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By

Joseph N. Wdowski, M.S. Ed.

2

COMRADES IN CONFLICT The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict of 1979

By

Joseph N. Wdowski, M.S. Ed.

History Thesis

Southern Connecticut State University

New Haven, CT

Academic Advisor

Dr. Michele Thompson

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INTRODUCTION

Presently the world has seen the fall and break up of the Soviet Union and its

Warsaw pact allies of Eastern Europe. Germany is once again united under a

democratic-capitalist regime. The People’s Republic of China is transforming into a

market economy. North Korea is close to ruin and Castro’s Cuba is abandoned and

adrift. It was not too long ago that the fear of a nuclear holocaust, caused by the Cold

War between The Communist East and the Western Free world, hung over all of our

heads. Today the fear of nuclear war is between India and Pakistan, for religious

reasons not political. The “Dooms Day Clock”, Nuclear Winter, and the Red Tide, are

no longer fears of today’s Western governments and no longer govern their foreign

policies or domestic budgets. The Cold War is over and the West won. Or did it?

Perhaps the Communist Nations would have fallen under their own weight? That the

containment policy, with its: covert actions, involvement in regional conflicts, and

massive military budgets, were not necessary in defeating world communism?

Perhaps, if left on its own, communism was already doomed to failure? The forces of

Nationalism and ethnic chauvinism alone would have turned out to be great enough

forces in demising the dream of global communism.

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This paper is about an event in history that marked the beginning of the end of

communism in the twentieth century. During the winter of 1979, just before the rainy

season in Southeast Asia, two of the world’s largest nuclear and conventional powers

came dangerously close to armed conflict. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and

the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) stood nose to nose in a high

risk game of “strategic chicken”; all over a fellow communist nation. A nation they

had both supported and aided in its nationalistic struggle against “Western

Imperialism.”

The Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, although almost completely forgotten by

the Western world, was a major milestone in the ending of the Marxist dream of

global domination by the proletariat. Ironically the end of the dream came shortly

after the communist forces defeated the United States in Southeast Asia. To

international socialist the American defeat was a symbol of victory against the

exploitative and morally misguided system of capitalism. So what went wrong? Why

did these four separate communist nations (PRC, USSR, Vietnam and Kampuchea)

turn against each other? Why didn’t they instead solidify their position after their

victory against America and move their Marxist Revolution forward? What was the

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major source of the Conflict? Was it just a “punitive” strike by Beijing against a

“disrespectful” and “arrogant” former tributary state? Or was it really an apparition of

the much larger growing antagonistic relationship between the Soviet Union and

China? And what does this almost forgotten war mean to us today and the future of

Asia and the world. To understand these questions this paper will analyze the social,

political, economic and military events that led to the conflict on the Sino-Vietnamese

border, the conflict itself and its repercussions on today’s world.

UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE DRAGON

In one month the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) suffered an estimated

42,000 casualties1 in a border war with their southern neighbor; almost matching the

numbers the Americans had lost in twelve years of fighting with the Vietnamese.

What drove Beijing to strike out so violently and costly against Vietnam?

During Vietnam’s war with America, China was Vietnam’s strongest and

greatest ally. The Chinese backed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)

with arms, training, economic aid, technical instructors in the thousands, and political

1 Wallace, James “China-Vietnam Peace – Just a Façade,” U.S. News And World Report,

March 19, 1979: p28 and Middleton, Drew “Peking Warns Hanoi against any Attack During

Withdrawal,” New York Times, March 5, 1979: pA1, A12.

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support in the world arena. To understand how the Chinese and Vietnamese

relationship soured so quickly after the ending of the Second Indochina War it is

fundamentally important to understand the history between these two nations.

Jung-gwo (the Chinese word for China, meaning: “Middle Kingdom”) for

thousands of years was just that – the Middle Kingdom. It was a vast Empire, the

center of its known world in science, culture, art, and industry. The regions of East

Asia not physically occupied by Imperial Chinese forces were tributary states heavily

connected to and influenced by their giant neighbor. Vietnam, much like the other

Asian nations that bordered the Middle Kingdom, owed much of its culture and

national identity to China. On the other hand China remained, through out the

milleniums, as the greatest threat to Vietnam’s national sovereignty and identity.

Vietnamese history is filled with stories of heroes and heroines who fought

against the Chinese. Beginning with Trieu Da (“Defender of the Homeland”), who in

the third century BC held off the expanding Han Empire (206 BC – AD 220). In 111

BC the Chinese armies of Wu Di defeated the successors of Trieu Da, taking control

of the fertile Red River Delta, which served as a convenient supply point for Han

Meaning nations paid “protection” to the Chinese to protect them from the Chinese.

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ships engaging in the growing maritime trade with India and Indonesia. China

occupied An Nam (Chinese meaning: “Peaceful South”) for the next one thousand

years. To this day the Vietnamese honor those heroes and heroines that rose up

against Chinese domination during their long period of foreign occupation.

In response to increased Chinese taxation and domination, revolts broke out in

Giao Chi, Cuu Chan and Nhat Nam, in AD 39. These revolts were led by the wife of a

Lac lord who had been executed by the Chinese, and her sister Trung Nhi. It took two

years for their open rebellion to be finally defeated by the Han General Ma Yuan. The

Trung Sisters drowned themselves to avoid being captured, immortalizing themselves

in Vietnamese history.2

The Trung Sisters were followed in AD 248 by another Vietnamese heroine;

Trieu Au (Lady Trieu). Lady Trieu led a six-month rebellion before it was also

crushed.3 In the late sixth and early seventh centuries another series of Vietnamese

revolts followed. The most famous of these revolts was led by Trieu Quang Phic (The

Father of Vietnamese Guerrillas.) In 570, Trieu Quang Phic was also defeated by the

2 Cima, Ronald J., ed., VIETNAM: A COUNTRY STUDY, Washington D.C.: Federal Research

Division, Library of Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office:1989: p8-9. 3 ibid.: p11.

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Chinese.4 Although these rebellions all ended in failure, they did establish a

Vietnamese tradition of armed rebellion against foreign forces. It was not until the

collapse of the Tang Dynasty (AD 618 – 907) in the early tenth century that the

Vietnamese, led by their nationalist hero Ngo Quyen, were able to win back their

national independence.

To prevent from being re-occupied by the newly established Song Dynasty

(960 – 1125) Dinh Bo Linh sent a successful tributary mission to the northern Chinese

empire. This mission secured Vietnam’s independence for the next 900 years. Yet

even during this protective period of being a tributary state, the Vietnamese were still

at times forced to defend their fragile national sovereignty.5 The armies of the Kublui

Khan invaded Vietnam in 1257, 1284, and 1287.

The Ming Dynasty finally took control of Vietnam in 1407, but was soon

expelled eleven years later by Le Loi. China and Vietnam have had over two thousand

years of antagonistic history. Their alliance of the 20th

Century against the French and

the United States was an abnormality.

4 ibid: p12.

5 ibid: p14-15.

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“If you analyze them [conflicts between China,

Vietnam, Soviet Union and Kampuchea] in historical terms,

[the tensions of 1979] were based on long standing geopolitical,

historical and even racial animosities. They long predated the

arrival of the Western colonial powers to Southeast Asia and the

creation of communist states in Russia, China and North

Vietnam.” –Richard Holbrook, Asst. Secretary of State for East

Asia and Pacific.6

It was the advent of colonial Western powers that brought about China’s and

Vietnam’s unnatural alliance. At the same period that the Vietnamese were giving up

their long defended independence to the French, the Chinese themselves were being

carved up by the Western and “honorary” Western powers (Japan). Due to the

pressure of “Gun Boat” diplomacy China entered an age of “unfair treaties”,

territoriality, forced trade agreements, and territorial acquisitions by foreign powers.

China discovered herself in a position in the World that was more and more similar to

6 Holbrook, Richard “U.S. Stance in Asia: Strongest ‘Since World War II’”,

U.S. News and World Report, Dec. 25, ’78 - Jan. 1 ’79, Vol. 85:25: p46.

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its former tributary state in the pacified south. The two nations finally had common

enemies.

COMMRADES IN ARMS

After the forces of capitalism and socialism had defeated the march of fascism

in Europe and in Asia, the communist nations returned to their struggle against

capitalism. The Iron Curtain dropped heavily across Europe sending shock waves

around the world and plunging it in to the Cold War that would last nearly forty years.

Soviet sponsored communist insurrections almost engulfed Greece and Turkey behind

its Iron Curtain. In the mean time, also supported by the Soviets, Mao and his peasant

army won their civil war against the Kuomintang (The Chinese Nationalists: who

were supported by the West). The Cold War was on and ancient enemies were finding

unlikely allies.

In Vietnam the French returned, hoping to refill the vacuum the defeated

Japanese had left behind. Having just lifted the yoke of Japanese imperialism, the

Vietnamese were not prepared to let the French just move right back in. For seven and

a half years the Vietnamese communists fought the French. The primary military

objective (determined by Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap) was to control the

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northern boarder of the country in order to freely move supplies and personnel from

China.7 With their supply lines secured with their Chinese communist allies, the

Vietnamese guerrillas were in a position to strike at the French in the Red River Delta.

Over time the Viet Minh soon controlled more than half of the villages in the Red

River Delta area.

Losing public support on the home front, the French colonial forces were not

receiving the additional needed troops to counter the Viet Minh’s military advances.

The French commanders’ only hope was to try a strategic strike at the Viet Minh’s

supply lines with China. In November 1953, French Foreign Legion paratrooper

battalions were dropped deep in Viet Minh held territory, taking hold of Dien Bein

Phu, sixteen kilometers from the Laotian border (Which was a vital link in the Viet

Minh’s supply lines with China.) On March 13th

, with over 50,000 regulars,

over 55,000 support troops, and 100,000 transport workers, General Giap began his

siege of Dien Bein Phu. Chinese aid (consisting mainly of ammunition, petroleum,

and heavy artillery) were carried 350 kilometers from the Chinese border, aiding the

Viet Minh greatly in cutting off the French garrison of 15,000 men.8

7 Cima, Ronald J. ed. Vietnam: A Country Study, Washington D.C.: Federal Research

Division, Library of Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office; 1989; p55. 8 ibid. p56.

12

Surrounded, the French begged for American air support to break the siege,

but American air support never came. Eisenhower feared a repeat of the Korean War.

He was terrified that any military action so close to the Chinese border would incite

the Chinese to come streaming across the border, just as they had done during the

Korean Conflict when United Nation’s forces approached too near their border. The

doomed garrison at Dien Bein Phu fell on May 7th

, of 1954.

The Viet Minh now had the upper hand at the peace table. In Geneva,

Switzerland July 1954 the French were forced to agree to the end of the their rule in

Vietnam. The ceasefire agreement established a provisional military demarcation line

at about the 17oN parallel and required the re-deployment of all French military forces

south of that line and all Viet Minh forces north of it.9 With the Vietnamese

communists well established in the north, the Eisenhower administration promised

support of a non-communist Vietnamese regime in the south. By January of 1955

American aid and advisors began to enter South Vietnam in support of the Bao Dai

government; the country was now firmly divided. This ended the First Indochina War

but set the stage for the Second Indochina War.10

9 Ibid: p58.

10 Ibid: p58-59.

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Nitkita Khrushchev, due to his move towards détente with the United States,

frowned upon Vietnamese communists reunifying the country by armed struggle.

Khrushchev’s push for a “peaceful transition” to socialism and reunification was

contrary to the Viet Minh’s and Mao’s support for full-scale guerrilla war to unify the

country.11

With China’s support, in 1960 the North Vietnamese began their full-scale

guerilla war against the American supported South Vietnamese government. This

action was one of the many developing rifts between communist China and

communist Russia.

BREAKDOWN: CHINA-SOVIET

North Vietnam’s struggle against the United States was becoming extremely

complicated as its two most powerful and natural communist allies began to bicker

between themselves. The Viet Minh were becoming a weapon that Moscow and

Beijing used against each other. Like the parents in a bad divorce would use the

children.

11

Chanda, Nayan Brother Enemy: The War After the War,

Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers; New York: 1986; p174.

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Philosophical and political differences between Mao and Khrushchev

greatened. The Chinese were upset with Khrushchev’s desire for détente,

unwillingness to support China in obtaining the bomb, and not backing China in

taking Taiwan from the Nationalist Chinese during the Quemoy-Matsu Island crisis of

1959. The Soviets were agitated by Mao’s refusal to tow the Moscow line, and his

demands for territories within the Soviet Union that Russia had acquired during the

times of the Czar. All of these disputes contributed to the growing animosity and

distrust between the two communist giants. Throughout the sixties though both

countries gave support to the Viet Minh. During the Khrushchev administration it was

China who was the principal provider of aid. After Khrushchev’s ousting in the Fall

of 1964, Moscow moved to re-establish its socialist leadership in the world.

Defending themselves against the Chinese charges of

revisionism and collusion with the United States, the new

Soviet leaders had to prove their Socialist bona fides by helping

Vietnam.12

– Nayan Chanda

12

ibid., p174

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The changes in Soviet leadership from Khrushchev to Brezhnev brought the

Soviet Union back into a more aggressive stance against the West. Which was what

Mao had been encouraging all along. Beijing questioned Moscow’s motives. The

more aggressive foreign policy did not seem to Mao as a Soviet move to further the

goals of the world struggle of socialism, but a blatant attempt by Moscow to further

its goals for a “Russian Empire”.

“Although determined to expand their power throughout

the world, the Soviets continue, at least under the Brezhnev

regime, to be low-risk, cautious expansionists. They are not

“high rollers” comparable to Hitler’s Germany. Their referred

pattern of expansion is to exploit internal instability in the Third

World – civil wars, regional conflicts and so forth – rather than

to intervene directly with their own military forces. By inserting

themselves into local conflicts, often with heavy shipments of

arms supplies, advisors, and offers of “friendship treaties”. The

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Soviets have succeeded in establishing considerable influence in

many of the troubled regions of the Third World.”13

China also noticed that the Soviets were also more than willing to enter their

own troops to enforce their national interests. (For example: the Soviet’s invasion of

Czechoslovakia in 1968). More importantly to the Chinese, the over 4,000 incidents

on the Sino-Soviet border along the Ussuri River from October 15th

, 1954 to March

1969 between PLA and Soviet troops. The Soviet-Sino border skirmishes finally

boiled over into major clashes in 1969 on March 2nd

, 4th

and 15th

.14

The Chinese were sure of Soviet intentions to re-establish the territorial claims

of Old Mother Russia. Beijing often referred to the Brezhnev administration as the

“New Czarist”. The Soviets too had their suspicions of Chinese foreign policy. The

Chinese Cultural Revolution of the 1960’s was not seen in Moscow’s eyes as a move

to confirm the continued socialist struggle, but was merely a tool of Mao’s to rid

13

Zagoria, Donald S. Editor; SOVIET POLICY IN EAST ASIA;

Yale U. Press; New Haven: 1982; p2 14

Salisbury, Harrison E.; WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA;

W.W. Norton & Company; New York: 1969; p180-181

17

himself of political opposition within his own party. In doing so, he consolidated his

“imperial” powers as the “New Emperor”. In June 1969 Brezhnev illustrated to the

Assembly of Communist Parties in Moscow the Chinese threat:

“The idea of China’s Messianic role is being instilled in

Chinese workers and peasants. Mass indoctrination in the spirit of

chauvinism and vicious anti-Soviet is under way. Children are

being taught geography from textbooks and maps that assign the

land of other countries to the Chinese [State]. ‘Go hungry and

prepare for war!’ – [these are] the guidelines the Chinese people

are being given.

“In so doing no doubt is left to just what kind of war is

meant.

“In the light of all this the policy of militarization of China

takes on special meaning. We cannot help but compare the feverish

military preparation with the fanning of chauvinistic sentiments

hostile to the socialist countries, and the overall approach of

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China’s leaders to the problems of war and peace in the present

epoch.”15

The perceived threats on both sides increased in a snowball effect that began

to dwarf the Cold War between the West and the East. Vietnam, still fighting a hot

war with the United States, was drastically affected by the growing hostilities between

its two bigger and older socialist brothers.

