Compiled Jan 17

8/3/2019 Compiled Jan 17

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Reyes v. ChiongDate Promulgated: July 1, 2003Ponente: Justice PanganibanNature of Case: Sworn Complaint filed by Atty. Ramon P. Reyes with the Office of the BarConfidant of this Court, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Victoriano T. Chiong Jr. for violation of hislawyer's oath and of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.Facts:

1) Petitioner is the counsel of Zonggi-Xu who invested P300,000 in a fishball factory to be set

up by Chia Hsien Pan.

2) The factory did not come into being; Xu asked for his money back but Pan refused to give

it.

3) Xu filed a petition for estafa against Pan. Respondent, Pans counsel, filed an Urgent

Motion to Quash the Warrant of Arrest. He also filed a civil action with the RTC of

Zamboanga City against petitioner, Xu and Prosecutor Salanga.

4) When confronted by petitioner, respondent explained that it was Pan who decided to

institute the civil action. Respondent claimed he would suggest to his client to drop the

civil case, if petitioner would move for the dismissal of the estafa case. However, the two

lawyers failed to reach a settlement.

5) IBP adopted the recommendations of Commissioner San Juan who held that respondent

had no ground to implead Prosecutor Salanga and petitioner. In so doing, respondent

violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Issue(s): Did respondent violate his lawyer's oath and Canon 8 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility?Disposition: Atty. Chiong suspended for 2 yearsHeld/Ratio:Canon 8: A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward hisprofessional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

1) If respondent or his client did not agree with Prosecutor Salanga's resolution, they shouldhave used the proper procedural and administrative remedies. Respondent could havegone to the justice secretary and filed a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion forReinvestigation of Prosecutor Salanga's decision to file an information for estafa.

2) The lack of involvement of complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in the business

transaction subject of the collection suit shows that there was no reason for their inclusion

in that case.

3) Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and

civility. A great part of their comfort, as well as of their success at the bar, depends upon

their relations with their professional brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other,they must treat one another with trust and respect. Any undue ill feeling between clients

should not influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each other.

CAMACHO v PANGULAYANPROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES: courtesy, fairness, candor, avoid harassing tactics Canon 8

FACTS:- Atty. Manuel Camacho filed complaint against the lawyers of Pangulayan and Associates Law

Offices, which included Atty. Luis Pangulayan and other respondents who comprised the law office.


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Camacho (complainant) was the counsel of some expelled students from the AMA ComputerCollege (AMACC) in a civil case

o The students were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE. The Student Disciplinary

Tribunal recommended the expulsion of the students after it found them guilty of usingindecent language in some articles in the paper, and of unauthorized use of the studentpublication funds

- Camacho alleged that the respondents, who were then the counsel for AMACC (defendant)obtained, without Camachos knowledge, compromise agreements or Re-Admission Agreementswith four of the expelled students in the aforementioned civil case

o

The re-admission agreements in effect required them to waive all kinds of claims they mighthave against AMACC, and to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filedagainst AMACC

- Respondent Atty. Pangulayan said thato The other co-respondents did not take part in the negotiation and execution of the re-

admission statementso The re-admission agreements had nothing to do with the dismissal of the civil case and were

executed only for the settlement of an administrative cases involving the expelled students- While the civil case was still pending, letters of apology and re-admission agreements addressed to

the AMACC president were separately executed by some of the expelled students

- Following the execution of the letters of apology and re-admission statements, Atty. Balmores (oneof the lawyers in Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices) filed with the trial court where the civilcase was pending a Manifestation on behalf of the defendant AMACC (hi I think a manifestation

means: a manifestation of their having availed of their intention to avail themselves of discoveryprocedures or basically the plaintiffs drop the charges against the defendants after a compromiseagreement)

- Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines then passed a resolution whichsuspended Pangulayan for 6 months for being negligent in his duty, and for the dismissal of thecase against the other co-respondents because they did not take part in the negotiations of thecase

HELD:- Pangulayan was aware that Camacho was the counsel of the plaintiff students, but he still

proceeded to negotiate with the students and their parents without communicating the matter totheir lawyer

- This failure of respondent whether by design or because of oversight is an inexcusable violation of

the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague- Also, the allegation that the re-admission agreements were only to settle the administrative aspectof the controversy is contradicted by the Manifestation, which clearly stated that the studentsagreed to terminate all civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings which they may have againstAMACC

- The Court found that 6 months was too harsh. They suspended Pangulayan for 3 months and thedecision was entered in his personal record. The case against the other respondents (other lawyersof Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices) was dismissed.

SABERON v LARONGLANGUAGE: abusive, offensive, improper; Canons of Professional Ethics

FACTS:- Complainant Jose Saberon charged Atty. Fernando Larong (respondent) of grave

misconduct for allegedly using abusive and offensive language in pleadings filed beforethe Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)

- Saberon filed before the BSP a petition against Surigaonon Rural Banking Corporation(bank) and Alfredo Bonpin. The petition alleged that the bank and Bonpin refused to returnchecks and land titles, which were given to secure a loan obtained by Saberons wife,despite full payment of the loan.

- Respondent Larong, counsel for the bank, filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses,stating among others: That this is another in the series ofblackmailsuits filed by the

plaintiff (Saberon)- Saberon then filed present complaint, finding the statements to be malicious and bereft of

any factual or legal basis


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- With respect to Saberons plea that respondent should be disbarred: disbarment andsuspension of an attorney as the most severe forms of disciplinary action, and should beimposed with great caution

o While Larong is guilty of using infelicitous language, such transgression is not of a

grievous character as to merit his disbarment- Saberons petition PARTLY GRANTED: Larong found guilty of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for

using intemperate language, fined P2,000, with a stern WARNING!

