today appear to require a politically un-acceptable level of sacrifice. This lack ofpublic understanding, support, and will-ingness to bear sacrifices did not changeuntil the debacle at Pearl- Harbor. AfterWorld War II, the Truman Doctrine andthe Marshall Plan, by most accounts,enhanced our security for decades. Butpublic support for these policies emergedonly after a devastating war that tookover 400,000 American lives.

This historical analogy raises a centralquestion: How much punishment will benecessary before we take oil supply in-terruptions seriously? Seven years havepassed since the Arab oil embargo ex-ploded on the world, scene, leaving infla-tion, recession, and disruption in itswake. Two years ago the Iranian revolu-

tion set in motion similar forces. Thetroubled waters of the Persian Gulf seemto be inflamed, not soothed, by oil. Andyet we have not faced up to the challengeposed by supply interruptions-a chal-lenge that affects every aspect of ourpersonal lives, our economy, and ourposition in the world. Further delay infacing the hard decisions will cost usdearly.

Referces ad Nots1. T. Neville, J. Blankenship, M. Barron, W.

Lane, J. Eschbach, L. Bower, "The energyproblem: Costs and policy options," StaffWorking Draft, Office of Gas and IntegratedPolicy, Policy and Evaluation, U.S. Departmentof Energy, Washington, D.C., 12 March 1980.

2. U.S. Department of Energy, Weekly Petro-leum Status Report [DOE/EIA-0208 (80-50),Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,19811.

3. National Foreign Assessment Center, U.S. Cen-

tral Intelligence Agency, International EnergyStatistical Review (ER/IERS 80-013, NationalTechnical Information Service, Springfield, Va.,1980).

4. U.S. Department of Energy, Reducing U.S. OilVulnerability: Energy Policy for the 1980's(DOE/PE.0021). An analytical report of the Sec-retary of Energy, 10 November 1980.

5. For example, the U.S. strategic reserve fill iscurrently only 0.2 percent of free-world con-sumption. Even a tripling of this level wouldonly amount to 0.6 percent.

6. Stock releases reduced this level to 75 millionbarrels by the beginning of December 1980.Estimate derived from Weekly Status Report,Department of Energy, 16 January 1981.

7. During the Iranian crisis, shortages reached 8.5percent of gasoline supplies, leading to the spe-cfic shortages described earlier.

8. D. Robinson, assistant administrator, Econom-ic Regulatory Administration, testimony beforethe Senate Energy and Natural Resources Com-mittee, 2 June 1980.

9. For large interruptions, greater weight is givento imports than to consumption in allocatingshortages. Since the United States imports onlyabout 40 percent of its oil, it would face smallerpercentage shortages than Japan, which importsnearlyall of its oil supply.

The fact that a problem will certainlytake a long time to solve, and that it willdemand the attention ofmany minds forseveral generations, is no justificationfor postponing the study.... Our diffi-culties of the moment must always bedealt with somehow: but our permanentdifficulties are difficulties of every mo-ment.-T. S. ELIOT (1).

This article arises from what we havelearned in the last few years in the courseof congressional oversight of the Officeof Research and Development of theU.S. Environmental Protection Agency(EPA). It addresses the basic question ofhow research can best serve the needs ofthat agency, and it is aimed not only atEPA managers, advisers, and research-ers but at all who share responsibility forthe conduct of research programs in reg-ulatory agencies, including members ofCongress, the Office of Management andBudget, and the Office of Science andTechnology Policy.The message we wish to deliver is first

that achievement of EPA's regulatorymission demands a foundation of basicinformation which must be built througha pr of rigorous basic research,SCIENCE, VOL. 211, 27 MARCH 1981

and second that this means a change inthe way research is viewed and managedin EPA. Scientific quality must becomethe first criterion for research programs.No matter how "relevant," proposedresearch that does not meet this standardshould not be funded.

The Nature of Research at EPA

The EPA Office of Research and De-velopment (ORD) is one of six majorunits of that agency. Three of the othersare responsible for the development ofpolution abatement programs, and oneis responsible for enforcement activities.A fifth unit is responsible for agency-wide planning and management. We re-fer collectively to these five other officesas program offices.One of our fundamental premises is

that EPA should conduct or fund onlysuch research activities as will supportits mission. That mission is defined inlarge part by several federal- statutes,principally the Clean Air Act, the CleanWater Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act,the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, andRodenticide Act, the Resource Conser-

vation and Recovery Act, the NoiseControl Act, and the Toxic SubstancesControl Act. The details of the lawsprovide guidance to research managers.Thus for our purposes the agency's mis-sion (now seen to be manifold) is welldefined, and the need is to translatelegislated regulatory objectives into cri-teria for managing research.Research being planned or conducted

in the present will bear fruit only in thefuture, but the problems facing the agen-cy exist now; so the question for EPAresearch managers becomes one of howto plan and operate a program that willbe supportive of the immediate agencymission. Part of the answer lies in therealization that while the problems fac-ing EPA indeed exist in the present withterrible urgency, they are likely to bedisappointingly similar and just as urgentin the future. For example, even afteryears of research there are still funda-mental questions concerning the bestway to control photochemical oxidants(2).Because of the regulatory (and thus

adversary) nature of EPA's mission, inorder to be supportive the research mustwithstand rigorous scrutiny. Litigationhas come to comprise a significant ele-ment in the overall EPA program. Whatis not clear is the degree to which EPA inresponse to this turn of events mustprepare or preserve a legal chain of evi-

