CONCLUSION - Shodhgangashodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/14797/12/12... · 2015. 12....
Transcript of CONCLUSION - Shodhgangashodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/14797/12/12... · 2015. 12....
CONCLUSION
Farmers' movements in Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharash
tra and Punjab articulated the discontent of surplus produc
ers in mid 1970's and 1980's. In these states the movement
started with issues specific to their own region. In the
course of the movement, region specific demands became sec
ondary, giving way to general and populist demands. Rallies
and dharnas sponsored by leaders of the movements, got
massive response and were well-sustained. As the movement
spread, the class bias of the leaders and their demands was
exposed, thus cutting the support base of the movement.
The farmers' movement in western Uttar Pradesh, is a
part of the ongoing farmers' movements in other parts of the
country. The movement started against the hike in power
tariff. With every agitation more general economic demands
i.e. remunerative prices, subsidised inputs, loan waiver
etc. were included in the charter of demands. To broaden the
support base of the movement, social issues like abolition
of dowry, limiting marriage expenses, discouraging drinking,
taking action against husbands deserting or harassing wives
were raised. Like the farmers' movements in other parts of
the country, BKU adopted similar method of agitation, i.e.
229
sit in dharnas, panchayats (rallies), gherao, rasta roko
(road blockade), non-payment of agricultural loans and dues,
gaon bandi (blockade of villages) etc.
The Shamli agitation provided confidence to Takait and
BKU. They realised that their demands enjoyed broad accept-
ance from the farmers. The Meerut siege brought BKU and
Tikait to public attention. From then, Tikait emerged as a
charismatic leader. The week long dharna, at the Boat Club
lawns of Delhi transposed the agrarian politics of BKU from
state to the national level. It reflected the growing asser
tiveness of rich and middle class/caste surplus producing
farmers. With these actions the BKU ensured that the farmers
charter of demands would occupy a place of pride in election
manifestoes of all political parties. The impending elec
tions and a month_- long dharna organised by the BKU at
Bhopa, compelled UP Congress government to sign an agreement
with BKU.
The concessions obtained by the BKU, from the state
government were more rhetorical than real. Hence Tikait's
leadership came under criticism. As BKU at the village level
was dominated by Jats, the other cultivating castes did not
have a say in the decision making forums of the Union. They
230
gradually distanced themselves from the activities of the
movement. Parallel farmers organisations of Tyagis and
Gujjars emerged. They divided the surplus producers on
caste lines. Moreover Tikait's participation in the anti
Mandal agitation, non-cooperation (non-tax payment) , and his
campaign against the police and administration created a law
and order problem in the region, which led to the decline of
the farmers participation in BKU's rallies and dharnas.
Corruption charges against Tikait, and his favouritism
towards his own Khap Balayan, divided the Jats. Jats of
other Khaps in the region turned against him, confining his
support base to parts of Muzaffarnagar and Meerut, particu
larly west of Kali Nadi, where the Baliyan Khap is dominant.
The major achievement of the movement was at the psy
chological level. It was able to instill confidence among
the rich and the middle class farmers. In the villages where
Jats dominate, the BKU is strong, there the farmers were no
longer afraid of corrupt police officials and bureaucrats.
The well-organised rallies and dharnas were able to arouse
consciousness among the farmers about their socio-economic
problems.
The farmers movement in western UP, like those of Tamil
231
Nadu, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Punjab was dominated by
rich and middle class farmers. They had a high stake in the
demands of higher prices and favourable terms of trade for
agriculture. They also possessed the resources to transport
farmers to the site of dharnas and rallies. Their contribu-
tion in the form of money, wheat etc. for the cause of the
movement was immense. Hence they played an active role in
mobilising marginal farmers and the landless. The small
farmers of western UP have adopted modern technology. They
not only use modern inputs in agriculture, but also produce
cash crops like sugarcane. As a result, demands like higher
prices for sugarcane and subsidies for agricultural inputs
attracted them to join the BKU. Their participation in the
rallies and dharnas of BKU provided a mass base for the
movement. Moreover, by joining the union, they received
attention and respect from the government officials. Mem-
bership of the BKU and its white-green cap was almost an
insurance against harassment by the police ande corrupt
officials.