Laput v RemotigueSept. 29, 1962Labrador, J.Facts:Petitioner was lawyer of client Vda. de Barrera in May 1952. By January 1955, P had prepared 2pleadings to close proceedings on an estate case. Client refused to countersign and asked P notto file them anymore. P found out that respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug had filed a writtenappearance as new counsel for Vda. de Barrera. On Deb. 1955, respondent Atty. FranciscoRemotigue entered his appearance.Respondents are charged with unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting cases andintriguing against another lawyer.Complainant states that the appearance of respondents are unethical and improper becausethey had the desire to replace P as attorney, and took advantage of the clients goodwill andintrigued against the preparation of the final inventory and accounting and prodded client not toconsent to Ps decision to close the proceedings. Also that Rs made P seem like a dishonestlawyer no longer trusted by his client, because Rs made the client sign revocations of power ofattorney and sent them out to corporations.Case was referred to the Solicitor General. Sol-Gen recommended complete exoneration of theRs.Holding: Sol-Gen was correct. Yay. Petitioners free from guilt. Case dismissed.Reasoning:

1) Before Atty. Pangalinghug entered his appearance, the client had already filed a pleading

discharging the petitioner. Even if Atty. Laput did not get a copy of the pleading, it was the

fault of the client and not the respondent.

2) Client just did not trust Laput anymore because she found out that some dividend checks

which should have been sent to her was sent to petitioner, so she felt cheated.

3) There is no irregularity in their appearance as counsel. Atty. Patalinghugs services were

properly contracted.

4) Petitioner voluntarily withdrew as counsel on Feb. 1955 after Patalinghug entered his

appearance. This amounted to acquiescence to respondents appearance as counsel. This

estops petitioner from complaining now.

5) Remotigue also not guilty of unprofessional conduct because his appearance was only onFeb. 1955, after client had already dispensed with petitioners services on Jan. 11, 1955

6) With regard to the revocation of power of attorney, they do not seem to be prompted by

malice, but made merely to safeguard the interest of the client.

Laput v RemotigueSept. 29, 1962Labrador, J.Follow-up Administrative Case


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Facts: Complainant, by virtue of a duly recorded Attorneys lien, has certificates of title andother records and papers of his client (Vda. de Barrera).Respondent Remotigue filed with the court motions to direct the complainant to surrendercertain certificates of title, another motion asking the court to issue duplicate copies of thecertificates of the title to respondent, and he and the client sold without notice to petitioner thelots covered thereby.Case is filed charging respondent Remotigue with malice, bad faith, and misrepresentation whenhe filed motions in court without notice to complainant, thereby committing unfair and unethicalpractices bordering on dishonesty.Solicitor-General found that as early as Jan. 1955, when Barrera discharged Laput as counsel, hehad already been asked to surrender all papers and documents relevant to the cases he handledHe was not served a copy of this pleading, but he must have known this since he went over therecords of the proceedings, yet Laput did not comply.In spite of the pleadings, complainant kept to himself the certificates of title. Respondent had notacted with malice or bad faith. Respondents complete exoneration approved.

Aguirre v. RanaJune 10, 2003Carpio

Facts:

Respondent Edwin L. Rana passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.On May 21, 2001, one day before the scheduled oath-taking of the successful bar examinees, the complainantfiled a petition for denial of admission to the bar against the respondent.Despite this, the Court allowed the respondent to take the lawyers oath but instructed him against signing in theRoll of Attorneys until the case has been resolved.

The charge against respondent was unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. According to thecomplainant, the respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate during the May 2001elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MEBC).The complaint alleged that the respondent filed a pleading before the MEBC where he represented himself ascounsel for George Bunan, a vice-mayorly candidate.The complaint further alleged that respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or

administrative body since he is a secretary of the Sanguniaang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate; and that he actedas counsel for George Bunan without the latter engaging him for his services.

Respondent claimed that his assistance to George Bunan was performed because the latter asked for hisspecific assistance and that it was not with him as a lawyer but merely as a person who knows the law. He alsodenied representing himself as an attorney.With regard to his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, the respondent stated that he hadalready resigned from the position.Respondent countered that the complaint is politically motivated since the complainant is the daughter of thelosing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

Issue: Did the respondent engage in unauthorized practice of law and should therefore be denied admission to thePhilippine Bar?

Ruling: Respondent Edwin L. Rana is denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

Reasoning:

Respondent took the lawyers oath on May 22, 2001. However, the records show that he appeared as counsel

for Bunan prior to the said date. The evidence also shows that he signed as counsel for George Bunan of thepleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precints forthe Office of Vice Mayor.On May 14, 2001, Mayorly candidate Erly Hao also retained respondent as counsel.Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MEBCand filed various pleadings without authority to do so.Respondent called himself counsel, knowing fully well that he was not a member of the bar.


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While it is true that respondent had already taken the lawyers oath, it is the signing of the Roll of Attorneys thatfinally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. Passing the bar is not the only requirement to become an attorney-at-law.Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shownmoral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar CompanyNovember 29, 1971Reyes, J.B.L.

Facts:

The petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo where the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)ordered the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Entila and Tenazas.Afterwards, Cipriano Cid and Associates, counself of record for the winning complainants filed a notice ofattorneys lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. Atty. Atanacio Pacis filed a similar claim.Entila and Tenazas manifested that they do not object to an award of attorneys fees amounting to 25% of thetotal backwages. Afterwards, Quintin Muning filed a petition for the award of services rendered equivalent to 20%of the total backwages. This petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid stating that Muning was not a lawyer.CIR awarded 25% of the backwages as attorneys fees with 10% to Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates, 10% toQuintin Muning and 5% to Atty. Atanacio Pacis%. The award to Muning, who is not a lawyer, is sought to bevoided in this case.

Issue: Can Quintin Muning, a non-lawyer, share in the division of attorneys fees?

Ruling: The orders under review are set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as attorneys fees forMuning.

Reasoning:

The principle in Amalgamated Laborers Association et al v. Court of Industrial Relations is applicablein that an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowedto share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be

justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the presentcase.Sec 5 (b) of R.A. 875 states that while parties before the Court of Hearing Examiner are not required to berepresented by legal counsel, it is no justification that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court ofIndustrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees.

Representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.Sec. 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides for compensation of attorneys agreement as to fees imports theexistence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorneys fees. Since respondentMuning is not an attorney, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with the winning complainants andtherefore cannot recover attorneys fees.The rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive:

-Statutes have been enacted prohibiting people not licensed or admitted to the bar from practicing law.-The great weight of authority is to the effect that compensation for legal services cannot be recovered byone who has not been admitted to practice before the court.-The reasons are that ethics of the legal profession should not be violated in that the law will not assist aperson to reap the benefits of an act done in violation of the law - and acting as an attorney withoutauthority constitutes contempt of court.

