors to establish enduring peace.
Peacebuilding is defined as those actions undertaken by international or national actors
to institutionalise peace and a modicum of participatory politics that can be sustained
in the absence of an international peace operation.
While the number and intensity of wars has declined by roughly half since 1990,
between one-third and one-half of all ended conflicts revert to war within five years.
While there is increasing evidence that international involvement can be an important
factor in preventing recurrence of war, this evidence is correlative rather than causal.
The United Nations, international financial institutions and bi-lateral donors now
recognise that the intricacies of peacebuilding policies, planning and implementation
materially affect both the possibility of success and the cost of the failure of
peacebuilding. There has been a recent series of reform efforts to improve
peacebuilding apparatus.
However, both experience and scholarship point to a series of chronic problems in
international peace efforts, including the issue of state-building as an integral part of
peacebuilding. Whether external actors currently have the knowledge, tools, resources
or legitimacy to contribute to state-building is central to the question of the efficacy of
international peacebuilding.
Other problems include:
162
Will and attention: Peacebuilding efforts often suffer from short-lived, crisis-
driven attention spans and are prone to weaken in the medium-term, two to
three years after the ending of hostilities.
More adequate, flexible resources: International institutions and bilateral
donors have recently improved their allocation procedures for financial and
human resources; however, their budget processes are still slow and lack
flexibility. Inter-agency and departmental stovepipes within institutions cause
difficulties in prioritising among competing needs and adequately sequencing
international involvement.
Gaps in civilian capacity: While peacebuilding requires civilian expertise in
critical functional areas, local capacity is still largely inadequate.
Gaps in contextual knowledge: External actors generally do not recognise the
importance of country contexts. They tend not to engage local experts
knowledgeable about culture and context in programme planning and
implementation.
Evaluating state capacity, legitimacy and effectiveness: It is difficult for
international actors to develop reliable indicators of state effectiveness and
citizen polls to measure state legitimacy.
The future effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts will depend on whether the current
trend of decreasing armed conflict continues. An increase in proxy wars against
terrorists and other armed conflicts will fuel the demand for more peacebuilding efforts
occurring simultaneously.
Given the present status of peacebuilding policies and programmes, it is not at all clear
that we are anywhere close to having international policy machinery or instruments
that can reliably handle multiple high-profile peacebuilding operations successfully.
Source: Call, C.T., E.M. Cousens, 2007, 'Ending Wars and Building Peace?', Working
with Crisis Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy, New York
Has Peacebuilding Made a Difference in Kosovo? A Study of Peacebuilding and
the March 2004 Riots
D Chigas (2006)
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Summary
Did deficiencies in peacebuilding programmes contribute to the March 2004 riots in
Kosovo? This paper, published by Care International and CDA Collaborative Learning
Projects, reports on a study conducted in the aftermath of the riots to determine any
peacebuilding programme gaps that inadvertently contributed to the recurrence of
violence. While the riots should not be the only benchmark for assessing peacebuilding
in Kosovo, peacebuilding programmes need to re-consider their heavy focus on multi-
ethnicity as the core of their strategy.
While Kosovo embarked on a period of relative calm in the aftermath of the 1998-1999
civil war, heightened tensions continued between the Albanian and Serb populations.
In 2004, the combination of ethnic tensions, high unemployment and frustration over
delays in defining the status of Kosovo Albanians resulted in a four days of riots. The
violence resulted in 19 dead, 900 wounded and extensive destruction of property.
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International peacebuilding missions have been very active in Kosovo for several
years, implementing programmes in inter-ethnic dialogue, peace education, multi-
ethnic projects and institutions, democratic governance and capacity-building and the
media.
The following findings indicate that peacebuilding programmes did not contribute
significantly to prevention of inter-ethnic violence and missed the mark in a number of
programme areas:
Perceptions of improvements in inter-ethnic violence from 2002-2004 masked
the reality of a steady level of inter-ethnic violence during that time.
Contrary to expectations, communities with greater inter-ethnic contact,
whether in the form of business/economic ties or personal relationships, did not
experience less violence.
Intra-ethnic social networks were more important than inter-ethnic engagement
in preventing violence.
Peacebuilding programmes did not address key driving factors of conflict
and failed to transform individual ties into networks of civic engagement.
Rather than improving relations, the heavy peacebuilding focus on multi-
ethnicity and the returning Kosovo Albanians increased ethnic divisions.
Mono-ethnic areas of Kosovo, considered to be more extreme politically, did
not receive the same levels of assistance as more mixed areas.
Programmes did not engage many key people and areas and did not focus on
the ―hard to reach‖ population.
As Kosovo Albanians and Serbs continue to struggle to find ways to coexist,
peacebuilding programmes assisting them should consider the following
recommendations for revised strategies:
Shift programme focus. Re-think the attention currently paid to multi-ethnicity
and refugees and internally displaced persons, even while maintaining the
pursuit of democracy and European standards as a strong goal.
Deal directly with driving forces of conflict and identify ways to deal more
directly with political issues. This work would enhance the impact of work on
inter-ethnic tension in the medium-term, if not in the short-term.
Re-consider the targeting of areas and programme beneficiaries. Focus not on
targeting the ―easy to reach‖ people, but on facilitating their evolution into a
peace constituency. Identify innovators and informal leaders in communities
and target the ―hard to reach‖.
Transform individual ties into networks of inter-ethnic engagement that can
proactively resist violence. A critical mass of young people exists that can be
mobilised for violence. Develop a strategy that turns individual ties into
meaningful ―bridging social capital‖ that provides a counterforce.
Work with intra-ethnic networks on conflict issues. Intra-ethnic networks of
trust and reciprocity are likely to be more important than inter-ethnic relations
in preventing and mitigating violence.
Source: Chigas, D. et al., 2006, 'Has Peacebuilding Made a Difference in Kosovo? A
Study of Peacebuilding and the March 2004 Riots', CARE International and CDA-
Collaborative Learning Projects, Pristina
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Contemporary Conflict Resolution Applications
L Kriesberg (2007)
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Summary
What are conflict resolution (CR) strategies and how do they benefit those involved in
wars? This chapter looks at the expanding field of CR in recent decades. CR offers
many strategies that are relevant for combatants as well as for the intermediaries trying
to mitigate destructive conflicts. CR ideas are increasingly influential and new
developments are largely a response to the changing international environment.
However, they are still insufficiently understood and utilised.
Conflict resolution is an area with a diverse range of practice, theory and research. In
the late 1970s the CR field was focused on negotiation and mediation. Practitioners
and theorists applied the CR approach to a variety of organisational, community and
national disputes. As CR workers turned to civil and international wars they gave
attention to ways in which intermediaries and partisans can reduce the intensity of
conflict and move towards negotiations for an agreement. In the later years of the Cold
War, attention was given to interrupting or avoiding destruction escalation, which
included enhancing crisis management systems. Recently, attention has been paid to
fostering constructive escalation and conflict transformation, for example in public
demonstrations to oust an authoritarian government. A major area of CR expansion is
aiding reconciliation between former enemies.
Although there is not a consensus about ideas and practices of CR, there are some
shared understandings about analysing conflicts and about how to wage or intervene in
them so as to minimise their adverse consequences and maximise their benefits.
Conflicts are inevitable in social life and often serve to advance and sustain
important human values including security, freedom and economic well-being.
Conflicts can become destructive of the values that they are trying to further.
Partisans blame each other for the bad things that happen in a conflict,
including their own conduct. Such self-victimisation reduces the ways to resist
the antagonists‘ attacks.
A conflict needs to be analysed to ensure that CR policies will be effective.
There needs to be information about the stakeholders‘ interests as well as
theoretical analysis.
The social construction of parties to a conflict is not as homogenous as might
appear. Adversaries wage conflicts within a larger social context. Intermediary
efforts can be initiated with subgroups.
Conflicts are waged by a mixture of coercive and noncoercive inducements.
Recent global developments, including the end of the Cold War, the impact of
technology on war-making and the role of non-state transnational actors, have changed
the nature of CR applications.
Collective engagement by outside parties which are seen to be legitimate is
crucial in averting destructive conflicts.
Multilateral agreements to reduce the availability of weapons to groups who
might use them in societal or international wars are important. Governments‘
unwillingness to sign such agreements should be addressed.
Acts by leaders of one side directed at leaders of the other side are particularly
important in the context of rapidly increasing channels of mass and
interpersonal communication.
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Attention should be paid to this new information and a high priority given to
responding to it.
To bring a destructive conflict to an agreed end, the adversaries need to believe
that peace will offer more than war.
Institutions and the rule of law are needed to implement and sustain
agreements.
Kriesberg, L., 2007, 'Contemporary Conflict Resolution Applications' in Crocker, C.,
Hampson, F. O., and All, P. (eds), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in
a Divided World, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, pp. 455-476
Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies
J Lederarch (1997)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
How can peacebuilding adapt to the realities and dilemmas posed by contemporary
conflicts? This United States Institute of Peace Press article argues that building peace
requires a comprehensive approach. It provides strategic and practical approaches to
peacebuilding that help establish an infrastructure for sustainable transformation and
which take seriously the immediate and deep-rooted needs of divided societies.
Peacebuilding faces systemic issues of how to deal with the production, transfer, and
ready availability of weapons for war making, which fuel and make possible an
extraordinary level of armed violence. For the most part, these are internal conflicts,
built around identity groups and often characterised as ethnic and/or religious in
nature. These are truly deep-rooted conflicts, which for us pose two central questions:
What conceptual framework is most useful for dealing with the structural and
psychological nature of contemporary conflict? What practical approaches and
activities have the greatest potential for moving these conflicts towards peaceful
outcomes? The answer might well lie in the development of a comprehensive,
integrative, and strategic approach to the transformation of conflict.
This approach is built on a conceptual framework composed of an
interdependent set of perspectives and activities identified as structure, process,
reconciliation, resources and coordination.
Structure is concerned with the systemic elements of how one approaches a
setting of protracted conflict.
Process brings into focus the long-term nature of the progression of conflict.
Reconciliation stresses that relationship, in its full range of psychological
dimensions, is central to transformation.
Resource focuses on the fact that although financial support is necessary, more
important is the development of new ways of thinking about categories,
responsibilities, and strategic commitment to peacebuilding.
Coordination emphasises the need to have specific mechanisms whereby the
above four components can intersect, interact, and cross-fertilise.
Several basics proposals lie at the heart of the framework and argument presented here:
The nature of contemporary conflict requires the development of theories and
praxis of the ‗middle ranges‘. Middle-range actors have the capacity to impact
processes and people at both the top and the grassroots levels. If mobilised
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strategically for peacebuilding, middle-range leaders could lay the foundation for
long-term, sustainable conflict transformation.
There is a need for ‗subsystem‘ strategies that link immediate issues within the
setting to the broader systemic dynamics within which the particular conflict
unfolds. The systemic issues must not be ignored but we cannot tackle these macro
issues from the sanctuary of intellectual discussion and broad international policy
statements.
Reconciliation is a central component of dealing with contemporary conflict and
reconstructing divided societies. Reconciliation provides a focus and a locus
appropriate to every stage of peacebuilding and is instrumental in reframing the
conflict and the energies driving the conflict.
Innovation is needed in approaching the core nature of deep-rooted conflict in
divided societies. To rebuild relationships, we must develop innovative ways of
providing space within which the emotional and psychological aspects of the
conflict can be addressed.
Coordination must be a central component in the effective implementation of a
comprehensive peacebuilding strategy and in the building of an infrastructure for
peace. This calls for not only an understanding of the larger challenge but also an
acknowledgement of the need for a multiplicity of roles, for multiple levels of
activity, and for diverse strategies and approaches.
Source: Lederach, J.P., 1997, ‗Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided
Societies‘, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press
At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict
J Lederach
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Summary
What is the relationship between liberalisation, institution building and peace in
countries that are just emerging from civil conflict. This study, from Colorado
University, examines the theoretical foundations of peacebuilding as a way of
diagnosing the practical problems in international operations between 1989 and 1999.
The study argues that while peacebuilders should preserve the broad goal of converting
war-shattered states into liberal market democracies, peacebuilding strategies need to
build effective institutions before liberalisation takes place.
The idea of peacebuilding, which emerged at the end of the 1980s, is based on the
belief that promoting liberalisation in countries that have experienced civil war creates
the conditions for a lasting peace. Democratisation is expected to shift societal
conflicts away from the battlefield into electoral politics. Between 1989 and 1990,
fourteen major peacebuilding operations were deployed. They all sought to build
liberal market democracies as quickly as possible. In all but three cases (Angola,
Rwanda and Liberia) large scale conflict has not resumed. However, the strategy of
political and economic liberalisation has increased the likelihood of renewed violence
in several of these states.
While there is evidence that well-established market democracies are less subject to
internal violence than other types of states, it appears that the transition from civil
conflict to a well-established market democracy makes a state particularly prone to
violence. Promoting democratisation and marketisation has the potential to stimulate
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higher levels of societal competition at a time when states are least equipped to contain
such tensions within peaceful bounds.
What is needed is a new type of peacebuilding strategy that begins from the premise
that democratisation and marketisation are inherently tumultuous transformations that
have the potential to undermine a fragile peace. The new strategy would minimise the
destabilising effects of liberalisation in several ways. Peacebuilders would:
Not immediately unleash political and economic competition
Not organise quick elections or economic ‗shock therapy‘
Manage the democratisation and marketisation process as a series of
incremental and deliberate steps
Delay the introduction of democratic and market reforms until a rudimentary
network of domestic institutions has been established
Immediately start building governmental institutions that can manage the
political and economic reforms.
This strategy may appear costly, time-consuming and anti-democratic. However:
The higher expense and longer duration must be weighed against the costs in
human lives and material resources that would follow a recurrence of large-
scale violence
If the strategy appears to delay the liberalisation of political and economic life,
it will achieve more durable peace in the long term
Implementing liberalisation too quickly, in the absence of effect institutions,
can counteract efforts to consolidate peace.
Source: Paris, R., 2004, ‗At War‘s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict‘,
Cambridge University Press, chapters 1 (pp. 13-39), 2 (pp. 40-51), 9 (pp. 151-178),
and 10 (pp. 179-211)
Constructing Sovereignty for Security
B Rubin (2005)
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Summary
Fragmentation and rivalry in the donor community constitutes as big an obstacle to
peacebuilding as divisions in war-torn countries. Would the creation of a multilateral
decision-making body as a counterpart for governments receiving aid help
international state-building efforts? This paper from the International Institute for
Strategic Studies supports the establishment of an inter-governmental Peacebuilding
Commission to oversee UN operations to rebuild states after conflict. This would
provide a useful institutional framework and deliver aid in ways that are accountable to
the global community and to reconstructed countries‘ citizens.
For centuries, stronger powers have intervened to establish politically acceptable forms
of order. The generalisation of the sovereign nation-state and the UN system has
altered the environment for latter-day state builders. While they may have differing
motivations, all face the problem of maintaining order and security in an increasingly
integrated global system. Operations must provide aid, war fighting, peacekeeping,
economic and democratic assistance, often without a coherent strategy. The
Peacebuilding Commission proposed by the UN Secretary-General‘s High-Level Panel
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on Threats, Challenges and Change would exercise authority over a Peacebuilding
Fund. This would be kept replenished in advance of operations and contain
unearmarked contributions. A Peacebuilding Support Office within the UN secretariat
would support the commission.
State formation consists of the interdependent mobilisation of three types of resources:
Coercion: The sovereign wields coercion, hopefully in the form of security
institutions, to exercise force over a territory. Key tasks in rebuilding a state
include dismantling irregular militias and building new security forces to enable
the state to exercise that coercion.
Capital: The acumulation of capital is needed to produce income to fund state
functions and services. Economic development, capital accumulation, revenue
collection and the suppression of untaxable, parallel economies all require
effective security forces. Strengthening fiscal capacity and protecting property
rights are also important.
Legitimacy: Symbolic and cultural resources legitimise the use of force and
induce people to comply voluntarily as citizens. State building operations aim to
make states more effective agents of control over their own territories. The
problem of ‗dual legitimacy‘ refers to whether this control is exercised by states
as sovereigns, or whether it is the result of external interests.
Implications relate to the politics of state-building:
Studies of state-building operations often try to identify ‗best practices‘ without
asking for whom they are best. Nonetheless, where goals are interdependent,
negotiation may lead to convergence among actors with different motivations.
The concepts of ‗exit strategy‘ and ‗sustainability‘ may converge in a mission to
build a legitimate and capable state. This requires transitional governance
institutions to establish an institutional framework for political contestation and
rule.
The Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Support Office and
Peacebuilding Fund proposed by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change would provide such a framework.
The commission and Peace Building Support Office will also have to develop
appropriate strategic and operational doctrines for post-conflict state-building.
If donors and troop contributors treat the Peacebuilding Commission as just
another avenue for aid, it will not serve its purpose. Donor countries will better
serve their own needs by giving aid in ways that are more accountable to the
global community and the reconstructed country‘s citizens.
Source: Rubin, B.R., 2005, 'Constructing Sovereignty for Security', Survival, 47(4), pp.
93-106, Routledge, London
Reconstruction as Modernization: The Post-conflict Project in Afghanistan
A Suhrke (2007)
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Summary
How successful has the recent post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan been in the light
of historical experiences of similar reforms? This Third World Quarterly article argues
that the conflation of post war reconstruction with a broader agenda for development
and modernisation has brought out a wide range of tensions associated with social
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change. The entire project shows signs of severe contradictions that are adding to the
problems caused by the growing insurgency.
The framework for the post-Taliban reconstruction project was laid down in the UN-
sponsored Bonn Agreement of December 2001. The document contained all the main
elements of modernity as commonly understood – from the Weberian-type state to
more recent additions of social justice and women‘s rights.
Previous reform attempts had several implications for this new reconstruction project.
King Amanullah‘s reforms in the 1920s showed the importance of not overloading the
modernist agenda in relation to the coalition carrying it. President Daoud‘s reforms in
the seventies showed the importance of not excluding potential rebels from the
political arena. Finally, the experience of the People‘s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA) from 1978 showed that foreign forces should not be allowed to
lead the war against a militant opposition.
These lessons seem to be casting a growing shadow over the present reconstruction-
cum-modernisation project:
The transnational modernising coalition is divided by different interests,
priorities and conflicting principles of legitimacy. It has a narrow Afghan base,
and the international component is huge and unwieldy (with some 60 countries
providing foreign aid, and 37 governments assisting in some military capacity
or other).
Among the Afghans several foci of contestation emerged. The most
fundamental challenge came from the militant Islamists – the Taliban and their
supporters – who opposed the entire project.
Another set of conflicts centred on the state-building agenda, which called for
change with respect to key areas of state power: revenue collection, the armed
forces, public administration and control over the illegal opium economy.
The reform agenda also raised hopes and fears, expectation and resistance in the
social and legal arena. Different visions of the good society collided and merged
with deep-seated power struggles, with women and social mores appearing as
emblematic issues.
Resistance to the Western-backed modernisation project could mobilise political
support by drawing on the discontent generated by the failure of the post war
project to bring rapid peace, order and prosperity.
How does the present modernisation project score in relation to the lessons from
previous modernisers?
Amanullah‘s experience has been forgotten as the present ambitious agenda
stands in sharp contrast to the fractious coalition on which it rests. The most
obvious result is a highly conflictual policy process with limited results.
The government has been more attentive to the lesson from Daoud. However,
the more President Karzai tried to co-opt potential rivals in the state
administration, the more he alienated members of his modernist coalition, who
advocated Weberian merit-based criteria for appointment.
In its most radical form, an inclusive policy would mean trying to strike a deal
with the Taliban. This has been impossible because the government, like the
PDPA before it, could not prevent foreign forces from fighting a war on Afghan
soil. The Taliban and al-Qaida are the enemy in a larger US-led war on terror,
and Washington has refused to negotiate.
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Source: Suhrke, A., 2007, 'Reconstruction as Modernization: The Post-conflict Project
in Afghanistan?, Third World Quarterly, 28:7, pp. 1291-1308
Supplementary readings
The Coherence of Democratic Peace-building
P Burnell (2006)
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Abstract
Recent attention has focused on the difficulties of establishing ‗coherence‘ between
humanitarian relief aid in complex emergencies and the objective of ending violent
conflict. This paper introduces a parallel problem: absence of total synergy between
making peace and building democracy. A widely held assumption in the international
community is that in post-conflict situations peace-building and democratization are
virtually synonymous; creating the conditions for the one does so for both, the two
processes will be reciprocal and mutually supportive. This suggests the policy issues
will be simple. But the reality could be very different. Choices have to be addressed
between requisites for peace and conditions for democracy; over the different
implications for peace of competing designs for democracy; and over the kind of
‗democracy‘ and its relation to other essential developments like state-building.
Source: Burnell, P., 2006, ‗The Coherence of Democratic Peace-building‘, Research
Paper No. 2006/147, Helsinki: UNU/WIDER.
Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War, the State and the ‘Post-Conflict’
Challenge in Afghanistan
C Cramer and J Goodhand (2002)
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Summary
Peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan require a significant expansion of
institutionalised economic interdependence. This must build on existing patterns of
interdependence, despite these being forged in a war economy. The article argues that
an effective, centralised state, with a clear monopoly of violence, is necessary. This
argument challenges standard international policy paradigms of reconstruction and
points to an alternative basis for international engagement in Afghanistan.
The article is part of a special issue of the journal Development and Change, entitled
State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction. Engaging the dynamics of war economies
is an important part of post-conflict reconstruction. There is a common belief that in
modern post-conflict situations appropriate economic development policies can
consolidate peace, based in part on the enhanced economic interdependence amongst
states in Europe after World War II. Underlying issues of structural change and capital
accumulation are often neglected, although war is the most common form of
contemporary capital accumulation: a centralised state is required to protect the poor
and structurally transform this primitive form of accumulation. While liberal
interpretations of war assume that its effects are always negative, other alternatives
emphasise the vibrancy of wartime entrepreneurship and spawning of new economic
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sectors. In analysing contemporary conflict, it is useful to remember that state
formation in Europe involved periods of protracted violence.
The article explores the role of centralised authority and state in the history of
Afghanistan, from the tribal confederacy of 1747 to present day, including the
incorporation of parts of Afghanistan in a ‗regional conflict complex‘: three themes
stand out:
The history of statehood reveals a non-linear trajectory of ‗punctuated
equilibrium‘.
Various state-builders have failed to sustain a monopoly of violence, to develop
wealth and welfare, to develop forms of representation and to develop
legitimacy (whether through tribalism, Islam or nationalism).
International aid has played an ambiguous or detrimental role with respect to
Afghan state formation.
The article appeals to international interveners to reflect on the history of state
formation in Afghanistan to avoid actions that lead to the repetition of existing
patterns:
A minimal liberal state is an inappropriate model, as is the common
compromise policy of promoting decentralised local governance structures.
The creation of a centralised, credible and effective state in Afghanistan is a
political, not a technical or capacity-building activity. The state must have
control over violence, and be able to make fiscal, regulatory and allocation
decisions.
Governance institutions must reflect and manage conflicting Afghan political
incentives. Political legitimacy is crucial: a key source of this is economic
growth, through an institutionalised expansion of economic interdependence.
A new role for the international community as international guarantor for the
Afghan state in the context of regionalised conflict, via strong United States
backing for the United Nations.
International aid must avoid discouraging the establishment of reciprocal
relations between the new state and its various interest groups.
Source: Cramer, C. and Goodhand, J., 2002, 'Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War,
the State and the "Post-Conflict" Challenge in Afghanistan', Development and Change,
vol. 33, no. 5, pp.885-909.
Transitional Governance: From Bullets to Ballots
DeGrasse, B.C., and C. Caan (2006)
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Abstract
Effective transitional governance is one of the most formidable challenges facing
reconstruction and stabilization missions in war-torn, failed states. Peace can be
sustained only when power is attained through political rather than violent means and
when government institutions are legitimate. Despite numerous interventions around
the world, establishing governance has too often been an elusive goal or an ephemeral
achievement. Attaining this objective can involve prolonging the intervention, as was
done in Bosnia, or repeating the intervention, as was done in Haiti. When the objective
to establish governance fails, the entire mission may collapse, as it did in Somalia. By
attending to the governance lessons from the past decade and a half, intervenors can
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identify and incorporate best practices into the planning and conduct of interventions to
help societies move from bullets to ballots effectively and expeditiously.
Source: DeGrasse, B.C., and C. Caan., 2006, Transitional Governance: From Bullets to
Ballots, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C
The John W. Holmes Lecture: Building Peace
M Doyle (2007)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
This article focuses on the strategies adopted by the United Nations (UN) in order to
achieve its success in building peace. The strategies include peacemaking,
peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement. The policy of multilateralism
adopted by the UN also contributes significantly to its success in fostering self-
sustaining peace. It is to be noted that the above-mentioned strategies reinforce the
other in a successful combination.
Source: Doyle, M.W., 2007, ‗The John W. Holmes Lecture: Building Peace‘, Global
Governance, 13 #1, pp. 1-15
Closing the Sovereignty Gap: an Approach to State-Building
A Ghani, C. Lockhart and M. Carnahan (2005)
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Abstract
The first section of this paper delineates a framework which proposes a set of core
functions that a sovereign state must perform in the modern world. This functional
delineation provides a framework for the calculation of a sovereignty index through
which the sovereignty gap can be measured in a tractable fashion. Once this more
quantitative framework is in place, the progress of or decline in state capabilities to
perform each function severally as well as collectively can be assessed. Moreover, the
index would also allow an overall assessment to be made of whether the multiplicity of
interventions by a wide array of international actors is closing or widening the
sovereignty gap.
The second section of the paper outlines some of the constraints that exist in the
current international system. Mindful of these constraints, the paper then proposes a
reorientation of the international community‘s approach to fragile states through the
introduction of state-building or sovereignty strategies.
Source: Ghani, A., C. Lockhart, and M. Carnahan, 2005, ‗Closing the Sovereignty
Gap: an Approach to State-Building‘, Working Paper 253, Overseas Development
Institute, London
173
The International Community and State Reconstruction in War-torn Societies
R Luckham (2004)
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Summary
What are the problems of state-reconstruction in war-torn societies? This paper from
the Journal of Conflict, Security and Development, examines the role of international
actors in the hugely ambitious project of rebuilding states after war.
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, political stabilisation of the developing world has
become a security issue for Western Countries. Donors are now adopting more
interventionist policies towards state reconstruction. War is endemic in the developing
world. The roots of many conflicts go back decades, and there is a tendency for them
to re-ignite or perpetuate themselves over the long term.
"New" wars are more destructive to development and result in more civilian casualties
than previous Cold War conflicts. State collapse leads to a governance void, "the rule
of unlaw", and "societies of fear". This makes it difficult to reconstruct the state or
build peace. The traditional linear model of conflict progression as pre-, during, and
post-conflict, with attendant progression from relief to reconstruction and
development, is too simplistic. In reality, conflicts are more complex:
The role of the state varies enormously. Conflicts can be in response to
repressive regimes (Sudan), democratic governments that exclude minorities
(Sri Lanka), or be regional violence that infects "good" governments (Caucasus,
African Great Lakes).
Governance breakdown can be a result of conflict (DRC), or a cause of conflict
(Somalia).
Most conflicts do not "end". The political, social, and economic factors
sustaining them remain. Violence often continues after ceasefire in the form of
crime.
Governance failings contribute to violence. War, and its legacies, creates new political
realities. Reconstruction cannot therefore be a reconstitution of the state in its pre-
conflict form. Donors need to engage with different layers of political authority above
and below the state as well as rebuild central government. All forms of intervention
need continual interrogation of underlying moral and political principles. The
international community must also learn from previous errors. Furthermore:
Multilateral interventions are less likely to serve special interests than unilateral
ones, and are more likely to be perceived as legitimate.
If unilateral interventions are undertaken, they must be defensible on general
principles, and enjoy the consent of national stakeholders.
Peace agreements, reconstruction plans and constitutions need to emerge from
national stakeholders, not imposed by external actors. Peacemakers impose
plans surprisingly often.
There needs to be a better understanding of the trajectories, causes and impacts
of conflict, and an awareness of how they might re-ignite.
It is very difficult to devise broadly applicable good practice models. Rather,
there tend to be difficult choices to be made between potentially conflicting
goals. For example, security first versus popular consent and electoral
legitimacy.
Further choices include development and global justice versus global security
concerns or power sharing versus an effective developmental state.
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Such choices are as much political as technical options, and have to be
negotiated in each particular national context.
Source: Luckham, R., 2004, 'The International Community and State Reconstruction in
War-torn Societies', Chapter 1 in After Intervention: Public Security Management in
Post-Conflict Societies: From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership, Geneva
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva
Aiding the State? International Assistance and the Statebuilding Paradox in
Afghanistan
H Nixon (2007)
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Summary
How can a sustainable, legitimate and effective state be established in Afghanistan?
As it moves from a transitional framework to a longer-term development framework,
insurgency, opium and popular discontent threaten to undermine progress and further
destabilise the country. This paper from the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
(AREU) argues that while these threats require short-term action, sustainable solutions
depend on improved governance, which in turn requires realistic statebuilding goals.
Aid dependence, donor-driven assistance, limited state control over resources and
budget assistance all present difficulties for statebuilding in Afghanistan.
Statebuilding invlolves a transition from working around the weak state to working
with and through it as it strengthens. It requires taking decisions about collective goals
and must be led by the recipient society itself to be effective. Statebuilding also
requires managing the complex relationship between assistance and long-term
measures on one hand, and aid dependency and short-term measures on the other - the
‗statebuilding paradox‘. The relative failure to date of governance programmes to
strengthen and improve the capacity of the state is in part due to conflicts between
short-term political agendas and long-term statebuilding processes.
The relationship between statebuilding and international assistance in Afghanistan is
affected by the quantity, delivery and effectiveness of aid:
Aid quantity and direction has been largely determined outside Afghanistan,
limiting the country‘s ability to set priorities and weakening accountability and
incentives to reform.
The bulk of assistance has been delivered outside government control, through
the External Budget. Channelling more money through the Afghan treasury (the
Core Budget) would enable more effective accounting, co-ordination and
spending prioritisation.
