1. ALARCON , NOELMIAA v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006

FACTS:The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under Executive Order No. 903 (MIAA Charter), as amended. As such operator, it administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. In March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 to the effect that the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21of its Charter. Thus, MIAA paid some of the real estate tax already due. In June 2001, it received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. The City Treasurer subsequently issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the airport lands and buildings. At the instance of MIAA, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying Opinion No. 061, pointing out that Sec. 206 of the LGC requires persons exempt from real estate tax to show proof of exemption. According to the OGCC, Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax. MIAA, thus, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the airport lands and buildings, but this was dismissed for having been filed out of time. Hence, MIAA filed this petition for review, pointing out that it is exempt from real estate tax under Sec. 21 of its charter and Sec. 234 of the LGC. It invokes the principle that the government cannot tax itself as a justification for exemption, since the airport lands and buildings, being devoted to public use and public service, are owned by the Republic of the Philippines. On the other hand, the City of Parañaque invokes Sec. 193 of the LGC, which expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) upon the effectivity of the LGC. It asserts that an international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in the said law. Meanwhile, the City of Parañaque posted and published notices announcing the public auction sale of the airport lands and buildings. In the afternoon before the scheduled public auction, MIAA applied with the Court for the issuance of a TRO to restrain the auction sale. The Court issued a TRO on the day of the auction sale, however, the same was received only by the City of Parañaque three hours after the sale.

ISSUE:Whether or not the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax?

HELD:The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local governments. Sec. 243(a) of the LGC exempts from real estate tax any real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines. This exemption should be read in relation with Sec.133 (o) of the LGC, which provides that the exercise of the taxing powers of local governments shall not extend to the levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities.

These provisions recognize the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national government, which historically merely delegated to local governments the power to tax. The rule

is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. This rule applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities. Moreover, a tax exemption is construed liberally in favor of national government instrumentalities. MIAA is not a GOCC, but an instrumentality of the government. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the properties. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. At any time, the President can transfer back to the Republic title to the airport lands and buildings without the Republic paying MIAA any consideration. As long as the airport lands and buildings are reserved for public use, their ownership remains with the State. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing these properties from public use, they remain properties of public dominion. As such, they are inalienable, hence, they are not subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale, and they are exempt from real estate tax. However, portions of the airport lands and buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has granted the beneficial use of such portions for a consideration to a taxable person.

MMDA vs Trackworks Rail Transit AdvertisingGR 179554 December 16, 2009

FACTS:Respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising entered intoa contract for advertising with the Metro Rail Transit Corp. andthereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and otheradvertising media in different parts of the MRT 3 premises.Sometime in 2001 MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle saidbillboards and signages pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009wherein the MMDA prohibits the posting, installation, and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any partof the road, sidewalk, center-island, posts, trees, parks and openspaces. Trackworks refused the said request and then MMDAproceeded to dismantle the billboards and similar forms of advertisement. Trackworsk filed a civil case before the Pasig RTC, atemporary restraining order was issued against MMDA. The MMDAfiled a petition with the Court of Appeals but denied said petitionand affirmed the order of the RTC. Petition was then filed with theSC which denied the same and eventually this resolution after apetition for review.

ISSUE:Whether or not the MMDA has the power under its mandate to cause the dismantling of respondents’ advertisement materials.

HELD:No, the Court ruled that MMDA had no power on its own to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards and other advertising materials installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. TheMMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system and administration. Nothing in Republic Act 7924 granted MMDA police power let alone legislative power. Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other advertising media in the MRT 3 from MRTC’s authority under the BLT agreement to develop commercial premises in the MRT3structure or to obtain advertising income is no longer debatable. Under the BLT

agreement, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of theMRT3 to the Government. Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this case, and until this date, MRTC’s entering into the contract for advertising services with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership. MMDA also may not invoke that it is implementing the Building Code rules and regulations because the power to enforce this lies with the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not in MMDA, as contemplated in the letters of Sec. 201, thus: Sec. 201. Responsibility for Administration and Enforcement.

The administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof is hereby vested in the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, hereinafter referred to as the Secretary.   There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH to implement the Building Code.

2. BAUTISTA, LUDIELYN C.

G.R. No. 169836             July 31, 2007PHILIPPINE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE and the CITY OF ILOILO,respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:The Ministry of Public Works and Highways reclaimed from the sea a 21-hectare parcel of land in Barangay Tanza, Iloilo City, and constructed thereon the IFPC, consisting of breakwater, a landing quay, a refrigeration building, a market hall, a municipal shed, an administration building, a water and fuel oil supply system and other port related facilities and machineries.

Upon its completion, the Ministry of Public Works and Highways turned over IFPC to the Philippine Fisheries Development Authority (Authority), pursuant to Section 11 of PD 977, which places fishing port complexes and related facilities under the governance and operation of the Authority.

Notwithstanding said turn over, title to the land and buildings of the IFPC remained with the Republic.

The Authority thereafter leased portions of IFPC to private firms and individuals engaged in fishing related businesses.

In May 1988, the City of Iloilo assessed the entire IFPC for real property taxes. The assessment remained unpaid until the alleged total tax delinquency of the Authority for the fiscal years 1988

and 1989amounted to P5,057,349.67, inclusive of penalties and interests. To satisfy the tax delinquency, the City of Iloilo scheduled on August 30, 1990, the sale at public auction of the IFPC. The Authority filed an injunction case with the Regional Trial Court.At the pre-trial, the parties agreed to avail of administrative proceedings, i.e., for the Authority to file a claim for tax exemption with the Iloilo City Assessor’s Office. The latter, however, denied the claim for exemption, hence, the Authority elevated the case to the Department of Finance (DOF). The DOF ruled that the Authority is liable to pay real property taxes to the City of Iloilo because it enjoys the beneficial use of the IFPC. The DOF added, however, that in satisfying the amount of the unpaid real property taxes, the property that is owned by the Authority shall be auctioned, and not the IFPC, which is a property of the Republic. The Authority filed a petition before the Office of the President but it was dismissed. It also denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the Authority. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the president.

