Compilation 4 Transpo Digest

Transportation Law Case Digests | Atty. Norianne Tan | 2016

Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue

SET 4:

WARSAW CONVENTION (with IATA)

1. Luna v. CA ---- Santos 2. Mapa v. CA ---- Yogue 3. Sabena Belgian World Airlines v. CA ---- Lim, A 4. United Airlines v. Uy ---- Lim, Y 5. British Airways v. CA ---- Miranda 6. American Airlines v. CA ---- Rivera 7. Federal Express v. American Home ---- Santos 8. PAL v. Savillo ---- Yogue 9. E. Lhuillier v. British Airways ---- Lim, A

RUFINO LUNA, RODOLDO ALONSO and PORFIRIO RODRIGUEZ v. CA, NORTHWEST AIRLINES, et al.

G.R. No. 100374-5, 27 November 1992 Warsaw Convention

CASE: Petitioners boarded Northwest’s plane bound for Seoul. They each checked in one piece of luggage. When they were boarded, due to engine problem, they were asked to transfer to another plane bound for Seoul on the same day. They were assured that their luggage would be sent to Seoul. However, upon arriving, they found out that their luggage was in Seattle. Thirteen days after receiving their bags, petitioners wrote a demand letter to Northwest, which denied any liability. The trial court and the CA both dismissed the case on petitioners’ failure to state in their pleading that they already filed a notice of claim. The issue is whether or not the dismissal of the case was proper. The Court held no. In this regard alone, the case should not have been dismissed. Petitioners filed a claim within the prescribed period. However, assuming the condition precedent was not complied with, the Warsaw Convention should not be a ground for summary dismissal of the complaints since Northwest may still be held liable for breach of other relevant laws. (Interpretation of Art. 25 of the Warsaw Convention is in the ratio) FACTS:

• In 1989, petitioners boarded Flight 020 of private respondent Northwest Airlines (“Northwest” not Saint West’s sister) bound for Seoul. They were supposed to attend a Rotary International Convention.

• They checked in one piece of luggage each. After boarding, due to engine trouble, they were asked to transfer to another plane scheduled to depart to the same destination on the same day. They were assured that their baggage would be with them in the same flight.

• However, when they arrived in Seoul, they found out that their pieces of baggage were apparently flown to Seattle. Four days later, they were able to retrieve it, but during that period, Northwest repeatedly made representations with petitioners.



• Thirteen days after they received their luggage, petitioners sent a written claim to Northwest.

• The company respondent, disowning any liability. • Petitioners filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages.

The court dismissed the case because petitioners failed to state in their pleadings that they filed a prior claim with Northwest within the prescribed period. This forced petitioners to file for a petition with the CA (Court: wrong remedy, it should have been a review). The CA also dismissed the petition, applying the Warsaw Convention. The CA’s interpretation was that Art. 26 of the Warsaw Convention cannot be invoked if the damage is caused by the carrier’s willful misconduct, as provided by Art. 25 thereof.

• Northwest also claims that it did not receive any demand letter from petitioners within the 21-day prescribed period provided in paragraph 7 of their Contract (plane ticket).

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the case was proper HELD & RATIO: YES, petitioners filed a claim.

• In this regard alone, the case should not have been dismissed. Petitioners filed a claim within the prescribed period.

• However, assuming the condition precedent was not complied with, the Warsaw Convention should not be a ground for summary dismissal of the complaints since Northwest may still be held liable for breach of other relevant laws.

• On the matter of interpreting Art. 25 of the Warsaw Convention: the Court said that Art. 25 refers only to the monetary ceiling on damages found in Art. 22 should damage be caused by the carrier’s willful misconduct.

• The case should not have been dismissed in the lower court, however, the Court did not subscribe that Northwest committed willful misconduct in handling the petitioners’ luggage. There must be a showing that the acts complained of were impelled by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of one’s rights.

MAPA v. CA G.R. No. 122308; July 8, 1997

Contract of International Transportation

CASE: Sps. Mapa entered into a contract of air transportation with TWA

evidenced by tickets purchased in Thailand (place of destination: Chicago, USA). Domicile of TWA (carrier) and its place of business are Kansas, Missouri, USA. Mrs. Purita Mapa and their daughter left Manila on board PAL flight for Los Angeles. Upon arrival at LA, they stayed their until they left for New York. They deported for Boston, taking a connecting flight on TWAs carrier from JFK Airport, NY, to Bostons Logan Airport, checking in seven (7) pieces of luggage at the TWA counter in the JFK Airport. After they had presented their confirmed TWA tickets at TWA’s ticket counter, they were issued their boarding passes. However, due to an error in the boarding gate (as they were wrongly instructed by TWA personnel), they were not able to board the plane. Upon arriving in Boston, they proceeded to the carousel to claim their baggages and found only three out of the seven they checked in. They immediately reported the loss of their 4 baggages to the TWA Baggage Office at Logan Airport. Despite repeated demands, they were still unable to recover the lost baggages so, Sps Mapa and their daughter then filed with RTC-QC, a complaint for damages. TWA countered raising, as special and affirmative defense, lack of jurisdiction of PH courts over the action for damages in that pursuant to Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the action could only be brought either in Bangkok where the contract was entered into, or in Boston which was the place of destination, or in Kansas City which is the carrier's domicile and principal place of business. RTC dismissed the case for lack of JD.

The issue in this case is whether or not the contracts of transportation between Purita and Carmina Mapa and TWA were contracts of international transportation under the Warsaw Convention.

SC ruled that it is not a contract of international transportation under Warsaw Convention. The contracts of transportation in this case are evidenced by the two TWA tickets both purchased and issued in Bangkok, Thailand. On the basis alone of the provisions therein, it is obvious that the place of departure and the place of destination are all in the territory of the United States, or of a single High Contracting Party. The contracts, therefore, cannot come within the purview of the first category of international transportation. Neither can it



be under the second category since there was NO agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate, or authority of another power. (please full ratio for better understanding. Juicecolored, ang jirap isumarize neto talaga). FACTS: • Sps. Mapa entered into contract of air transportation with TWA as

evidenced by TWA tickets purchased in Bangkok, Thailand. Said TWA tickets are for Los Angeles-New York-Boston-St. Louis-Chicago. o Domicile of carrier TWA and its principal place of business is

Kansas City, Missouri, USA. The place of destination is Chicago, USA.

• Mrs. Purita Mapa and Carmina (Sps Mapa’s dughter) left Manila on board PAL flight No. 104 for Los Angeles. Carmina was to commence schooling at Boston University and thus was accompanied by Purita to assist her in settling down at the University.

• They arrived in Los Angeles on the same date and stayed there until they left for New York City. Purita and Carmina arrived at the John F. Kennedy (JFK) Airport, New York, on TWA Flight No. 904.