The class interest of the rich, middle and small farm
ers, in Upper Doab region was blurred by peasant proprietor
ship. Districts like Meerut, Muzaffarnagar, Saharanpur,
232
Bulandsahar, Moradabad, parts of Bijnore, and Aligarh
(bastions of the BKU) , have an old tradition of the Bhaiya
chara. In this system, particularly prevalent among the
cultivating castes of Jats, Gujjars, Tyagis and Jat Muslims
etc., the land was divided among Khap members forming a
bhaiyachara community. The absence of an intermediary be-
tween peasant proprietors (unlike the zamindari system in
east UP) and state, combined with a political system of
Khaps, in which rich and poor peasant proprietors are
equals, placed them in a dominating position in the rural
areas of these districts. It was this old political system
of Khaps, which was revived by Tikait. He himself is the
Chaudhary of one of the largest Khap Balyan. The Choud-
haries of other Khaps provided the BKU, an organisational
structure necessary to mobilise people and resources for
dharnas and rallies. Hence in the initial stages of the
movement, small and marginal farmers belonging to Jats,
Gujjar, Tyagis, and Jat Muslims rallied behind a cause which
would benefit their whole bhaiyachra community. But the
mobilisation based on khap system, limited BKU's geographi
cal support base to the districts of Upper Doab region where
these castes are economically and numerically dominant.
The BKU failed to mobilise, the landless labourers and
233
rural poor, who in this region generally belong to the
scheduled caste and other lower castes. They were either
forced to participate in rallies and dharnas or joined the
movement on their own to enjoy free food and a free ride to
the towns, and cities, where the rallies or dharnas were
staged. In fact the most important among the issues, that
could have mobilised landless labourers and rural poor was
the demand of minimum wages. But no such demand was ever
included in the numerous charters of demands, presented by
BKU to the government.
The emergence of BKU, increased the political clout of
the rich and middle caste/class farmers. Their economic
dominance backed by a powerful organisation of BKU, in
creased atrocities on the lower castes especially Jatav
labourers. The Bandhua Mukti Mazdoor Union, Dalit Sena, and
Bhartiya Mazdoor Union (Mitharia) failed to organise the
agriculture labourers, who were attracted towards the firy
speeches of Mayawati and Kanshi Ram. Thus the Bahujan Samaj
Party was able to form village units in the Upper Doab
region and challenged the dominance of BKU. In 1989 elec
tions BSP emerged as a third party in the rural areas of
Upper Doab regiori, after Janata Dal and Congress.
234
Split in Lok Dal and increasing political clout of BKU
provided an opportunity to the Congress to woo the surplus
producers, who were generally opposed to the Congress. In
the initial stages of the movement, the Congress government
both at the state and centre, was lenient towards BKU be
cause it wanted to divide the Jat and Gujjar votes of Janata
Dal (A) . The support base of the Janata Dal (A) and BKU was
same. Tikait's followers were not ready to support the Con
gress. Hence, he supported Janata Dal which before 1989
elections had brought all anti-Congress forces on one plat
form, and was likely to form the government. But Tikait's
indulgence in electoral politics, hobnobbing with Congress
politicians and Devilal, in order to side line Ajit Singh,
and to emerge as the Sole leader of the Jat farmers, demol-
ished the non-party image of the movement.
BKU activists on party lines.
It divided the
After the 1989 elections the political discourse in UP,
was dominated by Mandal-Mandir issue. The BJP propaganda on
Hindutva, polarised the farmers on communal grounds. The
BJP was able to penetrate the support base of BKU. Hence
Tikait had no choice but to follow his followers and support
BJP, in 1991 elections, which destroyed BKU's secular image.
235
It lost its support base of rich and middle class Muslims
causing further decline in the movement.
Tikait realised his mistake and denied his support to
BJP. To regain his Muslim support base he launched an
agitation against the BJP government. But BJP came down
heavily on BKU, and arrested Tikait many times. He was not
allowed to hold any major dharna or rally successfully in
UP. Tikait opposed BJP in 1993 elections and unsuccessfully
supported Congress. But could not negate the communal poli
tics of RSS, BJP and VHP combine. Nor could it keep the
agrarian issues on the agenda of national politics. By this
time it was clear to all political parties that BKU had no
great influence over the surplus producers in the electoral
politics of Muzaffarnagar and Meerut. In fact the surplus
producers of Upper Doab region, used BKU only to get econom
ic concessions from the government, and to increase their
power against the agricultural labouers. In electoral
politics they had their own individual preferences. They _
wanted BKU to remain neutral in elections and maintain its
non-party nature.
