Conceptualizing Populism in Comparative Research

Which Attributes Should (Not) Be Part of a Minimal Definition

Matthijs Rooduijn

Department of Political Science

University of Amsterdam

Oudezijds Achterburgwal 237

1012 DL Amsterdam

The Netherlands

Contact: m.rooduijn@uva.nl

DRAFT, please do not cite without the permission of the author

Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR General Conference in Reykjavik,

panel “Problems and Methods in the Study of Comparative Politics in Latin

America”, 25-27 August 2011

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Conceptualizing Populism in Comparative Research

Which Attributes Should (Not) Be Part of a Minimal Definition

Abstract

There are different bodies of literature concerning populism. Yet so far there has

not been much cross-fertilization between them. Most definitions of populism are

still based on a specific geographical selection of cases. As a result the concept does

not travel well across cases and over time. The aim of this paper is to develop a

‘minimal definition’ of populism that transcends the area-based definitions and can

therefore be used in comparative research. By means of a systematic comparison of

six strongly divergent populist actors, a definition is developed that differs from

the existing conceptualizations of populism. It is also demonstrated that some

features that are often associated with populism are context-specific attributes, and

should therefore not be part of a minimal definition of the concept.

Introduction

The term populism has been used to describe a wide range of divergent political

actors. It has been used, for instance, to describe political movements in the

United States, such as the nineteenth century People’s Party, Perot’s United We

Stand, and, more recently, the Tea Party. The term has also been applied to Latin

American authoritarian regimes such as those of Perón in Argentina, Chávez in

Venezuela, Morales in Bolivia and Correa in Ecuador. Moreover, scholars and

journalists have used the concept to describe Western European political parties

and their leaders, such as Le Pen’s Front National (FN) in France, Berlusconi’s

Forza Italia (FI) in Italy, Haider’s Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) in Austria

and Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in the Netherlands.

Because the term populism has been used to describe such a wide range of

divergent political actors in different times and places, there are many different

definitions of the concept. One could make a distinction between at least three

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area-based bodies of literature that exist relatively independently from each other:

the United States literature, the Latin American literature and the Western

European literature. Within each body of literature other characteristics are

emphasized, and there has not been much cross-fertilization between these

different area-based bodies of literature yet. Definitions of populism are therefore

often based on specific contexts. This is problematic because it leads to ‘conceptual

stretching’ (Sartori, 1970), and thus hampers a valid comparison across cases and

over time. It is therefore not strange that most studies of populism are (mostly

qualitatively oriented) case studies (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008b, e.g. Mény

and Surel, 2002b), while more systematic comparative approaches are still scarce

(exceptions are Rooduijn and Pauwels, forthcoming, Hawkins, 2010, 2009).

The goal of this paper is twofold. First, a ‘minimal definition’ of populism is

developed that is valid across cases and over time, and is therefore appropriate for

systematic comparative research. The paper is innovative because this minimal

definition is developed by means of the systematic comparison of six cases. None

of the minimal definitions of populism that have been developed so far (Hawkins,

2010, Mudde, 2004, Weyland, 2001) are based on such a systematic comparative

approach. The developed definition differs from the existing definitions of

populism. Second, the paper sheds light not only on attributes that are universal

enough, and should therefore be part of a minimal definition of populism, it also

demonstrates which features are mere contextual particularities and therefore

should not be included in a general conceptualization of populism.

The paper proceeds in four steps. First, twelve supposed characteristics of

populism are discerned from the literature. Second, six political actors are selected

that are considered populist in the literature. Third, it is assessed to which extent

the selected actors possess the supposed characteristics of populism. Fourth, the

attributes that are shared by all actors are theoretically linked to each other and a

minimal definition of populism is presented that can be used in comparative

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research. Specific attention is also paid to those characteristics that are mere

contextual specificities and are therefore not part of the minimal definition.

Three area-based bodies of literature

One could roughly distinguish three area-based bodies of literature concerning

populism: the United States literature, the Latin American literature and the

Western European literature. As the name indicates, the United States literature

concerns populist actors in the United States (Kazin, 1995, Goodwyn, 1978, 1976,

McKenna, 1974, Hicks, 1961, Hofstadter, 1955). Many works in this literature

focus on late nineteenth century popular and agrarian movements and perceive

populism as ‘a way of looking at things’ that contrasts the ‘plain’ people from rural

states against the industrial cosmopolitans from the Eastern shores of the country.

The main argument of these movements was that ‘the people’ should stand up

against the ruling political, cultural and economic elite. Moreover, they perceived

‘the people’ not in a socialist or communist sense, but as a unified category much

broader than a socio-economic class only. This US perception of the concept did

not really change over time. Kazin (1995: 1), for instance, defines populism as “a

language whose speakers conceive of ordinary people as a noble assemblage not

bounded narrowly by class, view their elite opponents as self-serving and

undemocratic, and seek to mobilize the former against the latter”.

The second body of literature consists of books and articles in which Latin

American populism is analyzed (De la Torre, 2010, Hawkins, 2010, 2009,

Weyland, 2001, Di Tella, 1997, 1965, Roberts, 1995). Just as in the US literature,

the emphasis is on contraposing the people against the elite. Yet in most Latin

American countries, the actors who proclaim this populist message are not small-

scale bottom-up movements, but powerful and paternalistic political leaders such

as Perón (Argentina), Vargas (Brazil), Chávez (Venezuela), Morales (Bolivia) and

Correa (Ecuador). These leaders claim that they know what ‘ordinary’ people want

and argue that their decisive leadership in the name of the people should therefore

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not be disturbed by ‘hampering’ representative institutions and the corrupt elite.

They want the relationship between the leader and the people therefore to be as

direct as possible. Weyland (2001: 14) argues that populism should be defined as “a

political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises

government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from

large numbers of mostly unorganized followers. This direct, quasi-personal

relationship bypasses established intermediary organizations or deinstitutionalizes

and subordinates them to the leader’s personal will.”

There are also scholars who have mainly focused on Western Europe

(Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008b, Mudde, 2007, 2004, Mény and Surel, 2002b).