• They departed for Boston, taking a connecting flight on TWAs carrier from JFK Airport, NY, to Boston Logan Airport, checking in seven (7) pieces of luggage at the TWA counter in the JFK Airport. TWA baggage receipts were issued therefor.

• After they had presented their confirmed TWA tickets (with departure at 3 pm) at TWA’s ticket counter, they were issued their boarding passes and were instructed to proceed to gate 35 for boarding. However, upon plaintiffs’ inquiry, they were informed that they were at the wrong gate (gate 1 dapat). At gate 1, they were told that their flight had just departed. They were able to board in the next plane.

• Upon arriving in Boston, they proceeded to the carousel to claim their baggages and found only three out of the seven they checked in. They immediately reported the loss of their 4 baggages to TWA.

• Plaintiffs received a letter from TWA apologizing for TWAs failure to locate the missing luggage and requesting plaintiffs to accomplish a passenger property questionnaire to facilitate a further intensive

and computerized search for the lost luggage. Plaintiffs duly accomplished the passenger property questionnaire.

• TWA was still unable to locate the missing baggages. Despite demands by Sps. Mapa, TWA failed and refused to indemnify and redress plaintiffs for the grave injury and damages they have suffered.

• Sps Mapa and their daughter then filed with RTC-QC, a complaint for damages.

• TWA filed its Answer raising, as special and affirmative defense, lack of jurisdiction of Philippine courts over the action for damages in that pursuant to Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the action could only be brought either in Bangkok where the contract was entered into, or in Boston which was the place of destination, or in Kansas City which is the carrier's domicile and principal place of business.

• TC issued an Order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction in light of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. TC held that page 2 of Passenger Property Questionnaire accomplished by plaintiffs under the heading "Your Complete Itinerary" shows that the TWA tickets issued to the plaintiffs form part of the contract of transportation to be performed from Manila to the United States. Since the Philippines and the United States are parties to the convention, plaintiffs' contracts of transportation come within the meaning of International Transportation.

• Sps. Mapa appealed to CA, contending that: o RTC erred in not holding that it has jurisdiction over the instant

case and that the Warsaw Convention is inapplicable because the contracts they had with TWA did not involve an international transportation; and

o Their cause of action could be based on brach of contract of air carriage founded on Arts. 1733-1735, 1755, and 1756 of the New Civil Code governing common carriers or Art. 2176 of the same code governing torts/quasi-delict.

• CA affirmed RTC. ISSUE: 1. whether the contracts of transportation between Purita and Carmina

Mapa and TWA were contracts of international transportation under the Warsaw Convention. à NO! HENCE, WARSAW CONVENTION IS NOT APPLICABLE.



HELD:

Petition is GRANTED and RTC-QC is DIRECTED to hear the case.

RATIO:

1. Contracts of transportation between Purita and Carmina, and TWA were not contracts of international transportation under Warsaw Convention. Hence, the Philippine Court has jurisdiction to hear the case.

As provided in Article I(2) of the Warsaw Convention, a contract is one of international transportation only if according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties (signatories to the Convention and those w/c subsequently adhered thereto), or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate or authority of another power, even though that power is not a party to this convention.

Two categories of international transportation: (1) where the place of departure and the place of destination are situated within the territories of two High Contracting Parties regardless of whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment; and (2) where the place of departure and the place of destination are within the territory of a single High Contracting Party if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate, or authority of another power, even though the power is not a party to the Convention.

The contracts of transportation in this case are evidenced by the two TWA tickets both purchased and issued in Bangkok, Thailand. On the basis alone of the provisions therein, it is obvious that the place of departure and the place of destination are all in the territory of the United States, or of a single High Contracting Party. The contracts, therefore, cannot come within the purview of the first category of international transportation. Neither can it be under the second category since there was NO agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate, or authority of another power.

The only way to bring the contracts between Purita and Carmina Mapa and TWA, within the first category of international transportation is to link them with, or to make them an integral part of, the Manila-Los Angeles travel of Purita and Carmina through PAL aircraft. The alleged linkages are:

(1) the handwritten notations on the two TWA tickets; and (2) the entries made by petitioners Purita and Carmina Mapa in

column YOUR COMPLETE ITINERARY in TWAs Passenger Property Questionnaire, wherein they mentioned their travel from Manila to Los Angeles.

NO LINKAGE WERE ESTABLISHED:

(1) The international tickets mentioned in the notations in conjunction with which the two TWA tickets were issued were not presented. Hence, no factual basis of the finding that the TWA tickets were issued in conjunction with the international tickets, which are even, at least as of now, non-existent.

(2) As regards the petitioners entry in YOUR COMPLETE ITINERARY column of the Passenger Property Questionnaire wherein they included the Manila-Los Angeles travel, it must be pointed out that this was made by Purita and Carmina Mapa only in connection with their claim for their lost pieces of baggage. The loss occurred much earlier.. The entry can by no means be considered as a part of, or supplement to, their contracts of transportation evidenced by the TWA tickets which covered transportation within the United States only.

It must be underscored that the first category of international transportation under the Warsaw Convention is based on the contract made by the parties. TWA does not claim that the Manila-Los Angeles contracts of transportation which brought Purita and Carmina to Los Angeles were also its contracts. TWA does not deny the assertion of the petitioners that those contracts were independent of the TWA tickets issued in Bangkok, Thailand. No evidence was offered that TWA and PAL had an agreement concerning transportation of passengers from points of departures not served with aircrafts of one or the other.

TWA relies on Article I(3) of the Convention: A carriage to be performed by several successive air carriers is deemed, for the purposes of this Convention, to be one undivided carriage, if it has been regarded by



the parties as a single operation, whether it had been agreed upon under the form of a single contract or of a series of contracts, and it shall not lose its international character merely because one contract or a series of contracts is to be performed entirely within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority of the same High Contracting Party. TWA also points to Article 15 of the IATA Recommend Practice 1724, which provides: Carriage to be performed by several successive carriers under one ticket, or under a ticket and any conjunction ticket issued in connection therewith, is regarded as a single operation.

The flaw of TWA’s position is their presumption that the parties have regarded as an undivided carriage or as a single operation the carriage from Manila to Los Angeles through PAL then to New York-Boston- St. Louis-Chicago through TWA. TWA should have offered evidence for its affirmative defenses at the preliminary hearing therefor. Without any further evidence as earlier discussed, the trial court should have denied the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction because it did not appear to be indubitable.

NOTE: In the case of the Philippines, the Convention was concurred in by the Senate. The Convention became applicable to the Philippines in 1951. Then, in 1955, Pres. Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring the Philippines formal adherence thereto, to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof.