Low and uneven government spending has resulted from planning and
implementation difficulties, overestimation and aid bottlenecks. Channelling
development money through the Core Budget presents the risk of unspent funds.
Unclear, inefficient and harmful External Budget assistance weakens the state‘s
capacity to retain qualified personnel and dilutes upwards and downwards
accountability.
Statebuilding assistance has further suffered from early reliance on pillars in
security sector reform, slow progress in public administration reforms,
inadequate subnational spending and conflicting short-term political and long-
term statebuilding agendas.
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Whilst the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) and the
Afghanistan Compact represent an important shift toward a comprehensive and
strategic approach to security, development and governance, important issues still
require attention:
Strategies should be aligned with a realistic long-term state building agenda
incorporating more concern for fiscal sustainability and the interactions between
short- and long-term measures.
Actors should seek an appropriate and aligned balance of Core and External
Budget resources for public goods and service provision.
They should improve efforts to locate, build and transfer human capacity and
improve social accountability.
The Afghan government should prioritise the development of the full ANDS,
using the development of sector strategies as an anchor for this process.
The government should elaborate the sub-national governance strategy and
strengthen communication strategies within the state and between the state and
citizens.
Donors should increase Core Budget support, contribute to state capacity
development, improve External Budget by identifying the most effective
mechanisms and improve reporting. They should also explore ways to increase
multi-year commitments, both by examining their own procedures and using
multi-lateral channels.
Nixon, H., 2007, 'Aiding the State? International Assistance and the Statebuilding
Paradox in Afghanistan', AREU Briefing Paper, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation
Unit, Afghanistan.
Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States
M Ottaway (2002)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
Is institution building the best way of reconstructing collapsed states? What can be
done to avert failure in reconstruction efforts? This paper by the Democracy and Rule
of Law Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace critiques the model of
state reconstruction currently adopted by the international community.
Multilateral organisations and bilateral donors have embraced an unprecedented
approach to collapsed states. Historically, such states simply disappeared through
conquest or dissolution. Now, war-torn states are expected to be rebuilt as functioning,
strong democracies within the same international borders through the intervention of
the international community. This external model of reconstruction rests on building
institutions which promote stability through checking the exercise of power. It is
contrasted with an internal model, where domestic actors produce change and which
hinges on re-establishing power.
External reconstruction is an attempted short-cut to democracy. Internal reconstruction
is closer to a historical process. It has no blueprint, and is less researched. Some
weaknesses of institution building for reconstruction are:
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The issue of power is unresolved. Newly developed institutions do not generate
authority and cannot curb the power of political factions. Elections achieve little
against entrenched power.
In practice donors are setting up organisations, not institutions. The usual targets
of donor efforts (parliament, judiciary, electoral bodies and so on) need setting
up afresh, and are not socially embedded.
Donors think in terms of transplanting best practices, not in terms of finding
solutions to locally perceived problems.
Institution building is usually undertaken prematurely. Donor requirements for
new institutions can be too demanding.
External actors often withdraw their power too soon. This removes the support
that buttresses fledgling institutions, resulting in failure.
Institutional solutions fail easily when countries are in the initial stages of emerging
from conflict. Donors must be prepared to make huge, sustained commitments backed
up by the threat of force to coerce factions to accept imposed best practices (Bosnia,
Kosovo). Neglect is a false economy, and will eventually cost the population (Rwanda)
or the international community (Somalia). Institution building is a good mechanism for
ensuring long term stability, and can work if donors:
Create mechanisms for generating power and authority before they begin to
build institutions. The use of force always plays a role in the restoration of
authority in collapsed states.
Set modest targets to avoid weakening fragile states by demanding too much too
soon.
Do not promote best practices prematurely, because they can become obstacles
to politically viable solutions.
Are careful not to encourage the institutionalisation of transitional, emergency
practices, as has happened in Rwanda with popular courts.
Source: Ottaway, M., 2002, ‗Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States‘,
Development and Change, vol. 33, no. 5
Short-term and Long-term Effects of United Nations Peace Operations
N Sambanis (2007)
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Abstract
Earlier studies have shown that United Nations peace operations make a positive
contribution to peacebuilding efforts after civil wars. But do these effects carry over to
the period after the peacekeepers leave? And how do the effects of UN peace
operations interact with other determinants of peacebuilding in the long run? The
author addresses these questions using a revised version of the Doyle and Sambanis
dataset and applying different estimation methods to estimate the short-term and long-
term effects of UN peace missions. He finds that UN missions have robust, positive
effects on peacebuilding in the short term. UN missions can help parties implement
peace agreements but the UN cannot fight wars, and UN operations contribute more to
the quality of the peace where peace is based on participation, than to the longevity of
the peace, where peace is simply the absence of war. The effects of UN missions are
also felt in the long run, but they dissipate over time. What is missing in UN
peacebuilding is a strategy to foster the self-sustaining economic growth that could
connect increased participation with sustainable peace.
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Source: Sambanis, N. 2007. The Long- and Short-term Effects of UN Peace
Operations. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, Washington
The Logic of Conflictual Peacebuilding
A Suhrke (2005)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
What have been the experiences and lessons learned from reconstruction activities
which have followed wars over the past ten years? With recent events both in
Afghanistan and Iraq and frequent talk of on-going conflicts, this question has
preoccupied politicians, aid donors and the media as never before. After the Conflict
draws together the main issues and arguments on the subject into a single volume
emanating from the University of York's Post-war Reconstruction and Development
Unit (PRDU), renowned as the world's leading research center dedicated to the study
of the aftermath of war. Examining case studies from war and post-war reconstruction
scenarios around the world the book sets out a philosophy of reconstruction that has
emerged from extensive original research at PRDU, showing that solutions to
successful post-war reconstruction must be found locally, within the communities
affected by conflict rather than being imposed from outside, however well-meaning the
interventions. Other key insights include the need to understand the root causes of
different conflicts and the importance of fully integrated approaches, which harness the
skills of a broad range of professional disciplines. After the Conflict will prove an
invaluable resource for students of post-war recovery, conflict studies, development
economics as well as to academics, practitioners, aid managers and policy makers.
Source: Suhrke, A. and Strand, A, 2005, ‗The Logic of Conflictual Peacebuilding.‘ In
Sultan Barakat, ed.: After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the
Aftermath of War. London/N.Y.: I.B. Tauris pp. 141-154.
Economic Priorities for Peace Implementation
S Woodward (2002)
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Abstract
As a sub-field of conflict resolution, peace implementation has been more practiced
than studied. Unlike either conflict mediation or long-term peacebuilding, very little
analytical reflection has been devoted to the immediate challenges of implementing
peace agreements once they are concluded. Too often, those responsible for translating
these accords into meaningful action have had to proceed quickly, without either an
accurate map of the hazards of the war-torn terrain in which they find themselves or a
reliable plan for managing challenges when they do arise. At the most elementary
level, what has been missing is clear knowledge of those factors that make the
difference between successful peace implementation and failure, between the
assurance of peace and the resumption of
war.
That such analysis is needed, and needed urgently, becomes clear in surveying the
experience of the 1990s. In Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Somalia, and twice in
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Angola, the failure to get warring parties to live up to their peace agreements not only
restarted armed conflict, it also escalated the violence. The breakdown of the 1994
Arusha Accords in Rwanda led to a genocide of some 800,000 people: approximately
fifty times more deaths than had occurred in the 1990-1993 civil war. As all of these
tragedies suggest, the period immediately after the signing of a peace agreement is
arguably the time of greatest uncertainty and danger. It is also the time when most
peace
agreements fail. Improving our knowledge of the specific challenges of peace
implementation might help to improve the odds of success.
Source: Woodward, S.L. 2002, Economic Priorities for Peace Implementation. IPA
Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation, International Peace Academy, New
York
Why State-building?
S Woodward (2006)
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Abstract
This workshop convened a group of scholars and policy practitioners to discuss Susan
L. Woodward's paper, ―Why State-Building?‖ Her argument is that the study and
practice of post-conflict reconstruction lacks consensus on the substance of what is
meant by the ―state.‖ This lack of a common concept of the state makes operations
more difficult. Particularly now, as an organizational basis for coordinated action
(such as the UN Peacebuilding Commission) is being developed, a common conceptual
and analytical framework is needed in order to define the core elements of state-
building and set priorities for policy implementation
Source: Woodward, S.L., 2006, Why State-building?: A report on the workshop held at
the Graduate Center, City University of New York, March 13.
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3. Post-conflict Stabilisation, Assessment and Planning
Core readings
Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations
U Kievelitz and T Schaef (2004)
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Summary
How can post-conflict needs assessments (PCNAs) be enhanced? Generally, PCNAs
are jointly carried out by the UN and the World Bank, sometimes in conjunction with
other key donor agencies. This guide aims to support current efforts among these
agencies to further enhance their engagement in the PCNA by learning from available
experience. It draws strongly on material from recent needs assessments in Timor-
Leste, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Iraq and Liberia.
Over the last decade, donors have attributed increasing importance to providing timely
and substantive support to post-conflict recovery and peace building. A large part of
this assistance is mobilised via international reconstruction conferences, at which
donors make pledges based on an overall assessment of post-conflict recovery needs.
Thus, the post-conflict needs assessment (PCNA) has recently become a key entry
point for conceptualising, negotiating and financing post-conflict recovery strategies.
PCNAs are complex multi-stakeholder processes, which routinely take place under
extreme time constraints.
This guide treats the PCNA both as a methodology and a process:
As a methodology, the PCNA involves the technical assessment of recovery
needs and development of a post-conflict transition strategy.
As a process of consultation, negotiation and analysis, the PCNA provides a
platform for national and international actors to agree on joint priorities, define
their commitments and prepare their activities.
This guide aims to help make PCNAs more effective by systematising the analysis and
suggesting more efficient processes. In particular, it contributes to:
The definition of common minimum standards regarding quality, reliability and
inclusiveness of the assessment.
A fast-track professional response by the international community when
recovery planning becomes feasible.
Lowering the costs of PCNAs by promoting systematisation and
standardisation.
In terms of value added, the following results and impacts can be expected from a
PCNA of the type proposed in this guide:
Provides donors, national authorities, and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and other stakeholders, with a comprehensive and fairly objective
estimate of needs.
High international visibility resulting in more substantial financial pledges for
recovery and reconstruction.
International consensus on recovery priorities leading to less program overlap
and more coherence between donors.
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Early focus on the roots of the conflict and measures to help overcome them in
the context of recovery and reconstruction.
Increased political momentum and support for the peace process and increased
legitimacy of the national authorities (conflict parties).
Establishment of a conceptual basis for an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper (I-PRSP), as well as World Bank and UN country strategies.
Source: UNDP, 2004, 'Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-
Conflict Situations', a joint project of the United Nations Development Program, the
World Bank, and United Nations Development Group, New York
Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting their Act Together
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004)
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Summary
The term peacebuilding entered the international vocabulary in 1992 through the UN
Agenda for Peace. Peacebuilding attempts to encourage the development of the
conditions, attitudes and behaviour that foster and sustain social and economic
development that is peaceful, stable and prosperous. This Utstein study of
peacebuilding was commissioned by the development ministers of Germany, the
Netherlands, Norway and the UK. It aims to improve the implementation of existing
policy. The empirical basis of this joint study is an illustrative survey of 336
peacebuilding projects implemented by the four original Utstein governments. In
addition to the survey the report contains studies of the peacebuilding policy and
activities of each country.
Peacebuilding uses a wide range of policy instruments, and peacebuilding activities fall
under four main headings. There are those which provide security, establish the socio-
economic foundations of long-term peace, establish the political framework of long-
term peace, and those which generate reconciliation. The Utstein governments have
learnt important lessons. For example, that peacebuilding must be responsive to
context and need and must be sustained for the long term. There has also been
recognition of a major need for coordination within and between governments and with
IGOs and NGOs. However, there are major strategic deficits in the peacebuilding
efforts of the four Utstein governments. In particular:
More than 55 per cent of the projects do not show any link to a broader strategy
for the country in which they are implemented.
Planning is based on relatively little analysis and there are important conceptual
confusions and uncertainties.
There are problems concerning the timing of financial flows and the unwanted
effects of the influx of resources into war-torn countries.
There is no known way of reliably assessing the impact of peacebuilding
projects.
Recommendations to correct the strategic deficit fall into three categories; policy
recommendations, evaluation recommendations and research recommendations:
Two strategic frameworks need to be adopted: one to assist in formulating
specific peacebuilding intervention strategies when the need arises; the other to
assist in formulating a general peacebuilding strategy for donors.
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Intervention strategies must be owned by those who implement them and the
regional context must also be incorporated.
Impact assessment should be shifted from the project level to the strategic level.
This will require a clear distinction between project outputs and impacts.
The evaluation community should discuss organising and coding project
archives.
Increased emphasis should be placed on joint evaluations by a group of donors
to promote strategic coordination and knowledge sharing.
More research is needed to find out how to correct the strategic deficit.
Source; Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, Towards a Strategic
Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting their Act Together, Overview report of the Joint
Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Difficult Choices in the New Post-conflict Agenda: The International Community
in Rwanda After the Genocide
P Uvin (2001)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
Rwanda has emerged as one of the countries where the new post-conflict agenda is
being most strongly implemented, under extremely difficult conditions. This agenda
poses many deep, and unsolved, ethical questions for donors. This paper from Tufts
University analyses donor behaviour in relation to government and justice in Rwanda
and identifies the key problems associated with the new approach. It calls for greater
promotion of local dialogue and increased clarity and transparency in donor
engagement.
In recent years, international donors have begun to codify and implement a new post-
conflict agenda based on using aid to promote peace and reconciliation. Donors are
becoming deeply engaged in political and social matters that they have avoided until
now. Post-genocide Rwanda is one of the strongest examples of this trend. The work of
international donors has produced some significant achievements, but it has also raised
many unresolved ethical questions. As donors move towards the use of aid for conflict
prevention in general, these questions will have wider relevance.
Official policy documents do not acknowledge the major ethical questions raised by
this new agenda. They have hardly been discussed, and there are no tools available for
solving them.
Donors may and do differ radically in their assessments of the situation in a
country, and of the way to move forward.
When donor objectives and principles differ, who makes the choices about what
actions to prioritise and on what grounds?
The new agenda includes issues which are highly politically sensitive. Donors
are in a position to make life and death decisions with a high likelihood of error,
without the participation of those affected by the consequences.
When internal or local solutions emerge, they often do not conform to Western
ethical ideals or international legal principles. What are the criteria for judging
them?
182
Donors can only control the form, but not the substance of the institutions they
help build. The latter depends on deep, locally owned social and political
dynamics.
No matter how conscious donors are of the need to involve all groups and
segments of society in the dynamics of peace and reconciliation, in practice they
do not manage it.
The ethical and strategic challenges encountered in finding post-conflict solutions are
the extreme versions of those associated with all development aid. The difficult and
dangerous choices associated with this work must be recognised, and the process by
which they are made must be reformed.
In the short-term, donors must give more priority to promoting local dialogues,
listening to broad sections of people, stimulating local knowledge generation
and research, and finding means of making people's voices heard by those in
power.
There is significant room for increased clarity and transparency. DFID's
Principles for a New Humanitarianism are a good example of appropriate
guidelines.
In the longer term, the terms of engagement, both ideological and procedural,
between those in rich countries seeking social change and those in whose name
this change is sought must be rethought.
This must include a privileging of justice, dignity and empowerment
considerations at all times, as well as the creation of the same sorts of
accountability that donors are subject to at home.
Uvin, P., 2001, 'Difficult Choices in the New Post-conflict Agenda: The International
Community in Rwanda After the Genocide', Third World Quarterly, vol. 22, no. 2
Supplementary readings
A Framework for Success – International Interventions in Countries Emerging
from Conflict
D Serwer and P Thomson (2007)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
This book assesses the nature and extent of the changes wrought by 9/11 and its
aftermath, and explores their wide-ranging implications. For the United States, of
course, the changes have been dramatic. It has engaged in a war on terrorism and has
become both a third party in certain conflict arenas and a direct party to the conflict in
Iraq and Afghanistan. But these events have also affected other actors, from the United
Nations to humanitarian NGOs to collective defence and security organizations such as
NATO and the OSCE.
At the same time, some things have not changed. Failed states, economic stagnation,
weapons proliferation, nuclear missiles, and identity-based conflicts continue to
threaten global security. Looking at the combination of old and new threats, are
traditional instruments of negotiation, mediation, peacekeeping and peace enforcement
still effective in managing and resolving conflict? How do conflict management efforts
and the campaign against terrorism interact in various security environments? Are our
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institutions—be they states, coalitions of the willing, international organizations, or
NGOs—capable of creating and implementing a peacemaking strategy? All these
questions are addressed in this new volume.
Source: Serwer, D., and P. Thomson. 2007. ‗A Framework for Success – International
Interventions in Countries Emerging from Conflict.‘ In Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler
Hampson, and Pemela All (eds). Leashing the dogs of war: conflict management in a
divided world. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, pp. 369-387.
The Gender Dimensions of Post-Conflict Reconstruction
E Zuckerman and M Greenberg (2006)
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Summary
Why do post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) programmes need to address gender
relations and equality? How can gender be ‗mainstreamed‘ in PCR interventions? This
draft conference paper by Gender Action considers gender, particularly the needs of
women, in post-conflict situations. PCR programmes commonly fail to recognise and
address gender issues. Investing in women and promoting gender equality are
necessary both for maintaining peace and achieving sustainable development.
Substantial research and activism on women‘s needs and participation in peace
negotiations followed the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women. United Nations
Security Resolution 1325 of October 2000 reinforced women‘s roles in defining peace
terms and peacemaking. However, there has been less focus on gender equality in
PCR. Donors and their partners in PCR often inadvertently reinforce gender
discrimination and disparities. This has negative impacts on the well being of women
and their families, on economic growth, and on opportunities for positive development.
Examples include:
Often only men are seen as ex-combatants and women who have also fought are
denied access to reintegration programmes
Employment training projects target male ex-combatants, even though in post-
conflict situations women are often household heads. The ―informal‖ and
―invisible‖ sectors are often ignored, as are issues such as childcare, family
responsibilities and cultural practices affecting women‘s participation
Conflict accelerates male rural-to-urban migration but agriculture programmes
tend to focus on male ex-combatants rather than women
PCR often fails to recognise and address violence against women within
households in post-conflict situations
International financial institutions frequently fail to take account of the gender
impacts of macroeconomic policies
Promotion of gender equality is important in any development intervention, but
essential in PCR. It must be undertaken in addition to ―women‘s projects‖ that focus
on women but do not change the society in which they live. The challenge is not
merely to empower women, but to engage all of society, including elder male leaders
and young men, to accept gender equality norms.
Recommendations are:
Careful gender analyses must be integrated into PCR, rather than simply being
‗added on‘ to development plans and projects
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Every post-conflict policy, program, and project design, implementation and
monitoring and evaluation must analyse and address gender issues, intervention
opportunities and gender derived benefits and costs
All social and economic data must be sex-disaggregated
Women and men should jointly make macroeconomic resource allocation
decisions
Critical numbers of women must be equal partners with men in the peace-
making process and in post-conflict decision-making. Male gender advocates
are also essential. Information about women‘s rights and gender equality needs
to be disseminated widely
Gender training is needed for women and men alike.
Source: Zuckerman, E., 2006, 'The Gender Dimensions of Post-Conflict
Reconstruction', UNU-WIDER Research Paper no 2006/62, United Nations
University, Helsinki
Review of the UK Government Approach to Peacebuilding
S Lawry-White (2003)
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Summary
What progress has the UK Government made on conflict reduction and conflict
prevention strategies since 1997? This paper, commissioned by the UK Department for
International Development (DFID), provides an overview of the UK Government‘s
approach to peacebuilding. It aims to provide implementation guidelines for what
works and what does not work in peacebuilding. It summarises government conflict
reduction and prevention strategy since 1997, and describes underlying principles and
the main strategies and mechanisms in use.
The UK‘s approach to conflict prevention appears to be based on the following
underlying principles:
There is a negative correlation between violent conflict and sustainable
development.
Personal safety is a precursor to development.
Democratic and representative systems of government and a rights based
society are necessary conditions for conflict prevention.
Coordinated interventions are required at multiple levels – from
intergovernmental to grass roots – and with a key role for the United Nations
(UN).
Delivery of UK conflict prevention goals relies on partnership with a variety of
institutions.
Front-loading of post-conflict investments reduces the chances of conflict
recurring.
Although the UK recognises a wide variety of security, political and social initiatives
that can contribute to conflict prevention, in practice UK interventions are governed by
a limited set of strategies. The three main strategies include:
Improving governance, which is seen as an overarching issue.
Related security sector reform initiatives; demobilisation, disarmament and
reintegration; defence diplomacy; small arms and light weapons reductions; and
humanitarian mine action.
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Peace processes.
Secondary strategies include establishing independent media, making the
international system more effective at improving conflicts, improving the role of
international business and international financial institutions and addressing
wars of abundance fuelled by the illegal exploitation of resources.
The paper highlights the following points about UK peacebuilding efforts:
The Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department was established in 1997 and
has spearheaded DFID‘s conflict related strategy and programming. Conflict
analyses is now being mainstreamed into DFID geographic departments and
country programmes.
The UK government recognises that each conflict is unique and DFID has
developed a Conflict Assessment Methodology, which has now been applied to
ten conflict situations.
The Conflict Prevention Unit was expanded in 2002 in order to enhance conflict
prevention resource management and to assist in the mainstreaming of conflict
prevention into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
The Africa Conflict Unit in DFID has doubled its personnel over the past three
years, partly in order to support activities under the Africa Conflict Prevention
Pool (ACPP).
Security and reconciliation activities make clear links to peacebuilding.
However, investments in post-conflict socio-economic and reconstruction
projects typically record no peacebuilding intent. As a result, they are unlikely
to be evaluated for their peacebuilding effects.
The emphasis placed by the UK on coordination between actors and giving the
UN a central role indicates that the UK is striving to achieve horizontal
consistency between actors.
The Global Conflict Prevention Pool and ACPP have allowed the development
of more focussed thematic and geographical conflict prevention strategies, and
have fostered a degree of interdepartmental coordination that would not
otherwise have been achieved.
Source: Lawry-White, L., 2003, 'Review of the UK Government Approach to
Peacebuilding and Synthesis of Lessons Learned from UK Government Funded
Peacebuilding Projects 1997-2001', DFID, London
In Support of Peacebuilding: Strengthening the Post Conflict Needs Assessment
UN/World Bank (2007)
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Abstract
An increasingly important element of the international community‘s engagement with
a country emerging from conflict is a joint process to assess needs and identify
priorities, used to anchor the mobilization of human and financial resources for
recovery and reconstruction. Over the last decade, donors have attributed increasing
importance to providing timely and substantive support to post-conflict recovery and
peacebuilding, and in this context Post Conflict Needs Assessments have been used by
national and international actors as an entry point for conceptualizing, negotiating and
financing a shared strategy for recovery and development in fragile, post-conflict
settings.
186
The United Nations and World Bank have undertaken a joint review of four years of
experience with Post Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) to identify lessons and
improve future exercises.
Source: UN/World Bank PCNA Review, 2007, ‗In Support of Peacebuilding:
Strengthening the Post Conflict Needs Assessment‘, the United Nations and World
Bank, New York.
187
4. Transition from Humanitarian Assistance to Full Recovery
Core readings
Beyond the Continuum: The Changing Role of Aid Policy in Protracted Crises
A Harmer and J Macrae (2004)
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Summary
Until recently, assistance to countries in protracted crises was seen only in terms of
humanitarian aid. How has this changed? This review by the Overseas Development
Institute argues that there has been a shift in the linking of relief and development. It
suggests that policy has moved towards areas of shared responsibility. However, it
warns that humanitarian actors must communicate more clearly and fully the
distinctiveness of their experience in these environments and work with development
actors to explore common ground.
During the last five years, there have been strenuous efforts to improve the response to
crises. In the past, the lack of trust between the government and international
assistance actors has created difficult environments for the delivery of traditional
development assistance. However, there is a growing consensus that disengagement
from protracted crises, including conflict-affected and ‗failed‘ states, is no longer an
option. Development aid actors are no longer relying upon humanitarian aid as the
primary instrument for international aid engagement. They are expanding their
capacity to mobilise, coordinate and disburse resources, as well as set the policy
framework for interventions in protracted crises.
There is scope for much greater understanding across the humanitarian and
development communities regarding the determinants and dynamics of crisis, and how
these impact on populations and societies. However, there remains weak understanding
between the two communities with regard to their respective goals and operating
principles.
Policymakers in this area are working within complex, fluid political
frameworks. This makes formalisation of policy extremely difficult and thus
reduces the predictability of response.
The different levels of financing, co-ordination modalities and arrangements for
integration with politico-military actors reflect the high politics that lies behind
the more technical process of better ‗linking‘ humanitarian and developmental
action.
It is also difficult to trace accurately trends in funding flows, both in terms of
quantity and to determine what the money is spent on.
The current trend towards deeper engagement by the development community
in situations of protracted crisis is likely to continue.
While there has been progress in the disbursement of funds to organisations in
situations of post-conflict transition, there remain obstacles to engagement in
situations of ongoing conflict and chronic political/economic crisis.
It is likely that in situations of protracted crisis the predominant form of aid will
continue to be grants rather than loans. However, there is the potential for new actors,
in particular the World Bank, to play an increasingly assertive role in the coordination
of this aid.
188
Development strategies could be informed by the significant work that has been
done in the humanitarian sector on assessing and prioritising needs and in risk-
management in highly insecure environments.
Programming strategies for food security and broader issues of service delivery
could benefit from combined analysis of both developmental and humanitarian
perspectives.
The deepening of engagement by developmental actors in situations of
protracted crisis is coinciding with, if not being driven by, the increasing
securitisation of the aid agenda.
The nature of the development enterprise has always implied buttressing the
sovereignty of the recipient regime, as well as reflecting the strategic priorities
of donor governments.
This is in contrast to classical humanitarianism, which has sought to maintain a
position of neutrality with regard to the legitimacy or otherwise of all parties
(including the regime), and with regard to geopolitics.
Harmer, A. and Macrae, J., 2004, Chapter 1 in Beyond the Continuum: The Changing
Role of Aid Policy in Protracted Crises, HPG Report 18, ODI
Conflict, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: Meeting the Challenges
M Lange and M Quinn (2003)
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Summary
Can the actions of Humanitarian Agencies (HA) go beyond the provision of emergency
assistance and contribute to long-term solutions? Current practice, based on reactive
and short-term programmes, makes successful interventions more difficult. It also rules
out any possibility for planning to make a long-term impact on the underlying causes
of conflict. This document by International Alert summarises current debates on
conflict, aid and peacebuilding and suggests possible actions to enhance the long-term
impact of humanitarian assistance. Based on the organisation‘s experience and
consultations with key stakeholders, it also introduces policy recommendations for
actors involved in emergency interventions.
If humanitarian assistance is to make a long-term impact on the underlying causes of
conflict a new approach to emergency interventions is needed. ‗Conflict sensitivity‘ is
the capacity of an organisation to: (i) understand the context (conflict) in which it
works, (ii) understand the interaction between its intervention and the conflict and (iii)
its capacity to act accordingly and avoid any negative impacts whilst maximising the
positive effects its intervention may have. This new approach is based on a widening
of the concept of human security on which humanitarian assistance is based. All threats
to the survival, daily life and dignity of human beings are included. At present, post
September 11th concerns of security, mostly associated with terrorism, are
constraining both the policy and practice of humanitarian assistance.
Incorporating a conflict sensitive approach to Humanitarian Agencies' planning and
programming can contribute to long-term peacebuilding efforts without putting at risk
the perception of neutrality and independence so relevant for HA. Other findings
suggest that a conflict sensitive approach:
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Requires HA to address policy, operations and capacity challenges. Issues such
as: conflicting government agendas, diversion of aid to belligerents and loss of
institutional memory constrain the positive impact of HA interventions.
Promotes HA to advocate for more comprehensive policies at an earlier stage.
Humanitarian assistance can move from short-term reactive responses to more
proactive and long-term efforts.
Requires more systematic information gathering and organisational learning
from past experience. Having a sound understanding of the root causes and
dynamics of the conflict can lead to more adequate interventions.
Calls for HA to make donors and international governments aware of the
damaging impact of conflict on great numbers of people. Advocacy efforts can
complement operations, securing funding and political support.
Humanitarian Agencies depend on donor policy and resource decisions to develop
their work. If they are to successfully engage in peace-building efforts, higher levels of
Donor – HA consultations are needed. Other recommendations suggest that donors
need to:
Develop a co-ordinated approach to conflict analysis and policy design.
Implement and evaluate a conflict sensitive approach. It is important that
conflict transformation goals are mainstreamed in intervention strategies.
Support the development of conflict sensitivity within Humanitarian Agencies.
Promote within different government agencies the development of a coherent
policy towards target countries. The impact on conflict of diplomatic, military,
trade and aid policies need to be assessed as a whole.
Develop downward accountability and closer bonds with NGOs and legitimate
local civil society organisations to enable stronger local ownership of the
process.
Source: Lange, M. and Quinn, M., 2003, Conflict, Humanitarian Assistance and
Peacebuilding: Meeting the Challenges, International Alert, London
Supplementary readings
Humanitarianism Unbound?
A De Waal (1994)
Access full text online
Abstract
The last three years have seen humanitarian organizations calling for military
intervention in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and elsewhere. Both relief agencies and
human rights organizations have vocally implored the United Nations, or individual
Western countries, to dispatch troops to strife-torn nations facing humanitarian
disaster. What is commonplace today would have been unthinkable even five years
ago. This paper examines the reasons for this extraordinary shift in the capacity of
humanitarian organizations to make these dramatic statements and asks whether the
analysis, capacity and accountability of these organizations matches their power. It
focuses on central and northeast Africa, a region that has the dubious distinction of
leading the world in the depth and complexity of its politically-caused humanitarian
emergencies.
190
Source: De Waal, A. 1994. Humanitarianism Unbound? African Rights, London
Introduction, Global Governance and the New Wars
M Duffield (2001)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
Since the mid-1990s, changing perceptions of war and security have led to the
‗radicalisation of development‘. Aid policy has shifted from humanitarian relief
towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction to avert future violence. What
has triggered these changes? How has the nature of war changed since the end of the
Cold War? Can the new development agenda deliver security in the face of ‗new
wars‘? This introductory chapter of the book ―Global Governance and the New Wars‖
presents a critical reflection on the incorporation of war into development discourse.