15

ibid., p183

19

20

VIETNAM’S WAR WITH AMERICA

China felt betrayed by the Soviets under Khrushchev when Moscow

supported and accepted a divided Vietnam after the Vietnamese victory against

French imperialism. Yet when the Brezhnev regime did an about face in its Vietnam

policy and began to support the North’s armed aggression against the American

supported south, China’s attitude towards Hanoi and Moscow became more and more

bitter as Hanoi began to accept more and more Soviet aid. China’s Chief-of–Staff of

the PLA, Lo Jui-ching, embraced this new Soviet attitude and advocated mending

relations with the Soviets, in order to take a more active role in Vietnam’s war against

America. Relations between Moscow and Beijing had deteriorated so much that Lo

Jui-ching met strong opposition from Mao, Lin Pao, Chao En-lai, and Deng Chen

(The Chinese Communist Parties’ supreme leadership at the time), reconciliation was

impossible.16

The Soviets were being seen clearly as the major threat to Chinese nationalist

interests and as problems increased between Beijing and Moscow, especially after the

16

“Peking Strategy Against Moscow”, ASIAN AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. ’81; 8:3; p131-147

21

border conflicts, China began to play its “American Card’. President Nixon, stuck in

an ever increasing unpopular war in Southeast Asia, took advantage of the Chinese-

Soviet rift and began to establish relations with communist China.

In 1971 “Ping Pong diplomacy” was termed with the American ping pong

team visiting China. In the shadows of the well publicized visit of the American Ping

Pong team, Henry A. Kissinger (Nixon’s Secretary of State) secretly also visited

Beijing. Both missions paved the way for Nixon famous visit to China the following

year. This visit resulted in Nixon’s and Chou En-lai’s “Shanghai Communiqué”. The

Shanghai Communiqué changed the course of Chinese-American relations, and in

turn changed the course of Chinese-Vietnamese relations.

The Vietnamese clearly took the Nixon visit to China as the beginning of

“China’s betrayal of Vietnam”.17

In a way it was, for it was Nixon’s hope to do just

that. He felt by wooing the Chinese he could persuade them to halt their support of

North Vietnam’s aggression against the South, allowing the United States to

honorably remove itself from the conflict. Vo Van Sung, Vietnam’s ambassador to

17

Cima, Ronald, J. Ed. VIETNAM: A Country Study, Federal Research Division,

Library of Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office; Washington D.C.: 1989; p218

22

France, later responded that the only reason that China had supported them was

because the Chinese wished to monopolize aid to the Communist side. Their plan had

failed because Vietnam “refused to become their tool”18

China’s distrust of the Soviet Union began to convince Beijing that the

continuation of the prolonged American-Vietnamese War was strictly only beneficial

for Moscow. The war tied up over 500,000 American troops in Southeast Asia,

freeing the Soviet’s hand to engage in subversive and military actions elsewhere in

the world. It was also hoped by the Soviets that Vietnam would be a dividing issue

between the American government, its people and the Western European Allies. In

addition the war tied up Chinese divisions on the Vietnamese border in order to deter

American strikes into North Vietnam. For the Soviets, every Chinese regiment on the

Vietnamese border was one less Chinese regiment on their border.

Beijing came to the conclusion (in spit of the socialist struggle for world

domination) that the Vietnamese war with America was not in China’s best national

interests. China’s move to the West helped to bring an end to twelve years of

American military involvement in Vietnam.

18

“Vietnamese Not Severing Diplomatic Tie to China, Their Envoy Says” NEW YORK TIMES;

Feb.19, ’79; pA6

23

BREAKDOWN: CHINA - VIETNAM

The primary goals of the new Deng Xiaoping regime was its desire to

implement its "Four Modernizations” policy and to hamper and even push back

Soviet hegemonism. Both of these goals naturally moved China towards the West.

China needed the West’s technological and financial investment to achieve the Four

Modernizations. The West’s military and diplomatic might was also needed in

curtailing Soviet aggression. China needed to defrost the Sino-American Cold War,

an action that logically pushed North Vietnam further into the Soviet sphere of

influence. Without the common ideological goal to defeat the “Yankee Imperialists”

old ethnic, historical, and nationalistic tensions emerged between Beijing and Hanoi.

These Tensions consisted of problems across the spectrum. Ranging from

ancient border disputes, newly claimed economical waters, ethnic chauvinism, and

hostile alliances with each other’s enemies.

THE BOAT PEOPLE

The Four Modernizations (industry, agriculture, science and technology, and

the military) were hoped to transform China into a modern state by the year 2000. In

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order to achieve all four goals of the Four Modernizations it was imperative to seek

outside assistance from the West. Beijing felt their best and most hopeful hopes for

aid would come from the millions of overseas Chinese, of whom many had the

education and financial resources to reinvest into the “Motherland”, hopefully

bringing China into the 21st Century. Unfortunately, for Beijing, most overseas

Chinese had fled communist China and were stanch anti-Communists. They were the

“evil landlords”, the “capitalist routers”, intellectuals and dissidents: The enemies of

the people. They were the ones that had their homes and businesses ripped from them.

They were the ones the Communist Revolution beat and humiliated in the streets.

They were the ones that lost loved ones in the Civil War, the Great Leap Forward and

the Cultural Revolution. If Beijing was to ever attract the support of overseas Chinese

they would have to change their image and try to illustrate itself as the benevolent and

protective father of the world-wide Chinese family.

When the newly united Republic of Vietnam started to persecute its ethnic

Chinese merchant class, Beijing could not stand idly by. Beijing had to show itself as

the champion of all ethnic Chinese, even the ethnic Chinese of the merchant class.

25

The Vietnamese, having just finished its long bloody wars of independence

and reunification, were now set on the task in rebuilding their war torn nation. The

animosity between China and Vietnam, along with the continued American led trade

sanctions against the victorious Vietnamese Communist government, placed Vietnam

in an extremely difficult economical position. Only the Soviet Union and its

communist block allies offered financial and technical support to the Vietnamese

reconstruction efforts. Desperate for material and financial resources the Hanoi

government accused its ethnic Chinese merchant class of disrupting its markets by

hoarding products; in order to create shortages to increase their profits on the black

market.19

Whatever the reasons, either as an excuse to cover up its own economic

policy failures or as a legitimate complaint of “counter-revolutionary” actions, the

Hanoi government moved against its ethnic Chinese population.

With the Americans gone, Vietnam now felt it was time to remove what little

influence there was on them from the Chinese. Hanoi, as it began its socialist

transition with its newly reunited southern half, began a class war against South

Vietnam’s merchant class. This happened to be dominated by ethnic Chinese.

19

Ronald, J. Cima, ed., Vietnam: A Country Study, Federal Research Division,

Library of Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office; Washington, D.C.: 1989; p217

26

Throughout Southeast Asia the merchant classes of Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia,

and Indonesia were dominated by minority ethnic Chinese. Communist China had to

show it would not tolerate the persecution of its “future investors”.

Beijing strongly protested against Vietnam’s treatment of its ethnic Chinese

population. Ironically in the past, when the Saigon government mistreated ethnic

Chinese (by banning them from eleven Chinese trades), the Hanoi government had

joined Beijing cries of protest:

“All decrees and measures of the U.S. puppet regime

regarding shall be abolished…Chinese residence have the

freedom and right to choose their nationality.”20

Hanoi responded to Beijing’s protest to their alleged systemic persecution of

ethnic Chinese, by stating that their policy was not aimed at ethnic Chinese. Hanoi

counter accused Beijing for supporting the bourgeois of Chinese descent:

20

Chang, Pao-min; “The Sino-Vietnamese Dispute Over Ethnic Chinese”;

THE CHINA QUARTERILY: June 1982, p199

27

“…Beijing has in fact forsaken its class stand and

betrayed the spirit of the proletarian internationalism.”21

The Vietnamese also pointed out Beijing’s hypocrisy in that they had not

voiced concern for the ethnic Chinese under the Beijing supported Pol Pot regime in

Kampuchea, “Who were evicted from their homes, robbed of their property, confined

to labor camps and tortured to death.”22

Although it could be argued in the case of the

Pol Pot regime, that they did not purposely single out their ethnic Chinese population.

During the Cambodian holocaust they were equal opportunity oppressors, murders,

and tormentors.

“[Beijing], which ignored the Khmer Rouge massacre of

the generations-old Chinese community in [Kampuchea],

violently condemned the Vietnamese. Between April and

21

Ibid.; p210 22

Ibid.; p210

28

August 1978, approximately 180,000 Haos (Chinese-

Vietnamese) were repatriated…”23

Hanoi’s social reordering of its society led to the famous flood of “boat

people” who were 85% ethnic Chinese. Of the Refugees that flooded the Southern

Chinese border 95% were ethnic Chinese.24

Publicly Hanoi’s policy was only against

the “bourgeois-oriented southern communities”… which reportedly eluded every

socialist rule and regulation promulgated in the south, including the currency reform

of late 1975 and curtailment of commercial activities in 1976.”25

On March 31st, 1978

the Vietnamese government announced a single currency of the new Vietnam Dong.

The Dong was limited per couple to trade in up to US$100 and an additional US$25

for each child, with a ceiling of US$250 for urban and US$150 for rural families. The

government confiscated all other monies. Hanoi also lashed back with land

reclamation and population redistribution. Privately, Vietnamese foreign officials

23

Klein, John “Roots of the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict”

ASIAN AFFAIRS 6:6; July-Aug. ’79; p29 24

Chang,Pao-min; “The Sino-Vietnamese Dispute Over Ethnic Chinese”;

THE CHINA QUARTERILY: June 1982, p212-213 25

Ibid.; p202

29

admitted to their foreign counterparts that Hanoi’s true intentions were to rid their

nation of the ethnic Chinese.26

Even if one was to disbelieve these allegations, the

sheer numbers of Hao people (ethnic Chinese in Vietnam) among those fleeing

Vietnam only proves that the Vietnamese having rid themselves of eating “Western

shit”, were ensuring themselves that they would not return to eating “Chinese shit”.

The United Vietnamese Government ordered residents in the South to re-

register their citizenship, heavily suggesting that ethnic Chinese see themselves as

Vietnamese. “Those Chinese who either insisted on retaining their Chinese citizenship

or showed signs of Chinese chauvinism had a heavy tax imposed on them and were

discriminated against occupationally with their food rations invariably reduced.”27

Hanoi had engaged in a deliberate act of ethnic cleansing. Chinese-Americans

responded by sending over US$ 242 million via Hong Kong to assist relatives to bribe

their ways out of Vietnam, money that could have been sent to assist China in its Four

Modernizations. To make matters worse for Beijing, it was starting to feel the pinch

of the additional financial burden caused by the flood of refugees across their

southern border. China was becoming outraged with Hanoi.

26

Ibid.; p227 27

Ibid.; p200

30

By the end of September all ethnic Chinese newspapers were ordered shut

down, followed by the shut down of ethnic Chinese run schools.28

By the end of that

year the pro-Chinese faction was purged from the Fourth Congress of the Vietnamese

Communist Party. Leading to the rise of the pro-Soviet faction and a more militant

stance on the Kampuchea-Vietnamese border. This widened the rift between Vietnam

and China even more so since the Pol Pot led government of Kampuchea was strongly

supported by Beijing.

The following year of 1977, Vietnamese treatment of ethnic Chinese

worsened. In February, Hanoi ordered all ethnic Chinese to fill out forms for

“citizenship cards”. Those who failed to register as Vietnamese lost their jobs,

residence registration, food rations, and were prohibited from civil service, public

enterprise, retail trade and farming. Their freedom of movement was also hampered.

Confiscation of ethnic Chinese properties and eventual exile followed for some. By

April Vietnam established a policy of “purifying the border area”. Those regions

bordering with China were cleared out. “The increasing sensitive region of people

whose loyalty to Vietnam could no longer be trusted.” This policy resulted in many

28

Ibid.; p200

31

ethnic Chinese and non-Vietnamese minority groups crossing into China.29

When

Chinese Vice Premier Li Xiannian brought up the matter in his talks with Premier

Pham Van Dong in June, it was simple ignored by the Vietnamese Premier.

The ethnic Chinese problems heated up even more so in 1978. On January 4th

,

1978 of The Renmin Rebao ( The People’s Daily), the official mouth piece of the

Chinese Communist government, editorial outlined China’s policy towards overseas

Chinese:

Overseas Chinese are part of the Chinese nation.

Overseas Chinese are a significant force in China’s socialist revolution and

construction.

[China] will strengthen work on overseas Chinese affairs…to form a broad

patriotic united front.

[China] will welcome and make proper arrangements for those who wish to return

to China to take part in building up the motherland or to settle down.

Those who took up foreign nationalities are still kinsfolk and friends30

29

Ibid.; p203 30

Ibid.; p204-205

32

In March of the same year, ethnic Chinese held demonstrations in Ho Chi

Minh City (Saigon), protesting property confiscation and physical expulsions. They

were crushed by force by the Vietnamese government. The government then clamped

down on all ‘bourgeois activities.” March 23rd

, para-security forces of 30,000 (police,

cadres and students) ransacked and confiscated property in the Chulon section of Ho

Chi Minh City, a prominently ethnic Chinese area of the city. Crack downs also took

place in other cities until mid April.31

The Spring of 1978 saw a massive exodus

across the Chinese-Vietnamese border. The Chinese claimed that between April to

mid May of 1978 over 50,000 overseas Chinese were driven out of Vietnam and into

China.32

The Vietnamese claimed that this mass excises was due to a “rumor

campaign” instituted by the Chinese via radio broadcasts and Chinese spies that had

infiltrated the Chinese communities in Northern Vietnam. These agents would pass

rumors of coming war and of a better life in China. China rejected the Vietnamese

claims that they were behind any type of rumor campaign and that it was actually the

Vietnamese themselves spreading the rumors to entice the Chinese populace to flee to

31

Ibid.; p206 32

Larkin, Bruce D. “China and Asia: The Year of the China-Vietnam War”, CURRENT

HISTORY; Vol. 77:449; Sept. ’79: p55

33

the Chinese border. Refugees though claimed that Vietnamese authorities tried to stop

the exodus by explaining that there was not going to be a war.33

China responded to this forced exodus with a major propaganda campaign in

May. Many news articles and “documentary” films were produced at this time

depicting the plight of the ethnic Chinese refugees. Some of these articles even

alleged that the mistreatment of ethnic Chinese was under the command of Moscow.34

Beijing also retaliated by suspending twenty-one factory projects promised to Hanoi.

“In order to divert funds and materials to make working and living arrangements for

the expelled Chinese.”35

This was followed by May 30th

with a suspension of fifty-

one aid projects in Vietnam and the return of 1,000 Chinese technicians. On June 17th

,

China ordered Vietnamese consulates in Canton, Kunning, and Nanning closed,

because Vietnam refused to allow the establishment of a Chinese consulate in Ho Chi

Minh City, Da Nang and Haiphong (all cities with high ethnic Chinese populations).

Beijing also withdrew its ambassador from Hanoi.36

33

Amer, Ramses “The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict in 1978-79 and the Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam”

MULTIETHNICA; No. 21/22 1997; http://www-hotel.uu.se.multietn/Amer.html ; p6 34

Porter, Gareth “The Great Power Triangle in Southeast Asia”.

CURRENT HISTORY; Vol.70:461; Sept. ’80: p162 35

BEIJING REVIEW; June 16, 1978; p213 36

“Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Rivalry”. ASIAN AFFAIRS, 6:1 Sept.-Oct. ’78; p15

34

On June 6th

, the Vietnamese agreed to permit two Chinese ships to evacuate

ethnic Chinese who wished to leave the country. Three ports were designated and

three months, to start on June 20th

, were set to allow the evacuation by ship.

Seventeen negotiation sessions were held, yet Vietnamese officials objected to

Chinese insistence that the refuges be referred to as “Chinese residence who are

victims of ostracism, persecution, and expulsion by the Vietnamese authorities.”