ISSUEWhether or not the Authority is liable to pay real property tax to the City of Iloilo – Whether or not the IFPC may be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency –

HELD:Yes. But only for those portions which were leased out to private persons. The Authority isnot a GOCC but an instrumentality of the national government which is generally exempt from payment of real property tax. However, said exemption does not apply to the portions of the IFPC which the Authority leased to private entities. With respect to these properties, the Authority is liable to pay real property tax. Nonetheless, the IFPC, being a property of public dominion cannot be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency. For an entity to be considered as a GOCC, it must either be organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. Two requisites must concur before one may be classified as a stock corporation, namely: (1) that it has capital stock divided into shares, and (2) that it is authorized to distribute dividends and allotments of surplus and profits to its stockholders.

If only one requisite is present, it cannot be properly classified as a stock corporation. As for non-stock corporations, they must have members and must not distribute any part of their income to said members.The Authority should be classified as an instrumentality of the national government. As such, it is generally exempt from payment of real property tax, except those portions which have been leased to private entities.

In Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) v. Court of Appeals, the Authority was cited as among the instrumentalities of the national government. The Authority has a capital stock but it is not divided into shares of stocks. Also, it has no stockholders or voting shares. Hence, it is not a stock corporation. Neither it is a non-stock corporation because it has no members.

The Authority is actually a national government instrumentality which is defined as an agency of the national government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or  jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate

powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter

When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. The MIAA case also held that unlike GOCCs, instrumentalities of the national government, like MIAA, are exempt from local taxes pursuant to Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code. This exemption, however, admits of an exception with respect to real property taxes. Under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, when an instrumentality of the national governmentgrants to a taxable person the beneficial use of a real property owned by the Republic, said instrumentality becomes liable to pay real property tax.

Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax exemption of all juridical persons "unless otherwise provided in this Code." Now, Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code expressly provides otherwise, specifically prohibiting local governments from imposing any kind of tax on national government instrumentalities. Section133 states: SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. – Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following: Taxes, fees or charges of any kinds on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units.

The Authority should be classified as an instrumentality of the national government which is liable to pay taxes only with respect to the portions of the property, the beneficial use of which were vested in private entities. The real property tax assessments issued by the City of Iloilo should be upheld only with respect to the portions leased to private persons.

In case the Authority fails to pay the real property taxes due thereon, said portions cannot be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority it was held that reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain and cannot, without Congressional fiat, be subject of a sale, public or private. The Iloilo fishing port which was constructed by the State for public use and/or public service falls within the term "port" in the aforecited provision.

Being a property of public dominion the same cannot be subject to execution or foreclosure sale. In like manner, the reclaimed land on which the IFPC is built cannot be the object of a private or public sale without Congressional authorization. Whether there are improvements in the fishing port complex. That should not be construed to be embraced within the term "port," involves evidentiary matters that cannot be addressed in the present case.

LUMAYNA V COAGR NO 185001 9/25/2009

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:The Department of Budget and Management granted a maximum of five percent salary adjustment to personnel in the Local Government Units pursuant to Republic Act No. 9137 and issued a circular to provide guidelines on personal services limitation pursuant to the Local Government Code. In pursuance thereof, a 2003 Annual Municipal Budget resolution was enacted by the Sangguniang Bayanof Mayoyao, Ifugao adopting a first class salary scheme for the municipality and implementing a five percent salary increase for its personnel re-aligning the amount originally appropriated in their 2002 Annual Municipal Budget for the salaries and benefits of seventeen new positions. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disallowed the increase and the re-alignment of funds on the ground that the re-alignment is not sufficient in form to implement a salary increase but finding good faith on the part of the officials of the municipality, it reconsidered. The Commission on Audit subsequently issued a Notice of Disallowance for the salary increases of municipal personnel and ordered herein petitioners to refund the amount contending that the increase was not in accordance with the Local Government Code; that the limitation on personal services had been exceeded; and that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution was not the appropriate manner of granting the increase.

ISSUE:Whether the Commission on Audit gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the notice of disallowance which directed the herein petitioners to refund the amount disallowed therein.

HELD:The Court partially granted the instant petition on the basis of the petitioner’s good faith but found that the Commission on Audit correctly affirmed the disallowance of the amount. Findings of fact by administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive and should not be disturbed in the interest of stability of the governmental structure.In the instant case, although the 5% salary increase exceeded the limitation for appropriations for personal services in the Municipality of Mayoyao, this alone is insufficient to overthrow the presumption of good faith in favor of petitioners as municipal officials. It must be mentioned that the disbursement of the 5% salary increase of municipal personnel was done under the color and by virtue of resolutions enacted pursuant to LBC No. 74, and was made only after the Sangguniang Panlalawigan declared operative the 2002 municipal budget. In fact, the Notice of Disallowance was issued only on 16 May 2003, after the municipality had already implemented the salary increase. Moreover, in its Resolution No. 2004-1185,38 the Sangguniang Panlalawigan reconsidered its prior disallowance of the adoption of a first class salary schedule and 5% salary increase of the Municipality of Mayoyao based on its finding that the municipal officials concerned acted in good faith.

The decisions of the commission clearly presented the factual findings and adequately explained the legal basis for disallowing the said amount. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Audit.

3. BRIGUERA, JOHN GILES

VFP vs. ReyesGR NO. 1555027 2/28/2005

FACTS: Petitioner Veterans Federation of the Philippines is a corporate body organized under Republic Act No. 2640. In 2002, petitioner received a letter from Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense to conduct Audit of VFP pursuant to RA 2640, where it stated that VFP is under the supervision and control of the Secretary of National Defense. Petitioner complained about the scope of power given to DND. As a result, petitioner sought relief under Rule 65 assailing that it is a private non-government corporation.