G. E. Brown, Jr., is a member of Congress and ofthe Committee on Science and Technology, U.S.House of Representatives. When this article waswritten he was chairman of the Subcommittee onScience, Research, and Technology. He is nowchairma of the Subcommittee on Department Oper-ations, Research, and Foreign Agiculture of theHouse Committee on Agriculture. R. Byerly, Jr., isa member of the staff of the Committee on Scincweand Technology. Their address is 2321 RaHouse Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515.

003648075/81A0327-1385$01.50/0 Copyright 0 1981 AAAS

Research in EPA:A Congressional Point of View

George E. Brown, Jr., and Radford Byerly, Jr.

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dence. So far the agency does not appearto be substantially controlled by suchconsiderations. It might be argued thatpreoccupation with legal accountabilitycould have a damaging effect on re-search. But in fact, there have been atleast some cases in the past where theagency did not exercise data quality con-trol even at the level of normal scientificstandards (3).

comes a basic research program (4) ask-ing, "What is the mechanism for . ..What seems to happen over and overagain in environmental programs is thatthe policy-makers run quickly throughthe "packed-down" knowledge existingin published sources and into areas offundamental ignorance. Perhaps this isnot surprising, inasmuch as the environ-mental sciences received inadequate at-

Summary. From lessons learned in several years of overseeing the researchprograms of the Environmental Protection Agency, the authors conclude that theagency should give more support to the accumulation of the scientific "intellectualcapital" needed for managing the environment in the long term.

A continuing problem that faces EPAresearch managers is the need to dobasic research versus the demand fromregulatory program offices for researchresults immediately applicable to abate-ment purposes. For example: Provisionsof the Clean Air Act call for "stateimplementation plans" to achieve "na-tional ambient air quality standards." Inprinciple, what is needed is a determina-tion of the relation between ambient airquality and pollutant emissions. Oncethe relationship has been established,emissions can be controlled by a statethrough its implementation plan; that is,one can work backward from a desiredambient air quality to calculate allowableemissions and from this determine an

abatement and enforcement strategy.Thus, the regulatory side of EPA de-mands models relating emissions to airquality. Unfortunately, even after years

of work, good models do not exist forpollutants such as photochemical oxi-dants and sulfates, because the funda-mental atmospheric science is simply notfar enough along. What started out as a

straightforward applied research pro-

gram to "develop a model . . ." be-

tention for years, but it is unnerving,given the importance of the regulatorydecisions that are based on our presentunsatisfactory understanding (5) and thefact that this situation has been repeated-ly cited (6-8).Another recurring problem is how to

set health-based standards. Because we

cannot experiment freely on human be-ings, there is the fundamental question ofhow to use high-exposure animal tests toset low-exposure human health stan-dards. If we try to avoid this problem bydoing epidemiological studies, other dif-ficulties arise: how to measure the healthof large numbers of people unobtrusive-ly, how to measure the effect of one

pollutant (or two) in a very "noisy"world, how to obtain incontrovertibleresults in timely fashion.To cope with the need for immediate

results and also with the need in manymatters for the basic understanding thatis lacking, the agency should have undermanagement a wide spectrum of activi-ties ranging from routine testing to veryadvanced research. This is not to saythat all fundamental research must beallowed, but rather that research aimed

Table 1. Environmental Protection Agency's research budget for fiscal year 1980, by "medi-um" and "discipline," in millions of dollars. Totals may not check because of rounding. Thetable does not include $4.6 million for management.

Discipline An-

Medium Helh Eco- Trans- Mon- Control tici- TotalHeffets logical andt itor- technol- pa-

m effects effects and ing ogy toiy

Air 27.1 2.4 12.6 20.6 4.1 66.8Water quality 7.0 15.2 1.4 12.2 29.3 65.2Drinking water 12.0 1.0 9.7 22.7Solid waste 0.5 13.7 14.2Pesticides 5.8 2.7 0.5 3.9 13.0Radiation 3.0 0.2 3.1Toxics 13.9 7.4 2.3 2.7 1.6 27.9Energy 18.2 15.3 7.2 8.2 52.5 101.4Intermedia 5.1 2.9 14.7 22.7