Hanoi insisted on referring to the refugees as “Vietnamese of Chinese decent [whom]

wish to leave Vietnam for China…” Dragging on to August with no agreement the

Chinese suggested the negotiations to be raised to deputy foreign minister level. This

too was fruitless and the Chinese ships soon returned to China empty.37

In mid July of 1978 the Chinese authorities closed their border with Vietnam.

The ethnic Chinese that still wished to leave Vietnam were forced to leave by boat,

starting the great exodus of the “Boat people”. Most were bound for Hong Kong but

also fled to other nations in the region including China.. There was a large influx of

“Boat people” in the months before and soon after the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. (see

table 1)

37

Ibid.; p17

35

ISLAND DISPUTES

Oil reserves discovered in the South China Sea brought even more tensions

between Hanoi and Beijing. In dispute were the Spartly Islands, which are

strategically located to exploit offshore drilling in the South China Sea. The Paracel

Islands were also in dispute for their riches in guano, an important source of artificial

fertilizers.

Ever since 1931 the Paracel Islands changed hands to the dominating power in

the region, first the French, then the Japanese during World War II. After the War the

Republic of China claimed the Islands, which were then occupied by the Vietnamese

in the 1960’s. By 1974 Mainland Chinese naval forces pushed the Vietnamese off the

Islands. The Chinese stated that they had laid claim to the islands since the Three

Kingdoms Period (3rd

century).

36

In 1887 China made agreements with the French government of a limit of

three nautical miles into the Gulf of Tonkin. When Hanoi announced a claim of a 200-

mile range of territorial waters, China was outraged.38

After the Second Indochina

War the Vietnamese seized six islands of the Spartly’s that were occupied by the

defeated Saigon government. China, in response, cited the 1958 letter from Pham Van

Dong, which stated that the Vietnamese recognized China’s claim to the Islands.

Hanoi simply replied that the letter was just “…diplomatic double-talk in order to

avoid antagonizing its ally during a time of war.”39

Hanoi’s “double-talk” justification

for breaking its 1958 agreement was a slap in Beijing’s face.

DREAMS OF EMPIRE

In the 1950’s President Eisenhower coined the phrase “The Domino Theory”.

He theorized that if South Vietnam fell to the communists that all the countries in the

region would also fall to communism. Like a row of dominos, if one is pushed over

the whole row is knocked down. Critics scoffed at Eisenhower’s analogy, yet history

has proven Eisenhower correct. Soon after the fall of Saigon, Cambodia (renamed

Kampuchea its original spelling, as opposed to the French “Cambodia”), and Laos did

38

Duiker, William J. VIETNAM SINCE THE FALL OF SAIGON; update Edition; Ohio

University Center for International Studies; Athens, Ohio: 1989 39

Ibid.; p182

37

fall to communist governments. Communist insurgent groups threatened even

Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. What Eisenhower was not able to foresee

was that the forces of nationalism and ethnic chauvinism would counter the

momentum of the falling dominoes. Hanoi was not satisfied with merely reuniting

with South Vietnam and the neighboring nations of Kampuchea and Laos joining the

communist brotherhood. It also wanted to establish an Indochina Federation led by

Vietnam. Before the unification of the South, the Vietnamese communist leaders had

made statements of national goals beyond unification:

The army is the party; the party is the army.

Communist Vietnam is first of all an army.

The solution to all problems is war.40

Such a worldview is in capable of stopping its military actions at its own

national borders. General Giap’s famous statement, quoted by Bernard Fall, also

40

Mount, Frank “The Prussians of Southeast Asia”,

ASIAN AFFAIRS, 6:6; July-Aug. ’79: p381

38

demonstrates the Vietnamese communists’ desire for developing a military society

bent on continued aggressions:

“The life and death of a hundred, a thousand, or even tens

of thousands of human beings, even if they are our own

compatriots, represents really very little.” – Gen. Giap41

As far back as 1930, when Ho Chi Minh (at the time an important Comintern

agent) brought the warring communist factions of Vietnam together into a new

Indochina (not merely Vietnamese) communist party.42

Hanoi officials, decades later,

referred to themselves to American diplomat William Sullivan as the “Prussians of

Southeast Asia” destined to exercise leadership over the weaker and less disciplined

states of the region.43

Ironically the nation to feel most threatened by the aspirations

of the “Prussians of Southeast Asia” was not the United States Government that tried

41

Ibid. 42

“Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Rivalry”, ASIAN AFFFAIRS, 6:1; Sept.-Oct. ’78: p2 43

Ibid.

39

to contain North Vietnam, but China, which had assisted the North in breaking south

of the 17th

parallel.

VIETNAM”S INVASION OF KAMPUCHEA

In 1975 the Khmer Rouge, Led by Pol Pot overthrew the Cambodian

government and established the communist nation of Kampuchea. The Khmer Rouge

was a highly oppressive regime that forcefully experimented on its population to

create a pure Maoist communist state. Forced labor, widespread executions, and

famine ended up killing over three million Cambodians. The Vietnamese invasion of

1978 ousted the Khmer Rouge. After the invasion the Khmer Rouge were still able to

control large areas of the countryside. Using guerrilla tactics to harass the Vietnamese

occupational forces the Khmer Rouge struck back at their invaders. “The Vietnamese

and Cambodians had been fighting against each other since the days of Angkor, and,

as Cambodians of every political tendency admit, Kampuchea was saved from total

annihilation by Vietnam by the arrival of the French in the Nineteenth Century.”44

Vietnam though did not enter Kampuchea to bring a halt to the Khmer

Rouge’s genocide of its own people. Vietnam’s old ambition of a Southeast Asian

44

Karnow, Stanley “East Asia in 1978: The Great Transformation”

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 57:3; ’79 p601

40

Empire was its only true purpose of occupying Kampuchea. Using border conflicts

that had started in 1977 as an excuse, the Vietnamese sent over 150,000 troops into

Kampuchea in support of the Cambodian Salvation Front (CSF). The Vietnamese

quickly set up a puppet government led by forty-four year old President Samrin.

President Samrin was a little known son of a large poor peasant family, who

ceremoniously, rose to be a division commander and a member of the CSF central

committee. At almost the same time a friendship treaty was signed between the

Samrin Regime and the Hanoi government. The treaty gave the Vietnamese the right

to station “advisors in Kampuchea and to preserve the territorial integrity”. A very

similar pact the Vietnamese had signed with Laos the year before.45

Advisors were not Vietnam’s only intentions, for the Vietnamese government

began a massive Vietnamese immigration policy into eastern Kampuchea. Over

700,000 Vietnamese citizens were reported to have moved into Kampuchea between

1979 and 1985. By 1985 the population in Phnom Penh and the eastern region were

more than sixty percent Vietnamese.46

The Kham Rouge’s previous genocide of its

45

Trumbull, Robert “Vietnam Celebrates the Signing of Pact with Cambodia”

NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 21, ’79: pA8 46

Yufan Hao and Guocang Haun. THE CHINESE VIEW OF THE WORLD,

Pantheon Books, New York; 1989; p207

41

own people actually played right into the hands of the Vietnamese. Due to the

genocide and mass immigration of Vietnamese into the country Kampuchea was

disappearing as a nation. Much like the mass immigration of Han Chinese into Tibet

was assimilating Tibet into China, Kampuchea was being absorbed into Vietnam.

Supported by Beijing the Kham Rouge fought against being eliminated. Pol

Pot called for the Cambodian people to rise against the invaders. “The army and the

people, side by side, are conducting a people’s war against the hated Vietnamese

invaders. The fighting will go on for eternity if necessary until the aggressors have

been completely defeated.”47

Vietnam now had its “Vietnam”.

China reacted strongly to Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea. For China was

deeply involved with the Kham Rouge even before the invasion. “Nearly 1,000

Chinese advisors (who wore civilian clothes, though their passport pictures clearly

showed them in Chinese army uniforms) joined the exodus [from Kampuchea when

the country was invaded] – leaving perhaps as many as 5,000 fellow countrymen

behind in Kampuchea.”48

Before the Vietnamese were able to take Kompong Som

(Kampuchea’s only deep water port) Chinese freighters were seen docked unloading

47

(Reuters) “Cambodia Says Invasion Is a ‘Life-or-Death Struggle’”

NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 5.’79 48

Deming, Angus “Hanoi Power Play” NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, ’79; p32

42

military equipment. Once the Vietnamese took the port, the Chinese still funneled

arms into the country. According to Deng Xiaoping the arms were being sent via

Thailand. The Thai government strongly denied that arms were being shipped through

their territory. U.S. intelligence reports confirmed Deng’s statement.49

The Chinese

also evacuated former Prince Norodom Sihanouk and his wife Princess Monique from

Phnom Penh to Beijing.

Sihanouk had been overthrown in March of 1970 by the pro-American

government of General Len Loi. The Prince was exiled to Beijing where he was the

nominal head of the Communist Resistance Government. He returned to Phnom Penh

in 1975 after the communist victory and was soon placed under house arrest. When

Vietnam invaded he was taken out of mothballs to unite the Cambodian people

against the Vietnamese and to try to raise international attention of the plight of

Kampuchea under Vietnamese occupation. From Beijing, Sihanouk urged the United

States to intervene militarily in Kampuchea.

49

Gwertzman, Bernard, “U.S. Warns Chinese Against Attack on the Vietnamese”,

NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 9, ‘79

43

“Now we like the United States, which has condemned the

Vietnamese. It is kind of you to do so. It is justice…I hope the

United States and the great American people will help us to

expel the Vietnamese from [Kampuchea]. We are ready to

forget the past and be good friends” - Sihanouk50

Surprisingly (although a logical move to generate American support),

Sihanouk also condemned the regime of the Kham Rouge, even though they were

being supported by his host nation of China.

“I don’t know why [the Pol Pot regime] chose to impose

such a terrible policy on the people, but they told me it was

genuine communism. We are not animals, not buffaloes or

oxen, to grow rice…”- Sihanouk51

50

Butterfield, Fox “Sihanouk Request Aid of U.S. and UN” NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 10 ’79;

pA1,A3 51

Ibid.

44

China did not only use Sihanouk to court the American public, he was also

instrumental in gaining support in the United Nations. The Chinese were able to get

the Security Council to allow Prince Sihanouk to participate in the United Nations by

a vote of 13 to 2 (the Soviets and the Checks.)52

In contrast the Vietnamese-Soviet

supported Samrin administration was shut out of the United Nations.

52

“UN Council Talks on Cambodia Widen”, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 13, ‘79

45

SOVIET-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS

Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea severely damaged Sino-Vietnamese

relations and it could be argued as the key reason for China’s invasion of Vietnam of

February of 1979. For the Chinese did not see Vietnam’s invasion as just an attack

upon a friendly government, but a strategic move by the Soviet Union against China.

Ever since the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Treaty in 1978 the Soviets

had gotten deeply involved in Vietnam and were in turn deeply involved in Vietnam’s

invasion of Kampuchea.

“Spearheading the Vietnamese invasion into the Parrot’s Beak region of

[Kampuchea] was the crack Ninth Division, which was used to capture Saigon in

1975. This division [was] equipped with highly sophisticated Soviet weapons and

other hardware, including T-62 tanks, 130mm guns, and jet aircraft, and is unlikely to

have been employed in the invasion without Russian consent. According to Phnom

Penh, Soviet advisors and technical experts accompanied the Vietnamese invaders,

and Russians drove some tanks and even acted as commanding officers on the

46

battlefield.”53

Other reports from usually reliable intelligence sources reported Cubans

had also participated in the invasion of the Parrot’s Beak.54

U.S. intelligence experts

stated that there was no evidence of Soviet or Cuban forces being directly involved in

the invasion. U.S. Intelligence did report that the Soviets were heavily involved

strategically, tactically, militarily and economically with the invasion.55

The Soviets on the other hand did not even acknowledge Vietnam’s

involvement in the invasion of Kampuchea. The official Soviet line was that

“Revolutionary armed forces” were advancing against the ‘reactionary Pol Pot Sary

clique.”56

Before 1974 Soviet aid to Vietnam was US$ 400 million. After the invasion

of Kampuchea Soviet aid to Vietnam nearly doubled. From 1978 to 1979 Soviet aid

reached US$ 5 billion in military and US$ 4 billion in economic aid.57

The Chinese saw the partnership of the Soviet Union and Vietnam as a move

against them. After the November 1978 signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of

Friendship and Cooperation, Deng Xiaoping referred to the Vietnamese as the “Cuba

53

“Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Rivalry” ASIAN AFFAIRS 6:1; Sept.-Oct. ’78; p8 54

Ibid. 55

Deming, Angus, “Hanoi’s Power Play” NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, ’79; p33 56

Whitney, Craig R. “Moscow Says Drive Into Cambodia Is by Vietnamese Supported

Rebels”, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan 5, ‘79 57

Yufan Hao and Guochang Haun, THE CHINESE VIEW OF THE WORLD,

Pantheon Books; New York: 1989; p204

47

of Southeast Asia”. Cuba, at the time was notorious for sending troops to Africa and

Latin America to support Soviet client states and subversive groups. Deng strongly

felt that the Soviets would use Vietnam as a thorn in the rear of China. Just like they

used Cuba as a thorn in the American backside. “The political and strategic context in

which the [Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship] treaty was signed makes it evident that

both Vietnam and the Soviets had anti-Chinese motives in mind when they

signed…The Vietnamese needed the security of Russia in order to neutralize China

[for their invasion of Kampuchea]. As events turned out, Hanoi made a successful

gamble.”58

“If one of the sides becomes the object of attack or of a threat of

attack, the contracting parties will quickly move to mutual

consultation with the goal of removing the threat and the taking

of appropriate effective measures for the preservation of the

peace and security of their countries.”

- Article VI of the Soviet-

Vietnamese Friendship Treaty59

58

Zagoria, Donald S. and Sheldon W. Simon “Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia”,

SOVIET POLICY IN EAST ASIA, Yale U. Press; New Haven: 1982 59

Shipler, David K. “Soviet terse in Invasion Report, Implying No Decision on Action”,

48

Hanoi hoped that its friendship agreement with the Soviets would counter any

Chinese military response to their invasion of Kampuchea. Although the treaty did not

prevent Chinese military action, it might have limited it greatly.

The Soviet-Vietnamese relationship gave Vietnam the protection of a

superpower. It also benefited the Soviets greatly. Vietnam was first of all a channel

for Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. Second, the Soviet-Vietnamese alignment had

the potential of driving a wedge between China and other communist or radical states

that supported Vietnam. Third, Vietnam was a major obstacle to Beijing’s anti-Soviet

pushes in the region as well as a hindrance to China’s own influences in the area.

Fourth, Vietnam could, for the first time in history, supply the Russian Empire with

military bases in the region.60

Vietnam also benefited from their Soviet relationship economically. June of

1978 the Vietnamese joined the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (a Soviet

block economic alliance). Twenty percent (maybe as high as thirty percent) of the rice

Vietnam consumed was imported from the Soviets. Without the Soviet food support

NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 18, ’79; pA10 60

Porter, Gareth “The Great Power Triangle of Southeast Asia”

CURRENT HISTORY. Vol. 79:458; Dec. 1980; p163

49

daily calorie intake would have dropped to 1,500 calories a day per person, just at the

UN substance level. Along with the food (and weapons), the Vietnamese imported

from the Soviets; petroleum, steel, iron, chemical fertilizers, and spare parts for their

transportation system. The Soviets funded US$ 3.5 billion of Vietnam’s five-year plan

of 1975-1980, and supported forty major industrial projects in Vietnam. The

Vietnamese were also able to send 30,000 students to the Soviet Union. The Soviets

in addition supplied the Vietnamese important support in the United Nations, for

example India’s recognizing the Heng Samrin government in Kampuchea.61

61

“How China Views the World, According to Teng Hsiao-ping”

U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Jan. 22, ’79; p37

50

THE SOVIET THREAT

“The flagrant large-scale aggression against Kampuchea

by the Vietnamese is not an isolated event, but part of the global

strategy of great power [Soviet] hegemonism. Its impact is

definitely not limited to Vietnam and Kampuchea, nor even to

the Asian and Pacific region…It has an impact on the world

situation as a whole…It has been our consistent stand to support

Kampuchea against Vietnamese hegemonism and Vietnamese

aggression. While attacking Kampuchea, the Vietnamese

constantly commit provocation against China, in an attempt to

realize the strategic design of great power hegemonism.”