ISSUE: Whether or not VFP is a public office.

HELD:Yes, petitioner is a public corporation. In the instant case, the functions of VFP – the protection of the interests of war veterans which promotes social justice and reward patriotism – certainly fall within the category of sovereign functions. The fact that VFP has no budgetary appropriation is only a product of erroneous application of the law by public officers in the DBM which will not bar subsequent correct application. Hence, placing it under the control and supervision of DND is proper.

YENKO V GUNGONGR NO. 165450 & 165452 8/13/2009

FACTS:Petitioner Raul Nestor C. Gungon in this consolidated case assails his transfer/ reassignment which according to him was violative of his constitutional right to stability of tenure and furthermore was illegally dismissed.

On February 28, 1987, Raul Nestor C. Gungon, who holds a professional career service eligibility, was extended a permanent appointment as Local Assessment Operations Officer III in the Assessors Office of the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila. On January 7, 1998, San Juan Municipal Administrator Francisco F. Yenko issued a Memorandum[2] temporarily reassigning Gungon to the Public Order and Safety Office (POSO) of the said municipality effective January 8, 1998 in the exigency of the service. Gungon was directed to report to Mr. Felesmeno Oliquino for further instruction. When Gungon received the Memorandum, Mr. Oliquino was confined at the San Juan Medical Center and he passed away on January 9, 1998.

On January 8, 1998, Gungon, in compliance with the reassignment Memorandum, reported to the POSO. The officer-in-charge (OIC) of the POSO, Arnulfo Aguilar, issued a Memorandum[3] dated January 8, 1998 requiring Gungon to report as Duty Agent, whose responsibility was "to conduct inspections within the municipal compound, apprehend any suspicious characters roaming within the vicinity of the municipal hall and compound," and setting his tour of duty at 12:01 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. from Monday to Friday. In a letter[4] dated January 9, 1998 to the OIC of the POSO, Gungon protested his reassignment for being violative of the Administrative Code of 1987, which prohibits reassignment that results in reduction in rank, status or salary of an employee. Gungon went on sick leave from January 8 to 21, 1998 after filing the proper application with supporting medical certificate.[5]

He was then Dismissed for not having to comply with his supposedly new duty as Duty Agent. ISSUE:Was Gungon Illegally Dismissed?

HELD:Yes. Petitioner Gungon is hereby reinstated, without qualification, to his former position as Local Assessment Operations Officer III in the Assessors Office of the Municipal Government of San Juan, Metro Manila, without loss of seniority rights. Gungon is entitled to payment of back salaries equivalent to five (5) years from the date he was dropped from the rolls, which is March 1, 1998. No costs.

4. BRILLANTES, JESSA VHIEBARA LIDASAN V COMELEC

21 SCRA 496FACTS:21 SCRA 496 – Political Law – Effect if Title Does Not Completely Express the SubjectBara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No.  4790, entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. Lidasan however discovered that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.]  Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory several barrios from Cotabato.

ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province – Cotabato – to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill”?

HELD:No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.

AMORA, JR. V COMELECGR NO 192280 1/25/2011

FACTS:Amora filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Bohol on December 1, 2009 his opponent Olandria filed a petition for disqualification alleging that Amora’s community tax certificate was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that Amora merely presented his Community Tax Certificate to Atty. Oriculo Granada instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity. Consequently, Amora’s COC had no force and effect and should be considered as not filed. Amora argued that he is personally known by Atty Granada and is a far relative of his, and that Olandria’s contention is a question of process and not validity and that his allegation is not a sufficient ground for disqualification. For this, Amora filed a petition for reconsideration. After winning the election, Amora’s petition was denied. The court contended that his CTC is not a qualified proof of identification.

ISSUE:Whether or not, the improper filling of a community tax certificate is a sufficient cause of disqualification

HELD:While it is accorded to the law that Amora, given the fact that he lacks a proper proof of identity is not considered a candidate ab initio, the court founded its decision pursuant to this sec:

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a)                Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;(b)               Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; (c)                Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;(d)               Those with dual citizenship;(e)                Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f)                Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and(g)               The insane or feeble-minded.Apparently none of the said disqualifications apply to Amora and that according to Sec. 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term Affirmation or Oath refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:

(a)    Appears in person before the notary public;(b)               is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and(c)                Avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or document.

In this case, however, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC, Amora complied with the requirement of a sworn COC. Thus, the alleged defect in the oath was not proven by Olandria since the presentation of a CTC turned out to be sufficient in this instance. On the whole, the COMELEC should not have brushed aside the affidavit of Atty. Granada and remained inflexible in the face of Amoras victory and proclamation as Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED

5. CALISO, NOEL NATIONAL ELECTRIC ADMNISTRATION V VILLANUEVA

GR NO 168203 3/9/2010

NO CASE DIGEST SUBMITTED

6. CRISPULO, JEFFREY, JR.LIMBONA V MANGELIN

170 SCRA 786

FACTS:Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been

resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

HELD:Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "sessions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is

that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

MITRA V COMELECGR NO 191938 7/2/2010

FACTS:When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the Representative of the Second district of Palawan. This district then included, among other territories, the Municipalities of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and he represented the district for 3 terms before the elections of 2010. Before the end of Mitra’s second term Puerto Princesa was reclassified as highly urbanized city and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City from voting candidates for elective provincial officials.

On March 20 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his voter’s registration record from precinct no. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica Puerto Princesa City to Sitio Maligaya Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.

Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando Balbon Jr. filed a petition to deny due course and cancel Mitra’s COC.

ISSUE:Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.

HELD:Yes. Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan. The Court ruled that Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement as mandated by the Constitution. Mitra effectively transfer his residency in Aborlan. Likewise the COMELEC could not present any legally accepted basis to conclude that Mitra’s statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation.