Northern policy-makers now focus on the security threat of underdevelopment in the
South fomenting international instability through conflict, criminal activity and
terrorism. The merging of the development and security agendas has led to a new
political project, the ‗liberal peace‘, which seeks to transform dysfunctional and war-
affected societies into cooperative and stable entities.
Using a ‗systems‘ approach, a new system of global governance is identified. The
radical social transformation agenda is bringing together governments, NGOs, military
establishments and private companies in networks of strategic governance relations
that are increasingly privatised and militarised.
Other important findings are:
The changing nature of North-South relations involves a shift from hierarchical
and territorial relations of government to polyarchical, non-territorial and
networked relations of governance.
Changes in international trade during the last few decades have increased
Southern exclusion from formal trade, leading to an expansion of parallel and
shadow trans-border trade.
The ‗new wars‘ witnessed since the end of the Cold War involve networks of
state actors, social groups, diasporas and strongmen, and have created
‗innovative‘ forms of protectionism, legitimacy and entitlements to wealth.
In both liberal peace and the new wars, traditional distinctions between people,
army and government have been blurred, and new ways of projecting power
have emerged.
Interactions between the strategic complexes of liberal peace and the new wars
have involved accommodation and complicity, for example where relief
interventions have encouraged famine or fuelled conflict.
The author makes the following conclusions:
It is questionable whether the increasingly privatised and regionally divided
strategic complexes of liberal governance will be able to promote security that
is socially and geographically inclusive.
Increased attention is therefore needed in academic and policy circles to
understanding the new development-security terrain.
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To understand the organisational dynamics involved, it is useful to use a
systems approach, which focuses on interconnections, processes and self-
transformation.
Source: Duffield, M., 2001, 'Introduction, Global Governance and the New Wars', in
Global Governance and the New Wars: the Merging of Development and Security, Zed
Books, London.
Service Delivery in Difficult Environments: Transferable Approaches from the
Humanitarian Community
C Laurence and L Poole (2005)
Restricted access text – DFID only
Source: Laurence, C. and Poole, L., 2005, 'Service Delivery in Difficult Environments:
Transferable Approaches from the Humanitarian Community', report to UK
Department for International Development (DFID).
Report of the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues
United Nations (2004)
Access full text online
Abstract
The United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and the Executive Committee on
Humanitarian Assistance (ECHA) established a joint working group on transition
issues to respond to two sets of policy directives contained respectively under
ECOSOC resolution E/2002/32 and Action Point 14 in the report of the Secretary-
General (A/57/387/2002). The working group agreed to focus on processes of
transition from conflict to peace, while recognizing that the term ―transition‖ is applied
to different but often overlapping processes of transformation. This report details their
findings and recommendations.
Source: UNDG, 2004, ‗Report of the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition
Issues‘, New York: United Nations Development Group and Executive Committee on
Humanitarian Assistance
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5. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former
Combatants
Core readings
Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards
UNDDR (2007)
Access full text online
Summary
What are the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration standards
(IDDRS)? This paper acts as a guideline to IDDRS. In a peacekeeping context there
has been a trend towards complex operations that seek to deal with a wide variety of
issues rather than traditional peacekeeping. The IDDRS provide the UN system with a
set of policies, guidelines and procedures for the planning, implementation and
monitoring of DDR programmes in a peacekeeping context.
While the UN has acquired significant experience in the planning and management of
DDR programmes, it has yet to establish a collective approach to DDR, or clear and
usable policies and guidelines to facilitate coordination and cooperation among UN
agencies, departments and programmes. This has resulted in poor coordination and
planning and gaps in the implementation of DDR programmes. The IDDRS have been
drafted on the basis of lessons and best practices drawn from the experience of all the
departments, agencies, funds and programmes involved.
The changed nature of peacekeeping and post-conflict recovery strategies requires
close coordination among UN departments, agencies, funds and programmes. While
the IDDRS were designed with peacekeeping contexts in mind, much of the guidance
contained within these standards will also be applicable for non-peacekeeping
contexts.
The three main aims of the IDDRS are:
To give DDR practitioners the opportunity to make informed decisions based on
a clear, flexible and in-depth body of guidance across the range of DDR
activities.
To serve as a common foundation for the commencement of integrated
operational planning in Headquarters and at the country level.
To function as a resource for the training of DDR specialists.
The standards consist of 26 modules divided into five levels. Each IDDRS module is
intended to serve both as part of the overall IDDRS framework and as a freestanding
document.
Level one - introduction and a glossary to the full IDDRS;
Level two - the strategic concepts of an integrated approach to DDR in a
peacekeeping context;
Level three - the structures and processes for planning and implementation of
DDR at Headquarters and in the field;
Level four - provides considerations, options and tools for carrying out DDR
operations;
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Level five - covers the UN approach to essential cross-cutting issues, such as
gender, youth and children associated with the armed forces and groups, cross-
border movements, food assistance, HIV/AIDS and health.
Source: United Nations, 2007, 'Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration Standards', United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration Resource Center (IDDRS), New York
The UN DDR website offers numerous guidelines and tools for all phases and aspects
of the DDR process. See www.unddr.org and specifically
http://www.unddr.org/tools.php
Supplementary readings
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and
Guiding Principles
N Ball and L van de Goor (2006)
Access full text online
Summary
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes play a critical role in
transitions from war to peace and are integral to peacekeeping operations and post-
conflict reconstruction. Implementation of DDR programs, however, remains
problematic. This briefing note from the Netherlands Institute of International
Relations (Clingendael Institute) addresses some problems that practitioners will
encounter with DDR program design and implementation. Providing guidance
questions and an overview of lessons learned from recent experience, it recommends
that DDR be seen as part of a broader political process. DDR should be tailored to
local political and economic situations and be embedded within a comprehensive
framework for enhancing security, peace consolidation and economic recovery.
DDR is the process of demilitarising official and unofficial armed groups. It
incorporates arms control, disbanding non-state armed groups, reducing the size of
state security services and assisting ex-combatants‘ reintegration into civilian life.
DDR can help create an environment in which the overall peace process,
reconciliation, social and economic rehabilitation and longer-term development can
take root. DDR processes are, however, only able to influence a fairly narrow range of
political and security objectives:
DDR processes contribute to a level of security that allows the peace process to
advance. They also promote confidence-building among former warring parties
and non-combatants.
DDR processes cannot substitute for inadequate political will on the part of
warring parties to engage in a process to resolve their differences peacefully.
DDR processes cannot substitute for peace enforcement activities or longer-
term programs to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.
DDR processes cannot prevent conflict from recurring, produce development or
guarantee ex-combatants‘ successful reintegration into civilian society.
Successful DDR processes require commitment from parties to the conflict,
agreement on a policy framework and an organisation to oversee DDR.
Additionally, they require an international commitment to the peace process.
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DDR must be seen as part of a political process of consolidating peace and promoting
stability, rather than as a technical activity. It should be tailored to the local political
context, institutional and human capacities and realities of economic life. Additionally:
DDR processes should be built on national leadership and responsibility. A
national program should guide the activities and donors should support this.
It is desirable to embed DDR in a comprehensive framework for enhancing
security, peace consolidation and economic recovery.
DDR processes should take into account a realistic appraisal of external support
for DDR as part of early planning. They should also take into account a realistic
assessment of problems and opportunities for implementation on the ground.
DDR processes must be very clear about the primary target group (male and
female combatants), eligibility criteria and types of benefits to be offered. These
must be communicated to all groups affected by a DDR process.
DDR processes require a centralised, integrated funding system, early funding
and evidence-based planning. Additionally they require monitoring and
evaluation on results-based outcomes, quantitative outputs and their political
and security impact.
Source: Ball, N. and Goor, L. van de, 2006, 'Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles', Clingendael
Security and Conflict Programme, The Hague
Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
T Bouta (2005)
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Summary
Recent studies show the increasing extent that women operate as combatants in
(ir)regular armies in conflict. How can disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
(DDR) programmes become more gender-sensitised? This study by the Clingendael
Institute examines men and women's active involvement in warfare, their gender-
specific roles and gender relations within armies and discusses the challenges for DDR
programmes in targeting female ex-combatants.
Women joining armies, whether voluntarily or under duress, tend to have four different
roles – combatant, support worker, abductee and wife/dependant. DDR programmes
need to be made accessible to all women who joined armies during conflict,
irrespective of whether or not they took active part in combat or whether or not they
possess a weapon. DDR programmes need to respond to male and female combatants'
different economic, social and psychological reintegration needs. Finally, it is essential
to formulate clear monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Some key action points are:
The tracing and establishing of contact with all women in armies in advance of
DDR programmes in order to avoid self-demobilisation.
Ensuring that development assistance programmes target abducted women and
protect them against renewed violence from their male counterparts.
Utilising the momentum of disarmament camps to prepare women's and men's
return to civilian life and making both groups aware of their rights as civilians
in the post-conflict phase.
Linking of reintegration activities for ex-combatants with broader development
assistance activities for war-affected communities.
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Preparing communities for the return of male and female ex-combatants,
including countering the negative stigmatisation of women who joined the
military.
Creating links with existing informal community support structures (often led
by women) and providing adequate psychological counselling for all ex-
combatants.
National, international and other agencies should play an important role in
incorporating gender issues in the planning and implementation of specific DDR
programmes. Recommendations for planners, donors and policy-makers at
international level include:
Assessment of the legal, political, economic contexts of the DDR programmes
and incorporation of gender expertise as an essential element of any assessment
mission.
Deployment of women in peacekeeping operations and DDR processes by
troop-contributing countries.
Preference for weapons-in-exchange-for-development projects over weapons-
in-exchange-for-cash projects, allowing greater targeting of women.
Build on existing informal community support structures, including womens'
organisations and networks. Provide training to women's organisations to
participation in healing and reconciliation work.
Institutionalisation of special measures to ensure that female beneficiaries have
equal training and employment opportunities as a part of economic
reintegration.
Take into account women ex-combatants' limited access to land, relatively few
skills, restricted mobility and the strict division of labour they may face.
Source: Bouta, T., 2005, 'Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration', Netherlands Institute of International Relations, ―Clingendael‖, The
Hague
Young Soldiers: Why they Choose to Fight
R Brett and I Specht (2004)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
They are part of rebel factions, national armies, paramilitaries, and other armed groups
and entrenched in some of the most violent conflicts around the globe. They are in
some ways still children? yet, from Afghanistan to Sierra Leone to Northern Ireland,
you can find them among the fighters. Why?
Young Soldiers explores the reasons that adolescents who are neither physically forced
nor abducted choose to join armed groups. Drawing on in-depth interviews with the
soldiers themselves, the authors challenge conventional wisdom to offer a thought-
provoking account of the role that war, poverty, education, politics, identity, family,
and friends all play in driving these young men and women to join military life. They
also address the important issues of demobilization and the reintegration process.
International in scope, covering a variety of situations in Afghanistan, Colombia,
Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Sri Lanka, and the United Kingdom, Young Soldiers concludes with a
196
discussion of the steps needed to create an environment in which adolescents are no
longer forced to "volunteer."
Source: Brett, R., I. Specht, 2004, ‗Young Soldiers – Why they Choose to Fight‘
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Introduction (pp. 1-8); chapter 1 (pp. 9-38), and
conclusion (pp. 121-136).
Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of
Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace
M Knight (2004)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
The process of disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration (DDRR) of
former combatants plays a critical role in transitions from war to peace. The success or
failure of this endeavour directly affects the long-term peacebuilding prospects for any
post-conflict society. The exploration of the closely interwoven relationship between
peacebuilding and the DDRR process also provides a theoretical framework
for this
article, which aims to present an assessment of various disarmament, demobilization
and reinsertion (DDR) programmes planned or implemented in a
number of countries
over the last two decades. The assessment is conducted by focusing on three specific
DDR issues: disarmament as a social contract; demobilization
without cantonment; and
the relevance of financial reinsertion assistance. The majority of these initiatives
adopted a ‗guns–camps–cash‘ approach that seems to provide only a limited
perspective for dealing with a wide range of complex issues related to the DDR
process. Therefore, the article questions whether there is a need for a more
comprehensive consideration of disarmament by acknowledging and responding to its
social, economic and political implications. In conjunction with the above-mentioned
consideration, disarmament in terms of a social contract is proposed as an alternative to
the current military-centred approach. Experience also indicates a tendency
towards the
inclusion of cantonment in the demobilization phase, regardless of whether it actually
can have some negative impacts on the DDRR process in
general. Subsequently, the
article questions such implications and possible approaches to demobilization without
cantonment. Finally, the article focuses on the effectiveness of cash payments during
reinsertion as an easier alternative to the provision of other
material assistance, since
this tends to be the most controversial aspect of the reinsertion phase.
Source: Knight, M. and Ozerdem, A, 2004, ‗Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to
Peace.‘ In Journal of Peace Research, 41(4): 499-516.
What Happens to Youth During and After Wars? - A Preliminary Review of
Literature on Africa and an Assessment of the Debate
K Peters, P Richards and K Vlassenroot (2003)
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Abstract
This report describes the current state of affairs with regard to the role and
position of child soldiers and of youth in general both during and after armed conflicts
197
in Africa. The authors review the literature, their own professional experience in the
field and place the problem of child soldiers in a wider context, making a number of
recommendations.
Source: Peters, K., P. Richards, K. Vlassenroot, 2003, ‗What Happens to Youth During
and After Wars? - A Preliminary Review of Literature on Africa and an Assessment of
the Debate‘ RAWOO Working Paper, October.
Youth and Conflict – A Brief Review of the Available Literature
M Sommers (2006)
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Abstract
Youth engulfed by conflict and post-conflict situations face circumstances that
substantially alter their lives and prospects. This makes effective programming for
them challenging yet vital. Drawing on extensive archival and internet research, this
short analytical literature review aims to illuminate key themes, trends, and promising
prospects for war-affected youth and the programs that aim to assist them.
The review will introduce debates over how the youth category has been defined and
whether youth should be seen primarily as passive victims of warfare, active threats to
peace, or as resilient survivors. Analysis suggests that while war‘s effects on youth are
complex, resilience is their most prominent shared characteristic. The implication of
this analysis on programming is significant because it casts youth as central
formulators of youth programming.
Source: Sommers, M., 2006, ‗Youth and Conflict – A Brief Review of the Available
Literature‘, Washington, DC: USAID (May).
Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of
Former Combatants in Colombia
K Theidon (2007)
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Abstract
A key component of peace processes and postconflict reconstruction is the
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. DDR
programs imply multiple transitions: from the combatants who lay down their
weapons, to the governments that seek an end to armed conflict, to the communities
that receive – or reject – these demobilized fighters.
At each level, these transitions
imply a complex and dynamic equation between the demands of peace and the clamor
for justice. And yet, traditional approaches to DDR have focused almost exclusively
on
military and security objectives, which in turn has resulted in these programs being
developed in relative isolation from the growing field of transitional justice and its
concerns with historical clarification, justice, reparations and reconciliation.
The author
draws upon research in Colombia, a case of great interest because the government is
attempting to implement mechanisms of reparations and reconciliation in a ‗pre-
postconflict‘ context, and to implement DDR on the terrain of transitional
justice.
198
Source: Theidon, K., 2007, ‗Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization
and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia‘, International Journal of
Transitional Justice, 1:66-90.
Ex-combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared
P Uvin (2007)
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Abstract
This report presents some findings about ex-combatants that are derived from a wider
study on masculinity and youth, partly sponsored by the World Bank‘s Multi- Country
Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP). This study involved almost 400
Burundians from all walks of life, with whom I had lengthy conversations about
questions of development, peace, the future, their plans for themselves and their
children, and just life in general. Among those interviewed, there were 63 ex-
combatants. I pulled these results out and present them here separately in an attempt to
gain a better understanding of who these people are and how their return to their
communities has proceeded. This report will focus mainly on the ―reintegration‖ part
of the DDR program—not the ―DD‖ parts, which had taken place (or not) long before I
arrived. Evidently, this is a small sample of the entire MDRP target group of more than
20,000 ex-combatants nationwide. The results presented here, thus, are mainly
indicative of the specific places I worked in; more substantial research is required to
test their validity on a larger scale.
Source: Uvin, P., 2007, ‗Ex-combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left,
how they fared‘, Working Paper No. 3, Multi-Country Demobilization and
Reintegration Program, Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Demobilization and Reintegration
J Weinstein and M Humphreys (2005)
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Summary
Policy analysts have debated the organisational factors that contribute to successful
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes, but little is known
about the factors that account for success at the micro level. What are the individual
level determinants of successful demobilisation and reintegration? This research from
the Centre for Global Development finds that an individuals‘ prospects of gaining
acceptance depends largely on the abusiveness of the unit in which he or she fought.
There is no evidence that participation in internationally funded DDR programs
improves an individual‘s chance of acceptance by their families or communities.
The basic purpose of DDR is to re-establish a legitimate monopoly over the use of
force by the government and return former fighters to civilian activities. In post-
conflict situations where there is distrust and uncertainty such programs are fraught
with complexity. The literature on ‗lessons learned‘ from DDR programs is devoid of
any micro-level data that might explain why some individuals and not others are able
to reintegrate.
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This study explores individual, group, and community level determinants of
reintegration success and considers whether combatants have been accepted by their
families, found employment, rejected their faction as a political actor and accepted the
democratic process. The degree of acceptance by family and community is a key
indicator of a combatant‘s long-term prospect.
There is little evidence that women or young people faced a significantly harder
time gaining acceptance into civilian life after conflict.
The most important determinant of whether an individual was accepted by
family and community is the abusiveness of the unit in which he or she fought.
There is weak evidence that individuals who settle in communities that suffered
high levels of abuse during the war encounter more difficulty in gaining
acceptance from family and friends.
There is little evidence that participation in DDR programs increases the
likelihood of acceptance. Non-participants do just as well in the post-war
period. The findings suggest this is most likely because other factors are
facilitating reintegration.
To design effective DDR programs that contribute to peace-building, we need rigorous
research on the micro factors that explain why combatants reject their factional
affiliations, reintegrate into the community and the economy and embrace the post-war
political order.
Specially targeted programs to help female combatants do not have a solid
evidence base because in Sierra Leone women face no more difficulty
reintegrating.
Individual level factors like the combatants experience in the war matter more
than the socio-economic characteristics of former combatants.
Factors only measurable at the country level might be far more important in
determining the path for reintegration.
The design of DDR programs must employ methodologies that can account for
selection effects that operate at the level of the individual directly. The best
approach is the development of monitoring and evaluation systems that employ
some degree of randomized intervention.
Source: Weinstein, J., and Humphreys, M., 2005, 'Disentangling the Determinants of
Successful Demobilization and Reintegration,' Center for Global Development,
Working Paper Number 69, Massachusetts
Does Money Work? Cash Transfers to Ex-combatants in Disarmament,
Demobilisation and Reintegration Processes
S Willibald (2006)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
What is the most effective form of aid for countries undergoing the immediate
transition from war to peace? Can direct cash transfers to ex-combatants be
successfully employed as part of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)
assistance packages? This Overseas Development Institute paper examines empirical
evidence of cash transfer programmes in West Africa. It argues that cash transfers can
indeed be a successful tool when used in the immediate ‗reinsertion‘, or post-
demobilisation stage of the transition process, provided they are properly administered.
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What is the most effective form of aid for countries undergoing the immediate
transition from war to peace? Can direct cash transfers to ex-combatants be
successfully employed as part of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)
assistance packages? This Overseas Development Institute paper examines empirical
evidence of cash transfer programmes in West Africa. It argues that cash transfers can
indeed be a successful tool when used in the immediate ‗re-insertion‘, or post-
demobilisation stage of the transition process. However, success depends on
appropriate choices on how to implement the cash transfer package. Inappropriate
implementation can have negative implications for local, national and regional security
and development.
Where cash transfers have failed, or have created negative side-effects, the evidence
suggests that factors beyond simply the use of money are more significant causes of
failure. The key factors to be considered in the management of cash transfers are:
payment location, eligibility criteria and the choice of who to target.
Ex-combatants (with the exception of child ex-combatants) do tend to use the
money they receive wisely. Nevertheless, there is a potential for corruption,
particularly at the commander level. Misuse and corruption can be reduced
through prior agreement on spending restrictions and eligibility criteria, backed
up by sufficient supervision.
The provision of cash to individual ex-combatants can create community
resentment, at least initially. Such resentment can be offset by clear
communication to community members of the objectives of cash transfers, and
through projects which help to re-integrate ex-combatants.
There is no evidence that cash transfers disadvantage female members of the
households of ex-combatants, and indeed the opposite seems to be the case.
However, inappropriate eligibility criteria could exclude and disadvantage
female fighters.
The choice of payment location carries local, national and regional security
implications. Delays in payment reduce the incentive to demobilise, and yet
cash transfers at the point of disarmament create a dangerous ‗cash-for-
weapons‘ image. Accurate information and timely delivery are crucial to
prevent frustration among ex-combatants.
There is a need for a regional approach to DDR programmes in order to limit
cross-border arms movements.
There is a need for a continued dialogue between aid organisations and donor and
recipient countries on the role of cash transfers in aid provision. The adoption and
success of such initiatives will depend largely on the willingness of these actors to
consider alternatives to traditional in-kind assistance. Existing empirical research
suggests that any potential disadvantages in the use of cash transfers in DDR packages
are surmountable. However this data is limited and further research is needed in the
following areas:
The impact of different management decisions, such as payment location and
eligibility criteria, on the success of cash transfer programmes.
Context-specific issues, which take into account the complex realities of each
country and conflict.
Detailed comparative analyses between the use of cash and other forms of aid.
This would help to identify where cash transfer programmes would be most
appropriate as a complement or replacement to other forms of aid provision.
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Source: Willibald, S., 2006, 'Does Money Work? Cash Transfers to Ex-combatants in
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Processes', Disasters, vol. 30, pp.
316-339
202
6. Transitional Justice and Reconciliation and their Role in Mitigating
Risks of Violence
Core readings
Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework
D Crocker (1999)
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Summary
How should a society deal with past evils? In his paper, David Crocker develops a
normative framework with which a society can reckon with past wrongs. He aims to
show that there are crucial moral aspects in reckoning with the past and to clarify,
criticise, revise, apply and diffuse eight moral norms. There is not a recipe for all but
rather a framework for exploration to decide what is most important to accomplish and
what the morally best ways to do so are.
Many nations and some international bodies today are deciding what, if anything, they
should do about past violations of internationally recognised human rights. Crocker has
formulated eight goals that have emerged from worldwide moral deliberation on
transitional justice (TJ) and may serve as a useful framework when particular societies
deliberate about what they are trying to achieve and how.
A general framework shaped by lessons from a variety of contexts can encourage each
society reckoning with an evil past to realise as many as possible of the goals that
international dialogue agrees are morally urgent:
Without reasonably complete truth, none of the other goals of TJ are likely to be
realised.
Ethically defensible treatment of past wrongs requires that individuals and
groups responsible for past crimes are held accountable and receive appropriate
sanctions or punishment.
The rule of law is critical for any society dealing with an evil past.
One way of reckoning with past wrongs is by ―righting‖ them – by restoring
victims to something approaching their status quo ante (via compensation,
restitution or reparation).
An emerging democracy fails to make a sustainable transition unless it identifies
the causes of past abuses and takes steps to reform the law and basic
institutions.
In particular circumstances, the achievement of one or more goals would itself
be a means to the realisation of the one or more of the others.
A society reckoning with past wrongs, sometimes in co-operation with international
institutions should: consider what lessons it might learn from other societies; examine
its‘ own capabilities and limitations; set clear objectives for its efforts. And take into
account that:
There is no single set of policies that will be ethically defensible and practically
feasible - sometimes the best that can be done is to approximate one or more
goals initially or postpone them until conditions improve.
Strategies implemented solely under pressure and without proper attention to
relevant ethical questions are likely to be ad hoc, ineffective, inconsistent and
unstable.
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Different local conditions have a crucial bearing on the best that can be done in
particular contexts.
Source: Crocker, D.A. 1999. 'Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework',
Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, School of Public Policy, University of
Maryland, College Park, Maryland
Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity
P Hayner (2002)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
This book is a profound exploration of truth commissions around the world, and the
anguish, injustice, and the legacy of hate they are meant to absolve. Case studies
include South Africa, El Salvador, Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala.
Source: Hayner, P.B., 2002, ‗Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and
Atrocity‘, New York: Routledge.
Supplementary readings
A Scoping Study of Transitional Justice and Poverty Reduction
J Alexander (2003)
Access full text online
Summary
In post-conflict developing countries, there is a frequent need to address human rights
violations committed during the conflict period. The mechanisms used for this purpose
include criminal and civil prosecution in domestic, foreign and international courts,
traditional justice processes, truth commissions, lustration/ vetting, reparations and
amnesties. These mechanisms are designed to achieve such goals as justice,
reconciliation and peace. Do they also have the potential to contribute to the goal of
poverty reduction?
This report for the Department for International Development (DFID) examines
‗transitional justice mechanisms‘ (TJMs) employed in post-conflict situations, with
reference to past and present examples. It explores the impact that TJMs may have on
achieving poverty reduction as primary among the United Nations Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). Yet so far, poverty reduction has not been a stated aim of
TJMs, limiting their impact on this goal. To fulfil their potential in reducing poverty,
TJMs must go beyond their usual emphasis on civil and political rights to address
violations of economic and social rights. Reparations for the economic and social
consequences of human rights abuses should be prioritised. Through their impact on
key conditions such as political and social stability, and by enhancing security and
access to justice, TJMs can contribute indirectly to the goal of reducing poverty. More
directly, they can help alleviate material disadvantage, exclusion and vulnerability.
To be effective TJMs must form part of a coherent overall strategy, meet clear and
realistic objectives, and be relevant and legitimate to those they aim to assist. Analysis
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of TJMs in countries including Rwanda, East Timor, Sierra Leone, South Africa, El
Salvador and Guatemala suggests that:
A combination of mechanisms may be necessary to produce the best results,
but efforts must be made to avoid gaps, co-ordinate the TJMs smoothly and
secure public understanding.
Many problems encountered by TJMs are caused by a lack of resources and
time commitment. A long-term view is required and external oversight is
essential to ensure accountability.
Transitional justice strategies must aim to conform to the relevant international
legal standards, although some consideration may legitimately be given to the
constraints of the post-conflict context.
Enforcement of the judgments, decisions and recommendations of TJMs is vital
to their success. Where they fail, there is a risk that tensions will be exacerbated
and the trust of victims in the state and/or international community will be
diminished.
International involvement in transitional justice has increased in recent years and can
directly or indirectly shape its design and implementation. Therefore, it can also help
boost the role of TJMs in reducing poverty. To achieve the best results:
International intervention should aim to complement domestic transitional
justice initiatives where possible, develop national capacity and increase
accountability.
Relating TJMs to poverty reduction may favour particular forms of justice that
bring individuals back into economic activity, including reparations for victims
or community service for perpetrators.
More attention should be paid to the perspectives of victims, with a greater
focus on vulnerable groups that make up most of the world‘s poor: women,
children, older people and the displaced.
Source: Alexander, J., 2003, 'A Scoping Study of Transitional Justice and Poverty
Reduction', Final Report for Department for International Development (DFID),
London.
Where We Are and How We Got Here: An Overview of Developments in the
Search for Justice and Reconciliation
N Kritz (2002)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
At the dawn of the 21st century, it is increasingly recognized that societies that refuse
to address the painful legacy of past abuses do so at their peril. The most vivid recent
demonstration of this lesson was the experience of the former Yugoslavia. In the name
of brotherhood and unity, the Tito regime prohibited any discussion of the brutalities
committed by Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks against one another during the World War II
period. The result was not brotherhood: accounts expanded into mythologies
transmitted from one generation to the next in each ethnic community and further
exaggerated along the way. This was exemplified by the mortality data for the
notorious Jasenovac concentration camp in Croatia. By the 1990's, the story had
expanded: Croat nationalists claimed that 20,000 people died at the camp during the
war, mostly of disease; Serb nationalists insisted that up to a million people,
overwhelmingly Serbs, were slaughtered by the Croat Ustashe at Jasenovac. After the
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death of Tito, cynical nationalists were able to exploit this unresolved history of
atrocities to instil fear in each ethnic group and to manipulate them into new rounds of
violence.
A variety of approaches have developed to respond to past atrocities in ways that are
intended to facilitate justice and/or reconciliation. These include criminal prosecution
of perpetrators—before domestic, international and mixed courts—the imposition of
various non-criminal sanctions, truth commissions, and the provision of compensation
to victims of the abuses, each of which are examined below. The importance of dealing
with the demons of the past is now more broadly accepted: the challenge is to fine-tune
and better coordinate the options.
Source: Kritz, N., 2002, 'Where We Are and How We Got Here: An Overview of
Developments in the Search for Justice and Reconciliation', in Henkin, Alice H. (Ed.),
The Legacy of Abuse: Confronting the Past, Facing the Future, Aspen Institute, New
York University School of Law.
Rebuilding an Inclusive Political Community After War
R Mani (2005)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
A peaceful future for post-conflict societies depends on their ability to build an
inclusive political community. Does transitional justice as it is currently practiced
facilitate reconciliation and inclusion? Experience to date suggests that transitional
justice measures do not fulfil the central intention of reconciliation. This paper from
the journal ‗Security Dialogue‘ proposes reparative justice as an alternative and
broader framework. The reparative justice approach aims to facilitate individual and
societal reconciliation towards the goal of regenerating an inclusive political
community.
Before political representation can be promoted in a post-conflict society, past
divisions of victims and perpetrators must be overcome. Reconciliation is a process
through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future. It is a step
toward an ‗inclusive political community‘, where all people and groups participate in
rebuilding their society.
Transitional justice is a set of mechanisms which is expected to yield the by-product of
reconciliation between people and communities in addition to delivering some measure
of justice. The two preferred mechanisms of transitional justice are trials and truth
commissions. The recent experiences in Sierra Leone, East Timor and Cambodia
expose some of the difficulties with transitional justice trials.