- Deng Xiaoping, Jan. ’7962

62

“How China Views the World, According to Teng Hsiao-ping”

U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Jan. 22, ’79: p37

51

It was well apparent that Soviet influence was on the move. The American

defeat in Vietnam and the scandal of Watergate had severely damaged the resolve of

the American people and their government. This in turn damaged American influence

around the world. The Soviets moved forcefully against the weakened state of

Western leadership. The Soviets attacked the world’s soft underbelly: the Third

World. Soviet influences were felt in Africa, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Latin

America and Asia. The late 1970’s also saw the re-emergence of China after its long

inner turmoil of the Age of Mao. The Great Leap Forward, and the Great Proletarian

Cultural Revolution for decades preoccupied the Chinese as they devoured

themselves. The reign of Deng Xiaoping ended China’s self-destructive period. Deng

moved China to modernize and to look beyond her borders. For Moscow, this new

emerging China had the potential of becoming its primary threat.

In the Asia of that time (excluding the East –West division of the Koreas) the

greatest divisions were between the heavily armed and heatedly debated borders of

the communist nations of the Soviet Union (3/4 of its land mass was located in Asia),

52

China, Vietnam, and Kampuchea. Common ideology was losing its binding effect to

the ancient antagonistic concepts of geography and nationalism.63

“In the Asian – Pacific region the region the Soviets

have a variety of incentives for wanting to increase their power

and influence. 1) The United States, Moscow’s principal

adversary, has a powerful coalition of allies and friends in East

Asia, a coalition stretching from Japan to Australia. The Soviets

seek to counter that American alliance system and to develop a

counter-coalition of states friendly to themselves. 2) Moscow

seeks to isolate and encircle China in an effort to keep China

weak, should China become a great power, the Soviets know

that, in the long run, it will almost certainly become Moscow’s

most dangerous adversary.”64

63

Zagoria, Donald S. SOVIET POLICY IN EAST ASIA, Yale U. Press; New Haven: 1982; p5 64

Ibid.; p2-3

53

Between 1977 and 1980 the Soviets increased their Pacific fleet to 270,000

tons, making it the Soviets largest of their four fleets.65

Between their naval bases in

Danang and Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam (both built by the Americans) and Vladivostok,

USSR, the Soviets were capable of covering the entire Chinese coastline. They were

also in the position to cut off China’s vital sea-lanes that connected her to the

economically and technologically superior Pacific Rim Nations, including the United

States (which is often forgotten to also be on the Pacific Rim).

The Soviets intentionally moved against China, yet keeping to their low risk

strategy they were successfully using against the United States in the Western World.

Through Vietnam, Moscow was able to make its presence felt indirectly in Indochina.

65

Ibid.; p18

54

Vietnam was becoming Moscow’s “Cuba of the Orient,” as stated by Deng Xiaoping

“…swashbuckling unchecked in Laos, Kampuchea, and even on China’s [southern]

border.”66

“In itself, whether tiny isolated Kampuchea is pro-

Soviet or not matters little to Moscow. What is important is that

China has lost an ally in Southeast Asia. Beijing inability to

protect its friends in Asia has been demonstrated, and Vietnam,

now a close Soviet Ally, has substantially enhanced its power

and influence in Indochina.

-Robin Knight (Moscow correspondent)67

Soviet encirclement of China increased with their involvement in Afghanistan.

In 1973 Mohammed Daoud, after overthrowing the Afghan monarchy, accepted

Soviet military and economic aid. Daoud needed Soviet support, especially in arms, to

66

Cowan, Edwin “Carter Calls for Quick Withdrawal by China in Message”

NEW YORK TIMES; Feb. 28, ’79; pA1 67

“Another War Over Indo-China for the U.S. ?”

U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT; Jan.22, ’79; p46

55

help in taking lands known by the Afghans as Paktoonistan, which were occupied by

Pakistan. Soviet support came with a price. By 1978 Daoud attempted to curtail

Soviet influence over his country. This resulted in a Marxist coup by Soviet trained

Afghan army officers. The Soviets followed by sending in 3,000 to 4,000 advisors

along with additional military and economic aid. China responded by sending aid to

Pakistan to buffer Soviet actions in Afghanistan. This aid increased in December of

1979 when the Soviet’s forces invaded Afghanistan in support of its besieged puppet

government by the radical Islamic Mujhadeen guerrillas.

China though was not strong enough economically, militarily, and technically

to offset Soviet aggression single handedly. Although a nuclear power, China was far

from being a super power. Only the United States still had the ability to offset Soviet

hegemonism. China would need to court the support of the Americans. Nixon’s visit

to China had helped greatly in deforesting the Sino-American Cold War, but the

American government still did not officially recognize the Beijing’s communist

government. The exiled Kuomintang government of the Republic of China on Taiwan

was still seen as the legitimate government of China proper. Before any Chinese-

American united front against the Soviet Union could be made, the Beijing

56

government would have to have America switch its recognition from Taipei to itself.

In true Chinese style the Chinese didn’t directly court the Americans. Instead they

first attempted to win support of the American “family” before pursuing the “bride.”

57

THE JAPANESE CARD

On February 16th

, 1978 China and Japan signed a trade agreement worth over

twenty billion U.S. dollars. It was mostly a trade of Chinese oil for Japanese steel and

factories. In opening relations with China, the Oshira administration also saw a great

opportunity in China’s one billion potential consumers for Japanese goods. The

Japanese were also starting to share Beijing’s concern about Soviet movement into the

region. A Soviet base in Vietnam could severely threaten shipping lanes to Middle

Eastern Oil: the lifeblood of Japanese Industry.

“The Soviet Union’s bullying tactics, which included

continued blunt rejection of Japanese hopes of resolving a

dispute over four islands off Hokkaido, also served to drive

Japan into China’s embrace.”68

68

Karnow, Stanley “East Asia in 1978: The Great Transformation”

FOREIGN AFFAIRS; 57:2; 1979; p595

58

On August 12th

, 1978 Japanese Foreign minister Sonoda and China’s Foreign

Minister Haung Hua signed a treaty of peace in Beijing. An anti-hegemony clause

was added to the document on Japan’s insistence. The clause was targeted at the

Soviets, which pleased the Chinese. The clause though was a double edge sword. It

was hoped by the Japanese to also deter future Chinese hegemony. Neither the less

the treaty symbolized China’s acceptance by one of America’s closest allies.

59

THE AMERICAN CARD

Since the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972 the result of it was the

exchange of “friendship Delegations”. The Chinese in the early 1970’s still viewed

the United States as merely the lesser of the two evils between the world super

powers. By the late 1970’s China’s stance became much harsher towards the Soviet

Union. The United States and its Western allies were being perceived as the enemy’s

enemy. As the old proverb states: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” America

was becoming a potential friend. China and the United States still had difficulties in

normalizing relations due to the Taiwan problem. As long as the United States

recognized the exiled government of the Republic of China on Taiwan, there was no

hope for diplomatic normalization between Washington and Beijing. Even though the

majority of Americans did support normalization with Communist China, they also

felt whole-heartedly opposed to turning their backs on Taiwan, a long term friend and

ally.

The very delicate Taiwan issue was going to take a major effort for the

American Presidential administration to resolve. The Nixon administration was

60

distracted by the Watergate scandal and the following Ford administration was

hampered by the fall of Southern Vietnam to the North and their desperate campaign

for re-election in 1976. It was not until the Carter administration that the American

Presidency had the luxury to give China the full attention it needed.

President Carter began by sending his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance to

Beijing in August of 1977. Vance’s five-day visit was given an unenthusiastic

welcome by the Beijing government. Vance had suggested to the Chinese to trade

embassies between the two countries, while the United States would keep a liaisons

office in Taipei. The Chinese rejected the proposal completely, insisting on their three

points for Sino-American diplomatic normalization. First: that the United States

terminate diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan. Second: that the

Americans withdraw from its 1954 defense treaty with Taiwan. Third: that the

Americans withdraw all American forces from Taiwan. The Vance team said they

would agree to the Chinese three points for normalization if the Chinese would agree

to promise that they would not try to take Taiwan by force. The Chinese refused to

give such a promise. The Vance trip resulted in nothing.

61

Back in February of 1977 President Carter asked Huang Chen, China’s

Liaison’s office chief for the PRC for a White House visit. During his visit Huang

emphasized strongly the Soviet influence in each topic they talked about.

“…When he spoke of the Soviet Union he grew

antagonistic and distrustful, and contradicted any suggestion on

my part that the Soviet leaders might be sincere in wanting to

preserve the peace and control atomic weapons.

“…He urged me to maintain a strong American presence

in the Western Pacific, and was concerned about the possibility

of any resurgence in Japanese military strength.(The later

position was to change. As our ties with the Chinese were

strengthened, their concerns about a possible Japanese threat

diminished, and they began to urge that Japan’s defense

capabilities be improved.)” - President Jimmy Carter69

69

Carter, Jimmy KEEPING THE FAITH: Memoirs of A President

Bantam Books; New York; 1982; p189

62

The Soviets were China’s only real threat to its security. Due to Beijing’s

interest in developing its Four Modernizations policy, they knew that they could not

afford to engage in an arms race with the Soviets. China needed the co-operation of

other nations to curtail Soviet expansionism, even if it meant making alliances with its

former archenemies; the “decadent American Imperialists” and even the “Ywe Bin

Gwei-dz” (Japanese Devils).

Remembering his meeting in February with Huang Chen, in May of 1978,

Carter sent National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to Beijing for a three-day

diplomatic mission. Brzezinski, a Cold War warrior and well-known advocate for

curtailing the Soviet Union, received a much warmer welcome from the Chinese.

Brzezinski did not emphasize the differences between the United States and China but

their common interests, mainly both countries’ concern with the Soviet Union. In

Beijing Brzezinski laid out clearly the American advantages in opening full

diplomatic relations with a strong China.

“The President of the United States desires friendly

relations with a strong China. He is determined to join you in

63

overcoming the remaining obstacles in the way of full

normalization or our relations…[The United States is also

committed to resisting] the efforts of any nation which seeks to

establish global or regional hegemony…Neither of us

dispatches international marauders who masquerade as non-

aligned to big-power ambitions in Africa. Neither of us seeks to

enforce the political obedience of our neighbors through

military force.

- Zbigniew Brzezinski70

Brzezinski backed these words by revealing two American government

documents to the Chinese that clearly stated American policy: Presidential Review

Memorandum 18 (which assessed the world strategic situation), and the Presidential

Directive 18 (which was Carter’s international security policy plan). The Chinese

were extremely pleased with Brzezinski’s approach. His diplomatic mission moved

70

Immanual C.Y. His THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA; 4th Edition;

Oxford University Press; New York; 1990; p787

64

Sino-American relations forward for the first time since Nixon’s historical visit to

China five years ago.

In December of 1978 the United States and the People’s Republic of China

established full diplomatic relations to begin on January 1st, 1979. Also in January of

1979 Deng Xiaoping made a diplomatic mission to the United States. Officially he

was there to seal the normalization of relations between the two countries and to sign

an agreement on cooperation in science and technology and a cultural agreement.

Deng was also there to prepare the United States for China’s planned “punitive strike”

on Vietnam. Throughout his visit, nearly every speech, press conference, and

interview he gave, Deng sounded the warning bell against the Soviet Union and its

undisciplined “Cuba of Asia”; Vietnam.

“… Vietnam controls Laos by military means, and the

Vietnamese made a major invasion of Kampuchea with more

than ten divisions. And then if we go further east, do we see that

the Soviet military forces have been strengthened or weakened

in the Asian and Pacific region? At least its navy and airforce

65

have been strengthened. The Soviet fleet is now equal in

strength to the Atlantic…We consider the true hot bed of war is

the Soviet Union, not the United States.” – Deng Xiaoping71

Since October of 1978 tensions between Vietnam and China had never been so

high. Border clashes between Vietnamese and Chinese troops were becoming

common. The Chinese supported Pol Pot Regime was pushed to the Western

mountains bordering Thailand. Fighting had even crossed over the Thai border. China

warned sternly that it would not stand idly by if the Vietnamese entered Thailand.

(The United States had also given such warnings publicly and indirectly through the

Soviets in relations to a Vietnamese invasion of Thailand.)

Since the beginning of Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea Beijing had howled

and threatened for Vietnam to pull out of Kampuchea. The Vietnamese, under their

protective shield of a Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union, blatantly ignored

Beijing’s saber rattling. As long as Vietnam remained in Kampuchea the Chinese

looked like a toothless paper tiger, far from being a nation to be respected, feared or

71

“An Interview with Teng Hsiao-p’ing” TIME Feb. 5, ’79; p33

66

taken seriously. As stated in Bui Diem’s article: A New Kind of War in Southeast

Asia; “…China [needed] to regain ‘face’ (surely it is not necessary to remind the

reader that ‘face’ is still an important factor in Asian Politics.)”72

Deng was not going

to be ignored and disrespected. At an American press luncheon Deng laid it out on the

line.

“One, for us Chinese, we mean what we say. The

Second point: We Chinese do not act rashly.”

- Deng Xiaoping73

The Soviets and Vietnamese did not view Deng’s trip as a friendly jester

between nations looking to normalize relations. They perceived the Deng visit as a

search for America’s blessing for Chinese military actions against Vietnam. The

Vietnamese Press Agency harshly forewarned Deng that if he did try to put meaning

72

Bui Diem “A New Kind of War in Southeast Asia” ASIAN AFFAIRS May-June ’79; p277 73

Fromm, Joseph “Teng Face to Face: ‘Controlled, Tough, Confident’”

U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT Feb. 12, ’79; 24

67

behind his words he would only “…bring [the Chinese] unpredictable disasters. If

they want to learn a lesson, let them learn from their U.S. masters.”

In Jimmy Carter’s Memories he mentioned a private meeting he held with

Deng during his visit to Washington. According to President Carter’s book Deng did

not seek any type of blessing from the Carter administration for a strike against

Vietnam. He did though mention that China was interested in avoiding war for the

next thirty years in order to give China time to implement the Four Modernizations.

Carter responded that he wished to avoid war indefinitely.

Deng felt in order to prevent war for the next thirty years it was imperative

that the United States remain a presence in Asia. Deng opposed strongly Carter’s

desires to shrink the American military from a “Two and Half War standing”

(meaning that the United was prepared to fight two major wars and a minor conflict

all at the same time) to only a “One and a Half War” standing. China also preferred a

continued American presence in Korea as opposed to a United Korea in alliance with

the Soviet Union. Interestingly the Soviets also preferred the United States remaining

in South Korea, for they feared a united Korea under Chinese influence.

68

Carter also mentioned that the Chinese had contacted him back in the early

part of 1978 encouraging the United States to try to reopen relations with Vietnam.

The Chinese at the time looked at an American-Vietnamese relationship as a way to

moderate Vietnam’s behavior in the region and also hamper its leaning towards the

Soviet Union. The Americans, especially the American people, were not yet

emotionally ready to make reconciliation with communist Vietnam. It would take

nearly twenty years for the Americans to heal enough to even begin the process of

normalizing relations with Vietnam (a severely economical weakened Vietnam after

the fall of the Soviet Union and with a still hostile China as its neighbor). This

weakened Vietnam enabled the Americans to return to Vietnam in a position of

strength to help rebuild Vietnam and hopefully jump-starts its fledgling market

economy.

In 1978 the Soviet Union was still much alive and Deng was determined to

instill in the American President and the American people the threat of the Soviet

Union. He continuously preached for a Chinese-American (and it allies) united front

against the Soviets. The Soviets felt that such a Chinese-American alliance would

offer the Americans little. Since China had little it could give America in return for its

69

economical, technological and military support. Dec. 27th

, 1978 Brezhnev sent a letter

to Jimmy Carter. According to President Carter the letter was ‘…almost paranoid

about the PRC and demanding that I prevented our western allies from selling any

defensive weapons to the PRC.”74

Even though the Soviets knew that the superpowers

would still have to deal with each other directly, they still feared a stronger China.

