Complaint rev 13_pk... · Web viewThe Plaintiff, Patricia A. Mele-Krage (hereinafter referred to as...

Patricia A. Mele-Krage5708 Candor St.,Lakewood, Ca. 90713

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

PATRICIA A. MELE-KRAGE, Plaintiff,

v.

OCWEN LOAN SERVICING LLC; DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE FOR INDYMAC INDX MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2006-AR4, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES 2006-AR4; and DOES 1 THROUGH 100 INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

)))))))))))))

VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Civil Action No.

The Plaintiff, Patricia A. Mele-Krage (hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiff” or “Patricia”), as

and for her Verified Complaint submitted pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 15

against Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”), Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as

Trustee for IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR4 (“Trust”); and “DOES 1

THROUGH 100 INCLUSIVE”, alleges as follows:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the following statutes: 28

U.S.C. § 1331, providing for “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”; and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), providing for

“supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within

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such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” This Court also

has jurisdiction over the claims, because this case involves New York common law trusts.

2. This Court has supplemental subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,

1337(a), and 1345; under 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(1) with respect to CFPA claims and; under 12

U.S.C. § 2614 with respect to RESPA claims.

3. Specifically, this Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1331, 1343, 2201, 2202, 12 U.S.C. § 2605, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, 1681, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which

confer original jurisdiction on federal district courts in suits to address the deprivation of rights

secured by federal law, as well as the specific grants of federal court jurisdiction under the

federal laws represented by TILA, FDCPA, RESPA, CCPA, the Securities Act of 33, as this is a

civil action arising under the laws of the United States.

4. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(1), because Defendants

are residents of, and/or conduct business in, this District. This Court has personal jurisdiction

over Defendants because they are residents of, and/or conduct business in, this District, and

under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 301, New York’s long arm statute. The claims also relate to Defendant’s

role as trustee over a trust created under New York law and/or administered at least in part in

New York.

PARTIES

5. Plaintiff Patricia is a resident of Los Angeles County, California, and is, in all

respects material hereto, sui juris.

6. Plaintiff Patricia was the heir and beneficiary of Marie J. Mele (original borrower,

henceforth “MJM”), and Plaintiff has been record title holder of the subject property since

February 10, 2012 (Exhibit 7). In addition, Plaintiff, Patricia A. Mele-Krage, daughter of the

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original borrower, had been the attorney in fact under a durable power of attorney for Marie J.

Mele from May 22, 2004 until the death of Marie J. Mele on July 12, 2006, and Patricia was

successor Trustee of Marie J. Mele’s Living Trust and Trustee and Beneficiary of Marie J.

Mele’s Home Trust. Plaintiff Patricia is officially Successor in Interest to Marie J. Mele (Exhibit

8) and stands in the shoulders of the original borrower for all purposes relevant in this lawsuit

and would suffer loss if the property were foreclosed on.

7. Defendant, Ocwen (Ocwen may be referred to herein as “servicer”) is a limited

liability company organized and existing under the laws of the state of Delaware, and doing

business in this district. They can be served with process by and through their Registered Agent

at Corporation Service Company, 80 State Street, Albany, N.Y. 12207.

8. Defendant Trust is a securitized trust organized and existing under the laws of the

state of New York, and doing business in this district. Trust can be served with process on its

trustee Deutsche Bank, at 60 Wall St., N.Y., N.Y.

9. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (“DBNTC”) is only Trustee of the Trust,

and is not a Defendant itself, but must be distinguished from “Deutsche Bank Trust”, which was

Assignee of the Assignment recorded 5/23/2007 (Exhibit 24), and was the named Beneficiary

that initiated foreclosure by a Substitution of Trustee recorded 5/24/2007 (Exhibit 25).

10. Defendants Does 1 through 100 inclusive are individuals or corporations that

aided and abetted in the civil conspiracy to deny Plaintiff due process.

11. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that at all times herein

mentioned, each of the Defendants were the agents, employees, servants and/or the joint-

ventures of the remaining Defendants, and each of them, and in doing the things alleged herein

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below, were acting within the course and scope of such agency, employment and/or joint

venture.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

12. On May 21, 1951, a Grant Deed to Louis R. Mele and Marie J. Mele was recorded

in Book 36139 Page 250 Official Records of Los Angeles County, California (Exhibit 1).

13. Louis R. Mele passed away in 1958.

14. On May 22, 2004, Marie J. Mele granted Durable Power of Attorney to Patricia

A. Mele-Krage.

15. On or about February 24, 2006 (the “Closing”), Plaintiff Patricia’s mother, Marie

J. Mele, refinanced the property located at 5708 Candor Street, Lakewood, California

(hereinafter the “Property”). The Property was refinanced with a mortgage loan allegedly

originated by IndyMac Bank. The alleged original beneficiary and nominee of the Promissory

Note and Mortgage was MERS.

16. On February 24, 2006, Marie J. Mele received an unsigned copy of the Notice of

Right to Cancel (Exhibit 9) and a signed Copy that showed the Transaction Date of February 23,

2006 (Thursday) and a Deadline Date of February 27, 2006 (Monday)(Exhibit 10), which should

have showed a Transaction Date of Friday, February 24, 2006 and a Deadline Date of February

28, 2006 (Tuesday). As a result, no valid Notice of Right to Cancel was received in 2006.

17. Borrower Marie J. Mele had a good credit score & thus could have qualified for a

fixed rate loan, but the broker got paid a Yield Spread Premium (“YSP”) to get her to accept a

worse loan: Omni Funding, the Broker on the mortgage transaction, collected a YSP of more

than $10,000 from Defendant Indymac. The YSP was a direct bribe to Omni for wrongfully

inducing MJM into taking a loan with worse terms, higher interest rates, and higher monthly

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payments, than MJM would otherwise have received. It was disclosed to Marie J. Mele that

her FICO score was 637, Empiricia 633, Beacon 588. Marie J. Mele stated that she wanted a

fixed-rate loan, and a 637 FICO / 633 Empirica should have helped qualify her for a fixed rate

loan.

18. On or about March 6, 2006, the Deed of Trust was recorded as Instrument #2006-

0475875, Official Records, Los Angeles County, CA (Exhibit 3). The first page of the Deed of

Trust was altered without Borrower’s permission after signing, and before recording (Exhibit 2).