The fundamental problem with trials and truth commissions is that they have the
unintended side-effect of being divisive. Truth commissions tend to focus on victims to
the exclusion of other groups, whereas trials focus exclusively on perpetrators. The
reconciliatory effect of truth commissions is uncertain, since the very nature of conflict
contradicts the existence of a single truth. Moreover, the desire to forgive and reconcile
with one‘s enemy is individual, and cannot be imposed.
Other problems of pursuing reconciliation through transitional justice include:
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The problems of political will and resources to implement trials, commissions,
reforms and recommendations.
The destruction of evidence in conflicts and the difficulty of finding and
providing evidence in chaotic post-conflict environments.
The weakness, destruction or corruption of the judiciary and scarcity of lawyers
to provide fair trials.
The difficulty of providing adequate witness protection and safe custody of
suspects.
Lack of agreement on appropriate punishment of war criminals.
The danger of a backlash and relapse into violence.
Reparative justice offers a more effective and suitable bridge between past and future
than transitional justice. Transitional justice is weighted in the past, as its main locus is
resolving the burden of past violations. Reconciliation through reparative justice is
turned towards making normal life possible in the future. Recommendations in the
spirit of reparative justice include:
Reconciliation can only stem from a form of justice that is inclusive and uniting
rather than exclusive and dividing. It should be permanent and incremental, and
survivor-oriented rather than perpetrator or victim centred.
Reparative justice would include all existing methods of transitional justice,
including trials and truth commissions. It would also return attention to the
neglected dimension of broader social practices of commemoration, healing,
education, meaningful apologies, acknowledgment and restitution.
Reparative justice would explore the ignored debate on punishment. It would
undertake alternative forms of punishment that might be more socially
constructive and might help rebuild fractured societal relations, in addition to
incarceration.
Reparative justice should not be seen as a panacea. It cannot in itself forge and
shape an inclusive political community. It will depend on considerable will on
the part of all political constituencies and consistent engagement by all parts of
society.
Mani, R., 2005, 'Rebuilding an Inclusive Political Community After War', Security
Dialogue, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 511-526
Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies - Approaches to Reconciliation
E Mobekk (2004)
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Summary
The issue of transitional justice in post-conflict societies has become increasingly
important in recent years. This paper from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces examines forms of transitional justice. It looks at truth
commissions, local courts and traditional methods of justice which have the greatest
potential for local ownership. It argues that local ownership is crucial to the success of
the post-conflict reconstruction process.
Reconciliation is the objective of post-conflict reconstruction processes but is often
vaguely defined. National reconciliation is achieved when societal and political
processes function and develop without reverting to the framework of the conflict.
Individual reconciliation is the ability of each human to conduct their life without fear
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or hate. The distinction is central because some transitional justice mechanisms
promote one type over another. There is a growing consensus of the nexus between
peace and justice. The justice debates infer that justice in the form of criminal
proceedings followed by punishment will not lead to reconciliation. However, certain
mechanisms of retributive and restorative justice can support reconciliation in
particular contexts.
Findings about the different forms of transitional justice include:
Truth commissions give a voice to the voiceless. However, recommendations
are often ignored. They are less politically sensitive because they are unable to
punish and can therefore be used to avoid issues of transitional justice. The lack
of accountability can undermine the transition process.
Civil society in numerous post-conflict societies has demanded trials and
retributive justice. Stability may be threatened if no action is taken.
Accountability must be established from the very beginning.
However, in some political situations trials are not possible. Local judicial
systems may be unable to handle the number of cases. Moreover, local trials
focus on the perpetrator not the victim and on individual guilt rather than
widespread abuse.
Traditional methods of justice are increasingly promoted as a means of
reconciliation and tools of conflict resolution.
However, they frequently deny the perpetrator a fair trial. Punishments can be
against international laws and standards. They are designed to deal with minor
crimes.
Three factors must be ensured in a post-conflict society, irrespective of the types of
transitional justice mechanisms that are implemented. Local ownership must be
assured. Needs assessments must be conducted prior to establishing or recommending
the types of mechanisms. The international community should make several options
available that can be implemented in a complementary manner. Specific
recommendations include:
Acknowledge truth as a difficult concept. Cover the truth commissions
extensively in the media.
Assess the use of amnesties and its consequences. Inform and educate civil
society as to what a truth commission can achieve and what its objectives are.
Local political willingness is essential for its success.
Reform the judicial system and the judiciary from the beginning. Establish ad
hoc solutions to address perpetrators of past human rights abuses, Develop an
international transitional law based on international human rights standards,
norms and laws.
Assess traditional mechanisms before encouraging their implementation.
Establish what level of crimes they can be applied to. Acknowledge the vast
variations between mechanisms and assess their viability.
Be aware of the potential effects on the judicial regime and public security
forces. Educate civil society that traditional mechanisms can be complementary
to formal judicial mechanisms so as not to undermine the reformed judicial
system. Implement the mechanisms consistently.
Mobekk, E., 2005, 'Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies - Approaches to
Reconciliation' in After Intevention: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict
Societies - From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership, eds. Ebnother, A and
Fluri, P., Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva
208
Donor-Driven Justice and its Discontents: The Case of Rwanda
B Oomen (2005)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
How does the fact that the justice process within Rwanda is so strongly conceived,
financed and driven by the international community affect its workings and
legitimacy? Never before was a process of justice so driven from outside, with
intensive donor involvement in domestic justice as well as the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). It has become the forerunner of a wider trend towards a
judicialisation of international relations.
The good governance paradigm has redirected donor funds towards a range of legal
activities formerly considered the prerogative of nation states. This was driven by the
end of the Cold War, the 1990s impasse in development thinking, failing states and the
perceived neutrality of the law. In various countries and territories essentially governed
by outside forces, pre-fabricated justice packages like criminal codes are implemented,
and often are not merely transitional. In sovereign countries, western legal transplants
are promoted which open the way for a free-market economy.
In Rwanda, donors invested in five main categories: International justice outside
Rwanda, the domestic legal system, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission,
gacaca (customary courts) and other human rights initiatives. The fields of agriculture,
health and education became secondary.
The ICTR did produce some groundbreaking case law, but had the international
community as its audience, not Rwandan victims.
Individual donors engaged in diverse activities, alongside numerous
international NGOs and Rwandan human rights groups. Lack of coordination or
even outright competition emerged.
Bringing out the full truth does not always result in reconciliation. At times
Rwanda resembled a laboratory for testing legal approaches.
The image of a stable democracy post-genocide is superficial. Elections in 2003
were rigged, and new elites have reaped most economic benefits. Human rights
violations, disappearances, killings, and government involvement in war in the
Congo are concerning.
The government monopolised knowledge production of the history of the
genocide and made use of the justice process to entrench its power, particularly
in the gacaca.
The gacaca received wide international support but lack traditional authenticity
and fall short on true popular participation. The weekly meetings, intensive
trainings and radio broadcasts strengthen government control, and deflect
international attention from other injustices.
The importance of justice in Rwanda should not be negated, but true justice should be
done. The legal has been made subservient to the political. Even the most localised
processes are about tightening minority control.
By funding elements of the justice process in the context of increasing
oppression, the international community risks complicity. It may legitimise
many elements of injustice in Rwandan society today and allow the government
to use saved funds for defence purposes.
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This is part of a wider trend in Africa today towards shadow bookkeeping.
Nations comply with donor exigencies in terms of decentralisation,
democratisation and constitution writing, while the real politics takes place
elsewhere along different lines.
There has been a growth and globalisation of the justice sector in development
with its own experts, interests, dynamics and political economy. There is a
danger of losing sight of the original purpose and other ways to achieve it. A
minority of Rwandans prioritise genocide trials, highlighting improved living
standards instead.
Separating law from politics is impossible. An isolationist emphasis on law, in
an environment so concerned with politicising the institutions of government,
emphasises the culture of impunity.
Source: Oomen, B., 2005, 'Donor-Driven Justice and its Discontents: The Case of
Rwanda', Development and Change, vol. 36, no. 5, pp. 887 – 910
Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons from Sierra Leone
R Shaw (2005)
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Summary
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs), are increasingly viewed as a standard
part of any national post-conflict healing process. Can TRCs contribute to social
recovery? This paper, published by the United States Institute of Peace, investigates
Sierra Leone's TRC, which began its public hearings in 2003. It examines the
compatibility of the TRC with the local recovery strategy - a "forgive and forget"
approach. It argues that the TRC will be more effective if it builds on established
practices of healing and coexistence.
TRCs became popular during the Reagan era as a means of dealing with repressive
Latin American regimes. More recently it has been held that the public recounting of
memories of covert, state-sponsored crimes is deemed a redemptive process. TRCs
provide an opportunity for the previously silenced stories of victims to be publicly
acknowledged. The process of remembering is intended to avoid reoccurrence. TRCs
therefore rest on the premise that past atrocities must be confronted in order to face the
future.
Sierra Leone's TRC was popular among local NGOs and human rights activists, but
gained less support among the wider population. The TRC in Sierra Leone was not
well adapted to the local context. The 'forgive and forget' approach, or social
forgetting, which is the traditional and established local practice for recovery was the
most popular amongst the people. This approach had been used to reintegrate child
soldiers in the North. Verbal remembering has proved useful where state-sponsored,
clandestine human rights abuses have taken place, but in Sierra Leone, crimes and
killings were common knowledge as no attempt was made to conceal them in the first
place.
Wherever TRCs are contemplated, scepticism is encountered. These can be based on:
Fear of retaliation by the perpetrators of past crimes and worries of government
retribution.
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Concerns about the coexistence of different justice mechanisms (in Sierra
Leone's case the TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone).
A discrediting of the assumption that TRCs give purportedly universal benefits.
The process of verbally remembering violence is problematic and largely based
on Western historical processes.
There will always be a need to document atrocities through first-hand accounts. This
can contribute to the development of stable national institutions. However, as Sierra
Leone's experience shows, specific considerations must be taken into account before
establishing a TRC:
TRCs can empower previously silenced survivors and are an important means
of establishing accountability after periods of covert state violence. But such
outcomes are unattainable in cases of overt crime and where there is no recourse
to retributive justice.
It is essential to gauge popular support for this type of healing process. The
views of all people should be taken into account, rather than instigating plans
based on the views of local politicians and NGOs.
Any process of healing is more effective if created in line with established
practices, rather than negating the value of cultural preference.
Recovery can in fact be undermined if external practices that seem to
vehemently oppose local tradition are thrust upon the population. In Sierra
Leone, communities were in fact divided over their views towards the TRC.
Shaw, R., 2005, 'Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons from
Sierra Leone', United States Institute for Peace, Special Report, no. 130
The Introduction of a Modernized Gacaca for Judging Suspects of Participation
in the Genocide and the Massacres of 1994 in Rwanda
P Uvin (2000)
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Summary
The formal justice system in Rwanda is failing to provide redress for the genocide and
massacres of 1994, despite heavy investment by the Rwandan government and
international donors. There is a need to speed up trials and improve their quality,
empty the country's overcrowded prisons and involve the population in establishing the
truth and promoting reconciliation. One solution may be offered by adapting gacaca, a
traditional mechanism of conflict resolution. But even this alternative is fraught with
contradictions. How can donors ensure that the system put into place maximises the
positive potential of gacaca and minimises its negative implications?
This paper examines the reasons in favour of gacaca and highlights the obstacles to its
efficient and equitable functioning. It warns donors that the decision to support gacaca
is highly political and offers clear advice on how to manage the process.
Gacaca potentially respects key conditions of fair trial and due process in an original,
locally appropriate form, and its limitations and constraints may be no less than the
current judicial system. Although gacaca enjoys widespread public support, its
legitimacy can be easily undermined and must therefore be clearly established to avoid
interference by (local) power-holders. Uvin proposes that donors adopt a policy of
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'critical support' with particular attention to fast, local, reliable and gacaca-specific
monitoring and subsequent joint action.
Other conclusions from the paper are that:
Gacaca could lead to an increase rather than a decrease in prison populations;
this might eventually require an amnesty once guilt was established.
Sensitisation to gacaca has so far been a top-down process; if reconciliation is to
be achieved in the long term, both development and judicial NGOs should be
involved in participatory work with the population.
A gender perspective is vital at all stages if women are to participate in the
gacaca process.
There are particular concerns about urban jurisdictions, where the basic social
conditions for efficient and effective functioning are not guaranteed.
The events of 1994 are not the only challenge for the justice system in Rwanda;
other problems must also be addressed, including crimes committed by the FPR.
Donors must co-ordinate their administration and policies. Critical financial and
political support for gacaca must be placed in a wider context and accompanied by
ongoing support for other programmes in Rwanda. Policy implications of this paper
are:
Central monitoring and management structures offer a means to deal with the
basic uncertainties of the gacaca experiment and to combat local abuses.
Investment in social services and primary and secondary education could be an
alternative to direct forms of compensation to genocide survivors as well as a
way of improving the lives of all Rwandans.
Uvin, P. 2000, 'The Introduction of a Modernized Gacaca for Judging Suspects of
Participation in the Genocide and the Massacres of 1994 in Rwanda', a discussion
paper prepared for the Belgian Secretary of State for Development Cooperation
Gender, Justice, and Truth Commissions
World Bank (2006)
Access full text online
Summary
How have truth commissions (TCs) in societies emerging from conflict or repressive
regimes incorporated a gender approach to their investigations of human right
violations? What assistance could development actors, particularly the World Bank,
provide to such an approach? This paper from the World Bank analyses the degree to
which a gender-sensitive perspective was used in three TCs, in South Africa, Peru and
Sierra Leone. It argues that a gender approach can enhance the effectiveness of
reparations offered by TCs and prevent future conflicts, and that increased support
from international actors might strengthen TCs‘ engagement with such issues.
TCs are non-judicial mechanisms which investigate and report on human rights
violations during armed conflict or repressive regimes. They seek to heal social
divisions by documenting atrocities, determining responsibility, facilitating victims‘
participation and recommending reforms to prevent future violence.
The gender perspective has been incorporated into TCs relatively recently. This
approach entails distinguishing between the consequences of human rights violations
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for men and women. It aims to rectify women‘s traditional invisibility in peace
negotiations by recommending reparations accommodating women‘s views and needs,
as well as men‘s.
The three TCs – following the end of apartheid in South Africa, the hostilities between
the Shining Path and the Peruvian state and the armed conflict in Sierra Leone –
partially incorporated a gender-sensitive approach:
The South African TC‘s mandate did not identify women or gender-based
violations as specific subjects for investigation, although female commissioners
interpreted ―torture‖ as referring to gender-based violence. The TC ran
preparatory workshops and commissioner training to encourage women to
testify on human rights violations. Although no references to gender appears in
the report‘s main conclusions, one chapter focused on women‘s experience of
violence and the TC recommended human rights training in schools and for
legal personnel.
The Peruvian TC‘s mandate did not specify investigation of sexual crimes, but
did refer to ―human rights violations‖. The TC‘s gender-sensitive provisions
included: a statement stressing the importance of the gender perspective, a
special TC gender unit, training for investigators interviewing women and a
forum on women‘s role in the conflict. The report discussed gender roles,
women‘s participation in post-conflict peacebuilding and stigma suffered by
female victims of sexual violence and took a gender-based approach in its
recommendation plan.
The Sierra Leonean TC‘s mandate specifically referred to ―sexual abuses‖ in the
conflict. Its female commissioners prioritised gender violence by establishing
workshops for women‘s groups and special hearings for women. The report
documented human rights violations during the conflict and recommended
redressing women‘s marginalisation with reforms to the political, judicial, legal,
healthcare and educational systems.
TCs provide a fundamental basis for development in post-conflict societies. Their
capacity to restore social divisions could be enhanced by improved application of a
gender approach and international support:
As well as contributing to transitional justice, TC reports provide early analyses
of transition societies‘ social needs. With greater resources, the three TCs
surveyed could have offered more complete investigations of gender inequality.
The post-conflict Peruvian government adopted some reforms suggested by the
TC, but implementation and political will were often weak. International actors
could provide research, training and report-writing support, but also
implementation assistance through funding and loan conditionality.
As a contributor to human security and post-conflict reconstruction, TCs could
contribute to the World Bank‘s objective of poverty reduction. The World Bank
could help fund reparations and institutional reforms following TCs.
Source: World Bank, 2006, 'Gender, Justice, and Truth Commissions', The World
Bank, Washington
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7. Security Sector and Justice Sector Reform and their Role in
Mitigating Risks of Violence
7.1 Security sector
Core readings
Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform
M Brzoska (2003)
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Summary
What are the strengths and weaknesses of developmental approaches to security sector
reform (SSR)? How is the concept of SSR changing, and how might it be developed to
enable better implementation? This paper from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces traces the origins of the SSR debate and surveys the
opportunities and challenges presented by reform. It argues that, while a
comprehensive and developmental approach to SSR is important, donor governments‘
inadequate coordination and competing objectives and recipient countries‘ resistance
have hampered SSR efforts.
With the growth in post-conflict development programmes since the end of the Cold
War, development practitioners have increasingly encountered and addressed security
issues. They have aimed to integrate SSR into wider poverty reduction objectives,
although this approach has been criticised for ignoring the underlying causes of
insecurity.
Early developmental SSR initiatives focusing on limiting military expenditure through
aid conditionality were replaced by an emphasis on policy dialogue and transparent,
accountable expenditure. The growth in post-conflict development work has focused
strategy on demobilisation, although the division of labour between peacekeeping
missions and development actors has been unclear. Development practitioners have
varying approaches to SSR:
SSR has been channelled towards poverty-reduction objectives since resources
are released through lower military expenditure and economic activity is
promoted through increased security and conflict prevention. However, hard
evidence of pro-poor outcomes of SSR is still sparse.
Other development practitioners prioritise security provision, even if it is
delivered by non-state actors. However, this ―security first‖ approach may work
to the exclusion of effective oversight of security services.
Another approach emphasises governance in the security services. This strategy
aims for civilian oversight, civil society monitoring, transparent budgeting and
professionalisation of the security sector. However, oversight can be
cumbersome and hamper security forces‘ short-term effectiveness.
Despite the development community‘s support of SSR, numerous difficulties exist in
prioritising and sequencing the elements of reform, and in implementing SSR. These
stem from lack of coordination and capacity among donors, insufficient certainty in
development actors‘ mandates and inadequate commitment from recipient countries:
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Donors often lack the financial and institutional capacity to institute SSR, since
many agencies have made cuts recently and few of their personnel have
experience of the security sector. SSR is resource-heavy since partial security
reform can be counterproductive.
Local ownership is key in an area as politically sensitive as SSR. However,
oppressive governments have little commitment to changing their security
forces, while strong reformist governments may resist donor intervention.
SSR requires cooperation from defence, foreign and justice ministries alongside
development agencies. However, there is often poor coordination owing to
cultural differences between ministries and conflicting interests – between
demilitarisation and arms exports, for example. An overarching SSR mandate
for development agencies or improved cross-cutting cooperation could enhance
the donor response.
Further research, involving the development of indicators to evaluate SSR and
analysis of SSR sequencing, should be undertaken to produce best practice
approaches. Local and international experts should jointly produce context-
specific reports on reform possibilities, linking broad SSR objectives with
realities on the ground.
Source: Brzoska, M., 2003, 'Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector
Reform', Occasional Paper no. 4, DCAF, Geneva
Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform: A Guide for Donors
L Nathan (2007)
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Summary
Local ownership is imperative for successful security sector reform (SSR), although
the principle is frequently breached in practice. This paper, commissioned by the UK
Government‘s Global Conflict Prevention Pool, aims to contribute to operationalising
donors‘ policy commitment to local ownership of SSR. Incorporating planning and
diagnostic tools, it argues that SSR programmes must be flexible and responsive to
local actors and conditions. Local ownership must be the primary objective for
developing a process-oriented approach to SSR that empowers local actors, thereby
increasing the chance of long-term success.
Donor governments often impose their own models and programmes on local actors,
generating resentment and resistance. Local ownership means that reforms must be
designed, managed and implemented by local actors. Reforms often face multiple
obstacles and a protracted process of struggle. SSR requires a context of democracy or
democratisation, the technical and material capacity for sustainable reform and a
willing executive capable of exercising control over security services.
Country context is critical in designing reforms and determining appropriate donor
support strategies. Other important considerations include:
SSR is a democratic and democratising project that should aim to ensure
decision-making and governance in the security sector conforms to democratic
norms.
Project funding cycles of one to three years impose unrealistic timeframes and
focus on short-term results. Donors should regard SSR processes to be as
215
significant as the content and outcomes of initiatives, and develop appropriate
timeframes.
Clearly defined cascading objectives that flow from overarching national goals,
through to security sector institutions and specific SSR programme objectives
improve the direction and cohesion of reforms.
Inclusive and consultative SSR design should distinguish between categories of
actor (decision-makers, implementing agencies, reform designers, advisors and
interested parties) and ensure they are properly engaged.
Incomplete or crude analyses that attribute potential obstacles solely to
incompetence and/or political resistance can be damaging. It is necessary to
distinguish between ideological, personal, organisational and structural
obstacles and the different strategies required to address them.
Long-term support for capacity-building on terms acceptable to local actors is the most
useful contribution donors can make to SSR. Such support could include:
Research support for parliamentary committees dealing with security, to help
develop their technical and comparative knowledge. Parliaments are forums for
open debate and building their capacity enhances oversight and executive
accountability.
Providing equipment and training to establish security policy and planning units
in relevant departments which can design, manage and monitor the SSR
process.
A small grants scheme for civil society activities focused on security, to enable
greater public participation and enhance the democratic process.
Funding for specialist training for drafting security legislation.
Comparative SSR exchange and study, including seminars, internships and
courses, to build the expertise and confidence of local actors.
Institutionalising the principle of local ownership in donor governments,
including incorporating local ownership and capacity-building as key objectives
in funding proposals and in reporting and evaluation requirements.
Source: Nathan, L., 2006, 'Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform: A Guide for
Donors', Paper prepared for the Department for International Development (DFID),
London
OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform: Supporting Security and
Justice
OECD-DAC (2007)
Access full text online
Summary
How can the gap between policy and practice on Security Sector Reform (SSR) be
closed? This handbook from the Development Assistance Committee of the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) provides
guidance on how to operationalise its guidelines on SSR. Addressing the challenges
faced by all citizens to achieve personal safety, security and access to justice should be
the key determining factor in evaluating the success or otherwise of donor support
programmes.
This handbook is the main outcome of the 2-years Implementation Framework for
Security System Reform (IF-SSR) process. It has been designed by and for
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international actors working to address insecurity and support access to justice. It aims
to ensure that donor support to SSR programmes is both effective and sustainable. It
advocates an approach whereby the desired outcome and the context determine the
priority, nature and scope of the programme.
The political terrain needs to be prepared in partner countries and early investments
made in appropriate analysis. Generating public interest, understanding and
engagement in SSR is critical.
Experience shows the benefit of establishing an inception phase to an SSR
programme – it allows donors to build understanding of the context, to
effectively target support, and to assess where donor support adds value.
The process of identifying and fostering ownership requires continuous
attention. It cannot be assumed that ownership will be easily identifiable or
coherent at the point where international actors engage.
SSR programmes need to take a multi-layered or multi-stakeholder approach.
SSR objectives need to focus on the ultimate outcomes of basic security and
justice services.
The international community needs to move from ad hoc, often short-term,
projects to more strategic engagement.
Donors should aim to improve basic security and justice service delivery, establish an
effective governance, oversight and accountability system, and develop local
leadership and ownership of the reform process.
Technical inputs to SSR should be delivered and co-ordinated with a clear
understanding of the political nature of SSR and institutional opportunities and
constraints.
Assessment tools should inform the design of realistic, focussed programmes,
which can make significant contributions to supporting partner countries in
addressing the security and justice needs of all citizens.
Donors must work with partners to ensure that initiatives to support the delivery
of security and justice are conflict-sensitive and financially, institutionally and
culturally sustainable.
The international community should use appropriate instruments and
approaches for different contexts and should build support across the justice and
security system to ensure a more strategic approach to SSR.
SSR should be viewed as an integral part of the planning process for immediate
post-conflict situations and peace support operations.
The OECD DAC Handbook on SSR can be used to help place sub-sector
reforms in the context of system-wide needs.
Source: OECD, 2007, 'OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform: Supporting
Security and Justice', OECD, Paris
217
Supplementary readings
Strengthening Democratic Governance of the Security Sector in Conflict-Affected
Countries
N Ball (2005)
Access full text online
Summary
A safe, secure environment for people, communities and states is essential for
sustainable development and conflict mitigation. This article in Public Administration
and Development analyses the challenges confronting the achievement of democratic
security sector governance after conflict. Addressing these challenges requires
professional security forces, capable civil authorities, rule of law and regional
approaches. Local stakeholders must make hard decisions about priorities on the
availability of domestic resources and the costs and benefits of accepting external
assistance.
Politicised or ineffective security and justice systems can create instability and
insecurity. Attention to democratic security governance is particularly important in
conflict-affected countries that typically experience significant institutional
weaknesses and suffer from the enduring legacies of undemocratic politics. Efforts to
strengthen and restructure the state apparatus are severely hampered by competition for
power, lack of legitimacy of political leaders and lack of consensus over the country's
future.
To date, efforts to reform the security sector have concentrated primarily on
strengthening the operational capacity of the security forces, rather than strengthening
democratic oversight and accountability mechanisms. A country's focus on short-term
security needs is often the result of limited resources.
Strengthening democratic governance of the security sector involves developing and
implementing a legal framework, civil management and oversight bodies and viable
and accountable security forces. It also means ensuring that the institutional culture of
the security forces is supportive. The following tasks should be prioritised:
Strengthen the professionalism of the security forces, both in normative and
technical terms.
Develop capable and responsible civil authorities and civil society. Civil society
must ensure their operations are fiscally accountable.
Give high priority to rule of law; respect for rule of law must exist among
civilians and security force personnel.
Develop regional approaches to security problems to encourage countries to
work together and reduce tensions.
Democratic security sector governance can be expected to occur at a pace consistent
with overall democratic consolidation. National leadership must be committed to the
reform process. The principles, laws and structures of the reforms must be rooted in the
country's cultural, historical and legal frameworks. Processes should be consultative.
Furthermore:
Local ownership of the reform process is essential.
The highly political nature of strengthening democratic security-sector
governance needs to be factored into reform efforts. External actors must
understand the critical political relationships.
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Decisions about reform strategy and programming must be informed by a highly
nuanced sense of context, involving the adaptation of borrowed solutions.
The pace and content of locally-owned reform processes must be shaped by
conditions in the reforming country.
Situating reform efforts within a comprehensive, sector-wide framework has the
potential to maximise the impact of the reforms and to increase the efficiency of
resource use.
Source: Ball, N., 2005, 'Strengthening Democratic Governance of the Security Sector
in Conflict-Affected Countries', Public Administration and Development, vol. 25, no. 1
Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform
Baly (2002)
Access full text online
Summary
There is a growing consensus that security needs to be approached just as much from
the perspective of protecting individuals and communities from violence, as from the
degree to which defence spending crowds out development expenditure. It is important
to understand the composition of the security sector as a whole.
Aiming to provide practical guidance for DFID governance advisers and country
programme managers considering how to support the security sector, these guidelines
set out the key actors but focus more narrowly on the military, paramilitary and
intelligence services as well as the civilian structures responsible for their oversight
and control and the related institutional machinery that manages the security sector.
The various chapters explain the involvement of other donors and UK government
departments, diagnoses the situation and considers how to design an intervention.
Chapters 5 to 11 look in more detail at the seven main areas identified as likely entry
points for reform.
Important conclusions include:
To help recipient governments develop a wider reform strategy and to
strengthen political support for change, it is important to take a comprehensive
view of the overall reform process. Reforms must be set in the wider context
and start with an understanding of what the particular security sector is for.
However, caution must be exercised where the military is entrenched in the
overall fabric of the state or where a civilian government is relying on it to
maintain power
Security sector programmes will generally need to address two sets of issues:
The quality of governance and technical competence. Reform on one front but
not the other is unlikely to work. The answer is to set reforms internal to the
security sector in a wider reform programme that strengthens the appropriate
instruments within the civilian policy sectors
Entry points for reform need to be chosen according to local circumstances.
However, the guidelines have identified seven key areas: (1) Building public
awareness and engagement; (2) building strategic planning capacity; (3)
strengthening legal and constitutional frameworks; (4) strengthening civil
oversight mechanisms; (5) strengthening financial management systems; (6)
facilitating war-to-peace transitions; and (7) improving human resource
management.
219
The sequencing of reform may well be difficult where reforms are politically sensitive
or the regulatory framework is weak. In many cases, the starting point may be to
address problems outside the security sector, relating to wider questions of
administrative capacity and political governance. With the military often being the
most developed of national institutions in many situations where security is
compromised, the main political challenges are identified as:
Disengaging the military from politics and other non-military roles
Redefining security roles and creating a civilian policy-making role so that
civilian policy sectors can contribute effectively to the formulation of security
policy
‗Re-professionalising‘ the military, and ensuring its restructuring and
demobilisation suits the new political environment
Managing relations with donors to ensure that international assistance is
consistent with national needs and priorities and does not undermine national
policy-making processes.
Baly, D. 2002, 'Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform', report for the
Department for International Development, London
Civilian Security
C Call and W Stanley (2002)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Abstract
Why do some peace agreements successfully end civil wars, while others fail? What
strategies are most effective in ensuring that warring parties comply with their treaty
commitments? Of the various tasks involved in implementing peace agreements,
which are the most important? These and related questions--life and death issues for
millions of people today--are the subject of Ending Civil Wars.
Based on a study of every intrastate war settlement between 1980 and 1998 in which
international actors played a key role, Ending Civil Wars is the most comprehensive,
systematic study to date of the implementation of peace agreements--of what happens
after the treaties are signed. Covering both broad strategies and specific tasks and
presenting a wealth of rich case material, the authors find that failure most often is
related not only to the inherent difficulty of a particular case, but also to the major
powers' perception that they have no vital security interest in ending a civil war.
Source: Call, C.T. and Stanley, W., 2002, ‗Civilian Security.‘ in Stedman, S. J. et al.
(eds) (2002) Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Boulder
CO: Lynne-Rienner Publishers, pp. 303-326.