74

Carter, Jimmy KEEPING THE FAITH: Memoirs of a President Bantam Books; New York; 1982;

p201

70

BUILD UP TO WAR

Soon after Deng’s return from the States, the PLA began to deploy along the

Vietnamese border. The Chinese had not had an ambassador in Vietnam for the past

six months. Che Chih-fang was withdrawn June 15th

for “reasons of health” at the

height of the exodus of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam. The Chinese envoy to Vietnam

in December of ’78 was Yang Kung-su the director of Government Tourism and

Travel Bureau. During all the tensions between China and Vietnam at the time the

Vietnamese ambassador to China, Nguyen Trong Vinh was never recalled, even as

60,000 Chinese troops massed on his nation’s border. February 10th

, 1979 Beijing

described these troops as main force divisions (Striking forces of the PLA) supported

by eight local divisions. They also brought near the Vietnamese border fifteen

squadrons (consisting of ten aircraft each) of Chinese copies of Soviet MIG 17’s,

MIG 19’s and MIG 21’s. In contrast the Vietnamese were able to put in the air 120

new Soviet built MIG 23’s, a few high altitude MIG 25’s and 75 captured American

F5’s.75

75

Middleton, Drew “Chinese Options for Any Move on Vietnam” NEW YORK TIMES

Feb.10, ’79; pA3

71

With or without an actual American blessing for China’s invasion of Vietnam,

Deng behaved as if he had received one. As Vietnam had hoped to shield itself from a

Chinese assault with its alliance with Russia, China, justifiably or not, used Deng’s

trip to America as a sign that China was now under the protection of the American

shield. It was thought that their newfound relationship with the United States would

counter any aggressive reactive moves on the part of the Soviets.

As an extra diplomatic bonus for China, Atal Bihari Vajpayee (India’s Foreign

Minister) went to Beijing for talks with his Chinese counter-part Huang Hua. In 1967

India and China had clashed on their common border. Vajipayee’s visit was to release

the tensions between the two countries. The released tensions on China’s Indian

border freed up to at least 150,000 Chinese troops to be re-deployed onto their Soviet

and Vietnamese borders.

In spit of all these troop build-ups, the Vietnamese continued to harass

Chinese border forces with minor clashes on and just behind the Chinese border. The

Vietnamese insisted that the French in exchange for trade concessions had unjustly

given Vietnamese territory to the Qing Dynasty in 1897. In January during a fierce

72

three-day clash, both the Chinese and Vietnamese admitted to losing up to 1,900

troops on their common border.

By Feb 14th

one third of China’s 5,000 combat aircraft were positioned in

striking range of Vietnam. By February 16th

over 650,000 Chinese troops were

deployed on the Chinese-Vietnamese border. Meo Mountain nomads of Laos

supported by the Chinese formed a resistance against Vietnamese occupation troops.

Out of a population of three million a quarter of a million people fled their homes in

Laos for refugees camps in Thailand. The Khem Rouge also became more active as

the winds of war blew strong from China. The Soviets in response to all the tensions

increased their air patrols on the Soviet-Chinese border. The Soviets, according to

American intelligence sources, by January of 1979 had already built up their own

forces ‘qualitatively and quantitatively’ on China’s Northern boarder.76

The Chinese

had placed their forces on high alert in China’s Northwestern region Dung-Bei (East

North: Manchuria). Dung-Bei was China’s industrial and natural resource heartland

with only the Amur River dividing it from the Soviet Union.

76

Karnow, Stanely “East Asia in 1978 The Great Transformation”

FOREIGN AFFAIRS 57:3; ’79; p590

73

The Chinese also worried about the Soviets making a western assault into

Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu (The Tarim Basin) China’s most western province North of

Tibet and bordering on the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The old Silk Road, China

ancient link to the Middle East and Europe, moved west from China through the Jades

Gates Pass into Xinjiang where the road splits and runs along the northern and

Southern boundaries of the Tarim Basin. Senator Henry Jacksons (D) of Washington,

was told by the Chinese that the government ordered the evacuation of a city in

Xinjiang with a population of 300,000 people in case of Soviet retaliatory strike into

the basin.

“As ideal terrain for a Soviet tank offensive,

sparsely populated [Xinjiang] is one of China’s most vulnerable

regions should confrontation with Vietnam lead to a wider war

with the USSR. For this reason [Xinjiang’s] potential defenses

must be strengthened as much as possible before any decision to

‘teach Vietnam a lesson’ is taken, some analysts suggest.”77

77

Meritz, Federic A. “Friendly India Visit May Trigger China Troop Shift to USSR Area”

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Feb. 16, ’79; p10

74

WAR

“I would bet it won’t happen – but we are very much in

danger of a Third World War” – Sen. Daniel Moynihan of NY78

On February 17th

, 1979 China struck along their common border with

Vietnam. The theater of battle was remote, heavily wooded and mountains with little

infrastructure for either side to mobilize large modern armies. From the outset of the

military operation the Chinese officials said that the military operation would be

limited in scope and duration. It was said to be in response to continued Vietnamese

attacks along and across their common border. General Hsu Shih-yu, the 73-year-old

ranking general of Southern China was put in command of the whole operation. Hsu

was instrumental in bringing Deng back into power.

In second-in-command, and the actual tactical commander of the invasion,

was General Yang The-chih. The 69-year-old general had commanded the Chinese

forces in Korea, explaining, perhaps, the common Chinese tactic of human wave

78

“A War of Angry Cousins” TIME; March 5,’79; p26

75

attacks on Vietnamese positions (The same tactic that was used against the Americans

in Korea). General Yang was born in 1910 the son of a poor blacksmith in Hunan

province. As a boy he worked as a coal-miner and a porter. He joined the communist

party and moved up through the ranks. He ended up commanding the vanguard

regiment during the Long March. He later fought the Japanese during World War

Two. During the Korean conflict he at first commanded three armies and for the last

year of the conflict he became the theater commander. Yang was lucky that the

Cultural Revolution had not touched him. An experienced military commander and

loyal and honored member of the party, Yang though was not prepared for the

Vietnamese.

General Yang’s and General Hsu’s opposites were first of the all the world

famous General Vo Nguyen Gaip. At 67 General Gaip was younger than his Chinese

counterparts, but he did not lack experience. General Gaip led the Vietnamese armies

in defeating the French in the First Indochina War and the Americans in the Second

Indochina War. Although suffering from Hodgkin’s disease since 1974, he had at his

command a battle-hardened army that was more than a match for the People’s

76

Liberation Army. General Van Tien Doug who had captured Saigon, was the 61-year-

old second in command at the time of the Chinese invasion.

At 04:00 Hours (Beijing time) Saturday morning the Chinese attacked with

150,000 troops supported by armor and under the cover of air support. They crossed

the border at so many points it was unknown to the Vietnamese what were the

Chinese true objectives. The invasion seemed to catch the Vietnamese completely by

surprise. At the time of the invasion most of Vietnam’s top leadership was in Phnom

Penh. This included Prime Minister Phan Van Dong, Army Chief of Staff General

Van Tien Dung, Foreign Minister Trinh, and Deputy Prime Minister Le Thanh Ngn.79

To make matters worse most of the Vietnamese regular army units were preoccupied

in Kampuchea. The Vietnamese were using only local militias to face the brunt of the

PLA offensive. Luckily for the Vietnamese, due to the tension that was brewing

between the two countries, the Vietnamese frontier with China was honeycombed

with, barbed wire, tank traps, and trenches. These defenses added greatly to the

militia’s ability to obstruct the advancing Chinese.

79

Butterfield, Fox “Details are Sketchty”; NEW YORK TIMES; Feb. 19, ’79; pA10

77

As the days passed the main thrusts of the Chinese were along the rail lines

that connected the two nations. The lines had been constructed during the Second

Indochina War to support the North Vietnamese against the Americans. Before the

out break of hostilities between China and Vietnam, all passenger traffic had been

halted on the northern railroads due to the massive troop build ups along the Sino-

Vietnamese border. By the 18th

of February, it was clear that the PLA’s main pushes

were along these rail lines, yet their true objectives were still unknown. Was this a

limited harassing assault, a plunge deep into Vietnam to strike at Hanoi the

Vietnamese capital, or was this an invasion of conquest to seize large sections of

Vietnam’s northern frontier? China at the time made no mention of their war

objectives, and did not make any demands on the Vietnamese. Surprisingly the

Chinese did not tie in their assault to Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea, their ties

with the Soviets, their mistreatment of ethnic Chinese, or the disputed sovereign of

the Paracel or Spartly Islands.

The Chinese purposely did not place any conditions on the Vietnamese or state

any objectives in order to leave them (if things did get too hairy) a flexible position to

withdraw at any moment, without the risk of losing face. To third nation diplomats to

78

the United Nations the Chinese described their full scale invasion as merely

“…another skirmish and that the more important issue was the…Cambodian

complaint.”80

In a coordinated effort, guerrilla activity in Kampuchea increased

greatly against Vietnamese forces.

The Soviets at first responded to their ally being attacked by China with only

oratorical assaults and saber rattling.

“China’s attack against Vietnam is added proof of Beijing’s

grossly irresponsible attitude to the destinies of peace and of the

criminal ease with which the Chinese leadership turns to arms.

“The heroic Vietnamese people, which [have] become

victims of a fresh aggression, [are] capable of standing up for

[themselves] this time again, and furthermore [they have] reliable

friends. The Soviet Union will honor its obligation under the

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the

Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

80

Teltsch, Kathleen “Vietnamese Seek ‘Appropriate Measures’ by U.N.” NEW YORK TIMES;

Feb.18,’79; pA11

79

“Those who decide policy should stop before it is too late.

“Hands off Socialist Vietnam!” - TASS81

After two days of fighting within Vietnamese territory the Soviets had still not

acted upon their agreement with the Vietnamese. Actually during the whole month

long conflict the Soviets never did enter the war. One of China’s suggested objectives

crystallized: The invasion of Vietnam showed that the Soviet Union was a “Paper

Polar Bear”. The Soviet’s lack of direct action illustrated that Vietnam and other

nations that coveted Soviet protection were not safe from China’s wrath. It also

depicted to the Western powers that the Soviets were not the bogeyman. The Soviets

throughout the conflict continually threatened Beijing that they would enter on the

side of the Vietnamese if the Chinese did not, without hesitation, withdraw from

Vietnam. Yet the Soviets never did enter the conflict directly. The Chinese called the

Soviet’s bluff (unless one considers one month of fighting and then withdrawing as

withdrawing “without hesitation.”)

81

Butterfield, Fox “Chinese Border Commander: Yang The-Chih”; NEW YORK TIMES; Feb. 19, ’79;

pA11

80

The Soviets did posture themselves to strike. All military leaves were

cancelled. The Soviets sent two naval task forces into the waters off the Vietnamese

coast. Other Soviet naval forces were deployed to shadow Chinese ships (Those

Soviet vessels were in turn shadowed by American ships.) Military aid to Vietnam

was increased greatly by the Soviets. All along the Chinese-Soviet and Chinese-

Mongolian borders more than 30 Soviet ground divisions and air units were beefed up

and placed on high alert. This included the Soviet’s “elite” 6th

Airborne Division at

Khabarovsk.82

The Soviets were poised to open up the conflict on China’s

northwestern and northern flanks.

In spite of China portraying the Soviets as a “Paper Polar Bear” to the world,

they were still playing it safe. Japanese sources reported that the Chinese had

evacuated civilians from at least three areas along the Chinese-Soviet border.83

Most

of China’s 3.6-million man army still faced the Soviets not Vietnam.

Deng even made it clear that they had contemplated the possibility of Soviet

retaliation but decided “If we are afraid of that, other people would think us soft.”84

82

Lewis, John “Soviets Beef up Pacific Might on Kuriles” CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR; Feb.

16, ’79; p7 83

“Why China Shakes its fist” U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT; March 5, ’79; p21-24 84

Kramer, Barry “Teng says that China Might Withdrawal Troops From Vietnam in about 10 Days”

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL; Feb. 27, ‘79

81

Deng also added “We estimated that the Soviet Union will not take too big an action.

If they should really come, there is nothing we can do about it. We are prepared

against them. I think our action is limited, and it will not give rise to a very big

event.”85

“The invasion revealed some limits to Soviet power by

demonstrating that an ally of the Soviet Union could be molested

with relative impunity. This was a lesson bound not to be lost on a

number of observers, notably those potentially threatened by the

Soviet Union.” –Brzezinski86

To this day it is still debated who called who’s bluff. Did the Chinese show the

world that the Soviets were not to be feared or trusted as an ally? Or did the Chinese

purposely shorten the conflict with Vietnam and never clearly state their objectives in

the conflict because they did actually fear Soviet intervention? Throughout the entire

85

Cowan, Edwerd “Carter Calls for Quick Withdrawal by China in Message to Its Leaders” NEW

YORK TIMES; Feb. 28, ’79; pA1 86

Young, Marilyn B. THE VIETNAM WARS 1945-1990; Harper Collins; New York; 1991; p311

82

invasion the Chinese repeatedly stated that the invasion would be “limited and of

short duration.” To best answer this question one can only hypothesize what the

Chinese would have done if there were no Soviet threat.

Maybe the Chinese would have driven all the way to Hanoi if it were not for

the Soviet threat. Or perhaps it was the PLA’s own incompetence that deterred the

Chinese from striking for the Vietnamese’s jugular. Being a modern power or not the

Chinese could have crushed Vietnam with the sheer weight of numbers of its military

force. Yet during the whole conflict the bulk of China’s military forces were tied up

on the Soviet border. Therefore it can be safely assumed that the Soviet factor did

play heavily upon Beijing’s decision-making process during the conflict. The Soviet’s

relationship with Vietnam did protect Vietnam from the Chinese, much as the United

States relationship with Taiwan is, to date, still deterring Chinese military action

against the island nation.

By February 21st the Chinese had advanced 10 miles into Vietnam. They had

taken the city of Lao Cai, which is 175 miles northwest of Hanoi. The city is located

on a direct rail line between the Vietnamese Capital and Yunnan. The Chinese paused

to re-supply and consolidate their positions. Due to Chinese logistical difficulties they

83

were continuing to use Korean War tactics of advancing in short bursts. The PLA was

discovering its shortcomings as a modern military force. Vietnam, which claimed it

was the third greatest military force in the world, was successfully harassing the PLA

supply lines with Mao’s own guerrilla war tactics. PLA troops reported going without

fresh drinking water for up to two days and nights.87

The Vietnamese claimed that they had inflicted on the Chinese in the first 48

hours of the conflict the same number of loses the United States Army suffered during

the Normandy landing.88

The mountainous northern terrain of Northern Vietnam was

ideal for guerrilla war tactics. The outdated Chinese Soviet modeled T-34 tanks and

supply columns were forced to move through narrow passes making them extremely

vulnerable to Vietnamese troops armed with Soviet supplied Sagger anti-armor

missiles. The Vietnamese were also armed with captured American 177mm and

130mm Howitzers, which outranged the antiquated Chinese copied Soviet artillery.

Along the coastal plain the Chinese sent three divisions into Vietnam. Two

divisions spearheaded the assault with the third division held in reserve. Yet their

momentum was halted as the units waited to be re-supplied. The Chinese though

87

Chinese Veterans interviewed on “The Great Wall of Iron”; prod. Stephen Amezdroz; BBC; 1990 88

Middleton, Drew “Questions Persist on China’s Military Goal” NEW YORK TIMES; Feb.21,’79;

pA8

84

claimed that they were inflicting great losses upon the Vietnamese. In spite of these

difficulties the Chinese at the time claimed to wiping out three Vietnamese divisions,

killing and wounding up to 10,000 troops while losing only 2-3,000. These claims are

difficult to believe. During the whole conflict both sides seemed to make wild claims

of success in the face of the enemy. Without objective reports on either side of the

conflict it is extremely difficult to determine what truly happened on the front at the

time. Both sides even accused each other of using chemical weapons, yet to date there

has been no third party verifications that either side resorted to chemical weapons.

