RULE 70: FORCIBLE ENTRY & UNLAWFUL DETAINER

1. REYES V. STA. MARIAFACTS:

Petitioners filed an action to quiet title on residential lot in Bulacan and to recover the possession thereof from respondents

They averred that through their tolerance and goodwill, thru the intervention and entreaty of one Maximo Santos, father of the defendants, the latter used and occupied the land free of charge, under the following conditions, to wit: (a) that instead of paying rentals on the premises defendants undertook to pay the corresponding real estate taxes on the land; and (b) that said defendants will leave and vacate the premises anytime the plaintiffs so demand

Plaintiffs verbally notified defendants that they needed the land, hence, said defendants should vacate, but said defendants unreasonably refused at the same time claiming ownership of the property, and alleging further that they bought the same from a certain Pablo Aguinaldo Petitioners accordingly prayed in their complaint for judgment declaring them as owners of the property and ordering the defendants to vacate the premises and return the possession of the same to them Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that "the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit" and that the action embodied in petitioners' complaint "is actually one for ejectment or unlawful detainer. Consequently, the case falls within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior court or municipal court" The lower court issued granted the motion to dismiss.ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the case was proper.

RULING: NO.

Such action was clearly an accion publiciana for the recovery of the right to possess (possesion de jure) (if not an accion reivindicatoria) falling within the lower court's jurisdiction and not a mere action for detainer to recover physical possession (possession de facto) which would fall within the jurisdiction of the municipal court (if filed within one year after unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession) as erroneously held by the lower court in its dismissal order. The complaint shows on its face that respondents' refusal to deliver the possession of the property was due to their adverse claim of ownership of the property and their counter-allegation that they had bought it from a certain Pablo Aguinaldo, and, therefore, petitioners' action was clearly one for recovery of their right to possess the property (possession de jure) as well as to be declared the owners There are 3 kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real property, namely, (1) the summary action for forcible entry or detainer, which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is brought within one year in the justice of the peace court; (2) the accion publiciana which is for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a CFI; and (3) accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership (which of course includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi also brought in the CFI The only issue in forcible entry and detainer cases is the physical possession of real property possession de facto and not possession de jure. If plaintiff can prove a prior possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority of time, he has the security that entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Petitioners' action was not merely for recovery of possession de facto. Their action was clearly one of accion publiciana for recovery of possession de jure if not one of accion reivindicatoria for declaration of their ownership of the land. Accion publiciana or the plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better and legal right to possess (independently of title) clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the CFI and not of the Municipal Courts. Petitioners, therefore, correctly filed their accion publiciana before the lower court. Having been fully apprised of respondents' refusal to surrender possession and their contrary claim of ownership of the same property, petitioners properly filed their accion publiciana with the CFI to avoid getting enmeshed in what would certainly have been another jurisdictional dispute, since they could reasonably foresee that if indeed they had filed a summary action for illegal detainer instead in the municipal court, respondents would then have contended, contrary to their present claim, that the municipal court is without jurisdiction over the detainer case by virtue of their contrary claim of ownership of the property2. HILARIO V. CA

Facts: The spouses Hilario purchased a house and lot from the spouses Palileo under a deed of sale dated March 5, 1986. Another document was executed on the same day granting spouses Palileo the right to repurchase within one year.

The Hilarios further allowed the spouses Palileo to remain in possession of the property on the verbal understanding that the Palileos would vacate the same after two years from the date of sale. The period passed without the Palileos complying, even after demands by the Hilarios so a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by the Hilarios with the MTC.The Palileos alleged that the deed of sale was in fact a deed of mortgage and that the obligation secured by such mortgage had already been extinguished. Thus, they remained owners and their continued physical possession of the property bolsters the assertion it was only a mortgage contract. The Palileos also questioned the MTCs jurisdiction.

The MTC affirmed its jurisdiction over the case and ruled that the deed of conveyance was a deed of sale which vested in the Hilarios the right of ownership and consequently, of possession. RTC affirmed this ruling. The Palileos appealed to the CA.

On the reasoning that the issue raised by the Palileos ultimately rested upon and involved the question of ownership, particularly on the assumption that the deed of conveyance was actually a mortgage contract, the CA reversed and set aside the judgments of the RTC and MTC.

Issue: W/N the case involved an issue of ownership which would deprive the MTC of jurisdiction over the case

Holding/Ratio Decidendi: No, the MTC was not deprived of jurisdiction. Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, provides that the MTC has the exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer and in such cases where the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.Therefore, as the law now stands, inferior courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment cases even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership; but this is subject to the same caveat that the issue posed as to ownership could be resolved by the court for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. An adjudication made therein regarding the issue of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land.

The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure.

3. WILMON V. CA

FACTS: Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation, et al were lessees of a commercial building and bodegas standing on registered land in Iloilo City owned in common by Solinap et al.

The leases were embodied in uniformly worded deeds.The lease contracts, among others

1) stipulated fixed terms or periods (September 1, 1987 to August 30, 1989);

2) provided for a deposit of an amount equal to two months' rents;

3) provided that the lessee should give the lessor 30 days prior notice of the intention to terminate or renew the contract, and that if no such written notice were given, the lessor would consider the contract terminated on the expiration of the term; and

4) contained a "reservation of lights" reading as follows: 3

Reservation of rights. LESSOR reserves the rights to sell, mortgage, hypothecate or encumber the property so long as it requires the purchase(r) or mortgage creditors to respect the terms of this lease contract; provided further that LESSEE shall be duly informed about LESSOR's plan to sell the property.