Halili vs. Court of Industrial RelationsDate of promulgation: April 30, 1985Ponente:Justice MakasiarTopic in the syllabus: 7.3.2. FEES Divide fees for legal service with persons not licensed to practice law R-9-02; Canon 34, Code of Professional Ethics

FACTS:

Urgent motion to cite Atty. Benjamin PINEDA, union administrator Ricardo Capuno and Manila Bank(Cubao Branch) in contempt for their alleged failure to comply with the temporary mandatoryrestraining order issued by the Supreme Court on September 1, 1983 and the September 13, 1983resolution directing Pineda and Capuno to comply with the restraining order and ordering ManilaBank to transfer funds allocated for the workers to the NLRC


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o Issuance of the temporary mandatory restraining order stemmed from Labor Arbite

Raymundo Valenzuelas orders before the NLRC, allowing the sale of the property awardedto satisfy or answer for the claims of the union members in 4 cases and authorized thedistribution of the proceeds of the purchase

BACKGROUND: 4 cases regarding claims for overtime of 500+ bus drivers and conductors of HalilTransit

o August 20, 1958: complaint filed with CIR

o December 23, 1974: 2 parties reached an Agreement

HALILI BUS AND CONDUCTORS UNION (including its officers and members-claimantsshall withdraw and dismiss with prejudice its case before the CIR

ESTATE OF FORTUNATO HALILI shall deliver: Deed of Transfer of a parcel of land inBarrio San Bartolome, Caloocan City (area = 33,952 sq. m.) + Negotiable Check foPhp25,000.00 in the name of Domingo CABADING (union president)

Deed of Transfer + Negotiable Check = full and final satisfaction of UNIONs claimsHALILI is ABSOLUTELY, COMPLETELY and FINALLY absolved and released from anyand all liability

UNION is a duly registered labor organization duly authorized on December 22, 1974by its members to sign the Agreement

o January 6, 1975: HALILI transferred land to UNION in trust for its members-claimants

o February 14, 1975: land was registered in the name of the UNION

o August 9, 1982: UNION, though Atty. PINEDA, filed urgent motion with Ministry of Labor and

Employment (MOLE) requesting authority to sell and dispose of the property

o September 23, 1982: motion granted

o Manila Memorial Park Cemetery (prospective buyer) expressed misgivings on authority o

UNION to sell and dispose of property (P.D. 1529, sec. 66)

o December 1, 1982: PINEDA filed motion with Supreme Court requesting for authority to sel

the property SC merely noted the motion in a December 8 resolution

o PINEDA, without authority from SC but relying on the earlier authority given by

MOLE, filed another urgent motion, praying that UNION be authorized to sell thelot to the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery and to make arrangements with it suchthat payment will be advanced for the real estate taxes inclusive of penalties,attorneys lien which is equivalent to 35% of the total purchase price, and homedevelopers fee of Php69,000.00

o February 9, 1983: Labor Arbiter granted motion

o June 7, 1983: sale was finally consummated

o When Atty. Jose ESPINAS (alleged original counsel for UNION) learned of the sale from past

Union president Lopez, he requested, first from Labor Arbiter Valenzuela and later NLRCDirector Reyes to provide records of the case. At first he was told the records were missingbut these were eventually found, at which point he and UNION filed motions urgentlypraying that:

PINEDA deposit with NLRC Php712,992.00 paid to him allegedlyrepresenting 35% attorneys fees on the sale of the lot now registered inthe name of the UNION


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CABADING (union president) or his reps deposit with the NLRC the 6% alleged unionexpenses paid to them

Manila Bank Cubao Branch prevent further withdrawals of amount deposited in thename of PINEDA and/or the UNION and turn over any remaining deposits to NLRC

Should PINEDA and the UNION officers have already withdrawn the deposits or partsthereof, they should be required to post a bond in the equivalent amounts of 35%(attorneys fees), 6% (union expenses) and 5% (brokers fee) of the total proceeds o

the sale, solidarily

EXTRA BACKGROUND FACTS (surfaced later, but occurred earlier)

o August 21, 1958: UNION president Lopez, in a letter, informed J.C. Espinas and Associates

that the general membership of the UNION had authorized a 20% contingent fee for the lawfirm based on whatever amount would be awarded the UNION

o When Atty. PINEDA appeared for the Union in these cases, he used the firm name B.C.

Pineda and Associates, giving the impression that he was the principal lawyer

o He joined Espinas firm in 1965, left for a bit, but rejoined in 1968 he did not reveal to his

partners that he had a retainers contract entered into on January 1, 1967 which allegedlytook effect in 1966 ONLY UNION officers knew about it!!!

Retainers contract appears ANOMALOUS, ILLEGAL and UNETHICAL

Executed only between PINEDA and OFFICERS NOT a contract with generamembership

Contingent fee of 30% for those still working for Halili and 45% for those whowere no longer working worked to the prejudice of the latter group, who wereentitled to more benefit besides, when the contract was executed, Halili hadalready stopped operations in Metro Manila, so PINEDA knew ALL the workerswould be out of work and the 45% would apply to ALL

Contract retroactively was executed when ESPINAS was still handling Halilis

appeal in the Supreme Court PINEDA did not substitute himself in the placeof Espinas or the law firm

When Pineda filed his motion for approval of his attorneys lien with LaborArbiter Valenzuela, he did NOT attach his retainers contract

Retainers contract wasnt even notarized!

HELD:

PINEDA is found guilty of INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT, for which he is sentenced toIMPRISONMENT in the Manila City Jail until orders of SC dated September 1 and September 13,1983 are complied with.

PINEDA is also directed to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be DISBARRED under Rule 138 of theRevised Rules of Court.

Copies of this Resolution and the October 18, 1983 resolution furnished to MINISTRY OF LABOR andTANODBAYAN for appropriate action.

RATIO (only included the issue relevant to the topic in the syllabus)

The Php101,856.00 which PINEDA donated to the UNION (amounting to 5% of the total35% attorneys fees taken from the proceeds) appears IMPROPER since it amounts to arebate/commission. This amount was subsequently treated as Union miscellaneousoperating expenses without the consent of the general membership.