Interestingly as both sides heightened their propaganda campaigns to win

international support, the Chinese keep their war rhetoric to a very low key on the

home front. For this paper several Chinese nationals (that were living in China at the

time of the conflict) were interviewed. All of those interviewed mentioned that there

was almost no mention of the war by the Chinese government. This was a direct

contradiction of typical Chinese Communist Party (CCP) practices whenever they

engaged the PLA in a foreign war. During the Korean War, the political propaganda

was so heated that Chinese citizens would name their children at the time with names

85

such as “Hands off Korea”, “Support our Korean Brothers” and “End American

Imperialism”, for example.

During the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict there were no wall posters to rally the

people to support the war effort. Only the Chinese Press Agency was authorized to

disseminate news of the conflict. This was extremely limited. The first shreds of

information about the war were not released to the Chinese public until February 26th

,

1979, nine days after the outbreak of the war. The report spoke only of PLA soldiers

sacrificing themselves so their units could advance, refuting ‘Vietnamese

invincibility”, and connecting the invasion to Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea.

Most notably was that casualty figures were not at all given. The Chinese

intentionally downplayed the conflict on the home front in order for it not to affect the

daily lives of the average Chinese. According to those interviewed for this paper the

only real knowledge of the war was from families that had sons, husbands, brothers or

cousins serving in the PLA and were actively involved in the fighting. The one image

that all most recalled was the number of Chinese soldiers returning home with

missing limbs or in body bags.

86

All those interviewed stated that what little reporting the people did receive

from the government about the war, most did not believe anyhow “We had learned

from the Cultural Revolution not to believe anything the government claimed” one

interviewee stated. Draft dodging was epidemic in China. Families feared for their

relatives to be called up to serve in Vietnam and assisted in helping them escape from

the military. Self inflicted wounds were also reported as common among those

avoiding military service and from troops already on the front in order to be sent back.

Draft dodgers on the most part were caught by the authorities and punished.

The Government did not seem to want to get the public into a war fever during

the conflict, or they were too embarrassed in their lack of success in obtaining a

deceive blow against the Vietnamese. It was not until the conflict was over that the

government aired a “documentary” about their war with Vietnam. The main argument

of the film was how the Vietnamese had bitten the hand that fed them. Films were

shown of captured arms stores that the Chinese had sent to the Vietnamese to fight the

Americans, but were “instead being hoarded and stashed near the Chinese border to

be used against the [Chinese] in some future date.” The documentary also reiterated

87

how the Chinese forces were victorious in the war. They had “taught Vietnam a

lesson” and “exploded the myth of the invincibility of the Vietnamese army.”

Originally the PLA invaded Vietnam at 26 points along the border. As the

invasion progressed they consolidated their offensive to five main thrusts.89

Most

notabile were the offensive pushes along the coast towards Mon Cai, the northeast rail

line towards Lang Soong, the northwest rail line from Yunnan and another major

thrust for Cao Bang 110 miles north-northeast of Hanoi.[see Map: Sino-Vietnamese

border]

February 23rd

the Battle of Lang Soon (80 miles northeast of Hanoi) raged. For

the first time Vietnamese Regulars were engaged along with the paramilitary forces

that had been alone conducting the defense of the nation. By the 24th

the Chinese

massed up to 70,000 troops outside Lang Soon. Both sides at the time were moving

heavy equipment into the battle theater of Lang Soon. The Vietnamese were dug in

South and Southwest of the city. The Chinese held the high ground to the Northeast

and Northwest of Lang Soon. The airforces of both sides were very active but

avoiding each other. Dogfights were unheard of. They both reserved their air power to

89

Chanda, Nayan BROTHER ENEMY: THE WAR AFTER THE WAR Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,

publisher; San Diego; 1986; p356

88

support ground units. Lang Soon seemed to be China’s main objective. It was a

provincial capital laying on the important rail line that ran from deep inside China to

Hanoi. It was also the one spot on the theater of operation that the Chinese faced

Vietnamese regulars. If they could win a decisive victory at Lang Soon the Chinese

could claim they had defeated the Vietnamese best.

Meanwhile at the United Nations in New York the Soviets and the Chinese

faced each other for world support. Mikhail A. Kharlamov, the Soviet ambassador

lashed out against the Chinese as “a nation bent on expansion”. He did not only

criticize the Chinese for the invasion of Vietnam but for also arming anti-government

forces in a number of countries. Chen Chu (The delegate to the U.N.) accused the

Soviets of encouraging Vietnam into reckless expansionism. He once again spoke the

now official CCP line that Moscow was using Vietnam as a “pawn or Cuba” in

Asia.90

The Communist world and its allies seemed to be mostly in support of

Vietnam. For it was perceived by the World’s left that China was led by a “Capitalist

Roader” who was leaning his Communist nation to the West. In Prague 1,000 Check

90

Teltsch, Kathleen “U.S., in U.N., calls for invader to Quit Vietnam and Cambodia” NEW YORK

TIMES; Feb. 24, ‘79

89

and Vietnamese youth demonstrated outside the Chinese embassy. “…Cubans were

ready to shed their blood in defense of Vietnam” Quoted Garnma (official Cuban

government newspaper).91

The leftist Labor Party of Great Britain responded by

criticizing the government’s plans to sell Harrier jump jets to China.

“We openly declare that we stand on the side of Vietnam

against the Chinese invasion…[China’s invasion was]

incomprehensible for a power which is supposed to be on the side

of progressive forces.” – Saleh Khalef (abu lyad) Second in

command of the PLO92

In the West the governments did not seem to take sides at all in the conflict.

The British government stated that all foreign troops should return home. Referring

not to just the Chinese forces in Vietnam but also the Vietnamese forces in

Kampuchea. This was also the official position of the United Stated States.

91

Reuters “Cuba Condemns China” NEW YORK TIMES; Feb. 19, ’79; pA6 92

“Palestinian Guerrillas Assail China for Vietnam Strike” NEW YORK TIMES; Feb. 21, ’79; pA8

90

The Americans did not even cancel their diplomatic trip of Treasury Secretary

Blumenthal to China, claiming that the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict and Sino-American

trade relations were completely different issues. In contrast later that same year when

the Soviets invaded Afghanistan to support the besieged communist government, the

Carter administration prohibited the American Olympic team from participating in the

Moscow Olympic games.

“Respect for independence and territorial integrity of all

nations and reliance on peaceful means to resolve disputes are the

fundamental principles of international conduct.

“Any erosion of these principles harms all nations. Even

limited invasions risk wider wars and turn public opinion against

the transgressor. Let there be no doubt as to the American position

on this matter.” – Blumenthal93

93

Butterfield, Fox “Peking Rules out a Drive for Hanoi” NEW YORK TIMES; Feb. 26, ’79

91

The Indians on the other hand cut short their ambassador’s (Foreign Minister

Atal Bihari Vajpayee) visit by one day, in response to the outbreak of hostilities

between China and Vietnam. In spite of this Vajpayee declared that his meetings with

Chinese Foreign Minister Haung Hua were successful.

The Americans, still handicapped by their post-Vietnam mentality were not in

a position to take an active part in the conflict. They contented themselves to

diplomacy, urging all sides to exercise restraint. The Americans were quite aware that

the conflict could blow up very easily into a larger global conflict. Their greatest

concern was about how the Soviets would respond. American naval forces were

deployed to shadow Soviet fleets. The USS Constellation along with its task force was

dispatched from the Philippines to the South China Sea. American surveillance

satellite information, related to Soviet deployment along the Sino-Soviet border, was

even given to the Chinese.

The Americans did not give any intelligence information about the

Vietnamese military theater, claiming that there was too much cloud cover. Although

it is more likely that the Americans did have the intelligence information but did not

want to actively assist the Chinese in their war effort. But by giving the Chinese

92

intelligence information about Soviet deployments the Carter administration properly

hoped that this would have a sobering effect on Beijing; by illustrating to them the

clear and real threat of a greater conflict with the Soviets if Beijing let the war

continue or widen.

Jimmy Carter had tried to deter the Chinese from entering Vietnam back when

Deng was visiting the United States. The Chinese Vice Premier asked for the

American President’s comments about his plan to invade Vietnam. It seemed though

that the Chinese leader was not looking for advice. It was clear he had already decided

to strike Vietnam. It was clear that he was only looking for the American Presidents

agreement to the decision.

“Fritz, Cy, Zbig and I went with Deng and

interpreters…listened carefully as the Chinese leader outlined his

tentative plans for China to make a punitive strike across its border

into Vietnam. When he asked for my advice, I tried to discourage

him, pointing out that the Vietnamese were increasingly isolated in

the world community and were being condemned because of they

93

were aggressors, having crossed the border into Kampuchea. It

might arouse sympathy for them and cause some nations to brand

China as a culprit if Chinese forces moved toward Hanoi.

Furthermore, I said, his potential military move would help refute

one of our best arguments for the new Sino-American relationship:

stability in Asia. The Vice Premier thanked me for my comments,

and added that it was highly desirable for China that its arrogant

neighbors know they can not disturb it and other countries in the

area without impunity.”94

Based on the response of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)

Deng’s response to Vietnam was the correct action to obtain stability in the region.

Thailand especially appreciated China’s intervention. For it was Thailand that was

taking on its shoulders most of the burden of housing refugee camps of those fleeing

the hostilities in Indo-China caused by Vietnam’s aggressions. The fighting in

94

Carter, Jimmy KEEPING THE FAITH: MEMOIRS OF A PRESIDENT; Bantam Books; New York;

1982; p206

94

Kampuchea had on more than one occasion spilled over the border into Thailand. The

Vietnamese outnumbered the Thai army of 140,000 by 4 to 1. The Vietnamese also

had 900 Soviet and captured American tanks; the Thais could only field 150 outdated

tanks. Vietnam’s airforce was also double the strength of the Thais’. Prime Minister

Kriangsak Chamanan of Thailand (supported by the United States) on the 6th

of

February requested the Carter administration for additional arms to “ward off

communist incursions”95

“We are very interested in seeing the integrity of Thailand

protected, the borders not endangered or even threatened by the

insurgent troops from Vietnam in Cambodia…In some instances,

the invading forces into Cambodia have deliberately stayed away

from the border itself and of course the Chinese give Thailand very

strong support.” – President Carter Jan. 17th

, ’79 96

95

Wallace, James N. “Why Fears of War Spread in Asia” U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT; March 5,

’79; p37-39 96

Gwertzman, Bernard “Carter Says U.S. Warned Vietnam and Soviet Not to Threaten Thais” NEW

YORK TIMES; Jan. 18, ’79

95

The Soviets and the Vietnamese both supported a pro-Vietnamese communist

party in Thailand placing internal pressures on the Thai government along with the

pressure along its border. Prime Minister Chamanan went as far as to visit Moscow to

plead to the Soviets to encourage the Vietnamese to control their behavior in the

region.

The Malaysians did not fear falling like a domino to Vietnamese aggression as

the Thais did. They did though worry that Vietnamese success in the region might aid

in the reemergence of the Malaysian Communist Party.

“One would be tempted to trust the Chinese more than the

Vietnamese. At least the Chinese are not the wolves at the

doorstep.” – A Malaysian Cabinet Official97

Both Indonesia and Malaysia, nations with large Chinese ethnic populations,

might have favored the short-term actions of the Chinese against the Vietnamese, but

97

Strasser, Steven “The Worried Dominoes” NEWSWEEK; Jan. 22, ’79; p35

96

they were also sincerely concerned about China’s long term ambitions. Both nations

were not willing to completely sanction the Vietnamese in the conflict, for they

looked at Vietnam as a buffer to Chinese hegemonism. They hoped to reach out to the

Vietnamese and perhaps even someday wean them away from the Soviet block. In the

short term they did realize that Vietnam and the Soviets were the immediate threat to

Southeast Asia. So they hesitantly supported China’s actions.

Singapore, with a large ethnic Chinese majority and leadership supported the

Chinese invasion of Vietnam, although publicly the government called for restraint

upon China and connected the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Vietnam with the

withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea.

“China should not have taken the law into its own

hands…Vietnam has no right to send its armed forces into

Democratic Kampuchea and to impose a regime on that

country.” – T.T. D Koh Rep. of Singapore98

98

Teltsch, Kathleen “Peking and Hanoi Assailed by Asian Neighbor at U.N.” NEW YORK TIMES;

Feb. 28, ’79; pA7

97

On July 28th

, 1995 Vietnam was admitted into ASEAN (the first communist

nation to do so). But by this time in history Malaysian and Indonesian influence had

become stronger. Vietnam was no longer in Kampuchea and was no longer

considered a threat to Thailand’s security. Fears of post-Tiananmen Square Chinese

hegemony became the dominant factor in Asia of the 1990’s.

In present day Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia the Chinese

minorities dominate large portions of the local economies. The ethnic Chinese often

invested millions of US dollars in China’s economy as opposed to re-investing their

profits into the economies of their host nations. Presently Asia is spiraling into

economic depression and a horrific backlash is materializing in the form of anti-

Chinese racism. Indonesia, to date, has been the guiltiest in assaults on their ethnic

Chinese. Riots on Chinese properties, murder, and rapes were rampant in 1998 after

the collapse of the Indonesian economy. ASEAN’s support of China during their

“punitive” attack on Vietnam in 1979 was merely a circumstance of the times.

The Japanese publicly opposed the Chinese invasion as “unlawful”, yet were

not willing to publicly sanction China for its attack on Vietnam. They, like the

98

Americans and most nations in the region wanted to link Chinese withdrawal with the

Vietnamese withdrawing from Kampuchea.

“No matter what reason, it is not right to send troops to

another country…I am saying they [the Chinese] are not right.

“We are avoiding calling the Chinese action aggression or

describing it is hegemonistic…we should first make them call off

the fighting and solve the dispute in a peaceful manner.” – Foreign

Minister Sunao Sonda of the Japanese Diet99

Sonda, saying that the Chinese were not right, was also not saying the Chinese

were wrong. He was also making it clear to the Vietnamese that if they truly wished

support from the nations in the region and the West they would have to pull out of

Kampuchea and change their own aggressive behavior. It is difficult for people to feel

pity when a thief is robbed.

99

Lewis, John “Japan Feels Trapped in Asia Standoff: Now it Must Walk Fine Line Between China

and USSR” THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR; March 6, ’79; p8

99

Within the United Nations the debate of Indochina went on. The Vietnamese

appealed to the U.N. to assist in ending the fighting but did not formally request a

hearing by the Security Council. Perhaps they feared that such a hearing would just

open up the issue of their own aggression in Kampuchea. It also must not be forgotten

that China sat on the Security Council with the power to veto any resolution passed by

the council if it did sanction China or call for any type of intervention by the United

Nations. Chen Chu (the UN Rep. of China) had already stated that China felt

Vietnam’s actions in Kampuchea should be considered on its own. The Chinese

objected to connecting Kampuchea with their military actions in Vietnam.

“This is yet another tragic situation where violence begets

violence and, unless the vicious cycle is broken quickly, can spread

with unforeseeable consequences.”

- Waldheim: Sec. Gen. of the U.N. 100

100

Telsch, Kathleen “Waldheim Ask End To Indochina Strife” NEW YORK TIMES; Feb. 19, ’79; pA10

100

In spite of efforts by the U.N. to peacefully halt the fighting in Indochina it

looked as if the conflict would continue to rage on. With each continued day of

fighting the chances of the war widening into a global conflict increased greatly. On

February 25th

the Vietnamese moved fighter-bombers and surface to air missiles from

Kampuchea to the Sino-Vietnamese Theater. The next day the Chinese once again

announced that the war would be short in duration that they would be pulling back to

the “real” Sino-Vietnamese border; not the borderline Vietnam insisted on.101

On February 27th 1979 the Vietnamese reported that they had struck back at

China. A battalion of its forces struck 15 miles into Chinese territory. According to

the Chinese News agency the Vietnamese attack on a farming commune was repelled,

after three days of fighting.102

The Vietnamese shelled into Ningming County in the Kwanfsi Chuang

Autonomous Region, thrusting into China controlling a four-mile stretch of highway

and a hill that commanded the road. It took the Chinese two days to successfully

counter-attack and regain the territory, killing or wounding 68 Vietnamese troops. 101

Kramer, Barry “China’s Invasion of Vietnam Continues as UN meets in Bid to Curtail Fighting”

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL; Feb. 26, ‘79 102

Metz, Fredric A. “Hanoi Hits Back at Peking Foe: Escalating War Sets U.S., Soviets on Edge” THE

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR; Feb. 28, ’79; p1

101

Meanwhile the American Carrier U.S.S. Constellation and its task force arrived in the

South China Sea along with elements of the 7th

Fleet out of Yokosuka Japan. The

American naval forces took up positions to shadow the Soviet fleet. 103

According to

Japanese intelligence a Soviet Alligator class amphibious assault ship was heading

into the region to join up with the Soviet fleet. The Alligator class ship carried Soviet

Marines with offensive strike capabilities.