Total 92.2 42.9 23.5 48.8 114.9 14.7 337.1

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at understanding certain well-definedareas of EPA interest must be encour-aged. In each part of the research pro-gram (in the air program, the water pro-gram, and so on), the balance betweenthe kinds of work to be supported mustbe determined by analysis of the prob-lems at hand. What we emphasize is thatagency management must not arbitrarilyor automatically eliminate or discourageany part of the research spectrum. Fur-ther, it is clear that EPA cannot conductall the basic research it needs in biomedi-cine, aerometry, physical chemistry, andso forth. Programs in other agencies canbe used, however, and EPA's researchmanagement must support, encourage,and communicate with these other pro-grams; they must be a part of the re-search spectrum from which EPA candraw. This course is not without prob-lems, such as slowness of response andconflict of interest. EPA cannot expect asister agency with its own mission torespond as a contractor would, but thisonly makes it more important for EPA toknow what its real, long-term informa-tion needs are and to continue to pointout the interesting research that wouldmeet these needs.

Resources Available for EPA Research

We turn now from general commentsto description of the resources devotedto research in EPA. For fiscal year 1980EPA's research budget is $337 millionout of a total operating budget of $1287million. (In comparison, the 1980 budgetof the National Cancer Institute is $937million, the environmental research bud-get in the Department of Energy is $277million, and the budget of the NationalInstitute of Environmental Health Sci-ences is $79 million.) The EPA researchbudget may be presented usefully in theform of a matrix (Table 1) in which thecolumns correspond to the various "dis-ciplines" of research (health effects,control technology, and so on), and therows, labeled by what EPA calls "me-dia" (air, water, and so on), correspondto the regulatory statutes. Programs notreflective of specific regulatory legisla-tion are included in three separate rows:the radiation medium refers to work thatEPA does on the health effects of non-ionizing radiation, the energy row repre-sents work initiated in response to the oilembargo of 1974, and the row labeled"intermedia" represents work that cutsacross media, for example, quality con-trol activities that apply to monitoring inseveral spheres. The intermedia cate-gory also includes the "center support

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program," under which there is intendedto be long-term support of linkages be-tween basic and applied activities in keyareas such as epidemiology. [For detailsof ORD's programs see (9, 10).] Another$50 million to $75 million worth of tech-nical work is carried out in the programoffices and is reported as research insome budget analyses; for the most partthat work is limited to testing, monitor-ing, and assessment activities.The staff of ORD numbers about 1750.

It has several laboratories, but over halfits budget of $337 million is spent extra-murally. If the fraction of work done in-house by EPA staff continues to decline,as it has for several years because of staffcuts and budget increases, the agencymay be forced to consider establishingnational laboratories such as the Depart-ment of Energy has.The funding for some program catego-

ries is small (Table 1), and one can seewhy for those categories there is such astruggle over which work gets top prior-ity. These resources are arrayed againstan even more impressive matrix of prob-lem areas. Indeed, the problems facingEPA could be displayed in the samematrix, and each element would consistof a long list of items (11). The point isthat although EPA has a large researchbudget, it is not large compared to themission, and therefore the agency mustuse its resources most wisely.

Congressional Hearings on

EPA Research Management

Oversight of EPA's research programwas a major activity of the Subcommit-tee on the Environment and the Atmo-sphere for several years (12). Because ofthe evident persistence and apparent im-portance of several research manage-ment issues, hearings were held in 1978to address them in a comprehensivemanner.

In planning the hearings, we wereaware of studies critical of the tendencyof EPA's research program to be crisis-oriented. For example, the NationalAcademy of Sciences (NAS), in a studyin 1977 of EPA research and develop-ment, recommended that "more re-search ... be done in anticipation ofdecisions rather than in response to cri-ses" (1, p. 4). We were also aware that asomewhat different perception of ORDand thus a different set of criticismsexisted within the agency itself. This wasexpressed by the head of the Office ofToxic Substances (OTS) at the 1978hearings: "Over the years, the systemfor coordination between ORD and OTS27 MARCH 1981

has not always worked well. On occa-sion, research results have been deliv-ered late or not at all. There have beeninstances in which final reports haveaddressed problems different from thoseoriginally agreed upon" (13, p. 86). Oncomparison of the NAS findings with thecriticisms voiced by the program offices,two distinct perceptions of the role ofORD emerge: scientists seem to perceivethe program offices as demanding "re-sponse to crises," whereas the programoffices see the scientists as wanting tofollow their research where it leadsthem, without regard to agency missionsand deadlines. Although not logical op-posites, these two views are sufficientlydifferent to cause major difficulties inplanning, managing, and evaluating theresearch program of the agency. In lightof such divergent perceptions, and be-cause of the consensus ZBB (zero-basebudgeting) method by which programfunding decisions are made in EPA (14),we sought the views of all the major EPAofficials in the hearings, to try to deter-mine the climate of expectations inwhich ORD must operate.Perhaps the most significant charac-