SORRY MAHABA. Natatakot ako magedit out kasi relevant talaga sila eh. Sorry. L- AKI SABENA BELGIAN WORLD AIRLINES v. CA and MA. PAULA SAN

AGUSTIN G.R. No. 104685, March 14, 1996

CASE:

Paula boarded an aircraft of Sabena Airlines from Casablanca bound for Manila with a stopover in Brussels, Belgium. She checked in her luggage containing of valuables (e.g., jewelries, accessories, clothes). When she was about to claim her luggage upon arrival in Manila, she was surprised to learn that her luggage was missing. She

immediately filed a complaint with the management regarding said incident. Several days after, she followed up her complaint and she was assured that the luggage will be shipped to Manila. However, it was lost for the second time prompting her to file an action for damages against Sabena. Sabena invokes Sec 5 (c), Art IX of the Warsaw Convention stating that “passengers shall not include in his checked baggage, and the carrier may refuse to carry as checked baggage, fragile or perishable articles, money, jewelry, precious metals, negotiable papers, securities or other valuables.”

SC held that the Convention does not exempt the carrier from liability if the damage is caused by his willful misconduct or by such default, which amounts to willful misconduct, or if the damage is caused by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment. In this case, Sabena was ultimately guilty of gross negligence in the handling of private respondents luggage. The loss of said baggage not only once but twice underscores the wanton negligence and lack of care on the part of the carrier. Hence, it is not exempted from liability. FACTS:

• Paula was a passenger on board an aircraft of Sabena from Casablanca to Manila with a stopover in Brussels, Belgium.

• Paula checked in her luggage which contained her valuables, namely: jewelries, clothes, shoes/bag, accessories, and the luggage itself with a total value of $4,265.00, for which she was issued Tag No. 71423.

• When Paula arrived at Manila International Airport, she immediately submitted her Tag No. 71423 to facilitate the release of her luggage but the luggage was missing. She filed her formal complaint, demanding immediate attention.

• When Paula followed-up the status of her baggage claim several days later, she was assured by Sabena that it has notified its Manila Office that the luggage will be shipped to Manila. But unfortunately Paula was informed that the luggage was lost for the second time.

• Paula demanded from the Sabena the money value of the luggage and its contents amounting to $4,265.00 or its exchange value, but Sabena refused to settle the claim.

• At the time of the filling of the complaint, the luggage with its content has not been found.



• Sabena invokes the Warsaw Convention. It insists that private respondent, being a seasoned international traveler, must have likewise been familiar with the standard provisions contained in her flight ticket that items of value are required to be hand-carried by the passenger and that the liability of the airline or loss, delay or damage to baggage would be limited, in any event, to only US$20.00 per kilo unless a higher value is declared in advance and corresponding additional charges are paid thereon. At the Casablanca International Airport, private respondent, in checking in her luggage, evidently did not declare its contents or value.

• Section 5(c), Article IX, of the General Conditions of Carriage, signed at Warsaw, Poland, on 02 October 1929, as amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955, generally observed by International carriers, stating, among other things, that:

Passengers shall not include in his checked baggage, and the carrier may refuse to carry as checked baggage, fragile or perishable articles, money, jewelry, precious metals, negotiable papers, securities or other valuables.

ISSUE: W/N Sabena is exempted from liability by virtue of the Warsaw Convention? – NO RATIO: The Warsaw Convention denies to the carrier availment of the provisions which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his willful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court seized of the case, is considered to be equivalent to willful misconduct, or if the damage is (similarly) caused x x x by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment.1

• It should be deemed a limit of liability only in those cases where the cause of the death or injury to person, or destruction, loss or

1 The Hague Protocol amended the Warsaw Convention by removing the provision that if the airline took all necessary steps to avoid the damage, it could exculpate itself completely, and declaring the stated limits of liability not applicable if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, its servants or agents, done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result. The same deletion was effected by the Montreal Agreement of 1966, with the result that a passenger could recover unlimited damages upon proof of willful misconduct.

damage to property or delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended by any willful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness or otherwise improper conduct on the part of any official or employee for which the carrier is responsible, and there is otherwise no special or extraordinary form of resulting injury.

• Otherwise, an air carrier would be exempt from any liability for damages in the event of its absolute refusal, in bad faith, to comply with a contract of carriage, which is absurd.

In this case, the appellate court, given all the facts before it, sustained the trial court in finding petitioner ultimately guilty of gross negligence in the handling of private respondents luggage. The loss of said baggage not only once but twice underscores the wanton negligence and lack of care on the part of the carrier. The above findings foreclose whatever rights petitioner might have had to the possible limitation of liabilities enjoyed by international air carriers under the Warsaw Convention. Under domestic law and jurisprudence (the Philippines being the country of destination), the attendance of gross negligence (given the equivalent of fraud or bad faith) holds the common carrier liable for all damages which can be reasonably attributed, although unforeseen, to the non-performance of the obligation, including moral and exemplary damages.

UNITED AIRLINES VS. UY GR No. 127768, November 19, 1999

Case: On October 13, 1989, Uy, a passenger of United Airlines (UA) from San Francisco to Manila, checked in some luggages, one of which was overweight. In a load voice, a UA’s employee asked him to repack his luggage, but unfortunately the same was still overweight. Hence, he was forced to pay overweight charges. Initially, Uy wanted to pay it through MCO which is an airline pre-paid credit but because of conflicting figueres UA did not accept the same, hence he was forced to use his credit card in paying, Upon arrival in Manila, he discovered that one of his bags had been slashed and its contents stolen amounting to around US$ 5,310.00.



Hence he wrote to respondent asking for reimbursement for the loss and humilation he suffered in the hands of UA’s employee. UA replied with a check amounting to US $9.70 per pound as payment for the loss. Uy thinking it to be inadequate, he sent two additional demand letters. Afterwhich, filed a complaint for damages in the Trial Court. UA moved to dismiss, invoking Art. 29 of Warsaw Convention, saying that the case is already prescribed. Respondent’s complaint reveals that he is suing on two causes of action which are the humiliating treatment of the UA’s employee (FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION) and slashing of luggage (SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION). From these, only the Second COA is covered by the Warsaw Convention. Since the first is not, the law that would govern is our Civil Code which prescribe a four year prescriptive period-hence this is not yet prescribed. For the second, the warsaw convention is clear that the action should be commenced within two years, hence this should be prescribed BUT applying the case of PAL vs CA, the SC held that because of the delaying tactic of UA, the warsaw convention’s 2 years prescriptive period would not apply in this case, and Uy is still allowed to pursue the case. Facts:

• On October 13, 1989, respondent Willie J. Uy, a passenger of United Airlines Flight No. 819 from San Francisco to Manila checked in some luggages, one of which was overweight. (Max weight allowance is 70 kgs. Per bag).

• Pet’s employee in a load voice asked him to repack his luggage. Unfortunately even after doing so the luggage was still overweight, hence the airline billed him for overweight charges.