After the expiration of the period fixed in the lease agreements, the lessors executed a public instrument entitled "Deed of Absolute Sale," in virtue of which they sold the leased property to Star Group. The deed provided that the "Vendee shall henceforth deal with the lessees and occupants of the properties herein sold without any further warranty or obligation on the part of the Vendors."

Star Group filed an action for unlawful detainer in the MTC against the Wilmon, et al. Wilmon, et al refused to concede and impugned STARs right to eject them claiming that their leasehold rights were violated: their right of preemption, the buyer was not required to honor their leases and denied the option to renew.

Wilmon, et al filed a petition to annul the sale, to exercise their right of preemption and recover two mos. deposit, conveyance of the property and damages.

The RTC issued a restraining order to enjoin the MTC proceedings of the unlawful detainer. However, the writ was later dissolved as the RTC judge held that the MTC case involved issue of physical possession while the RTC case involved is one of ownership. Thus the suspension of unlawful detainer is not warranted.. The MR was denied. The RTC and CA did not rule in favor of Wilmon, et al to issue an injunction to the unlawful detainer.

ISSUE: Whether or not an action of unlawful detainer filed in the MTC against a lessee grounded on the expiration of the latter's lease should be abated or suspended by an action filed in the RTC by the defendant lessee on the claim that he is entitled to a right of preemption (or prior purchase) of the premises in question and wishes to have said right judicially enforced?

RULING: Based on current jurisprudence, an ejectment case is not abated by the ff: Injunction suits, Accion publiciana, Writ of possession where ownership is the principal issue, Action for quieting of title to property, Suits for specific performance with damages, Action for reformation of instrument, Action for reconveyance of property or "accion reivindicatoria, Suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting property.

The underlying reasons is because actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved. This is specially true in the cases at bar, where the petitioners-lessees' claims that the lessors (and the buyer of the leased premises) had violated their leasehold rights because (a) they (the lessees) were not accorded the right of preemption, (b) the buyer was not required to respect their leases, and (c) the lessees were denied the option to renew their leases upon the expiration thereof constituted their causes of action in the suits commenced by them in the Regional Court.

The precedents invoked by the petitioners do not represent current and prevailing doctrine; they might at most be deemed exceptions justifying the general rule. Moreover, the facts in the rulings invoked by them are quite readily distinguishable from the numerous precedents upholding said general rule.

In this case, we follow the general rule that an action to annul a sale or reconveyance in the RTC shall not abate the ejectment case pending in the MTC.

It may well be stressed in closing that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry and lawful detainer cases, "the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding that issue of ownership," the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial courts, and Municipal Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve "the issue of ownership . . . only to determine the issue of possession."

4. MUNOZ v. CA

FACTS: Complainant NICOLAS GARCIA filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with MTC of Pampanga, alleging the following:

that he is an owner of an agricultural land;

He and his co-owners acquired the lot by succession from their father PEDRO;

That the lot is tenanted by LORETO GARCIA;

Defendants Spouses Munoz constructed their houses on the portion of the lot without knowledge and consent of the owners;

That NICOLAS sent letters to demand to asking Spouses Munoz to remove their houses;

Spouses Munoz refused to vacate their houses.

Spouses Munoz denied assertions of NICOLAS alleging that LORETO GARCIA (tenant) is deemed owner of land by virtue of PD 27. They also asserted that MTC lacks jurisdiction since the case is an accion publiciana recognizable by RTC.

MTC: in favor of NICOLAS, since he is a co-owner of lot.

RTC: reversed; NICOLAS failed to establish proof of prior possession over land since case at bar only deals with possession de facto (not de jure)

CA: set aside RTC decision. HENCE.

ISSUE: W/N complaint filed by NCOLAS was for summary proceeding of forcible entry (MTC has jurisdiction)or an accion publiciana (RTC has jurisdiction)?

HELD: RTC HAS JURISDICITION. Reversed.

1) There was no mention in the complaint of NICOLAS that he is in PRIOR POSSESSION of property with co-owners. It did not state when the tenant LORETO started to posses the property. It also failed to state that PEDRO was in prior possession of the property at the time of the entry by SPOUSES MUNOZ. Finally, it also failed to aver that when the entry was accomplished or when NICOLAS found out of such entry.

The failure to allege the TIME when unlawful deprivation took place is fatal because this will determine the start of the counting of the 1 year pd for the filing of the summary action of forcible entry. In effect, the action should either be an accion publiciana or reinvindicatoria with the RTC.

FORCIBLE ENTRY

UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Possession illegal; it is an open challenge to the right of possessor Possession legal until demand is made to recover possession or until possession fails to do an act (i.e. pay rent) which makes continued possession of premises illegal

Thus after lapse of 1 year, the suit must be started with RTC as accion publiciana.

5. SUMULONG C. CAFacts: Esperanza Sumulong entered into a contract of lease with Jopson Corp covering two adjoining lots along Earnshaw St., Sampaloc, Manila. Lease contract provided that if lessee abandons the property lease contract shall become automatically terminated and cancelled, and premises vacated peacefully by lessee for lessor to hold. Upon her return from the USA, Sumulong discovered that Joson had vacated the leased premises and tolerated the illegal entry of Inland. Pursuant to the abovementioned provision, the lease contract was rendered automatically terminated and cancelled. Sumulong then took possession of the subject properties. To regain possession, Inland did the following:

1. misrepresented to plaintiff that Jopson is also the owner of Inland- Sumulong accepts

2. Dec 1989- Sumulong discovers misrepresentation, notified Jopson of termination of lease contract, took possession of properties

3. Inland pusuaded Sumulong to grant it temporary use of the properties pending negotiations for a lease- Sumulong perceives good faith, allows Inland to occupy

4. Inland insists on an unreasonably low amount of the lease rental- Sumulong decided not to lease premises to Inland; formally notifies termination of lease contract to Joson (March 1990)

5. April 1990- without Sumulongs knowledge, Inland acquired sub-lease from Jopson; Sumulong then took over physical possession of the premises to secure its interest; Inland asked Sumulong if it could enter again and promised to finalize the lease contract; upon entry, Inland refused to enter into a lease contract and pay.