MERS was named as Nominee for Indymac Bank FSB.

19. Marie J. Mele grant deeded the property to “Marie J. Mele as Trustee of the Trust

of Marie J. Mele” on March 27, 2006, which was recorded on March 28, 2006 as Los Angeles

County Recorder # 06-0661953 (Exhibit 5). Patricia A. Mele-Krage was a Beneficiary and

Successor Trustee of that Living Trust.

20. Marie J. Mele passed away on July 12, 2006 (Exhibit 4). Patricia A. Mele-Krage

became Successor Trustee of the Trust of Marie J. Mele upon her death.

21. On or about March 13, 2007 (Instrument #2007 0553598 Official Records, Los

Angeles County, Ca.) a Notice of Default was recorded by First American Loanstar Trustee

Services. On June 13, 2007, a Cashier’s Check for $13,668.86 brought the loan current.

22. A Rescission of the Notice of Default was recorded on June 27, 2007 as Los

Angeles County Recorder # 2007-1538474.

23. On May 23, 2007, the Deed of Trust was assigned by MERS to “Deutsche Bank

Trust” at Los Angeles County Recorder #2007-1251412. (Exhibit 24) The Assignment was

signed by “Paige Holen, VP IndyMac Bank FSB”, according to the Notarization.

24. Subsequently, no further Assignments by “Deutsche Bank Trust” were ever

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recorded to any other entity.

25. Some later Assignments were recorded by MERS as Nominee for IndyMac Bank

FSB, and by IndyMac Bank FSB themselves (Exhibits 26, 27, 28, 29), which were VOID after

the 2007 Assignment to Trust, because signed by a non-Beneficiary..

26. On December 19, 2007, Plaintiff sent Defendants a Qualified Written Request

with Dispute of Debt.

27. A Notice of Default by Quality Loan Service was recorded for IndyMac Bank

FSB on April 14, 2008, Trustee Sale # CA-08-1552265-DL.

28. On May 23, 2008, Plaintiff sent Defendants another Qualified Written Request

with Dispute of Debt.

29. A Substitution of Trustee to Quality Loan Service Corp was recorded by IndyMac

Bank FSB on May 27, 2008 at Los Angeles County Recorder # 2008-0925415.

30. A Notice of Sale was recorded on July 18, 2008 at Los Angeles County Recorder

#2008-1284359, which set a sale date for August 8, 2008.

31. On July 31, 2008, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendants requesting a Loan

Modification and a postponement of the sale date to allow time for the process.

32. IndyMac offered a Forbearance with an initial payment of $3,040.00 and a

balloon payment of $15, 574.00 due in 2009.

33. Plaintiff made the initial payment of $3,040.00 and other payments, but were

unable to make the balloon payment in 2009.

34. Patricia A. Mele-Krage, successor Trustee of the Trust of Marie J. Mele, grant

deeded the Property to “Patricia A. Mele-Krage as Trustee for the Home Trust…”, which was

recorded March 6, 2009 as Los Angeles County Recorder # 2009-0493405 (Exhibit 6).

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35. Plaintiff requested a copy of the Notice of Right to Cancel from Indymac in 2009.

36. Indymac sent a signed Copy that showed the Transaction Date of February 23,

2006 (Thursday) and a Deadline Date of February 27, 2006 (Exhibit 10), which should have

showed a Transaction Date of Friday, February 24, 2006 and a Deadline Date of February 28,

2006. As a result, no valid Notice of Right to Cancel was received in 2009, when requested.

37. There were Multiple TILA Violations: In February 2006, alleged Original Lender

IndyMac failed to disclose as Prepaid Finance Charges 2 broker fees for $70 (DocPrep) and $35

(Demand Fee), misrepresented the APR, disclosed the wrong transaction date and wrong

deadline date in the Notice of Right to Cancel (“NORTC”), & failed to disclose documents. See

Itemization, Closing Statement, TILA Disclosure, Compliance Ease Audit of Origination Loan

Documents (Exhibit 37)

38. The Property was sold in foreclosure on August 6, 2009.

39. A Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale was recorded on August 12, 2009 at Los Angeles

County Recorder # 2009-1236431.

40. An Unlawful Detainer was filed on September 2, 2009 in California Superior

Court, Los Angeles County, as Case # 09C03175.

41. A lawsuit was filed against IndyMac Federal Bank, Deutsche Bank Trust, et al on

September 9, 2009, by Plaintiff in California Superior Court, Los Angeles County, as Case #

VC054159.

42. A third Qualified Written Request and Dispute of Debt was sent to Defendants on

October 10, 2009, which Defendants ignored except for irrelevant responses.

43. The Unlawful Detainer was Dismissed on March 29, 2010.

44. A Rescission of the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale was recorded on June 2, 2010 at

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Los Angeles County Recorder # 2010-0745049.

45. The Complaint by Plaintiff in California Superior Court was then dismissed on

July 1, 2010.

46. On September 27, 2010, IndyMac offered a Loan Modification.

47. On October 7, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a Loan Modification Application with

Exhibits.

48. On October 20, 2010, IndyMac requested more documents by November 3, 2010.

49. On November 3, 2010, the additional documents were faxed to IndyMac.

50. On March 28, 2011, IndyMac denied Plaintiff’s Loan Modification Application

for alleged missing information, which Plaintiff had sent multiple times.

51. Plaintiff protested the wrongful denial and on April 3, 2011, resent several items

of information which IndyMac claimed was missing.

52. On April 5, 2011, Plaintiff sent a signed, notarized proposed Loan Modification

contract as a tender offer.

53. On April 20, 2011, IndyMac again asked for the documents (which had already

been provided).

54. A new Notice of Trustee’s Sale was recorded July 1, 2011 at Los Angeles County

Recorder # 2011-0894089.

55. On July 13, 2011, IndyMac denied the Loan Modification again.

56. Plaintiff thereafter sent another Loan Modification Application.

57. Another Notice of Trustee’s Sale was recorded December 16, 2011 at Los

Angeles County Recorder # 2011-1706371.

58. On February 6, 2012, IndyMac denied the Loan Modification because of a

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pending sale.