7. DACLIS, MARLONGUANZON V CA

200 SCRA 271, 1991

DE JESUS, JR. V SANDIGANBAYANGR NO 192539-71 8/23/2010

NO CASE DIGEST SUBMITTED

8. DE GUZMAN, KENNETHMMDA V BEL AIR VILLAGE

GR NO 135962 3/27/2000

FACTS:On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.

ISSUE:Whether or not MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the state endowed with police power.

HELD:A ‘local government’ is a “political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs”. It is a “body politic and corporate” – one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the [LGU’s corporate powers] provided under the Code.”There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a “development authority” and not a political unit of government since it is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.

In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

PEOPLE V SANDIGANBAYANGR NO 153952-71 8/23/2010

FACTS:Two letter complaints were filed with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio on October 28,1986 and December 9, 1986, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of Congressman Democrito Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after private respondent had replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial Governor of Agusan del Sur on March 1986 The complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the provincial attorney in 1976 of a free patent title for a lot in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. He misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the lands subject herein are disposable lands, thereby inducing said inspector to recommend approval of his application for free patent. On August 10, 1989 an information for violation of RA 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was then filed in the Sandiganbayan after an ex parte preliminary investigation. A motion to quash the information was filed by the private respondent contending among others that he is charged for an offence which has prescribed. Said motion was granted. The crime was committed on January 21, 1976, period of prescription was 10 years, therefore it has prescribed in 1986. Now the motion to quash was being assailed.

ISSUE:Whether or Not the motion to quash validly granted. 

HELD:Yes. RA 3019, being a special law the computation of the period for the prescription of the crime is governed by Sec. 29 of Act No. 3326, which begins to run from the day of the commission of the crime and not the discovery of it. Additionally, BP 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Sec. 11 of RA 3019 by increasing ten to fifteen years of the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of RA 3019 may not be given retroactive application to the crime which was committed by Paredes, as it is prejudicial to the accused. To apply BP 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law1 for it would alter his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed.

9. ESGUERRA, ELAMAENAVARRO V ERMITAGR NO 180050 4/12/2011

FACTS:"G.R. No. 180050 (Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. v. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., Respondents; Cong. Francisco T. Matugas, et al., Intervenors.) - On June 18, 2010, movants Congressman Francisco T. Matugas, Hon. Sol T. Matugas, Hon. Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr., Hon. Simeon Vicente G. Castrence, Hon. Mamerto D. Galanida, Hon. Margarito M. Longos, and Hon. Cesar M. Bagundol filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010.Movants claim that they have legal interest in this case as they are the duly-elected officials[1] of Surigao del Norte in the May 10, 2010 elections, and their positions will be affected by the nullification of the election results in the event that the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 in this case is not reversed and set aside. On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered a Decision in the instant case, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared NULL and VOID. The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared NULL and VOID.The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a motion for reconsideration in behalf of public respondents, and respondent Governor Geraldine Ecleo Villaroman, representing the Province of Dinagat Islands, also filed a separate motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated February 10, 2010.

On May 12, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution denying the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Meantime, on March 9, 2010, the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 8790,[2] the pertinent portion of which reads:x x x x

NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system configuration, and depending on whether the Decision of the Supreme Court in Navarro vs. Ermita is reconsidered or not, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to declare that:If the Decision is reversed, there will be no problem since the current system configuration is in line with the reconsidered Decision, meaning that the Province of Dinagat Islands and the Province of Surigao del Norte remain as two (2) separate provinces;

If the Decision becomes final and executory before the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte.

x x x x

If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte.

The result of the election will have to be nullified for the same reasons given in item "b" above. A special election for Governor, Vice-Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will have to be conducted.Since movants' elective positions will be adversely affected if the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is not reversed, they pray that they be allowed to intervene in this case and to file their Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010, and that their motion for reconsideration be admitted by the Court.

ISSUE:The issue is whether or not intervention may be allowed after the Court has denied the motions for reconsideration of its Decision in this case.

HELD:The Court rules in the negative.

Fundamentally, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.[3] Under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. Since this case originated from an original action filed before this Court, the appropriate time to file the motion-in-intervention is before and not after resolution of this case.[4]

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is DENIED.

In view of the resolution of June 29, 2010, noting without action the second motions for reconsideration filed by counsel for respondent the New Province of Dinagat Islands and by the Office of the Solicitor General for the public respondents, the Court further Resolves to NOTE WITHOUT ACTION the(a) Opposition to Respondents' Second Motions for Reconsideration dated June 15, 2010 filed by counsel for petitioner;

(b) Motion to Admit Reply (Re: Opposition to Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration dated June 15, 2010), dated July 6, 2010, filed by counsel for respondent the New Province of Dinagat Islands; and

(c) Aforesaid Reply dated June 15, 2010."

ESTAMPA, JR. V CITY GOVT OF DAVAOGR NO 190681 6/21/2010

This case is about the failure of a citys medical health officer and disaster coordinator to respond to a catastrophic bombing incident upon the excuse that he needed to attend first to the needs of his family.

FACTS:On February 1, 2001 the City Government of Davao appointed petitioner Dr. Edilberto Estampa, Jr. as Medical Officer VI at its City Health Office. The position made him head of a Task Force Unit assigned to deal with any untoward event taking place in the city and Disaster Coordinator for the Davao City Health Office under the Davao City Disaster Coordinating Council.