Their conceptualizations of populism have strongly been influenced by Western

European political parties such as Le Pen’s FN, Haider’s FPÖ, Bossi’s Lega Nord

and Dewinter’s Vlaams Belang. A common characteristic of these parties is that

they are all from the far right. They emphasize the cultural identity of the people

and therefore position them not only against the bad elite, but also against

‘dangerous others’. Depending on the concrete context, those ‘dangerous others’

could be, for instance, immigrants or people with another race or religion. As a

result ‘exclusionism’ plays a pivotal role in many European definitions of

populism. Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008a: 3), for instance, define populism as

“an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites

and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to

deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and

voice”. However, although a majority of the allegedly populist parties in Western

Europe are radical right wing parties, there are also many allegedly populist parties

that have radically different ideologies. Examples are Berlusconi’s FI in Italy

(Tarchi, 2008), Lijst Dedecker in Belgium (Pauwels, 2011) and Die Linke in

Germany (March, 2007).

The cross-fertilizations between these three different bodies of literature is

still minimal. Although the authors from different literatures increasingly cite

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each other, the definitions of populism they make use of in their analyses are still

strongly influenced by their ‘own’ body of literature. There are only few scholars

who have transcended ‘their’ bodies of literature and have analyzed populist

phenomena over a long time period and across a wide variety of cases (e.g. Taggart,

2000, Canovan, 1981, Ionescu and Gellner, 1969b). Their studies, however, did not

result in clear minimal definitions of populism which can be used in empirical

comparative research.

Characteristics of populism mentioned in the literature

The different bodies of literature do not agree on what the genus of populism is –

i.e. the overarching dimension of the concept (Weyland, 2001). Is it an ideology

(Mudde, 2004), a discourse (Hawkins, 2010), a style (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007),

or an organizational form (Taggart, 1995)? In order to determine to which species

an animal belongs, a biologist looks at the specific characteristics of that animal. If

it has feathers and wings it is a bird; if it has hair and hooves it is a mammal.

Similarly, in order to determine the genus of populism, we should look at the

specific characteristics of populist actors. Yet before we can do that, we must first

find out what these specific characteristics are.

This inquiry starts with a presentation of characteristics that have been

associated with populism in the three mentioned bodies of literature. Some

characteristics are emphasized in all three bodies of literature, but most of them

are highlighted in only one or two of them. A distinction is made between: (1)

features that relate to the ideas of populists; (2) characteristics that have to do with

the style of populists; and (3) attributes that concern the organization of populists.

Later I will determine which characteristics should be part of a minimal definition

of populism and what this means for the genus of the concept.

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Ideational characteristics

The first feature that is often associated with populism is the centrality of the

people. All three bodies of literature emphasize this characteristic. Populists are

said to worship the people, and emphasize the people’s fundamental position in

the centre of politics (e.g. De la Torre, 2010, Mény and Surel, 2002a, Taggart, 2000,

Kazin, 1995, Goodwyn, 1976, Ionescu and Gellner, 1969a). ‘The people’ can mean

many different things to many different populists in many different circumstances

(see Mudde, 2004, Canovan, 1981). It can refer, for instance, to the electorate, to

the nation, or to no fixed group at all. This does not mean that ‘the people’ has no

meaning (Panizza, 2005: 5). It only means that the way in which the term is

understood is dependent on the particular context.1

The second characteristic of populism that is emphasized in all three bodies

of literature is anti-elitism. People-centrism cannot be understood without this

characteristic of anti-elitism. The elite is accused of being alienated from the

people (e.g. Barr, 2009, Laclau, 2005, Mudde, 2004, Canovan, 2002, Weyland,

2001, Goodwyn, 1978, McKenna, 1974), has no idea what ordinary people find

important, and only represents its own interests. The accusations differ from

arrogance and selfishness to incompetence and corruption. In most cases these

allegations go hand in hand. Just as people-centrism, anti-elitism is dependent on

the context and can take different forms. It could be directed towards many

different kinds of elites: a political elite (politicians in general, political

organizations, political parties, the ‘established’ political order), an economic elite

(multinationals, business elites, bank executives or capitalism in general), a

cultural elite (intellectuals), a media elite (journalists) and a legal elite (judges) (see

1 To deal with the slipperiness of the concept of ‘the people’, Taggart proposes to make use of the

term ‘heartland’ (Taggart 2000). A heartland can be seen as an idealized conception of the people,

located in an idealized landscape. The heartland is a mythical and constructed ideal of the

population, it is an ‘imagined community’ (Mudde 2004). It is not constructed with reference to the

future, like a utopia, but with reference to the past. The heartland can be used as a tool to better

understand what a specific populist means when he or she refers to a particular people.

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also Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 324). In contemporary Western Europe the

criticized elite is mostly a political elite (Canovan, 2002), whereas in the United

States in the nineteenth century the victims of the populist critique consisted

typically of an industrial elite and cosmopolitan intellectuals (Taggart, 2000). No

matter which type of elite is criticized, the general phenomenon is the same: a

conflict between those without power (the people) and those with power (the

elite).

A third feature that is mentioned in all three bodies of literature is that the

people is a homogeneous entity. This is a result of the antagonistic character of the

perceived relationship between the people and the elite. Because populists argue

that the people is exploited by the elite, they believe that all ‘ordinary’ men have a

shared interest in their opposition against the elite. Therefore they present ‘the

people’ (singular) as a uniform entity. US authors argue that populists, when they

address the people, blur class distinctions by lumping all in one single

homogeneous category of ‘the ordinary people’ (see McKenna, 1974: xii, xiv).

Although European scholars do not focus explicitly on this lack of class

consciousness, they make the same general argument of ‘homogeneity of the

people’ (see Taggart, 2000: 92).

According to many scholars, this emphasis on the power of the people and

the negativity about the elite leads to the message that ‘ordinary citizens’ must be

given their voice back and that people therefore should have more influence on

the political decision-making process. Populists are said to want to circumvent the

‘opaque and complex consensus seeking politics’ by introducing more directness in

the form of measures of direct democracy such as referenda, popular initiatives

and plebiscites (Taggart, 2000, Canovan, 1981). This is the fourth alleged

characteristic of populism.