Sumulong filed a case for forcible entry. MTC ruled in favor of Sumulong because Inland entered the premises by stealth and strategy, since it had no sublease when it entered the premises. RTC reversed the MTC decision and said that the right to possession can be ventilated by way of another action. CA affirmed RTC decision.

Issue: Whether the Civil Case should be dismissed?

Held and Ratio: NOT DISMISSED. Although there is no cause of action for forcible entry, the allegations in the body sufficiently establish a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The MTCs decision is consistent with that of unlawful detainer, except that the fixed reasonable compensation for the use of the premises should only commence to run from December 1989 and not from June 1989.Why not forcible entry? No strategy and stealth.

1. "Strategy" could only mean machination or artifice and considering that the parties tangled for weeks to reach an agreement on the terms and conditions of a contract of lease, no such machination or artifice could be said to have been employed by Inland.

2. "Stealth," is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission.

Why unlawful detainer? Inland refused to vacate.

6. ONG V. PAREL

Facts: Petitioners spouses Ong are the registered owners of Lot No 18 of Rizal Park subdivision having purchased the property from the spouses Magbag in 1994.Adjacent to this is Lot No.17 registered under the name of Visitacion Beltran, grandmother of respondent Parel. Petitioners filed an action for forcible entry against defendant alleging among other thingsthat defendant through strategy and stealth constructed an overhang and hollow block wall along the common boundary of the parties adjoining lot, thereby illegally depriving petitioners of possession of the said portion of their lot; that they discovered the same in August 1994 when they had the boundaries of their lot resurveyed; that they made various demands on the defendant to remove the constructions and vacate the same. The defendant alleged that such constructions had already been in existence since 1956 and that these are within the boundary of lot 17 owned by her. Upon ocular inspection, the Commissioner and Geodetic Engineer reported that defendants house (wall, window, eaves of main building) encroached petitioners property. The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners.

Defendant filed an appeal with the RTC which reversed the MTCs decision and dismissed the case for failure of the petitioners to prove prior physical possession of the subject lot. The case was appealed to the CA but it denied the petition because it found that the alleged encroachments were made by the late Visitacion at a time when she still owned both lots thus the introduction of the said construction could not be equated with strategy and stealth giving rise to forcible entry.It was admitted by the petitioners in their petition that this case involves a boundary dispute andthe encroachment was discovered only upon a relocation survey of the property; such controversy could not be threshed out in an ejectment suit in view of the summary nature of the action, and the MTC, accordingly, is without jurisdiction. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Is a petition for forcible entry proper in this case?

Held: No. This is not a proper case for forcible entry, it is a boundary dispute wherein the adobe wall, overhang and window grill on the respondents side of the property encroach upon the petitioners side of the property.

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires that in actions for forcible entry the plaintiff is allegedly deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth and that the action is filed any time within one year from the time of such unlawful deprivation of possession.This requirement implies that in such cases, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by unlawful means.The plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the property in litigation until he was deprived thereof by the defendant.The one year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land, except that when entry was made through stealth, the one year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof. If the alleged dispossession did not occur by any of the means stated in section 1, Rule 70, the proper recourse is to file a plenary action to recover possession with the RTC. Stealth is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission. Petitioners failed to establish that respondents encroached upon their property through stealth as it was not shown when and how the alleged entry was made on the portion of their lot. The alleged encroachments were made by the late Visitacion at a time when she still owned both lots. Respondent in her affidavit had affirmed that her grandmother Visitacion was the registered owner of Lot No. 17 with improvements which include the window sill overhang and the old adobe wall which were constructed as early as 1956 and these improvements are adjacent to the private alley from Elias Street which has to be opened and maintained as long as there exists building thereon; that the maintenance of such alley was made as an encumbrance in petitioners title when they bought the adjacent Lot no. 18.Petitioners failed to present evidence to the contrary.

For failure of the petitioners to circumstantiate prior physical possession and the fact of entry by the defendant by force, intimidation, violence or stealth, the present action for forcible entry must exigently fail. Where the complaint fails to specifically aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the action should either be ACCION PUBLICIANA or ACCION REINVINDICATORIA for which the lower court has no jurisdiction.

Furthermore, neither does the instant case fall under a case for unlawful detainer. The complaint does not allege that the possession of respondent ever changed from illegal to legal anytime from their alleged illegal entry before petitioners made the demand to vacate.In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.

7. CO TIAMCO vs. POMPEYO DIAZ FACTS: Antonio Co Tiamco filed an action against Yao Boom Sim (aliasCo Hue), Yao Ka Tiam (aliasChua Kui), and Sy Gui Gam (aliasGo Si Pio) for unlawful detainer in a building in Manila. At trial, plaintiff offered as evidence, a notice to quit alleged to have been served upon defendants prior to the action. This was objected to on the ground that the fact sought to be proved thereby was not alleged in the complaint. Objection was sustained. An action for mandamuswas brought by plaintiff before the CFI compel admission of evidence and was granted. When the trial was resumed in the municipal court, the evidence was admitted. Judgment was rendered against defendants who appealed to the CFI. The notice, was a part of the record elevated on appeal. In the CFI, the complaint filed in the municipal court was reproduced. Defendants filed a MTD upon the ground that there was no allegation in the complaint of a notice to quit or vacate the premises served upon them prior to the action and, therefore, the municipal court had no original jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and, as a consequence, the CFI had no appellate jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The motion was sustained and the case dismissed. Hence, this action formandamusagainst the CFI to reinstate the petitioner's case.

