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1. Offensive PKOs Bad

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1. Militarism/Colonialism1. Offensive peacekeeping embraces militarism and colonialism

East African, April 26, 2014, Partiality dilemma: The new model of UNintervention missions

ince then, the UN has sw!n" li#e a pend!l!m in $oth theory and pra%is fromitstraditional non&com$ative and 'ne!tral' peace#eepin" model to a newmilitaristic approach that has seen its forces em$roiled in com$at in Africantheatres of war( This follows a new tendency $y ma)or "lo$al powers at the helmof the United Nations ec!rity *o!ncil to p!rs!e a more militaristic approach,which is t!rnin" UN missions into 'com$ative peace#eepin"(' This has f!elledscepticism a$o!t the ne!trality of UN missions and the $ehind&the&scenes role offormer E!ropean colonial powers in these missions(

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2. Dont olve !iolence1. Offensive peacekeeping cant resolve t"e str#ct#ral ca#ses of

violence

East African, April 26, 2014, Partiality dilemma: The new model of UNintervention missions

+!t the new UN interventionism has its fierce critics( ean&-arie .!ehenno, theUnited Nations peace#eepin" chief from 2000 to 200/, has ca!tioned a"ainst thethin#in" that a com$ative mission will resolve conflicts in Africa, partic!larly*on"os !a"mire( ffensive peace#eepin" cannot $e relied !pon to resolve thestr!ct!ral ca!ses of the conflicts in omalia, o!th !dan or eastern 3*, whichoften have re"ional dimensions and lin#a"es in nei"h$o!rin" co!ntries( Thesep!ndits want the UN to p!rs!e a sol!tion that will involve willin" heads ofstate from the re"ion( They say that it is 'not a 5AT team thats "oin" toclean !p a $ad nei"h$o!rhood That re!ires politics('

2. $n offensive force co#ld enco#rage t"e involvement of moregro#ps

News ecord, !ly 0, 201, 7United Nations A!thori8es ffensive perations inthe 3emocratic ep!$lic of *on"o,9 http:www(newsrecord(co!nited&nations&a!thori8es&offensive&operations&in&the&democratic&rep!$lic&of&the&con"o

Pieter Vanholder, the DRC country director for the Life and Peace

Institute,believes that attempting to accomplish these goals may result in

unintended consequences. pea!ing to "l#$a%eera, Vanholder e&plained,

'(he brigade may be seen as a !ind of occupation force. "s a consequence

it could become a push factor for some to )oin armed groups, adding to

local resistance.*
http://www.newsrecord.co/united-nations-http://www.newsrecord.co/united-nations-

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%. &ndermine 'mpartialit(

1. Offensive peacekeeping kills t"e &)s role as a mediator

Africa ;olicy +rief, April 1, 2014, Partiality dilemma: The new model of UNintervention missions, http:www(africapi(or"wp&content!ploads20140&14

Also worryin" e%perts is that the new militarism is radically chan"in" the waythe UN has $een perceived in conflict sit!ations( 'The $i""er dan"er is thatwhen the UN $ecomes a com$atant on the "ro!nd it loses what has $een its !ni!erole of havin" $een a potential mediator of $ein" the impartial o!tsider,' said-r ?a!renti( thers feel that the shift to a com$ative style can compromise theima"e of the UN peace#eepin" forces as ne!tral actors in conflicts( '=t maycompromise the ne!trality and impartiality which we find essential to theor"anisations peace#eepin"( =ts presence sho!ld $e perceived $y all parties asthat of an honest $ro#er, and not a potential party to the conflict,' said .ertosenthal, the envoy of .!atemala, a non&permanent mem$er of the UN ec!rity

*o!ncil(

2. *ack of impartialit( "as #ndermined peacekeeping in t"e

#dan

Africa ;olicy +rief, April 1, 2014, Partiality dilemma: The new model of UNintervention missions, http:www(africapi(or"wp&content!ploads20140&14

The impartiality dilemma +eyond *on"o, UN interventionism is facin" an'impartiality' dilemma( The role of the UN mission in o!th !dan @UN-= hasca!sed friction with the leaders in !$a, who are tryin" to !ell an ins!r"ency

led $y the former vice&president ie# -achar( Bollowin" the o!t$rea# ofviolence in 3ecem$er 201, the UN ec!rity *o!ncil approved with !nprecedentedspeed a re!est $y ecretary&.eneral +an Ci&moon to $oost the stren"th of theUN-= to 12,,000 troops and D00 police(The perception of the lac# of impartiality of the UN force $y !$a has createdacrimony( =n an!ary, o!th !dan president alva Ciir acc!sed the UNpeace#eepin" mission of actin" li#e a 'parallel "overnment' in his co!ntry( =tdid not help matters that in -arch, UN tr!c#s that were s!pposedly carryin" foodwere fo!nd to $e carryin" weapons and $lan#ets that !$a s!spected to $edestined for the re$els(

%. Offensive peacekeeping operations #ndermine &) credibilit(needed to resolve f#t#re crises

A!stin Bay, 12-13&1, !n o!rnal @?ewiston, -aine, 3ecem$er 1, 201A!stin +ay: U(N( tryin" peace#eepin" with fan"s

+!t as for the U(N( orderin" its well&e!ipped military !nits to destroyspecific com$atant factions *ritics of offensive mandates a!thori8in" the
http://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdf

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'ne!trali8ation' of specific factions contend, with "ood reason, that, when thisocc!rs, the ec!rity *o!ncil has overtly chosen sides( 5hen its peace#eepersenter a soverei"n co!ntry with the mandate to attac# a re$el faction, the U(N(loses more than credi$ility as a mediator( *ome the ne%t dirty war, the criticsar"!e, peace#eepin" forces will $e met as invaders(

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+. 'mpartialit( 'mpact

1. *ack of impartialit( prevents peacekeeping solvenc(

Dr. $eni +halan, -/, Partial Peace0 (he Politics of (a!ing ides in 12

Peace!eeping, Paper prepared for International tudies "ssociation "nnual Convention, (oronto, 3#4,h ttp s0 5566 6 .a c a de m ia.e du 53 / 7 / 89 5P a rti a l: P eace : ( h e: P o liti c s :o f: ( a! in g : id e s : in : 1 2: P eace!e ep in g D;"0 #3#/ Lecturerin International ecurity and Development

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are relatively evenly matched, 6here there is not a strong international interest in the

victory of one side over another, and once the conflict has reached some form of

stalemate.77 ffective mediation can, in turn, be e&pected to produce better outcomes,such as a negotiated ceasefire 6ith 6hich armed groups comply, 6hich means this

approach may also have a substantive legitimation function.

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,. &ndermines -#manitarianism

1. &) taking on a combat role #ndermines "#manitarianism2.

Africa ;olicy +rief, April 1, 2014, Partiality dilemma: The new model of UN

intervention missions, http:www(africapi(or"wp&content!ploads20140&14

*riticism of UN interventionism has also come from the h!manitarian aid a"encieswho fear that a com$ative UN force ris#s $l!rrin" the line $etween aid wor#ersprovidin" care and soldiers( 'Fo! can have a helicopter one day !sed to deliverthe Borce =ntervention +ri"ade troops to attac# a villa"e and ne%t day todeliver aid to that same villa"e,' said -ichiel Gofman, a senior h!manitarianspecialist with -edicins sans Brontieres in +r!ssels( The UN $!rea!cracy canonly ta#e li"htly the critics of interventionism at its own peril( =n warsit!ations, perception is everythin"( =nterventionism h!"ely impacts theperception of the UN peace#eepin" operations not )!st in Africa $!t "lo$ally(

%. Offensive missions co#ld t#rn aid orkers into targets

!darsan a"havan, Novem$er 2, 201, 5ashin"ton ;ost, a"havan has $een The;osts Ca$!l $!rea! chief since 2014( Ge was previo!sly $ased in Nairo$i and+a"hdad for the ;ost, =n Holatile *on"o, A New UN Borce with Teeth,http:www(washin"tonpost(comworldafricain &volatile&con"o&a&new &!n&force&with&teeth20111010cda6af4>Istory(html 3A:12&

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. )ationalism

1. &) militarism in $frica triggers nationalism

Africa ;olicy +rief, April 1, 2014, Partiality dilemma: The new model of UNintervention missions, http:www(africapi(or"wp &

content!ploads20140&14

Altho!"h Africa is !nli#ely to resist e%ternal players in sit!ations li#e the*A, "rowin" perceptions of increased UN militarism on the continent are li#elyto stir resid!al nationalism a"ainst e%ternal intervention( =n recent decades,the continent, thro!"h the AU, has "rown increasin"ly assertive of itsindependence vis&a&vis former colonial powers and the 5est(
http://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdf

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0. 'nconsistent it" Peacekeeping !al#es1. Offensive PKOs inconsistent it" t"e core principles of

peacekeeping

*o!rtney Brooks, March 28, 2013, E%plainer: UN -ove to .ive ;eace#eepers BirstEver *om$at -andate, http:www(rferl(or"content!n &peace#eepers &com$at&

resol!tion24D410D

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. &ndermines #pport for Peacekeeping

1. 't is diffic#lt to get commitments to peacekeeping involving

offensive PKOs

Dr. $eni +halan, -/, Partial Peace0 (he Politics of (a!ing ides in 12Peace!eeping, Paper prepared for International tudies "ssociation "nnual Convention, (oronto, 3#4,h ttp s0 5566 6 .a c a de m ia.e du 53 / 7 / 89 5P a rti a l: Pe ace : ( h e: P o liti c s :o f: ( a! in g : id e s : in : 1 2: P eace!e ep in g D;"0 #3#/ LecturerinInternational ecurity and Development

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3. noball

1. One offensive intervention sets a precedent for anot"er

2.