teristic of that climate is the pressureimposed by a growing body of regulatorylegislation. Referring to the many dead-lines imposed by Congress, Douglas P.Costle, then administrator of EPA, com-pared the agency's job to "having toperform an appendectomy while runningthe hundred-yard dash." He went on tosay that this "has led to a significantportion of the R & D program being di-rected at responding to short-term regu-latory demands" (13, p. 3). CertainlyCongress has given the agency a greatmany short-term requirements, and thishas led to difficulties in implementingsound research in what is first and fore-most a regulatory agency. As the head ofORD testified, "Research results wereoften not responsive to regulatory needs,nor was the quality of research consist-ent" (13, p. 6). We are reminded of theapocryphal operating principle of bu-reaucratic support groups: "If you wantit bad, you'll get it bad." Perhaps noteven a scientific saint could face oneunreasonable deadline after anotherwithout occasionally responding in thisway.

It seems clear to us that EPA's re-search predicament cannot be overcomeor even mitigated solely by making ORDmore "responsive." To the extent thatthe program offices could be character-ized as not having a broad or long-rangeview of either research and developmentor the agency mission, there is a need toensure that their demands for research

support are tempered by such a view.This is not a criticism of the abatementefforts of the program offices; their needto meet statutory deadlines is wellknown. They have, however, beensomewhat unrealistic in what they haveexpected to receive from ORD.The hearings provided examples. The

assistant administrator in charge of airprograms summarized what he expectsfrom ORD, including assessments of thepublic health implications of air pollu-tants (13, p. 71). He said, "In mostcases, these assessments do not imposenew research requirements on ORD, butdo call for, in a fairly short-term re-sponse, the application of understandingof the nature of the pollutant's healtheffects" (13, p. 70). What seemed to belacking in his statement was recognitionthat the "understanding" desired canonly come from a program of sound,continuing research. He also described aneed for air quality simulation models fortesting state implementation plans. Thisneed was seen as "immediate" becauseof a regulatory deadline imminent at thetime of the hearing. Of course, suchmodels have been an "immediate" needsince passage of the Clean Air Act in1970, and will continue to be needed inthe foreseeable future (15), so the needcould more properly be called "continu-ing." One kind of research can provideincremental information to meet a dead-line; another kind would better addressthe continuing need. If the program of-fices only approve research to meet "im-mediate" needs, ORD will not be able todevelop the understanding the agencyneeds.Another example of mixed expecta-

tions came from testimony related toneurotoxicological research. The assist-ant administrator for toxic substancesprograms and Administrator Costleagreed on the importance of research inthis area. The administrator said, "Wehave found that a critical gap exists inour understanding of the behavioral andneurotoxicological effects of chemicals"(13, p. 4). The assistant administratordescribed one category of research need-ed by his program as "long-term, 3 to 5years, more fundamental research fromwhich the payoff to the regulatory pro-gram is more speculative but whichserves to keep EPA expertise at theforefront of scientific inquiry. Thiswould include basic research in areassuch as behavioral toxicology, epidemi-ology, and the fate and effect of chemi-cals in the environment" (13, p. 85).When asked why he characterized thepayoff of such work as "speculative," heanswered with the truism that whenever

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research is done at the frontiers of sclen-tific knowledge it is impossible to assurethat it will yield immediately applicableresults. The point we would make is thatwhenever such a critical gap exists EPAmust establish a position at the forefrontof scientific knowledge. The position isthe payoff, and it is not speculative. Theprogram offices should, through the ZBBprocess, encourage ORD to achieve suchleadership positions, because ultimatelythis is what will best support- their abate-ment and enforcement efforts (16).Another assistant administrator stat-

ed, "Regarding long-term research, Iwould find it difficult to slight the criticalimmediate regulatory needs of the pro-gram in favor of long-term research pro-jects which, while scientifically interest-ing, may or may not produce usabledata" (13, p. 30). Assuming that he is nottalking about misdirected research, itwould seem from his statement that theterms "critical" and "long-term" areused in opposition-or perhaps it has notbeen considered that the agency has re-search needs that are both critical andlong-term (such as those in neurotoxicol-ogy and photochemistry).The paragraphs above contain some

statements of the assistant administra-tors who represent the principal "cus-tomers" ofORD and who translate workdone by ORD into abatement programsthrough which EPA's overriding missionof environmental protection is effected.The disturbing lesson of the hearingsseems to be that the customers do notunderstand what to expect from a re-search program. Perhaps they do notpose the right questions; and if theirquestions are invalid, the answers will bealso. In comments surprisingly applica-ble to EPA research, Henry Kissingerhas described the general difficulty theintellectual has with the policy-maker(17):

The contribution of the intellectual to policy istherefore in terms of criteria that he hasplayed a minor role in establishing. He israrely given the opportunity to point out that aquery delimits a range of possible solutions,or that an issue is posed in irrelevant terms.He is asked to solve problems, not to contrib-ute to the definition of goals.... In short, alltoo often what the policy maker wants fromthe intellectual is not ideas but endorse-ment.... The policy maker sincerely wantshelp. His problem is that he does not knowthe nature of the help he requires. And hegenerally does not become aware of the needuntil the problem is already critical.... Ofnecessity, the bureaucracy gears the intellec-tual effort to its own requirements and its ownpace: the deadlines are inevitably those of thepolicy maker and all too often they demand apremature disclosure of ideas which are thendissected before they are fully developed. Theadministrative approach to intellectual effort

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tends to destroy the environment from whichinnovation grows. Its insistence on "results"discourages the intellectual climate that mightproduce important ideas whether or not thebureaucracy feels it needs them.