In the European literature, populism is often not only associated with

negativity about the elite, but also with negativity about specific social groups.

This exclusionism is the fifth mentioned ideational feature of populism. Since

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many populists in Europe are from the far right and thus exclude one or more

social groups in one way or another, many European scholars consider

exclusionism to be another defining element of populism (see Albertazzi and

McDonnell, 2008a). Populists claim to defend the collective identity of the ‘true’

people against enemies from outside. As we have seen, whether these outsiders are

immigrants, unemployed, or people of another religion or race depends on the

concrete context. Combined with exclusionism, the homogeneous conception of

the people is often not only based on the ‘demos’ (political uniformity in

opposition to the corrupt elite), but also on the ‘ethnos’ (cultural uniformity in

opposition to ‘dangerous others’).

To emphasize their message of anti-elitism and/or exclusionism, populists

often proclaim a serious crisis (political, cultural and/or economic) (Betz, 2002:

198). They argue that the political influence, the cultural identity or the economic

situation of ‘ordinary’ people is under great threat and must urgently be protected

(Taggart, 2000: 93-4). It does not matter whether the proclaimed crisis is real or

not, it only matters that populists argue that there is a crisis.

Stylistic characteristics

The emphasis on stylistic attributes of populism can mainly be found in the

European literature. One of the features of the allegedly populist style is the usage

of a popular language. Because of their glorification of the people and their despise

of the elite, populists tend to use a rather simplistic language that is

understandable for ‘normal’ people and differs from the difficult and formal

language of the elite. This focus on linguistic simplicity has often been described as

the ‘tabloid style’ of populists (see for instance Canovan, 1999: 5).

A second stylistic characteristic is that populists make use of a polarizing

language in which they exaggerate and use undiplomatic and sometimes even

bellicose language in order to bring their message of crisis across (Canovan, 2004:

242). The world is divided in Good and Evil (see Hawkins, 2010). ‘Good’ is

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associated with the people (the ingroup), whereas ‘Evil’ is associated with the elite

and/or ‘dangerous others’ (the outgroup). The result of this Manichean approach is

a way of practicing politics in which a clear distinction is made between ‘us’ and

‘them’. The political debate gets dichotomized (Taggart, 2000: 113), and an

aggressive language is the result.

To get this message across, it is often argued that populists make use of a

direct communication style. The idea is that populists do not want to communicate

with citizens via side roads such as inconvenient party platforms or annoying

institutions such as parliament. These are obstacles that stand in the way of a

direct relationship between the politician and the voter. Populist politicians

therefore prefer to communicate directly via popular mass media such as television

(Mazzoleni, 2003) – and more recently social media such as Facebook and Twitter.

The United States literature and the European literature share with each

other a focus on a fourth stylistic characteristic: the populitst’s creation of an

outsider image. Because populists do not trust the established political parties, they

present themselves as not being part of the elite (e.g. Goodwyn, 1976). In the

European literature it is emphasized that in order to strengthen their image of

defyers of the established order, populists often present themselves as political

mavericks (Betz and Johnson, 2004: 315, see also Barr, 2009: 33-4). This does not

necessarily mean that they actually are political outsiders, as Mudde (2004: 560)

has emphasized, it is sufficient that they create such an image.

Organizational characteristics

Organizational characteristics concern the way in which populist organizations are

constituted. In the Latin American body of literature, centralization of the leader

plays a pivotal role. As we have seen, Weyland (2001) emphasizes that a populist

organization has a strong personalistic leader at its apex. Also Taggart (2000: 100-

3) argues that populist organizations can be characterized by their centralized

nature and the centralized role of its leaders. Some scholars argue that the concept

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of charisma is of vital importance to understand populist leadership (Taggart,

2000). According to Weber, charismatic authority is a combination of the personal

characteristics of an almost ‘superhuman’ leader and the qualities that ordinary

voters ascribe to him (Weber, 1968).

The Latin American literature does not only emphasize the organizational

feature of leadership, it also highlights a second organizational characteristic:

populists want a loosely mediated relationship between leader and followers. This

means that populists want to get rid of intermediate institutions and organizations

which stand in the way of a direct relationship between themselves and their

followers. Their eventual goal is to limit the distance between leader and

supporters. Most populists therefore refuse to create a party structure that is

similar to the dominant model of party organization (Taggart, 2000: 75). Populists

tend to organize themselves in loose movements instead of tightly structured

political parties (see Wiles, 1969).

For an overview of all the characteristics that have been discerned from the

three bodies of literature see Table 1.

[Table 1 about here]

Case selection

In order to develop a minimal definition of populism that is applicable across cases,

a most dissimilar system design was used. The goal was to look for the attributes

that populists from backgrounds as divergent as possible share with each other.

Only these attributes should be part of a minimal definition. The sample of

populist actors was selected from three geographical areas: the United States, Latin

America and Western Europe. From each geographical area two prototypical

populists – i.e. political actors of which general agreement exists that they are

populist – have been included in the sample. To guarantee temporal diversity, the

focus is not only on contemporary populism but also on historical cases. It was

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decided to include different types of political actors (politicians, parties and

movements), because the label of populism has been attached to all three types of

actors (see table 2). Note that I have also aimed at ideological diversity. Although

one could contend over the ideological labels I have attached to them here, I

believe that this selection of actors represents a wide variety of ideological stances.

[Table 2 about here]

The first selected populist actor is the United States People’s Party (e.g. Kazin,

1995, Goodwyn, 1976, Hicks, 1961). This political movement was established in

1891 to defend the interests of farmers. It faded away a decade later. The second

selected populist actor is Ross Perot. As an independent candidate and challenger

of the established parties, he participated in the United States presidential

elections in 1992 and 1996. He has been labelled populist by many different

authors (e.g. Kazin, 1995, Canovan, 2004, Taggart, 2000). Third, the Argentine

politician and general Juan Perón was selected (e.g. De la Torre, 2010, Weyland,

2001, Roberts, 1995). He was president of Argentina from 1946 until 1955 and

from 1973 until 1974. Perón is still immensely popular in Argentina. The fourth

selected populist is Hugo Chávez (e.g. Hawkins, 2010, Roberts, 2007, Weyland,

2003). He is president of Venezuela since 1999 and is famous for his critique on

the United States’ foreign policy. Fifth, the French Front National (FN) was

selected (e.g. Rydgren, 2008, Surel, 2002, Betz, 1993). Its leader Jean-Marie Le Pen

participated in five presidential elections. In 2002 he defeated the main left

candidate and made it to the second round, which he lost. Sixth, Silvio Berlusconi

was selected. He is one of the longest-serving prime-ministers in Italy. He entered

politics in 1994 with his own political party Forza Italia (FI) and is currently the

leader of the centre-right Popolo della Libertà. Berlusconi has been called populist

by many different authors (De Beus, 2009, e.g. Tarchi, 2008, Zaslove, 2008).