ISSUE: Was unlawful detainer case validly dismissed? NO.

HELD: The order of dismissal is erroneous on the following grounds: (1) It relies on a wrong construction of the Rules of Court; (2) it is unwarranted under the circumstances of the case; and (3) the complaint filed is sufficient in itself.

It is apparent from that a demand is a pre-requisite to an action for unlawful detainer, when the action is "for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease," and where the action is to terminate the lease because of the expiration of its term. A lease ceases upon the expiration of its term without the necessity of any notice to the tenant who thenceforth becomes a deforciant withholding the property unlawfully "after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied," In other words, upon the expiration of the term of a lease, the landlord may go into the property and occupy it, and if the lessee refuses to vacate the premises, an action for unlawful detainer may immediately be brought against him even before the expiration of the five days.

Indeed, upon the expiration of the lease, there may be a tacit renewal thereof (tacita reconduccion), as when, with the acquiescence of the lessor, the lessee continues enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days, and the lessor's acquiescence may be inferred from his failure to serve a notice to quit. But tacit renewal in such case, being a new contract is a matter of defense which may be alleged by defendant in his answer, no allegation being necessary in the complaint by way of anticipation of such defense.There has been in this case a notice to quit, though not specifically pleaded in the complaint. That notice has been offered and admitted in the municipal court as evidence. And even supposing, without conceding, that the complaint is deficient in that regard, the deficiency was cured by evidence. This evidence was admitted upon objection of the defendant. When evidence is offered on a matter not alleged in the pleadings, the court may admit it even against the objection of the adverse party, where the latter fails to satisfy the court that the admission of the evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his defense upon the merits, and the court may grant him a continuance to enable him to meet the new situation created by the evidence. Of course, the court, before allowing the evidence, as a matter of formality, should allow an amendment of the pleading and the municipal court did not do so in the case. Since, however, the municipal court is not one record, the rule on amendments should not therein be rigidly applied. Furthermore, where the failure to order an amendment does not appear to have caused surprise or prejudice to the objecting party, it may be allowed as a harmless error. Well-known is the rule that departures from procedure may be forgiven where they do not appear to have impaired the substantial rights of the parties. It is true that the case was dismissed by the respondent court, it was there on appeal and for trialde novo, independently of any evidence that had been presented in the municipal court. But the admissibility of the notice to quit as evidence, should have been considered by the respondent court as a closed question in so far its jurisdiction was concerned, for it was one of the branches of that court which, in an action formandamus, issued a writ compelling the municipal court to admit the evidence. When the writ has been issued and has become final and has been obeyed, it is perfectly valid and should be respected. Specially is this so in the instant case where the complaint filed was sufficient and under its allegations the municipal court was bound to admit the evidence.We, therefore, believe and so hold that the respondent court having judicial knowledge of themandamus proceedings was duty bound to give due regard and full weight to the final and executed judgment therein rendered and, had it done so, it would have found that the supposed deficiency of the complaint pointed out in the motion to dismiss had already been supplied by evidence admitted by order of one of its branches; that the curative evidence was already before it as a part of the record elevated on appeal by the municipal court; and that to throw away the whole case only because the complaint was silent on a fact well known to all the parties and to the court was certainly to defeat the paramount interests of justice for the sake of a useless technicality.

In an action for unlawful detainer, a simple allegation that defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is made sufficient, for the words "unlawfully withholding" imply possession on the part of the defendant, which was legal in the beginning having no other source than a contract, express or implied, possession which has legal in the beginning having no other source than a contract, express or implied possession which has later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant. Thus, a form of a pleading is devised which is brief and concise and though apparently too general it is so worded as clearly to apprise the defendant of the substance of the claim. Other details like the one-year period within which the action should be brought, and the demand when required to be made by the Rules must be proved but need not be alleged in the complaint.It is true that according to Rule 4 section 3, the complaint in an inferior court shall state "the grounds of action" but no other facts are required in the form to be stated aside from those that are already therein stated which are thus deemed sufficient grounds for action.

The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of this form of pleading rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible and accordingly technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delay should carefully be avoided.

8. PENAS V. CA

FACTS: Subject of this controversy were 2 apartments in QC, which were leased by Penas Sr. to private respondent Lupo Calaycay at a rental fee of P110/month. The written lease contract was on a month to month basis. Penas, Sr. died in 1976 so an extra-judicial settlement of his estate was executed by his surviving heirs, one of whom is his son, Penas, Jr. In 1990, the petitioners notified Calaycay that effective March 1990, they were terminating the written month to month lease contract as they were no longer interested to renew the same and demanded that the latter vacate the premises on or before February 28, 1990. The petitioners stated in the letter thatthey would allow the lease to continue provided a new lease contract would be executed for a period of (1) year at an increased monthly rental of P2,500 (later reduced to P2K).

Calaycay continued staying on the leased premises and effective March 1990, he deposited the monthly rentals with PNB in his name ITF (in trust for) Penas, Jr. On August 10, 1992, Penas sent another letter to the defendant to vacate the subject premises and to pay back rentals amounting to P60K. On September 25, 1992, Penas filed an unlawful detainer suit on the ground of termination of the month to month lease contract and failure of the defendant to execute a new lease agreement with increased rentals.