Brett D. Schaefer, is ay Cin"ham Bellow in =nternational e"!latory Affairs inthe -ar"aret Thatch, April 10, 201, *enter for Breedom, a division of theCathryn and hel$y *!llom 3avis =nstit!te for =nternational t!dies, at TheGerita"e Bo!ndation and editor of *onUNdr!m: The ?imits of the United Nationsand the earch for Alternatives @owman J ?ittlefield ;!$lishers, 200D, U((ho!ld ppose a et!rn to U(N( ;eace Enforcement,

http:// www.her i tage .o rg/rese a rch/r eports /2 013/04 / u s -s h ould - oppos e -re t urn-to -un-peace - enfor ce m ent 3A:12&6&14

The UN* has a!thori8ed missions in the "ray area $etween traditional missionsand peace enforcement, incl!din" the -NU* operation $efore creation of theintervention $ri"ade, $!t esol!tions 20D/ and 2100 "o f!rther toward peace

enforcement than the U(N( has vent!red since the 1DD0s( The U(N( is aware of thesi"nificance of this shift and has ta#en pains to dis"!ise it( esol!tion 20D/e%plicitly esta$lishes the intervention $ri"ade on 7an e%ceptional $asis andwitho!t creatin" a precedent or any pre)!dice to the a"reed principles ofpeace#eepin"(9 The Under&ecretary&.eneral for ;eace#eepin" perations told)o!rnalists that -=NU-A 7is not an enforcement mission(9 Fet the very act ofcreatin" the intervention $ri"ade esta$lishes a precedent for f!t!re action, andassertin" that -=NU-A is not an enforcement operation cannot overcome the factsthat there is no peace to #eep and that peace#eepers are mandated to imposea!thority on $ehalf of the -alian "overnment where it is either wea# or a$sent(
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcement

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14. $lternatives

1. Parallel mission alternative

Dr. $eni +halan, -/, Partial Peace0 (he Politics of (a!ing ides in 12

Peace!eeping, Paper prepared for International tudies "ssociation "nnual Convention, (oronto, 3#4,h ttp s0 5566 6 .a c a de m ia.e du 53 / 7 / 89 5P a rti a l: P eace : ( h e: P o liti c s :o f: ( a! in g : id e s : in : 1 2: P eace!e ep in g D;"0 #3#/ Lecturerin International ecurity and Development .

2. &) a#t"ori5ed intervention forces are s#perior

Brett D. Schaefer, is Jay Kingham ellow in !nternational "egulatory #ffairs in the$argaret Thatch, April 10, 2013, %enter for reedom& a di'ision of the Kathrynand (hel)y %ullom *a'is !nstitute for !nternational (tudies& at +he ,eritageoundation and editor of ConUNdrum: The Limits of the United Nations and theSearch for Alternatives "owman ittlefield u)lishers& 200& US Should!ppose a "eturn to UN #eace $nforcement,http:// www.he ritage.o r g/re s earch/r eports/2 013 / 04/u s - should - opp o se-re t u r n - to-un -

pea c e-enfo r ce m ent %!A:12&'&1(

5ith re$renica and wanda in mind, the U(N( since 1DDD has instr!cted its

peace#eepers to protect civilians from the imminent threat of violence( Thesede$acles also led to a ree%amination of U(N( peace enforcement c!lminatin" inthe Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations@+rahimi report,which ac#nowled"ed the need for ro$!st peace#eepin" operations at times $!t also!ne!ivocally stated: 7KTLhe United Nations does not wa"e war( 5here enforcementaction is re!ired, it has consistently $een entr!sted to coalitions of willin"tates, with the a!thori8ation of the ec!rity *o!ncil, actin" !nder *hapter H==of the *harter(9 This report has "!ided peace#eepin" policy for over a decade(Even as U(N( peace#eepin" has $een assi"ned $roader responsi$ilities ande%panded to historic hi"hs in personnel and e%pense in the 2000s,K2L the U(N(haso$served the principle that it sho!ld not en"a"e in peace enforcementoperations( =ndeed, the U(N( reiterated the concl!sions of the +rahimi report inthe 200D A New Partnership Agenda Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping:The sin"le most important findin" of the +rahimi report was that UN peace#eepin"

can only s!cceed as part of a wider political strate"y to end a conflict andwiththe will of the parties to implement that strate"yM( ;eace#eepin" is notalways the ri"ht answer( =n sit!ations of hi"h political tension, or in conte%tswhere re"ional or national s!pport is lac#in", prevention, mediation,peace$!ildin" and conflict&sensitive development activities may $e moreeffective( =n active conflict, m!ltinational coalitions of forces or re"ionalactors operatin" !nder UN ec!rity *o!ncil mandates may $e more s!ita$le(!ccessf!l crisis mana"ement rests on choosin" the ri"ht tools and $rin"in" themto"ether in ways that ma%imi8e their respective stren"ths(
https://www.academia.edu/6474185/Partial_Peace_The_Politics_of_Taking_Sides_in_UN_Peacekeepinghttps://www.academia.edu/6474185/Partial_Peace_The_Politics_of_Taking_Sides_in_UN_Peacekeepinghttps://www.academia.edu/6474185/Partial_Peace_The_Politics_of_Taking_Sides_in_UN_Peacekeepinghttps://www.academia.edu/6474185/Partial_Peace_The_Politics_of_Taking_Sides_in_UN_Peacekeepinghttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttps://www.academia.edu/6474185/Partial_Peace_The_Politics_of_Taking_Sides_in_UN_Peacekeepinghttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcement

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%. $lternative in t"e Congo

Brett D. Schaefer, is Jay Kingham ellow in !nternational "egulatory #ffairs in the$argaret Thatch, April 10, 2013, %enter for reedom& a di'ision of the Kathrynand (hel)y %ullom *a'is !nstitute for !nternational (tudies& at +he ,eritageoundation and editor of ConUNdrum: The Limits of the United Nations and theSearch for Alternatives "owman ittlefield u)lishers& 200& US Should!ppose a "eturn to UN #eace $nforcement,http:// www.he ritage.o r g/re s earch/r eports/2 013 / 04/u s - should - opp o se-re t u r n - to-un -

pea c e-enfo r ce m ent %!A:12&'&1(

Neither the %"C nor )ali is ripe for UN peace*eepin+ The positive environment

from a decade a+o has een s-uandered . %"C #resident /oseph aila ithample help from spoilers inside and outside the countr.4 There is little prospectfor peace in )ali until a ne +overnment is elected that incorporates ade-uaterepresentation from lon+&ostraci5ed +roups64 7hile elections are scheduled for/ul., si+nificant challen+es persist that could derail themThe !ama Administration has a responsiilit. not to support the most convenientoptions ut rather to support efforts that are most li*el. to result in internationalpeace and securit. 8nstead of peace enforcement throu+h UN operations, theUS should e9plore and advocate alternatives that address these situations andsupport a UN mission onl. hen the asic principles of peace*eepin+ are in placeSpecificall., the US should shift +ears and demand that the )!NUSC!intervention ri+ade e independentl. commanded in a manner similar to therench force in )ali or the African Union force in Somalia 8nternational effortsshould concentrate on addressin+ lac* of +overnance in the %"C, and )!NUSC!should e donsi5ed and focused on less amitious +oals of protectin+ andprovidin+ securit. for humanitarian efforts until conditions are a+ain ripe for a moretraditional UN peace*eepin+ operation 8n )ali, the US should dela. standin+ up)8NUS)A until conditions improve hile supportin+ the current rench and Africaninterventions

Althou+h the Administration ma*es decisions in the Securit. Council, thosedecisions have financial implications The UN char+es the US 2636 percent of

the UN peace*eepin+ ud+et, includin+ the ;1( illion annual ud+et for)!NUSC! 4)8NUS)A is pro?ected to cost ;600 million annuall. hich is not currentl. factoredinto fiscal .ear 201( ud+et proposals 1 0 4 Con+ress should challen+e the

Administration over hether the UN should e entrusted ith these situations andas* hich alternatives ere e9plored
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcementhttp://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcement

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11. Bad to #pport Congo 6overnment

1. 6overnment is corr#pt and its forces are acc#sed of mass

rapes

!darsan a"havan, Novem$er 2, 201, 5ashin"ton ;ost, a"havan has $een The

;osts Ca$!l $!rea! chief since 2014( Ge was previo!sly $ased in Nairo$i and+a"hdad for the ;ost, =n Holatile *on"o, A New UN Borce with Teeth,http:www(washin"tonpost(comworldafricain &volatile&con"o&a&new &!n&force&with&teeth20111010cda6af4>Istory(html 3A:12&

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12. $27 Offensive PKOs )ecessar( to top 8ebel 6ro#ps

1. Defeat of M2% "asnt deterred ot"er gro#ps

3r o$ert +esselin", an!ary 1, 2014, +esselin" is a enior ;olitical Adviser to

the =G *o!ntry is# and Borecastin" !$&aharan Africa team, anes=ntelli"ence eview, El!sive riches & *ontin!ed threats to the 3*s mineralstrade