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Results

The People’s Party

In 1892, at a convention in Omaha, the United States People’s Party was formed. It

was created from a background of regional agrarian organisations in which farmers

and other ‘normal’ people opposed the ruling economic and political elite. During

the Omaha convention, the Populists of the People’s Party presented a declaration

of principles in which they showed that they were both strongly people-centrist

and anti-elitist: “We have witnessed for more than a quarter of a century the

struggles of the two great political parties for power and plunder, while grievous

wrongs have been inflicted upon the suffering people” (cited in McKenna, 1974:

90). The Populists attacked the rich from the East in general, and the corrupt

railroad corporations, politicians and capitalists in particular. The party proclaimed

a devastating crisis in the first sentence of their Omaha Platform: “we meet in the

midst of a nation brought to the verge of moral, political, and material ruin” (cited

in McKenna, 1974: 89). One of the central measures to overcome this crisis was

the introduction of the popular initiative and the referendum.

The ‘people’ the Populists referred to is seen as a uniform entity that

transcends specific classes and other groups. According to Goodwyn (1978: 97),

the Populists see the ‘people’ as an alliance of northern framers, southern blacks

and urban workers. Some Populists wanted to include black people in their

alliance as well, but most Populists were rather exclusionist. There was the

recognition that blacks and whites shared economic interests, but many Populists

were not keen on allowing black people to become members of the club (Kazin,

1995: 37-8). Moreover, in its official documents the party emphasized that

immigrant labour should be restricted (Canovan, 1981).

Because the party developed from collaborations between small, regional

farmers’ alliances, the party consisted of a rather complex set of alliances and sub-

alliances in which the connections between bottom and top were only loosely

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mediated (Goodwyn, 1976: 91). It could, therefore, be described as a bottom-up

movement. Because the regional organizations continued to play a pivotal role

within the People’s Party, the party “was not a function of a particular charismatic

leader” (Taggart, 2000: 26).

To persuade the people to rebel against the ruling elite, the People’s Party

made frequent use of a Manichean discourse of Good versus Evil (us vs. them,

democracy vs. plutocracy, producers vs. exploiters), as a result of which the party’s

language was rather polarizing (see the previous examples from their Omaha

Platform). Yet its language could not be described as simple or simplistic. Their

language is impregnated with complex arguments and rather complicated

sentences.2

Apart from the platform, most Populists did not communicate directly with

the electorate; a lot of communication took place at the regional level via the

farmers’ alliances. In their initial communications, the Populists presented

themselves as outsiders in the political realm. A few years later, however, they

decided to form a union with the Democratic Party, and did not emphasize their

‘outsiderness’ anymore. This turned out to be a bad electoral choice, for it was the

introduction to the end of their success. Their message of anti-elitism had become

much less credible after they had formed an alliance with the Democrats.

2 See for instance the following sentence in the Omaha Platform: “While our sympathies as a party

of reform are naturally upon the side of every proposition which will tend to make men intelligent,

virtuous, and temperate, we nevertheless regard these questions, important as they are, as

secondary to the great issues now pressing for solution, and upon which not only our individual

prosperity but the very existence of free institutions depend; and we ask all men to first help us to

determine whether we are to have a republic to administer before we differ as to the conditions

upon which it is to be administered, believing that the forces of reform this day organized will

never cease to move forward until every wrong is remedied and equal rights and equal privileges

securely established for all the men and women of this country” (website History Matters).

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Ross Perot

Exactly one century after the formation of the People’s Party, another third-party

actor challenged the main US political parties. During the 1992 presidential

elections, Ross Perot, an independent candidate from Texas – and also a billionaire

businessman – gained around twenty percent of the vote. Perot claimed that his

country was in crisis and he castigated “the decade of greed, the era of trickle-

down economics” (Kazin, 1995: 273). In order to solve the crisis, he argued that

the established political order must make place for a political entrepreneur who

would balance the budget.

He said that ‘normal’ Americans were the owners of their country and

should claim their country back from the politicians in Washington. To give more

power to the people he wanted to introduce more direct democracy by means of

‘electronic town halls’. One of his one-liners was: “I am Ross, and you are the

boss” (cited in Posner, 1996: 251). Perot did not exclude specific classes or groups

in his plea to give more power to the people. Instead, he argued that all Americans

are united in their struggle against the corrupt politicians. This is clearly

represented by the name of his political organization: United We Stand America.

His speech ‘We Own This Country’ was the beginning of a campaign

strategy of frequenting a large amount of TV-shows. With his anti-Washington

message and his unusual mix of political positions, he appealed to both

Republicans and Democrats. One of Perot’s central messages to his campaigners

was tat they should always think ‘out of the box’. This would help him being

portrayed as a Washington outsider. To enforce this image as an outsider, he also

claimed that initially he did not want to run as a political candidate, but was

forced into it because he felt the obligation to rescue the country from the

established politicians (see Taggart, 2000, Gold, 1995).

To appeal to the people he used a simple and uncomplicated language,

explained economic troubles in a facile and straightforward way, and also

communicated directly with his voters through talk shows on television (Kazin,

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1995: 273). On television, he mixed this simple language with a bombastic style to

show his frustration with the established order (Taggart, 2000: 42). He ridiculed

overdressed lobbyists, “country clubbers” and “preppies” in the White House

(Kazin, 1995: 272-3). People liked this clear, tough and confrontational political

approach. “Keeping his message simple, and spicing the shows with his own brand

of down-home Texas humor, he was a fresh face in a sea of candidates who

normally were reserved and shied away from candor, controversy, or color”

(Posner, 1996: 260).