It is clear that senior EPA officials seeORD in much this way, and that they donot like to be told that they are notposing the right questions, that "a querydelimits a range of possible solutions."Thus many forces now at work in EPA

push its research program in a directionthat could be characterized as short-term, limited in scope, routine, and lack-ing in the stimulation needed to sustainhigh-grade work. A review of the hear-ings suggests the following as epitome:"The fact that the need for excellence isconstantly invoked is no guarantee thatits nature will be understood" (17).There are indications, however, that

the research climate may be improving.Administrator Costle, at least, seemed torecognize the need to institutionalize asound research program: "We believethe Agency has erred in the past byshort-changing long-term research. Ihave been forced, as I said earlier, tomake decisions based on inadequateknowledge. If I could leave a singlelegacy for my successors, it would be forthem not to find themselves in that posi-tion" (13, p. 4). The agency seems tohave an idea ofwhat has been wrong andis groping for remedies (18). In the nextsection we suggest a general criterion forfuture action.

What We Must Do

Our principal assertion is that EPA'sresearch program must be dealt withfrom a new point of view by Congress,by the Office of Management and Budget(OMB), and most of all within EPAitself. Although OMB is often the nay-sayer, cutting research funds that do notseem immediately justified, we think thatif the agency went to OMB with a budgetembodying a new point of view it wouldbe more successful. In this new point ofview, research would be considered asdeveloping intellectual capital for theagency. Equally important, scientific ex-cellence would replace expediency asthe principal criterion in planning andevaluating programs.One accumulates capital by foregoing

present consumption, and the capitalsubsequently provides for greater futureconsumption. Given limited resources,EPA must forgo certain short-term re-search activity in order to build under-standing which in the long run is neces-sary to accomplish its mission. The accu-

mulation of this intellectual capitalthrough research creates opportunitiesfor progress which would not otherwiseexist. An NAS study of the interaction ofresearch and engineering pictures re-search as "a well of knowledge fromwhich engineering can drink to satisfydefined needs, rather than as a geyserwhich floods the engineer with solutionsto present problems and with clear op-portunities for exploitation" (19). Typi-cally, past accumulation of intellectualcapital has not been planned in a utilitar-ian way, but today pressures exist toforce the accumulation and to predictutilitarian ends of basic research.Does this help us with the question of

how best to manage research in EPA?Consider the tension between the re-search scientist and the program official(policy-maker) needing usable informa-tion. There is often a confusion of endsand means here, as described by W. 0.Baker, past chairman of the board of BellTelephone Laboratories, who arguesthat in our management we must ac-knowledge not only the public purposesof science, such as providing usable in-formation, but also the private purposes.Baker says, "The public investment inresearch and development must encour-age this combination of public and pri-vate purposes, including some so privatethat they involve the inner and soulfulaspirations of human beings. These per-sonal aims are to understand, to know,to perceive" (20). He goes on to describethe personal drives for the "satisfactionof understanding and discovery whichare a component of artistic experience."For the policy-maker, the desired end isusable information, while for the scien-tist the end is in part the satisfaction ofunderstanding. Thus although the verysuccesses of research have tended "tomake the public and its representativesin government impatient with the deepermechanisms of science and research," inorder to generate the desired usable in-formation provision must be made forthis fundamental scientific priority whichoften puts understanding (intellectualcapital) above application (consump-tion). Neither wishful thinking nor zero-base budgeting will change the nature ofscience and scientists. The drive to un-derstand must be tapped and stimulated,not frustrated. For example, if the agen-cy were to dedicate certain funding tothe support of peer-reviewed, unsolicit-ed proposals from universities, a greatdeal of talent and enthusiasm could betapped. In the 1950's and 1960's majorcontributions came from the universitycommunity by that route, but the situa-tion has changed (21).

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A second management problem is in-herent in EPA's mission: the pressure ofnumbers-the thousands of chemicals tobe tested for toxicity, the hundreds ofrivers to be monitored, the numerousenforcement actions demanding atten-tion of various kinds-in short, the mas-sive load of difficult but routine testing.Fulfillment of this mission might seemhopeless under Civil Service regulationswith budget and staff restraints and gov-ernment procurement procedures, butthe difficulties point to the solution. Theenormous load of routine testing and theconcomitant demand for results (data)mean that EPA must have a high-qualitysource of intellectual capital, a soundresearch program unencumbered by cri-sis-oriented management.