The defeat of the -2 has not s!cceeded in motivatin" many mem$ers of otherre$el"ro!ps and comm!nity&$ased -aO&-aO self&defence militias that operatewithin the re"ion to s!rrender and disarm( n 3ecem$er, UN !nder&secretary&"eneral for peace#eepin" operations GervP ?adso!s said that the B=+ wo!ld en"a"ethese other armed "ro!ps( The B=+ is most li#ely to $e deployed a"ainstcolla$orators of the -2, incl!din" some -aO -aO "ro!ps in North and o!th Civ!,and other "ro!ps that operate in areas now effectively !nder BA3* control, s!chas the Alliance des ;atriotes po!r !n *on"o ?i$re et o!verain @A;*?, $ased inthe town of -asisi, North Civ!, and the Union des ;atriotes *on"olais po!r la

;ai%Borces ;op!laires *on"olaises @U;*;B;* in ?!$ero, also in North Civ!(Accordin" to the UN .ro!p of E%perts, $oth of these "ro!ps are involved in theminin" of col!m$ite&tantal!m and "old(

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1%. $27 )ecessar( to Defeat 8ebels

1. Cant defeat all of t"e rebel gro#ps in t"e Congo

!darsan a"havan, Novem$er 2, 201, 5ashin"ton ;ost, a"havan has $een The

;osts Ca$!l $!rea! chief since 2014( Ge was previo!sly $ased in Nairo$i and+a"hdad for the ;ost, =n Holatile *on"o, A New UN Borce with Teeth,http:www(washin"tonpost(comworldafricain &volatile&con"o&a&new &!n&force&with&teeth20111010cda6af4>Istory(html 3A:12&

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1+. Militari5ed $pproac"es 9ail

1. Militari5ed peacekeeping fails

:ames loan; :#ne %; 241+ is a enior Lecturer at the 1niversity of Elasgo6, chool of

La6, and a former adviser to a 12 peace mission. Fis boo! The Militarisation ofPeacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century 6as published in - by Fart Publishing,

;&ford, 12 Peace!eeping in Darfur0 " @uagmareA (hat +e Cannot "ccept,

http055666.e#ir.info5-/5-35-H5un#peace!eeping#in#darfur#a#quagmire#that#6e#cannot#accept5

"s the author of a - boo! lamenting the change in direction in 12

peace!eeping since the turn of the century and 6arning that such operations

6ould almost certainly fail, I 6as not surprised to read the articles. Deeply

disturbed, of course, but not surprised. 12"?ID is an e&ample of a@militari%ed peace!eepingA operationJalso !no6n as @Chapter VII

peace!eepingA, @robust peace!eepingA, or @muscular peace!eepingAJa type of

operation that has routinely been authori%ed by the ecurity Council since thelate 44-s. (he operations represent an attempt by the ecurity Council to

prevent the recurrence of a R6anda#type situation, 6here mass atrocities

occurred in the presence of a 12 peace!eeping operation, by moving a6ay

from the traditional policy that force may only be used by peace!eepers in self#

defense =or, sometimes, in defense of the mandate of the force>, in favour of apolicy authori%ing the use of offensive force to protect civilians and others. "s I

argued in -, this type of operation is unli!ely to be successful.

"( 'snt 't orking, peace!eeping forces tend to have little in the 6ay of sophisticated

equipment =that, again, in many cases, must be donated>, and the commandstructure of peace!eeping forces is frequently problematic. Bor e&ample, an

order from a commander from tate " may be ignored by a subordinate from

tate

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ensure the success of such operations, I am not convinced that assigning

peace!eepers forceful tas!s is a good idea. Imagine a mayor of a city 6ith

serious crime problems and an inadequate police force deciding that the 6ay to

protect the citi%enry 6as to arm traffic 6ardens or ambulance attendants. +hilethese ne6ly robust city employees might very 6ell prevent a number of crimes,

it 6ould not be long before they 6ere no longer seen by the criminal population

as unthreateningJinstead, becoming the targets of the criminals. ?ilitari%ed

peace!eepers are in something of a @no#6inA situation0 6here they use force,

they become the target of various forces 6here they do not use force =because

they are vastly outnumbered and to do so 6ould be the equivalent ofcommitting suicide>, there is a substantial ris! that the local populationJ6hich,for better or 6orse, has come to thin! of the peace!eeping force as their

protectorJ6ill see them as failures or co6ards. Recall the title of the firstarticle in theForeign Policy investigation0 @(hey $ust tood +atchingA.

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"enocide(K1L =mportantly, U(( enforcement of these criminal offenses was

limitedto acts committed in the United tates(K2L Gowever, ado#tion of the

R2P nor' woud o%i!ate the $nited States to#re&ent a acts of !enocide,

ethnic ceansin!, and war cri'es even if they occ!r o!tside of the U(( !ch

an o$li"ation wo!ld impose !ni!e responsi$ilities((s the word)s #ree'inent

'iitary force, the $nited States woud ha&e to %ear a dis#ro#ortionateshare of the 2; international commitment( =n the event that acts of "enocideand ethnic cleansin" occ!r, the vast ma)ority of nations in the internationalcomm!nity co!ld reasona$ly plead military inferiority on each s!ch occasion,leavin" the United tates to $ear the $r!nt of any intervention( -ost mem$ers ofthe international comm!nity co!ld also plead poverty, a"ain leavin" the Unitedtates to f!nd the intervention( Even if the intervention is f!nded thro!"h theUnited Nations system, the United tates wo!ld still pay an !ne!al share of thecost(KL

%. @"e doctrinal dominance of r2p recks $mericas global

leaders"ip BO@- str#ct#rall($)D percept#all(. 9oreign

polic( m#st s"ift back to A*9')@A8A@Kapla n 8 /1 /1 3http:nationalinterest(or"commentarythe& tra"edy&!s&forei"n&policy &//10o$ert 3( Caplan is a forei"n correspondent for The Atlantic, a senior fellow atthe *enter for a New American ec!rity in 5ashin"ton and a mem$er of the;enta"ons 3efense ;olicy +oard( Gis most recent $oo# is -onsoon: The =ndiancean and the B!t!re of American ;ower @andom Go!se, 2010(

*he 1++0s were fu of cas for hu'anitarian inter&ention in wanda,which tra"ically went !nheededR and in +osnia and Cosovo where interventions,while $elated, were $y and lar"e s!ccessf!l( Bree from the realpoliti#

necessities of the *old 5ar, hu'anitarians ha&e in the past two decades tried

to reduce forei!n #oicy to an aspect of !enocide #re&ention( =ndeed, theNa8i Goloca!st is only one lifetime removed from o!r ownQa nanosecond in h!manhistoryQand so postS*old 5ar forei"n policy now ri"htly e%ists in the shadow of

it( *he codified u#shot has %een R2P: the 7esponsi$ility to ;rotect,9 the

mantra of h!manitarians( +!t('erican forei!n #oicy cannot 'erey %e

defined %y R2P and Never A"ain tatesmen can only rarely $e concerned withh!manitarian interventions and protectin" h!man ri"hts to the e%cl!sion of other

considerations( The $nited States, li#e any nationQ$!t especially $eca!se it is

a "reat powerQsimply has interests that do not aways cohere with its

&aues( That is tra"ic, $!t it is a tra"edy that has to $e em$raced and

accepted(5hat are those overridin" interests The $nited States, as the

dominantpower in the 5estern Gemisphere,'ust always#re&ent any other #ower

fro' %eco'in! euay do'inant in the Eastern Gemisphere( -oreover, as a

li$eral maritime power, the United tates m!st see# to#rotect the sea lines of

comm!nication that ena%e word trade. =t m!st also see# to#rotect%oth

treaty and de facto aies, and especially their access to hydrocar%ons(These are all interests that, while not necessarily contradictory to h!man

ri"hts,simply do not operate in the same cate"ory( +eca!se the $nited States

is a li$eral power, its interestsQeven when they are not directly concerned

with h!man ri"htsQare "enerally moral( +!t they are ony secondariy 'oral(

Bor see#in" to ad)!st the%aance of #ower in ones favor has %een thro!"ho!t

history an a'ora enter#rise p!rs!ed $y $oth li$eral and illi$eral powers(

Nevertheless,when a i%era #ower li#e the United States pursues such a

goal in the
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-tragedy-us-foreign-policy-8810http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-tragedy-us-foreign-policy-8810http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-tragedy-us-foreign-policy-8810http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-tragedy-us-foreign-policy-8810http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-tragedy-us-foreign-policy-8810

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+. $doption of r2p cr#s"es & "egemon( it"o#t improving

sec#rit(

Holm e s 1 1http:www(herita"e(or"researchcommentary201104whose&responsi$ility &to&protectCim ( Golmes, a 3istin"!ished Bellow at The Gerita"e Bo!ndation, oversaw thethin# tan#s defense and forei"n policy team for more than two decades( Golmeswas Gerita"es vice president for forei"n and defense policy st!dies anddirector of the 3avis =nstit!te for =nternational t!dies from 1DD1 thro!"h 2012e%cept for his service, d!rin" most of the first term of ;resident .eor"e 5(+!sh, as assistant secretary of state for international or"ani8ation affairs(Golmes priority is writin" a $oo#, d!e in fall 201, in which he hopes to layo!t a compellin" vision for Americas f!t!re $y !nitin" Gerita"es domestic andforei"n policy ideas( 7Bew people $rin" "reater clarity and historical wisdom tothorny iss!es than Cim Golmes,9 Gerita"e ;resident Edwin ( Be!lner said in

anno!ncin" the new role on 3ec(

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cause for usin! force. Defendin! our aies from attac# or even la!nchin"

military interventions overseas to take out terrorist %ases woud, !nder this

definition,%e ie!iti'ate. The second o$)ective is to ee&ate the

Security ounci as the only $ody that can le"itimately a!thori8e the !se of

force $y any nation, incl!din" the U(( *his has o%&ious i'#ications for

the $.S. onstitution, which reco"ni8es the war&ma#in" powers only of the;resident and the *on"ress( !r nation has the $!l# of the worlds military

forces( $his doctrine would constrain us from using force for our own

protection @e%cept for very o$vio!s invasions( 5orse, it ea&es our forceson the hook to inter&ene overseas at the %ehest of the Security ounci,

at our e "#ense( =t rele"ates o!r military to the stat!s of U(N(&mandated world

police force(*his 'akes no sense in ter's of $.S. nationa security or in terms of theU(N( *harter( Article