• Uy offered to pay the charges via a miscellaneous charge order (MCO) or an airline pre-paid credit. This, however, was not accepted saying that there were conflicting figures listed on it. Despite the explanation of Uy that the last figure written on the MCO represented his balance, petitioners employees did not accommodate him.

• Faced with the prospect of leaving without his luggage, respondent paid the overweight charges with his American Express credit card.

• Upon arrival in Manila, he discovered that one of his bags had been slashed and its contents stolen amounting around US $5,310.00.

• In a letter dated 16 October 1989 respondent bewailed the insult, embarrassment and humiliation he suffered from United Airlines employees, as well as his loss and requested reimbursement thereof.

• Petitioner United Airlines, through Central Baggage Specialist Joan Kroll, did not refute any of respondents allegations and mailed a check representing the payment of his loss based on the maximum liability of US $9.70 per pound.

• Respondent, thinking the amount to be grossly inadequate to compensate him for his losses, sent two (2) more letters to petitioner airline, one dated 4 January 1990 through a certain Atty. Pesigan, and another dated 28 October 1991 through Atty. Ramon U. Ampil demanding an out-of-court settlement of P1,000,000.00. Petitioner United Airlines did not accede to his demands.

• On 9 June 1992 respondent filed a complaint for damages against United Airlines alleging that he was a person of good station, sitting in the board of directors of several top 500 corporations and holding senior executive positions for such similar firms; that petitioner airline accorded him ill and shabby treatment to his extreme embarrassment and humiliation; and, as such he should be paid moral damages of at least P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages of at least P500,000.00, plus attorney's fees of at least P50,000.00. Similarly, he alleged that the damage to his luggage and its stolen contents amounted to around $5,310.00, and requested reimbursement therefor.

• United Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondents cause of action had prescribed, invoking Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention which provides -

o Art. 29 (1) The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within two (2) years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination, or from the date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date on which the transportation stopped.

(2) The method of calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.

• Respondent countered that par. (1) of Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention must be reconciled with par. (2) thereof which states



that "the method of calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of the court to which the case is submitted." Interpreting thus, respondent noted that according to Philippine laws the prescription of actions is interrupted "when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor." Since he made several demands upon United Airlines, the two (2)-year period of limitation had not yet been exhausted.

Trial Court- DISMISSED CASE HOLDING WARSAW CONVENTION IS CLEAR THAT THE ACTION MUST BE BROUGHT WITHIN 2 YEARS. UY’S MR WAS ALSO DENIED L Appellate court- REVERSE TC,

• Warsaw Convention did not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws (meaning a longer prescriptive period may apply) but even to say, the CA will follow the 2 year prescriptive period of the Warsaw Convention, the period was interrupted by Uy’s demand letters to UA.

• Hence, the appellate court ruled that respondents cause of action had not yet prescribed and ordered the records remanded to the Quezon City trial court for further proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention should apply to the case at bar. RULING: Affirmed CA

• Respondent's complaint reveals that he is suing on two (2) causes of action: (a) the shabby and humiliating treatment he received from petitioner's employees at the San Francisco Airport; and, (b) the slashing of his luggage and the loss of his personal effects amounting to US $5,310.00.

• While his second cause of action - an action for damages arising from theft or damage to property or goods - is well within the bounds of the Warsaw Convention, his first cause of action -an action for damages arising from the misconduct of the airline employees and the violation of respondent's rights as passenger - clearly is not.

• Insofar as the first cause of action is concerned, respondent's failure to file his complaint within the two (2)-year limitation of the Warsaw Convention does not bar his action since petitioner airline may still be held liable for breach of other provisions of the Civil Code which prescribe a different period or procedure for instituting the action, specifically, Art. 1146 thereof which prescribes four (4) years for filing an action based on torts.

• As for respondent's second cause of action, indeed the travaux preparatories (in english: preparatory works) of the Warsaw Convention reveal that the delegates thereto intended the two (2)-year limitation in Art. 29 as an absolute bar to suit and not to be made subject to the various tolling provisions of the laws of the forum. This therefore forecloses the application of our own rules on interruption of prescriptive periods. Article 29, par. (2), was intended only to let local laws determine whether an action had been commenced within the two (2)-year period, and within our jurisdiction an action shall be deemed commenced upon the filing of a complaint.

• Since it is indisputable that respondent filed the present action beyond the two (2)-year time frame his second cause of action must be barred. Nonetheless, it cannot be doubted that respondent exerted efforts to immediately convey his loss to petitioner, even employed the services of two (2) lawyers to follow up his claims, and that the filing of the action itself was delayed because of petitioner's evasion.

• Although, respondent filed his complaint more than two (2) years later, beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for filing a claim for damages. However, it is obvious that respondent was forestalled from immediately filing an action because petitioner airline gave him the runaround, answering his letters but not giving in to his demands. True, respondent should have already filed an action at the first instance when his claims were denied by petitioner but the same could only be due to his desire to make an out-of-court settlement for which he cannot be faulted.

• Hence, despite the express mandate of Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention that an action for damages should be filed within two (2) years from the arrival at the place of destination, such rule shall not be applied in the instant case because of the delaying tactics employed by petitioner airline itself. Thus, private



respondent's second cause of action cannot be considered as time-barred under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention. This is inline with the case of Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and setting aside the appealed order of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss the complaint, as well as its Resolution denying reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Let the records of the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings taking its bearings from this disquisition.

BRITISH AIRWAYS vs. CA, MAHTANI and PAL G.R. No. 121824, January 29, 1998

Warsaw Convention CASE: Mahtani decided to visit his relatives in Bombay, India. His travel agent purchased a ticket with the itinerary Manila-Hongkong-Bombay (and back). Since British Airways (BA) had no direct flights from Manila to Bombay, Mahtani had to take a PAL flight to Hongkong. He checked in 2 pcs. of luggage but when he arrived in Bombay, he discovered they were missing. Mahtani filed a complaint against BA and his travel agent, Mr. Gumar. BA, in turn, filed a third party complaint against PAL saying that the reason for the non-transfer of the luggages was due to the PAL flight’s late arrival in Hongkong. The trial court awarded $400 representing the value of the contents of the luggages in addition to P7000 for the value of the two lugagges. BA asserts that since Mahtani did not declare a higher valuation, the liability should be limited to the value stated in the ticket. WoN the award should be limited to the value stated in the ticket YES, because according to the Warsaw Convention, in the transportation of checked baggage and goods, the liability of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the consignor has made, at time the package was handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of the value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires. BUT IN THIS CASE, the benefits of limited liability are subject to waiver such as when the air carrier failed to raise timely objections during the

trial when questions and answers regarding the actual claims and damages sustained by the passenger were asked. BA had waived the defense of limited liability when it allowed Mahtani to testify as to the actual damages he incurred due to the misplacement of his luggage, without any objection. FACTS:

• Mahtani decided to visit his relatives in Bombay, India. In anticipation of his visit, he obtained the services of a certain Mr. Gumar to prepare his travel plans. The latter, in turn, purchased a ticket from British Airways (BA) where the following itinerary was indicated:

o MANILA-HONGKONG-BOMBAY-HONGKONG-MANILA • Since BA had no direct flights from Manila to Bombay, Mahtani had

to take a flight to Hongkong via PAL, and upon arrival in Hongkong he had to take a connecting flight to Bombay on board BA.