MTC QC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the complaint was allegedly filed more than 1 year after private respondent began unlawfully occupying the premises. The CA affirmed the TC decision reinforcing that since herein petitioners were not collecting the rentals being deposited by private respondent to PNB, there no longer was any lease contract between the parties for 2 years since the first letter of the petitioners. The Court of Appeals thus agreed that the proper remedy of the petitioners was to file an action for recovery of possession in the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the petitioners complaint?

RULING: YES.

The 1 year period provided for in section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from theLASTletter of demand to vacate, the reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises.

In the present case, the first demand letter gave Calaycay the option to either vacate the premises or agree to execute a new lease contract on an annual basis. The notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is NOT the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects to stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected until he defaults in said obligation and necessary demand is first made.

The facts of this case do not warrant a departure from said settled doctrine. It should be noted that even if the private respondent was depositing rentals in trust for the petitioners, what was being deposited were rentals at the old rate, which petitioners were not bound to accept or withdraw. When Calaycay elected to remain in the premises after petitioners had sent him the first letter, he assumed the new rental rate and could be ejected from the premises only upon default and by a proper demand from the petitioners. The demand was made on 10 August 1992, followed by the action for unlawful detainer on 25 September 1992. Private respondent was thus ordered by the SC to vacate the premises and pay back rentals.9. CANIZA V. CA

FACTS:

Carmen Caiza was declared an incompetent by RTC of Quezon City because of senile dementia. Her legal guardian is her niece Amparo Evangelista. Caiza was owner of a house and lot in QC which was being occupied by the spouses Estrada out of kindness and tolerance. Evangelista, in behalf of Caiza, filed a complaint of unlawful detainer against the Estradas because despite repeated demands, they refused to vacate said lots. The complaint alleged that the Estradas are depriving Caiza of needed income since they are occupying the property rent-free. Estradas said that the lot was already bequeathed to them by virtue of a holographic will made by Caiza before she was declared an incompetent. MTC ruled in Caizas favor but the RTC reversed saying the action is supposed to be accion publiciana. CA affirmed the RTC rationating that the Estradas were not occupants by mere tolerance but they were sort of adopted family as the holographic will, although of no force and effect until probated, evinces the intent that the Estradas are to remain in possession.ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that the action of Caiza must be for acion publiciana and not accion interdictal.RULING: YES

The SC held that the complaint clearly sets out a case for unlawful detainer and says: It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. The Estradas defense, relying on the literal interpretation of Sec.1 of Rule 70 is pure sophistry. "the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied."

Caiza's act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. More than once has the SC adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.

It is also important to note that the 1 year period to file the complaint for desahucio is reckoned from the date of last demand to vacate. The reason being that the lessor has the option to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises.

Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Caiza had executed a will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that circumstance did not give them the right to stay in the premises after demand to vacate on the theory that they might in future become owners thereof, that right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being possible unless and until the will is duly probated.

Also, since there has been a valid substitution of parties after the death of Caiza in this case, Evangelista, being a legal heir of the original plaintiff, may still continue to prosecute the case against the Estradas.

10. CETUS V. CA

FACTS: Private respondents are lessees of the premises originally owned by Susana Realty. These individual verbal leases were on a month-to-month basis. Rental payments were made to a collector of Susana Realty who went to the premises monthly. Susana realty sold the premises to Cetus Devt. Private collector continued to pay to a collector by Cetus. For the months of July, August and September, respondents failed to pay their rentals as no collector came. Cetus sent a letter to each private respondent demanding that they vacate the premises and to pay back rentals. Private respondents paid. But for failure of the private respondents to vacate, Cetus filed a complaint for ejectment. Trial court ruled that theres no cause of action because at the time of the filing of the complaint, the rentals had all been paid (no rentals in arrears). The CA held that the right to bring an action of ejectment must be counted from the time the defendants failed to pay rent after the demand therefore. ISSUE: Whether this demand is merely a demand to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease or also to vacate right after.

HELD: Two requisites in an ejectment suit: 1) there must be failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease, ans 2) there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within 15 days in case of lands, and 5 days in case of buildings. In this case, theres no cause of action for ejectment. 11. CURSINO V. BAUTISTA

FACTS: Maria James is the owner and lessor a premises in Paranaque leased by Cursino at a monthly rental of P100.00.

Cursino defaulted in the payment of his monthly rentals (Oct. Dec. 1977). He sent postal money orders as payment, which were refused by Maria James.

Prior to the sending of said postal money orders, Maria James demanded that Cursino pay the back rental and vacate the premises 'within a period of five (5) days from receipt of this letter'.

Despite the formal demand, Cursino failed and refused to vacate the subject premises without justifiable cause. Hence, Maria James was constrained to secure the services of counsel and incurred expenses in this litigation.

Cursino contends that he has not defaulted in the payment of rents and that it was Maria James who refused to accept the same.

Cursino did not vacate the premises as demanded and so a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by respondent.

RTC: Maria James for the win. Cursino was ordered to pay back rentals and vacate the premises. CA: affirmed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the possession of the lessee legitimized by the lessor's acceptance of the payment of back rentals.

HELD/RATIO: NO. CA decision affirmed.

The failure of the owners to collect, or their refusal to accept the rentals are not valid defenses. Article 1256 of the Civil Code provides that if the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due.

Petitioner further argues that in spite of his payment of back rentals with five days from receipt of the demand letter, private respondent filed the complaint for ejectment which allegedly is contrary to the provision of Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Such argument is untenable.