220
Police Reform: Peacebuilding through 'Democratic Policing'?
G C Celador (2005)
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Summary
What role has police reform played in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (BiH) since the Dayton Peace Accords? This article published in
International Peacekeeping assesses the internationally-led police reforms in BiH, and
specifically the minority police recruitment policy and the certification process for all
police officers. It argues that these programmes have failed to make the expected
progress, and questions the theory that the police can be changed before society
changes.
In most, if not all, societies affected by internal conflict, the police are characterised by
bias, intimidation and brutality. In the 1990s, police reform therefore became an
essential pre-requisite for the success of post-conflict peacebuilding missions. The
guiding paradigm for such reform efforts is ‗democratic policing‘. This is the idea that
the police are a service, not a force, characterised by responsiveness and accountability
and focused on the security of the individual rather than the state. BiH is one of many
examples that confirm this trend. The Dayton Peace Accords included the goal of
ensuring that Bosnian police forces operated in accordance with the best international
policing standards.
In many significant respects the internationally-led police reform efforts in BiH failed
to make the expected progress.
Although the police no longer engage directly in human rights violations, there
are still instances where they prove unable or unwilling to make redress in this
situation, especially in relation to minority returns victims.
Multi-ethnic police forces are unlikely to attract minority returnees to pre-war
areas when other key institutions and services are absent.
The emphasis on strict ethnic quotas could prove counter-productive for the
development of a professional and efficient police force.
In many cases, local authorities have either not initiated disciplinary or criminal
procedures against de-authorised police officers, or the resulting punishments
have been inappropriate.
The accountability measures introduced have not led to higher levels of popular
trust and confidence in the police and thus in the Bosnian state.
The attempts to use the police as a transmission mechanism for the values that
international actors want the whole of BiH to adopt have led to the undermining
of the basic functions of the police.
The experience with police reform in BiH raises questions over the theory that the
police can be changed before society changes.
Completely abandoning the multi-ethnic idea in the police forces is not a viable
possibility - this would send out a negative message and impact particularly
badly on minority returnees in some parts of BiH.
The ethnic quotas could be relaxed, starting with lower numbers of places for
minority police officers and then gradually increasing the number as and when
the number of minority returnees increased.
The problem of empty positions is having a negative impact on the effectiveness
of police work.
221
Socially-engineering the police according to democratic policing precepts may
help in transforming a society, but it cannot work in isolation from a broad
range of other social mechanisms.
Without changes in the broader social context, the theory that strong group
identities can be subsumed by an overriding, apolitical, professional police
identity remains unproven.
Overzealous civilian oversight might be counterproductive to the development
of a culture of accountability within the police.
Source: Celador, G., 2005, 'Police Reform: Peacebuilding through 'Democratic
Policing'?' International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 364-376
Security Sector Transformation in Post Conflict Societies
Cooper and M Pugh (2002)
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Summary
Since the end of the Cold War, the attitude of development organisations towards the
security sector has changed and personal security is now recognised as a key concern
of the poor in weak states. In addition, repressive or corrupt security structures can
undermine the stability crucial to maximising the benefits of aid programmes.
Consequently, a number of agencies have engaged with the issue of security sector
reform and the idea is now largely accepted as something broader than solely the
military.
This paper, from the Centre for Defence Studies, argues that wider and more
innovative reform – security sector ‗transformation‘ – would be a way of addressing
the issues of socio-political dynamics of civil-military relations, as well as taking
account of the political economy of conflict. It concludes with a number of detailed
recommendations that the UK might address and points out that, while in developed
states there are signs that policy coordination has increased, there is still a risk that
policy can be co-opted by special interest groups, notably military-industrial actors,
whose interests may not always coincide with security sector reform in conflict prone
societies.
Identifying the challenges to security-sector reform as: Resource manipulation,
weapon‘s proliferation, the emphasis on coercion in international interventions and the
diverse contexts of war torn societies, the paper delineates the role that transformative
strategies can play in preventing conflicts and promoting post-conflict peace building
as follows:
There is a substantial deficit in current security sector governance in post
conflict societies that necessitates going beyond reformism
For peace to be embedded, the objects of reform should not be confined merely
to the security sectors of target countries but should also incorporate the broader
global structures and agents that condition them
It implies an holistic approach to security which recognises the interconnections
between the security sector and other areas of the domestic, regional and global
arena, most notably the economy
Therefore, strategies on other issues, such as the economy or the environment,
might be implemented to complement rather than undermine transformation of
the security sector
222
Further, a transformative approach would give greater weight to the
mobilisation of civil society to sustain peace and control militarisation than has
hitherto been the case.
To achieve its goals, the paper divides a range of policies into two categories:
‗Structural arms control‘ initiatives designed to effect change in regional or
global structures, such as tightening arms-export credits and licensing rules,
taxing defence sales and controlling conflict resources such as Diaspora funds
and non-military conflict goods such as diamonds
Initiatives aimed at generating socio-political safeguards against militarism
within states, such as the transformation of civil-military relations through
constitutional and capacity building provisions to establish the supremacy of
civil authorities and a separation of powers
It also outlines an alternative approach: To locate changes in security sectors
within a broader transformative framework and to rebalance economic
structures and the socio-political environment so as to reduce the incentives for
militarisation. Also to engage with a wider set of actors, issues and security
concerns in a manner that expands and empowers the ‗islands of tranquility‘ in
war torn societies.
Source: Cooper, N. and Pugh, M. 2002, 'Security Sector Reform in Post-conflict
Societies', Working Paper no. 5, Centre for Defence Studies, London.
Security Sector Reform, Conflict Prevention and Regional Perspectives
O Greene (2003)
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Summary
What is the added-value of regional or sub-regional approaches to security sector
reform (SSR) and conflict prevention strategies? This article, published in the Journal
of Security Sector Management, argues that the UK government and other donors
should assist in establishing or further developing regional and sub-regional SSR
programmes due to the cross-border nature of many security challenges. Equally,
donors should strengthen their ties with established regional mechanisms and
institutions to facilitate links between SSR programmes and wider conflict prevention
activities.
There is little consensus on the precise definition of the term ‗security sector‘. It
usually refers to those institutions and organisations allocated a legitimate role in the
use or threat of coercive force to deal with external or internal threats to the security of
the state and its citizens. Security sector reform aims to enhance the efficiency or
effectiveness of the security sector to meet the needs of national security or policing
priorities.
SSR and conflict prevention activities are inter-linked. SSR activities that aim to
improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of the security sector indirectly contribute to
conflict prevention objectives. In addition, measures that enhance the democratic
governance of the security sector and ensure good civil-security sector relations
contribute to the building of a peaceful society in which conflicts can be pursued
without violence or fear of violence. Due to the transnational nature of many security
223
challenges, a regional or sub-regional approach to SSR could represent a useful step
forward by:
Enhancing awareness and engagement on cross-border or sub-regional security
issues. This may lead to the development of SSR programmes that are designed
to address cross-cutting, transnational challenges.
Engaging with regional organisations in the development of SSR programmes.
This may be beneficial as regional actors often share a similar understanding
and approach to the legitimate role of various branches of the security sector,
such as civil defence or the military‘s role in policing.
Enhancing regional co-operation and confidence building. Geographical
proximity facilitates the sharing of experiences, lessons learned and the spread
of precedents.
Understanding that bilateral or sub-regional co-operation may enhance SSR
effectiveness through the provision of border guards and the promotion of
confidence-building measures (CBMs).
Ensuring that the adoption of regional approaches does not replace or lead to
inadequate analysis of specific national or sectoral SSR issues.
The UK government has taken a leading role in promoting security sector reform as an
integral part of its efforts to support conflict prevention and post-conflict
peacebuilding. The UK and other donors could assist in establishing or further
developing regional or sub-regional SSR programmes by:
Learning from the experience of established regional or sub-regional SSR
programmes. These already exist to a limited extent in sub-regions such as the
Stability Pact countries and NATO‘s Partnership for Peace (PfP).
Extending established regional or sub-regional SSR programmes to other areas,
particularly where regional institutions have already established relevant norms.
This includes sub-regions or clusters of states in Southern, Eastern and Western
Africa, ASEAN and Latin America.
Reviewing existing regional SSR programmes to identify gaps and opportunities
for extending assistance. For example, programmes to enhance police capacity
for combating transnational crime and terrorism are being developed in Africa
and ASEAN, however, these reforms have not been extended to other sectors.
Ensuring that regional approaches retain flexibility and a strong bilateral
dimension. Flexibility is essential to circumvent capacity problems and political
constraints in regional organisations.
Strengthening the link between SSR and conflict prevention. The UK should
develop mechanisms to enhance the contribution of SSR programmes supported
in the Conflict Prevention Pools to conflict prevention strategies.
Source: Greene, O., 2003, Security Sector Reform, Conflict Prevention and Regional
Perspectives, Journal of Security Sector Management, Vol. 1, No. 1
Reforming Civil-Military Relations
S Huntingdon (1995)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Source: Huntington, S., 1995, ‗Reforming Civil-Military Relations‘, Journal of
Democracy, 6(4): 9-17.
224
Demilitarising the Political Process in Africa: Some Basic Issues
E Hutchful (1997)
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Abstract
In the 1970s and 1980s, Africa was the most militarised and conflict-torn continent in
the world. Civil wars, military coups, armed foreign interventions, ethnic conflicts, and
other forms of civil and political strife were commonplace. At the height of these
conflicts one-quarter to one-third of Africa's population were displaced and became
refugees. In the 1970s, military budgets and arms procurements in Africa grew at a
faster rate than in any other world region, before receding in the 1980s under the
impact of deepening economic recession. While these trends have not disappeared
altogether, Africa has witnessed a no less dramatic demilitarisation and
democratisation of its politics since the late eighties and early nineties. Peace accords
and elections have led to the end of civil wars in Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique,
Ethiopia and Eritrea. Military governments have been removed in Mali, the Central
African Republic, Benin, the Congo, Ghana, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and, until
recently, Niger and Burundi. Authoritarian and one-party governments in the Ivory
Coast, Kenya, Gabon, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Tunisia, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania and
elsewhere have submitted themselves to elections and otherwise liberalised their
regimes.
Source: Hutchful, E., ‗Demilitarising the Political Process in Africa: Some Basic
Issues‘, African Security Review, 2, 1997
Security Sector Reform: Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation
C McArtney and M Fischer (2004)
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Abstract
This issue of the Berghof Dialogue Series examines the arguments for engagement
with the security sector and provides an analysis of the dilemmas that arise and
suggestions for how they might be overcome.
Source: McArtney, C., M. Fischer, O. Wils (eds.), 2004, ‗Security Sector Reform:
Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation‘, Berghof Handbook for
Conflict Transformation Dialogue Series No. 2, Berlin: Berghof Research Center for
Constructive Conflict Management.
Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005)
Access full text online
Summary
How do you foster through governance reforms a secure environment that is conducive
to poverty reduction and sustainable development? What are the key components of
security? These are questions that are addressed in this publication by the Development
225
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD). The research suggests that the traditional concept of security is
being redefined. The document sets out the key concepts of security system reform
(SSR) and suggests ways to support it in developing countries.
Security from violence is fundamental to people‘s livelihoods and to sustainable
economic, social and political development. Security matters to the poor and other
vulnerable groups, especially women and children. Conflict-affected countries account
for a high proportion of those furthest from the Millennium Development Goals.
OECD governments now realise that ―the cost of neglect‖ – letting countries drift into
deep difficulties or become failed states – is far too high for people, nations and
international security. The overall objective of security system reform is to create a
secure environment. This secure environment rests upon two essential pillars: (1) the
ability of the state, through its development policy and programmes, to generate
conditions that mitigate the vulnerabilities to which its people are exposed and (2) the
ability of the state to use the range of policy instruments at its disposal to prevent or
address security threats that affect society‘s well-being.
The SSR policy agenda covers three inter-related challenges facing all states: (1)
developing a clear institutional framework for the provision of security that integrates
security and development policy and includes all relevant actors (2) strengthening the
governance of the security institutions and (3) building capable and professional
security forces that are accountable to civil authorities. The focus of security policy is
broadening from an almost exclusive focus on state stability and regime security to
include the well-being of their populations and human rights.
Security and development are increasingly seen as being inextricably linked, which
opens the way to mainstreaming security as a public policy and a governance issue. In
this context, it is clear that SSR needs to be:
People-centred, locally owned and based on democratic norms and human rights
principles and the rule of law, seeking to provide freedom from fear.
Seen as a framework for addressing diverse security challenges facing states and
their populations through more integrated development and security policies and
through greater civilian involvement and oversight.
Founded on activities with multi-sectoral strategies, based upon a broad
assessment of the range of security needs of the people and the state.
Developed by adhering to basic principles underlying public sector reform such
as transparency and accountability.
Implemented through clear processes and policies that aim to enhance the
institutional and human capacity needed for security policy to function
effectively.
There is now greater public scrutiny of security policy. State institutions involved in
providing security are being re-evaluated. For reforms to be successful, the following
policy goals should be taken into account:
The promotion of peace and security as fundamental pillars of development and
poverty reduction.
Whole-of-government approaches to SSR, which might entail necessary
institutional changes.
The facilitation of partner country-owned and led reform efforts.
226
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004, Security System
Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice, Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) Guidelines and Reference Document, Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris
7.2 Justice sector
UK Government policy
Justice and Poverty Reduction: Safety, Security and Access to Justice for All
Department for International Development (2000)
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Summary
How important are justice systems for improving the lives of the poor? What
contribution can DFID make to bettering these systems? The aim of this paper is to
assist DFID‘s mission to improve the security and welfare of the world‘s poorest
people through improving their access to justice. It observes that the burden of crime
falls most heavily upon the poorest and most vulnerable sectors of society who are also
those least able to access the justice system. It also has a wider economic cost, as
resources are diverted from social welfare into policing, revenue is lost to invisible
trade, assets are damaged or stolen, and consequently investment is discouraged.
It is estimated that the cost of crime, both in lost assets and in revenue directed to law
enforcement, is around five per cent of GDP in the developing world, and fourteen per
cent in the developed world. The burden of suffering falls disproportionately heavily
on the poor, who are unable to enjoy the benefits of the justice system due to the
corruption of the police and the distance and expense of the courts. In addition:
States where the legal system and crime control are poor are unattractive to
investors and so economic growth suffers
Poor people tend to rely on customary justice systems rather than formal legal
ones, because they are quicker, cheaper and closer to home. However, they also
tend to be more partial and discriminatory
Proactive crime prevention is up to eight times more cost-effective than reactive
measures. Reducing youth unemployment, drug dependency or the availability
of firearms are examples of preventive measures
Traditional/customary legal systems account for eighty per cent of total cases.
They take better account of the needs of local communities, butter do not
always protect the rights of the poorest and most vulnerable members of society.
Because police forces, particularly in developing countries, often abuse their powers,
issues of transparency and accountability are as important as efficiency and efficacy.
Relevant and practical human rights training is essential, as are adequate budgets and
safeguards against political interference, and also investigative skills and equipment so
that cases can be based on evidence rather than confessions. In addition, DfID can help
governments improve safety, security and access to justice through (1) consultation
with interested parties; (2) sector-wide diagnosis of the problems to be addressed and
consequential sector- wide approaches to reform, including where necessary the
pooling of donor resources; and (3) targeting development assistance towards a
coherent set of objectives and policies to which the government is committed. Other
approaches include
227
Law reform to reduce discrimination, promote public- interest litigation by
advocacy groups, paralegal assistance, legal aid and legal rights education
Making courts more accessible through the use of local languages and even
local magistrates, mobile courts, education for both judges and the wider public,
better co-ordination between courts and other agencies, and improving case-
flow
Passing sentences which put reparation before retribution, which are more
humane and cost-effective and also help decongest prisons.
Source: DFID 2000, 'Justice and poverty reduction: safety, security and access to
justice for all', Department for International Development publication, 2000
Putting SSAJ Policy Into Practice
Department for International Development (2001)
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Summary
Justice systems can play an important part in improving the lives of poor people. The
Department for International Development (DFID) can help improve these systems in
ways that are appropriate to the local culture and within available resources. But how
should safety, security and access to justice (SSAJ) policy be put into practice?
This guidance note, from DFID's Governance Department, looks at how DFID's
guidelines could be implemented, with the caveat that each case should be treated
individually and that the guidelines should not be read as a manual. All justice systems
are different and have many components. Justice matters to poor people. The impact of
theft, for example, is more severe if the victim is poor; and a lack of access to justice
fosters corruption. A new approach will provide DFID with comparative experience of
sector reform to help support national reform initiatives and to influence the agenda of
donor programmes.
Safety, security and accessible justice are of great concern to poor people. The
Government recognises this and is aware that in many cases formal justice systems fail
to protect them. Other findings include:
Because they lack security, poor people are less likely to invest in improving
their own futures
Efforts by the poor to escape from poverty are hampered by corrupt police and
judicial officers. The poor feel insecure about accessing government services
Respect for the law is reduced due to vigilantism and self-help policing
initiatives which citizens are forced into because of poor safety and security.
Corruption escalates because of lack of access to justice
SSAJ is vital for governance and development. Maintaining law and order is a
key government responsibility and part of the necessary framework for
economic and social development
The rule of law is linked to economic growth and investment. A well-
functioning justice sector promotes better lives for poor people whilst ensuring
the protection and promotion of economic and social, as well as civil and
political, rights
State power can be constrained by a strong independent judiciary.
228
Justice system reform is a neglected issue. DFID suggest two new elements of policy:
(1) Basing interventions on a sector instead of single institutions; and (2) looking at the
sector from the user‘s perspective - particularly the poor and vulnerable. In addition to
this:
Providing support to SSAJ issues is essential for those countries that are
involved in a Poverty Reduction Strategy process
An SSAJ strategy can play an important role in protecting human rights
The sector approach helps to find suitable entry points, such as the underlying
causes of problems common to justice sector institutions, which may be via an
intervention in another sector
Sequencing issues may need to be examined. For example, increasing the
supply of legal aid is pointless if judges are corrupt. Judicial corruption would
initially have to be tackled
In challenging traditional systems it is important that the positive aspects, such
as the combination of social support and social control, are not lost in
implementing changes
Penal reform could include: Providing alternatives to prison for minor
offenders; reducing pre-trial detention; improving prison conditions; and
moving towards a process of rehabilitation and re-integration.
Source: Department for International Development 2001, 'Guidance Note: Putting
SSAJ Policy into Practice', DFID, London.
Core readings
The Rule of Law in Conflict Management
N Kritz (2007)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
The nature of war has changed, with the majority now being intranational rather than
international. This research from the United States Institute of Peace argues that in this
context new tools are required to manage conflict and to make and maintain the peace.
Most important in this is the development of the rule of law. If diligently nurtured, rule
of law‘s contribution to accountability, conflict resolution, limits on power and the
processing of opposing views can reduce the likelihood of another civil war.
In recent years, 93 per cent of the major armed conflicts have been ethnic or religious
conflicts, disputes over self-determination or succession or violent political struggles
between opposing domestic political factions. The techniques that may have been
appropriate for resolving wars between states are often unable to bring reconciliation
between domestic adversaries who together must build a durable national union. In this
new scenario, establishing the rule of law becomes increasingly important, particularly
in the immediate postconflict construction of peace.
Rule of law imposes a network of institutions, mechanisms and procedures that check
sources of tension at an early phase, prevent any party from engaging in violent action
and offer fairness and openness.
The shift from international to intranational conflict affects the rule of law in several
ways:
229
Many laws which were previously only used in conflict between states are
increasingly being applied to abuses in intrastate conflicts.
There is a greater acceptance of the universal jurisdiction over crimes - so that
crimes committed in one country can be prosecuted in another.
While state military forces receive basic instruction in the international rules
that govern their conduct, insurgent groups engaged in civil wars, to whom
these international rules of conduct now apply, do not receive any training.
Governments against which these groups are fighting are reluctant to have them
sign the Geneva Convention since it is seen to give them legitimacy.
While war between two states can be resolved without changes to the internal
laws or institutions of the warring parties, resolving conflict within a state
requires changes to assure each group that their interests will be protected
through non-violent means.
The rule of law incorporates many elements necessary to ease tension and lessen the
likelihood of further conflict. Those involved in postconflict peacebuilding and societal
reconstruction need to face the challenges associated with accounting for past abuses
and constructing a new constitutional order.
Courts should be set up as the main forum for the peaceful resolution of
disputes but should be part of a whole system of criminal justice, including a
law-abiding police force, prison system and criminal defence lawyers.
Truth and reconciliation commissions can complement criminal trials, serving a
different but vital function for societies in transition.
A balance is needed between legitimately removing individuals implicated in
repression from government structures and avoiding widespread political
purges.
Enabling society to participate in drafting the constitution means the process
will involve compromises in time, content and money but it can produce a
constitutional system that is more widely accepted and more supportive of
peace.
Local ownership is important. This requires new approaches based on local
decisions informed by outside advice.
Source: Kritz, N., 2007, ?The Rule of Law in Conflict Management?, in Crocker, C.,
F.O. Hampson, and P. All (eds.), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a
Divided World, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, pp. 401-424
Balancing Peace with Justice in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict
R Mani (2005)
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Summary
Peace without justice is only a symbolic peace. But how can justice be restored after
conflict? This article from the journal Development argues that international
peacebuilders have sometimes imposed rather than proposed and facilitated solutions.
In order to rejoin peace and justice there must be a mutual agreement between
stakeholders in post-conflict societies: civilians and combatants, citizens and
governments, international peacebuilders and national recipients. The most important
dimension is the role of the local population.
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Restoring justice after conflict is as much a political imperative as a social necessity.
Political leaders will not make concessions or respect peace agreements unless
grievances have been addressed. Equally, the public will not trust authorities and invest
in peace unless their injustices are tackled. Yet, remarrying peace with justice after
conflict has torn them apart is a difficult task. It is rarely undertaken comprehensively,
producing inadequate results and often setting back the peace process itself.
Three distinct, interdependent dimensions of justice are relevant to building peace:
Rectificatory justice: This is rectifying the injustices that are direct
consequences of conflict including human rights abuses, war crimes and crimes
against humanity. Since 1945, there has been more deliberate targeting of
civilians. The need to address these violations is commonly referred to as
‗transitional justice‘.
Legal justice: Breakdown of the rule of law, political manipulation and
corruption in the legal system are common symptoms of conflict. These result in
a lack of legal redress for injustices experienced by the population.
Distributive justice: The structural injustices and distributive inequalities that
underlie the causes of conflict are often neglected. It is both the experiences and
perceptions of exclusion, rather than poverty or ethnicity in themselves, which
matter.
The task of restoring justice after conflict has been reduced to a preoccupation with
injustices related to the consequences of conflict. To lay the foundation for a lasting
peace, all three dimensions of justice need to be addressed.
Peacebuilding consists of a ‗negative‘ task of preventing relapse into violence
and a ‗positive‘ task of aiding recovery and removing underlying causes of war.
It is essential to respect the delicate balance between these two.
International rule of law programmes tend to ignore political ramifications and
fail to consider context or longer-term objectives. Incremental programmes
should embed the rule of law in justice and human rights and focus on longer-
term, more ambitious goals.
A single officially sponsored mechanism cannot resolve rectificatory justice
claims definitively; a combination of measures is required. Trials and truth
commissions target individual perpetrators and victims, whereas a broader
response will engage all survivors.
‗Reparative justice‘ is sensitive to the nature of offences and their impact on
victims, offenders and societies. It is also flexible in devising a suitable
combination of responses.
Donors continue to promote growth at all costs, with little attention to
distributive effects and the need to redress inequitable pre-conflict situations.
They should first redress past economic inequalities before policies of
generalised economic growth and development are implemented.
Mani, R., 2005, 'Balancing Peace with Justice in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict',
Development, 48(3), pp. 25-34
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Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2004)
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Summary
How do you foster through governance reforms a secure environment that is conducive
to poverty reduction and sustainable development? What are the key components of
security? These are questions that are addressed in this publication by the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD). The research suggests that the traditional concept of security is
being redefined. The document sets out the key concepts of security system reform
(SSR) and suggests ways to support it in developing countries.
Security from violence is fundamental to people‘s livelihoods and to sustainable
economic, social and political development. Security matters to the poor and other
vulnerable groups, especially women and children. Conflict-affected countries account
for a high proportion of those furthest from the Millennium Development Goals.
OECD governments now realise that ―the cost of neglect‖ – letting countries drift into
deep difficulties or become failed states – is far too high for people, nations and
international security. The overall objective of security system reform is to create a
secure environment. This secure environment rests upon two essential pillars: (1) the
ability of the state, through its development policy and programmes, to generate
conditions that mitigate the vulnerabilities to which its people are exposed and (2) the
ability of the state to use the range of policy instruments at its disposal to prevent or
address security threats that affect society‘s well-being.
The SSR policy agenda covers three inter-related challenges facing all states: (1)
developing a clear institutional framework for the provision of security that integrates
security and development policy and includes all relevant actors (2) strengthening the
governance of the security institutions and (3) building capable and professional
security forces that are accountable to civil authorities. The focus of security policy is
broadening from an almost exclusive focus on state stability and regime security to
include the well-being of their populations and human rights.
Security and development are increasingly seen as being inextricably linked, which
opens the way to mainstreaming security as a public policy and a governance issue. In
this context, it is clear that SSR needs to be:
People-centred, locally owned and based on democratic norms and human rights
principles and the rule of law, seeking to provide freedom from fear.
Seen as a framework for addressing diverse security challenges facing states and
their populations through more integrated development and security policies and
through greater civilian involvement and oversight.
Founded on activities with multi-sectoral strategies, based upon a broad
assessment of the range of security needs of the people and the state.
Developed by adhering to basic principles underlying public sector reform such
as transparency and accountability.
Implemented through clear processes and policies that aim to enhance the
institutional and human capacity needed for security policy to function
effectively.
232
There is now greater public scrutiny of security policy. State institutions involved in
providing security are being re-evaluated. For reforms to be successful, the following
policy goals should be taken into account:
The promotion of peace and security as fundamental pillars of development and
poverty reduction.
Whole-of-government approaches to SSR, which might entail necessary
institutional changes.
The facilitation of partner country-owned and led reform efforts.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004, Security System
Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice, Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) Guidelines and Reference Document, Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris
Supplementary readings
Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge
T Carothers (2003)
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Summary
The causal relationship between rule of law promotion, and economic development
and democracy is not as direct as it might appear but remains donors‘ rationale for
these activities. Is there a problem of knowledge concerning rule of law projects? What
should practitioners know when they promote these activities?
This paper from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace considers the
apparent lack of knowledge supporting rule of law projects in developing countries.
There is a surprising amount of uncertainty about the rationale for rule of law
promotion and what actually constitutes the ‗rule of law‘. There is limited knowledge
about how system changes occur and what long-term effects specific changes will have
on the development of the rule of law. Despite the amount of rule of law activity taking
place, the knowledge of individual practitioners tends not to be systemised or absorbed
by sponsoring institutions. The ‗lessons learnt‘ in official reports are frequently too
general and obvious. Appropriate reforms to aid programmes are often blocked by
agencies‘ underlying interests and incentives.
The common sense appeal of arguments supporting rule of law promotion is often too
simplistic and can be misleading. It is not clear that foreign investment is required for
economic development. In addition:
Whilst the rule of law and democracy are closely linked, reasonably democratic
states often have significant shortcomings in the rule of law
There is no proof that a state must have an established and effective rule of law
to attract investment. In fact, the presence of certain types of foreign investors
may contribute to the development of the rule of law through demands for
reform
Promoters tend to have a narrow outlook on what the rule of law is, focusing on
institutions, especially the judiciary, and having little interest in non-Western
forms of law, traditional systems of justice, or in some cases even civil law
A mechanistic approach is generally taken to developing rule of law, with
promoters trying to reshape key institutions to match those of countries
233
considered to have the rule of law. In many countries, this encounters strong
resistance
The area‘s knowledge accumulation is hindered by its conceptual and practical
complexity; the particularity of each legal system; and the limited focus of
academics and lawyers on empirical research about rule of law programmes
Aid agencies tend to be poor at accumulating knowledge due to limited
resources being committed to evaluations; the frequent changing of personnel;
and a certain defensiveness within a context of doubts about the value of aid.
There is no proof that improvements in one part of the system will ‗spillover‘ into
other parts. It is not clear whether judicial independence improves the rule-of-law.
Other policy implications include:
Rule of law is not yet a field of activity, if such a designation requires a well-
grounded rationale; a clear understanding of the problem; a proven analytic
method; and an understanding of the results achieved
Donors know that rule of law projects may help economic development and
democracy, but do not know how strong the direct causal relationship may be or
whether similar resources targeted elsewhere might have had greater effects
The aid community should have a broader concept of what constitutes the rule
of law, considering, for example, the role of the legislature and executive, and
how citizens understand, use and value the law
It should not be presumed that change will happen once the right institutions are
in place, but rather when key people within the system want it to happen and are
given enabling assistance for them to carry out that change.
Source: Carothers, T. 2003, 'Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of
Knowledge', Rule of Law Series no. 34, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington, D.C.
Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative
S Golub (2003)
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Summary
This paper argues that, in integrating law and development, many multilateral and
bilateral development agencies overemphasise 'rule of law (ROL) orthodoxy', which
concentrates aid on 'top-down' support for state legal institutions and law reform. It
suggests an alternative approach, legal empowerment—the use of legal services and
related developments, to increase disadvantaged populations‘ control over their lives.
Legal empowerment builds civil society to provide pro-poor legal services and to
increase the capacities and power of the poor so they can better assert their rights, often
in the context of agriculture, health, gender, natural resources, and other 'non-justice'
sectors. As indicated by a growing array of quantitative and qualitative evidence, legal
empowerment contributes not just to governance and justice, but also to social
development and poverty alleviation.
As most prominently practiced by multilateral development banks, the dominant, ROL
orthodoxy paradigm concentrates on law reform and government institutions,
particularly judiciaries, to build business-friendly legal systems that presumably spur
poverty alleviation. But many bilateral and other development agencies similarly take a
top-down, state-centred approach in their law programs, albeit in pursuit of other ends.