On March 4, 2003, at around 6 p.m., a powerful bomb exploded at the passengers terminal of the Davao International Airport, killing 22 persons and injuring 113 others. Dr. Estampa had just arrived home at that time and was taking care of his one-year-old daughter. He learned of the bombing incident between 7 to 8 p.m. His wife arrived at 9 p.m. from her work at the Davao Medical Center where most of the bombing victims were brought for treatment. She prevailed on Dr. Estampa to stay home and he did.On March 6, 2003 Dr. Roberto V. Alcantara, Officer-in-Charge of the Davao City Health Office, required Dr. Estampa to explain in writing why he failed to respond to the bombing incident. Dr. Estampa submitted his explanation. Apparently satisfied with the explanation and believing that Dr. Estampas presence in the aftermath of the bombing was not indispensable considering the presence of other medical practitioners, Dr. Alcantara considered the case closed. The latter did not, however, bother to endorse the case to a superior officer or to the City Legal Office with his recommendation.

About 10 months later or on January 26, 2004 Dr. Josephine J. Villafuerte, the Davao City Health Officer, queried the head of the Citys Human Resource Management Office (HRMO) regarding the status of the case against Dr. Estampa for failing to respond to the bombing incident. Reacting to this, the HRMO endorsed the matter to the City Legal Office for verification and investigation. Subsequently, the Assistant City Legal Officer required Dr. Estampa to answer the charge against him. But he did not do so.On March 19, 2004 the Assistant City Legal Officer submitted an Investigation Report, finding a prima facie case against Dr. Estampa for neglect of duty[1] and recommending the filing of a formal charge against him. The city mayor approved the report and signed the formal charge. On receiving the same, Dr. Estampa filed his answer and supporting documents.

At the pre-trial, Dr. Estampa waived his right to counsel. The parties agreed to dispense with a formal hearing and to just submit their position papers or memoranda. On November 12, 2004 the City Legal Officer found Dr. Estampa guilty of grave neglect of duty and recommended his dismissal. On February 8, 2005 the city mayor approved the recommendation and dismissed Dr. Estampa. The latter moved for reconsideration but this was denied, prompting him to appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).On June 2, 2006 the CSC denied Dr. Estampas appeal, corrected the denomination of his offense to gross neglect of duty, and affirmed his dismissal. The CSC also denied Dr. Estampas motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Dr. Estampa appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for review under Rule 43. The CA denied his application for issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction and eventually rendered a

decision on March 30, 2009, denying his petition and affirming the resolutions of the CSC. The CA also found no merit in his motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:The only issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the rulings of the City Legal Officer and the CSC that found Dr. Estampa guilty of gross neglect of duty for failing to respond to the March 4, 2003 Davao City bombing.

HELD:Dr. Estampa points out that his dismissal was void because: (1) neither a proper complaint nor a formal charge initiated the case against him; (2) the CA considered and appreciated evidence not presented at the hearing before the City Legal Officer; (3) the delay in the preliminary investigation of Dr. Estampas case violated his rights to due process and speedy disposition of his case; (4) he could not be held liable for gross neglect of duty since the charge against him was only for simple neglect of duty; and (5) the evidence presented did not support the findings against him.

1. But, as the Davao City government pointed out, Executive Order (E.O.) 292 (the 1987 Administrative Code)[2] and the CSC Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases vest in heads of cities the power to investigate and decide disciplinary actions against their officers and employees.[3] E.O. 292 also allows the heads of local units, like the mayor, the authority to initiate administrative actions against subordinate officials or employees[4] even without the complaints being subscribed and sworn to.[5] In these proceedings, a person is considered formally charged a) upon charges initiated by the disciplining authority or b) upon the finding by such disciplining authority of a prima facie case against him based on a private persons complaint.[6]

The Davao City Health Officers inquiry into the status of Dr. Estampas case did not partake of a complaint under E.O. 292 as he suggests. That inquiry was a mere follow up of the fact-finding investigation that Dr. Alcantara began. Nor did the City Legal Officers order during the preliminary investigation, which required Dr. Estampa to file his answer and supporting documents, constitute the complaint under the law. That order was merely an incident of the preliminary investigation.[7]The real formal charge against Dr. Estampa was that which the city mayor signed, charging the doctor, in his capacity as Disaster Coordinator of the City Health Office, with neglect of duty for failing to respond to the March 4, 2003 bombing in Davao. That formal charge directed him to submit his answer, accompanied by the sworn statements of his witnesses, and to indicate if he preferred a formal trial or would rather waive it. He was thus properly charged.

2. Dr. Estampa claims that the CA considered and appreciated evidence that was not presented before the City Legal Officer, in particular referring to the letters of Dr. Villafuerte (to the HRMO inquiring about the status of the case against him), Mr. Escalada, HRMO head (endorsing the case to the City Legal Office), and the affidavit of Dr. Samuel G. Cruz, Assistant City Health Officer (that Dr. Estampa failed to answer phone calls to him after the bombing and that he ignored the driver who was sent to fetch him). Dr. Estampa was not furnished with copies of these documents which were mentioned for the first time only on appeal to the CSC in the City Governments Comment.

The letters of Dr. Villafuerte and Mr. Escalada are official communications and form part of the records of the case. They are public documents. As to the affidavit of Dr. Cruz, the City Government admits that it was not presented in evidence although it still formed part of the case records since it was officially endorsed to the City Legal Office by Dr. Cruz.

The decisions of the CSC and the CA are not based only on these documents. Dr. Estampas guilt is evidenced by his own evidence and inaction, as will be shown later on. The letters of Dr. Villafuerte and Mr. Escalada merely show the process of investigation of the case. Dr. Cruzs affidavit is also merely corroborating at best and may even be dispensed with.

3. Dr. Estampa cannot complain that he was not heard on his defense. The record shows that, initially, his immediate superior asked him to explain why he did not respond to the bombing incident and he submitted his explanation. In the next instance, he was asked during the preliminary investigation to file his answer and submit evidence in his defense although he chose not to do so. After being formally charged, he was again asked to file his answer to the charge. And he filed one, accompanied by supporting documents. He also took part at the pre-trial and elected to have the case decided based on the parties position paper or memorandum. Surely, Dr. Estampa has no reason to complain of denial of his right to due process.