First ultimate goals and then specificobjectives must be set. The Clean AirAct, for example, requires states to de-velop implementation plans, and thisleads in a fairly straightforward way tospecific research objectives. Thus an im-plementation plan for photochemical ox-idants requires an atmospheric chemis-try model. Because many unique localairsheds must be controlled, what isneeded is a thorough understanding ofphotochemistry; this is the proper re-search objective, and it is the intellectualcapital needed for achieving the ultimateabatement goal. Hendrik Bode has de-scribed most eloquently "some of theusual canons of quality of scientific re-search" (22):

Novelty is certainly one; the importance ofdiscovering a new and unpredicted phenome-non requires no argument. Beyond this, theprincipal criterion can perhaps be describedas a sort of intellectual efficiency in getting agreat understanding of, and command over,nature for a small price. The generality ofresult and the perspective it sheds on a widerange of situations, in other words, are impor-tant indices. The fascinating feature of New-ton's Law of Gravitation was the fact that itapplied to every particle of the universe. Sucha formulation does not rule out the systematicexpenmental work that constitutes the back-bone of science, but it is almost the oppositeof defining research as the mere satisfactionof idle curiosity or the indiscriminate heapingup of disjointed facts without pattern orpurpose.

Bode's two canons of quality, noveltyand intellectual efficiency, represent twoimportant criteria for EPA. Noveltymeans, among other things, that goodscientists do not like to duplicate oneanother's work unnecessarily. Thismakes a manager's job somewhat easier,because the higher the quality of theprogram the more the staff will eschewduplication. Intellectual efficiency andgenerality of results are important be-cause EPA is in danger of being smoth-27 MARCH 1981

ered by the burden of routine testing.Having a research program of high

quality could pay off for EPA also byenabling it to work with other agenciesas a leader-not as a "lead agency" inthe way OMB uses that term, but as ascientific leader. EPA should becomesuch a leading agency and should engagein cooperative (not dictatorial) researchwith other agencies. This would requireEPA to specify the understanding need-ed, perhaps to fund special costs, and tosolicit interest from other agencies, allthe while providing an example of highquality in its own scientific work.

Since essentially all EPA research isintended to support regulatory needs, itis all strongly guided by program offi-cials, who seem not to understand itsnature (23). What is needed are criteriafor use by the agency managers in devel-oping the research program necessary todeal with the intractable problems theyface, problems seemingly larger than thescientific resources available. The lackof dose-response information for largenumbers of chemicals is an example; onecan easily imagine all the nation's scien-tific resources absorbed in routine toxic-ity testing. Luckily, competing demandswill deny us the luxury of such an intel-lectually lazy, brute-force approach. In-novation and creativity are needed, andthat means EPA must support the bestminds to think and experiment on newapproaches-to build the intellectualcapital.EPA must build up the best and most

creative environmental research pro-gram possible, and it must support andencourage such work outside the agencywith information, funds, shared equip-ment, symposia, and so on. The kinds ofspecific steps that would have to betaken to develop such a program areknown (6-8). Congress has asked EPA,without success, to take some suchsteps. For example, the agency has beenasked to devote at least 15 percent of itsbudget to long-term research (24); toincrease its in-house health effects re-search staff (25); and to use peer reviewin planning its research (26). For variousreasons, some beyond the agency's con-trol, none of these steps has been taken.The list of rejected congressional initia-tives could be expanded. The lesson wetake from this history is that before spe-cific steps are discussed a consensusmust be established about the kind ofresearch program needed.Our recommendation is for rigorous,

uncompromised research, part of it donein-house to assure that EPA has thecompetence to judge its contract re-search. Agency scientists should not be

allowed to wander into irrelevant stud-ies, but the definition of relevanceshould be broadened to include all theresearch that must be done. Researchmust be clearly defined in terms of theagency's mission, and programs must bewell focused and yet creative, if neces-sary, in execution- This latter demandwill not make life easy for the agency'smanagers, but it is a problem faced inmany research organizations, and per-haps EPA can learn from others. Strikingthe balance between mission directionand creative freedom will be difficult, butthe managers are working hard now onthe fruitless task of trying to solve funda-mental problems with limited analyticaltools. "Officials-and other executivesas well-tend to work to the point ofexhaustion as one indication that theyhave done all that could be asked" (17).Surely, striving for the high-quality pro-gram recommended here would be morerewarding.