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o Amalgamated Laborers Association vs. CIR: We strike down the alleged ora

agreement that the union president should share in the attorneys fees. Canon 34of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms clear and explicit. It says: Nodivision of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, basedupon a division of service or responsibility. The union president is not theattorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president. Anagreement whereby a union president is allowed to share in attorneys fees isimmoral. Such a contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be justified. Acontingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an attorney is to

receive in a suit should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case,including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always besubject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.

o Fraudulent and deceitful pattern in Pinedas actions: sometimes, instead of signing his

motions for and in behalf of J.C. Espinas & Associates, he signed as B.C. Pineda, lonecounsel for petitioner

Cobb-Perez v. LantinJuly 29, 1968

Castro, J

TOPIC: COURT OBLIGATIONSCANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court

CANON 22 (Canons of Professional Ethics). Candor and fairness

The conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness.

It is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote the contents of a paper, the testimony of a witness, thelanguage or the argument of opposing counsel, of the language of a decision or a textbook; or with knowledge of itsinvalidity, to cite as authority a decision that has been overruled or a statute that has been repealed, or in argument toassert as a fact that which has not been proved, or in those jurisdictions where a side has the opening and closingarguments to mislead his opponent by concealing or withholding positions in his opening argument upon which his side thenintends to rely.

It is unprofessional and dishonorable to deal other than candidly with the facts in taking the statements of witnesses, indrawing affidavits and other documents, and in the presentation of causes.

A lawyer should not offer evidence which he knows the court should reject, in order to get the same before the jury byarguments for its admissibility, nor should he address to the judge arguments upon any points not properly calling for

determination by him. Neither should he introduce into an argument, addressed to the court, remarks or statementsintended to influence the bystanders.

Ultra Summary: The counsel of the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions calculated todelay (6 times = more than 8 years after the finality of the judgment) the execution of a simple money

judgment which has long become final and executory.

Facts:

Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision against the observation of the court thatthe series of actions that were filed by the petitioners and their counsel were merelymeans to prevent the execution of a simple money judgment. Treble costs were charged

against counsel by the court since they had an active participation in attacking theexecution in a piecemeal fashion by seeking the issuance of preliminary injunctions.

Instances (di ko alam kung ano yung other 2 huhuhu. Possibly di sinabi sa case or yung 2times na nag-no show sila in #2 and #4)

1) After the decision was rendered, Mercedes Cobb-Perez (wife) intruded and askedfor an ex parte writ of preliminary injuction from CFI Rizal knowing that the casewas decided in CFI Manila. Naturally, the ex parte writ was lifted because thecourt did not have jurisdiction.


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2) Even a month before the ex parte writ of injunction was lifted, wife filed a motionto lift the writ of execution, alleging that the property was conjugal and thenature of the debt is personal. Wife failed to present any evidence and she andher counsel failed to attend the hearing.

3) Wife and Damaso Perez (Husband) filed for the issuance of another injunctionfrom Branch 22 of CFI Manila (not the same branch which controverted the writof execution. This was denied by Judge on the ground that the court had nopower to interfere with the injuction or decree of a court of concurrent or

coordinate jurisdiction.

4) On the same day that the injunction was denied, Husband resorted to anotherremedy by filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the order which denied hiswifes motion. Naturally, this did not prosper because it was filed by his wife.For more, this was merely an offer to replace the levied property (stocks) withcash dividends. Promise was never fulfilled by husband or counsel.

Issue:

WON the counsel of the petitioners should be charged with the treble costs.

Judgment: Atty. Crispin Baizas and A.N Bolinao shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs.

Reasoning:

It is apparent that the remedies were designed the foil the execution of the moneyjudgment since even before one remedy was exhausted, they interposed another one.

Although their defense is that the counsel is merely assertive, there is a differencebetween assertiveness (which should be encouraged) and an insistence despite thepatent futility of the clients position. It is the duty of the counsel to advise his client onthe merit or lack thereof of his case. If the cause is defenseless, it is his duty to advise theclient to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible.

A lawyers oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client.Young v. BatuegasDate Promulgated: May 9, 2003Ponente: Justice Ynares-SantiagoNature of Case: (Resolution) Atty. Walter T. Young filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint fordisbarment against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q.Susa for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and violating the lawyer's oath.Facts:

1) December 13, 2000, respondents Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for accused, filed for

bail, alleging that the "accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority..."

2) Petitioner learned from NBI that accused (Arana)surrendered only on December 14, 2000

3) Respondent Susa calendared the petition for bail despite the foregoing irregularity and

other formal defects:

a. lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant

b. violation of the three-day notice rule

c. failure to attach the Certificate of Detention


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2) Respondents argued that they brought their client to the NBI to voluntarily surrender on

Dec. 13 but due to heavy traffic, they reached the NBI at 2am the next day.

3) As regards the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that complainant, as private

prosecutor, was not entitled to any notice.*

4) Respondent Susa explained that it was Ms. Pena who received the respondents motion

(for bail) and was instructed by the presiding judge to receive it subject to the certificate

of detention.

5) IBP Investigating Commissioner, Rebecca Villanueva-Maala recommended that

respondents be suspended from the practice of law for 6 months.

Issue(s): Are respondents Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood?Disposition: GUILTY. Suspended from practice of law for 6 months.Held/Ratio:

1) A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will

"do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as

a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as wel

to the courts as to his clients."

2) Respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from them as

members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if it

found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the

truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and

was under detention.

3) In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, reasonable notice of

hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for

his recommendation.

4) Although a motion may be heard on short notice, respondents failed to show any goodcause to justify the non-observance of the three-day notice rule. Verily, as lawyers, they

are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends

of justice.

Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd, Employees Association-NATU vs. The Insular LifeAssurance Co., Ltd.

January 30, 1971Castro, J.

Facts:The companies (respondents) and the unions in the companies (petitioners) entered into a

collective bargaining agreement. During the negotiations, there was a dead-lock on the issue of

union-shop. Conciliation conferences were held in the Department of Labor to no avail because

the companies did not make any counter-proposals, but instead, insisted that the unions first

drop their demand for union security. Further negotiations took place but with no satisfactory

result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. The Unions voted to declare a strike

in protest against what they considered as unfair labor practices of the companies.

While the unions were on strike, the companies sent two letters (exhibits A & B) individually to

the employees on strike. Exhibit A (p.253) basically provided benefits to employees such as


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meals, comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, overtime pay, etc. Exhibit B, on the other hand,

included threats, stating that their positions might not remain open for long.

The management tried to break through the Unions picket lines a fight was started by Garcia,

assistant corporate secretary, and in the fight that ensued, both parties suffered injuries. Prior to

the fight, the Companies organized three bus-loads of employees, including a photographer.