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%. 82P Bad7 overeignt(

1. $ccepting r2p destro(s & sovereignt(Gro v e s 8http:www(herita"e(or"researchreports200/0

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it woud effecti&ey surrender its authority to e"ercise an essential,

sovereign power. Birst ;rinciples and National overei"nty *he $nited

States'ust not surrender its independence and so&erei!nty ca&aiery( The

Bo!ndin"

Bathers and s!$se!ent "enerations of Americans paid a hi"h price to achieveAmericas soverei"nty and sec!re the !naliena$le ri"hts of U(( citi8ens( The"overnment formed $y the Bo!nders to safe"!ard American independence and protectindivid!al ri"hts derives its powers from the consent of the "overned, not fromany other nation or "ro!p of nations(K42L Gavin" achieved its independence $yfi"htin" a costly war, Americas Bo!nders approached permanent alliances andforei"n entan"lements with a fair de"ree of s#epticism( ;resident .eor"e5ashin"ton, in his 1>D6 farewell address, favored e%tendin" Americas commercialrelations with other nations $!t warned a"ainst e%tensive political connections(K4L 5ashin"ton well !nderstood that le"itimate "overnments are formed onlythro!"h "ainin" the consent of the people( Ge therefore placed ahi"h val!e on the independence that the United tates had achieved and was

ri"htf!lly d!$io!s a$o!t involvement in E!ropean intri"!es( =nte!ra to

nationa so&erei!nty is the ri!ht to 'ake authoritati&e decisions onforei!n #oicy and national reso!rces,#articuary the !se of the nations

'iitary forces( -any of the reasons why America fo!"ht the 5ar of

=ndependence a"ainst .reat +ritain revolved aro!nd +ritains ta%ation of theAmerican people witho!t their consent and its practice of 'declarin" themselvesinvested with power to le"islate for !s in all cases whatsoever('K44L nceAmerica "ained control of its reven!e, nat!ral reso!rces, and ind!stry and hadformed a "overnment separate and apart from any other, the Bo!nders wo!ld nothave compromised or dele"ated its prero"atives to any other nation or "ro!p ofnations( 5ashin"ton ri"htly warned his co!ntrymen to 'steer clear' of s!chforei"n infl!ence and instead to rely on 'temporary alliances for e%traordinary

emer"encies('K4L The United tates cannotrely on world opinion, as e%pressed thro!"h an emer"in" international norm s!chas 2;, to set the proper criteria for the !se of U(( military force( Thecommitment to !se force m!st $e made e%cl!sively $y the U(( "overnment actin"as an independent, soverei"n nation $ased on its own criteria for militaryintervention(K4/L =n s!m, the R2P doctrine does not har'oni4e with thefirst #rinci#es of the $nited States( Adoptin" a doctrine that $inds theUnited tates to scores of other nations and dictates how it m!st act to preventatrocities is the very sort of forei"n entan"lement a"ainst which 5ashin"ton

warned !s( *he $nited Stateswoud %etray the Bo!ndin" Bathers achievement of

independence and so&erei!nty if it whoy acceded to the R2P doctrine.

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2. $ctivel( reecting r2p cr#cial to maintain sovereignt(Gro v e s 8http:www(herita"e(or"researchreports200/0

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international 'test('cr!tini8e on"oin" efforts $y certain actors within the international

comm!nity to operationali8e and otherwise promote the 2; doctrine in the Unitedtates, the United Nations, the international N. comm!nity, and otherinternational for!ms(

e)ect the notion thatthe 2; doctrine is an esta$lished international norm(

*oncl!sion

The United tates sho!ld ta#e no comfort from the fact that, as a party to the200< 5orld !mmit !tcome 3oc!ment, it has committed itself only to $ein"'prepared to ta#e collective action' to end atrocities or that the =*= reportrepresents the o$li"ation to prevent atrocities as a mere 'responsi$ility(' 2;advocates are attemptin" to achieve worldwide consens!s that the internationalcomm!nity has an o$li"ation to intervene, with military force if necessary, inanother co!ntry to prevent acts of "enocide, ethnic cleansin", and otheratrocities( 2; proponents may not $e satisfied with anythin" less than am!ltilateral treaty && a United Nations *onvention on the esponsi$ility to;rotect && that creates $indin" le"al o$li"ations on its si"natories(

The United tates sho!ld therefore contin!e to treat the responsi$ility toprotect doctrine with "rave s#epticism( The independence won $y the Bo!nders anddefended $y s!$se!ent "enerations of Americans sho!ld not $e s!andered, $!trather sho!ld $e safe"!arded from f!rtive encroachments $y the internationalcomm!nity(

nly $y maintainin" a monopoly on the deployment of diplomatic press!re,economic sanctions, political coercion, and military forces will the Unitedtates preserve its national soverei"nty( Accedin" to a set of criteria s!ch asthose set forth $y the 2; doctrine wo!ld $e a dan"ero!s and !nnecessary steptoward $olsterin" the a!thority of the United Nations and the internationalcomm!nity and wo!ld compromise the consent of the American people(

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,. $27 82P Doesnt kill overeignt( its PreventiveE

1. Aven if its prevention; t"e doctrine still kills sovereignt(G a y 7 /23 /1 3http:nationalinterest(or"$lo"the&$!88the &deceptive&appeal&the &

responsi$ility&protect &/>64ohn Allen .ay is an assistant mana"in" editor at The National =nterest( Gis$oo# @co&a!thored with .eoffrey Cemp 5ar with =ran: ;olitical, -ilitary, andEconomic *onse!ences was released $y owman and ?ittlefield in early 201, TheNational =nterest, !ly 2, The 3eceptive Appeal of the esponsi$ility to;rotect, 3A: 12&>&14

(%ri!ht and 6iia'son 'i!ht re#y that all these worries repeat the error

of ass!min" that 2; is mainly a$o!t its third pillar, when in fact 7R2P is at

its core an instru'ent of #re&ention. =t does not mandate military action $ythe United tates or others( The idea is to "enerate preventive diplomacy,increased development aid, sanctions, and other tools to avoid the militaryoptions that mi"ht $e necessary when prevention fails and atrocities commence(9

The second pillar, for them, $ears the most wei"ht( et the way Al$ri"ht and5illiamson envision this pillar wor#in" is also a threat to sovereignty ( Theyimply this in the ;olitico op&ed they released to pl!" the report, as they note

that 7yria today presents !s with a star# reminder of the hi"h h!man costs of

e!ivocation(As Assad $e"an to t!rn state or"ans into his own tool of repression, R2P5s

#re&enti&e under#innin!s were ri!htfuy caed into uestion(((9 =ndeed(

o#re&enti&e action coud ha&e ke#t (ssad fro' turnin! the s tate5s

institutions into toos of re#ression whie aso res#ectin! Syrian

so&erei!nty, $eca!se Assads r!le was already repressive( As in mosta!tocracies, the "overnment co!ld not $ecome less repressive witho!t endan"erin"its contin!ed hold on power( Assad was th!s li#ely to re"ard the second&pillarefforts that wo!ld have $een necessary to sta$ili8e prewar yria as a threat,and to ref!se them( @=ndeed, other a!tocracies, s!ch as !ssia and E"ypt, havesimilarly ref!sed s!ch 7help(9 o sho!ld these second-#iar 'easures $econducted o&er a !o&ern'ent5s o%ections =f not, theyll often $e

ins!fficientR if so, so&erei!nty is further eroded. Fet Al$ri"ht and5illiamson pass over this pro$lem in silence(
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. $27 afeg#ards Protect overeignt( E

1. 82P safeg#ards $&6MA)@ erosion of sovereignt(M e non 6/1 2 /1 3http:www(the&american &interest(comarticles2010612its&fatally &flawed

a)an -enon is Anne and +ernard pit8er ;rofessor of ;olitical cience, *ity*olle"e of New For#*ity University of New For#, and a senior fellow at theAtlantic *o!ncil(

R2P5s ori!inators anticipated that any prescription perceived as proposin" la%criteria for the !se of force wo!ld $e dead on arrival, so the =*= report and

follow&on p!$lications of its il# have%owed %efore the shrine of

so&erei!nty. They affirm that the o$li"ation to protect people rests in thefirst instance with the "overnments that have )!risdiction over them, $!t theyadd that when a state cannot or will not protect h!man ri"hts, theresponsi$ility shifts to the international comm!nity, which means, ideally, theUN "irded with ec!rity *o!ncil a!thori8ation, or in a pinch re"ionalor"ani8ations if they promise s!$se!ently to see# UN* approval( 2;

proponents ta#e pains to e%plain that the concept is not a prete%t for militaryintervention( Borce, .areth Evans tirelessly reiterates, sho!ld $e !sed onlyd!rin" h!man ri"hts emer"encies and only followin" the fail!re of diplomacy,mediation, namin" and shamin", and sanctions( Even then, he stresses,feasi$ility, ris#s, proportionality and the prospects for s!ccess m!st $ewei"hed( @There is more than a dollop of )!st war theory in 2;R A!"!stine andA!inas wo!ld $e pro!d( R2P5s e"#ositors aso reco''end &arious#re&enti&e