59. On February 7, 2012, Plaintiff faxed and mailed a fourth Qualified Written

Request and Dispute of Debt with copies of the Assignment to “Deutsche Bank Trust” and the

Substitution of Trustee by “Deutsche Bank Trust”, which showed the current foreclosure was

being done by the wrong party, a non-beneficiary. Defendants again ignored the QWR except

for irrelevant responses.

60. Patricia A. Mele-Krage, Trustee for the Home Trust, grant deeded the Property to

Patricia A. Mele-Krage and James A. Krage on September 16, 2011, which was recorded

February 10, 2012 as Los Angeles County Recorder # 2012-0236652 (Exhibit 7).

61. On February 13, 2012, Plaintiff again faxed documents to Sarah “36F” at

IndyMac to try to get the Loan Modification.

62. On February 14, 2012, IndyMac sent a response saying that the QWR didn’t

specify wrong payments or servicing errors, notifying us that we may qualify for an Independent

Foreclosure Review, and enclosing a copy of the Note as only a partial, incomplete response to

the Dispute of Debt. IndyMac ignored the allegations that the foreclosure was by the wrong

party.

63. On March 5, 2012, Plaintiff’s husband, James Krage, co-owner of the property,

filed Bankruptcy Chapter 13, Case # 2:12-bk-17916-WB, which was not dismissed until August

16, 2016.

64. Servicing Rights to the Loan were transferred from Indymac to OCWEN

approximately early 2014.

65. A Substitution of Trustee to Western Progressive by Deutsche Bank National

Trust Company as Trustee for IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR4, Mortgage Pass-

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Through Certificates Series 2006-AR4, by Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Its Attorney in Fact, was

recorded on December 2, 2014 at Los Angeles County Recorder # 2014-1293302, signed by

Franci Boothney of Ocwen.

66. A “Corrective” Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust by MERS as Nominee for

IndyMac Bank FSB to DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE

FOR INDYMAC INDX MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2006-AR4, MORTGAGE PASS-

THROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES 2006-AR4, was recorded on April 24, 2015, at Los

Angeles County Recorder # 2015-0468089. Indymac Bank FSB no longer existed.

67. The FDIC states, “On July 11, 2008, IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., Pasadena, CA was

closed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and the FDIC was named Conservator” on their

website at:

https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/IndyMac.html

68. From about June 9, 2015 until June 26, 2015, Plaintiff and her husband logged

into OCWEN’s online website and downloaded several documents, including 4 versions of the

Deed of Trust and 2 versions of the Note. The downloaded documents showed that the first

page of the Deed of Trust was modified before recording. The 2 versions of the Note show the

Endorsement on different parts of the signature page, at least one of which had to be

photoshopped or forged. Plaintiff and her husband were unaware of the 2nd copy of the Note

with a possibly fraudulent endorsement until it was downloaded in June 2015. June 2015 was

the first discovery of possible fraud by a forged endorsement on a 2nd copy of the Note.

69. A new Notice of Default by Western Progressive for Deutsche Bank National

Trust Company as Trustee for IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR4, Mortgage

Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-AR4, by Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Its Attorney

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https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/IndyMac.html

in Fact was recorded on September 29, 2015 as Los Angeles County Recorder #2015-1204650

(Exhibit 30).

70. The Notice of Default recorded September 29, 2015 was recorded in violation of

James Krage’s Bankruptcy stay.

71. A Rescission of the 2008 Notice of Default was recorded on October 7, 2015, at

Los Angeles County Recorder # 2015-1240888

72. A Rescission of the 2015 Notice of Default was recorded on April 14, 2016, at

Los Angeles County Recorder # 2016-0416266 (Exhibit 36)..

73. In 2006, Marie J. Mele did not receive a copy of a Notice of Right to Cancel with

the correct Transaction Date of February 24, 2006 and the correct Deadline Date of February 28,

2006.

74. In 2009, Plaintiff requested a copy of the Notice of Right to Cancel from IndyMac

Mortgage Services and Indymac sent another copy of a Notice of Right to Cancel dated February

24, 2006, with a transaction date of February 23, 2006 and a deadline date of February 27, 2006.

Again wrong dates (Exhibit 10).

75. On May 11, 2015, Patricia Ann Mele-Krage’s Registration of Claim as Successor-

in-Interest to Marie J. Mele was filed with the California Secretary of State at File # 2015-024

(Exhibit 8).

76. In 2015, Plaintiff requested a copy of the Notice of Right to Cancel from Ocwen

and on June 26, 2016, for the first time since the closing, Ocwen faxed Plaintiff a copy of a

Notice of Right to Cancel with the correct Transaction and Deadline Dates (Exhibit 11).

77. On June 26, 2015, Plaintiff gave Notice of Rescission under TILA (Exhibit 12),

well within the 3 days provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1635, after first receipt of the last document

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required by TILA, a Notice of Right to Cancel with the correct Deadline Date.

78. 15 USC 1635(a) states:

“…the obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the information and rescission forms required under this section together with a statement containing the material disclosures required under this subchapter, whichever is later….”

79. Additionally, Plaintiff had additional rights to rescind under TILA pursuant to 15

U.S.C. § 1635(i), because Plaintiff’s home was in foreclosure and some mortgage broker fees

were not included in the finance and the Notice of Right to Cancel given to the borrower before

June 26, 2015 did not have the correct transaction and deadline dates, and therefore was not the

“appropriate form of written notice”. (Also, because a correct Notice of Right to Cancel with a

correct Transaction Date and correct Deadline Date was first given to Plaintiff on June 26, 2015,

15 USC 1635(a) allowed Rescission after Delivery of the last document required by TILA.)

80. 15 USC §1635(i)(1) states:“…the obligor shall have a right to rescind the transaction equivalent to other rescission rights provided by this section, if— (A) a mortgage broker fee is not included in the finance charge in accordance with the laws and regulations in effect at the time the consumer credit transaction was consummated; or(B) the form of notice of rescission for the transaction is not the appropriate form of written notice published and adopted by the Bureau or a comparable written notice, and otherwise complied with all the requirements of this section regarding notice.”

81. The June 26, 2015 Notice of Rescission under TILA was not contested within 20

days, and the creditor did not return any money or property within the 20 days.