Dr. Estampa laments that almost a year passed from the time his immediate superior asked him to submit a written explanation of the incident to the time when preliminary investigation of his case began. The delay, according to him, violated his right to the speedy disposition of his case. But, Dr. Alcantaras action cannot be regarded as part of the administrative proceeding against Dr. Estampa. It was but a fact-finding investigation done by an immediate superior to determine whether disciplinary action was warranted in his case. And, although Dr. Alcantara was later heard to say that he regarded the matter closed after reading Dr. Estampas explanation, Dr. Alcantara took no step to formalize his finding by reporting the matter to his superior, the Davao City Health Officer, with his recommendation.

Besides, to reiterate what the CA said, the right to speedy disposition of cases may be deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In this case, the Assistant City Legal Officer finished the preliminary investigation of Dr. Estampas case in only a little over three weeks from the time it began.

4. The claim of Dr. Estampa that he could not be found guilty of gross neglect of duty when he was charged only with simple neglect of duty is unmeritorious. The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of the information in a criminal action. It is enough that he is informed of the substance of the charge against him. And what controls is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense in the formal charge.[8] Here, the formal charge accused him of failing to respond, as was his duty as Disaster Coordinator of the City Health Office, to the March 4, 2003 bombing incident that saw many people killed and maimed. It was a serious charge although the formal charge failed to characterize it correctly as gross neglect of duty.

Gross neglect of duty denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty.[9] It has been held that gross negligence exists when a public officials breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.[10]

5. Dr. Estampa claims that the city failed to show that he had an obligation to respond to the Davao City bombing and that no one advised him of his duties and responsibilities as city health offices Coordinator to the Disaster Coordinating Council. But Dr. Estampa cannot claim ignorance of his duties. The local government code, the provision of which he may be assumed to know, provides that a government health officer has the duty, among others, to be in the frontline of the delivery of health services, particularly during and in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and calamities.[11] Furthermore, as Medical Officer VI, one of his specified duties was to act as head of a task force unit for any untoward events in his area of responsibility. It was precisely because of his position as Medical Officer VI that he had been designated Disaster Coordinator for his office.

When Dr. Estampa accepted his post and swore to perform his duties, he entered into a covenant with the city to act with dedication, speed, and courage in the face of disasters like the bombing of populated places in the city. As the CA pointed out, the bombing incident on March 4, 2003 caused so many deaths and injuries that the victims had to be farmed out among several hospitals in the city. Plainly, the City needed public health officers to come to the rescue of the victims in whatever way their sufferings or those of their families could be assuaged. As disaster coordinator, the city needed Dr. Estampa to organize and coordinate all efforts to meet the emergency. Yet, although he knew of the bombing, he chose to stay at home.

In his letter-explanation, Dr. Estampa justified his absence from the emergency rooms of the hospitals to attend to the bombing victims with the claim that he needed to attend to his family first. Initially, he could not leave his one-year-old daughter because they had no house help. When his wife arrived from work shortly, he also could not leave because she was six months pregnant. Further, a bomb was found some meters from their apartment a few weeks earlier. Dr. Estampa said in his letter that he was unable from the beginning to give full commitment to his job since he gave priority to his family. He simply was not the right person for the job of disaster coordinator.Dr. Estampas defense is not acceptable. A persons duty to his family is not incompatible with his job-related commitment to come to the rescue of victims of disasters. Disasters do not strike every day. Besides, knowing that his job as senior medical health officer entailed the commitment to make a measure of personal sacrifice, he had the choice to resign from it when he realized that he did not have the will and the heart to respond.

Assuming that he had a one-year-old daughter in the house, he could have taken her to relatives temporarily while his wife was still on her way from work. But he did not. And when his wife arrived shortly at 9 p.m., he still did not leave under the pretext that his wife was six months pregnant. Yet, he had in fact permitted her to work away from home up to the evening. What marked his gross irresponsibility was that he did not even care to call up his superior or associates to inform them of his inability to respond to the emergency. As a result, the city health office failed to provide the needed coordination of all efforts intended to cope with the disaster. Who knows? Better coordination and dispatch of victims to the right emergency rooms could have saved more lives.

The Court finds no excuse for reinstating Dr. Estampa to the position he abandoned when it needed him.WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision dated March 30, 2009 and resolution dated November 20, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 02191-MIN.

10. IDJIRANI, DATU SYED OMARAldaba v. Comelec –

GR No. 188078 March 15, 2010CARPIO, J:

FACTS:This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.

House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010. Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative in Congress.

ISSUE:Whether or not R.A. 9591, “An act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan” is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected.

HELD:It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:

The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB.

The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized. The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.

It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010. It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.

Salumbides v. OmbudsmanGR. No. 180917 April 23, 2010

Carpio Morales, J.:

FACTS:Salumbides and Glenda who were both appointed in July 2001 as Municipal Legal Officer/Administrator and Municipal Budget Officer, respectively of Tagkawayan, Quezon, and Mayor Vicente Salumbides III were administratively charged with with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and violation of the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and the Local Government Code. This is with regards to the construction of a two-classroom building with fence for the Tagkawayan Municipal High School (TMHS) since the public school in the poblacion area would no longer admit high school freshmen starting school year 2002-2003. This was done without any approved appropriation and ahead of the public bidding. The Office of the Ombudsman dropped the mayor and Coleta, both elective officials, as respondents in the administrative case, the 2004 elections having mooted the case.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Doctrine of Condonation shall expand to cover coterminous appointive officials who were administratively charged along with the re-elected official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly committed during their preceding term.