Perot built a political organization around himself, of which he was the

only and uncontested leader. The movement was completely inferior to his

personal political performance. Because he strongly disliked the existing parties

and their institutionalized organizational structure, he established an organization

in which the distance between him and his rank and file was as short as possible.

In fact, Kazin (1995: 273) argues that Perot never built a party organization that

was more than a mere network of his admirers. Except for the moments that Perot

appeared on television, the party was invisible.

Juan Perón

Although Juan Perón died in 1974, he is still one of the most popular Argentinean

politicians. This might partly be due to the immense popularity of his second wife

Eva Duarte, also known as Evita. In 1946 Perón was elected president for the first

time. He argued that the country was in a social and political crisis and therefore

urgently needed a strong and charismatic leader who was able to actually solve the

problems (Crassweller, 1987: 222). Perón defined his ideological stance as the

‘Third Position’: a middle way between capitalism and socialism. He got re-elected

in 1951, but was ousted after a coup in 1955. He lived in Paraguay and Spain and

only returned to Argentina in 1973, when he was elected president again. He died

one year later.

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Just as the political actors we discussed so far, Perón strongly emphasized

the struggle between the (good) people and the (bad) oligarchy (De la Torre, 2010,

Roberts, 2007). His supporters have been called ‘descamisados’ (shirtless ones) to

distinguish them from the members of the political elite who always wore jackets

and ties (Page, 1983: 136-7). Although many of Perón’s supporters were working

class, one should not conclude that Peronism was a working class movement

(Crassweller, 1987: 222). Perón emphasized the importance of national unity and

tried to close the gap between the different socio-economic classes by forging a

cross-class alliance of supporters – a uniform entity in its opposition against the

elite. He did not exclude specific social groups such as immigrants or people of

another religion. Perón was not a supporter of means of direct democracy. The

will of the people should, in his opinion, be expressed via a strong and charismatic

leader (Weyland, 2001).

In order to forge a cross-class alliance, Perón used a language that was not

only understandable for the highly educated, but also for the lower classes. He

therefore used a lot of metaphors in order to clarify his ideas. His discourse,

however, could not be called simplistic or simple. As Crassweller (1987: 184)

argues, his communicative strength “lay in Perón’s strange ability to combine lofty

language with homespun metaphors” (my emphasis). And although he criticized

the ‘oligarchy’ he did not really make use of a polarizing style. In fact, his Third

Way politics (‘not left, not right’) and his emphasis on social justice made his style

rather accommodative.3 To distinguish ‘us’ (the people) from ‘them’ (the elite)

Perón presented himself as a political outsider. He was famous for his direct

communication style with the public. “The iconography of Perón appearing on the

balcony to greet the masses who chanted his name and greeted his appearance

with an ovation became an integral component in his subsequent rule as the

3 This does not mean that Perón acted accommodative towards his opponents. To the contrary, he

did not hesitate to jail critical journalists or politicians.

17

symbol of his direct link to the people and his genuine popular support” (Taggart,

2000: 62).

Perón had never made a secret of his admiration for the leadership style of

Mussolini. He perceived politics in military terms and emphasized that he saw

himself as a ‘conductor’: a strong personalistic leader (Page, 1983: 220). In his

emphasis on strong leadership, Perón was “hostile to the idea of political parties as

bases of power, for they were inconsistent with the functions of the ‘Conductor’”

(Crassweller, 1987: 230). To be able to directly control his organization Perón

made sure that the party was strongly underinstitutionalized and completely

dependent on his personalistic leadership (Roberts, 2006).

Hugo Chávez

In the early eighties, a group of military academy graduates, inspired by the

thoughts of the Venezuelan patriot Simón Bolívar, founded a secret organization

within the armed forces. The goal of this organization was to do something about

the increasing corruption in the country. In 1992, the group performed a failed

coup against the government. But in 1998 they were more successful: the leader of

the group (that had by then turned into a political party), the charismatic Hugo

Chávez, convincingly won the presidential elections. Thirteen years later, he still

is the uncontested president of Venezuela.

The point of departure for Chávez’s political ideas is the centrality of the

Venezuelan people. A slogan during the 2000 campaign was, for instance, ‘With

Chávez, the people rule’ (Hawkins, 2010: 15). Although he focused especially on

the elevation of the poorest people from the lowest classes, he stated explicitly that

his message was directed towards all Venezuelans (Roberts, 2003: 75). In his

conception they form one entity in their opposition against the elite. He argued

that their interests were at risk because of a group of conspiring elites, supported

by a corrupt political system. Addressing the elite, Chávez frequently used terms

such as ‘enemies’, ‘corruption’, ‘the oligarchy’, counterrevolutionary forces’, ‘coup-

18

mongerers’, ‘the lackeys of imperialism’, ‘the nightmare of world capitalism’ and

‘savage neoliberalism’ (Hawkins, 2010: 61).

Chávez’s main goal was a revolution to overthrow the existing political

order. In his opinion, this was the only possible way to solve the political and

cultural crisis in which the country was placed by the corrupted political Punto

Fijo system (Hellinger, 2003). He had enough of the representative system and

proposed to introduce measures of direct democracy (Ellner, 2003: 149). Chávez

was not exclusionist towards specific societal groups except of course for the

Venezuelan (and later also foreign – read United States) elite.

To bring his message across, Chávez makes use of a simple language in

which he refers to famous myths and symbols (Hawkins, 2010: 56-7). When he

talks about the corrupt elite, his language is strongly polarizing and even bellicose.

“Chávez recited passages from Florentino y el Diablo, a Venezuelan folk ballad in

which a cowboy named Florentino is challenged to a singing duel with the Devil;

Florentino courageously accepts the challenge and eventually defeats the Devil

through his perseverance and wit. Chávez asserted that the coup-mongering

leaders of the opposition were the Devil, and behind them was the biggest Devil

of all, George W. Bush” (Hawkins, 2010: 2).