82. 15 USC 1635(b) states:

“…When an obligor exercises his right to rescind under subsection (a), he is not liable for any finance or other charge, and any security interest given by the obligor, including any such interest arising by operation of law, becomes void upon such a rescission. Within 20 days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return to the obligor any money or property given as earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or

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appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest created under the transaction….”

83. On August 16, 2016, James Krage’s bankruptcy was dismissed.

84. On December 3, 2014, Plaintiff got screenshots from the Bloomberg Database

alleged to be related to our loan for a Certified Forensic Loan Audit. The screenshots from the

Bloomberg Database showed that 9 of the 15 classes that the Note was in were paid in full by

2014.

85. The “POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT dated as of March 1, 2006”

(“P&A”) for the “INDYMAC INDX MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2006-AR4 MORTGAGE

PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES Series 2006-AR4” was found at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1355513/000090514806003334/efc6-

339_5853127ex991.txt

86. An analysis of the P&A, Section 1.01 Definitions, showed that the Closing Date

for the Trust was March 31, 2006.

87. An analysis of the P&A, Section 1.01 Definitions, showed that the Note for even

“Delay Delivery Mortgage Loans” had to be delivered “not later that five business days

following the Closing Date. “

88. An analysis of the recorded documents showed that the first Assignment was

signed March 8, 2007, and recorded May 23, 2007.

89. An analysis of the recorded documents and the P&A showed that the Assignment

signed March 8, 2007, was signed almost a year after the closing date, and could not have been

submitted within five days following the closing date.

90. An analysis of the P&A showed that Section 2.01(c)(i) required the full Chain of

Title of Endorsements:2.01(c) (i) “The original Mortgage Note, endorsed by manual or facsimile signature in blank in the following form: "Pay to the order of _______________ ______________without recourse," with all intervening endorsements showing a complete chain of endorsement from the originator to the Person endorsing the Mortgage Note (each endorsement being sufficient to transfer all interest of the party so endorsing, as noteholder or assignee thereof, in that Mortgage Note) ….”

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http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1355513/000090514806003334/efc6-339_5853127ex991.txt

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1355513/000090514806003334/efc6-339_5853127ex991.txt

91. An analysis of the Note, supplied in IndyMac on February 14, 2012, in response

to a Qualified Written Request and Dispute of Debt, showed that the only Endorsement was “in

Blank” by Claudia Solis of IndyMac Bank, FSB, and did not contain any other Endorsements by

other entities in the Chain of Title.

92. Upon information and belief, violations of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement

also violate New York law and violate REMIC requirements for REMIC tax-free status.

93. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(1), provides that “each consumer whose

ownership interest is or will be subject to the security interest shall have the right to rescind the

transaction.

94. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(1) states in full:

“(a) Consumer's right to rescind. (1) In a credit transaction in which a security interest is or will be retained or acquired in a consumer's principal dwelling, each consumer whose ownership interest is or will be subject to the security interest shall have the right to rescind the transaction * * *.”

95. The Official Staff Commentary provides a further definition of “consumer” in this

context:

“2. Rescission rules. For purposes of rescission under §§ 226.15 and 226.23, *918 a consumer includes any natural person whose ownership interest in his or her principal dwelling is subject to the risk of loss. Thus, if a security interest is taken in A's ownership interest in a house and that house is A's principal dwelling, A is a consumer for purposes of rescission, even if A is not liable, either primarily or secondarily, on the underlying consumer credit transaction.” 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I, § 226.2(a)(11), Note 2 (2010).

96. The Illinois Supreme Court, in Financial Freedom Acquisition, LLC (OneWest

Bank N.A.) v Standard Bank and Trust Company et al, 2015 IL 117950 (Supreme Court of

Illinois, Nov. 2015) (a Published Case) stated:

¶ 22 Section 1635 of TILA provides, in relevant part:“(a) Disclosure of obligor's right to rescindExcept as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of any consumer credit transaction * * * in which a security interest * * * is or will be retained or acquired

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in any property which is used as the principal dwelling of the person to whom credit is extended, the obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction * * *.” 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2006).The corresponding provision of Regulation Z relating to rescission provides:“(a) Consumer's right to rescind. (1) In a credit transaction in which a security interest is or will be retained or acquired in a consumer's principal dwelling, each consumer whose ownership interest is or will be subject to the security interest shall have the right to rescind the transaction * * *.” (Emphasis added.) 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(1) (2010).4

Regulation Z defines “consumer” as:“a cardholder or a natural person to whom consumer credit is offered or extended. However, for purposes of rescission under §§ 226.15 and 226.23, the term also includes a natural person in whose principal dwelling a security interest is or will be retained or acquired, if that person's ownership interest in the dwelling is or will be subject to the security interest.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(11) (2010).The Official Staff Commentary provides a further definition of “consumer” in this context:“2. Rescission rules. For purposes of rescission under §§ 226.15 and 226.23, *918 a consumer includes any natural person whose ownership interest in his or her principal dwelling is subject to the risk of loss. Thus, if a security interest is taken in A's ownership interest in a house and that house is A's principal dwelling, A is a consumer for purposes of rescission, even if A is not liable, either primarily or secondarily, on the underlying consumer credit transaction.” 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I, § 226.2(a)(11), Note 2 (2010).¶ 23 As the appellate court pointed out, TILA states that an “obligor” has the right to rescind but does not define the term. However, based on the corresponding provisions in Regulation Z and the commentary, we conclude Congress did not intend to limit rescission rights to only obligors, as that term is generally defined. Regulation Z and the commentary provide that “each consumer whose ownership interest is or will be subject to the security interest” (emphasis added) (12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(1) (2010)) or “is subject to the risk of loss” (12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I, § 226.2(a)(11), Note 2 (2010)) is entitled to rescind. More particularly, the commentary makes it evident that to possess the right to rescind one need not be liable (i.e., an obligor) on the underlying consumer credit transaction. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I, § 226.2(a)(11), Note 2 (2010).¶ 24 Section 226.2(a)(11) along with the commentary related to that section have been in existence since 1968. More importantly, Congress has not amended TILA to exclude consumers who are not liable on the underlying credit transaction from having the right to rescind. Accordingly, we must presume Congress agrees with the expanded definition of “obligor” with respect to the right to rescind.¶ 25 We note, further, that Congress recently moved authority from the Federal Reserve Board to the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau to oversee TILA. The Bureau has adopted a new Regulation Z which includes the identical definitions and commentary. Certainly, had Congress disagreed with Regulation Z or the Official Staff Commentary it would have taken appropriate action to rectify the matter in conformity with its intent.