Epilogue

The authors would like to add a morepersonal note which is not directly relat-ed to the achievement of EPA's statu-tory goals. If EPA's activities can beseen as a small part of a larger effort tomake the world a better place for man,then this is our attempt to relate EPA'spart to the larger effort. Bronowski (27)has said it: "Why is it the business of noone in particular to stop fitting sciencefor death and to begin fitting it to ourlives?" It is clear what science can dowhen it is well supported. Many of thebest scientific minds of the world wererecruited to work on the atomic andhydrogen bombs, and they made won-derful "progress" for us. But now prog-ress in other directions is needed. We.need to realize fully the potential of"research and seeking of knowl-edge ... as major civilizing influences,and elements of a free society" (20).Specifically, we need to recruit the bestscientists into research programs such asEPA's. It is unfortunate that at presentthe agency has such difficulty in provid-ing a comfortable institutional home forscience. It would be a service to man-kind to reverse this state of affairs.

References and Notes

1. T. S. Eliot, Christianity and Culture (Harcourt,Brace, New York, 1949), p. 5.

2. Air Quality Trends in the South Coast Air Basin(South Coast Air Quality Management District,El Monte, Calif., June 1979). In a letter transmit-ting a copy of this report to President Carter,dated 6 July 1979, A. A. McCandless, chairmnanof the South Coast District Board, says, -"De-spite a multi-billion dollar effort by government,industry, and the public, there has been no netprogress in oxidant control in the'past six years.

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The latest data for 1978 suggests that the situa-tion may, in fact, be deteriorating.... we maybe losing the war on air pollution."

3. For examples see House Subcommittee on theEnvironment and the Atmosphere, The Environ-mental Protection Agency's Research Programwith Primary Emphasis on the CommunityHealth and Environmental Surveillance System(CHESS): An Investigative Report (GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C., 1976), espe-cially chapters 4 to 6.

4. Without trying to be entirely rigorous, we willuse an NSF definition: "Basic research is thattype of research which is directed toward in-crease of knowledge in science. It is researchwhere the primary aim of the investigator is afuller knowledge or understanding of the subjectunder study, rather than a practical applicationthereof." This was given by A. T. Waterman,then director of NSF, in Symposium on BasicResearch, D. Wolfie, Ed. (American Associ-ation for the Advancement of Science, Washing-ton, D.C., 1959), p. 20.

5. For example, the EPA administrator, D. Costle,in a letter dated 12 June 1978 to Senator WilliamProxmire, chairman of the HUD-IndependentAgencies Subcommittee of the Senate Appropri-ations Committee, said concerning environmen-tal research, "I've had to make too many billiondollar decisions over the last year without thecritical information this sort of investment,made five years ago, would have provided."

6. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assess-ment, A Review of the U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency Environmental ResearchOutlook FY 1976 through 1980 (GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C., 1976).

7. National Academy of Sciences, Commission onNatural Resources, Analytical Studies for theU.S. Environmental Protection Agency, vol. 3,Research and Development in the Environmen-tal Protection Agency (National Academy ofSciences, Washington, D.C., 1977).

8. National Advisory Committee on Oceans andAtmosphere, A Report to the President and theCongress, fifth annual report (GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C., 1976).

9. ORD Program Guide (EPA-600/-79-038, Envi-ronmental Protection Agency, Washington,D.C., 1979).

10. Research Outlook, 1980 (EPA-600/9-80-006, En-vironmental Protection Agency, Washington,D.C., 1980). This presents the agency's 5-yearenvironmental research plan in response to stat-utory requirement. The plan is updated and anew report issued annually.

11. Many examples of the environmental problemsEPA faces are reported in Environmental Out-look 1980 (EPA 600/8-80-003, EnvironmentalProtection Agency, Washington, D.C., 1980).

12. At the beginning of the 94th Congress (Janu-

ary 1975) the Committee on Science and Tech-nology received jurisdiction over "environ-mental research" as a result of several changesin the rules of the House of Representatives.The Subcommittee on the Environment and theAtmosphere was formed to handle this juris-diction and for 4 years (two Congresses), withCongressman Brown as chairman, had respon-sibility for ORD. In January 1979, as a re-sult of reorganization within the Committee onScience and Technology, Congressman Brownmoved to the chair of the Subcommittee onScience, Research, and Technology. The Sub-committee on the Environment and Atmospherewas renamed Subcommittee on Natural Re-sources and Environment and given some addi-tional jurisdiction.

13. Environmental Protection Agency Research andDevelopment Issues: 1978, hearings before theHouse Subcommittee on the Environment andthe Atmosphere, 19 July and 13 and 14 Septem-ber 1978 (Government Printing Office, Washing-ton, D.C., 1979).

14. In making funding decisions, the agency uses azero-base budgeting (ZBB) process in whichprograms are approved by a consensus of theadministrator and the six assistant administra-tors. In the ZBB process, the ORD has onlyabout one of six votes, and thus research pro-grams are vulnerable to a great deal of influencefrom the program offices. Because they playsuch a substantial role in defining the program ofresearch ultimately conducted by ORD, theadministrator and all assistant administratorswere asked to testify on what they expect fromthat office.

15. Special Urban Air Pollution Problems: Denverand Houston, hearings before the House Sub-committee on the Environment and the Atmo-sphere, 19 and 21 November 1977 (GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C., 1978).