HELD:No. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. Election expresses the sovereign will of the people. Under the principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a non-career position. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

11. LAURIO, CRISTINASEN AQUINO III V COMELEC

GR NO 190582 3/7/2010

FACTS:This case comes before the court by way of Petition for Certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeks to nullify as unconstitutional the Republic Act 9716, “An Act Reapportioning the composition of the (1st) and (2nd) legislative districts in the province of Camarines Sur and thereby creating a new legislative district from such reapportionment.

Petitioner contends that the 250,000 population requirement was not meet and declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province?

HELD:Rep. Act 9716, which only creates an additional legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law because under Sec. 5, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution succinctly provides “Each City with a population of atleast 250,000, or each province, shall have at least one representative”.

It just only means that a 250,000 population requirement is just for the city and not to the province. Wherefore, the petition dismissed, and R.A. 9716 declared as a valid law.

GALEOS V PEOPLE GR NO 174730-37 & 174845-52 2/9/2011

FACTS:This was a consolidated petitions seek to reverse and set aside the decision of SandiganBayan convicting Paulino Ong, Galeos, and Rivera who was a relative with each other as to consanguinity and affinity on the crime of Falsification of Documents.

Ong was a Mayor in 1998, who appoint Rivera and Galeos in the position of Construction and Maintenance man and Plumber I when he was an OFFICER-In-Charge-Mayor.

Ong signed their SALN’S many times and he contends that he does not aware with their relationship when he appoints them. Galeos and Rivera leave the question in SALN’S that correspond to their relatives in the government.

ISSUE:Whether or not the accused acts violates the Local Government Code of 1991?

HELD:

By withholding information on his relatives in the government service as required in the SALN, Rivera and Galeos was guilty of falsification as clearly stated that “ No person shall be appointed in the local government career service if he is related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the appointing power or recommending authority.

As to Ong, gave rise to abuse of authority, knowing the Filipino cultural trait of valuing strong kinship and extended family ties. Wherefore, petitioners denied and affirmed the decisions of Sandiganbayan.

12. ORANG, MONERMUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ V BAZ, JR.

265 SCRA 182, 1996FACTS:This is a petition for review of the decision of RTC Branch 14, affirming the legal existence of Municipality of Sinacaban in Misamis Occidental and ordering the relocation of its boundary for the purpose of determining whether certain areas claimed by it belong to it.

Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive Order 258 of President Elpidio Quirino pursuant to 68 of Revised Administrative Code of 1916, which consists of southern portion of Municipality of Jimenez and through Municipal Resolution 171 & Provincial Board Resolution No. 77 fixed the boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. But Municipality of Jimenez asserted that together with Municipality of Sinacaban an Agreement on boundary approved also by Provincial Board but it has no power to alter the boundaries fixed by Executive Order.

ISSUE:Whether or not the boundary provided in Executive Ordet 258 or Resolution No. 77 of Provincial Board should be used as basis for adjudicating Sinacaban territorial claim.

HELD:The creation of Municipal Corporation is essentially a Legislative Matter and therefore President has no power to create a Municipality, however, it was held that the Municipality created by Executive Order is later IMPLIEDLY RECOGNIZE and its acts are accorded with legal validity, its creation can no longer questioned.

Local Government Code 1991 states that:" Municipalities existing as of the date of effectivity of Code shall continue to exist. Existing Municipal district organized pursuant to Presidential issuances or Executive Orders and which have their respective set of elective Municipal Officials holding office at the time of effectivity of the Code shall be considered as Regular Municipalities." The Petition was DENIED and the decision of RTC Branch 14 is AFFIRMED.

FERRER, JR. V ROCO, JR.GR NO 174730-37 &174845-52

FACTS:This petition challenges the April 21, 2006 decision of Court of Appeals (CA) affirming IN TOTO the Order of Regional Trial Court of Naga and its Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner herein filed petition for Declaratory Relief and/or Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order questioning the Resolution No. 2000-263, 2000-354 and Ordinance 2000-056 issued by Mayor Roco approving the application of Mr. Obieda of ARE Square Realty Development Corp. for Preliminary Approval for Locational Clearance (PALC) for First Class Memorial Park in Naga.

RTC found that petitioner prayer was premature as the questioned resolutions and ordinance were merely promulgated to pave the way for the endorsement of Application of respondent. It recognized that Housing Land Use and Regulatory Board (HLURB) is the entity which decidr whether application will be granted or not.

ISSUE:Whether or not Trial Court erred in holding that HLURB has jurisdiction over the case and in granting appellants prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and on Writ of Preliminary Injunction

HELD:Court ruled that filing of petition with RTC has no basis because we recognized the DOCTRINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES which requires that the resort be first made to administrative authorities in cases falling under their jurisdiction to allow them to carry out their functions and discharge their liabilities within the specialized areas of their competence. In addtion, in this case issues raised are clearly not yet ripe for judicial determination.Decision of Court of Appeald and Resolution were AFFIRMED.

13. ORGASAN, LEDEBEE LEEPROV. OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL V COMMISSIONERS OF COA

GR NO 182574MUNICIPALITY OF TIWI V BETITO

GR NO 171873 7/9/2010

NO CASE DIGEST SUBMITTED

14. RIVERA, DENISONBASCO V PAGCOR197 SCRA 52, 1991

NO CASE DIGEST SUBMITTED

15. SALVADOR, JERLIEUS V ESPIRITU SANTO23 PHIL 610 12/11/2012

FACTS:The provincial fiscal of Rizal filed an information charging Isidoro Espiritusanto with a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 1, series of 1910 enacted by the municipal council of Malabon, Rizal which strictly prohibits the game of jueteng within the limits of the pueblo and prescribes the penalties to be imposed for its violation. Isidoro was found to be engaged, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in collecting wagers for the gambling game known as jueteng wherein the tickets necessary for conducting the same have been seized in his possession. He was sentenced to the payment of a fine of ₱50 and, in case of insolvency, to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment and the costs.Defendant’s attorney questioned the constitutionality of the said ordinance. He argued that the ordinance is invalid and contrary to the municipal code because the council exceeded the powers conferred upon it by the code which, in subsection (u) of Section 39, only authorizes it “to provide against the evils of gambling, gambling houses, and disorderly houses of whatsoever sort”.