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97. The mortgage is a “federally related mortgage loan” within meaning of 12 C.F.R.

§1024.2(b) because it is a loan that was:

a. Secured by a first on residential real property upon which there was lo-

cated a structure designed principally for occupancy of one to four families; and

either was:

i. Made in whole or in part by a lender that was either regulated by or

whose deposits or accounts were insured by an agency of the federal

government;

ii. Made in whole or in part, or was insured, guaranteed, or assisted in

some way by the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban

Development (hereinafter “HUD”) or any other officer or agency of the

federal government; or, under or in connection with a housing or urban

development program administrated by the Secretary of HUD or a

housing or related program administered by

iii. Made in whole or in part by a “creditor” as defined in section 103(g) of

the Consumer Credit Protection Act that made or invested in residential

real estate loans aggregating more than $1,000,000.00 per year; or

iv. Was originated either by a dealer or by a mortgage broker.

98. The Loan Servicer is a “servicer” within meaning of 12 C.F.R. §1024.2(b) because it

is a “person” responsible for servicing a federally related mortgage loan.

99. All conditions precedent to the filing of this action has occurred or has been waived.

100. At the time that Ocwen became the servicer, the loan was claimed to be in default

by Defendants.

COUNT IWRONGFUL FORECLOSURE

101. Plaintiff incorporates and realleges all of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1

through 99 as if fully set forth herein.

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102. The first Assignment in 2007 to “Deutsche Bank Trust” by a VP of Indymac Bank

FSB (Exhibit 24) was not to the Trust, and the Assignee “Deutsche Bank Trust” did

not later record any Assignment to the Trust. Please note that “Deutsche Bank

Trust” is not “Deutsche Bank National Trust Company”, and Plaintiff has been

unable to locate “Deutsche Bank Trust”.

103. The later attempted assignments to Trust (Exhibits 26, 27, 28, 29), which were not

from the 2007 Assignee “Deutsche Bank Trust”, were from Indymac Bank FSB,

which was no longer Beneficiary after the 2007 Assignment to “Deutsche Bank

Trust”. The later Assignments, which are void because signed by non-Beneficiary

Indymac Bank FSB after the 2007 Assignment to “Deutsche Bank Trust”, which form

the base upon which the non-judicial foreclosure process was initiated, would also

violate the terms of the Promissory Note, Deed of Trust, and/or California law and are

therefore void for a second reason. 2 Assignments (Exhibits 27,28) were signed by

Erica Johnson-Seck, a notorious RoboSigner, proven so by her own Deposition.

104. In addition, Deutsche Bank, which has asserted itself as the current trustee of the

Deed of Trust, has not been properly appointed as trustee of the Deed of Trust, and

therefore the current foreclosure process (as well as past foreclosure processes) is/was

in violation of California law.

105. As a result of the Defendants current and past wrongful foreclosure, the Plaintiff

has suffered and continues to suffer harm.

COUNT II:DECLARATORY RELIEF



17

107. The property is currently in the non-judicial foreclosure process.

108. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and Defendants

regarding their respective rights and duties, in that Plaintiff contends that Defendants,

and each of them, do/did not have a valid secured interest in the Property sufficient to

foreclose against the Property because Defendants, and each of them, obtained title by

and through void assignments.

109. Once the loan was rescinded, the security interest or lien became automatically

void, by operation of law. 15 USC §1635(b); Reg. Z §§226.15(d)(1), 226.23(d)(1).

The note also was voided. The lender’s interest in the property was “automatically

negated, regardless of its status and whether or not it was recorded or perfected.”

Within 20 days of receipt of the notice of cancellation, the lender was required to

return to the borrower any money or property that had been given to anyone in

connection with the loan. 15 USC §1635(b); Reg. Z §§226.15(d)(2), 226.23(d)(2).

110. The lender must also have taken steps to reflect that the security interest had

terminated. Defendants never complied with the 20 day notice thus breaching the

rescission statute and making it impossible for Plaintiff to tender and pay off the loan

under TILA law. Once the lender has terminated the security interest and returned

any money or property it received, the borrower is then required to tender any

property or money received from the lender. 15 USC §1635(b); Reg Z §226.15(d)(3),

226.23(d)(3).

111. Attorney’s fees are available against Defendants, as well as actual and statutory

damages. 15 USC §1640(a). The remaining balance is the amount due on tender.

Once tender is delivered, the rescission process is complete.

18

112. Because Defendants violated TILA rules after rescission (and did not return the

funds within 20 days), Plaintiff is not required to tender. However, if Defendants had

complied with the TILA steps, Plaintiff would have been ready, willing, and able to

tender.

113. The mortgage is a “federally related mortgage loan” within meaning of 12 C.F.R.

§1024.2(b) because it is a loan that was:

a. Secured by a first on residential real property upon which there was lo-

cated a structure designed principally for occupancy of one to four families; and

either was:

i. b. Made in whole or in part by a lender that was either regulated by or

whose deposits or accounts were insured by an agency of the federal

government;

ii. Made in whole or in part, or was insured, guaranteed, or assisted in

some way by the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban

Development (hereinafter “HUD”) or any other officer or agency of the

federal government; or, under or in connection with a housing or urban

development program administrated by the Secretary of HUD or a

housing or related program administered by

iii. Made in whole or in part by a “creditor” as defined in section 103(g) of

the Consumer Credit Protection Act that made or invested in residential

real estate loans aggregating more than $1,000,000.00 per year; or

iv. Was originated either by a dealer or by a mortgage broker.

114. The Loan Servicer is a “servicer” within meaning of 12 C.F.R. §1024.2(b)

because it is a “person” responsible for servicing a federally related mortgage loan.

19

115. All conditions precedent to the filing of this action has occurred or has been

waived.