It will be recalled that private respondent formally demanded from the petitioner, the following: (a) to pay the back rentals, and (b) to vacate the premises.

Petitioner was able to pay the back rentals but refused to vacate the premises. Undoubtedly, petitioner's belated payments of his back rentals do not automatically restore the contract of lease without private respondent's consent. The terms of the contract of lease have been violated and the lessor-owner has the unquestionable right to withdraw from said contract or agreement whether oral or written. In the case at bar, respondent-lessor did not consent to petitioner's possession of the leased premises after the latters default in the payment of the monthly rents. On the contrary, respondent demanded that petitioner pay the back rental and vacate the premises. The refusal of the petitioner to vacate the premises after demand, makes his withholding of possession unlawful.12. HEIRS OF SUICO V. CA

FACTS: The 2-storey residential building subject of the instant petition was originally owned by the late Emilia Suico, grandmother of the petitioners. (This building was actually constructed by the parents of the defendants, who were the original lessees, with grandma Emilia then being the original lessor. Originally, what was being rented was the land with a nipa house. But, the nipa house was destroyed by the typhoon; so, the defendants parents constructed a building made of permanent materials). The said bldg. was being rented by the respondents for P360/month. Finding this amount to be inadequate, in 1991, petitioners proposed to increase this amount to P1200/month. Respondents refused. Instead, they proposed a lease contract for 25 yrs. at a monthly rental of P600. Of course, petitioners turned this down. They also refused to receive the tendered rentals. The respondents then deposited these rentals to a bank. When the parties still failed to conciliate at the barangay level, the petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case at the MTC. The MTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, and ordered the defendants to vacate the premises and pay the petitioners rentals starting April 1991 up to the last month of occupancy. On appeal to the RTC, the decision was modified. The RTC judge fixed the lease for another 5 yrs (until 1998), and ordered the defendants to continue paying until the end of the fixed lease period. When the case was brought to the CA, the appellate court ruled that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case because the award of ownership over the disputed bldg. is not an issue in unlawful detainer case, rather, a possession de facto only.ISSUE: Whether the CA committed reversible error in holding that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the case because the issue of ownership of the building was raised.

HELD: Yes. The SC annulled the decision of the CA and affirmed the decision of the MTC. The CA failed to fully appreciate the subject matter of the lease and the purpose of the respondents claim of ownership over the building. It was not disputed that the respondents constructed the building because the original one (the nipa house) was previously destroyed by a storm. This allegation of ownership was raised merely to underscore respondents claim that petitioners demand for rental increase for several times was harsh and oppressive disregarding the close relationship between the petitioners grandma and the respondents parents. Notably, respondents never asked for the value of their bldg., but only sought that the complaint be dismissed, or in the alternative, that the lease period be fixed, with moral damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses in either case. Also, the respondents in fact did not set up the defense of MTCs lack of jurisdiction on the basis of issue of ownership.The parties to the oral lease in question (grandma Emilia and respondents parents) did not fix a specified period therefor. However, since the rentals were paid monthly, the lease, even if verbal, may be deemed to be on monthly basis, expiring at every month. In such case, a demand to vacate was not even necessary for judicial action after the expiration of every month.

As to the issue of RTCs extension lease period for 5 years from 1993-1998, the Court reversed this. Instead, the SC found MTCs ruling more in accord with justice and equity. The respondents and their parents had been in possession of the premises for 43 yrs. At first, respondents were paying relatively meager price at P30 a month, then P360, before a demand to increase it at P1200 was made. This meager rent was due to the fact that the original lessor, grandma Emilia, and defendants parents were close. Obviously, the respondents had already benefitted from this fact. Also, the extension of 5 yrs was almost obtained (since this case was resolved already in 1997).

The RTC also erred when it ruled that after the expiration of the 5-yr lease period, the property vacated shall become the property of the petitioners. The Civil Code provides that the lessors would only become the owners if they choose to reimburse the respondents, as of the termination of term, of the value of the house constructed. If they refuse to reimburse, the respondents remedy is to remove the house.

13. MARA V. ESTRELLA

Facts: Mara, Inc. filed a complaint for forcible entry agains Jose de Leon. It was alleged that on or about April 5, 1973, de Leon through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth occupied 4 lots registered in the name of Mara, Inc. It was also alleged that Mara, Inc. had prior possession of the said lots.Four days after the filing of complaint, Mara, Inc. asked the City Court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to restore to it the possession of the said lots.

The writ was granted as the validity and incontestability of the TCT from which Maras titles were derived had been upheld in previous decisions, on the condition that Mara post a bond (P10,000).

De Leon filed an MR which was denied. Mara posted its bond and the writ was issued. De Leon filed a motion to dissolve the writ and offered a counterbond of the same amount, which was granted.

Issue: W/N Mara, Inc. is entitled to the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to recover possession of the lots during the pendency of the ejectment suit.Held: Yes. The 2nd paragraph of Art. 539 of the Civil Code provides that A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry may within 10 days from the filing of a complaint present a motion to secure from the competent court, in the action for forcible entry, a writ of preliminary injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within 30 days from the filing thereof. This has been incorporated in Sec. 3, Rule 70.

It is the undisputed policy of every people which maintains the principle of private ownership of property that he who owns a thing shall not be deprived of its possession or use except for the most urgent and imperative reasons and then only so long as is necessary to make the rights which underlie those reasons effective. The injunction contemplated in article 539 is an exception to the general rule that the writ of injunction is not proper where its purpose is to take property out of the possession or control of one person and place it in the hands of another whose title has not clearly been established by law.