To bring this polarizing message across, Chávez often emphasizes that he is a

political outsider and that he does not belong to the ‘political class’. In fact, he is

one of the ordinary people (Ellner, 2003: 145-6), and therefore prefers to

communicate directly with Venezuelans through his own television and radio

shows in which he discusses his policies, tells jokes and sings songs. The most

fascinating example is Chávez’s television show Aló Presidente, which is

broadcasted every week.

Chávez is supported by a network of decentralized grass-roots

organizations. Maybe the most central organizations were the so-called ‘Bolivarian

Circles’ – neighborhood committees that operated relatively independently from

19

the official party organization (Roberts, 2007: 7). Hawkins (2010: 178-81) shows

that these organizations were strongly dependent on their political leader and that

they had a movement-like form of organization, which was rather unmediated

and completely different from the bureaucratic hierarchies of the established

political parties.

Front National

The Front National (FN) was founded in 1972. It was an amalgam of many

different radical right groups, such as “French Algeria die-hards; revolutionary

nationalists; wartime Vichyites; Holocaust revisionists; neo-fascists; neo-Nazis;

monarchists; Catholic fundamentalists; former members of extreme right

groupuscules; and so on” (Hainsworth, 2000: 18). During the first decade of its

existence, the party was not successful. Only in 1983, in a local election, the party

made its electoral breakthrough. But the biggest success for the FN took place

exactly three decades after its foundation: in 2002 FN-leader Jean-Marie Le Pen

eliminated the leader of the Socialist Party in the first round of the presidential

election.

The reason to found the FN was that there was a concern about a socio-

cultural crisis: an alleged decline of the greatness of the country. France had to act

quickly in order to avoid a national disaster (Betz, 1994: 130-1). The party strongly

emphasized – and still emphasizes – the importance of preservation of what it calls

the French national identity. There was fear that this French identity was under

threat by the influx of migrants who wanted to keep their own identity and

thereby undermined and challenged everything that was typical of the French

nation. “France for the French” is one of the most famous slogans of the FN

(Davies, 1999). This emphasis on ‘the nation’ resulted in a rather homogeneous

understanding of ‘the people’. The FN did not focus on specific socio-economic

groups and has developed an interclassiste profile (Davies, 2002: 140). The party

therefore also supports measures of direct democracy.

20

Yet the French people are not only contrapositioned against ‘dangerous

others’; the FN also emphasizes the antagonistic relationship between the good

people and bad elite. Le Pen depicted all political parties as a single political class

that was alienated from the public (Rydgren, 2008). He talked about the ‘Gang of

Four’ (political parties) that captured the established order, and also referred to

politics as a ‘closed shop’ (Davies, 2002: 136). “He proclaims himself as the man

fighting for the real interests of French people against the whole of the French

political establishment” and thus presents himself as a political outsider (Davies,

1999). A clear example, which also demonstrates the direct communication style

of the FN, is the postcards that the FN published for New Year on which it wrote:

‘1991: The Year of the Outsider’ (Davies, 2002: 136).

To bring its message across, the party makes use of an accessible and down-

to-earth language (Davies, 2002: 135) and does not shun polarizing stances. Just

one example is the following line of the FN-politician Stirbois: “Immigrants from

beyond the Mediterranean: go back to your huts” (quoted in Hainsworth, 2000:

24). Since the foundation of the party until 2011, Le Pen was the leader of the FN.

Le Pen withstood all the challenges from other candidates who contested his

leadership, and managed to keep all the different currents in the FN together. By

now he is often portrayed as a charismatic and charming politician (Hainsworth,

2000, Declair, 1999) who managed to build a “highly disciplined, efficient, and

authoritarian organization” around himself (Simmons, 1996: 187). In January 2011,

Jean-Marie Le Pen, aged 82, handed over the party leadership to his daughter

Marine Le Pen.

Silvio Berlusconi

In the early nineties Italy witnessed a huge political corruption scandal of which

the political consequences were enormous. It opened up the possibility for new

political entrepreneurs to enter the stage. One of those entrepreneurs was

marketing man, soccer club owner and a media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi.

21

Berlusconi argued that he had decided to go into politics because he did not

believe in the ‘old political class’, or the partitocrazia anymore. The country was,

in his opinion, in a devastating social and political crisis (Campus, 2006: 141-2).

According to Berlusconi, politicians should start listening to what ‘normal Italians’

wanted. Whom Berlusconi exactly referred to when he talked about ‘normal

Italians’ was not clear. Most probably he referred to everybody who was not part

of the (according to Berlusconi mostly left-wing) political elite – after all they all

shared the same interest in their struggle with the elite. Contrary to Le Pen in

France, Berlusconi was not explicitly negative about immigrants (as long as they

were not part of the ‘communist’ elite) (Tarchi, 2003: 171). One of the ways in

which Berlusconi wanted to translate the will of the people into policy was by

means of measures of direct democracy.

Berlusconi makes a clear distinction between ‘Good’ (the people and

Berlusconi himself) and ‘Bad’ (the arrogant ‘communist’ political elite), and does

not, at any time, nuance this distinction. To distinguish himself from the bad

political elite, Berlusconi presents himself as an outsider in the political realm. He

emphasizes that he is a normal man, just like everyone else and that his political

adventure is only a temporary adventure. As soon as the country is safe from the

corrupt elite, he will leave the stage again (Tarchi, 2003: 163-4). To enforce this

image as an anti-elitist outsider, Berlusconi makes use of a simple and clear

language that is often aggressive towards the leftist media and legal elites: a

language that comes from the realm of television and that everyone can easily

understand (Tarchi, 2003: 168). An interesting example in this respect is the

language of football. Because football is often associated with action and success, it

plays a pivotal role in Berlusconi’s discourse. The name of his party, Forza Italia

(FI), is the chant of the supporters of the national football team. Literally it means

‘Go Italy’ (Jones, 2003: 106).

Berlusconi tries to communicate as directly as possible with his electorate.