116. Plaintiff asks the Court to do the following:

a) Declare that the Notice of Rescission under TILA mailed on June 26, 2015 was

valid;

b) Declare that Defendants did not follow TILA rules within 20 days to either

return all funds in the transaction or file suit to stop the Rescission;

c) Declare inadequacy of remedy at law;

d) declare that the Note and Deed of Trust are now void after TILA Rescission;

e) alternatively, declare that one or more of the subject assignments were void and

therefore Defendants do not have the power or authority to foreclose against the Property;

f) declare that the foreclosing trustee of the deed of trust was not properly

substituted and therefore lacks power to foreclose; and

g) declare that the note and deed of trust were split and claimed due by separate

and distinct entities in violation of the note, deed of trust, and/or California law and are

therefore void.

COUNT III:VIOLATIONS OF THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT - 15 U.S.C. § 1640



118. Defendants were required to disclose the assignment or transfer of the Note and

Deed of Trust each and every time that they were assigned or transferred.

20

119. The Defendants failed to disclose the purported assignment and/or transfer of the

Note on multiple occasions.

120. In addition, the purported transfer of the Promissory Note in December 2005 to

Trust was a non-recorded event and was concealed by Defendants.

121. Some or all of the purported assignments/transfers were concealed by Defendants

and were not reasonably ascertainable until discovered by Plaintiff upon review of the

loan audit.

122. In addition, while the recorded event may have been discoverable (although

Plaintiff knows little if anything about real estate matters), the non-disclosure of the

purported assignments/transfers shows a pattern and practice of defendants to skirt

the TILA requirements.

123. The failure to make the required disclosures caused Plaintiff time and expenses

associated with negotiating with the wrong party or parties associated with the loan.

124. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 entitles Plaintiff to an award of statutory damages, costs,

litigation expenses, and attorneys' fees (if Plaintiff retains an attorney) as a

consequence of the Defendants' violations of TILA.

COUNT IV:CALIFORNIA’S HOMEOWNER BILL OF RIGHTS (“HBOR”)



126. At all times material hereto, Ocwen was/is a loan servicer as defined under

California Civil Code 2923.6 and the Property was owner occupied by Plaintiff.

127. Ocwen is a “large servicer” pursuant to HBOR.

21

128. Ocwen violated California’s HBOR in the following ways:

a. Prior to initiating the latest non-judicial foreclosure proceedings, Ocwen failed to contact Plaintiff as required by HBOR.

b. Ocwen failed to alert Plaintiff that they may request documentation demonstrating Ocwen’s authority to foreclose.

c. Ocwen failed to provide post-Notice of Default outreach with regard to the loan modification process.

d. Though requested by Plaintiff, Ocwen failed to provide a single point of contact as required by HBOR.

e. Ocwen negligently mishandled the mortgage modification process thus causing preventing Plaintiff from completing the mortgage modification process before the foreclosure of Plaintiff’s property.

129. Plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of Ocwen’s violation of California’s

HBOR.COUNT V:

CCPA


through 1 and 99 as if fully set forth herein.

131. Title 15 USC Chapter 41 § 1461(g) states:(g) Notice of new creditorIn addition to other disclosures required by this subchapter, no later than 30 days after the date on which a mortgage loan is sold or otherwise transferred or assigned to a third party, the creditor that is the new owner or assignee of the debt shall notify the borrower in writing of such transfer, including -(A) the identity, address, telephone number of the new creditor;(B) the date of transfer;(C) how to reach an agent or party having authority to act on behalf of the new creditor;(D) the location of the place where transfer of interest in the debt is recorded; and(E) any other relevant information regarding the new creditor.Plaintiffs are entitled to actual and statutory damages as a result of the Defendants violation of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.

132. Defendants violated the CCPA by failing refusing to disclose the purported

assignments/transfer of the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust.

22

COUNT VIRESCISSION

133. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as

though fully set forth herein.

134. Because Plaintiff (or the original borrower) did not receive a signed final copy of

the Notice of Right to Cancel with correct dating, all closing documents were not

given to Plaintiff before closing TILA, U.S.C. § 1601 Regulation Z.

135. The Controlled Business Arrangement (CBA) Disclosure which is required was

not given to Plaintiff (or original borrower) as required 12 U.S.C §2607 (c)(4).

136. At no time were all TILA disclosures given to the Plaintiff or the Borrower prior

to closing of the Loan. Indymac Bank FSB, which later allegedly sold the loan to

Indymac Federal Bank FSB, failed to provide all the necessary material disclosures as

required. The only copies of the Notice of Right to Cancel given to the Borrower

were with wrong dates and were not delivered in 2006. No preliminary disclosures

were given as to price as required by 12 CFR § 226.17 (b) and 226.19 (a).

137. In 2009, Plaintiff requested a copy of the Notice of Right to Cancel from Indymac

Mortgage Services, and Indymac Mortgage Services again provided a copy of the

Notice of Right to Cancel with incorrect dates (See Exhibit 10).

138. On June 26, 2015, Plaintiff received from Ocwen a copy of a Notice of Right to

Cancel with correct dates (this was the first time the Notice contained the correct

dates). (See Exhibit 11). This was the delivery of the final document required by

TILA that first started ticking the Statute of Limitations of 3 days or 3 years for

Rescission under TILA.

139. On June 26, 2015, Plaintiff, Patricia A. Mele-Krage, heir of Borrower Marie J.

Mele, Successor in Interest to Marie J. Mele (Exhibit 2), and with an 80% ownership

interest in the property that would be subject to loss, mailed a Notice of Rescission

(Exhibit 6), which was effective by operation of law on the date mailed.

23

140. A rescission letter was sent to the parties involved due to the many violations.

(Exhibit 12). This loan was rescinded per TILA 15 U.S.C. 1635(b); Reg Z §§ 226.15

(d) (1), 226.23(d) (1), 226.15 and 226.23. Predatory Lending Practice 15 U.S.C.

§1602 (a) (1) (A); Reg Z § 226.32(a)(i). 141. The Rescission is valid under Federal Truth In Lending Act (TILA), and U.S.

Treasury Regulation “Z” (Reg Z) and the legal effects of a Rescission under these

statutes. The TILA rescission notice automatically rendered the trust deed and Note

void by operation of law.