• Prior to his departure, Mahtani checked in at the PAL counter in Manila his two pieces of luggage containing his clothings and personal effects, confident that upon reaching Hongkong, the same would be transferred to the BA flight bound for Bombay.

• Unfortunately, when Mahtani arrived in Bombay he discovered that his luggage was missing and that upon inquiry from the BA representatives, he was told that the same might have been diverted to London. After patiently waiting for his luggage for one week, BA finally advised him to file a claim by accomplishing the "Property Irregularity Report.

• Back in the Philippines, Mahtani filed his complaint for damages and attorney's fees against BA and Mr. Gumar.

• BA filed a third-party complaint against PAL alleging that the reason for the non-transfer of the luggage was due to the latter's late arrival in Hongkong, thus leaving hardly any time for the proper transfer of Mahtani's luggage to the BA aircraft bound for Bombay.

• Trial Court rendered its decision in favor of Mahtani: o P7,000.00 for the value of the two suit cases; o $400.00 representing the value of the contents of plaintiff's

luggage; o P50,000.00 for moral and actual damages; o 20% attorney’s fees and costs.

• BA asserts: the award of compensatory damages in the separate sum of P7,000.00 for the loss of Mahtani's two pieces of luggage



was without basis since Mahtani in his complaint stated the following as the value of his personal belongings:

1. personal belonging P10,000.00 2. gifts for his parents and relatives $5,000.00

• Moreover, he failed to declare a higher valuation with respect to his luggage, a condition provided for in the ticket, which reads:

Liability for loss, delay, or damage to baggage is limited unless a higher value is declared in advance and additional charges are paid: 1. For most international travel (including domestic corporations of international journeys) the liability limit is approximately U.S. $9.07 per pound (U.S. $20.000) per kilo for checked baggage and U.S. $400 per passenger for unchecked baggage.

ISSUE: WoN the award should be limited to the amount stated in the ticket when passenger fails to declare a higher amount. HELD & RATIO: YES, according to the Warsaw Convention. BUT BASED ON THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THERE WAS A WAIVER OF THE DEFENSE OF LIMITED LIABILITY. • Applicable Provision:

o Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention. In the transportation of checked baggage and goods, the liability of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the consignor has made, at time the package was handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of the value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires. In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that the sum is greater than the actual value to the consignor at delivery.

• American jurisprudence provides that an air carrier is not liable for the loss of baggage in an amount in excess of the limits specified in the tariff which was filed with the proper authorities, such tariff being binding, on the passenger regardless of the passenger's lack of knowledge thereof or assent thereto. This doctrine is recognized in this jurisdiction.

• BUT in this case, the benefits of limited liability are subject to waiver such as when the air carrier failed to raise timely objections during the trial when questions and answers regarding the actual claims and damages sustained by the passenger were asked.

• BA had waived the defense of limited liability when it allowed Mahtani to testify as to the actual damages he incurred due to the misplacement of his luggage, without any objection.

• Where the proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right to object. However, such right is a mere privilege which can be waived. Necessarily, the objection must be made at the earliest opportunity, lest silence when there is opportunity to speak may operate as a waiver of objections.

AMERICAN AIRLINES v. CA, HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS and DEMOCRITO MENDOZA,

G.R. No. 116044-45. March 9, 2000 CASE:

Mendoza purchased conjunction tickets in Manila from SAL. In Geneva, Mendoza exchanged the unused portion of the conjunction ticket for a one-way ticket from Geneva to NY from petitioner. Mendoza filed an action for damages before RTC Cebu for the alleged embarrassment and mental anguish he suffered at the Geneva Airport when the petitioner’s security officers prevented him from boarding the plane, detained him for about an hour and allowed him to board the plane only after all the other passengers have boarded.

W/N Philippine courts has jurisdiction in the action for damages filed by Mendoza in view of Art 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention.-YES

The Warsaw Convention to which the Philippines is a party and which has the force and effect of law in this country applies to all international transportation of persons, baggage or goods performed by



an aircraft gratuitously or for hire. Art. 28 (1) enumerates the four places where an action for damages may be brought: “An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.” In this case, It is undisputed that petitioner issued the ticket in Geneva which was neither the domicile nor the principal place of business of petitioner nor the respondents place of destination.

Art 1(3) of the Warsaw Convention:"Transportation to be performed by several successive carriers shall be deemed, for the purposes of this convention, to be one undivided transportation, if it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation, whether it has been agreed upon under the form of a single contract or a series of contracts…xx” Art. 1(3) clearly states that a contract of air transportation is taken as a single operation whether it is founded on a single contract or a series of contracts. The contract of carriage between Mendoza and SAL although performed by different carriers under a series of airline tickets, including that issued by petitioner, constitutes a single operation. The third option of the plaintiff under Art 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention e.g., to sue in the place of business of the carrier wherein the contract was made, is therefore, Manila, and Philippine courts are clothed with jurisdiction over this case. FACTS:

• Mendoza purchased from Singapore Airlines (SAL) in Manila conjunction tickets for Manila - Singapore - Athens - Larnaca - Rome - Turin - Zurich - Geneva - Copenhagen - New York.

• Petitioner was not a participating airline in any of the segments in the itinerary under the conjunction tickets.

• In Geneva, Mendoza decided to forego his trip to Copenhagen and to go straight to NY. He exchanged the unused portion of the conjunction ticket for a one-way ticket from Geneva to NY from petitioner. Petitioner issued its own ticket to Mendoza in Geneva and claimed the value of the unused portion of the ticket from the IATA clearing house in Geneva.

• Mendoza filed an action for damages before RTC Cebu for the alleged embarrassment and mental anguish he suffered at the Geneva Airport when the petitioner’s security officers prevented

him from boarding the plane, detained him for about an hour and allowed him to board the plane only after all the other passengers have boarded.

• Petitioner filed MTD for lack of jurisdiction of Philippine courts to entertain the said proceedings under Art. 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention.

• Both the RTC and CA held that the suit may be brought in the Philippines under the pool partnership agreement among the IATA members, which include Singapore Airlines and American Airlines, wherein the members act as agents of each other in the issuance of tickets to those who may need their services; that the contract of carriage perfected in Manila between Mendoza and SAL binds petitioner as an agent of SAL and considering that petitioner has a place of business in Manila, the third option of the plaintiff under the Warsaw Convention i.e. the action may be brought in the place where the contract was perfected and where the airline has a place of business, is applicable.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine courts has jurisdiction in the action for damages filed by Mendoza in view of Art 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention HELD & RATIO: 1. YES.