In this case, the Torrens titles of Mara, Inc. to the four lots appear to be unassailable. De Leon in his answer merely pretended lack of knowledge of said titles. He has also not shown any indubitable right to possess the said lots. The judge should not have dissolved the bond.

14. BALAGTAS V. ROMILLO

FACTS: Balagtas Realty Corporation(petitioner, owner of a row of residential apartments located at Balagtas Street in Pasay City, filed nineteen (19) separate Identical complaints for illegal detainer against private respondents for refusal and failure to vacate their respective premises and to pay their rentals in arrears, as well as an increased monthly rental of P2,000.00 from May 1, 1976, notwithstanding valid and formal demand. The dispositive portion of the decision ordered the defendants to immediately vacate said premises and to forthwith surrender its peaceful possession the plaintiff; to each pay to the plaintiff their respective rental arrears up to April 30, 1976, as well as (P2,000.00) monthly rentals from May 1, 1976 until each of them finally and respectively vacates his/her respective apartment-premises subject matter of these summary complaints.The first motions for immediate execution of the said Judgment under the provisions of the first paragraph of Sec. 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. was filed January 26, 1977. Immediate execution was stayed as private respondents filed with the Pasay City Court a common notice of appeal dated February 10, 1977 and posted respective supersedeas bond covering (a) adjudged rental arears prior to May 1, 1976, (b) adjudged liquidated damages, and (c) the P2,000.00 monthly rentals as found by the Judgment of the Pasay City Court to exist from May 1, 1976 and accruing down to the time of the Judgment However, on October 11, 1977, petitioner filed for the second"Motions for Immediate Ejectment Execution" against the private respondents on the ground that respondents failed to deposit to the Court of First Instance their monthly rentals for the period from February 1, 1977, in the amount of P2,000.00 monthly "as found by the judgment" of the City Court of Pasay City, on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month under Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Respondent judge denied such motion.Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge acted without and/or in excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's Motions for Immediate Ejectment Execution.Held: Yes. Under Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, judgment in favor of the plaintiff must be executed immediately in order to prevent further damages to him arising from continued loss of possession. However, the defendant may stay execution (a) by perfecting an appeal and filing a supersedeas bond, and (b) by paying promptly from time to time either to the plaintiff or depositing with the Court of First Instance the adjudged reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property. This rule is mandatory, the exception being when the delay is due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. 3 In the case at bar, it is uncontradicted that private respondents posted their respective supereas bonds to answer for rentals and damages accruing down to the time of the perfection of their appeals in January, 1977. What is controverted is whether or not there is complnce with the second requisite which is the payment of the monthly rentals as they fell due. Private respondents insist that they correctly paid 1000P as rentals as provided in the Letter-Contract dated April 21, 1976 (Exhibit A), which was sustained and upheld by the Pasay City Court as the new lease contract governing the relations between the petitioner and private respondents,The Court held that since the dispositive part of the decision of the Pasay City Court adjudged and ordered the respondents "to each pay to the petitioner Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) monthly rentals from May 1, 1976 until each of them finally and respectively vacates his/her respective apartment-premises subject matter of these summary complaints," anything said in the body of the opinion about the P1,000.00 discount if a lessee pays his/her rental within the first three days of the month, is merely an obiter. Where there is conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of a decision, the former must prevail over the latter. When respondents effected monthly deposits of less than P2,000.00, they violated the condition imposed by Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The law providing that in case the defendant appeals, he must pay to the plaintiff or into the CFI the amount fixed as rent on or before the 10th day of each calendar month, and that failure to do so shall cause the judgment to be executed, is mandatory and cannot be evaded. The court has no discretion to give or not to give effect to such failure to pay. Failure of the defendant to deposit on time the monthly reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property or the rents fixed in the judgment is a ground for execution of such judgment as a matter of right the duty of the court to order such execution being ministerial and imperative. 15. CHUA V. CA

FACTS: The Batangas MTC rendered judgment for the spouses Chua with respect to four lots in Galicano St., Batangas City, ordering the ejectment of spouses Moreno and for them to pay monthly rentals of P50,000.00 starting April 7, 1992 until they shall have vacated the lots and surrendered their possession to the Chua spouses plus attorney's fees. A copy of the decision was received by the Chua spouses' counsel on March 10, 1993; on March 11, 1993 they filed a notice of appeal; The Moreno spouses however, moved for the execution of the decision in their favor, alleging that although Chua spouses had filed a notice of appeal, they had not filed a supersedeas bond nor make a deposit every month of the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the properties as required by Rule 70, sec. 8.Chua spouses opposed, claiming that they are co-owners of the lots from which they were ordered to be ejected and that to grant immediate execution of the decision would render their appeal moot and academic. They later claimed that while they were after all willing to file a supersedeas bond, they had been kept busy attending to their businesses and thus unable to secure a bond. RTC denied the Moreno spouses motion for execution, on the ground that the transmission by the MTC of the records of the ejectment case to the RTC, without waiting for the expiration of the period of appeal, prevented private respondents from filing a supersedeas bond on time. RTC then issued another order giving petitioners an extension of five days within which to file a supersedeas bond. After initially admitting a cash bond of P550,000, the RTC also granted petitioners' motion for the substitution of the cash bond with a surety bond.