142. Plaintiff has also given Notice of Fault (subsequent to the rescission) by multiple

actions since the rescission:

a. July 31, 2015 Notice that Defendants had defaulted (Exhibit 13).

b. August 13, 2015 recorded Notice of Intent to Preserve Interest with a copy

of Rescission and Exhibits (Exhibit 15).

c. October 10, 2015 – a 2nd Notice that Defendants had defaulted (Exhibit

16).

d. December 28, 2015 - a letter to Attorney Les Zieve explaining Default

(Exhibit 18).

e. December 28, 2015 - a letter to Quality Loan Service explaining Default

(Exhibit 19).

f. February 12, 2016 – a letter to Attorney Brian Paino for OCWEN explain-

ing their Default and our Right to Rescission (Exhibit 31).

g. March, 2016 – a 2nd letter to Attorney Brian Paino for OCWEN explaining

their Default and our Right to Rescission (Exhibit 32).

h. April 4, 2016 a recorded Notice of Rescission of Notice of Default, clos-

ing the Foreclosure (Exhibit 34), possibly a response to acknowledge our Rescis-

sion for the first time.

24

i. April 13, 2016 – a 3rd letter to Attorney Brian Paino for OCWEN giving

Notice of Fault and Opportunity to Cure (Exhibit 33) after we did not receive fur-

ther correspondence (before we found the Notice of Rescission of Notice of De-

fault).

143. Plaintiff is entitled to rescind the loan and all accompanying loan documents for

all of the foregoing reasons: 1) TILA Violations; 2) Failure to provide a Mortgage

Loan Origination Agreement; 3) Fraudulent Concealment; 4) Fraudulent Inducement;

5) failure to abide by the PSA; 6) making illegal or fraudulent transfers of the note

and Mortgage/Deed of Trust; and 7) Public Policy Grounds, each of which provides

independent grounds for relief.

144. The public interest would be prejudiced by permitting the alleged contract to

stand; such action would regard an unscrupulous lender.

145. As a proximate result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff has been damaged in an

amount not yet ascertained, to be proven at trial.

COUNT VIIVIOLATION OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, REGULATION X , 12 CFR §1024.41 (b)(2)(i)(A)

146. Plaintiff incorporates all of the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 99

herein as if fully set forth herein.

147. Code of Federal Regulations, Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41 (b)(2)(i)(A)

requires that when a bank is made aware of a communication that can reasonably be

deemed to be an application for loss mitigation, the servicer must promptly conduct a

review to determine whether the communication represents a complete or an

incomplete application. Re. X, 12 C.F.R. § expressly notes, “if a servicer receives a

loss mitigation application 45 days or more before a foreclosure sale, a servicer shall:

25

(A) Promptly upon receipt of a loss mitigation application, review the loss mitigation

application to determine if the loss mitigation application is complete.” Reg. X, 12

C.F.R. § 1024.41 (b)(2)(i)(A).

148. Defendants Ocwen & DBNTC did not conduct a review to determine whether the

Plaintiff’s submitted loan modification application represented a complete or an

incomplete loan modification application.

149. Reg. X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(b)(1) requires that when a servicer deems the loss

mitigation application to be incomplete, the servicer must act affirmatively to

complete the application. The servicer must exercise “reasonable diligence” to obtain

any documents and information it claims to require to complete the application.

150. Reg. X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(b)(1) expressly notes, “[A} complete loss mitigation

application means an application in connection with which a servicer has received all

of the information that the servicer requires from the borrower in evaluation

applications for the loss mitigation options available to the borrower. A servicer shall

exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining documents and information to complete a

loss mitigation application.” Reg. X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(b)(1).

151. Defendants Ocwen, DBNTC did not act affirmatively to complete the Plaintiff’s

loan modification application and did not exercise reasonable diligence to obtain any

documents/information to complete the application.

152. Reg. X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(b)(2)(i)(B) requires (1) of the servicer determines

that the application for loss mitigation is complete, it must send the borrower a notice

acknowledging that the application is complete within five business days of receipt of

26

the application, and (2) The servicer must provide a written notice to the borrower

describing the documents and information needed to complete the application.

153. Reg. X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(b)(2)(i)(B) expressly notes:

Notify the borrower in writing within 5 days (excluding legal public holidays,

Saturdays, and Sundays) after receiving the loss mitigation application that the

servicer acknowledges receipt of the loss mitigation application and that the servicer

has determined that the loss mitigation application is either complete or inco0mplete.

If a loss mitigation application is incomplete, the notice shall state the additional

documents and information the borrower must submit to make the loss mitigation

application complete and the application date pursuant to paragraph (2)(ii) of this

section.

154. Defendants Ocwen, DBNTC did not send the Plaintiff a notice acknowledging

that his loan modification application was complete within five days of receipt of the

application and did not provide a written notice to Plaintiff describing the documents

and information needed to complete the application.

155. Reg. X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(b)(2)(ii) requires the written notice outlined in Reg.

X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(b)(2)(i)(B) must include a reasonable date from the Bank by

which the homeowner should submit the missing documents and information. Reg. X,

12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(b)(2)(ii) expressly notes, “[T]he notice required pursuant to

paragraph (b)(2)(i)(B) of this section must include a reasonable date by which the

borrower submit the documents and information necessary to make the loss

mitigation application complete.”

27

156. Defendants Ocwen, DBNTC did not (1) provide the written notice outlined in

Reg. X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(b)(2)(i)(B), and (2) did not provide a reasonable date

from the Bank by which the borrower should submit the missing documents and

information.

157. As a result of the aforementioned conduct, Defendants Ocwen, DBNTC are in

violation of the Code of Federal Regulations , including but not limited to, Reg. X, 12

C.F.R. § 1024.41(b)(2)(i)(A); Reg. X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(b)(1); Reg. X, 12 C.F.R. §

1024.41(b)(2)(i)(B); Reg. X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(b)(2)(ii), and is attempting to

foreclose on the Plaintiff’s property without any legal authority or standing to do so,

and in violation of State laws which were specifically enacted to protect consumers

such as Plaintiff from the type of abusive, deceptive, and unfair conduct in which

Defendant engaged. Defendant’s unlawful conduct has caused Plaintiff’s damages in

an amount to be proven at trial. Defendants U.S. Bank as Trustees of their respective

securitized trusts are liable for the actions of the servicer because it is within the

scope of said agency relationship.