'easures: early&warnin" mechanisms, pre&crisis mediation, peace#eepin",

economicassistance and post&conflict reconstr!ction(2 7et the reassurances

that force woud %e a rare, ast-ditch response ha&e not #acated critics,

for several reasons( R2P5s#re-inter&ention #rescri#tions 'erey re#eat

e"istin! re'edies and add nothin" to diplomacys tool#it( 6hat5s new is the

casuistry of reframin" and diminishing sovereignty in order to

e!iti'i4e atruistic ar'ed inter&ention in defense of the a$stract ri"htsthat most political comm!nities a"ree !pon in theory( .iven 2;s emphasis on

feasi$ility and the chances for s!ccess,weak states are its 'ost ikey

#ro&in!!roundsR powerf!l ones need not fear, no matter the ma"nit!de of theirmisdeeds( +eca!se idealism and power are ine%trica$ly intertwined, with thelatter fre!ently corr!ptin" the former, 2; provides powerf!l states one scriptfor playin" the .ood amaritan when intervention promotes their interests, andanother for eschewin" or opposin" aid when it doesnt(
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0. $27 )/& F overeignt( is Don )oE

1. is #niG#e F sovereignt( is strong F -&M$)'@$8'$)

')@A8!A)@'O) is t"e O)*H ca#seChir s ten se n 3 /2 /1 2http:notesonli$erty(com2012002$i8arre &love&trian"le&towards &a&new&internationalism+randon *hristensen @follow him on Twitter received his +(A( in c!lt!ralanthropolo"y from U*?A in 201, where he also minored in -iddle Eastern andAfrican st!dies( Gis writin"s have $een feat!red in the Breeman and ateal*learGistory( Ge was $orn in the middle of Utah, raised in a small Northern*alifornia town, and spent two years attendin" a comm!nity colle"e in anta *r!8$efore movin" to ?os An"eles( Ge is interested in pre&colonial polities,property ri"hts, ethnicity, and international trade(

;erhaps, $!t stron!y disa!ree with 3r( ?arisons o$servations here( Notwiththe notion that wea#er states have selfish interests too, $!t rather withthe ar!u'ent that state so&erei!nty has %een erodin! precipito!sly over the

past twenty years( To the isolationist, free trade and international "overnance@incl!din" military alliances are necessarily $ad thin"s for a state and itssoverei"nty, $eca!se these concepts are perceived to $e ta#in" away from the

a$ility of a state to ma#e decisions in its own interests( Fet the 'aor

#owers and, to a lesser e%tent, the re!iona #owers of the world are ar!ey

a%e

to do what they want in terms of form!latin" domestic and forei"n policies(!st thin# of the recent attempt $y +ra8il and T!r#ey to "et =ran to play nicewith its n!clear technolo"y( 5ith the e%ception of the United tates in =ra and

Af"hanistan, the 7weak states9 of the world and their#redation %y 'aor

#owers see's ony to %e occurrin! aon!#eri#heries of the ma)or powersterritories, specifically in the re"ion of the world traditionally !nder !ssianinfl!ence( And even these predatory practices of the !ssian state are lar"ely

aimed at defendin" -oscows peripheries from the inc!rsions into re"ion $y theAmerican state( o = wo!ld loo# at the sit!ation of wea# states o!tside theperipheries of "reat powers not as a steady erosion of state soverei"nty, $!t asthe last sta"e of coloni8ation $y E!ropeans a cent!ry a"o( The wea#ness in thesestates was inherent from the $e"innin", as they were lar"ely constr!cted toe%tract reso!rces for shipment to E!ropean ind!stry and to ens!re that recentlycon!ered non&5estern rivals, whether monarchies, confederations, city&states,or empires, remained con!ered once and for all( =n order for a state to havesoverei"nty, it needs to $e reco"ni8ed $y its own people as le"itimate, and not$y ma)or powers @tho!"h it certainly helps, and the str!ct!re of wea# states,at least o!tside the peripheries of ma)or powers, is ille"itimate in the eyes ofmost the people livin" within these states( 3r( ?arison contin!es: 7=f there isone thin" more mis"!ided than or"ani8in" forei"n policy aro!nd Wh!manitarian

and democratist meddlin" in the affairs of other nations, it has to $e therevival of the li$eral nationalist conceit that there sho!ld $e an independent

nation&state for every "ro!p that wants one(9 Gardly( $he )ilsonian notions

of humanitarian intervention and democratic nation*building are easiy

the 'ost 'is!uided

ideas $ein" espo!sed thro!"ho!t 5ashin"ton today, and the fact that some ofthe idealists over at Borei"n ;olicy have latched onto li$eral nationalism as away to promote their mis"!ided policies sho!ld not deter !s from the fact thatthe $nited States has not #ursued nor#ro'oted i%era nationais' in itsforei!n #oicy since 6ison5s disastrous 'eddin! in E!rope over @nearly a
http://notesonliberty.com/2012/03/02/bizarre-love-triangle-towards-a-new-internationalism/http://notesonliberty.com/2012/03/02/bizarre-love-triangle-towards-a-new-internationalism/http://notesonliberty.com/2012/03/02/bizarre-love-triangle-towards-a-new-internationalism/http://notesonliberty.com/2012/03/02/bizarre-love-triangle-towards-a-new-internationalism/http://notesonliberty.com/2012/03/02/bizarre-love-triangle-towards-a-new-internationalism/http://notesonliberty.com/2012/03/02/bizarre-love-triangle-towards-a-new-internationalism/http://notesonliberty.com/2012/03/02/bizarre-love-triangle-towards-a-new-internationalism/

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cent!ry a"o( ?et !s $e clear: the NAT e%c!rsions into the +al#ans had nothin"to do with promotin" li$eral nationalism, and everythin" to do with h!manitarianintervention, democratic state&$!ildin", and "eostrate"ic mane!verin"( The

'iitary e"cursions into ra, (f!hanistan, 9aiti, So'aia, and .od #nows

where else over the past twenty years ha&e nothin" to do with the concept of

li$eral nationalism and e&erythin! to do with hu'anitarian inter&ention,de'ocratic state-%uidin!, andor "eostrate"ic mane!verin"( :i%era

nationais', as it is promoted $y the idealists,is e"tre'ey new on the

scene in D.. and is#ro%a%y ust one of the 'any, 'any fads that swin"

thro!"h the capital and are used to a##y hu'anitarian inter&ention and

de'ocratic state-%uidin" to forei"n policy proposals(

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+. R2P & n creas e s ) a r - oral /a 0 ard

1. Moral "a5ard blocks negotiated sol#tionsBe a umont /! /1 3http:www(the"!ardian(comworld201may04!n &syria&d!ty&to&intervene

;eter +ea!mont writes on forei"n affairs for the .!ardian and $server( Ge hasreported e%tensively from conflict 8ones incl!din" Africa, the +al#ans and the-iddle East, and has reported widely on h!man ri"hts iss!es and the impact ofconflict on civilians( The winner of the .eor"e rwell ;ri8e for his reportsfrom =ra he is the a!thor of The ecret ?ife of 5ar: o!rneys Thro!"h -odern*onflict

ennifer 5alsh, professor of international relations at %ford University who

has st!died the development of 2;, a"rees with Evanss analysis( +!t she also

identifies a ''ora ha4ard/ inherent in R2P S that it can create a

perception

in conflicts that a re%e force 'ay %e ony a re!i'e-s#onsored atrocity

away fro' internationa inter&eners comin" to its aid( The incenti&e forre%es to find a ne!otiated soution is thus reduced.

2. erbia proves moral "a5ardM e non 6/1 2 /1 3http:www(the&american &interest(comarticles2010612its&fatally &flaweda)an -enon is Anne and +ernard pit8er ;rofessor of ;olitical cience, *ity*olle"e of New For#*ity University of New For#, and a senior fellow at theAtlantic *o!ncil(

Those who start wars are often confident that they #now how they will end( Theyare )!st as often proved wron"( =dealistic h!manitarian interveners, a s!$&

species of s!ch h!$ristic planners, con"rat!late themselves on their hi"h&mindedness, which leads most of them to ass!me that if no self&interestedmotives attach to their intentions, then no self&interested conse!ences can

emer"e from them( f co!rse this is a$s!rd( =ne resut of (*=5s @event!al

decision to strike Bosnian Ser% forces in 1DDoso&o anddrove another 1(4 million from their homes( The shallowness of the alliancescommitment to h!manitarian principles was revealed when it chose to cond!ct acampai"n that wo!ld prod!ce minimal, ideally 8ero, cas!alties for its ownsoldiers, no matter the horrendo!s conse!ences for the people it had intervenedto protect( NATs defenders say that it did not do the #illin" and e%pellin",
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/04/un-syria-duty-to-intervenehttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/04/un-syria-duty-to-intervenehttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/04/un-syria-duty-to-intervenehttp://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2013/06/12/its-fatally-flawed/http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2013/06/12/its-fatally-flawed/http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2013/06/12/its-fatally-flawed/http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2013/06/12/its-fatally-flawed/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/04/un-syria-duty-to-intervenehttp://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2013/06/12/its-fatally-flawed/

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tefan +a!schardffensive ;Cs release

--

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-

++. oral /a 0 ard1 S e c essio n ism

1. 82P sparks global secessionism t"ro#g" moral "a5ard"a ni# 1 3ani#, alph ( A(, The esponsi$ility to ;rotect as an =mpet!s for ecessionist