• The Warsaw Convention to which the Philippines is a party and which has the force and effect of law in this country applies to all international transportation of persons, baggage or goods performed by an aircraft gratuitously or for hire.

• The contract of carriage entered into by Mendoza with SAL, and subsequently with the petitioner, to transport him to nine cities in different countries with NY as the final destination is a contract of international transportation and the provisions of the Convention automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its passengers. This includes section 28 (1) which enumerates the four places where an action for damages may be brought.

o Art (28) (1): “An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile



of the carrier or of his principal place of business or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.”

• It is undisputed that petitioner issued the ticket in Geneva which was neither the domicile nor the principal place of business of petitioner nor the respondents place of destination. The question is whether the contract of transportation between the petitioner and Mendoza is a single operation and part of the contract of transportation entered into by the latter with SAL in Manila.

o Art 1(3) of the Warsaw Convention:"Transportation to be performed by several successive carriers shall be deemed, for the purposes of this convention, to be one undivided transportation, if it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation, whether it has been agreed upon under the form of a single contract or a series of contracts, and it shall not lose its international character merely because one contract or series of contracts is to be performed entirely within the territory subject of the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same High contracting Party."

• The contract of carriage between Mendoza and SAL although performed by different carriers under a series of airline tickets, including that issued by petitioner, constitutes a single operation. Members of the IATA are under a general pool partnership agreement wherein they act as agent of each other in the issuance of tickets.

• A member airline which enters into a contract of carriage consisting of a series of trips to be performed by different carriers is authorized to receive the fare for the whole trip and through the required process of interline settlement of accounts by way of the IATA clearing house an airline is duly compensated for the segment of the trip serviced.

o When petitioner accepted the unused portion of the conjunction tickets, entered it in the IATA clearing house and undertook to transport Mendoza over the route covered by the unused portion of the conjunction tickets, petitioner tacitly recognized its commitment under the IATA pool arrangement to act as agent SAL as to the segment the petitioner agreed to undertake. As such,

petitioner assumed the obligation to take the place of the carrier originally designated in the original conjunction ticket.

• Art. 1(3) clearly states that a contract of air transportation is taken as a single operation whether it is founded on a single contract or a series of contracts. The number of tickets issued does not detract from the oneness of the contract of carriage as long as the parties regard the contract as a single operation.

o Petitioners acquiescence to take the place of the original designated carrier binds it under the contract of carriage entered into by Mendoza and SAL in Manila.

• The third option of the plaintiff under Art 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention e.g., to sue in the place of business of the carrier wherein the contract was made, is therefore, Manila, and Philippine courts are clothed with jurisdiction over this case.

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY and PHILAM INSURANCE COMPANY

G.R. No. 150094, 18 August 2004 Warsaw Convention

CASE: FedEx was contracted by an Airway Bill issued by Burlington to deliver cartons of veterinary biologicals to Smithkline. The cargoes were insured by AHAC. When the cargoes were delivered and stored in the warehouse, the consignee’s representative found out that the cargoes were not in good condition (as corroborated by the examination done to it). Smithkline abandoned the cargoes and declared a claim with AHAC. Then, AHAC filed a claim for damages against FedEx as Smithkline’s subrogee. The issue is whether or not the case will prosper. The Court held in the negative. Art. 26 of the Warsaw Convention and even the Airway Bill itself stipulate that a notice of claim of loss of or damage to the goods must first be filed with the carrier before any action or enforcement of claim may be filed in court. As a condition precedent, the notice precedes the action, and therefore, failure to comply with it within the prescribed period, the consignee or



shipper cannot impute liability to the carrier. In this case, respondents did not allege nor prove that they complied with this condition precedent, hence, the case will not prosper. FACTS:

• In 1994, Smithkline Beecham (“Smithkline”) delivered to Burlington Air Express (“Burlington”), an agent of petitioner Federal Express (“FedEx”), a shipment of 109 cartons of veterinary biologicals for delivery to consignee Smithkline and French Overseas Company in Makati City.

• The shipment was covered by Burlington in an Airway Bill, with words REFRIGERATE WHEN NOT IN TRANSIT and PERISHABLE.

• Burlington insured the cargoes with American Home Assurance (“AHAC”).

• FedEx transported the cargoes to Manila. There were two shipments, and both were immediately stored at Cargohaus Inc.’s (“Cargohaus”) warehouse.

• Dario Dioned (“Dioneda”) facilitated the release of the subject cargoes, but he found out that they were stored only in a room with two air conditioning units running, instead in a refrigerator.

• Dioneda did not proceed with the release of the cargoes, but subjected the some samples thereof to examination, where it was discovered that its enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) reading was below the positive reference.

• As a result, Smithkline abandoned the shipment, declared a total loss, and filed a claim with AHAC, through its Philippine representative, Philam Insurance Co., Inc. (“PhilAm”).

• Respondents AHAC and PhilAm filed an action against FedEx imputing negligence in handling the cargo.

• The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents. The CA reversed it and ruled that the shipping receipts were a prima facie evidence that the goods had been delivered in good condition. The CA also ignored the Warsaw Convention in coming up with its decision (specifically Art. 26, quoted below).

• FedEx, on the other hand, claims that respondents had no capacity to sue.

ISSUE:

There are six issued raised in the case, but the most important one is this: Whether or not the suit will prosper HELD & RATIO: NO, the court said that the suit WILL NOT PROSPER for prescription has already set in.

• According to the Airway Bill issued by Burlington: o “No action shall be maintained in the case of damage to or

partial loss of the shipment unless a written notice xxx is presented by shipper or consignee xxx within 14 days from the date the goods are placed at the disposal of the person entitled to delivery, or in the case of total loss, unless presented within 120 days from the date of issue of the Airway Bill.”

• Furthermore, Article 26 of the Warsaw Convention states that: o “1. Receipt by the person entitled to delivery of luggage or

goods without complaint is prima facie evidence that the same have been delivered in good condition and in accordance with the document of carriage.

o 2. In the case of damage, the person entitled to delivery must complain to the carrier forthwith after the discovery of the damage, and, at the latest, within three days from the date of receipt in the case of luggage and seven days from the date of receipt in the case of goods. In the case of delay the complaint must be made at the latest within fourteen days from the date on which the luggage or goods have been placed at his disposal.

o 3. Every complaint must be made in writing upon the document of carriage or by separate notice in writing dispatched within the times aforesaid.

o 4. Failing complaint within the times aforesaid, no action shall lie against the carrier, save in the case of fraud on his part.”