“The Soviet Communist Party is firmly convinced that a

world war can and must be averted, and is using the might of the

Soviet Union, its influence and authority [to avert that possibility]”

- Andrei P. Kirilenko: Soviet Politburo Member104

American Intelligence reports had the Chinese military commitment up to

200,000 troops by February 28th

. The Chinese claimed to have destroyed seven

Vietnamese missile bases near the Chinese frontier, although they did not report what

103

Middleton, Drew “Chinese Commune Raided” NEW YORK TIMES; Feb. 28, ’79 104

Kramer, Barry “Soviet Intervention Grows More Likely As Vietnam War Drags On, Japanese Say”

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL; Feb. 28, ‘79

102

type of missile bases: surface to air, short or medium range surface to surface missile

batteries? On March 1st the Chinese captured Mong Cai, a Vietnamese coastal town

on the Gulf of Tonkin, yet the main clash was still Lang Soon. The Vietnamese on the

same day claimed to have held back a three-prong attack by the Chinese on Long

Soon. In Pravda Moscow warned that they will “fulfill their obligations.” The official

East German Press Agency reported that East German and Hungarian youths were

ready to go to Vietnam to fight against the Chinese invaders.

The war was having an effect on China. It was not turning into a simple slap

on of the wrist of a “disobedient”, “arrogant”, “rogue” nation. On March 2nd

the

Chinese cancelled a US$ 2.5 billion contract with the Japanese for plant equipment.

“War time credit crunch” was given as the reason.105

As long as China stayed in

Vietnam, international opinion (and domestic opinion, although not vocalized) was

turning against the Chinese government.

The Chinese also discovered that the PLA was lacking greatly in its ability to

conduct a modern war. Logistical problems haunted the PLA from the outset of the

conflict. The PLA’s outdated war machine was proving to be incapable of easily

105

Strout, Richard A. “China: War vs. Modernizing” THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR; Mar. 1,

’79; p1, 11

103

swatting away Vietnamese resistance. If areas of the battlefield had heavy cloud

cover, which is often the case in the sub-tropical mountain ranges of northern

Vietnam, Chinese air support was paralyzed. The Chinese aircraft were also

unequipped for night missions. The Vietnamese Conflict was making it clear how

much China needed the “Four Modernizations”. If China wished to ever be

considered a regional power, not to mention a respected serious player of the global

arena, the PLA needed to be modernized.

“[The] Chinese hoped that within [the] first two weeks of

[the] war that they would have been able to draw the Vietnamese

regular army into a major set-piece battle. Which would offer the

Chinese a victory.

“The Vietnamese in the first round of the war, kept their

regular army out of the fighting, relying on well-armed, hugely

mobile militia and regional forces. These units were beefed up

with individual reinforcements from the regular army.”

104

- James Wallace of U.S. News & World Report.106

Advancing slowly, the Chinese by March 5th

, 1979 had captured Lao Cai

along with four other Vietnamese provincial capitals. The next Day China announced

it’s planned withdrawal. Beijing claimed that they had achieved their planned goals

(although to this day it is still not clear to anyone outside of the Central Committee’s

Military Commission what those planned goals were.)

The Vietnamese’s initial reaction was that the Chinese were bluffing in order

to buy time to bring up reserves in order to continue their offensive. The Swedish

embassy at this time reported that the Hanoi government was still digging shelters

and was ordering all embassies to be prepared for evacuation.

The Vietnamese claimed that in spite of Chinese claims of withdrawing, the

Chinese were still committing “barbarous criminal acts”, including plundering,

bombing people’s homes, and wanton shelling. As the Chinese did begin their

withdrawal the PLA let loose, destroying whatever they could of the Vietnamese

106

Wallace, James “Now China learns A Lesson in Vietnam” U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT; Mar.

12, ’79; p 27-28, 30

105

infrastructure. They withdrew slowly enabling them to destroy factories, bridges and

roads, electricity and telephone networks, and public buildings (including power

plants, hospitals, and schools.)107

The Chinese withdrawal, although destructive, was sincere. The Vietnamese

government official paper Nhan Dan on March 7th

responded, “…to show our good

will for peace, we will allow the invading Chinese army to withdraw their troops, but

if their units continue acts of war on their withdrawal route they will be severely

punished.”

Eleven days later on March 19th

the Chinese withdrawal was completed along

the (according to the Chinese) the “real” border, which happened to be one and half

miles deeper into Vietnam compared to the boundary line before the conflict erupted.

Along this new border the Chinese army has been dug in to this day.

107

Devillers, Philippe “Vietnam in Battle” CURRENT HISTORY Vol. 79, No. 461; Dec. ’79: p216

106

AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSION

The result of the conflict in human lives was, at first reported by the Chinese,

42,000 Chinese killed and wounded and 16,000 Vietnamese killed or captured. The

Chinese claimed that they had successfully “punished” Vietnam, but at a price most

modern powers would not consider a reasonable cost. Since war is a tool of politics,

the most important question is: what did the Chinese accomplish from this war?

Since the Chinese never gave any official reasons for their “punitive” strike, it

must be assumed that their differences and tensions with Vietnam and the Soviet

Union must have been Beijing’s political objective, which were:

1. To halt Vietnamese oppression of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam.

2. To force Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea.

3. To halt Soviet hegemonism.

4. To “reclaim” and occupy disputed territory and take possession of the oil rich

fields of the Spartly Islands.

107

5. To establish China once again as a regional power, and perhaps even a global

power. The Chinese wanted the nations of the world to respect China and to erase

its two centuries of “humiliation”.

1. Vietnamese ethnic Chinese: The conflict did not hamper Vietnamese

oppression against the Vietnamese’s ethnic Chinese population. The exodus of ethnic

Chinese actually increased after the war (table 1). Pao-min Chang in his 1982 article

in The China Quarterly stated, “The Chinese population in South Vietnam has now

been all but completely eliminated. For all practical purposes, the dispute over the

Chinese in Vietnam has therefore virtually become a dead issue in a most bizarre and

tragic way.” Soon after the war the Vietnamese even began to crack down on ethnic

Chinese in Kampuchea. 43,000 ethnic Chinese-Kampucheans were shipped in

Vietnamese trucks across the border into Thailand.

In spite of this failure to protect Overseas Chinese the Beijing government

was still able to entice Overseas Chinese investments to fuel China’s rapid

development in the 1980’s and 1990’s. The reasons for Overseas Chinese investments

were most likely several factors. Due to Beijing’s opening special economic zones the

108

possibilities of cashing in on China’s mythological one billion plus consumer market

was extremely alluring (the same illusive consumer market that launched a thousand

trade vessels to China over a century ago). The 19th

century Western businessman’s

fantasy of selling one pair of shoes to every “Chinaman” and becoming a millionaire

has turned into the fantasy of the 20th

century corporate executive to sell a coke and

hamburger to every Chinese person and increase their world market share.

The second reason for Overseas Chinese investments was the attraction of

China’s cheap labor force along with the advantage of a common cultural and

language as opposed to the language and cultural difference in the cheap labor

markets of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. As the

Pacific Rim nations developed and modernized, cheap labor for industry became

scarce, especially in Taiwan. Taiwanese companies in particular moved their factories

from Taiwan to Mainland China. Ironically, with all the past and present tensions

between Taiwan and China, Taiwan was and is China’s greatest investor in its

unprecedented rapid economic development. From Singapore, to Hong Kong, to

Taiwan, to Mainland China, ethnic Chinese can be heard speaking of the 21st Century

109

as the “Chinese Century”. Ethnic pride, to the point of being chauvinism, seems to be

a greater force than ideological differences.

2. The Occupation of Kampuchea: The Chinese “punitive action” did not in

any way hasten Vietnam’s withdrawal from Kampuchea. It was the future collapse of

the Soviet Union, cutting off Vietnam’s subsides that finally forced Vietnam out.

After the collapse of Communist Eastern Europe the Vietnamese suddenly developed

a desire to become part of the world market economy. These factors probably played

more of a role in Vietnam’s final withdrawal in the 1990’s. With the insertion of

United Nations troops along with the stabilizing return of Prince Sihanouk,

Kampuchea held free elections for the first time.

3. Soviet hegemonism: China’s desire to use the war to curtail Soviet

influence in Southeast Asia was also a failure. The war, if anything, acted as a

catalyst to increase Soviet involvement in the region, until its own implosion (with

great help from President Ronald Reagan’s arms build up of the 1980’s). On March

7th

, 1979 Pentagon officials reported that a Soviet tank-landing ship (which could

110

carry up to 30 Soviet tanks) made a port a call at Danang. Marking the first time for a

Soviet military vessel to use a Vietnamese port.108

Soviet strength in Vietnam rose to 2 carriers, 300 surface ships and subs,

several dozen aircraft including Backfire Bombers (capable of carrying nuclear

weapons which could reach deeply into China.) They also constructed a large-scale

intelligence-gathering network in Vietnam.

Soviet military power after the conflict even increased in Laos. 600 Soviet

military advisors served in Laos to train its armed forces to work along with the

60,000 Vietnamese troops that occupied the nation. The Russians also constructed

electronic stations, to monitor communications in southern China, and modernized

the Laotian airfields.

At the End of 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan not withdrawing until

1989, not a good sign of any type of immediate retardation of Soviet aggression.

4. As for territorial claims; the Chinese have been able to hold onto the one

and half mile extended border into Vietnam since the end of the conflict. The border

between China and Vietnam has become one of the most intensely militarized regions

108

“Hanoi Says Its Prepared for Peace Talks as Soon as Chinese Troops Withdrawal.” THE WALL

STREET JOURNAL March 7th

, ‘79

111

of the world. The Vietnamese heavily fortified their side of the new border and

stationed over a million troops along it. Minor outbreaks along the Vietnamese-

Chinese border continued to sporadically erupt well into the next decade. Both sides

would engage in mining and harassing operations into the other’s territory.

Yet, the Spartly Islands to date are still in dispute and are a deep concern to

peace in Southeast Asia. Recently the Chinese have been mostly clashing with the

Philippine government over the islands.

5) Establishing a new respect in the world as at least a regional player.

China’s poor execution of the Vietnamese campaign and its high casualty rate did

nothing to improve China’s image as a regional power. If anything the war portrayed

China as a clumsy water buffalo in china shop, smashing everything while seriously

injuring itself with large and deep lacerations. Whatever esteem the Beijing

government was able to earn in its “punitive” action against Vietnam, it was quickly

ruined by its horrific actions at Tiananmen Square on June 4th

, 1989.

The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict did achieve at least one unexpected benefit for

Beijing. It clearly illustrated to the Chinese leadership that the PLA was antiquated

and in disorder. “A Chinese Communist Party critique, apparently adopted by the

112

politburo before the troop pullback, admitted that China is not equipped for modern

warfare."109

The final official CCP tally of the PLA was a one to one ratio in losses to

the Vietnamese during the 1979 war. China would never be considered a serious

player in the super power global game with those kinds of statistics.

The PLA was in desperate need of modernization. At the time of the conflict

the Chinese had only one armored vehicle for every 241 troops. In comparison, at the

time, the Soviets had one for every twenty troops and the American had one armored

vehicle for every twenty-three soldiers in its ground forces. The Chinese also lacked

greatly in modern communications. The PLA illustrated great weakness in

coordination of combined arms tactics. Armor and infantry and infantry and artillery

were unable to properly function together.

The greatest weakness of the PLA was its inability to handle basic supply

logistics. The Chinese lacked the proper amount of trucks, transport aircraft, rail lines,

and highways to move units and supplies quickly and efficiently to the front.

Disorganization was so epidemic during the war that the PLA even brought back the

very non-egalitarian concept of ranks. By reestablishing an officer class the Deng

109

Wallace, James “China-Vietnam Peace – Just a Façade” U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT March

19, ’79; p28

113

regime hoped it would prevent such disarrays in any future conflict. The Chinese also

realized that they would need to drastically update their 1950’s style weapons. The

Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 was a watershed for the PLA. It was a lesson hard

learned and in the coming decades the Chinese would make sweeping changes to the

PLA by modernizing and professionalizing it.

As for modernization, the Chinese have engaged in reverse engineering of

captured or bought American weapons from third nations. They have also, as recently

publicly exposed in the Cox report; have been intensely and aggressively involved in

espionage against the United States.

The Chinese have a strong desire to be “respected” and to be taken seriously

as a world power. The peaceful transfer of Hong Kong from Britain to China was

celebrated in China as a victory and end of Chinese “humiliation” (a favorite word of

the Chinese). On the night of the handover the Beijing government aired on CCTV a

special to celebrate the hand over. The high point of the special was a dance

dramatization of struggling 19th

century Chinese firing a mock cannon and sinking a

mock British Man of War. The peaceful transfer of Hong Kong to the Chinese was

illustrated to its people as a Chinese military victory that had never occurred.

114

With Hong Kong repatriated, and Macao about to, China sees Taiwan as its

last lost territory. Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and American support for

Taiwan, China now screams of American hegemonism. China since the Sino-

Vietnamese war has done much to improve its military capabilities. China has had

twenty years to raise a professional officer class for the PLA. They have even opted

to reduce their massive military for a leaner more professional force of quality over

quantity. They have used reverse technology to build weapon systems to sell to third

nations such as Pakistan (a major cause of today’s tensions in the subcontinent.) With

the profits from such sales the Chinese have reinvested them in modernizing their

own military. They have even increased their naval tonnage to build a blue navy.

With the announced stolen American technology, Beijing has developed the

neutron bomb, which they have now been threatening to use against Taiwan. Also

from the fruits of espionage against the United States the Chinese have announced

improved missile technology that can now strike the American East Coast. China for

the first time has also announced that it will not peacefully wait forever for Taiwan to

reunify with the Mainland. The boldness of Beijing’s rhetoric at the dawn of the new

century can be accredited to China’s confidence in its restructured military forces.

115

This restructuring is a result of China’s blooding in the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict of

1979.

Back in 1979 Deng confided with President Carter that China needed thirty

years before it would be willing to engage in a major military conflict. That was

twenty years ago. The sobering effect of China’s war with Vietnam, and the

accelerated modernization effort that resulted from the conflict might have made

China feel cocky enough to feel it does not have to wait another ten years for their

next major war, explaining its bold threats against Taiwan and even the Unites States

in the last couple of years.

If anything can be learned from the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict of 1979 it is the

simple fact that the natural selfishness of tyrannical state. That they will most likely

resort to the use of arms as opposed to compromise, when diplomacy will not achieve

what ever it is they desire. Throughout human history it is hard pressed to think of a

war that was fought between two democracies. The only example one might come up

with is the American Civil War between the Union and the Confederate States

(although a slave state). Nations ruled by dictators, monarchs, or oligarchies (as

communist nations are) will find it difficult to compromise and find peaceful

116

solutions to their foreign affairs. Dictatorships, monarchies, and oligarchies have an

inherit ant nature not to respect the rights of others. They are intolerant of dissent and

seek absolute dominance over their own people. So when the Soviets assisted the

Chinese Communist party’s revolution they naturally assumed that they would

dominate China. When China assisted the Vietnamese Communist party’s revolution

they too assumed that they would dominate Vietnam. But once these revolutionary

governments took power and no longer needed the assistance of a foreign power, they

refused to be subjugated by a foreign capital. Therefore causing dissent and

resentment between all parties.