The farmers movement in western UP had a potential for
disciplining local bureaucracy, and for stimulating communi-
236
tarian support for more productive and equitable use of
common property resources, for co-operative marketing,
manufacturing of agricultural products, for bringing more
resources for rural development and for ensuring that they
are effectively used. But the movement was dominated by
rich, middle class/caste farmers, who overemphasised remu
nerative prices, subsidy for inputs, waiver of loans and
electricity dues. They failed to espouse the cause of agri
cultural labourers, marginal farmers, and social issues
related to women, in an effective way. Hence, there is no
evidence of progressive motivation in the farmers movement.
The farmers' movement, unlike peasant movements of 1950's
and 1960's, was not a struggle for restructuring the unequal
rural society, rather it was a struggle of the emerging
rural elite to further strengthen their economic and politi
cal position in the existing power structure of India.
237
APPENDIX
Table I: Village Schedule
1. Survey Conducted in 1990
Village Tahsil District
1 Chandaudhi (Khas) Meerut Meerut 2 Mandi Muzaffarnagar Muzaffarnagar 3 Gunarsi Deoband Saharanpur 4 Atari Moradabad Moradabad 5 Salempur Bijnore Binore
2. Survey Conducted in 1993
1 Matheri Jansath Muzaffarnagar 2 Makhayli Muzaffarnagar Muzaffarnagar 3 Sonta Kairana Muzaffarnagar 4 Allawalpur (Maj ra) Budhana Muzaffarnagar 5 Pichaukra Sardhana Meerut 6 Mubarikpur Maw ana Meerut 7 Wazidpur Bagpat Meerut 8 Jani Meerut Meerut
238
District: ______________ _
Sl. Name/Caste
No.
Table II: Information on Socio-Bconomic Profile,
of Participation in BKU, and Blectoral Preferences, [Questionnaire Form]
Tahsil: ____________ __ Dev. Block: ____________ __ Village: ______________ _
Participation in Electoral Party Prefe Agricultural
Implements
ding to BKU
Luxury
Items BKU Participation renee accor-
AGB BDU. LAND OCC B IND TR BTB DP TH BC J/C M/S R TV AM/S N/M J/CA RAL 1989 1991 1993 N/A Yes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
B.
9.
10.
EDU = Education, OCC = Occupation, B Bank Balance, IND = Indebtedness, TR = Tractor, ETB = Electric Tubewell, D
Diesel Pumpsets, TH =Threshers, BC Bogi Gari (Bullock Cart), J/C =Jeep and Car, M/S =Motorbike, Scooter,
Radio, TV = Television, AM/S = Active-Member/Sympathisers, N/M = Not Members, J/CA Jailed or Court Arrested, RA
Rallies
239
Table 2.1: Mean Distribution of Agricultural Classes and Size Groups in UP Regions,
1961 Census (in % of total cultivating households)
Regions
Kuma on
Agricultural Classes
Proprietors
64.07
Tenents Mixed Proprietors Tenants
16.48 19.46 Rohilkhand 92.47 2.40 5.21 Oudh 87.78 3.75 8.47 Eastern Districts 91.65 2.33 6.03 Lower Doab 90.50 2.18 7.32 Bundelkhand 87.63 3.65 8.69 Upper Doab 95.81 1.16 3.02 Uttar Pradesh 89.94 3.21 6.85
Source: Calculated from Government of India 1966, Table BXI, Means are based on groups of Tahsils, cited in Paul Brass, "The Politicization of the Peasantry in a North Indian State", Journal of Peasant Studies, Jan-Sept 1980, p.406.
240
Table 2.2 Percentage Distribution of the Number of Holdings in various Economic Regions of Uttar Pradesh
Region Size Class in Hectares
Upto 1 1 - 2 2 - 4
Western 25.3 34.3 38.8
Central 18.5 20.9 18.3
Eastern 48.6 33.3 28.5
4 - 10
39.9
14.3
25.0
10 & above
27.5
10.3
26.9
Bundelkhand 3.1 7.3 10.3 17.1 31.2
Hill
Total
Source:
4.6 4.2 4.1 3.7 3.6
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Agricultural Census of Uttar Pradesh, 1976-77, Board of Revenue Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, 1980, p.44.