• The filing of a claim with the carrier within the time limitation constitutes a condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against a carrier for loss of or damage to the goods. The shipper or consignee must allege and prove the fulfillment of the condition. Otherwise, no right of action against the carrier can accrue. This condition precedent has the following fundamental reasons:



o to inform the carrier that the cargo has been damaged, and that it is being charged with liability; and

o to give it an opportunity to examine the nature and extent of the injury.

• Moreover, when a contract of carriage has a stipulation that requires a notice of claim for loss of or damage to goods shipped and the stipulation is not complied with, the liability cannot be imposed on the carrier.

• As a condition precedent, the notice precedes a suit for enforcement.

• In this case, there is neither an allegation nor a showing by respondents that they complied with this requirement within the prescribed period, the suit will not prosper.

PAL v. SAVILLO G.R. No. 149547; July 4, 2008

Prescription CASE:

Griño was invited to participate in a golf tournament in Jakarta, Indonesia. He and other companions purchased tickets from PAL-Manila with the ff. points of passage: MANILA-SINGAPORE-JAKARTA-SINGAPORE-MANILA. Griño and his companions took the PAL flight to Singapore. Upon their arrival at Singapore, they proceeded to the Singapore Airlines (SAL) office to check-in for their flight to Jakarta but the latter rejected the tickets of Griño and his group because they were not endorsed by PAL. Griño tried to contact PAL’s office at the airport, only to find out that it was closed. Left with no recourse, they were constrained to purchase tickets anew and board Garuda Airlines’ last flight bound for Jakarta. Upon Griño’s return to PH, he sent a demand letter to PAL and to Singapore Airlines. Both disowned liability and blamed each other. Griño, then, filed a complaint for damages before RTC. PAL filed a MTD on the ground of prescription. According to PAL, the said complaint was barred on the ground of prescription—that the Warsaw Convention, governed this case, as it provides that any claim for damages in connection with the international transportation of persons is subject to the prescription period of two years. Since the Complaint was filed on 15 August 1997, more than three years after PAL received the

demand letter on 25 January 1994, it was already barred by prescription. RTC denied MTD. CA affirmed RTC.

The issue in this case is whether or not the complaint is barred by prescription.

SC ruled that the action has not yet prescribed. In the case at hand, SAL barred Griño from boarding its flight because PAL allegedly failed to endorse the tickets of Griño and his companions, despite PAL’s assurances to Griño that Singapore Airlines had already confirmed their passage. An action based on these allegations will not fall under the Warsaw Convention, since the purported negligence on the part of PAL did not occur during the performance of the contract of carriage but days before the scheduled flight. Moreso, had the present case merely consisted of claims incidental to the airlines’ delay in transporting their passengers, then Griño’s Complaint would have been time-barred under the Warsaw Convention. However, this involves a special species of injury resulting from the failure of PAL and/or SAL to transport Griño from Singapore to Jakarta. Since, this is an action based on tort, the applicable prescription period is that provided under Article 1146 of the Civil Code which provides that an action based upon a quasi-delict shall be instituted with 4 years. (from receipt of demand letter of PAL to the filing of action: 3 years. Hence, no prescription yet). FACTS: • Simplicio Griño was invited to participate in the 1993 ASEAN Seniors

Annual Golf Tournament held in Jakarta, Indonesia. • He and several companions decided to purchase their respective

passenger tickets from PAL with the following points of passage: MANILA-SINGAPORE-JAKARTA-SINGAPORE-MANILA. Griño and his companions were made to understand by PAL that its plane would take them from Manila to Singapore, while Singapore Airlines (SAL) would take them from Singapore to Jakarta.

• Griño and his companions took the PAL flight to Singapore. Upon their arrival at Singapore, they proceeded to the Singapore Airlines office to check-in for their flight to Jakarta but the latter rejected the tickets of Griño and his group because they were not endorsed by PAL. Griño tried to contact PAL’s office at the airport, only to find out that it was closed.

• Stranded at the airport in Singapore and left with no recourse, Griño was subjected to humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, serious anxiety, fear and distress. Eventually, Griño and his



companions were forced to purchase tickets from Garuda Airlines and board its last flight bound for Jakarta.

• When they arrived in Jakarta, the party who was supposed to fetch them from the airport had already left and they had to arrange for their transportation to the hotel at a very late hour. After the series of nerve-wracking experiences, Griño became ill and was unable to participate in the tournament.

• Upon his return to the Philippines, Griño brought the matter to the attention of PAL. He sent a demand letter to PAL and another to Singapore Airlines. However, both airlines disowned liability and blamed each other for the fiasco.

• Thereafter, Griño filed a Complaint for Damages before the RTC seeking compensation for moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 and attorney’s fees.

• PAL filed a Motion to on the ground that the said complaint was barred on the ground of prescription. PAL argued that the Warsaw Convention, particularly Article 29 thereof, governed this case, as it provides that any claim for damages in connection with the international transportation of persons is subject to the prescription period of two years. Since the Complaint was filed on 15 August 1997, more than three years after PAL received the demand letter on 25 January 1994, it was already barred by prescription.

• RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTC held that the provisions of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws of the Philippines, not the Warsaw Convention, were applicable to the present case.

• CA affirmed RTC. It pronounced that the application of the Warsaw Convention must not be construed to preclude the application of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. By applying Article 1144 of the Civil Code, which allowed for a ten-year prescription period, the appellate court declared that the Complaint filed by Griño should not be dismissed.

ISSUE: w/not the complaint filed by Griño has prescribed by being filed beyond the two (2)-year period provided under the Warsaw convention à NO! HELD+RATIO: 1) The present action cannot be dismissed based on the statute of

limitations provided under Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention.

The Warsaw Convention applies to "all international transportation of persons, baggage or goods performed by any aircraft for hire”. The cardinal purpose of the Warsaw Convention is to provide uniformity of rules governing claims arising from international air travel; thus, it precludes a passenger from maintaining an action for personal injury damages under local law when his or her claim does not satisfy the conditions of liability under the Convention. A claim covered by the Warsaw Convention can no longer be recovered under local law, if the statute of limitations of two years has already lapsed. In determining whether PAL’s MTD should have been granted by the trial court, it must be ascertained if all the claims made by the Griño in his Complaint are covered by the Warsaw Convention, which effectively bars all claims made outside the two-year prescription period provided under Article 29 thereof: (1) In the case at hand, SAL barred Griño from boarding its flight

because PAL allegedly failed to endorse the tickets of Griño and his companions, despite PAL’s assurances to Griño that Singapore Airlines had already confirmed their passage. While this fact still needs to be heard and established by adequate proof before the RTC, an action based on these allegations will not fall under the Warsaw Convention, since the purported negligence on the part of PAL did not occur during the performance of the contract of carriage but days before the scheduled flight. Thus, the present action cannot be dismissed based on the statute of limitations provided under Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention.