16. Long-Term Environmental Research in the En-vironmental Protection Agency, hearings beforethe House Subcommittee on the Environmentand the Atmosphere, 30 June 1977 (GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C., 1978). Seetfie testimony of R. L. Sansom, especially hissupplemental statement, p. 52.

17. H. Kissinger, The Reporter, 5 March 1959, p.30.

18. For example, the agency has instituted a newsystem of research grants putatively aimed atbringing new work of high quality into its pro-gram. Despite this aim the published solicitationfor grant proposals does not explicitly andunambiguously state that funding decisions willbe based on scientific quality. Instead the fol-lowing appears: "Scientific merit and relevanceof proposals will be significant and balancedfactors in the evaluation procedures since allprojects must be in concert with the Agency's

budget appropriations." In other words, itseems that work on highly relevant mattersmight be funded even if of poor quality. [SeeEPA and the Academic Community (EPA-600/8-80-010, Environmental Protection Agency, Cin-cinnati, Ohio, 1980), p. 2.]

19. National Academy of Sciences, Materials Advi-sory Board, Report ofthe AdHoc Committee onPrinciples of Research-Engineering Interaction(National Academy of Sciences, Washington,D.C., 1966), p. 16. - -

20. W. 0. Baker, in House Committee on Scienceand Technology, Seminar on Research, Produc-tivity, and the National Economy, 18 June 1980(Government Printing Office, Washington,D.C., 1980).

21. Testimony of J. N. Pitts, in 1980 Authorizationfor the Office of Research and Development,Environmental Protection Agency, hearings be-fore the House Subcommittee on Science andTechnology, 13 and 15 February 1979 (Govern-ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1979).

22. H. W. Bode, in Basic Research and NationalGoals, a report to the House Committee onScience and Astronautics (National Academy ofSciences, Washington, D.C., 1965), p. 74.

23. At present the program offices guide EPA'sresearch not only through the ZBB process butalso through the mechanism of 13 research com-mittees. These committees translate programoffice needs into "research strategy docu-ments" which guide all EPA research (10).

24. This provision is contained in section 6 of PublicLaw 95-155, the FY 1978 authorization act forORD. For explanation of congressional intentsee Conference Report to Accompany H.R.5101, 95th Congress, Report No. 95-722 (Gov-ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,1977).

25. This provision is contained in section 11 ofPublic Law 95-155. For explanation see thereport cited in (10), and also Report to Accom-pany H.R. 5101, 95th Congress, Report No. 95-157 (Government Printing Office, Washington,D.C., 1977).

26. This was contained in section 4(a) of H.R. 7099,the House version of the FY 1981 authorizationbill. The provision was deleted from the finalversion of the bill at least in part because theagency strenuously (if informally) opposed itand succeeded in having it removed from theSenate-passed version of the bill. For explana-tion of intent, see Report to Accompany H.R.7099, 96th Congress, Report No. 96-959 (Gov-ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,1980).

27. J. Bronowski, The Common Sense of Science(Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 19:8,p. 143.

28. We thank A. V. Applegate for substantial a%sis'-ance in the preparation of this paper.

The Evolution of CooperationRobert Axelrod and William D. Hamilton

The theory of evolution is based on thestruggle for life and the survival of thefittest. Yet cooperation is common be-tween members of the same species andeven between members of different spe-cies. Before about 1960, accounts of theevolutionary process largely dismissedcooperative phenomena as not requiringspecial attention. This position followedfrom a misreading of theory that as-signed most adaptation to selection at

the level of populations or whole spe-cies. As a result of such misreading,cooperation was always consideredadaptive. Recent reviews of the evolu-tionary process, however, have shownno sound basis for a pervasive group-benefit view of selection; at the level of aspecies or a population, the processes ofselection are weak. The original individ-ualistic emphasis of Darwin's theory ismore valid (1, 2).

0036-8075/81/0327-1390$01.50/0 Copyright 1981 AAAS

To account for the manifest existenceof cooperation and related group behav-ior, such as altruism and restraint incompetition, evolutionary theory has re-cently acquired two kinds of extension.These extensions are, broadly, geneticalkinship theory (3) and reciprocation the-ory (4, 5). Most of the recent activity,both in field work and in further develop-ments of theory, has been on the side ofkinship. Formal approaches have varied,but kinship theory has increasingly takena gene's-eye view of natural selection(6). A gene, in effect, looks beyond itsmortal bearer to interests of the poten-tially immortal set of its replicas existingin other related individuals. If interac-tants are sufficiently closely related, al-

Dr. Axelrod is a professor of political science andresearch scientist at the Institute of Public PolicyStudies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 48109.Dr. Hamilton is a professor of evolutionary biologyin the Museum of Zoology and the Division ofBiological Sciences, University of Michigan.

SCIENCE, VOL. 211, 27 MARCH 198113.90

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