ISSUE:Whether or not Municipal Ordinance No. 1, series of 1910 of Malabon, Rizal was constitutional.

HELD:Yes. The municipal council concerned acted within the powers conferred upon it by the Municipal Code and in accordance with the provision of Section 6 of Act No. 1757. Since the game of jueteng is not susceptible of regulation, but must be prosecuted and completely suppressed in order to avoid repetitions of the great and far-reaching social and moral evils it has been producing in the towns of these Islands. The ordinance is not in conflict with the provisions of Section 5 of the Act of Congress. It must be considered that an ordinance has not the character of and is not a general law. It is merely a regulation of a local nature, and one perfectly valid and effective, provided it is in harmony with the general laws in force in the Islands. The constitutional provision has no application to municipal ordinances, as these do not partake of the nature of laws, but are mere rules provided for the fulfillment of the laws. Thus, the Supreme Court affirm the judgment of the CFI.

16. SAMORANOS, CHARISSETATEL V MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC

207 SCRA 57G.R. NO. 40243 11 Mar 1992

FACTS:

Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioner’s warehouse.

A committee was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood.

Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place within two months from receipt of the said resolution.

The municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance 13, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in thepoblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire.

On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.

HELD: Ordinance 13, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police

power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.

Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which reads: The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law

These principles require that a municipal ordinance(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute(2) must not be unfair or oppressive(3) must not be partial or discriminatory

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade(5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and(6) must not be unreasonable.Ordinance 13 meets these criteria.

The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligations of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.

ASILO, JR V PEOPLEGR NO 159017-18 &159059 3/9/2011

FACTS Private respondemt visitacion’s late mother Marciana Vda Coronado (Vda. De Coronado)

and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna entered into a lease contract whereby the Municipality allowed the use and enjoyment of property comprising of a lot and a store  in favor of the respondent’s mother for a period of twenty (20) years, extendible for another 20 years. The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado in case of modification of the public market, she or her heir/s would be given preferential rights. Visitacion took over the store when her mother died Visitacion secured the yearly Mayor’s permits.

A fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan. Upon Visitacion’s request for inspection, District Engineer Marcelino B. Gorospe of Ministry of Public Works and Highways found that the store of Visitacion remained intact and stood strong. This finding of Engineer Gorospe was contested by the Municipality of Nagcarlan. The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the fire.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarian, Laguna issued Resolution No. 156 authorizing Mayor Comendador to demolish the store being occupied by Visitacion using legal means. With the strength of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution Nos. 183 and 156 Mayor Comendador authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo and Angeles supervising the work.

Visitacion filed with a case for damages before the RTC. Spouses bombasi, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and Angeles for violation of Sec.3(e) of the Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act” before the office on the Ombudsman. Sandiganbayan rendered a decision, finding the accused Demetrio T. Comemdador and Paulino S. Asilo Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

The counsel for the late Mayor also filed its Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the death of the late Mayor had totally extinguished both his criminal and civil liability. The Sandiganbayan granted the extinction of the criminal liability is concerned and denied the extinction of the civil liability holding that the civil action is an independent civil action. Hence, these Petitions for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:WON the accused is guilty of violating RA 30192.

HELD: The Supreme Court sustain the Sandiganbayanin its finding of criminal and civil liabilities

against petitioner Asilo and petitioner Mayor Comendador.  The elements of the offense are as follows:

(1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) That said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their

official duties or in relation to their public positions;(3) that they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party;(4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the

other party; and (5) that the public officers have actedwith manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross

inexcusable negligence. Clearly, the demolition of plaintiff’s store was carried

out without a court order, and notwithstanding a restraining order which the plaintiff was able to obtain. 

The demolition was done in the exercise of official duties which apparently was attended by evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence as there is nothing in the two (2) resolutions which gave the herein accused the authority to demolish plaintiff’s store. The accused public officials were devoid of any power to demolish the store. A closer look at the contested resolutions reveals that Mayor Comendador was only authorized to file an unlawful detainer case in case of resistance to obey the order or to demolish the building using legal means. Clearly, the act of demolition without legal order in this case was not among those provided by the resolutions, as indeed, it is a legally impossible provision

Sangalang v. IAC (G.R. No. 71169. December 22, 1988)

FACTS:The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of several streets to the general public, after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All but Jupiter St. was voluntarily opened. The strong opposition later gave way when the municipal officials force-opened the gates of said street for public use. The area ceased to be purely residential. Action for damages was brought against Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to maintain the purely residential status of the area. Other similarly situated also filed their respective cases. All were dismissed in the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said dismissals.

ISSUE:Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala Corporation violated in opening the Jupiter street for public use.

HELD:No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was violated.

RATIO:Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation, to build a “[f]ence along Jupiter [street] with gate for entrance and/or exit as evidence of Ayala’s alleged continuing obligation to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial sections. Assuming there was a contract violated, it was still overtaken by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why Courts should hold otherwise other than for the supposed “non-impairment” guaranty of the Constitution, which is secondary to the more compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.

17. TELLO, LAWRENCEMUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE V V.M. REALTY

292 SCRA 678 7/20/1998

NO CASE DIGEST SUBMITTED

18. VILLANUEVA, KRISTIAN RORYSANGALAG V IAC

176 SCRA 719 8/25/2009

NO CASE DIGEST SUBMITTED

19. LISACA, KENAN ISRAELMODAY V CA

268 SCRA 586 2/20/1997

NO CASE DIGEST SUBMITTED

20. SIOSON, MARTINMERCADO V BES

GR NO 109713 4/6/1995NO CASE DIGEST SUBMITTED