241
Land
Holdings
Acre
Landless
Marginal
0-2.5
Small
2.5-5
Middle
5-10
Large
10-15
Rich
15 & above
THH
2084
878
535
362
96
41
Table 4.1: Educational Qualification in 8 Villages of
Meerut and Muzaffarnagar
Illiterate Primary Middle Secondary Hr. Secon.
No. of Total Total
HHI
Total
HHI
Total
HHI
Total
HHI HHI HHI
418 214 51.19 106 25.35 55 13.15 26 6.22 12 2.87
176 85 48.29 45 25.56 20 11.36 15 8.56 8 4.54
106 38 35.85 30 28.30 16 15.09 9 8.49 8 7.54
73 1l 15.06 15 20.54 12 16.43 13 17.80 12 16.43
19 2 10.52 5 26.31 3 15.78 2 10.52 3 15.78
9 0 0 1 11.11 2 22.22 2 22.22
Graduate
Total
HHI
5
4
5
10
3
4
1.19
2.27
4. 71
13.69
15.78
44.44
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 3996 801. 350 43.69 201 25.09 107 13.35 67 8.36 45 5.61 31 3.87
THH Total no. of Households, HHI Households Interviewed.
242
Table 4.2: Religion/Caste and Level of Participation in 5 Villages each in Meerut, Muzaffarnagar, Saharanpur,
Bijnore and Moradabad
Sl. Religion/Caste No. of No. of No. HH HH in
terviewed
1. Gujars 34 3
AM
1
s NM p
1 3
J
1 2. Jats 547 56 44 10 2 47 16 3 . Muslims 450 45 9 7 31 15 1 4. Harijan 402 39 5 6 28 15 5. Saini 130 13 5 1 7 5 6 . Bhangi 101 11 3 8 4 7 . Brahmin 91 9 2 1 6 3 8 . Julaha 73 8 1 7 2 9 . Nai 46 5 5 1 10. Bania 38 4 4 11. Dhanak 35 4 1 3 1 12. Dhiwar 31 4 1 1 3 2 13. Gadaria 18 2 2 14. Kumhar 15 2 2 15. Badhai 8 2 2 ----------------------~-------------------------------------
2005 207 71 29 110 98
AM = Active members, S = Sympathisers, NM = Not members, P = Participation in various agitations of the BKU, J = Jailed.
243
18
Table 5.1: District-wise Percentage Votes polled by different Parties in Constituencies of
Western UP (1989)
District Congress
Saharanpur 37.33 Muzaffarnagar 36.76 Meerut 25.70 Ghaziabad 34.31 Bulandsahr 26.32 Aligarh 38.22 Mathura 31.44 Agra 31.74 Mainpuri 35.99 Etah 42.09 Bareily 32.14 Badaun 40.69 Shahjahanpur 50.02 Pilibhit 36.69 Bijnor 16.65 Moradabad 38.54 Rampur 39.46 Farrukhabad 37.29 Eta wah 42.37
BJP JD BSP CP
Bhartiya Janata Party = Janata Dal = Bahujan Samaj Party
Communist Party of India, Marxist
BJP JD BSP CP
0.00 50.91 11.76 0.00 0.00 60.77 2.46 0.00 0.22 69.00 5.09 0.00 8.27 46.65 10.77 0.00 7.90 57.69 7.72 0.37
14.19 37.79 9.81 0.00 9.35 49.83 9.38 0.00 0.00 62.89 5.37 0.00 7.09 50.51 2.89 3.53
21.83 32.01 4.14 0.00 13.62 49.06 5.18 0.00 24.70 32.42 2.20 0.00
7.16 37.96 4.86 0.00 15.77 45.79 1. 74 0.00
8.69 35.50 35.72 3.44 15.56 34.15 10.97 0.78 27.85 8.31 24.38 0.00 18.20 41.74 2.77 0.00 3.81 53.62 0.00 0.00
Communist Party of India-
Source: Election Commission of India, New Delhi.
244
Table 5.2: Region-wise Result of the 1991 Assembly Elections in UP
Region No.of BJP Cong JD SJP BSP CPI CPI(M) I&O ACS
Districts
Western 151 76 6 39
Hill 19 14 4 1
Central 113 49 22 23
Bundelkhand 21 11 4
Eastern 121 61 10 28
UP 425 211 46 91
ACS Assembly Constituencies Seat I&O Independent & Others
11
11 2
5 1
8 5 3
30 12 4
Source: Election Commission of India, New Delhi.