After the fight, the companies filed criminal charges against the picketers in the City Fiscals

Office of Manila, alleging that non-strikers were injured and using the photographs taken during

the fight as evidence.

Eventually, the strike was called off because of the companies ultimatum, giving them until June

2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced. Employees went back to the companies but

some werent readmitted despite complying with the conditions set by the company

(enumerated below).

The CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies. The

Companies filed an answer denying the allegations and prayed for the dismissal of the case.

After trial on the merits, Judge Arsenio Martinez rendered a decision dismissing the unions

complaint for lack of merit.

Issues & Reasoning

1. WON the Companies are guilty of unfair labor practices by sending the letters individually tothe strikers. [YES]

The act of sending the letters individually to employees is not considered to be a

legitimate exercise of the companies freedom of speech. They were sent to the striking

employees individually through registered special delivery mail without being coursed

through the unions which were representing the employees in the collective bargaining

the act of bargaining individually despite the collective bargaining agreement is

considered an unfair labor practice.

Exhibit A contained promises of benefits and Exhibit B contained threats. The free speech

protection under the constitution is inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the

employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats, or reprisal. The company

was guilty of union-busting and strike breaking. It is clear that the letters were intended to

destroy unionism within the employees.

2. WON the companies discriminated in the matter of readmission of employees after the strike.[YES]

The companies imposed 3 conditions for readmission of the strikers: 1) employee must be

interested in continuing to work; 2) there must be no criminal charges against him; 3) he

must report for work on June 2, 1958. All employees went back to work, therefore the onlyissue is if the employees all complied with the 2nd condition. Despite the fact that they

were able to secure clearances, 34 officials and union members were still refused to be

readmitted on the ground that they committed acts inimical to the companies. For more

the companies admitted non-strikers who had criminal charges despite the fact that they

werent able to secure clearances. This is a clear act of discrimination.

3. WON the companies dismissed officials and members of unions without giving them thebenefit of investigation and opportunity to present their side. [YES]

Despite the fact that they were able to secure clearances, some of the employees werent

admitted and were instead dismissed. There was no sufficient basis for such dismissal


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(letters stated that they merely committed acts of misconduct while picketing during the

last strike). Also, there was overwhelming evidence to negate the allegation that a

member (Tabasondra the VP of the union) had abandoned his job.

4. WON the court should order the reinstatement of officials and members of unions. [YES]

The union members were discriminatorily dismissed and the court should order their

reinstatement with back pay.

5. WON Judges misquotation was an attempt to mislead. (THE ONLY ONE RELEVANT TO OURLESSON) [NO]

Petitioners asked the Court to cite Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial

Relations in contempt on the ground that what the judge quoted (in p. 277 and 278 in the

case) do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of the Courts decision (basically, the judge

cut and paste sections of a portion of the decision and put them into separate paragraphs

and changed some words).

The Court said that this does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against the

respondent judge. The Court is inclined to believe that the misquotation is more a result of

clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt to mislead. The respondents counsels, who

reproduced it, are likewise not at fault since they merely relied on the quotation by thejudge.

Be that as it may, the Court has the firm view that in citing the Courts decisions and

rulings, it is the bounden duty of the courts, judges, and lawyers to reproduce or copy the

same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. The reason for this is

that from this Tribunals rulings do all other courts, lawyers, and litigants take their

bearings.

If not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose the

proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers, and the public who

may thereby be misled. In other words, verbatim reproduction of quotations is imperative.

Happily for the judge and the respondents counsel, there was no substantial change in

the thrust of the Courts particular ruling which they cited. They are, however, admonished

to be more careful in citing jurisprudence in the future.

Judgment: Dismissed respondents will be reinstated to their former or comparatively similarpositions, with backwages.

IN RE SOTTORESPECT COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS: maintain respect and insist similar conduct by others

C-11

FACTS:- Respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto was required by the Court in the present proceeding to

show cause as to we he shouldnt not be punished for contempt of court- Sotto had previously issued a written statement in connection with the decision of the

Court In Re Angel Parazo in the Manila Times and other newspapers. The following areexcerpts of his statement:

o High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once

more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majorityof its members


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o I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil is to change the

members of the Supreme Court I announce that one of the first measures which Iwill introduce in the coming congressional sessions will have as its object thecomplete reorganization of the Supreme Court.

- Sotto was granted 10 days more besides the 5 days originally given to him to file hisanswer, but still filed his answer after the expiration of this period. The case was set forhearing on January 4, but was postponed to January 10, 1949. Sotto, however, did notappear, so the case was submitted for decision

- In his answer, Sotto did not deny having published the threat and intimidation as well asthe charges against the Supreme Court.

1) Contended that under section 13, article VIII of the Constitution, which states theSupreme Courts power to promulgate rules regarding pleading, practice, andprocedure, that the Court has no power to impose correctional penalties upon thecitizens, and that the SC can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a lawand a law has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the ChiefExecutive

2) Alleged that he made his statement in the press in the exercise of the freedom ofspeech, and with utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of thehonorable members of the high Tribunal

RULING: Atty. Vicente Sotto guilty of contempt by virtue of the publication and was required toappear and show cause to the Court why he should not be disbarred

HELD:- 1) Well settled doctrine in the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since

our Constitution is patterned after theirs: That the power to punish for contempt isinherent in all courts of superior jurisdiction independently of any special expression ofstatute (simply, that this power exists but is not explicitly stated in the law)

- Court then cited In Re Kelly:o Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an

impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamoro Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the parties, the counsel,

etc., with reference to the suit or tending to influence the decision of thecontroversy is contempt of court and is punishable- Had respondent limited himself to a statement that our decision is wrong or that our

construction of the intention of the law is not correct, his criticism might be tolerated, for itcould not in any way influence the final disposition of the Parazo case by the court.However, Sotto did not merely criticize the decision of the Parazo case, which was thenstill pending.

o He intended to intimidate the members of the Court with the presentation of a bill in

the next Congress, reorganizing the Supreme Court by reducing its members from11 to 7, in order to change the members of the Court who decided the Parazo case,and influence the final decision of the Court

o He attacked honesty and integrity of the Court and degraded the administration of

justice, as seen in his statement: In the wake of so many blunders and injusticesdeliberately committed during these last years [by the SC]; the Supreme Courtof today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy.