During campaigns he spoke to the people directly via his own TV-channels (he

22

owned 3 of the 6 largest television networks) and refused to make use of the

mediation of the press. He applied the methods of TV advertising to the realm of

politics (Ginsborg, 2004). Moreover, during the campaign in 2001, he sent a

biography of himself, called Una Storia Italiana (An Italian Story) to almost every

Italian household. The book contained simply written stories and most of all

pictures of Berlusconi’s and his successes (Stille, 2006: 252).

FI was certainly not a party in the traditional sense of the word. In fact,

Berlusconi argues that when FI is called a ‘political party’ he feels shivers down

the spine (Tarchi, 2003: 166). It could better be seen as a loosely organized

electoral machinery with only one goal: winning elections. Berlusconi is the

uncontested leader who rules the party with an iron hand. During campaigns

Berlusconi’s face was on huge posters on boards alongside the road, in railway and

train stations and all other imaginable spots (Ginsborg, 2003). Berlusconi presents

himself not only as ‘the idealized archetype of the Italian everyman’, but also as

‘exceptional, a superman in the making’ (Stille, 2006: 257). A comparison

Berlusconi himself likes to make is with Moses or Jesus (Jones, 2003: 293).

[Table 3 about here]

Which characteristics should be part of the minimal definition

Only four of the twelve characteristics which are often associated with populism

are shared by all populist actors. This means that only these four features should

be part of a minimal definition of the concept. The first feature is that all populists

centralize the people. What they exactly mean with ‘the people’ often remains

unclear. What is clear, however, and this is the second shared feature, is that they

seem to have the idea that the people with whom they identify is a unified entity.

The third shared characteristic is that this uniform people is exploited by a corrupt

and selfish elite. The fourth feature that can be found in all six cases, is that

23

populists argue that the exploitation of the people by the selfish elite constitutes a

serious political, economic and/or cultural crisis.

What then is the genus (Weyland, 2001) – or the overarching dimension –

of populism? Is it an ideology, a discourse, a style, or an organizational form? It is

remarkable that all four shared characteristics are ideational features. This means

that populism must be an ideational phenomenon, and cannot be merely a style or

an organizational form. Populism might thus be either a (thin-centered) ideology

or a discourse. Thin-centered ideologies can be defined as “those actual and

composite thought-patterns of individuals and groups in a society which relate to

the way they comprehend and shape their political worlds, and which supply us

with crucial clues for understanding political conduct and practices” (Freeden,

1998: 749). Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008: 481) describe a discourse as follows: “A

discourse can be understood as a set of categories and concepts embodying specific

assumptions, judgments, contentions, dispositions, and capabilities. It enables the

mind to process sensory inputs into coherent accounts, which can then be shared

in intersubjectively meaningful fashion.” Thus, both an ideology and a discourse

are sets of ideas that help people to make sense of the world. The difference

between them is that a (thin-centered) ideology is a deeply rooted political

worldview – it represent certain convictions – whereas a discourse, on the other

hand, can, but need not represent such a worldview. A discourse can also be

employed strategically by political actors to gain votes. Ideologies are thus always

accompanied by particular discourses, but discourses need not necessarily

represent a particular ideology.

The genus of a minimal definition of populism should be a discourse and

not a (thin-centered) ideology for two main reasons. First, it is impossible to

demonstrate empirically whether populist ideas represent actual ideologies. We

can observe the arguments themselves, but it is extremely difficult (and in many

cases even impossible) to find out whether these ideas are strategically employed

to win votes or whether they represent a deeply rooted worldview. Second, it has

24

been demonstrated that many populists become less populist after their first

successes (Rooduijn et al., 2011). This indicates that, at least for some parties,

populism is not a deeply rooted worldview but a superficial discourse that they

employ strategically to win votes.

A minimal definition of populism would therefore be as follows: populism

is a discourse in which a serious crisis is proclaimed because there exists a

Manichean struggle between two antagonistic and homogeneous constructs: the

(good) ‘ordinary’ people and the (bad) ‘corrupt’ elite.

Which characteristics should not be part of the minimal definition

We should be cautious with this minimal definition. Once other populist actors

are analyzed too, it might have to be adjusted. It is possible, for instance, that the

proclamation of a serious crisis is not shared by all populist actors outside our

sample. More definitive conclusions can be drawn about which attributes should

not be part of a minimal definition of populism because these conclusions are

based on falsification instead of verification. The first attribute that should not be

part of a minimal definition of populism is support for direct democracy. Populists

want to avoid the nontransparent decision-making by the elite, but they are not

necessarily in favor of direct democracy. Some want to circumvent the elite by

entrusting the power to make political decisions to a charismatic leader who

exactly knows what the people want. An example is Perón. As a strong leader he

said that he would embody the will of the people in his own voice. And, although

Berlusconi supported direct democracy in theory, he once said to the people:

“Since you have chosen me in a free electoral competition, you must now be quiet,

and let me do my job” (cited in Urbinati, 2006).

Exclusionism should not be part of a minimal definition of populism either.

In contemporary Western Europe most populist parties have a far right ideology,

and are exclusionist indeed. They accuse immigrants (often Muslim immigrants) of

threatening the European culture and identity. Moreover, often it is assumed that

25

these ‘dangerous others’ also secretly conspire with the corrupt elite. The addition

of this attribute of exclusionism to the definition of populism thus seems

convincing if we look at the radical right populist parties in Western Europe. Yet

it is problematic to reconcile it with populist phenomena in other times and at

other places. In fact, if we look at the populist actors analyzed in this paper, only

the People’s Party and the FN could be defined as exclusionist. The other parties

criticize the elite, but do not combine this critique with an attack on ‘dangerous

others’. Perot, for instance, did not criticize dangerous others. Instead, he wanted

to unite all Americans against the Washington elite. He therefore called his party

United We Stand America.

None of the stylistic characteristics should part of our minimal definition of

populism. The language of the People’s Party cannot be called simple or simplistic.