234
The problems with the paradigm are not its various economic and political goals, per
se, but its questionable assumptions, unproven impact and insufficient attention to the
legal needs of the disadvantaged.
Legal empowerment represents an alternative, more balanced approach. It prioritises
civil society support but engages government where possible and does not preclude
important or even leading roles for dedicated officials and ministries. It also addresses
a central reality that ROL orthodoxy overlooks: in many developing countries, laws
benefiting the poor exist on paper but not in practice unless the poor push for laws
enforcement.
Legal empowerment is more than an alternative to the dominant paradigm; it should be
integrated into many mainstream socio-economic development efforts that generally
do not address ROL or the legal needs of the poor. It puts community-driven and
rights-based development into effect by offering concrete mechanisms, involving legal
services, to alleviate poverty, advance the rights of the disadvantaged, and make the
ROL more of a reality for them. So far, however, legal empowerment efforts mainly
consist of diverse civil society initiatives rather than deliberate donor programs. As a
result, it is under-appreciated and underused. The message for ROL development
practitioners is that they need to think less like lawyers and more like agents of social
change. Conversely, development practitioners in other fields could benefit from
thinking more like lawyers and human rights advocates. The changes in perspective
will create opportunities for using law to enhance development. Both groups should
also stop assuming that assistance to state institutions yields greater impact and more
sustainable outcomes than support for civil society. In fact, there are significant
arguments and evidence to the contrary.
Legal empowerment differs from ROL orthodoxy in at least four additional ways:
Attorneys support the poor as partners, instead of dominating them as
proprietors of expertise.
The disadvantaged play a role in setting priorities, rather than government
officials and donor personnel dictating the agenda.
Addressing these priorities frequently involves nonjudicial strategies that
transcend narrow notions of legal systems, justice sectors, and institution
building.
Even more broadly, the use of law is often just part of integrated strategies that
include other development activities.
Because research suggests that legal empowerment has helped advance poverty
alleviation, good governance, and other development goals, it merits
substantially increased financial and political support. Such assistance can be
provided:
As aid specifically directed at legal empowerment.
In conjunction with ROL promotion.
As part of mainstream socio-economic development work embracing such
fields as agriculture, education, gender, health, natural resources, and water.
Golub, S., 2003, Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy. The Legal Empowerment
Alternative, Rule of Law Series Working Papers No. 41, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington D.C.
235
Human Rights and Justice Sector Reform in Africa: Contemporary Issues and
Responses
Open Society Justice Initiative (2005)
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Summary
A strictly legalistic view of justice is inadequate to analyse the full extent of justice
sector reform in contemporary Africa. Proper assessment should include formal,
informal, national and international mechanisms. This collection of articles from the
Open Society Institute (OSI) demonstrates a holistic review of justice, including
localising universal norms, globalising local principles of access to justice and
promoting the link between justice, safety and security through the safeguarding of
accountability mechanisms.
Analysis of Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Gambia, South Africa, Sudan and the Democratic
Republic of Congo raises specific issues concerning judicial reforms. These include
issues of national reform, equality and citizenship, international justice, transnational
remedies and the freedom of expression and information. In particular:
Elements of customary justice either co-exist with or have been incorporated
into formal justice systems in many countries, especially in rural areas where
formal justice systems are often not present.
Traditional and informal mechanisms of justice are extremely important because
of numerous limitations on formal justice in Africa.
The strengths of the formal and traditional systems need to be incorporated. In
Sierra Leone, the link is provided by community-based paralegal workers,
informed about formal legal systems.
Given that the right to citizenship is a prerequisite to other rights, it is important
to strengthen weak international norms on the granting and confiscation of
citizenship. National citizenship policies need to be opened for scrutiny, and
advocacy on the issue developed.
The three international tribunals currently operating in Africa need to focus on
compensation/reparation issues and give adequate attention to local conceptions
of justice.
More effort needs to be put into providing aid that takes into account good
developmental practice, and in defining the concept of national ownership.
The test for good practice should include the extent to which justice mechanisms are
made affordable to ordinary people, as well as guaranteeing procedural simplicity and
fairness and consistency with cultural expectations. It is important to avoid bias against
traditional marginalised groups (women, children etc), dispense justice in local
languages and produce outcomes that emphasise community-building, skills transfer,
restoration and reparation. In addition, justice sector reform requires:
Better planning and continuation of funding in order to ensure sustainable
interventions.
Re-conceptualisation of justice as a sector and not just a set of separate
institutions and co-ordinated work between institutions from state and the civil
society.
Greater understanding of the context for intended reforms, with the continued
promotion of national leadership but also political astuteness.
Provision of assistance not just to states but also to non-state actors, such as
customary systems of justice.
236
Improvement of donor habits and incentives through closer scrutiny of the ways
in which aid is delivered.
Source: Open Society Justice Initiative, 2005, 'Human Rights and Justice Sector
Reform in Africa: Contemporary Issues and Responses', Justice Initiatives, Open
Society Justice Initiative
Fighting Corruption: A Rule of Law Agenda?
M O‘Donnell
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Abstract
This chapter summarizes the literature on corruption, emphasizing the close links
between corruption, the rule of law, statebuilding and peacebuilding. It also reviews
the evolution of international anti-corruption policy and practice and examines
the applicability of general practice to post-conflict settings.
Source: O‘Donnell, Madalene. ‗Fighting Corruption: A Rule of Law Agenda?‘ Draft
chapter prepared for International Peace Academy edited volume, Civil War and the
Rule of Law, forthcoming
Rule of Law Tools in Post-Conflict
Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights States (2006)
Monitoring Legal Systems:
http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/ruleoflaw-
Monitoring_en.pdf
Mapping the Justice Sector:
http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/ruleoflaw-
Mapping_en.pdf
Vetting: an operational Framework:
http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/ruleoflaw-Vetting_en.pdf
Prosecution Initiatives:
http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/ruleoflaw-
Prosecutions_en.pdf
Truth Commissions:
http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/ruleoflaw-
TruthCommissions_en.pdf
237
Supporting Security, Justice and Development
C Stone (2005)
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Summary
An understanding of how insecurity and poverty are linked is increasingly informing
development assistance. How can assistance with policing and justice be strengthened?
This paper, part of a larger study commissioned by the UK government, draws together
lessons from the experiences of recent UK funded policing and justice programs in
seven countries: Afghanistan, India, Jamaica, Malawi, Nepal, Nigeria and Sierra
Leone.
The UK's Security Sector Reform (SSR) strategy embraces reform of the military and
intelligence services along with police and other security and justice agencies. Its work
on Safety, Security and Access to Justice (SSAJ) includes policing, courts and penal
regimes, civil and commercial justice, and alternative dispute resolution. These
programmes are pursued on a holistic, sector wide basis, rather than focusing on
individual institutions. They proceed from an understanding that government
ownership and assessing the problems from the users perspective are fundamental to
success.
Assuring civilian oversight of uniformed services and advancing the security and
justice concerns of poor people and other vulnerable groups are difficult tasks in all
societies. The challenge is probably greater in countries experiencing armed conflict
(Nepal), of emerging from it (Sierra Leone, Afghanistan). In these countries, the
guidance on the pursuit of sector wide reform has been difficult to follow on the
ground. This is partly because of short-term funding arrangements, the confinement of
civilian leadership to silos and less expertise in sector-wide approaches amongst
development agency staff.
Ten lessons learned are identified from the UK's experience of police and justice
reform:
Design and implementation should integrate short-term work on community
safety with long-term organisational and institutional change.
Design and coordination processes should anticipate tensions within the security
sector, particularity between the army and the police.
Civil Society Involvement should be stronger in order to balance the focus on
the supply of security and justice with appropriate focus on the demand.
Improvements in safety and access to justice are assumed to contribute to
poverty reduction. The logic models created at the design stage and the
assessments conducted during implementation should be improved to
demonstrate those links explicitly.
Actual progress on human rights should be accelerated so that programs are less
likely to be set back by human rights abuses.
Gender issues should be mainstreamed.
Sector-wide co-ordination led by the partner government is a key intermediate
outcome, but the strategy for achieving this coordination should be reconceived
so that it develops more quickly and is less easily set back.
As part of UK programs, strong Whitehall co-ordination should be encouraged.
Co-ordination of UK departments and managers in country should be
strengthened.
238
Recruitment, deployment and retention of experts and managers should receive
greater attention.
Following on from these lessons, 15 specific recommendations for project implication
are made, including:
SSR and SSAJ should remain distinct programs, but be closer aligned.
Police and military advisers should develop more collaborative relationships to
encourage the same in institutions of partner governments.
A fully staffed SSAJ team should be established in the Department for
International Development (DFID).
A repository of good practice with civil society organisations should be
established centrally.
DFID and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office should establish a critical
incident review process to examine events leading up to and following any
serious violation of human rights.
The UK should commit to work on SSAJ and SSR in Middle Income Countries
that could serve as anchors of security regionally and globally.
Source: Stone, C. et al., 2005, 'Supporting Security, Justice and Development: Lessons
for a New Era', Vera Institute of Justice, New York
239
8. Small Arms and Light Weapons Programmes and their Role in
Mitigating Risks of Violence
UK Government policy
UK Policy and Strategic Priorities on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2004-2006
DFID (2004)
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Summary
The widespread availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a major
source of insecurity and poverty worldwide. This Department for International
Development (DfID) paper summarises the United Kingdom‘s policies and strategies
on SALW. The British Government‘s objectives regarding limiting the availability and
misuse of SALW focus on three areas: strengthening controls on supply; reducing
availability; and addressing demand. It recognises that these issues are complex and
inter-related, requiring action between states, intergovernmental organisations and civil
society.
SALW are generally considered to be weapons that can be used by one or two people.
The developing world suffers disproportionately as a result of SALW, although richer
countries are by no means immune. Production is highly decentralised globally. SALW
have many legitimate military and civilian uses. However, a lack of adequate
regulation has meant that significant quantities of weapons are diverted into the black
market, from where they are easily subject to misuse.
Stronger national, regional and international controls on small arms transfers are
critical to combating easy availability and misuse. The UK is committed to stronger
controls on SALW transfers and the systematic collection, management and
destruction of weapons:
The UK will work with others to achieve international consensus on stronger
controls on transfers of SALW and build capacity to implement effective
transfer controls.
Where control is lax, for example in relation to the activities of arms brokers
and the marking and tracing of weapons, the UK will support the establishment
of new global controls.
The UK will continue to seek opportunities to collect and destroy weapons and
ammunition, in partnership with others.
The UK will also continue to support efforts to systematically include weapons
and ammunition collection and destruction as integral elements of peace support
operations. This includes effective demobilisation, disarmament and
rehabilitation (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR).
In partnership with others, the UK aims to develop coordinated policy and best
practice on these issues.
Controlling supply and reducing the availability of weapons is not enough – more
needs to be done to address the root causes of armed violence. Increasing
understanding of the motivations driving illicit gun use is essential for developing
targeted programmes:
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Reducing demand for guns requires long term sustainable development,
improved public security, heightened public awareness and increased alternative
livelihoods opportunities, including for ex-combatants.
Resolving the structural problems that underpin insecurity and violence is
essential.
In partnership with other agencies, the UK will support further research and
analysis into the impact of armed violence and arms availability on poverty and
development.
The UK will work to promote increased donor coordination on armed violence
issues, although this should not detract from stand-alone small arms control
programmes.
The UK will also work to comprehensively integrate armed violence prevention
and small arms reduction into its own development assistance and encourage
other bilateral and multilateral agencies to do the same.
Source: DFID, 2004, 'UK Policy and Strategic Priorities on Small Arms and Light
Weapons, 2004-2006', Department for International Development, London
Small Arms and Light Weapons: a UK Policy Briefing
DFID (2001)
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Summary
Small arms and light weapons are an enormous problem. They kill over 300,000
people every year, cause injury to over 900,000 people and affect millions indirectly
through the dislocation of communities and destruction of livelihoods. This official UK
policy briefing summarises the damage caused by small arms and light weapons and
outlines current UK initiatives to combat the problem.
There are an estimated 550 million small arms and light weapons: One for every 10
people on the planet. Small arms and light weapons are also cheap, durable, robust,
easy to manufacture and copy and have a long lifespan. It is difficult to achieve
effective controls: The manufacture and trade of small arms and light weapons is
decentralised, and illicit transfers are believed to account for a significant proportion of
the global trade—a market which is thought to be worth over one billion dollars
annually. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons also has serious
development costs: Post-conflict reconstruction and political, social and economic
development are undermined, as are the security and stability of the country or region.
The UK Government has responded to this problem in the following manner:
It has set up a committee mandated to combat illicit trafficking, pursue a
‗responsible and transparent‘ policy on legal transfers, and promote the removal
and destruction of weapons
It is working towards securing agreements with the European Union (EU) and
Organisation for Security Co- operation in Europe (OSCE) and has pledged its
support for the UN‘s 2001 Programme of Action on Small Arms
The UK Small Arms and Light Weapons Programme has said that it will be
working on practical programmes over the next three years to reduce the
volume of weapons in circulation
The UK has pledged its support for governments and civil society organisations
in affected regions in order to build political commitment and effective controls
241
The UK has said it will support the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) initiative to help countries develop their own weapons collection,
management and destruction programmes, by providing UK experts in this area.
Because the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a worldwide problem, it
requires a comprehensive, coordinated response at the local, national, regional and
global levels. General recommendations are that:
A comprehensive response should integrate the perspectives of defence,
development, foreign policy, law enforcement and trade and needs to work in
partnership with international institutions
Agreements to control small arms will have little impact unless they are
matched by efforts to collect, securely manage and destroy the weapons in
circulation
Peace accords must provide for demobilisation, disarmament and the
rehabilitation of combatants
Peacekeeping operations must make provision for weapons collection and
destruction
These measures will only be effective if they take place within the framework of
a programme for Security Sector Reform — the remodelling of the military
forces and structures appropriate to the legitimate defence needs of a country.
Source: DFID 2001, 'Small Arms and Light Weapons: A UK Policy Briefing',
Department for International Development, FCO, and Ministry of Defence, London
Core readings
Obstructing Development: The Effects of Small Arms on Human Development
Small Arms Survey (2003)
Access full text online
Summary
What effect does small arms violence have on development? How have development
agencies and governments sought to tackle small arms use? This chapter from a work
published by the Small Arms Survey analyses the social, economic and human cost of
small arms use around the world. It argues that such violence causes widespread
damage to developing societies, and outlines developmental responses aimed at cutting
demand for small arms, regulating their use and destroying surplus stocks.
Internal armed conflict and social violence, which includes criminal and domestic
conflict, is concentrated in developing countries, and incidences are rising. Recent
conflict, a history of state-led violence, high unemployment levels and growing
inequality may contribute to armed criminality.
The direct consequences of small arms use include the human and financial costs of
firearms casualties, while the indirect effects encompass the social, economic and
developmental harm caused by armed violence or its threat. It can be difficult to
monitor firearms use because crimes go unreported or figures are suppressed by
governments.
Various findings are made on the effects of small arms use:
242
Social services and social cohesion can be affected by the threat and use of
firearms. School enrolment rates and educational performance may drop and
clinics may shut and face disruption to supplies. The prevalence of gangs and
child soldiers may cause breakdown in families and communities.
Economic activity can be hit by higher transport costs, deteriorating
infrastructure and disruption to trade and production. Foreign investment,
savings and tax collection are also impaired by violent insecurity.
Development programmes are distorted by the threat of violence. Rising
logistical costs and security threats can hamper access for agencies and even
force their withdrawal from deprived areas.
The rule of law can be undermined by the growing use of private security in
violent societies. Private security firms can increase the flow of small arms back
into society and exacerbate criminality, while higher security expenditure
diverts resources from more productive activities.
Tackling firearms misuse entails a partnership between governments, NGOs and
international actors. It involves a tripartite approach directed at addressing the demand
for firearms, increasing legal controls and destroying surplus weapons:
Demand can be restricted by demobilisation initiatives, public awareness
campaigns and ‗weapons for development‘ programmes undertaken by
governments and international agencies. Some NGOs have focused on wider
factors feeding the demand for small arms, such as unemployment and
insecurity.
Domestic oversight of small arms use and availability has been promoted
through international initiatives assisting governments to monitor firearms
imports. Development agencies and governments have invested in
strengthening police and judicial systems and reforming the security sector to
promote accountability.
Multilateral organisations have instituted weapons collection guidelines and
established disarmament programmes in partnership with national
governments. The success of these initiatives should be measured according to
their contribution to development, rather than the raw numbers of weapons
destroyed.
Donors should undertake better surveys to monitor the effect of small arms use
in order to develop improved interventions aimed at reducing violence as part
of a broader developmental strategy.
Source: Small Arms Survey, 2003, ‗Obstructing Development: The Effects of Small
Arms on Human Development‘, Chapter Four in ‗Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2003:
Development Denied‘, Oxford University Press, Oxford
Supplementary readings
Tackling Poverty by Reducing Armed Violence
Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, Department for International Development (2003)
Access full text online
Summary
Armed violence poses a significant obstacle to poverty reduction. So why have so few
development agencies dealt with the problem of small arms in their policies or
243
programmes? This report from the Department for International Development
discusses ways of integrating arms controls into development policy and programmes
and suggests that more needs to be done to encourage development organisations to
address this issue.
Small arms availability and use is a development issue but more needs to be done to
document its impact on poverty. Although many development programmes are
affected by armed violence, the links between weapons availability and poverty are not
well documented. Currently many agencies are wary of addressing small arms because
of mandate and resource constraints and insufficient knowledge of both the problem
and possible solutions. Efforts to engage development agencies on arms issues have
been limited and often the messages conveyed have seemed irrelevant to poverty
reduction. Engaging policy makers on armed violence is key, particularly those
responsible for developing Poverty Reduction Strategies, as these provide the
overarching framework for many donors‘ bilateral assistance. Although there is a clear
need and many opportunities for integrating armed violence reduction into
development assistance, there are also risks. To date, there has been limited
information exchange or co-ordination among development agencies on armed
violence issues.
More needs to be done to engage development agencies effectively.
Co-operation among development agencies on armed violence issues needs to
be strengthened.
Armed violence is particularly relevant to specific areas of development.
There are risks in integrating small arms controls into development assistance.
Governments and civil society in developing countries need to be engaged on
armed violence issues.
Small arms reduction measures need to be integrated into national development
policy frameworks.
The onus lies with the small arms community to develop evidence and tools for
development agencies, to demonstrate that in countries affected by the wide
availability and use of arms, poverty reduction can be best achieved through a
reduction in armed violence and improved human security. Furthermore:
Research should be commissioned that makes explicit the links between armed
violence reduction and poverty eradication, including achieving the Millennium
Development Goals.
Those engaged on small arms issues should develop best practice guidelines for
armed violence reduction programmes that are accessible to development
practitioners, and help development agencies to engage on armed violence
initiatives.
Co-operation between different parts of government and civil society should be
improved, to ensure that, where armed violence is a significant obstacle to
development, this is articulated in poverty reduction strategies.
More needs to be done to engage the international financial institutions,
particularly the World Bank, to ensure that armed violence issues are included
in development policy dialogues.
Armed violence should be included in conflict assessments and more should be
done to document examples of urban and rural development programmes that
have successfully addressed armed violence. Arms management issues should
be integrated into security sector reform processes.
244
Increased co-operation among development agencies is a high priority, and the
OECD Development Assistance Committee could play a role in improving co-
ordination of donor policies on arms issues.
Source: Department for International Development, 2003, 'Tackling Poverty by
Reducing Armed Violence: Recommendations from a Wilton Park Workshop', 14-16
April, DFID, London.
Shattered Lives: A Case for Tough International Arms Control
Amnesty International and Oxfam (2003)
Access full text online
Summary
The uncontrolled proliferation and misuse of arms by government forces and armed
groups takes a massive human toll in lost lives, lost livelihoods and lost opportunities
to escape poverty. What action is required at international, national and local level to
control arms proliferation? In this report, Amnesty International and Oxfam argue that
governments can and must do more to control arms proliferation effectively. Better co-
ordination between governments is needed to address both the trade in arms and safety
at community level.
Every government in the world has a responsibility to control arms, both within their
borders and those they export. The world‘s most powerful governments – who are also
the world‘s biggest arms suppliers – have the greatest responsibility. The five
permanent members of the UN Security Council (France, Russia, China, UK and USA)
together account for 88 per cent of the world‘s conventional arms exports; these
exports contribute regularly to gross abuses of human rights.
Since the attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon in 2001, some suppliers
have relaxed arms controls in order to arm new-found allies against ‗terrorism‘,
irrespective of their disregard for human rights and humanitarian law. Despite the
damage caused by arms, there is still no binding, comprehensive, international law to
control their export. Still, the 1997 Landmines Treaty saw the end of open trading in
landmines and the same combination of public pressure and sympathetic governments‘
action could secure an Arms Trade Treaty.
Civil society and governments need to work proactively and effectively together to
address the problems of arms at international, regional, national and local level to stem
the source of supply and address the root causes of why people possess arms in
insecure environments.
Governments must agree on the Arms Trade Treaty, preventing arms being
exported to destinations where they are likely to be used to commit grave
violations of human rights and humanitarian law.
Governments must develop and strengthen regional arms-control agreements, to
uphold international human rights and humanitarian law.
Governments must improve state capacity and their own accountability to
control arms transfers and protect citizens from armed violence.
Civil society and local government agencies are urged to take effective action to
improve safety at community level, by reducing the local availability and
demand for arms.
245
Governments are acting too slowly to control arms. They must take urgent action in the
following areas:
International level: adopt the Arms Trade Treaty by the 2006 UN review
conference on small arms (through government lobbying in international and
regional forums); create new international instruments to prevent irresponsible
arms brokering, transporting, financing and foreign licensed production; provide
more funding for practical assistance for arms-affected countries.
Regional level: create/strengthen arms control, building on and inspiring work
at the national level. These controls should address the flow of arms, and reduce
widespread availability.
National level: ensure responsible use of arms by national security forces,
abiding by international standards; take swift disarmament/demobilisation
action when conflict has ended; establish independent justice mechanisms to
deal with human rights abuse; create/enforce legislation to control import,
export, transit, production, sale and use of arms; improve public information
about arms production, possession and transfer; work with civil society to
develop strict arms controls.
Local level, in collaboration with civil society: rebuild confidence in the
possibility of non-armed security (in part by reducing the quantity of arms in
circulation); provide assistance to victims of armed violence; develop
sustainable livelihoods as an alternative for those who depend on armed
violence for their living.
Source: Hillier, D., and Wood, B., 2003, ‗Shattered Lives: A Case for Tough
International Arms Control‘, Amnesty International and Oxfam, London
246
Part 4: International Development System
Contents
1. Aid Instruments ................................................................................................................. 247
2. Development Effectiveness (Policy Coherence, Donor Alignment, Harmonisation) ....... 254
3. DFID‘s Governance Agenda and Competencies ............................................................... 267
247
1. Aid Instruments
Core readings
The Choice of Financial Aid Instruments
M Foster and J Leavy (2001)
Access full text online
Summary
There are various forms of aid and ways of ensuring that it reaches its intended targets.
Which is most appropriate in a given situation?
This guide from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) provides policymakers
with matrices and explanatory notes to help determine the most effective way to
deliver aid. There are three levels of aid: macro support, sectoral or other sub-national
support, and support to specific projects. The choice depends largely on the degree of
consensus within and between governments and donors over spending priorities.
Where stakeholders are agreed, it makes sense to support the government's budget as a
whole rather than impose the additional reporting costs of targeted support. If aid
might be disbursed inefficiently or incompletely by a weak government, it may be
better to restrict aid to particular sectors or projects. Aid may be conditional on certain
policies, may be earmarked for specific purposes, or special disbursement and
accountability measures may be required. In practice, aid is frequently a hybrid of
these levels and obligations.
Macro aid can be balance of payments support, general budget support, or debt
relief; the latter gives least control - once granted it cannot be revoked, even if
conditions are not met.
Macro aid is appropriate when there is formal agreement between donors and
government over public policy, strong public expenditure management, and
when efficiency gains outweigh the specific benefits of targeted aid.
Similarly, sectoral support is appropriate when there is agreement over sectoral
policies, administration is strong and benefits are greater than with project
finance.
The 'sector-wide approach' (SWAp) is different: there is a single policy and
expenditure programme for a whole sector; all funding is channelled through
government systems; it should be encouraged as it is the most efficient and
sustainable mode of delivery.
Project finance is appropriate in weak policy environments: it can support civil
society in holding government to account, and may be the only way to deliver
aid effectively; good projects can also influence policy by 'leading by example'.
It is also appropriate when governments do not think donors should be involved
in domestic policymaking.
How far to impose conditionality is subject to similar considerations as above; they
must also be coordinated with other donors' conditions and have domestic backing.
Conditionality can help domestic reformers by committing government to
certain policies, but a heavy-handed approach can be counter-productive if
reformers are seen as foreign 'stooges'.
Besides the ethical considerations, policies implemented without domestic
support are less effective and sustainable than those with strong backing.
248
Domestic channels should be used where possible, though technical assistance
(TA) may be needed, especially in specialist procurement; where capacity is
weak, systems should be strengthened rather than bypassed.
When economic problems lead to failed conditions, withdrawing aid can
exacerbate the situation - but not withdrawing as threatened raises moral hazard
issues.
In theory, a government can reduce its spending in a sector by the amount of
funds earmarked for it, thus freeing up resources for other uses; in practice,
public spending is not that easy to exchange, and earmarking is effective.
'Poverty earmarking' as developed by Uganda avoids many problems: a base
level of domestic spending in a sector is determined and aid is earmarked for
spending above that level.
Foster, M. and Leavy, J., 2001, 'The Choice of Financial Aid Instruments', Overseas
Development Institute, London.
Supplementary readings
The Status of Sector Wide Approaches
A Brown, M Foster, A Norton and F Naschold (2001)
Access full text online
Summary
Increasingly, donors have switched from project-based operations in developing
countries to working within sector-wide approaches (SWApS). Here, all significant
funding supports a single-sector policy and expenditure programme, under government
leadership. This report, commissioned for a donor working group, summarises
experiences prior to 2001 and proposes ways to make the SWAp process more
effective.
At the time of the study, SWAps were at an early stage of implementation,
representing work in progress rather than a blueprint. In 2001, most SWAps had not
yet attained their goals but were moving towards them. Work was still underway, even
with well-established programmes as in Uganda, on integrating all sources of funding
and ongoing projects, making sector coverage more comprehensive, and developing
common procedures and greater reliance on government. Experiences from SWAps in
different countries showed progress in improving government-donor relationships,
building government capacity, tackling corruption and targeting services more
effectively to the poor. However, there were still many problems with the planning,
implementation and management of SWAps, which were reducing their effectiveness.
The report asserts that SWAps may not be appropriate in all situations and contains a
framework for assessing their relevance. Where they are in place, some general
observations can be made:
In some cases, donor efforts to direct programme design have led to rejection by
governments, who lack ownership over the SWAp.
Governments are often unable to hold donors to their commitments, making
budget dependence on them risky.
Donors are too demanding with regard to programme details and immediate
results, often because they do not trust the review process. Monitoring and
information systems are underdeveloped.
249
Civil society participation in formulating policies is low, as is the quality of
analysis of how SWAps could reduce poverty and their impact on it.
Transaction costs appear to increase, at least in the initial stages. This puts extra
pressure on overloaded ministries, which are expected to achieve and maintain
high levels of productivity.
Most disbursements still take place using donor project procedures. The
inability of the World Bank to provide direct budget support is a problem.
Recommendations are made to improve the design, implementation and management
of SWAps, as well as to measure their impact. Actors should:
Link agreed SWAp strategies to hard choices and concrete processes, such as
medium-term budget frameworks and civil service reform.
Recognise that policy change is ongoing, and put in place permanent analytical
capacity to support government. A focused annual review process should be
established, which may lower transaction costs.
Focus, in the case of donors, on delivering coherent and consistent messages
and giving priority to essentials. They should be aware of political contexts and
have realistic expectations.
Develop indicators and systems to monitor programmes, and gather more
information on problems of service delivery and access for the poor. Civil
society participation should be increased.
Address capacity shortages by introducing wider civil service reforms and
decentralising responsibility to district level. Corruption should be targeted with
effective sanctions.
Make financial procedures common across sectors and use the government
accounting system. Greater transparency, independent tracking and community
involvement can improve accountability.
Source: Brown, A., Foster, M., Norton, A., and Naschold, F. 2001, 'The Status of
Sector Wide Approaches', Working Paper No.142, Overseas Development Institute,
London
Sector Wide Programmes and Poverty Reduction
M Foster and S Mackintosh-Walker (2001)
Access full text online
Summary
How effective are sector-wide approaches (SWAps) in tackling poverty reduction
goals? What lessons can be drawn from current practice to improve their performance?
This report by the Overseas Development Institute analyses sector programmes in a
variety of countries, and gives an overview of how the current generation of SWAps is
addressing poverty concerns.
Poverty issues tend to be addressed more effectively in SWAps that specifically aim to
improve poor people‘s access to services. Most of the sector programmes reviewed had
this objective, except in agriculture where growth was a priority. Success is most likely
where efforts have been made to understand and tackle the constraints on poor
people‘s access to services. For example, in education, cost to parents has been widely
identified as a major barrier and reducing it is a key intervention. Governments must
also commit to expenditure that targets the poor and then protect that spending from
fiscal pressures. Overall, education sector programmes have raised primary school
250
enrolment, with a focus on the poor. However, evidence for the health sector is more
mixed.
The report cites case studies from Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana, Bangladesh, Zambia,
Ethiopia and Cambodia. Overall, there is growing recognition that merely increasing
the proportion of spending on primary services is insufficient. More focused efforts
must be made to overcome the problems that prevent poor groups from accessing
services. Other observations are that:
Private financing and private service providers are playing a more important
role in SWAps. For example, involving the private sector in higher education
can free up more public funds for primary.
Many countries are spending a high share of their education budget on primary
services, but in the health sector this can be more politically difficult to
maintain.
A key problem in health is that universal free provision of even basic services is
unaffordable. Charging fees has helped to overcome funding shortfalls, but this
is a barrier to utilisation by the poor.
Most countries are trying to expand insurance programmes as a way to boost
funding without excluding the poor, but these are at an early stage.