- If the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of theCourt and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to takethe law into their own hands. Moreover, Atty. Vicente Sotto is in duty bound to uphold thedignity and authority of the Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he hastaken, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice

- 2) Respondents assertion in his answer that he made his statement in good faith andwithout intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of the high


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Tribunal may mitigate but not exempt him from liability, but it is belied by his acts andstatements during the pendency of this proceeding

o Sotto alleged that Justice Gregorio Perfecto was the principal promoter of the

proceeding for contempt, conveying the idea that the Court acted through theinstigation of Justice Perfecto

- License or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused withliberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of free press and the freeexercise of the right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary

- It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligationto be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be removed fromoffice or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct

- In summary: in all his statements, the respondent misrepresented to the public the causeof the charge against him for contempt of court. In truth, he is charged with intending tointerfere and influence the final disposition of the said case through intimidation and falseaccusations against the Supreme Court

CONCURRING (J. Perfecto, as in that guy Sotto was blaming for all of this gulo. This case is solong because of this opinion. His feelings were very hurt eh):

- Sottos answer was filed late, but the Court overlooked this delay. It legally could havebeen rejected

- The record of this case indicates that the practice of falsehoods seems to be habitual inrespondent; proceeded to enumerating Sottos past criminal cases and misbehavior

- Respondents allegation that he made the press statement not as a private citizen but as asenator, and should have ample liberty to discuss public affairs lacked merit. Senators arenot amenable to the law

- Respondent could not have acted in good faith as he alleged, as seen in his slanderousstatements like the Supreme Court having committed many blunders and injusticesdeliberately)

- Respondents statement was an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice bybullying the members of the SC with the menace of reorganization and removal

- Posing as a false martyr for freedom of the press

SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, et. al. VS. Hon. CLORIBEL et. Al.In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attys. Vicewnte Sotto, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano Regalaand Associates, Erlito Uy, Juanito Caling; and Morton MeadsCanon 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to

judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.After the decision of the court adverse to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the ff.Lawyers made statements against the court:

1. Atty. Vicente Santiago guilty of contempt of court

Third motion for reconsideration- he pictures petitioners as vulturous executives.

- He speaks of the Court as a civilized, democratic tribunal but by innuendo would

suggest that it is not.

Motion to inhibit- He categorizes the decision of July 31, 1968 as false, erroneous and illegal.

- He accuses two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of the case:

Associate Justice Castro bec his brother is the vp of the favoured party and Concepcion

whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created board of investments. He said

that the two justices were not free from the appearance of impropriety and also

aroused suspicion that their relationship affected their judgment.


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- Paragraph 6 (contained language that was disrespectful)

*see page 8 of case for complete text- Although this was voluntarily deleted, the fact is it has been made.

- Par 6 describes many of our judicial authorities who believe that they are chosen

messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and no matter what the

circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity.

- Paragraph 7

- Repeated mention of unjudicial prejudice against respondent MacArthur and spoke of

unjudicial favoritsm for petitioners

- Paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that any other justices who have received

favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners xxxx should also

inhibit themselves.

He convinced Caling to sign the motion, who with Meads explained to him the allegationsand the background of the case. Caling said that if not for his friendship with Santiago, hewould not have signed the motion.

2. Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt

- Accuses petitioners of having made false, ridiculous and wild statements in a

desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur

- He charges petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only

from case to case but from pleading to pleading.

3. Atty. Regala exonerated

4. Atty. Uy exempt from contempt

5. Atty. Caling guilty of contempt. He should have taken care that his name should not be

attached to pleadings contemptuous in character

6. Morton meads guilty of contempt. He had admitted having prepared the fourth motion

for reconsideration.

In re: AlmacenFebruary 18, 1970Castro,J.

Facts:

Before the court is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacens Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title filed in protestagainst what Almacen alleges, among others, a great injustice against his client by the Supreme Court.The present petition stemmed from a civil case entitled Yaptinchay v. Calero, in which case, Atty. Almacen wascounsel for the respondent.


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-The trial court rendered a decision against Almacens client which prompted him to move forreconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion but did not notify the latter of thetime nor place of the hearing. Hence, the motion was denied.-Upon appeal, the CA relied on Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. Inc. V. Batu Construction & Co., in dismissingthe appeal stating that the motion for reconsideration did not contain neither the time nor place of thehearing and thus is a useless piece of paper. A second motion for reconsideration on the CA decisionwas also denied.-Atty. Almacen then appealed to the SC by certiorari. The supreme court denied the appeal through aminute resolution.

It was at this point that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing the aforementioned Petition - apleading which is interspersed with contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks against theSupreme Court and its individual members.

-Almacen indicts the Supreme Court as a tribunal peopled by men who are calloused to our please forjustice, who ignore without reasons their applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of theConstitution with impunity."-His client has allegedly become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy."-Justice, as administered by the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb."

-He ends his petition with a prayer that a resolution be issued ordering the Clerk of Court to receive his

certificate of title in trust with reservation that at any time and in any event that we regain our faith andconfidence he may retrieve his title to resume his practice of the noblest profession.-Almacen reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of his petition.

The Court then resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause why no disciplinary action should be takenagainst him. The Court allowed him to submit a written explanation and thereafter, be heard in oral argument.Almacens written argument as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers no apology. Almacen merelyrepeats his allegations and even embellished them with abundant sarcasm and innuendo.

Issue: Did Atty. Almacen employ scandalous, offensive and menacing language against the Supreme Court and itsmembers and should therefore be subject to disciplinary action?

Ruling: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen is hereby suspended from the practice of law until further orders.

Reasoning:

On minute resolution denials:

Although the court has been asked to do away with issuing minute resolutions, and instead to state the facts andthe law and to spell out the reasons when denying petitions, foregoing such a practice would render the Courtunable to effectively carry out its burden under the Constitution.Such mode of disposal has helped the court alleviate its heavy docket.Then Sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court state that a review is not a matter of right but of sound judicialdiscretion and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor.

Upon a thoroughgoing examinationof the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully andcorrectly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court; Therewas, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.

On expressing disappointment and criticism on judicial action:

Judicial officers are not above reproach; like all other public officers, they must answer for their answers beforethe chancery of public opinion.Lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, alsothe manner in which they are handed down.Criticism of the courts has been an important part of the traditional work of the bar and no class of the communityought to be allowed freer scope in scrutinizing the capacity, impartiality and integrity of the members of the

judiciary because they have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment.