In fact, the party filled their platform with rather complex sentences and

complicated arguments. Perón used a lot of metaphors to clarify his political

message, but he did not employ a simplistic language either. He also did not

polarize. With his Third Way politics he tried to attract voters from both the left

and the right. As a result his style was more accommodative than it was

provoking. Regarding the direct communication style, the People’s Party is the big

exception. Communication took place via the Farmers’ Alliances, and was not

directed to the public directly. It must be noted that direct communication with

the people was nearly impossible because at the end of the nineteenth century the

television was not invented yet. Yet the absence of television and therefore direct

communication does not make the People’s Party itself less populist. The final

stylistic attribute – portrayal as an outsider – should also be left out of the minimal

definition of populism. A few years after he People’s Party was founded, the party

did not emphasize its position as an outsider in the political realm anymore.

Although electorally this was a very bad decision, it did not make the ideas of the

party less populist.

26

We can conclude that most modern populist parties employ a specific style

in which they try to show that they support the people (popular language, direct

communication style) and loathe the elite (polarization, presentation as outsider).

This style helps them to bring their message across. Yet, if we look at historical

cases, we see that populists have not always made use of such stylistic strategies.

This style does therefore not define what populism essentially is (Mudde, 2004,

Jagers, 2006). Canovan (Canovan, 1999: 5-6) argues that a particular style is not

sufficient to mark someone as populist. The concept of populism can only be used

if this politician also offers substantive analyses and solutions. In a similar vein

Taggart (2000: 5) argues: “To say that things are done in a ‘populist’ manner is not

to tell us much about the politics of populism. If they are done in a populist way

because they embody a deeper commitment to populist ideas, then it is on the

populist ideas that we should focus.” In short, modern populists are inclined to

make use of a specific style that emphasizes their people-centrality and anti-

elitism, but this style is not the essence of their populism.

The organizational attributes should not be part of the minimal definition

of populism either. The People’s Party, for instance, was not organized around a

charismatic leader, and Jean-Marie Le Pen’s FN cannot be called a loosely

organized movement. Just as with the stylistic attributes, it could be argued that

populists are inclined to be organized around strong leaders and in loose

movements. This does not mean, however, that every populist actor is organized

in such a way. A specific organizational form can help populists to spread their

message and to gain seats, yet it does not define the essence of their populism. As

Hawkins (2010: 166) argues, specific organizational aspects are consequences of a

populist discourse.

Conclusion

Populism has been defined in many different ways. Yet most of these definitions

are based on particular contexts. This is problematic because it leads to ‘conceptual

27

stretching’ (Sartori, 1970), which hampers the comparability of populism across

cases and over time. The aim of this paper has been to develop a minimal

definition of populism that is appropriate for comparative research. Although

there already exist some of those minimal definitions (Hawkins, 2010, Mudde,

2004, Weyland, 2001), those definitions are not founded on the systematic

comparison of populist actors across cases and over time. In this paper this lacuna

was filled by using a most dissimilar system design to look for the attributes that

populists from backgrounds as divergent as possible share. We paid specific

attention to the attributes that were not shared by each selected populist because

these features should not be part of a minimal definition of populism.

Based on the analysis, populism is defined as a discourse in which a serious

crisis is proclaimed because there exists a Manichean struggle between two

antagonistic and homogeneous constructs: the (good) ‘ordinary’ people and the

(bad) ‘corrupt’ elite. This definition has a lot in common with the minimal

definitions recently employed by Mudde (2004) and Hawkins (2009, , 2010). They

share the ideational focus on the antagonistic relationship between the good

people and the bad elite. An important difference, however, is that in the existing

definitions populism is perceived as a (thin-centered) ideology or as a worldview.

The minimal definition that has been developed in this paper is different from this

perspective because it is impossible to determine empirically whether the populist

discourse is based on a deeply rooted worldview (or thin-centered ideology) or

not. The populist discourse could just as well be a pragmatic strategy to gain votes.

A populist discourse might represent an underlying worldview or (thin-centered)

ideology, but this need not necessarily be the case.

It has been shown that support for direct democracy and exclusionist ideas

should not be part of a minimal definition of populism because not every populist

supports direct democracy, and not every populist is exclusionist. There also does

not seem to exist something like a specific populist style. Although many populists

present themselves as outsiders and communicate with the people as directly as

28

possible in a simple and polarizing language, not every populist makes use of these

stylistic strategies. Although a particular style can help populists to win votes, it

does not define their populist essence (Mudde, 2004). The same holds true for

organizational characteristics. Many populist parties are loosely organized around

a strong and often charismatic leader. But not each and every one of them. A

specific organizational structure should therefore not be seen as an element of

what constitutes populism, but as a consequence of specific populist ideas

(Hawkins, 2010: 166).

Now we know which attributes should and which attributes should not be

part of a minimal definition of populism, we are able to actually start measuring

and comparing populist discourse across cases and over time. Although some

scholars have already started doing this (Rooduijn and Pauwels, forthcoming,

Hawkins, 2010, 2009), systematic comparisons between the United States, Latin

America and Western Europe are still scarce. Future comparative research on

populism should start focusing on such transcontinental endeavors.

29

Tables

Table 1: Characteristics of populism mentioned in the literature

Ideational characteristics

1. People-centrism2. Anti-elitism3. Homogeneity of the people4. Direct democracy5. Exclusionism6. Crisis

Stylistic characteristics

7. Popular language8. Polarization9. Direct communication style10. Image of outsider

Organizational characteristics

11. Centralization of leader12. Unmediated relationship

Table 2: Selection of actors that are generally considered populist

Space

United States Latin America Western Europe

Time ClassicalPeople's Party1890s(Farmers interests)

Peron1940s-1970s(Social-democratic)

Front National1970s-2000s(Far right)

ModernPerot1990s(Liberal)

Chávez2000s(Far left)

Berlusconi1990s-2000s(Conservative)

30

Table 3: Populists and their characteristics

People's Party

Perot Perón ChávezFront

NationalBerlusconi

Ideational characteristics

1. People-centrism + + + + + +

2. Anti-elitism + + + + + +3. Homogeneity of the people + + + + + +4. Direct democracy + + - + + +5. Exclusionism + - - - + -6. Crisis + + + + + +

Stylistic characteristics

7. Simple language - + - + + +

8. Polarization + + - + + +9. Direct communication style - + + + + +10. Image of outsider - + + + + +

Organizational characteristics

11. Centralization of leader - + + + + +

12. Loosely mediated relationship + + + + - +

31

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