245
1
1
5
1 2
1 9
Table 5.3: Results of the 1991 State Assembly Elections of Western UP
Region
Districts
Saharanpur
No.of BJP Cong JD SJP BSP CPI CPI(M) I&O ACS
10 5 5 Muzaffarnagar 9 4 5 Meerut+ 16 3 1 6 Ghaziabad 6 v Bulandsahr 10 1 2
6 v Aligarh 10 6 4 Mathura 6 3 1 2 Agra 11 7 4
Etah 8 7 1 Bijnor 7 7
Moradabad 12 7 1 4 Rampur 4 3 1 Badaun 8 4 3 Bareily 9 6 2
1 v Pilibhit 4 4
Shahjahanpur 6 3 2 1 Etawah 7 2
5 v Farrukhabad 7 3 1 3 Mainpuri 7 3 1 3
Total 151 76 6 39 11
V = vacant or election not held.
Source: Election Commission of India, New Delhi.
246
Table 5.4: Results of the 1993 State Assembly
Blection of Western UP
Districts of No.of
Western UP AC
Saharanpur &
Hardwar
Muzaffarnagar
Meerut &
Ghaziabad
Bulandshahr
Aligarh
Mathura
Agra
Etah
Bijnor
Moradabad
Rampur
Badaun
Bareily
Pilibhit
Shahajahanpur
Eta wah
Farrukhabad
Mainpuri
Total
10
9
16
9
10
6
8
9
7
12
4
8
9
4
6
7
7
5
146
BJP
s 'k
8 34.9
7 40.4
8 37.3
7 40.3
6 36.3
3 31.9
6 40.6
5 34.6
4 35.3
8 36.6
2 30.1
4 31.0
2 35.7
3 35.0
3 26.5
28.6
5 37.2
1 28.8
80
AC Assembly Constituencies 1 S
JD
s 'k
28.1
2 23.8
5 31.0
1 20.0
1 14.7
2 24.3
16.1
1 11.6
1 19.9
2 20.9
1
13.4
15.4
3.0
9.5
1 13.1
0.2
8.5
4.8
17
Seats.
Cong
s %
2 24.5
14.1
2 15.1
13.8
1 17.4
1 17.5
1 15.8
14.4
6.5
8.3
11.1
17.1
12.3
9.1
3 24.6
20.9
14.1
18.6
10
Source: Election Commission of India, New Delhi.
s
SP
'k
5.5
6.5
1 10.5
1
2
7.3
9.4
9.1
1 17.9
3 26.4
4.4
1 22.8
2 23.8
4 30.1
7 39.1
10.1
2 23.0
7 39.4
2 30.2
4 40.4
37
247
s
BSP
'k
2.1
7.6
0.2
10.5
14.8
4.0
3.7
4.4
10.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
10.1
1.7
5.5
0.0
0.0
CPI
s 'k
o.o
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
o.o
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
s
1
1
CPM
'k
0.0
0.0
0.0
o.o
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
I&O
s 'k
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.5
4.6
2.2
0.0
2.6
1 10.0
3.8
10.0
1.8
0.0
1
19.1
2.8
0.0
3.2
2.9
G INTENSITY -E S H: CRQ!OP:_t:P~I N~-:-TAR PRAO Once)
RN UT More Than 81 WESTE .:___ d Area Sown 8-19 -MA P-2.:3 " ( •1• Of Cultivate 197 ·
1962-1965
~-\ .. ~-.·.~
. ·-~ . . . . . ......
r/h-v~~~ . . ·-::_.. ·::: ~~- • • :. :. :_(
·.·.·.·.·.·.·.j·:·:·:·) . . . ·. ;.: ...... .
1970-19 73
ETI low 120 Bt:ll . ~ . .
~ 120-140
~Above 140
ttAfl-2:1 WESTERN UTTAR PRADESH: AREA UNDER HYV CROPS
{ Percentag! Of HY V To Gross Cropped Ar~a Of i HYV Crops)
1970-1973
II HIGH{).SO)
§MEDIUM (30-GO)
[[]IIJ LOW(430)
1978- 1981