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However, all such criticism must not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfaircriticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer todisciplinary action.

On whether Atty. Almacen can properly be subject to disciplinary sanctions:

There is no relief afforded to Atty. Almacen by the circumstances that his actuations were made only after thejudgment in his clients appeal attained finality. He could still be found in contempt, for what is sought to beprotected is the Court itself and its dignity.The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes in Atty. Almacens petition, answer and oralargumentation far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism.They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himselfand, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in themto the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thuslaid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.

Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of AppealsDate of promulgation: October 1, 1998Ponente:Justice Regalado

TOPIC IN THE SYLLABUS:Code of Professional ResponsibilityRULE 12.03: A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering anexplanation for his failure to do so.

FACTS:

June 20, 1980:o M/V (motor vessel) Pavlodar, flying under the flagship of the USSR (now Russia) and owned

by the Far Eastern Shipping Company, arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, BritishColumbia.

o The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port.

o The Philippine Port Authority (PPA) tasked Captain Roberto Abellana to supervise the

berthing of the vessel.o The Manila Pilots Association (MPA) assigned Senen Gavino to conduct docking maneuvers

for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth 4.o Gavino boarded the vessel and stationed himself in the bridge. The vessels master, Victor

Kavankov, was beside him. Kavankov briefed him about the vessel and its cargo. Thevessel lifted anchor and headed towards the port.

o Half a mile away from the pier (landmark, in case sir asks: big church by North Tondo

Harbor), Gavino ordered the engine stopped. 2,000 ft. away from the pier, Gavinoordered the anchor dropped. However, the anchor did NOT take hold as expected .

The vessel didnt stop nor slow down.o A commotion ensued between Kavankov and his crew members. But when Gavino asked

what it was about, Kavankov assured him there was nothing to it.o Gavino ordered the engines half-astern (according to Google, this means revolutions

as indicated in ship's orders).o Abellana, who was on the pier, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast.

o Anchor still did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the full-astern code. But before

the anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammedinto the apron of the pier, causing damage to both the pier and the vessel.

Manila RTC: PPA sued Far Eastern, Gavino and MPA. Far Eastern, Gavino and MPA ordered tojointly and severally pay PPA P1,053,000 representing actual damages and the costs of the suit.

Court of Appeals: No employer-employee relationship existing between MPA AND Gavino. MPAsolidarily liable (with Far Eastern and Gavino) to PPA, but MPA entitled to reimbursement fromGavino for such amount of the adjudged pecuniary liability in excess of the amount equivalent to75% of its prescribed reserve fund.


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Supreme Court: Far Eastern assigned several errors to the Court of Appeals.

NOTE: The issues and ratio arent really relevant to the topic in the syllabus but Im includingthem anyway. Skip ahead to the last part if you want to get to the Legally Professional part!

ISSUES, HELD and RATIO

1. WON Gavino and MPA should be held solely responsible for the resulting damages sustained bythe pier

a. NO! Both Gavino and Kavankov were negligent (based on their respective

testimony)b. MPA is solidarily liable for the negligence of its member pilots, without prejudice to

subsequent reimbursement from the pilot at fault

2. WON the master (Kavankov) exercised the required diligence demanded from by him by thecircumstances at the time the incident happened

a. NO! Like Gavino, he was negligent.

3. WON the amount of damages sustained by PPA (awarded by RTC, affirmed by CA) is exorbitantand unreasonable

a. NO! Amount of damages is reasonable represents the proportional cost of repair andrehabilitation of the damaged section of the pier.

4. WON Far Eastern should be awarded any amount ofcounterclaima. NO! Far Easterns imputation of PPAs failure to provide a safe and reliable berthing place is

obtuse mere afterthought (tardily raised), no allegation or evidence on record that BerthNo. 4 was unsafe and unrealiable

5. WON Far Easterns claim against Gavino and MPA should be granted in the event that FarEastern is held liable

WHY ARE WE DISCUSSING THIS IN LEGPROF AND NOT OBLICON?Prefatorily, on matters of compliance with procedural requirements, it must be mentionedthat the conduct of the respective counsel for [Far Eastern] and PPA leaves much to bedesired, to the displeasure and disappointment of this Court.

Counsel for Far Eastern: law firm ofDel Rosario and Del Rosario, through its associate, AttyHerbert A. Tria

o What did they do wrong? FORUM SHOPPING

MPAs petition in G.R. 130150 was posted by registered mail on August 291997. It would be fair to conclude that when Far Eastern filed its petitionin G.R. No. 130068 on September 26, 1997, it would already havereceived a copy of the former and would then have knowledge of thependency of the other petition. It was therefore incumbent upon FarEastern to inform the Court of that fact through its certificationagainst forum shopping.

o Far Eastern cant pretend it didnt know about the other petition

because on April 25, 1998, it itself filed the motion for consolidationof the 2 cases!

Del Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically Atty. Tria, is REPRIMANDED andWARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts of heedless disregard oits undertakings under the Rules shall be dealt with more severely.

Counsel for PPA: Office of the Solicitor General, composed ofAssistant SG Roman G. DeRosario, Solicitor Luis F. Simon, and Assistant Solicitor General Pio C. Guerrero

o What did they do wrong? inordinately and almost unreasonably long period of time

to file comment, thus unduly delaying the resolution of these cases

First case (G.R. No. 130068)

It took several changes in OSG leadership before the comment on behalf oPPA was filed

It took 8 motions for extension of time, totaling 210 days, a warningthat no further extension shall be granted, and personal service on the SGhimself of the resolution requiring the filing of such comment before OSGfinallydelivered the comment on July 10, 1998 (original deadline: Novembe12, 1997)


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Far Eastern wasnt even furnished a copy of said comment!!! (Required bySection 5, Rule 42: The comment of respondent shall be filedA copythereof shall be served on the petitioner.) Instead, a copy wasinadvertently furnished to MPA, which wasnt even a party to that case!

Second case (G.R. No. 130150)

It took 6 extensions, a total of180 days, before comment was filed.