COUNT VIIIVIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE 2923.4



159. California Civil Code 2923.4 requires that a Bank undertake a meaningful review

of borrower for loss mitigation options upon submission of a loan modification

application. California Civil Code 2923.4 expressly notes, “to ensure that, as a part of

the nonjudicial foreclosure process, borrowers are considered for, and have a

meaningful opportunity to obtain, available loss mitigation options, if any, offered by

28

or through the borrower’s mortgage servicer, such a loan modification or other

alternatives to foreclosure.”

160. Defendants Ocwen, DBNTC did not undertake a meaningful review of Plaintiff’

for loss mitigation options upon submission of the, loan modification application.

Rather, Defendant purported to review Plaintiff and even purported to offer a

modification yet has still no provided any writings or documents showing a

meaningful review for or offer of loan modification. Defendants have only produced

a denial because Plaintiff purportedly did not accept an offer that was never received.

161. Defendants Ocwen , DBNTC are in violation of the California Civil Code and is

attempting to foreclose on the Plaintiff’s property without any legal authority nor

standing to do so, and in violation of State laws which were specifically enacted to

protect consumers such as Plaintiff from the type of abusive, deceptive, and unfair

conduct in which Defendant engaged. Defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as

Trustees of their respective securitized trusts are liable for the actions of the servicer

because it is within the scope of said agency relationship.

162. Defendants’ unlawful conduct has caused Plaintiff’s damages in an amount to be

proven at trial.

COUNT IXVIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE 2923.7



164. California Civil Code 2923.7 requires that a Bank must provide a single point of

contact for all borrowers who request and are being reviewed for a loan modification

(or other loss mitigations alternatives). California Civil Code 2923.7 expressly notes,

29

“[u]pon request from a borrower who requests a foreclosure prevention alternative,

the mortgage servicer shall promptly establish a single point of contact and provide to

the borrower one or more direct means of communication with the single point of

contact.”

165. Defendants Ocwen, DBNTC did not provide a single point of contact for the

Plaintiff upon his request to be reviewed for a loan modification.

166. Defendants Ocwen, DBNTC are in violation of the California Civil Code and is

attempting to foreclose on the Plaintiff’s property without any legal authority or

standing to do so, and in violation of State laws which were specifically enacted to

protect consumers such as Plaintiff from the type of abusive, deceptive, and unfair

conduct in which Defendant engaged.

167. Defendants’ unlawful conduct has caused Plaintiff damages in an amount to be

proven at trial.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE Plaintiff respectfully requests the following:

AS TO COUNT I: WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE

A. Award Damages in an amount to be determined by proof at trial;

B. Award Punitive Damages as allowed by law;

C. Award costs, interest, and attorney’s fees.

AS TO COUNT II: DECLARATORY RELIEF

A. Declare that the Defendants did/do not have an enforceable secured or unsecured claim

against the Property;

B. Declare that the Plaintiff owns the Property free and clear of all encumbrances of the

Defendants or anyone claiming by or through the Defendant;

D. Award Damages in an amount to be determined by proof at trial;

30

E. Award costs, interest, and attorney’s fees.

AS TO COUNT III: VIOLATIONS OF THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT

A. Award Damages in an amount determined at trial.

B. Award Statutory Damages in an amount to be determined by proof at trial;

C. Award Special Damages in an amount to be determined by proof at trial;

D. Award Punitive Damages as allowed by law;


AS TO COUNT IV: CALIFORNIA’S HOMEOWNER BILL OF RIGHTS

A. Award Statutory Damages and treble damages in an amount to be determined by proof at

trial;

B. Award Special Damages in an amount to be determined by proof at trial;

C. Award costs, interest, and attorney’s fees.

AS TO COUNT V: VIOLATIONS OF THE CCPA

A. Award Damages in an amount determined at trial.

B. Award Statutory Damages in an amount to be determined by proof at trial;

C. Award Special Damages in an amount to be determined by proof at trial;

D. Award Punitive Damages as allowed by law;


AS TO COUNT V1: RESCISSION

A. For Declaratory Relief, including but not limited to the following Decrees of this Court

that:

a. Plaintiff’s loan was rescinded;

b. Plaintiff is entitled to the exclusive possession of the property;

c. Plaintiff owns in fee simple, and is entitled to the quiet and peaceful possession

of, the above-described real property.

d. Defendants, and each of them, and all persons claiming under them, have no

estate, right, title, lien, or interest in or to the real property or any part of the property.

e. Award costs, interest, and attorney’s fees.

31

B. AS TO COUNT VII: VIOLATION OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, REGULATION

X, , 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41 (b)(2)(i)(A)

C. A. Award Damages in an amount determined at trial.

D. B. Award Statutory Damages in an amount to be determined by proof at trial;

E. C. Award Special Damages in an amount to be determined by proof at trial;

F. D. Award Punitive Damages as allowed by law;

G. E. Award costs, interest, and attorney’s fees. H.I.

J.K. AS TO COUNT VIII: VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE 2923.4

L. A. Award Damages in an amount determined at trial.

M. B. Award Statutory Damages in an amount to be determined by proof at trial;

N. C. Award Special Damages in an amount to be determined by proof at trial;

O. D. Award Punitive Damages as allowed by law;

P. E. Award costs, interest, and attorney’s fees.

Q.R. AS TO COUNT IX: VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE 2923.7

S. A. Award Damages in an amount determined at trial.

T. B. Award Statutory Damages in an amount to be determined by proof at trial;

U. C. Award Special Damages in an amount to be determined by proof at trial;

V. D. Award Punitive Damages as allowed by law;

W. E. Award costs, interest, and attorney’s fees

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38, plaintiff demands a trial by jury for

issues so triable.

32

Respectfully Submitted March ___, 2017.

,

_____________________________________Patricia A. Mele-Krage

VERIFICATION

I, Patricia A. Mele-Krage, am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and of the

united States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: March ___, 2017 Lakewood, CA

_____________________________________Patricia A. Mele-Krage

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