-ovements: n the Necessity to e&Thin# Territorial =nte"rity @3ecem$er 6,201( -atthias Cettemann @ed, .ren8en im HXl#errecht @an rame# Herla",201( Availa$le at N: http:ssrn(coma$s tractY2644>/alph ani# is research assistant of ;rof( A!"!st einisch and lect!rer at theUniversity of Hienna( After completin" his st!dies in law and political scienceat the University of Hienna and the Universidad Alcala de Genares @-adrid , hehas wor#ed inter alia as a research assistant in the pro)ect 7 =nternational ?awthro!"h the National ;rism: The =mpact of !dicial 3ialo"!e9 at the Universityof Hienna, ection for =nternational ?aw and =nternational elations , as wellas at the ?aw Bac!lty of the University of Amsterdam, where he also o$tained hispost"rad!ate ??(-( de"ree in international law

The historical and political roots of s!ch secessionist str!""les will $e$rieflyo!tlined in the ne%t section, which is followed $y a short overview onthe le"al framewor# re"ardin" secessionist claims( After havin" disc!ssed thee%tent to which law has a say in this s!$)ect matter and the possi$ility ofsecession as a Z remedial [, !ltima ratio ri"ht !nder e%traordinarycirc!mstances, the followin"part will then proceed to demonstrate that

secession is increasin!y !ainin! fact!al and le"al i'#ortance in i!ht of

the increasin! tendency to dea with intra-state conficts on the

internationa#ane instead of treatin" these as essentially domestic matters(The last step in this development has $eenthe emer"ence of the concept of the Z

Reponsibility to Protect [ which essentially enshrines the duty of statesto #rotect their res#ecti&e #o#uations from "enocide, war crimes, ethnic

cleansin", and crimes a"ainst h!manity and also de le"e ferenda o$li"ations !ponthe international comm!nity to act once a state is !na$le or !nwillin" to

protect its pop!lation from s!ch acts or even carryin" o!t these serio!s h!manri"hts violations itself( As will $e shown however, this conce#t does not only

have positive effects $!t'ay also constitute an incentive for secessionist

movements to acti&ey #ro&oke the !o&ern'ent they are fi"htin" to reactin a manner that mi"ht force the international comm!nity to step !p with atleast some #ind of international s!pport on their $ehalf( Gere, one needs to$ear in mind that s!ch s!pport mi"ht decisively shift the $alance of powertowards the otherwise clearly disadvanta"ed secessionist "ro!p( This incentiveis f!rther fostered $y the fact that massive state retaliation may also providethe $asis for thea$ove&mentioned ri"ht to Z remedial secession [, there$y also infl!encin" theinternational comm!nity in its s!$se!ent assessment of the pressin" iss!e ofreco"nition( Ass!min" that s!ch a ne%!s of the esponsi$ility to ;rotect and the

ri"ht to remedial secession indeed e%ists, the internationa co''unity coudthus often unknowin!y and unintentionay %eco'e the 'idwife of new

states( That wo!ld call for a f!ndamental re&concept!ali8ation either of theattit!de towards secessionism or that towards intervention on h!manitarian"ro!ndsR this point will $e addressed in the last part, which will $e followed$y a concl!sion(
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12. ecession7 $27 $lternative Ca#salit(

1. 82P is t"e C8&C'$* determinant of global secessionism"a ni# 1 3ani#, alph ( A(, The esponsi$ility to ;rotect as an =mpet!s for ecessionist

-ovements: n the Necessity to e&Thin# Territorial =nte"rity @3ecem$er 6,201( -atthias Cettemann @ed, .ren8en im HXl#errecht @an rame# Herla",201( Availa$le at N: http:ssrn(coma$stractY2644>/alph ani# is research assistant of ;rof( A!"!st einisch and lect!rer at theUniversity of Hienna( After completin" his st!dies in law and political scienceat the University of Hienna and the Universidad Alcala de Genares @-adrid , hehas wor#ed inter alia as a research assistant in the pro)ect 7 =nternational ?awthro!"h the National ;rism: The =mpact of !dicial 3ialo"!e9 at the Universityof Hienna, ection for =nternational ?aw and =nternational elations , as wellas at the ?aw Bac!lty of the University of Amsterdam, where he also o$tained hispost"rad!ate ??(-( de"ree in international law

=t is all too li#ely that, due to the chan!e in attitude towards

intervention in ci&i wars, often fo!"ht o&er secessionist de'ands, aswell as re"ardin" reco"nition of there$y possi$ly emer"in" states, such

conficts are here to

stay and'ay we increase in the f!t!re. This wo!ld partic!larly S $!tnot e%cl!sively S affect co!ntries composed $y many @ easily separa$le

"ro!ps livin" in more or less distinct territories witho!t sharin" any

sense ofcomm!nity or even solidarity. *he #ossi%iity of a dou%ed 'ora ha4ardca!sed $y the interplay of remedial secession and the prospect of o!tside

intervention is thus of crucial significance for the future of the

international legal order. Fet, this effect in "eneral and regarding

secession in partic!lar has ar!eyre'ained i!nored $oth $y practitioners and theorists( ather, schoars!s!ally see' reuctant to &oice funda'enta criticis' in connection with

the advances in connection with the !se of force on h!manitarian "ro!nds,especially !pon a!thori8ation $y the ec!rity *o!ncil, in fear of $ein" seen asadvocates of oppressive re"imes( At the same time, states seem to avoid orsimply not consider the possi$ility of this very iss!e in their shorttermp!rs!ance of strate"ic "oals, while they are #een on avoidin" the creation ofany precedence at all costs and re"ardless of the facts( =n the case of Cosovofor instance, the intervenin" co!ntries simply emphasi8ed that the conflict wasnot an iss!e of an attempt to secession $!t a h!manitarian catastrophe that hadmade the !se of force necessary to stop and prevent a re"ime from "ross h!manri"hts a$!ses( 10> Nanda, elf&3etermination, 2>D( 10/
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1%. ecession pills Over

1. ecession linked globall( F spills over$a r is on 1 1http:www(theamericanconservative(comlarisonthe&wa"es&ofosovo &and&so!th&

s!dan3aniel ?arison is a senior editor at TA*, where he also #eeps a solo $lo"( Gehas$een p!$lished in the New For# Times +oo# eview, 3allas -ornin" News,rthodo% ?ife, Bront ;orch ep!$lic, The American cene, and *!lt!re11, and is acol!mnist for The 5ee#( Ge holds a ;h3 in history from the University of*hica"o, and resides in 3allas(

This is always very easy for others with nothin" at sta#e to say. Sudan5s

%reak-u# doesn5t threaten the rest of (frica unti it #ro&ides the

#recedent in other co!ntries for similar independence movements( >oso&o was

su##osed to %e e"ce#tiona, too, unti reco!nition of its inde#endence

moreor less directly ed to the effecti&e #artition of ?eor!ia( 5hen theU(( and other states reco"ni8ed Cosovo, few $elieved that it co!ld have an

effect on o!th ssetia and A$#ha8ia, $!t it did( Gow many co!ntries will s!fferfrom "reater insta$ility $eca!se self&determination prevailed in !dan =nce

'aor #owers start re-drawin! %orders to satisfy the de'ands of self*

determination or other concerns, there is no obvious place to stop (

Cosovos e%ample isnt s!pposed to have any effect on the sit!ation in

Cara$a#h, either, $!t whyare the people in Cara$a#h and Armenia $o!nd $y this 5estern ass!mption!pporters of the secession of o!th !dan have to ta#e into acco!nt the

possi$ility that the success of the southern Sudanese in achievin"

independencewi encoura!e other se#aratist and auto'o'ist 'o&e'ents inAfrica and elsewhere( =n many ways, African nation&states are amon" the mostar$itrary, artificial creations in the entire world, $!t that doesnt mean that

splittin" them !p into e!ally artificial, less via$le statelets will ma#ethin"s any $etter( Cosovos separation from er$ia and event!al independenceempowered a "an" of criminals(

2. ecession creates a domino effectB y m a n a n% &ollo' # 1 2+yman, 3aniel, and Cenneth ;ollac#( 'The yrian pillover(' Borei"n ;olicy@2012(Cenneth -ichael ;ollac#, ;h3, is a noted former *=A intelli"ence analyst ande%pert on -iddle East politics and military affairs(3r( 3aniel ?( +yman is a professor at .eor"etown Universitys 5alsh chool ofBorei"n ervice in the ec!rity t!dies ;ro"ram and 3epartment of .overnment

ecessionism: As the +al#an co!ntries demonstrated in the 1DD0s, seemin"ly

tri!mphant secessionist %ids can set off a domino eect ( So&enia)s

decaration of inde#endence ins#ired roatia, which prompted Bosnia to do

the same, which enco!ra"edMacedonia, and then >oso&o. Strife and confict

foowed all of these declarations( ometimes it is the desire of one s!$"ro!p

within a state to $rea# away that tri""ers the civil war in the first place( =nother cases, different !rou#s &ie for contro of the state, $!t as the
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-wages-of-kosovo-and-south-sudan/http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-wages-of-kosovo-and-south-sudan/http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-wages-of-kosovo-and-south-sudan/http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-wages-of-kosovo-and-south-sudan/http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-wages-of-kosovo-and-south-sudan/http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-wages-of-kosovo-and-south-sudan/