CA reversed the RTC. ISSUE: W/N despite the expiration of the period for perfecting the appeal, the RTC had the authority to set the amount of and accept a supersedeas bond to stay the immediate execution of a decision in an ejectment suit pending appeal. HELD&RATIO: RTC had no authority to do so. As a general rule that, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the property in question.To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending, the Sec. 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal.The failure of the defendant to comply withanyof these conditions is a ground for theoutright executionof the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being "ministerial and imperative."Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.In this case, the bond was filed out of time. The motion for execution was filed eighteen days from the date the petitioners received a copy of the MTC's decision, after the appeal had already been perfected. Because no supersedeas bond had been filed within the period for appeal, a writ of execution should have been issued as a matter of right. How the Amount of Supersedeas Bond Is Determined: Petitioners need not require the MTC to fix the amount of the supersedeas bond. They could have computed this themselves - it is equivalent to the amount of rentals, damages and costs stated in the judgment or thereasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises, at the rate determined by the judgment, damages and costsdown to the time of the final judgment in the action. The reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises is that fixed by the Court in the judgment, because the rental stipulated in the contract of lease that has expired or terminated may no longer be the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises as a result or by reason of the change or rise in values. But the bond together with the appeal is only to prevent the immediate execution of a judgment rendered against the defendant in forcible entry and detainer cases. It does not answer for amounts accruing during the pendency of the appeal, which are, in turn, the subject of the periodic deposits to be made by the defendant.Where Is the Supersedeas Bond Filed? The bond should be filed before the MTC or, where the records have been forwarded to the RTC, before the latter court. In either case, it should be done during the period of appeal. In this case, petitioner failed to file the bond on time not because they did not know where to file it, but because they believed that they should not do so. Hence, their opposition to the motion for execution was based on their alleged co-ownership of the property. It was only before the CA that they claimed confusion on where the bond should be filed. The pendency of an action for partition (filed by the spouses Chua) does not constitute a compelling reason to further delay execution of the judgment, since such action is entirely independent of the ejectment suit. An ejectment suit is conclusive only on the issue of material possession or possessionde factoof the property under litigation,not on the issue of ownership (as in an action for partition). The only issue in this case is whether or not a writ of execution should be issuedpending appeal of the ejectment suit.The Chua spouses perceived injuries to their business located in the land in question are irrelevant since an action for ejectment is not conclusive on the right of possession of the land and any case such could have been avoided if they had filed the supersedeas bond, which they did not do so. Moreover, in an action for ejectment or for recovery of possession of real property, defendant's claims for the value of the improvements on the property or necessary expenses for its preservation should be interposed as compulsory counterclaims.16. DE LAUREANO V. ADIL

FACTS:

Petitoner de Laureano was owner of a lot in Iloilo City. She leased said lot to respondent Ong Cu for a period of 15 years. The term expired but respondent refused to vacate and remove the improvements thereon forcing petitioner to file an ejectment case in the city court of Iloilo City where she won. Respondent filed an appeal but instead of filing a supersedeas bond based on the findings of the city court, he asked that the city court ex parte to approve the bond in the amount of 22k. it was granted. Petitioner prayed in the CFI of Iloilo for execution pending appeal on the ground that the bond was inadequate and for preliminary mandatory injunction in order to restore her in possession of the lots alleging that the appeal was frivolous and dilatory. Both motions of petitioner were denied by the CFI. The bond was upheld and it would be absurd to grant the mandatory injunction because the very purpose of the bond is to stay the execution and leave possession with the respondent. Hence this petition for certiorari.ISSUE: W/N the CFI acted with GAD in denying petitioners motion for execution and mandatory injunction.RULING: YES

As explicitly provided in section 8, the judgment of tile inferior court in plaintiff's favor in an ejectment case is immediately executory. Thus, where the city court on the day it rendered the judgment ordered the execution thereof and the defendant did not perfect his appeal and did not post a supersedeas bond, it was held that certiorari would not lie to set aside the execution. Section 8 of Rule 70 is an exception to the general rule as to the execution of the judgment of an inferior court which is found in section 18, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court.

The reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises is that fixed by the inferior court in its judgment because the rental stipulated in the lease contract that had expired might no longer be the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises by the reason of the change or rise in value.

The purpose of the supersedeas bond is to secure payment of the rents and damages adjudged in the appealed judgment. Hence, the bond is not necessary if the defendant deposits in court the amount of back rentals as fixed in the judgment. In other words, the supersedeas bond answers only for rentals was in the judgment and not for those that may accrue during the pendency of the appeal which are guaranteed by the periodical deposits to be made by the defendant.

The bond should have been in the amount of 161k. The city court should not have allowed respondent to dictate the amount. The reasonable value for the use and occupation was also fixed in the judgment, hence there was another error by the city court.

If this were a case where the respondent did not file any supersedeas bond or did not make any monthly deposit, then petitioner would be entitled as a matter of right to the immediate execution of the city court's judgment. Execution in that case would be mandatory but since respondent only filed an inadequate bond based on the error of the city court, he should be allowed to file the correct amount 30 days from notice. SC RULED THAT CA ERRED IN HOLDING THIS IS A CASE OF UNLAWFUL DETAINED. The fact that demand was made by NICOLAS for the SPOUSES MUNOZ to vacate premises doesnt change the nature of the latters possession of property and convert action from forcible entry to unlawful detainer.

Section 8. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected, and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the municipal or city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the municipal or city court to exist. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment, on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the municipal or city court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Court of First Instance to which the action is appealed. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, of which the defendant shall have notice, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on its merits.

Rental. P2,000.00 per month period payable by you to us, through our collector, within the first three days of each corresponding month period; provided, however, that you shall be granted by us an initial discount of Pl,000.00 for each monthly rental paid on time, but this discount shall not in anywise amend the aforesaid rental,