In some cases, reviews conducted during the SWAp process have produced a
sharper focus on poverty. In Uganda, the national Poverty Reduction Strategy
has had a positive impact on SWAps.
Improvements can be made to the implementation and management of SWAps so that
they tackle poverty more effectively. Experience to date suggests that:
Where funds are administered through local government, highly conditional
approaches can ensure they reach their target. Tracking studies have also helped
identify problems.
Decentralisation to facility or community level may increase accountability to
users, but local-level inequalities must be addressed to ensure that the
vulnerable are not excluded.
To evaluate and improve SWAps‘ effectiveness in reaching the poor,
administrative data needs to be supplemented with wider surveys. Monitoring
information should be made widely available.
Districts that cannot meet financial accountability criteria should not lose funds,
and poverty-relevant expenditure should be protected from cuts.
Attracting staff to work in rural areas is a common problem, but incentives have
been introduced to encourage staff to take up tough posts. Staff with lower
qualifications are also being used.
Programme management may be improved by introducing performance-related
assessment and greater accountability to the public.
Source: Foster, M. and Mackintosh-Walker, S. 2001, 'Sector Wide Programmes and
Poverty Reduction', Working Paper No.157, Overseas Development Institute, London
251
Evaluation of General Budget Support: Synthesis Report
International Development Department, University of Birmingham (2006)
Access full text online
Summary
To what extent and under what circumstances is Partnership General Budget Support
(PGBS) an effective aid mechanism? This study for a large group of bilateral and
multilateral donors synthesises findings on the experience of PGBS from Burkina
Faso, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda and Vietnam. PGBS is not a
development strategy in itself, but an approach that supports the development aims of
the partner country.
PGBS is a response to dissatisfaction with earlier aid instruments, and eschews
imposing external solutions through conditionality in favour of supporting
government-owned development. It is closely linked to the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) initiative and the introduction of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSP). There are high expectations of the instrument, which include: improved
harmonisation and alignment of aid, increased efficiency and effectiveness of public
administration, greater predictability of funding, and improved domestic
accountability. Analysis of the seven study countries found that PGBS was a relevant
response to each individual context. It has evolved and become more relevant in each
case over time.
PGBS has significant effects through financial empowerment, strengthening incentives
within government, and improving coherence and coordination among international
partners. Key findings of the study were:
Improvements in harmonisation and alignment in every case. However, there is
still significant scope for further harmonisation
Technical assistance was the least well integrated input
Political context was generally not well analysed and adapted to
The variety of international partners, their differing interests, and high
expectations make PGBS inherently complex to manage
PGBS supported increases in PRSP priority expenditures. However, better
poverty analyses of public expenditures are required everywhere
Budget support is not more vulnerable to corruption than other forms of aid.
Deciding whether PGBS is an appropriate modality is not a simple decision. It requires
assessing the size, scope, scale, design and role of the instrument. Variables may have
simultaneously positive and negative implications. PGBS is a long term exercise, and
requires donor stamina. Design and implementation must consider the interplay
between different aid modalities. It should reduce dissonance and exploit
complementarities between them. Although incremental approaches are best in
introducing PGBS, there is no standard evolutionary sequence leading to adoption. In
addition:
Objectives should be realistic and the central role of strengthening public
expenditure management should be kept in focus
Government systems should be utilised as early and as completely as possible
PGBS is vulnerable to political risk. Governments must both want and be able
to engage with partner agencies, and there needs to be basic trust
PGBS is more likely to be attractive to countries that are heavily aid dependent.
In these cases, macroeconomic stability and elementary fiscal discipline are
essential
252
There is scope for a limited number of sector focussed and more general PGBS
instruments to be mutually reinforcing. Aligning such budget support
instruments with different general/ sector orientations is an important practical
issue.
Source: International Development Department, 2006, 'Evaluation of General Budget
Support: Synthesis Report', IDD, University of Birmingham, Birmingham
CIDA Primer on Program-Based Approaches
R Lavergne and A Alba (2003)
Access full text online
Summary
The expression ―programme-based approaches‖ (PBAs) is one that has emerged
relatively recently in the development world. What does it mean? And how does it
compare with other approaches? This analytical review by the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) covers a wide range of PBA issues, exploring some of
the implications of this new vision for how aid agencies work. It suggests that the shift
from projects to PBAs is an important one with major implications for how the Agency
operates.
PBAs emphasise comprehensive and coordinated planning in a given sector, thematic
area of intervention, or national poverty reduction strategy (PRS). PBAs are intended
to support locally owned programmes of a developing country government or
institution that one or more donors have agreed to support. A programme is defined as
an integrated set of activities designed to achieve a set of outcomes in a relatively
comprehensive way. The programme may be a PRS, a sector programme, a thematic
programme (such as an environmental strategy), or the programme of a specific
organisation. A PBA is a way of engaging in development cooperation based on the
principle of coordinated support for a locally owned programme of development. The
approach includes several key elements:
Leadership by the host country or organisation.
A single programme and budget framework.
Donor coordination and harmonisation of procedures.
Efforts to increase the use of local procedures over time with regard to
programme design and implementation, financial management, and monitoring
and evaluation. PBAs need to be understood as highly dynamic.
The PBA concept is a flexible one that allows for a wide range of intervention and
reflects international trends in thinking about development cooperation. Ultimately, the
point of PBAs is to highlight a number of internationally recognised principles of aid
effectiveness, and to systematise their application in a coherent and consistent way.
This systematic approach to aid effectiveness principles translates into a paradigm shift
of far reaching significance. Taken together, all of these changes point to a vastly
different way of doing business under PBAs. Among the changes implied are as
follows:
A shift in preoccupation from ensuring the success of individual projects to one
of concern for the success of development programs at a higher level.
A shift from thinking about results that are attributable to CIDA‘s own efforts to
an approach based on joint accountability for outcomes achieved in partnership
with others.
253
Increased attention to issues of institutional development and a more
sophisticated approach to risk and uncertainty, based on dialogue and
partnership rather than donor controls and the progressive emergence and
flourishing of trust and confidence over time.
This in turn will have implications for staffing in donor agencies and for the
locus of decision-making, with a premium on continuity and field presence.
Source: Lavergne, R. and Alba, A., 2003, 'CIDA Primer on Program-based
Approaches', Canadian International Development Agency, Gatineau, Quebec
254
2. Development Effectiveness (Policy Coherence, Donor Alignment,
Harmonisation)
Core readings
Governance, Development, and Aid Effectiveness: A Quick Guide to Complex
Relationships
J Court (2006)
Access full text online
Summary
While most people agree that governance contributes to positive economic and social
outcomes, it is rare to find rigorous, systematic and comprehensive governance
assessments. This briefing paper, published by the Overseas Development Institute,
synthesises current thinking on the relationship between governance and development
and aid effectiveness. Use of improved assessment approaches would contribute to
more effective aid interventions, benefiting poor people in developing countries and
satisfying taxpayer concerns in donor countries about the cost of aid.
Governance consists of more than a narrow focus on government. It relates to the
public realm where state, economic and societal actors interact to make decisions.
Cross-country evidence indicates that better governance contributes to improved
investment and growth rates. More effective government, bureaucracy and rule of law
contribute to better economic performance and the personal and economic well-being
of citizens.
The main arenas of governance are civil society, political society, government,
bureaucracy, economic society and the judiciary. The practice of good governance
includes adherence to the universal principles of participation, fairness, decency,
accountability, transparency and efficiency. Assessing the status of governance in a
developing country poses challenges that are very different from other socio-economic
issues. First, there are few objective or "hard" indicators. Second, governance remains
a sensitive issue, making it difficult to collect data.
Governance assessments suffer from a number of shortcomings, including:
A lack of reliable, valid and comparable data on key governance concerns.
Inadequate information-gathering by donors on a country's current situation;
lack of focus on reforms that are politically feasible.
Insufficient linkage of assessment results to aid allocation and country
programming.
A team of researchers have developed a new, systematic approach to generating
comprehensive assessments that stresses accuracy and legitimate data
collection. The approach adopts a set of universal principles and focuses on key
arenas of the political process. It solicits the views of local experts and
stakeholders, generates qualitative as well as quantitative information and is
independently managed.
To develop more independent, rigorous and detailed governance assessments, donors
should:
255
Solicit input from local stakeholders during the assessment process and develop
local capacity to conduct such assessments.
Orient the level and type of aid according to specific country contexts.
Improve the clarity of both assessment findings and donor-recipient agreements
so as to avoid the start-stop approach to aid.
Support the maintenance of government, private sector and civil society
accountability to local stakeholders in spite of aid assistance.
Increase coordination among donors.
Be realistic about the time it takes for governance constraints to be overcome.
Source: Court, J., 2006, 'Governance, Development, and Aid Effectiveness: A Quick
Guide to Complex Relationships', Briefing Paper, Overseas Development Institute,
London
From Aid Effectiveness to Development Coherence in Fragile States
C Lockhart (2005)
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Summary
How can policy coherence be achieved in relation to fragile states? What are the
challenges, and what mechanisms are emerging to address them? This background
paper from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), prepared for the Senior Level
Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, focuses on coherence between
aid and non-aid policies of donor countries.
There is a growing recognition among donors that their core business is development
effectiveness, not just aid effectiveness. The impact of non-aid policies on
development outcomes is gaining ever-higher priority, and the emphasis is on securing
coherence across government departments. Just as lack of coherence can result in
contradictory outcomes, it is impossible to achieve certain policy goals without
mobilising a range of complementary outcomes. In the medium term, building the
effectiveness of the 'beneficiary' state is also central to a wide range of goals. All of
this is particularly relevant to fragile states.
Consensus does not yet exist on the means of setting precise objectives and on
designing policies and implementation mechanisms to reach those objectives that
ensure coherence across the different domains (security, diplomatic, development,
humanitarian, legal, trade, investment and migration).
Donor governments have tended to respond to fragile states with policies
generated separately by their different ministries; there are many examples of
incoherence resulting at a strategic level.
There are also many cases of donor support to projects which do not add up to a
coherent strategy; the whole is less than the sum of the different interventions.
When each part of the government proceeds in setting objectives and designing
interventions, potential conflict between different stakeholders in a government
system is unavoidable.
A number of initiatives are underway to promote better policy coherence at the
level of strategy and policy setting, project design and analysis in different
donor governments; it is too early to judge their impact.
256
It is not clear that greater coherence within a particular donor government or
within a domain will lead to a coherent approach at country level; on the
contrary, it may undermine inter-donor coherence.
To reach strategy coherence, there must be system-wide coherence, across different
actors and activities.
There must be agreement on a single strategic process between those actors, and
recognition that the perpetuation of competing or parallel strategies will
undermine this.
As part of a single strategic process, coherence is required in each of the
following levels: goal and objective setting; policy and implementation
mechanisms; analysis and monitoring mechanisms.
Actors with clear levels of authority must be afforded incentives to participate
in the strategic process, which may be anchored in a budget process, or in a joint
planning tool.
Transparency in accounting and record-keeping across all activities is important
to allow measurement of whether activity and expenditure is aligned with goals.
Sub-national fragility and cross-border issues require flexibility in analysis and
engagement; this can pose an organisational challenge to donors geared to
working with single nation-states.
Global issues are often central, so more creative ways of achieving coherence
with the United Nations Security Council and other global actors are needed.
Source: Lockhart, C., 2005, ‗From Aid Effectiveness to Development Coherence in
Fragile States‘, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London
Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery: Good Practice Papers
OECD (2003)
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Summary
How should donors and developing countries work towards co-ordinating practices to
ensure effective delivery of aid? These guidelines drawn up by the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) offer a set of principles and ‗good practices‘ for all parties.
Their goal is to simplify and harmonise procedures, thereby reducing costs and
boosting progress towards the Millennium Development Goals.
Managing different donor procedures bears a high cost for developing countries.
Meeting multiple requirements employs a large proportion of their administrative
capacity and reduces ownership of their own development plans, among other
problems. In response, the DAC convened a task force and commissioned a survey of
developing countries‘ needs. This work culminated in a set of good practice papers on
how donors can improve their operational procedures with a view to strengthening
partner country ownership. The papers address six key areas: frameworks for donor co-
operation, country analytic work and preparation of projects and programmes,
measuring performance in public financial management, reporting and monitoring,
financial reporting and auditing, and delegated co-operation.
Each chapter contains detailed guidelines and examples of initiatives that are already
under way. The broad areas covered by the recommendations are:
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Good practices between donors and partner governments. This might include
greater reliance on partner government systems for administering aid or timing
missions, and should be agreed on and applied by all parties.
Good practices between donor agencies. The aim here is to prevent unnecessary
duplication of work: for example, one donor could entrust another to execute
tasks such as audits or diagnostic work.
Good practices within individual donor systems. This covers changes donors
can make to their own systems to reduce costs and strengthen partners‘
ownership.
Guidelines to address potential risks arising from harmonised procedures. These
emphasise the importance of adapting practices to local circumstances, building
capacity and using indicators to monitor progress.
The message for donors is that they should simplify and harmonise their procedures,
while attempting to align them in the medium-term with systems in partner countries.
Donors should also aim to be more transparent. Suggested improvements include:
Setting an effective institutional framework with partner governments that
should lead to greater sharing of objectives, clearer expectations, lower costs
and more predictable and transparent aid flows.
Rationalising the development and application of diagnostic tools, including
country analytic work, and the preparation of specific donor operations.
Planning and executing diagnostic reviews of public financial management in
the context of a government-led strategy for improvement. This should be
integrated with performance measurement and capacity building efforts.
Designing reporting and monitoring systems that avoid duplication and support
the priorities of partner countries.
Working towards the delivery of common financial reports that reflect all
project funds, as well as independent audits. Donors should co-ordinate their
requirements and align them with strengthened national processes.
Increasing delegated co-operation, whereby one donor acts on behalf of one or
more others. This should benefit all parties and be done in a way that supports
partner governments‘ leadership of the development process.
Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2003,
'Harmonising Donor Practices For Effective Aid Delivery: Good Practice Papers',
OECD, Paris.
Supplementary readings
Poverty Efficient Aid Allocations – Collier/Dollar Revisited
J Beynon (2003)
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Summary
What makes aid effective and what are the implications of this analysis for aid
allocations? Recent World Bank research has stimulated a major debate around these
issues. There is growing consensus among donors that ‗good‘ policy is a key factor for
aid effectiveness and should therefore be a criteria for allocation. This paper from the
Economics and Statistics Analysis Unit of the Overseas Development Institute re-
258
examines the evidence on which those arguments are based, and analyses aid
efficiency over the 1990s.
The World Bank view is that aid only works effectively when governments pursue
particular policies, and that selectively allocating aid to better performers will lead to
more poverty reduction. However, the ‗aid-growth‘ model on which this thinking is
based has been challenged and recent research has identified other variables that could
affect its policy conclusions. While these require further analysis, micro-economic
evidence does confirm the view that policies are important for aid effectiveness. Many
donors have already responded to that message by moving to make their aid allocations
more performance-related. Aid effectiveness did increase during the 1990s, but
differences in donor performance suggest that there is still room for improvement in
allocations.
The paper summarises the main arguments and evidence generated by the
Burnside/Collier/Dollar ‗aid-growth‘ model underpinning the World Bank research,
together with those of its critics. It then subjects the Collier/Dollar aid allocation
models to a wider range of sensitivity tests. Key conclusions are that:
More aid should go not just to countries with better policy and institutional
environments, but also to countries recovering from conflicts and those facing
external shocks.
More research is needed, particularly on the issues of diminishing marginal
returns and absorptive capacity, the extent to which aid promotes reform, the
effectiveness of different instruments, and the implications for aid allocation.
The models highlight the potential for more efficient allocations, but sensitivity
testing shows higher variation in ‗poverty efficient‘ allocations at country and
regional level.
Testing also shows much more ambiguity in the desired direction of change for
country allocations, which reduces the models‘ value for policy makers.
Further development of the models is needed to incorporate other variables,
concerns about uneven regional trends in poverty reduction and the implications
of the Millennium Development Goals.
The World Bank has claimed that aid efficiency improved through the 1990s and this
finding is being used to help make the case for increased aid. Further analysis of
changes in aid efficiency shows that:
Efficiency improvements are mainly due to falling aid levels, plus some effect
from better policy performance – not to changes in the pattern of aid allocations
(although this requires careful interpretation).
There is much additional evidence from project evaluations and aid-growth
regressions to show that aid effectiveness has been improving, and the case for
increasing aid remains strong.
Multilateral donors are marginally more efficient than bilaterals. The African
Development Fund improved significantly in the 1990s to become the most
efficient and the European Commission is the least efficient.
Among major bilaterals, the UK improved substantially and is among the most
efficient, alongside Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Italy. Spain and the US
are among the poorest performers.
These differentials suggest that there is considerable room for donors to
improve aid allocations, although efficiency measures should be better informed
by the further analysis proposed in the paper.
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Beynon, J., 2003, ‗Poverty Efficient Aid Allocations – Collier/Dollar Revisited‘,
Economics and Statistics Analysis Unit Working Paper 2, Overseas Development
Institute, London.
Reforming the International Aid Architecture: Options and Ways Forward
S Burall and S Maxwell (2006)
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Abstract
This working Paper describes the characteristics and constraints of the current
international aid architecture. It also summarises the perceptions in partner developing
countries of the strengths and weaknesses of key bilateral and multilateral aid agencies
and the countries‘ perceptions of best practice features of aid agencies.
Source: Burall, S. and S. Maxwell with A.R. Menocal, 2006, Reforming the
international aid architecture: Options and ways forward. ODI Working Paper 278
(October).
Harmonisation and Alignment in Fragile States
K Christiansen, E Coyle and C Lockhart (2004)
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Summary
How relevant is the harmonisation and alignment agenda to difficult partnerships?
What is the experience of harmonisation between donors and alignment with recipient
government's systems and priorities so far? What lessons that can donors and other
external actors learn? This paper by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
explores the relevance of harmonisation and alignment for assistance in fragile states.
The report concludes that the agenda is of even more relevance in difficult partnerships
or fragile states and highlights the main obstacles. It goes on to outline specific policy
recommendations for external actors and donors.
DAC defines 'difficult partnerships' or fragile states as those low-income countries
with a lack of political commitment or weak capacity to develop or implement pro-
poor policies. The challenge of external interventions such as those by aid and other
actors is that an understandable approach of state avoidance by donors ultimately
undermining their own objectives. In the context of weak recipient state systems and
policies external actors are tending to generate a multiplicity of parallel, state avoiding
interventions. This in turn reinforces patterns of complexity and fragmentation of
actors and efforts on both the donor and partner sides. The very process of avoidance
however only serves to undermine and fragment state institutions further. In the
medium term it also mitigates against the development of any meaningful
accountability relationship between institutions and their citizens.
The paper found four main clusters of experiences of harmonisation and alignment
across a range of fragile states: strong country leadership; strong donor leadership;
weak country leadership and fragmented donors; and a further category of the 'most
difficult partnerships' which involve particularly isolationist regimes, severe concerns
around legitimacy, and/or wide spread levels of ongoing armed conflict.
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A number of common obstacles and issues were identified in 'fragile state'contexts:
Donors often have very different ideas about what the priorities are, particularly
in the absence of government leadership on policy prioritisation.
If political commitment is perceived to be lacking, donors tend to move state-
avoiding approaches. Donors seem to believe that policy alignment is a
necessary precondition for systems alignment. This assumption needs to be
revised.
The presence of humanitarian relief agencies in many fragile states has serious
implications for alignment. Their practice of state-avoiding approaches has
major institutional development implications for such states.
When there is weak capacity, donors and recipients particularly need to focus
on a very limited number of tasks rather than spread limited human, financial
and institutional capital. Not doing so is likely to undermine their own
objectives.
Further focus is required on developing appropriate country-level mechanisms
for ensuring coherence both between donor government departments (e.g.
across security, political, trade, development, humanitarian actors)and across
different intervening governments.
Some specific recommendations for moving towards improved interventions by
external actors in fragile states are set out:
Donors should undertake detailed and joint diagnostics of existing
country/national processes and systems. There is often an incorrect assumption
that there is 'nothing there'.
Donors activities should be aligned to all stages of the government's strategy,
policy and implementation cycle. The focus of processes is the national budget.
Such an approach requires changes in approach and actions by both the
recipient and donor. Where use of government systems is not possible, donors
should 'shadow align'. This means using the same timetables or rules as
government while not putting resources directly through systems.
In extreme situations where alignment is not possible, donors need to
harmonise. Harmonisation should focus on the creation of mechanisms that
enhance, not undermine, the emergence of country systems, policies, leadership
and ownership.
The selectivity and sequencing of interventions are critical. The number of
interventions should be very limited, prioritised and carefully timed to take
account of existing institutional capability and mobilise capacity.
Donors should support policymaking and aid management in partner
governments. This includes providing better incentives, training and twinning
opportunities as well as more effective technical assistance.
Progress with alignment and harmonisation should be monitored at the level of
impact, namely the country level. Donors should consider the range of elements
around the policy and budget cycle including their own and their implementing
agencies/NGO activities.
Source: Christiansen, K., Coyle, E and Lockhart, C., 2004, ‗Harmonisation and
Alignment in Fragile States‘, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London, Report
prepared for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Development Assistance Committee ( OECD-DAC )
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Shifting Sands: The Search for 'Coherence' Between Political and Humanitarian
Responses to Complex Emergencies
J Macrae and N Leader (2000)
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Summary
The early 1990s saw an increase in calls to enhance the coherence of political and
humanitarian action. With a growing sense of mutual distrust from humanitarian and
political actors, this paper seeks to detail the findings of a six month study on the
politics of coherence, and particularly to understand the precise character of the new
relationship proposed between aid and politics in the post-Cold War era.
The study has focused on two donor governments (the UK and the Netherlands), as
well as analysing how the UN provided a means to operationalise and legitimise the
coherence agenda. To understand the implications of coherence in practice, four mini-
case studies were undertaken, on each in Serbia and Kosovo and two in Afghanistan.
The four case studies examined the extent to which the theory of coherence has led to
improved analysis of the political determinants of need in conflict affected countries,
and has reached the following conclusions:
At this basic level of information sharing, the gains have been minimal, which
reflects a weakness of existing information collection and analysis within the
political strand. It also highlights a need for humanitarian information systems
to adequately capture need
There is a strong trend towards the bilateralisation of humanitarian response,
bringing bilateral donors nearer to operational decision making, which has both
positive and negative implications
There is a need for sustained advocacy and public information in order to
generate a constituency for humanitarian action in donor countries
Humanitarian aid is a weak tool as part of an overall strategy of conflict
management, and attempts to use it as such undermine its effectiveness in terms
of relieving poverty and suffering.
The report makes recommendations to three types of organisation: Donor
governments, the UN, and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agencies (NGHAs),
which are as follows:
Donor Governments should increase investment in political analysis and
engagement in non-strategic areas; codify in law a commitment to guarantee the
principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian
assistance; review the trend towards the bilateralisation of Humanitarian
Agencies; and develop a range of aid instruments for engaging in these
environments, not just humanitarian assistance
The UN: The Secretary General should approve ECHA‘s recommendation that
will preserve the independence of humanitarian action from political
interference; strengthen the UN‘s capacity for producing independent political
analysis; and revive the Strategic Framework initiative on a global basis and
particularly in Afghanistan
NGHAs must articulate more clearly and consistently their institutional
relationships with, and understanding of ‗politics‘ in, recipient and donor
countries; they need to review their commitment to humanitarian principles and
agree mechanisms by which adherence to them can be enhanced; and they
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should increase investment in analysing global and country specific trends in
relation to humanitarian policy, to maintain critical engagement with official
donors and to develop an active constituency.
Macrae, J. and Leader, N. 2000, 'Shifting Sands: The Search for ‗Coherence‘ Between
Political and Humanitarian Responses to Complex Emergencies', Humanitarian Policy
Group Report no. 8, Overseas Development Institute, London
Aid Allocation and Fragile States
M McGillivray (2005)
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Summary
How can donors provide poverty reducing and efficient aid allocations, particularly in
relation to fragile states? This paper, written for the Senior Level Forum on
Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, summarises research on aid allocation
and effectiveness, with a particular focus on fragile states. It presents these findings in
the broader context of how aid is and should be allocated in developing countries.
The premise that aid is more effective in countries with better policies and institutions
has been a dominant force behind donor allocations. Aid can lead to higher growth in
these countries, allowing donors to maximise poverty reduction and make quicker
progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. However, there is an increasing
move towards selectivity, with donors concentrating more aid on poor performers. Aid
allocation to fragile states is a growing concern.
Historically, fragile states have received less aid relative to need and absorptive
capacities than most, and some - categorised as 'aid orphans' - have received far less
than others. In addition, fragile states have received the most volatile and unpredictable
aid flows. Aid to the most fragile states has typically been the most volatile.
Inconsistent aid allocation has exacerbated the problems of growth and poverty
reduction in these countries.
More aid needs to go to poor countries than currently does, but donors face some
challenges if aid allocations are to be poverty efficient in fragile states. Key points are:
Under-aiding or over-aiding can result from lack of donor co-ordination.
Aid orphans receive very little media and diplomatic attention, even though
there is a high risk of them falling into instability.
Conventional aid instruments can be problematic in fragile states.
Risk adverse donors do not invest in fragile states but the risk of non-
intervention is rarely considered.
The weak capacity and risk of instability in fragile states means that there is a
need for careful sequencing of reforms and donor engagement.
Only once a minimum level of capacity is reached can other infrastructure and
technical assistance be effective.
Donors need to resolve the co-ordination problem that leads to donor orphans and
excessive aid flows. Further considerations are:
The absorptive capacity constraints in fragile states should be urgently
addressed, such constraints can result in aid being harmful, reducing growth and
increasing poverty.
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The level at which aid becomes counterproductive needs to be clarified.
More aid could be provided to organisations that are not directly involved with
the government, such as NGOs, private corporations or independent service
authorities.
More research is needed into effective aid modalities and the optimal
sequencing of aid in fragile states. Investments in human capital, working with
civil society and the private sector, technical assistance and service delivery are
all appropriate at different stages of interventions.
The effectiveness of aid can depend on a range of different variables, but are not
given sufficient consideration by donors. For example, there is evidence that
structural vulnerability and political stability are important for aid to be
effective towards poverty reduction and economic growth.
It should be recognised that growth is not the only benefit of aid; other positive
impacts include the prevention of instability and conflict, improvements in
human rights and the promotion of human development.
Source: McGillivray, M., 2005, ‗Aid Allocation and Fragile States‘, World Institute for
Development Economics Research, UNU, paper presented at the Senior Level Forum
on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, OECD-DAC, 13th-14th January,
London
Aid, Incentives and Sustainability. An Analysis of Development Co-operation
E Ostrom, C Gibson, S Shivakumar and K Andersson (2002)
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Summary
Recent studies of development assistance programs conclude that despite tremendous
efforts and good intentions, aid has produced disappointing results.Does aid itself
create incentives that undermine sustainability? This study by the Swedish
International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA) explores how the incentives
that arise in the system of development co-operation affect sustainable outcomes, and
recommends strategies to mitigate some of the perverse incentives often found in
development assistance systems.
This study introduces an institutional perspective on development co-operation that is
partly novel to SIDA and the rest of the aid community. Firstly, this perspective
highlights the role of incentives and increases our understanding of incentive problems
within developing country contexts as well as within the system of aid itself. Secondly,
it provides a method and tools for institutional analysis and evaluation of the
relationship between aid, incentives and sustainability. Finally, the study applies the
method empirically by initiating an analysis and evaluation of the incentive structure
and its causes within SIDA and five SIDA-supported projects in India and Zambia.
The study uses the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to
analyse the system of aid. The study finds that SIDA can contribute to more
sustainable outcomes through:
A more explicit and systematic understanding of incentive problems and their
institutional causes in local development contexts as well as those created by the
very system of development co-operation
The creation of incentives within SIDA that encourage individual and
organisational learning about sustainability
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The devolution of genuine ownership to the actual target population.
Incentives underpin aid effectiveness and sustainability. The following suggestions are
made to identify and mitigate perverse incentives and improve SIDA's mission
effectiveness:
A more explicit and systematic understanding of institutions and incentives
within particular organisational structures and mechanisms for transmitting this
knowledge.
Formalising an understanding of incentives in the system of aid through SIDA‘s
training modules thus fostering a keener awareness of project and program
design and implementation, yielding higher chances of success.
High rate of turnover of staff dealing with any one project and the lack of link
between career advancement and participation in sustainable projects result in
little incentive for involvement in a project after reassignment.
Identification and correction of perverse incentives require thoughtful analysis
before, during and after a project/program. Midterm formal evaluations are
particularly critical to improving sustainability.
All those affected by projects, particularly the beneficiaries, should be involved
in the evaluation of projects.
SIDA can help recipient countries increase their in-country ability to create and
analyse alternative forms of development and institution building based on
analyses of incentive structures.
Source: Ostrom, E., Gibson, C., Shivakumar, S. & Andersson, K., 2002, 'Aid,
Incentives and Sustainability. An Analysis of Development Co-operation', Swedish
International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA), Stockholm
Striking a New Balance: Donor Policy Coherence and Development Cooperation
in Difficult Environments
R Picciotto et al (2004)
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Summary
What are the challenges of policy coherence and development effectiveness in fragile
states? This report by the University of London examines the operational challenges
posed by development cooperation in difficult environments and the responses adopted
by donor countries. It concludes that improved coordination in individual donor
countries is a necessary, but far from sufficient, condition for productive engagement
with fragile states. In order to achieve development results, donor countries and
development assistance agencies should join together to achieve coordination,
harmonisation and alignment.
Global poverty reduction remains the overarching goal of the development community
and the economic imbalances associated with globalisation continue to evoke deep
concern. But geoeconomics no longer dominates geo-politics in international relations:
security is once again a major preoccupation of policy makers. Yet, the intersection
between the security and development domains remains heavily contested and
concerns are widespread about the distortions that the 'war on terror' may impose on
development operations. A comprehensive policy change agenda is needed to deal with
the unprecedented complexity of the development problems faced by fragile states.