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resol!tions have also esta$lished norms and standards of internationalh!manitarian law( These incl!de the .eneva *onventions of 1D4D and itss!$se!ent ;rotocols( Altho!"h not sidesteppin" the respect for nationalsoverei"nty still em$edded in the U(N( *harter @and th!s the ri"ht of theec!rity *o!ncil to decide !ltimately !estions of international peace, these

conventions and resol!tions did !ite conscio!sly stretch the $o!ndaries of olddefinitions of soverei"nty( They not only diminished the le"itimacy of nationalsoverei"nty $!t also $roadened the scope of action that international $odiesco!ld ta#e in defense of h!man ri"hts and to protect a"ainst "enocide and massm!rder( =t was always a $alancin" act, $!t there was inherent tension $etweenthe ri"hts of national soverei"ntyQwhich the U(N( .eneral Assem$ly and ec!rity*o!ncil )ealo!sly protectedQ and the ri"hts of individ!als to protectionQwhichwere championed in s!ch $odies as the G!man i"hts *o!ncil, the ffice of theGi"h *ommissioner for G!man i"hts, and the h!man ri"hts treaty $odies(

The resoutions on R2P ratified $y the U(N( .eneral Assem$ly in 200< tried to

overcome these tensions, $!t it sti reco!ni4ed the uti'ate authority of

the Security ounci( Each state had a responsi$ility to protect itspop!lation, the resol!tion said, $!t collective action was to $e ta#en 7thro!"hthe ec!rity *o!ncil, in accordance with the *harter, incl!din" *hapter H==, ona case&$y&case $asis(M9 =n other words, only the ec!rity *o!ncil co!ld decidewhether an intervention of the international comm!nity sho!ld $e !nderta#en,which implied not only the ri"hts of the veto of the ;ermanent Bive @;&

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1,. 82P Bad7 Bias

1. Prefer o#r evidence F r2p good cards tainted b( promilitar(

biasM a hon e y 1( /22 /1 3http:www(opendemocracy( netopen"lo$alri"htsliam&mahonymyth&of &military&mi"ht&in&r2p&choices?iam -ahony has $een wor#in" in the field of civilian protection and h!manri"htssince the 1D/0s( A!thor of ;roactive ;resence: Bield trate"ies for*ivilian ;rotection, he has done e%tensive fieldwor# in many co!ntries, and is apioneer in the theory and practice of international protection( A formerlect!rer in G!man i"hts at ;rinceton University, he co&fo!nded Bieldviewol!tions and thro!"h it has led analysis and trainin" for h!ndreds of UN andN. protection staff deployed in conflict 8ones(

n the , assu'#tions, cutura 'yths and

an!ua!e cons#ire to#ro'ote unwise 'iitary action. *he effectiveness ofmilitary responses to conflict has $ecome !nconscio!sly and widely ass!med( Aremilitary responses so pop!lar $eca!se o$)ective scientific st!dy has proventheir efficacy r does this de$ate mostly reflect the daily teachin" in many

c!lt!res thro!"ho!t the world, that the $i""er stic# always wins $he

promotion of violent force as the pro$lem&solvin" option of last resort

#er&ades #o#uar cuture fro' 9oywood to schoo history curricua( And

it pervades this debate (2; proponents insist that their doctrine prefers non&military approaches( +!tthe lan"!a"e of the de$ate s!""ests otherwise: ro$!st $y definition means stron"and healthy, $!t in the international comm!nitys de$ate over approaches toconflict it is !s!ally a synonym for military and violent( The do!$le&ed"edphrase last resort implies $oth that the military option has "reat ris#s $!talso that if all other means fail, this is the one that will wor#( .areth Evanspiece in this de$ate, for instance, refers to the military option as somethin"

to $e considered when 7no lesser meas!re9 is availa$le( 5ith tho!sands of livesat sta#e, why wo!ld we settle for 7lesser meas!res9 !ch an!ua!e, sofre!ently!sed even $y those who are honestly committed to civilian protection,ine&ita%y su##orts cas for 'iitary action, e&en if it is u nwise( *he

i'#icit 'essa!e is that the ony reay serious action is 'iitary

action. @&erythin! ese is weak and half&hearted( *his an!ua!e alsoin&ites word#owers li#e the U to cothe their'iitary as#irations in

hu'anitarian rhetoric, re"ardless of whether their intent or final impacthelps civilians on the "ro!nd( yria, with its consistent s!pport to Ge8$ollah,has $een considered an enemy $y the U for decades( *an we serio!sly $econsiderin" that the U is all of a s!dden en"a"in" now o!t of concern foryrians civilians The U is already en"a"ed militarily s!pportin" one side inthis war, and the civilian death toll has only increased as a res!lt( =f

anythin", the de$ate re"ardin" how $est to protect civilians in yria is m!chtoo late S the $alance of conse!ences for civilians sho!ld have $een assessed$efore the first military or political s!pport was offered to the re$els, $ac#in 2011( = have had the opport!nity to spend some time in the 3emocraticep!$lic of *on"o in recent years, assessin" strate"ies for the protection ofcivilians, in a sit!ation where the international comm!nity and the UN have p!tall their e""s in the military $as#et( -any *on"olese themselves are also

deba o&er Responsibility*to*
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desperately hopin" for military salvation( Fet after a decade of $l!e $erets and$illions of dollars spent, civilians remain totally v!lnera$le to privationsfrom armed "ro!ps as well as from the @UN&s!pported *on"olese military( Thisyear the UN was faced with $road&$ased press!re to do somethin" more( 3espitethere $ein" no o$)ective assessment of the real protective impact on the

*on"olese people of the c!rrent militari8ed approach, the only 7new9 strate"ythey co!ld come !p with was to stren"then the military approach and approve a UNforce with an e%plicit offensive mandate: more military, more 7ro$!stly9

offensive( =nterestin"ly, a recent study ookin! at a different ty#e of

confict S resistance movements a"ainst repressive re"imes A su!!ests that in

the last h!ndred years, unar'ed resistance 'o&e'ents were 'ore successfu

at achievin" their o$)ectives than armed ones( @*henoweth, Erica, and -aria (tephan( 5hy *ivil esistance 5or#s: The trate"ic ?o"ic of Nonviolent*onflict( 5ith ade!ate research, the hy#othesis of a correation ininternational interventions%etween 'iitary force and #rotecti&e i'#act

mi"ht $e shown to $e valid, or it mi"ht not( +!t in the meantime it is

largely a myth , a heuristic si'#ification that "ives !s a too&readily&

availa$le and simple answer to comple% sit!ations( =t is also a myth that"ives many peoplehope, $eca!sewe dee#y wish that there were a uick soution to the h!man

s!fferin" we are witnessin" in the conflicts that prompt these de$ates(

3ecision&ma#ers tr!ly concerned with protectin" civilians need to reco"ni8e

this unconscious assu'#tion that privileges the military option ( atherthan

reactin" to #nee&)er# press!res to do somethin", or to do more, policy decisionssho!ld $e $ased on a caref!l conte%t&$ased analysis of each partic!lar case, andan e%tremely ca!tio!s assessment of reasona$le e%pectations of conse!ences(This #ind of assessment is necessary $efore military action, $efore economicsanctions, or any other press!re( Those in power who order atrocities & whether;resident Assad or an armed "ro!p leader in the *on"o & are most often

interested in s!stainin" or increasin" their own power( !ch power is political,economic, and military and it depends on their relationships with others( Astrate"y to protect civilians m!st e%amine the real interests of these people,identifyin" all the political, economic and military relationships they havethat present opport!nities for levera"e( Brom that analysis, a n!anced and morecomple% strate"y wo!ld com$ine the ran"e of tools of levera"e availa$le( Thesein t!rn wo!ld $e tailored to ma%imi8e their com$ined impact, and the strate"ywo!ld assess the pro)ected $alance of conse!ences with an emphasis onminimi8in" ne"ative impacts on civilians( Those in power who order violencea"ainst civilians are !s!ally lin#ed to a ran"e of powerf!l economic interests,and may $e even more sensitive to economic press!res than to military ones( @=nfact, e%ternal military threats can sometimes serve to stren"then domestics!pport for a tar"eted "ro!p S consider how Ge8$ollah has $enefitted from

=sraeli attac#s on ?e$anon( Economic sanctions are not a panacea, either, andmay well in some cases h!rt civilians far more than can $e )!stified $y theirimpact( B!rther, )!st as military decisions tend to $e $ased on "eo&politicsdivorced from the interests of civilians, decisions a$o!t economic meas!res tendto $e s#ewed in the interests of economic power $ro#ers for whom sacrificin"profits for h!manitarian "ain is !naccepta$le( =t sho!ld not $e s!rprisin" thatwe cannot control the arms trade, for instance, when h!"e m!ltinationalinterests in the U and E!rope ma#e so m!ch money from itR or that we havediffic!lty f!lly implementin" other #inds of 7smart9 sanctions even when theyhave UN ec!rity *o!ncil $ac#in"( The fact that sanctions so seldom effectivelytar"et the wealthy, $!t instead too often inflict "reater s!fferin" on the poor,is no accident( The point here is not that economic meas!res are $etter or worsethan military ones, $!t rather that there is no self&evident hierarchy amon"

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them( =f wise decisions are to $e made, the costs and %enefits of

different meas!res'ust %e carefuy assessed, $ased on past e%periences

and on the real dynamics of each c!rrent conte%t( But this is not what is

ha##enin!(

=nstead, the debate is dominated by myths, bias and rhetoric ( The cr!cial

assessment of the e%pected $alance of conse!ences has $ecome a phrase for s

oundbite s, rather than an analytical prere#uisite to action ( As lon" as the

military option is perceived as

more potentially effective than it is in reality, and economic and politicalpress!res considered less effective than they mi"ht $e, !nwise decisions res!lt(

*hat is the fundamental nat!re of bias.