It was a natural development of events that at the height of the global

expansion of the preliterate dictatorship that the Communist nations would have

turned against each other. Simple, there can only be one dictator in a global

dictatorship.

117

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Becker, Elizabeth, “Inside Cambodia,” Newsweek, January 8, 1979: 27-28.

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Browne, Malcolm W., “Ages-old Animosities Behind Border War,” New York Times,

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1979: A1.

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------------------- “Details are Sketchy,” New York Times, February 19, 1979: A1, A10.

118

------------------- “Incursion by China Placed at 10 miles After New Fighting,” New York

Times, February 21, 1979: A1, A6.

------------------- “Pause Appears Over,” New York Times, February 21, 1979: A1, A6.

------------------- “First War Reports in Peking Depict Charging Chinese,” New York Times,

February 25, 1979: A10.

------------------- “Peking Rules Out a Drive for Hanoi,” New York Times, February 26, 1979:

A1.

------------------- “China Reports It Has Begun Withdrawal From Vietnam,” New York Times,

March 6, 1979: A1, A10.

Carter, President James Earl, Keeping The Faith: Memoirs of a President, New York:

Bantam Books, 1982.

Ceely, John K., “China’s Arms in Vietnam Drive Prove Elusive,” The Christian Science

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Chanda, Nayan, Brother Enemy: The War after the War; San Diego: Harcourt Brace

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Chang, Pao-min; Beijing, Hanoi, and The Overseas Chinese, Berkely, CA:

Institute of East Asian Studies: University of California Press, 1982.

------------------- “The Sino-Vietnamese Dispute Over the Ethnic Chinese,” The China

Quarterly, June 1982: 195-230.

Chen, King C., China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications,

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“China Denies End of Hostilities on Vietnam Border,” The Washington Post, January 23,

1979: 1.

“Chinese Increasing Pressure on Town in Vietnam Attack,” New York Times, February 24,

1979: A4.

“Chinese Troops and Planes Attack Vietnam, U.S. Urges Withdrawal, Hanoi Plea to UN,”

New York Times, February 18, 1979: A1.

119

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“Counter Attack in Defense of Our Frontiers,” Renmin Ribao, February 18, 1979: 9-11.

Cowan, Edward “Carter Calls for Quick Withdrawal by China in Message to Its Leaders,”

New York Times, February 28, 1979: A1.

Deming, Angus and Others, “Hanoi’s Power Play,” Newsweek, January 22, 1979: 29,32-34.

------------------- “China Rattles Its Saber,” Newsweek, February 19,1979: 53.

DeVillers, Philippe, “Vietnam in Battle,” Current History, 79:461, December 1979: 214-218,

225-226.

Diem, Bui, “A New Kind of War in Southeast Asia,” Asian Affairs, 6:5, May-June 1979:

273-281.

Duiker, William J., Vietnam Since the fall of Saigon, Updated Edition, Athens, Ohio:

Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1989.

Fraser, John, “China, Viet Casualties Thousands,” The Christian Science Monitor,

February 22, 1979: 7.

------------------- “Peking’s Viet War May Drag: Teng Hedgess, Hanoi Proves Tough Foe,”

The Christian Science Monitor, February 28, 1979: 1.

------------------- “China ‘Lesson’ For Vietnam: How Effective,” The Christian Science

Monitor, March 7, 1979: 12.

Fromm, Joseph, “Teng Face to Face: ‘Controlled, Tough, Confident’,” U.S. News and World

Report, February 12, 1979: 24.

“Frontier Forces Counter-Attack Vietnamese Aggressors,” Beijing Review, February 23,

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Garver, John W., “Sino-Vietnamese Conflict and the Sino-American Rapprochement,”

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120

Gwertzman, Bernard, “Carter Says U.S. Warned Vietnam and Soviets Not to Threaten Thais,”

New York Times, January 18, 1979: A1.

------------------- “U.S. Warns Chinese Against Attack on The Vietnamese,” New York Times,

February 10, 1979: A1, A3.

“Hanoi Says Its Prepared for Peace Talks as Soon as Chinese Troops Withdraw,”

The Wall Street Journal, March 7, 1979: 1.

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Holbrook Richard, “U.S. Stance in Asia: Strongest ‘Since World War II’,” U.S. News and

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Hood, Steven J., Dragons Entangled: Indochina and the China-Vietnam War, Armonk, NY:

An East Gate Book, M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1992.

“How the Teng-Carter Talks Troubled Russia’s Rulers,” U.S. News and World Report,

February 12, 1979: 23.

Hsu, Immanuel C. Y., The Rise of Modern China, 4th Edition, New York:

Oxford University Press, 1990.

“India’s Defense Chief Tells of Vow by China to Keep Border Calm,” New York Times,

February 21, 1979: A6.

Jencks, Harlen W., “China’s “’Punitive’ War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment,” Asian

Survey, Vol. XIX:8, August 1979: 801-815.

Johnson, Chalmers, “The New Thrust in China’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affair, 57:1, Fall

1978: 125-137.

Kamm, Henry, “Hanoi Reports of ‘Front’ Seeking to Oust Cambodia Regime,” New York

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December 4, 1978: A1, A13.

------------------- “Vietnam Reported Pushing Deeper into Cambodia” New York Times,

December 7, 1978: A3.

121

------------------- “Vietnam Denies It is Fostering Exodus,” ” New York Times, Dec. 13, 1978:

A3.

------------------- “’Liberation’ Group Says it has Formed Regime in Cambodia,” New York

Times,

January 9, 1979: A1.

------------------- “Cambodia Forces Reported in Flight From Angkor Area,” New York Times,

January 11, 1979: A1.

------------------- “Laos Resists Newest Overlord, Hanoi,” New York Times, February 12, 1979:

A2.

------------------- “Battle of Lang Son on Vietnam Border is Reported Begun,” New York

Times, February 25, 1979: A1, A10.

------------------- “Vietnam Says it is Willing to Talk if Chinese Keep Pledge to Pull Out,”

New York Times, March 7, 1979: A1, A4.

------------------- “Asians Appear to Side with Peking against Hanoi,” New York Times,

March 14, 1979: A1.

Karnow, Stanley, “East Asia in 1978: The Great Transformation,” Foreign Affairs, 57:3,

1979: 590-605.

Kleinen, John, “Roots of the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict,” Monthly Review, October 1982: 16-

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Knight, Robin, “New Opportunities for the Kremlin,” U.S. News and World Report,

March 5, 1979: 24.

Kramer, Barry, “China seems to be Withdrawing Troops From Vietnam After Three-day

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------------------- “China, Vietnam Battle Resumes: Casualties Heavy,” The Wall Street

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February 21, 1979: 1.

------------------- “China’s Invasion of Vietnam Continues As UN Meets in Bid to Curtail

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122

------------------- “Teng Says that China Might Withdraw Troops From Vietnam in About 10

Days,” The Wall Street Journal, February27, 1979: 1.

------------------- “Soviets Intervention Grows More Likely as Vietnam War drags On,

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Larkin,Bruce D., “China and Asia: The year of the China-Vietnam War,” Current History,

77:449, September 1979: 53-56, 83.

Levine, Richard J., “Blumenthal Opens Discussion in Peking, Seemingly Unaffected by

Vietnam Clash,” The Wall Street Journal, February 26, 1979: 1.

Lewis, John, “Soviets Beef up Pacific Might on Kuriles,” The Christian Science Monitor,

February 16, 1979: 7.

------------------- “Japan Feels Trapped in Asia Standoff,” The Christian Science Monitor,

March 6, 1979: 8.

MacDonald, Peter, Giap: The Victor in Vietnam, London: Warner Books, 1993.

MacFadden, Robert D., “Hanoi, Peking, Ancient Foes, At War Again,” New York Times,

February 18, 1979: A1.

Meritz, Frederic A “Friendly India Visit May Trigger China Troop Shift to USSR Area,”

The Christian Science Monitor, February 16, 1979: 1,10.

------------------- “Teng’s Brinkmanship – How Far?” The Christian Science Monitor,

February 22, 1979: 1, 9.

------------------- “Delayed Pullout: Chinese Tactic or Viet-Style Mire?”

The Christian Science Monitor, February 23, 1979: 1, 7.

------------------- “Hanoi Hits Back at Peking Foe,” The Christian Science Monitor,

February 28, 1979: 1, 6.

------------------- “Vietnam offers China the Red Carpet Exit,” The Christian Science Monitor,

March 8, 1979: 3.

------------------- “China-Viet Feud: Ready for Talks?” The Christian Science Monitor,

March 19, 1979: 1, 14.

123

------------------- “Putting out the Fires in Indo-China” The Christian Science Monitor,

March 23, 1979: 4.

Middleton, Drew, “Chinese Options for Any Move on Vietnam,” New York Times,

February 10, 1979: A3.

------------------- “A Classic Military Operation,” New York Times, February 18, 1979: A1,

A10.

------------------- “Pause in the Vietnam Battle,” New York Times, February 19, 1979: A1, A10.

------------------- “Questions Persist on China’s Military Goal,” New York Times,

February 21, 1979: A8.

------------------- “Vietnam Drive: Big Clash Seen,” New York Times, February 22, 1979: A6.

------------------- “China’s Lost Chance: No Quick Easy Victory in Vietnam,” New York

Times, February 24, 1979: A1.

------------------- “China’s Soldiers are Put to Test,” New York Times, February 25, 1979: A1.

------------------- “Vietnamese Are Locked in Battle with Chinese at 3 Frontier Towns,”

New York Times, February 26, 1979: A1.

------------------- “Chinese Commune Raided,” New York Times, February 28, 1979: A1.

------------------- “Fighting at Lang Son, A Key Chinese Goal, Now Reported Intense,”

New York Times, March 1, 1979: A1.

------------------- “Lang Son Captured: China is Reported Ready to Pull Out,” New York Times,

March 4, 1979: A1, A14.

------------------- “Peking Warns Hanoi Against any Attack during Withdrawal,” New York

Times, March 5, 1979: A1, A12.

Mount, Frank, “The Prussians of Southeast Asia: Can They be Stopped?” Asian Affairs, 6:6,

July-August 1979: 378-385.

Nagorski, Andrew, “Pol Pot Fights Back,” Newsweek, January 29, 1979: 46,48.

Nielsen, John with Pringle, James, “Grand Masters of War,” Newsweek, March 5, 1979: 31.

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A8.

“Peking Strategy Against Moscow,” Asian Affairs, 9:3, January-February 1981: 131-147.

Porter, Gareth “The Great Power Triangle in Southeast Asia,” Current History, 79:461,

December 1980: 161-164, 195-196.

Ram, Maham, “China’s Hit at Vietnam jars India: Delhi Official Quits Negotiation in

Peking,” The Christian Science Monitor, February 1, 1979: 7.

Reuters, “Cambodia Says Invasion is a “Life-or-Death Struggle,” New York Times,

January 6, 1979: A1.

------------------- “Cuba Condemns China,” New York Times, February 19, 1979: A7.

------------------- “Britain Still Plans Fighter Sale,” New York Times, February 19, 1979: A7.

------------------- “Cambodian Soldiers Driven Briefly Over Thai Border,” New York Times,

March 5, 1979: A12.

------------------- “Vietnam Says Chinese Continue Occupation Despite Pull out Plans,”

New York Times, March 10, 1979: A2.

Robinson, Thomas W., “China’s Asia Policy,” Current History, 79:458, September 1980:

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New York Times, February 18, 1979: A10.

------------------- “Soviet Military Men Assail China, But Shun Any Hint of Retaliation,”

New York Times, February 24, 1979: A1.

Smith, Hedrick, “U.S. Fears Soviet Wants Cam Ranh Bay as Navy Base,” New York Times,

February 25, 1979: A1.

Stout, Richard A., “China: War vs. Modernizing,” The Christian Science Monitor,

March 2, 1979: 1, 11.

125

Sterba, James P., “Teng Welcomed Home by Leaders,” New York Times, February 9, 1979:

A1.

Strusser, Steven with Nagorski, Andrew, “The Worried Dominoes,” Newsweek,

January 22, 1979: 35.

Strusser, Steven with others, “Showdown in Asia,” Newsweek, March 5, 1979: 26-27,29,31-

32.

“Taiwanese Blame U.S. Policy,” New York Times, February 19, 1979, A10

Taylor, Keller Weller, The Birth of Vietnam, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Ltd., 1983.

Teltsch, Kathleen, “Vietnamese Seek ‘Appropriate Measures’ by UN,” New York Times,

February 18, 1979: A11.

------------------- “Waldheim Ask End to Indo China Strife,” New York Times, February 19,

1979: A10.

------------------- “U.S. May Request Debate at UN on Asian Fighting If Others Delay,”

New York Times, February 21, 1979: A6.

------------------- “U.S. in UN, Calls for Invasion to Quit Vietnam and Cambodia,”

New York Times, February 24, 1979: A1.

------------------- “Peking and Hanoi Assailed by Asian Neighbor at UN,” New York Times,

February 26, 1979: A7.

------------------- “UN at Stalemate on Indochina Wars,” New York Times, February 28, 1979:

A1.

Trester, Joseph, “Attack on Vietnamese Compared to the Drive against India in 1962,”

New York Times, February 18, 1979: A10.

Trumbull, Robert, “Vietnam Celebrates the Signing of Pact with Cambodia Regime,”

New York Times, February 21, 1979: A8.

“UN Council Talks on Cambodia Widen,” New York Times, January 13, 1979: A1.

UPI “China Bans Comment on Vietnam Fighting,” New York Times, February 19, 1979, A6

UPI, “A Cuban Envoy Pledges All the Aid Hanoi Needs,” New York Times, March 4, 1979:

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126

“Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Rivalry,” Asian Affairs, 6:1, September-October 1978: 1-31.

“Vietnamese Authorities Agitate for War Against China,” Renmin Ribao, February 18, 1979:

11-14.

“Vietnam Charges Chinese Continue ‘Barbarous Acts’,” New York Times, March 6, 1979:

A2.

“Vietnamese Not Severing Diplomatic Tie to China, Their Envoy Says,” New York Times,

February 19, 1979: A6.

Wallace, James N., “Russia vs. China: Struggle for Asia,” U.S. News and World Report,

February 5, 1979: 27-30.

------------------- “Why Fears of War Spread in Asia,” U.S. News and World Report,

February 19, 1979: 37-39.

------------------- “Now China Learns A Lesson in Vietnam,” U.S. News and World Report,

March 12, 1979: 27-28, 30.

------------------- “China-Vietnam Peace – Just a Façade,” U.S. News and World Report,

March 19, 1979: 28.

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Whitney, Craig R., “Moscow Says Drive into Cambodia is by Vietnamese Supported Rebels,”

New York Times, January 5, 1979: A1.

------------------- “Soviets Contends U.S. Shares Blame in the Chinese Invasion of Vietnam,”

New York Times, February19, 1979: A6.

------------------- “Security Pact Cited,” New York Times, February 19, 1979: A1, A11.

------------------- “Russians Say China Failed to Move to Provoke a U.S.-Soviet Collision,”

New York Times, March 5, 1979: A1.

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Willis, David K., “Soviets React Warily To China,” The Christian Science Monitor,

February 20, 1979: 12.

------------------- “Arms Treaty Periled by Jarring Events,” The Christian Science Monitor,

February 22, 1979: 1, 9.

------------------- “Moscow: Reaping Benefits of Restraint,” The Christian Science Monitor,

March 1, 1979: 1, 9.

------------------- “Soviets claim a ‘Victory’ Over China,” The Christian Science Monitor,

March 6, 1979: 3.

Willey, Fay with others, “Russia’s Options,” Newsweek, March 5, 1979: 28-29.

Wizaltzer, Lewis, “U.S. Asks UN Invasion Debate” The Christian Science Monitor,

February 22, 1979: 9.

------------------- “U.S. Acrobatics in UN Tilt Slightly Towards China,”

The Christian Science Monitor, February 26, 1979: 5.

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