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A broader concept of policy coherence that embraces human security and global
stability would provide the framework for coordinated action. The 'whole of
government' practices pioneered by a few donor countries would be emulated. Process
improvements in donor countries would be accompanied by complementary adaptation
of strategies, programs and practices in line with the hard won lessons of experience.
Particular changes that need to be implemented include the following:
Expand the policy coherence agenda to include security objectives. Initiate a
participatory process designed to complement the Millennium Development
Goals with Millennium Security Goals.
Energise high-level political leadership to avoid development considerations
being sidelined in global policy making.
Formulate performance indicators for results-based assessments of policy
coherence for development in fragile states. Undertake harmonisation of
country typologies under the aegis of the DAC.
Merge the security and development agendas through collaborative policy
research and consensus building.
Emphasise multilateral solutions and emulate the good practices used by
Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK and other donor countries to promote 'joined
up' government while pursuing donor harmonisation and coordination.
Design engagement strategies based on sound risk management principles and
disregard the 'conflict cycle'. Address the perverse consequences for
development that may flow from bringing together security and aid agencies.
Donors need to learn to work 'in' and 'on' conflict instead of 'around' conflict. They
need to:
Select the 'benign neglect' option only after due consideration of the
humanitarian and security consequences of inaction.
Adopt realism, a holistic and long term perspective, adequate fiduciary, social
and environmental safeguards, involvement of reform minded actors and
innovative approaches that nurture civil society and private sector participation.
Mainstream 'conflict sensitivity' criteria in macroeconomic policy advice, fiscal
policy and public expenditure reforms, poverty reduction strategy papers and
public expenditure reviews.
Privilege diplomacy, private investment, trade and security assistance over aid
in donor engagement in fragile states but provide sufficient aid to make the
other instruments effective.
Accord greater priority to conflict prevention, post conflict assistance and
security sector reform in donor country engagement strategies.
Replicate the special funding pools pioneered by Utstein. Reconsider aid
allocation principles and practices to take account of security considerations.
Source: Picciotto, R. et al, 2004, ‗Striking a New Balance: Donor Policy Coherence
and Development Cooperation in Difficult Environments‘, IPI/Global Policy Project,
London, UK
266
Financing and Aid Arrangements in Post-Conflict Situations
S Schiavo-Campo (2003)
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Summary
What does the the international experience with post-conflict reconstruction tell us
about financing modalities and aid arrangements in post-conflict situations? Are there
a series of recommendations that emerge from the experiences of post conflict
countries? This paper written on behalf of the World Bank looks at the experience of
aid funds in four post-conflict environments. In a general sense a pre-requisite for post-
conflict reconstruction and effective financing, is the establishment and maintenance of
peace.
An identification of the contextual features of each conflict situation is mandatory for
an effective reconstruction strategy and the design of the financing and aid architecture
that is to embody that strategy:
Each case has its own unique contributing features. In East Timor external
assistance was affected by the absence of an administrative capacity, In Bosnia
political and administrative fragmentation conditioned everything.
Evidence from the four studies shows that a ‗useful checklist‘ of possible
checks can be identified, some are obvious and none are sophisticated, nor are
they necessarily prescriptive.
In a general context factors such as a clear mandate, working for genuine
partnership and proactive communication are important.
In terms of structure and design, to aid in reconstruction a Multi Donor Trust
Fund (MDTF) will be set up. An Aid Management Agency (AMA) will act as
the bridge between donors and the government.
A single umbrella MDTF will accomplish little to aid effectiveness however, if
its design is faulty or its provisions are disregarded by donors, or the security
environment is unstable.
If no donor contributes there is no MDTF. This tautology underlines the
necessity to focus on incentives for individual donors to join an MDTF.
In terms of policy, it seems the dynamics of the development business and short-term
urgencies typical of a post-conflict situation have often been allowed to prevail over
long term institutional objectives.
The most obvious, but perhaps important, recommendation is to tailor design
and sequencing of financial aid and aid coordination to the circumstances of the
specific case.
A balance between ‗outsider nationals‘ and ‗insider nationals‘ is very important
for sustainability. The balance must be found, however, by the countries‘ people
themselves.
Local organisations and NGOs should not be by-passed in post-conflict
reconstruction programmes. NGOs and local communities are often the only
ones capable of implementing activities on the ground.
Source: Schiavo-Campo, S., 2003, 'Financing And Aid Arrangements In Post-Conflict
Situations', World Bank, Washington D.C.
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3. DFID’s Governance Agenda and Competencies
UK Government policy
Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the Poor
DFID (2006)
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Summary
In 2005, rich and poor countries promised more and better aid. Whilst there has been
progress, much remains to be done. This White Paper, by the Department for
International Development, sets out how the UK government will work with others to
deliver these promises. It outlines key commitments in relation to building states that
work for the poor, helping people get security, incomes and public services, tackling
climate change and reforming the international system.
The last two decades have seen dramatic progress in reducing poverty, but this
progress has been uneven. Africa will not meet any of the MDGs, and by 2015 over
90% of the world‘s poor will live in Africa and South Asia. Gender discrimination is
holding back economic growth and sustainable development, and one third of the
world‘s poor now live in fragile states.
In support of promises made in 2005, the UK government will concentrate its aid in
countries with the largest number of poor people, including middle-income countries.
It will work more in fragile states which are most off track with the MDGs, and give
greater priority to gender equality. It will also make sure that its wider policies create
an international environment that promotes development.
Efforts to eliminate world poverty are not only morally right, but will also create a
safer, more prosperous world. Eliminating poverty means tackling four main
challenges:
Good governance is essential to combating poverty. Governance is about
politics, or the way in which citizens and governments relate to each other.
Good governance requires state capability, responsiveness and accountability. It
means making politics work for the poor.
Countries need to do better at delivering security, incomes and health and
education for all. Security is a precondition for development and requires
effective states. Preventing conflict is better and more cost effective than
helping countries rebuild afterwards. Growth is the best way to reduce poverty,
and there must be better access to economic opportunities. Everyone must have
access to four essential public services; education, health, water and sanitation
and social protection.
Climate change threatens to derail development. Developing countries will need
support to adapt to its devastating effects on the water cycle, and developing
countries must be part of a future solution.
The international system must be improved and international problems need
international solutions. Developing countries must have a stronger say in how
the international system works. Multilateral organisations have a critical role to
play in aid delivery.
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To this end, over the next five years, the UK will:
Help to build states that work for the poor: by making good governance central.
A new ―quality of governance‖ assessment will guide how the UK gives aid.
Decisions about aid will also be based on partner countries‘ commitment to
poverty reduction. Corruption, bribery and money laundering will be tackled
internationally.
Help people have security, incomes and public services: by promoting peace
and security, supporting private sector development, investing in infrastructure
and agriculture and reforming international trade rules. DFID will commit at
least half of all future direct support for developing countries to public services.
Work internationally to tackle climate change: including creating incentives for
clean energy, helping developing countries to adapt and ensuring they are
involved in discussions about solutions.
Create an international system fit for the 21st century. This means UN reform,
more responsive international finance institutions, and supporting the growing
roles of regional organisations. It also means pushing for the OECD-DAC to
monitor and hold donors to account on their development commitments.
Source: DFID, 2006, 'Elminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the
Poor', White Paper no. 3, Department for International Development, London
Governance, Development, and Democratic Politics: DFID's Work in Building
More Effective States
Department for International Development (2006)
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Summary
An effective state is the single most important factor in determining whether
development progress occurs. This paper, published by the United Kingdom (UK)
Department for International Development (DFID), discusses the agency‘s approach to
governance development and how it works with partner countries and the international
development system. Governance work has moved beyond designing stand-alone
projects; it now seeks to address how power is held and in whose interests it is used.
Governance concerns the use of power and authority and how a country manages its
affairs. It determines the relationship between citizens and the state and involves a
wide range of organisations and institutions. Governance is country-specific, but also
shaped by the wider international environment.
Good governance requires state capability to get things done, accountability to citizens
and responsiveness to citizens‘ needs and rights. To that end, democratic politics is the
most effective way to address the issues of poverty and powerlessness.
Key to sustainable development is the ability of governance to reduce poverty. Good
governance improves the rights of the poor by reducing violent conflict and managing
disputes peacefully. It delivers essential public services even-handedly and effectively.
Good governance also reduces poverty by empowering citizens to realise their human
rights and addressing the issues of gender inequality, discrimination and social
exclusion.
DFID helps countries improve governance by:
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Employing specialists in the fields of governance, conflict, social development
and economics. DFID has increased its financial resources for governance
programmes from £85 million in 1997/8 to £322 million in 2005/6.
Focusing on the poorest countries and regions and working in increasingly
complex and difficult environments that present the biggest governance
challenges.
Improving its understanding of local context and using comprehensive
governance assessments to tailor programmes to a country‘s specific needs.
Forging strong partnerships with other UK government departments,
international agencies and local partners that draw upon additional skills,
perspectives and expertise.
Providing capacity building assistance to national governments, legislatures,
local governments, justice and security sectors and national oversight bodies.
Assisting civil society, political society, the media, trade unions and the private
sector. This non-state assistance increases the likelihood that improved capacity
will take root and thrive in all country sectors.
The major contemporary challenge for all donors is how to engage with power. The
focus is now about how power is used by both formal and informal institutions that
shape politics and policy.
Other challenges include:
To ensure that governance initiatives are based on a stronger, more nuanced
understanding of context.
To recognise that the most appropriate development models are led by the host
country.
To tackle global issues, such as international corruption and crime, climate
change and migration, that have a major impact on governance and
statebuilding in poorest countries.
To help developing countries embed the culture of democratic politics. This
requires that all groups accept the rules that bind societies together and see
themselves as genuine stakeholders in a fair and transparent political process.
DFID, 2006, 'Governance, Development, and Democratic Politics: DFID's Work in
Building More Effective States', Department for International Development, London
Core readings
Governance Interventions in Post-War Situations: Lessons Learned
Chr. Michelsen Institute (2004)
Access full text online
Summary
Which democratic systems are most likely to be successful in different post war
contexts? What has been learned in the last ten years of peace building in countries
such as Guatemala and Afghanistan? This paper, from the Chr Michlesen Institute in
Norway, looks at the recent experience in internationally assisted transitions from war
to peace.
Governance is a process, not a product, a long-term perspective is necessary and social
engineering has distinct limits.
270
Post war situations include, but are not limited to: self enforcing, as a result of a
decisive victory (for example East Timor), mediated peace building, (for
example Bosnia), and conflicted peace building when the peace settlement does
not incorporate the defeated party (for example Afghanistan).
The most critical governance interventions include: constitution making and
design, watchdog institutions, truth commissions and criminal justice
procedures, local governance, security sector reform, elections and electoral
systems and political parties' support to human rights organisations,
empowerment projects and co-operation between divided communities.
While rapid results are seen as vital to maintaining the peace process, post
conflict governance measures require a long time frame. Restoration of
administrative infrastructures and human rights are early priorities.
Building trust is of central concern – either in the negative sense of absence of
threats of violence or in the positive sense of confidence in the post war order.
Reconciliation can take at least three forms, ranging from peaceful coexistence
to the comprehensive reconstruction of social bonds between victim and
perpetrator.
External actors need to be conscious of the dilemmas of ownership and assistance that
a post war situation presents. The dilemma is inherent in all aid activities, but is
accentuated in a post war situation by the imbalance in resources and administrative
capacity that typically exist.
Aid actors should be aware that they have their own interests and procedures,
which may conflict with a policy framework that emphasises the principles of
democracy, local self-determination and ownership.
A one-size policy does not fit all cases and aid actors need to adjust policies to
local types of post-war situations.
Promoting human rights is a confidence-building measure essential to
establishing a foundation for post-war democratic governance.
Accountability measures are necessary to secure democratic governance, but
accountability can take many different forms and structures. There is no
obviously ideal package or sequence.
Decentralisation has obvious advantages in post-war situations where the central
state is weak or remains contested, but must be balanced by a national structure.
Approaching security issues through non-conventional entry points can
encourage critical reforms in a difficult sector.
Source: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2004, Governance Interventions in Post-War
Situations: Lessons Learned, Research Paper, UNDP & Chr. Michelsen Institute,
Bergen Seminar Series, held 5–7 May 2004
Review of DFID’s Governance Target Strategy Paper
M Khan
Access full text online
Summary
The Target Strategy Paper (TSP) published in 2001 identified seven key governance
capabilities necessary for effective poverty reduction and the achievement of the
International Development Targets. This review from the Department for International
271
Development (DFID) focuses on the questions policy makers should be aware of when
developing governance reforms that can make an impact on poverty reduction.
The TSP is a sophisticated document drawing qualified conclusions from its reading of
the available theory and evidence on governance. However, this theory and evidence is
itself highly contested. Practitioners need to be aware of the limitations of the
established analysis.
Important insights include:
The focus on environmental and political conditions does not draw sufficiently
on the growing case study evidence. Some of the environmental and
redistributive capabilities that the TSP aims to achieve are overly ambitious for
poor countries. Many of the high growth developers would have failed on many
of these indicators.
The TSP identifies the capacity to run an open competitive system as an
important governance capability. However, whether democracy will be a spur to
the painful changes required to accelerate development depends on specific
factors in each country. The operation of democracy is often conditioned by
patrimonial political systems that use democracy to sustain traditional systems
of power.
The TSP ignores many of the structural drivers of corruption. Important types of
corruption in poor countries are driven by the need to achieve political
stabilisation and by the state‘s inability to protect property rights effectively.
These drivers are not affected by conventional anti-corruption measures
supported by development agencies.
The drivers of change studies that aim to enable DFID country offices to
identify entry points for reform at the country level are limited. This is because
they do not follow a common approach and vary considerably in their quality
and the relevance of their recommendations. The studies assume that the
governance priorities identified in the good governance approach are the right
ones.
Recommendations include:
The objective has to be to identify the conditions required to make democracy
compatible with pro-poor growth. Democracy should be a goal, not a condition.
Transformation strategies have to be devised that allow rapid growth in the
context of real democracy in developing countries, where patrimonial and
clientelist structures dominate.
Reform should identify the types of corruption that are most seriously
constraining development. Anti-corruption strategy could be made more
effective by thinking creatively about allowable influence and expenditures
within a regulatory framework that makes sense for the country.
We need a common framework to think through how we should identify policy
and reform priorities. We need to combine the country-specific approach with a
more pragmatic approach to identify the institutional capacities that are required
for accelerating growth.
It is important to have achievable goals. Reform efforts can be improved by
distinguishing between different types and goals of governance.
Donors should not contribute to the perception that environmental and
redistributive reforms are sufficient for achieving prosperity. Donors can
facilitate gradual moves towards difficult decisions by raising awareness, which
can initiate debates and political reconfigurations that make dynamic
transformations more likely.
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Source: Khan, M. 2005, 'Review of DFID‘s Governance Target Strategy Paper',
Department for International Development, External Review of Governance Target
Strategy Paper 2001
Britain's New White Paper: Making Governance Work for the Poor
M Moore and S Unsworth (2006)
Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)
Summary
Has the White Paper lived up to its billing? In this article Mick Moore and Sue
Unsworth from the Institute of Development Studies review Britain‘s White Paper on
governance and development. The White Paper seemed to promise a serious
contribution to a long overdue discussion about how development really happens. This
article focuses on the main theme of governance and argues that the Paper goes a long
way in the right direction to achieving its promise, but with some missed opportunities.
The entire White Paper is action-oriented in substance and tone. There are no explicit
intellectual underpinnings to it. However, the content of Chapter 3 represents a marked
evolutionary spurt in donor thinking about the causes of and remedies for bad
government in poor countries. The behaviour of governments and businesses in rich
countries is part of the problem: they could and should do much more to limit the
damage they cause, often in ways that will benefit them too.
The White Paper maintains that:
Development is about far more than aid, and requires concerted international
action on a wide range of policy issues affecting developing countries.
Bad governance is often caused or exacerbated by the ways in which poor
countries interact with global economic and political forces, powerful richer
countries, and large trans-national private enterprises.
It does not take sufficient account of:
The way the international context for aid is changing, notably with the growing
profile of China in Africa.
The extent and depth of the governance challenge posed by the unprecedented
combination of deep inequalities between countries and ever closer ties.
The operational implications, both for aid relationships and for the design of
governance programmes, of the White Paper‘s own claim that ‗good
governance is about good politics‘.
The evidence - from research and donor‘s evaluations – of the limited impact of
e ‗capacity-building‘ in improving governance.
The authors support the White Paper‘s focus on what Britain can do to eradicate or
dampen these ‗international drivers of bad governance‘ and to encourage other
countries to do the same.
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is an excellent
example: primarily a British initiative, it has achieved wide international buy-in.
There are many similar opportunities for governments to work in tandem with
private sector interests to help curb corrupt and illegal practices.
Europe has a great deal of persuasive capacity: it can use co-ordinated
diplomatic and economic bargaining power to help change incentives faced by
rulers in poor countires.
273
DFID is uniquely well placed to provide the interface between international
action and country level impacts. DFID specialist staff in country offices can
help inform and prioritise international action to change policies which
encourage bad governance in poor countries, drawing on their understanding of
how global factors play into local political processes and influence the
behaviour of economic and political elites.
Donors cannot for much longer expect to influence developing countries simply
because they provide grants. To have constructive influence in the longer term,
they will have to exercise it in more creative and diffuse ways.
Source: Moore, M., S. Unsworth, 2006, 'Britain's New White Paper: Making
Governance Work for the Poor', Development Policy Review, vol. 24, no. 6, pp. 707-
715
Supplementary readings
Aid Dependence and Governance
D Bräutigam (2000)
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Abstract
This study analyzes the political economy of aid dependence. Large amounts of aid
delivered over long periods, create incentives for governments and donors that have
the potential to undermine good governance and the quality of state institutions. These
incentives are not always acted on, but when they are, large amounts of aid may reduce
local ownership, accountability and democratic decision-making, while fragmenting
budgets and lowering tax effort. Large amounts of aid, delivered to countries with
weak institutions create some of the institutional problems that lead to ineffectiveness.
In aid
dependent countries, donor agencies and foreign experts often take over many of the
critical functions of governance: substituting their own goals for an absent leadership
vision, using foreign experts and project management units in place of weak or
decaying public institutions, and providing finance for investments whose operation
and maintenance is neither planned for nor affordable. In these countries, aid has been
part of the problem. And longterm dependence on aid creates disincentives for both
donors and governments to change the rules of their engagement.
Source: Bräutigam, Deborah, 2000, ‗Aid Dependence and Governance‘. Stockholm.
How Good Must Governance Be?
A Goldsmith (2005)
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Summary
Governance is the current international development catchword and the contemporary
view is that good governance, highlighting transparency, accountability and
participation, should be established and expanded everywhere to boost development.
How much do open, rule-based institutions matter for development? Compiled for the
Quality of Governance Institute, Göteborg University, this paper reviews four
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historical case studies and raises questions about the efficacy of better governance as a
general treatment for slow growth or non-development.
Governance is defined as the decision-making procedures and behavioural conventions
in formal public organisations. Social science has always maintained that governance
has important consequences for the development performance of nation states. Open
civic institutions are seen as a catalyst because they create an environment where
honesty, hard work and entrepreneurship are rewarded. Those lacking in transparency
are believed to generate perverse incentives that are said to trap societies in poverty.
Making statistical observations across a large number of countries, empirical research
suggests that poor governance is detrimental to development and welfare while good
governance, including rational-legal public bureaucracies, judicial independence,
protection of property rights, common law and democracy, is advantageous. The study
of governance and development presents a range of methodological challenges, not
least that governance in the real world is neither black nor white, but a pallet of shades
of grey.
An examination of the United States reveals that there is little to show that rule-
based governance presaged economic modernisation, as opposed to being an
auxiliary or complimentary factor in the process.
Accounts of South Korea‘s rapid economic growth do not feature customary
good governance institutions as an important explanatory variable, given that
the state was an authoritarian, crony capitalist system during the
industrialisation drive.
Often presented as a poster child for how much institutions matter, all of the
institutional building blocks for growth were already in place in Mauritius
before the economic acceleration began in 1971.
Jamaica‘s institutional endowment approximates that of Mauritius, yet its
economy languished, hence it is difficult to blame standard governance factors
for the missing growth acceleration.
Whilst four cases can never be definitive, they do provide strong anecdotal evidence
that, whilst there are numerous reasons to welcome the hallmarks of good governance,
expecting such institutions to yield large development dividends still requires a leap of
faith. The case studies reveal that meritocratic bureaucracies, independent judiciaries
and honest elections are worthy goals in their own right, but setting them up did not
give an immediate jolt to development. Rather, economic development was more cause
than effect of governance.
Academics and policymakers need to refine formal models of testing the
relationships between governance and development, including the
interdependence among institutions and the developmental impact of some
institutions over others.
Until and unless the empirical picture is clarified, a multifaceted approach to
institution building might seem advisable for prioritising and sequencing
governance reforms.
Support should be focused on those institutions that matter most as a means of
developmental shock therapy, rather than of spreading resources across a
smorgasbord of governance reforms as international development agencies
often do.
Western donors should be wary of holding low-income countries to
unrealistically high standards for governance, which not even the United States
could approach until it became quite affluent.
275
Source: Goldsmith, A., 2005, 'How Good Must Governance Be?,' University of
Massachusetts, Boston
Good Enough Governance Revisited - 2007
M S Grindle (2007)
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Summary
Given limited resources of money, time, knowledge and capacity, what are the best
ways to move towards better governance in a particular country? This article from the
Development Policy Review argues that the concept of good enough governance falls
short as a tool to guide decisions in real world contexts. Rather the feasibility of
particular interventions can be assessed by analysing the context for change and the
implications of the content of the intervention being considered.
Good enough governance means that interventions thought to contribute to
development need to be prioritised and made relevant to the conditions of individual
countries. However, there is a gap between concept and practice - between the general
mandate to improve governance and the dilemmas facing those designing
interventions. This is particularly noticeable in addressing the conflict-ridden and often
illegitimate status of fragile states. Debates continue over the definition of good
governance and over measurement, indicators and inference.
Large cross-country analyses tend to find consistent correlations between
development and good governance. Country case studies, on the other hand,
tend to demonstrate that development is not dependent on ‗getting governance
right‘. Meanwhile, problem driven research accepts that governance is
important to development and addresses problems created for governance by
particular conditions.
Questions about statistical and historical inference remain unresolved. The
current agenda is additive rather than analytical, leaving practitioners with long
lists of things to do but little guidance on how to choose among them.
The World Bank, UNDP and DFID play a sensitive role in translating often
ambiguous research into the practice of good governance. While they have
contributed to misguiding practice, such organisations increasingly
acknowledge the importance of contextual realities and the content of
governance programmes.
Combining analysis of context and content can inform difficult choices on where to put
scarce resources to achieve better governance.
Two analytical frameworks can help identify interventions that are appropriate
for specific situations, one focusing on the strengths and weaknesses of states,
and one providing insights into the sources of change that might exist.
Governance objectives can be disaggregated into contributing characteristics,
such as effective police organisations and conflict resolution. Actions to achieve
these vary in practical application. Some take more time, some are
administratively complex, and some require more behavioural change.
Interventions to achieve the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) can also be
categorised in terms of factors that contribute to the ease or difficulty of their
achievement. Inevitably, uneven capacity will become increasingly apparent in
the effort to achieve some of the goals.
276
Good political economy seeks ways of bringing analyses of context and content
to bear on the process of reform. Each phase of the reform process can be
viewed as an arena in which characteristics of the context and content of the
initiative come into play.
Source: Grindle, M., 2007, 'Good Enough Governance Revisited', Development Policy
Review, vol. 25, no. 5, pp. 533-574
Governance and Conflict Management: Implications for Donor Intervention
B Latto (2002)
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Summary
Good governance means that conflict is more likely to be managed peaceably. This
paper for the Crisis States Programme argues that violent conflict may be avoided
where governance structures provide political redress and allow compromise,
moderation and inclusion. It then draws out implications for donors at both national
and international levels of governance.
Conflict is unavoidable, but the risk of violence is reduced where governance
processes allow differences and opposition to be managed constructively. The roots of
conflict are thought to lie in grievances resulting from social, economic and political
inequalities between groups (which may be ethnic or religious). Recent research has
focused on the need to understand economic motivations for conflict. Yet whatever the
cause, appropriate political arrangements can help to solve conflict without violence.
Many aspects of governance can play a part, including constitutional design and
political and justice systems. The optimal model will differ according to
circumstances, but experience suggests a set of principles on which to base donor
interventions.
If all countries with high levels of poverty and inequality are at risk from violent
conflict, donor aid should be sensitive to how it interacts with conflict management. In
this context, recent experience in states such as Fiji, Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina
suggest that:
Early intervention to prevent conflicts escalating is crucial.
Where violent conflict has already happened, there is often a rare opportunity
for institutional change. Choices made during transition periods must be well
informed and aimed at reducing differences.
Sustainable solutions can only result from internal participatory processes and
should not rely too much on international financing.
Sudden shifts to Western-style multi-party democracy systems and economic
liberalisation may actually worsen political tensions.
Conflicting interests and power struggles could mean that even rational choices
have unintended consequences.
Instead of jumping to a new, unfamiliar system, it may be better to make limited
reforms to an existing system, which can evolve with time.
War economies are highly dependent on international trade networks. Thus action at
this level can be very effective. It also fits with a wave of opinion arguing that efforts
should concentrate on creating the environmental conditions necessary for peace,
rather than manipulating state institutions. Policy suggestions cover both international
and national interventions, however, and include:
277
International sanctions, although these are not always successful.
Better regulation of global trade in commodities such as oil, diamonds,
hardwoods and narcotics, which often fuel violent conflict.
Regulation of the international flow of small arms, alongside a more effective
framework to crack down on money laundering and bribery.
At national level, consideration of whether integrative power sharing and
devolution could help manage conflict, and how changes to electoral systems
might produce more moderate, inclusive behaviour.
Enhancing state legitimacy by boosting the political role of civil society,
strengthening the media, increasing government transparency and working with
political parties to produce policies that reduce inequality.
Improving security and human rights through transitional justice methods, a
stronger judiciary, local policing initiatives and democratic control of the
military.
Source: Latto, B., 2002, ‗Governance and Conflict Management: Implications for
Donor Intervention‘, Crisis States Programme Working Paper No.9, London School of
Economics, London
How Does Taxation Affect the Quality of Governance?
M Moore (2007)
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Abstract
This paper summarises the policy implications of a growing debate about the
connections between taxation and the quality of governance in developing countries.
Taxation – or the absence of tax – impacts on the quality of governance through two
main channels. The first relates to the degree of dependence of governments on general
taxation for their financial resources. Many governments do not need to make much
tax effort because they have large non-tax incomes from oil, gas and mineral exports or
from foreign aid. State elites are then financially independent of citizen-taxpayers. This
changes the political incentives that they face, and the ways in which they seek to
obtain, use and retain power.
The long term consequences for governance are malign: state elites are less responsive
and accountable to citizens; and, depending on the sources of non-tax revenue, may
have less incentive to build up the political and organisational capacities of the state.
States are likely to be simultaneously arbitrary and weak. All else being equal, the
dependence of governments on general taxation has positive effects on the quality of
governance. But that relationship is not automatic. How governments tax also matters.
We cannot assume that, because they are fully dependent on taxation for revenues,
governments will be capable, accountable, or responsive. They may levy taxes
coercively, and thereby damage state-society relations and reinforce poor governance.
Public authorities in contemporary poor countries face some incentives to tax
coercively. Establishing more consensual taxation practices is an important practical
route to improving governance. Aid donors could play a more constructive role.
Source: Moore, M., 2007, ‗How Does Taxation Affect the Quality of Governance‘,
Working Paper 280, Center for the Future State, Institute of Development Studies,
Brighton.
278
Striving for Good Governance in Africa: Synopsis of the 2005 African
Governance Report
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2005)
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Summary
What constitutes good governance in Africa? How can it be achieved and how is it
measured? This report is a synopsis of the Economic Commission for Africa‘s (ECA)
African Governance Report that aims to ascertain public perceptions of the state of
governance in the region. It highlights the pressing need for the implementation of a
bold and innovative programme to develop Africa‘s governance capacity.
The creation of capable states in which peace and security are guaranteed and sustained
is one of the most fundamental challenges in Africa today. This research gathers public
perceptions of governance across various African states. It highlights capacity deficits
and encourages the sharing of intra-regional experience and knowledge on the
challenges to good governance.
Overall governance is improving in Africa and the situation across the continent is
very different from a decade ago. However, considerable country variations are
evident, with some countries scoring consistently better than the average and some
consistently worse. The report finds positive trends towards creating capable states:
The trend to democratic transitions. Many African countries have evolved from
authoritarian or military regimes. Good governance is increasingly promoted by
states through a new social pact.
Elections have become the only acceptable basis for choosing leadership.
The trend toward greater political inclusiveness. Many countries are seeking to
ensure that the executive and the legislature reflect the profile of their
population in religious, ethnic, racial and regional terms.
The trend toward expanded voice and accountability. Citizens are more able to
participate in the political process and express their beliefs without fear of
retribution. In turn governments are more responsive.
The trend toward better public financial management and accountability. More
countries are running smaller deficits, managing their tax systems better and
improving fiscal transparency.
Capable states are however far from the norm in Africa and much remains to be
achieved especially in the quality of public sector management. A bold, cross-cutting,
comprehensive, Africa-led programme needs to be implemented, backed with
substantial funding from international development partners. This effort should address
the following ten priority areas to develop a critical mass of capacity in Africa:
Strengthening the capacity of parliaments to perform their core functions. Also,
deepening legal and judicial reforms.
Improving public sector management. Action should be country specific,
sustained and focussed on re-evaluating the role, size and organisational
structure of the public sector.
Improving the delivery of public services. Also, removing bottlenecks to private
enterprise, for instance through the protection of property rights and the
enforcement of contracts.
279
Tapping the potential of information and communication technologies for
promoting transparency, openness and knowledge exchange.
Fostering credible and responsible media. Additionally, maximising the
contribution of traditional modes of governance.
Confronting the governance dimension of HIV/AIDS, particularly on
institutional structures.
Getting partners to live up to their commitments on aid.
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2005, ‗Striving for Good
Governance in Africa: Synopsis of the 2005 African Governance Report‘, UNECA,
Addis Ababa