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1. 82P I 6enocide =#dan/(ria>

1. 82p derails effective genocide prevention F abandoning it is

ke( to (ria and #dan)e * a a l 1 2http:www(nytimes(com2012010opinionhow &to&end&mass&atrocities(htmlIrY0Ale% de 5aal is e%ec!tive director of the 5orld ;eace Bo!ndation at the Bletcherchool, T!fts University(, Gow to End -ass Atrocities, New For# Times, -arch 10,3A: 12&>&14

Gi"h from last years interventions in ?i$ya and =vory *oast, Evans wrotetri!mphantly in Borei"n ;olicy last 3ecem$er that those missions $ro!"ht 7an endto most of the conf!sed de$ates9 a$o!t h!manitarian intervention( The vision he,;ower and fellow idealists share is to send the cavalry over the hill not onlyto stop any massacres $!t also to herald )!stice and democracy( =f only it werethat simple( =n the face of 7evil,9 the ideaists tend to t!rn ri"hteo!s andfor!et to ask i'#ortant uestions a%out what they want to achie&e andhow. *he resut is a 'isre#resentation of history and a mis!nderstandin" of

the measures that can most eectively halt atrocities today( ne ma)orpro$lem is that the ideaists tend to 'isconstrue or overloo# the

funda'enta 'oti&ations of #er#etrators( They typically see the #illers as

insatia$le( This is !nderstanda$le $eca!se they are driven $y the memory of theGoloca!st and thewandan "enocide( +!t the Na8is and G!t!s were e%ceptional for ma#in" thee%termination of a people essential to their politics( -ost mass #illers haveother "oals( =n many cases, the perpetrators simply stop #illin" when they havereached their "oals, $ecome e%ha!sted, fallen o!t amon" themselves or $eendefeated( Ta#e the Ni"erian civil war of 1D6>&>0( 3espite a $loc#ade of thesecessionist province of +iafra and the "enocidal rhetoric of some Ni"erianleaders, the #illin" ended when the +iafran re$els finally fell to Ni"erianforces( Gavin" achieved their military aim, the Ni"erians then $e"an a process

of reconciliation and reconstr!ction !nder the $anner 7no victor, novan!ished(9 =n .!atemala, the perpetrators of the 1D/0&/ massacres of -ayancomm!nities s!spected of s!pportin" *omm!nist ins!r"ents called an end to theatrocities after defeatin" the re$els( =n =ndonesia, the "enerals stopped#illin" the *omm!nists in 1D66 once the "ro!p no lon"er posed a threat( Thesoldiers of ;resident -ilton $ote massacred tens of tho!sands of people inU"andas ?!wero Trian"le in 1D/&4 Q !ntil they were defeated on the$attlefield( ?i#ewise, the #illin"s in East ;a#istan ended with =ndias invasionin 1D>1 and the Chmer o!"es atrocities in *am$odia with Hietnams interventionin 1D>/&>D( =n other words, even once they are !nder way, 'ass atrocities donot ead ine"ora%y to %otto'ess 'assacres. The #illers !s!ally havepolitical "oals: They are determined to #ill !ntil they have achieved theiro$)ectives, not !ntil theres no one else left standin"( *heir use of &ioence

can $e e%cessive, $!t more important, it is often instru'enta. $his createsan opportunity for negotiating an end to mass atrocities, thro!"h peace tal#s

and with financial and diplomatic incentives and press!re( =n recent history

such dea- 'akin! has %rou!ht to an end, al$eit often an imperfect one,

massacres in 4urundi, 5ast $imor, 6enya, acedonia and South Sudan. Fet

the ideaists insist on p!rs!in" a more am$itio!s a"enda: nothin" short of

democracy and )!stice,

imposed $y'iitary inter&ention( And this can undermine simply getting thekilling to
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/10/opinion/how-to-end-mass-atrocities.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/10/opinion/how-to-end-mass-atrocities.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/10/opinion/how-to-end-mass-atrocities.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/10/opinion/how-to-end-mass-atrocities.html?_r=0

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state that fails in these d!ties faces the prospect that other states will

intervene in its Winternal affairs witho!t its consent(' =n a sense, then, it

was the human rights community"s criti#ue of sovereignty that helped

pave the way for drone strikes.

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1. 82P I 'mperialism

+. 82p is a fig leaf for imperialismG l obal &o li' y +orum 1 !http:www("lo$alpolicy(or"h!manitarian& intervention(html

.lo$al ;olicy Bor!m is an independent policy watchdo" that monitors the wor# ofthe United Nations and scr!tini8es "lo$al policyma#in"( 5e promoteacco!nta$ility and citi8en participation in decisions on peace and sec!rity,social )!stice and international law(

5hat is to $e done in a crisis li#e the "enocide in wanda, when theinternationalcomm!nity see#s to stop the #illin" *an nations, actin" thro!"htheUN ec!rity *o!ncil, f!lfill a 'responsi$ility to protect' innocentciviliansr is s!ch a doctrine )!st a Tro)an horse for "reat power a$!se 5hen

nations send their 'iitary forces into other nations) territory, it is

rarey if e&erC for /hu'anitarian/#ur#oses. *hey are typically p!rs!in"

their narrow national interest & "ra$$in" territory, !ainin! !eo-strate!ic

ad&anta!e, or sei4in! contro of precio!s nat!ral resources. ?eaders hope towin p!$lic s!pport $y descri$in" s!ch actions in terms of hi"h moral p!rposes &

$rin"in" peace, )!stice, democracy and civili8ation to the affected area( n

the era of cooniais', @uro#ean !o&ern'ents a cynicay insisted that

they acted to#ro'ote such hi!her co''it'ents & the 'white mans $!rden,'

'la mission civilisatrice,' and so on and so forth( *he a##ea to hi!her

'ora #ur#oses continues to infect the #oitica discourse of the !reat

#owers.

Todays 'humanitarian intervention7 is only the latest in this long tradition

of political obfuscation ( =n 200, the U&UC invasion and occ!pation of =rawas la$eled 'h!manitarian intervention' $y UC ;rime -inister Tony +lair
http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention.htmlhttp://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention.htmlhttp://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention.htmlhttp://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention.html

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13. 82P I imperialism7 $frica

1. 'ndeterminac( of 82p allos repeated interventions against

$frica

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2001 =nternational *ommission on =ntervention and tate overei"nty @=*=report to the United Nations 2004 A -ore ec!re 5orld: !r haredesponsi$ility, to the 200< 5orld !mmit !tcome 3oc!ment, to the ecretary&.enerals 200D =mplementin" the esponsi$ility to ;rotect( The ori"inalstatement of 2; in the =*= report e%plains: 7tate soverei"nty implies

responsi$ility, and the primary responsi$ility for the protection of its peoplelies with the state itself( 5here a pop!lation is s!fferin" serio!s harm, as ares!lt of internal war, ins!r"ency, repression or state fail!re, and the statein !estion is !nwillin" or !na$le to halt or avert it, the principle of non&intervention yields to the international responsi$ility to protect(9 f co!rse,the statement poses more !estions than it answers( 5hat is the threshold atwhich responsi$ility is le"itimately ta#en !p $y the international comm!nity5ho ma#es that decision And who is the international comm!nity The precisese!ence of actions necessary to f!lfil 2; is also left !ndefined( Accordin" to=*=, 2; comprises three 7specific responsi$ilities9: the responsi$ility toprevent, $y addressin" 7$oth the root ca!ses and direct ca!ses9 of crisesR theresponsi$ility to react to 7sit!ations of compellin" h!man need9 $y employin"7appropriate meas!res9, !p to military interventionR and the responsi$ility tore$!ild, which will help address 7the ca!ses of the harm the intervention was

desi"ned to halt or avert9( .iven the increasin"ly e%pansive form!lations of2;, accordin" to which 2; action is to help prevent, react, and re$!ildco!ntries, wor# with, press!re, and coerce states, and address root ca!ses andprevent the rec!rrence of conflict, there seems to $e little that is notincl!ded amon" the instr!ments that may $e le"itimately !sed in the name of 2;(This co!ld span from development aid to diplomatic press!re, from direct$!d"etary assistance to invasion and occ!pation, from traditional reconciliationto international criminal prosec!tion( Even one of 2;s most vocal academics!pporters, Ale% +ellamy, admits that, 7it is seldom S if ever S clear what 2;re!ires in a "iven sit!ation9( The res!lt is a sit!ation in which some analystscan condemn the AU&UN intervention in 3arf!r as a dismal fail!re of 2; whileothers can la!d it as a s!ccessR some $lame 2; as an e%c!se !sed to preventeffective intervention there while others credit it with ena$lin" international

involvement( The same am$i"!ity characterises disc!ssions of the 2; in Cenyad!rin" the post&election violence in 200/( ome wo!ld a"ree with Cofi Annan that7Cenya is a s!ccessf!l e%ample of 2; at wor#9 $!t others deny that 2; played arole in the !nfoldin" of international involvement, e%plainin" that 7the

sit!ation was only la$elled a 2; sit!ation retrospectively9( *his

funda'enta indeter'inacy of R2P was 'ade e&en cearer, as was its

dan!er, in the :i%ya inter&ention( The doctrines first f!ll&scale deploymentled to the $om$in" of civilian infrastr!ct!re, the deposin" and #illin" of-!ammar .addafi, the installin" of a re$el "overnment, and the armin" ofcivilians S all in the name of protection( The last was )!stified $y a seniorBrench diplomatic so!rce as: 7an operational decision ta#en at the time to helpcivilians who we

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