While MPA (petitioner in this case) was properly furnished with a copy of itscomment, it would have been more desirable and expedient to have furnishedits co-respondent Far Eastern with a copy thereof, if only as a matter o

professional courtesy. This undeniably dilatory disinclination of the OSG to seasonably file

required pleadings constitutes deplorable disservice to the tax-payingpublic and can only be categorized as CENSURABLE EFFICIENCYon the partof the government law office. This is most certainly professionallyunbecoming of the OSG.

o What else did they do wrong? They didnt consolidate the 2 cases! Consolidation would

have made their job easier theyd only have to prepare 1 comment, which they might haveactually been able to submit on time.

We find here a lackadaisical attitude and complacencyon the part of theOSG in the handling of its cases and an almost reflexive propensity to movefor countless extensions,AS IF TO TEST THE PATIENCE OF THE COURT,before favoring it with timely submission of required pleadings.

The canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility apply with equal forceon lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks

As government counsel, they have the added duty to abide by the policy ofthe State to promote a high standard of ethics in public service

It is incumbent upon OSG, as part of the government bureaucracy, to performand discharge its duties with the highest degree of professionalismintelligence and skill and to extend prompt, courteous and adequateservice to the public (source: Code of Conduct and Ethical Standardsfor Public Officials and Employees)

Assistant SG Del Rosario and Solicitor Simon are ADMONISHED and WARNED that arepetition of the same or similar acts of unduly delaying proceedings due to delayedfiling of required pleadings shall be dealt with more stringently.

SG is DIRECTED to look into the circumstances of this case and to adopt providentmeasures to avoid a repetition of this incident and which would ensure compliancewith orders of this Court regarding the timely filing of requisite pleadings, in theinterest of just, speedy and orderly administration of justice.

Copies of the decision will be spread upon the personal records of the lawyers in theOffice of the Bar Confidant

Programme Inc. v. Province of Bataan26 June 2006Corona, J.

FACTS:

Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. (BASECO) was the owner of Piazza Hotel inMariveles, Bataan.

On May 14, 1986, granted petitioner Programme Inc. a contract of lease of Piazza Hotel.o Monthly rental: P6,500

o 3 year contract from January 1, 1986 to January 1, 1989, subject to renewal by

mutual agreement of parties

Upon expiration of the contract, petitioner was allowed to continue operating the hotel onmonthly extensions of the lease contract.

In April 1989, the PCGG issued a sequestration order against BASECO. Among theproperties sequestered was the lot on which the Piazza Hotel stood.


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On July 19, 1989, the Piazza Hotel was sold at a public auction for non-payment of taxes.The respondent Province of Bataan was the highest bidder.

Programme Inc. filed a complaint for preliminary injunction and for collection of a sum ofmoney against BASECO. Respondent Province of Bataan filed a motion to intervene, as thenew owner of the property. Said motion was granted. Province of Bataan filed a complaint-in-intervention praying that petition Programme Inc. be ordered to vacate the Piazza Hotelfor lack of legal interest.

Trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent. CA affirmed TC decision.

ISSUE:1. Is respondent Province of Bataan the legitimate owner of Piazza Hotel?

RULING: PETITION DENIED1. Yes

Evidence clearly established Bataans ownershipo Title of land on which Piazza Hotel stands is in the name of the respondent

o Tax declaration was in the name of the respondent as owner of Piazza Hotel

Petitioner was merely a lessee; hence could not be the owner of a building merelyleased to it.

o Petitioner admitted BASECOs ownership then of the property in the lease

contracto In its own complaint for preliminary injunction and sum of money, petitioner

acknowledged that it was not the owner of the property when it stated that[BASECO] lease[d] to [petitioner] the building Piazza Hotel x x x for monthlyrentals of P6,500.

At best, what was confirmed was that the petitioner managed and operated the hotel.There was no evidence that petitioner spent for the construction or renovation of theproperty.

Petitioner cannot be considered a possessor in good faith because this applies only toa case where one builds/sows/plants on land which he believes himself to have a claimof title, not to lands wherein ones only interest is that of a tenant under a rentalcontract.

Both the trial and appellate courts already declared that the land and theimprovements thereon belonged to the respondent. The Court finds no reason tooverturn this factual conclusion. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.

Since the petition was clearly without legal and factual basis, counsel shouldnot have even filed the appeal. It is obvious that the intention was merely todelay the disposition of the case.

Dispositive: Costs against petitioner. Same costs against Atty. BenitoCuesta I, petitioners counsel, for filing this flimsy appeal, payable within ten(10) days from finality of this decision.

MANILA PEST CONTROL, INC., (COMPLAINANT) VS. WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSIONETAL(RESPONDENTS)

GR NO. L-27662 OCTOBER 29,1968FERNANDO, J.

1. Abitria an employee of Manila Pest Control (MPC) filed a complaint against Workmenscompensation commission(WCC). MPC filed an MR against the decision by WCC but wasdenied since there was already a decision against petitioner awarding Abitria P6,000 as hisdisability compensation benefit. It was also denied because there was no plea in the MR toset aside said decision and it was rendered moot and academic.

2. MPC filed another MR arguing that they werent aware that a decision has already beenmade regarding the complaint filed by Abitria.


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3. But this MR was denied and a the plea for execution made in behalf of Abitria was grantedthe sheriff levied the properties of MPC.

4. Because of this, MPC is arguing that there was an infringement of procedural due processand the acts of WCC was either in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse ofdiscretion.

5. WCC filed an answer and it was revealed that petitioner was the just evading theperformance of an obligation

o Abitria was made to inhale dangerous fumes as the atmosphere was polluted with

poisonous chemical dusts. He began to experience symptoms of pulmonarytuberculosis.

o WCC granted the petition of Abitria and held that the illness was brought about by

his work.

o Guzman (of WCC) tried to deliver the decision to Manila Pest Control. He went to the

office of Atty. Corpuz but Corpuz refused to receive the decision arguing that he nolonger had anything to do with the case and he also said that the decision should bedelivered to Atty. Camacho. Camacho wasnt there so Guzman just left the decisionwith the clerk.

ISSUES1. WON there was an infringement of due process against MPC. NO.

RULINGPetition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is denied.

REASONING1. MPC was arguing that there was an infringement of due process when the decision was

executed even when they didnt receive a copy of the said decision but it was found out

that their own counsel refused the decision in order to delay the fulfillment of theobligation of MPC to pay Abitria the compensation demanded. This cannot be. The courtheld that due process concept cannot be the very vehicle to visit on a hapless andimpoverished litigant injustice and fairness.

Compiled Jan 17

Documents

Transcript of Compiled Jan 17