(2) Had the present case merely consisted of claims incidental to the airlines’ delay in transporting their passengers, then Griño’s Complaint would have been time-barred under the Warsaw Convention. However, the present case involves a special species of injury resulting from the failure of PAL and/or SAL to transport Griño from Singapore to Jakarta – the profound distress, fear, anxiety and humiliation that Griño experienced when, despite PAL’s earlier assurance that Singapore Airlines confirmed his passage, he was prevented from boarding the plane and he faced the daunting possibility that he would be stranded in Singapore Airport because the PAL office was already closed.



• These claims are covered by the Civil Code provisions on tort, and not within the purview of the Warsaw Convention. Hence, the applicable prescription period is that provided under Article 1146 of the Civil Code which provides that an action based upon a quasi-delict shall be instituted with 4 years.

• Griño’s Complaint was filed with the RTC in 1997, which was less than four years since PAL received his extrajudicial demand in 1994. Thus, Griño’s claims have not yet prescribed and PAL’s Motion to Dismiss must be denied.

EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER v. BRITISH AIRWAYS

G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010 CASE:

Lhuillier took respondent’s flight from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. She alleged that respondent’s flight attendants exhibited disrespectful attitude towards her. One flight attendant even singled her out from among all the passengers to lecture on plane safety. Allegedly, the attendant made her appear to the other passengers to be ignorant, uneducated, stupid, and in need of lecturing on the safety rules and regulations of the plane. Lhuillier filed the complaint for damages in the RTC of Makati City. British Airways filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction. It alleged that only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention.

SC held that Philippine courts have NO jurisdiction. The Warsaw Convention (to which the Philippines was a signatory) applies in this case because the air travel, where the alleged tortious conduct occurred, was between the United Kingdom and Italy, which are both signatories to the Warsaw Convention. Furthermore, since the place of departure and the place of destination are situated within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, said carriage is deemed an "international carriage" within the contemplation of the Convention.

Thus, applying the Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before the court where–

1. The carrier is domiciled; 2. The carrier has its principal place of business; 3. The carrier has an establishment by which the contract has

been made; or 4. Of the place of destination.

In this case, respondent is a British corporation domiciled in

London, United Kingdom with London as its principal place of business. The ticket was issued in Rome, Italy. Finally, both the petitioner and respondent aver that the place of destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly designated given the routing presented in the said passenger ticket and baggage check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before the courts of Rome, Italy. Thus, the RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does NOT have jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioner. Also, allegations of tortious conduct do not bring the case outside the ambit of the Warsaw Convention. FACTS:

• Lhuillier took respondent’s flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. Once on board, she allegedly requested Julian Halliday (Halliday), one of the respondent’s flight attendants, to assist her in placing her hand-carried luggage in the overhead bin. However, Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her, and even sarcastically remarked "If I were to help all 300 passengers in this flight, I would have a broken back!"

• When the plane was about to land in Rome, Italy, another flight attendant, Nickolas Kerrigan (Kerrigan), singled her out from among all the passengers in the business class section to lecture on plane safety. Allegedly, Kerrigan made her appear to the other passengers to be ignorant, uneducated, stupid, and in need of lecturing on the safety rules and regulations of the plane. Affronted, petitioner assured Kerrigan that she knew the plane’s safety regulations being a frequent traveler. Thereupon, Kerrigan allegedly thrust his face a mere few centimeters away from that of the petitioner and menacingly told her that "We don’t like your attitude."

• Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to respondent’s ground manager and demanded an apology. However, the latter declared that the flight stewards were "only doing their job."

• Lhuillier filed the complaint for damages, praying that respondent be ordered to pay P5 million as moral damages, P2 million as nominal damages, P1 million as exemplary damages, P300,000.00 as attorney’s fees, P200,000.00 as litigation expenses, and cost of the suit.

• British Airways, by way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over



the case and over its person. It alleged that only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention.

• Article 28(1) of the Convention being invoked by British Airways provides that:

An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court of domicile of the carrier or his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court of the place of destination.

British Airways argues that since a) respondent is domiciled in London; b) respondent’s principal place of business is in London; c) petitioner bought her ticket in Italy (through Jeepney Travel S.A.S, in Rome); and d) Rome, Italy is petitioner’s place of destination, then it follows that the complaint should only be filed in the proper courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy.

• Petitioner argues that her cause of action arose not from the

contract of carriage, but from the tortious conduct (torts) committed by airline personnel of respondent in violation of the provisions of the Civil Code on Human Relations. Since her cause of action was not predicated on the contract of carriage, petitioner asserts that she has the option to pursue this case in this jurisdiction pursuant to Philippine laws.

ISSUE: W/N the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to entertain the suit– NONE. The Warsaw Convention must be followed pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. RATIO: 1. The Convention is a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by

the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.

It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention. It was concurred in by the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Warsaw Convention applies because the air travel, where the alleged tortious conduct occurred, was between the United Kingdom and Italy, which are both signatories to the Warsaw Convention.

2. Application of the Convention: the transport of the petitioner is

deemed to be an "international carriage" within the contemplation of the Warsaw Convention.

Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention provides: 1. This Convention applies to all international carriage of persons,

luggage or goods performed by aircraft for reward. It applies equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an air transport undertaking.

2. For the purposes of this Convention the expression "international carriage" means any carriage in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a transshipment, are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another Power, even though that Power is not a party to this Convention. A carriage without such an agreed stopping place between territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same High Contracting Party is not deemed to be international for the purposes of this Convention. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, when the place of departure and the place of destination in a contract of carriage are situated within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, said carriage is deemed an "international carriage". The High Contracting Parties referred to herein were the signatories to the Warsaw Convention and those which subsequently adhered to it.



In the case at bench, petitioner’s place of departure was London, United Kingdom while her place of destination was Rome, Italy. Both the United Kingdom and Italy signed and ratified the Warsaw Convention. As such, the transport of the petitioner is deemed to be an "international carriage" within the contemplation of the Warsaw Convention. Since the Warsaw Convention applies in the instant case, then the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is governed by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.

3. Jurisdiction

Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before – 1. the court where the carrier is domiciled; 2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business; 3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or 4. the court of the place of destination. In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London, United Kingdom with London as its principal place of business. Hence, under the first and second jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may bring her case before the courts of London in the United Kingdom. In the passenger ticket and baggage check presented by both the petitioner and respondent, it appears that the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the third jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has the option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the petitioner and respondent aver that the place of destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly designated given the routing presented in the said passenger ticket and baggage check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before the courts of Rome, Italy. We thus find that the RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioner. It is to be noted that this article is jurisdictional in character; it is not a venue provision. Thus, where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes on a dual concept.

Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established in accordance with Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, following which the jurisdiction of a particular court must be established pursuant to the applicable domestic law. Only after the question of which court has jurisdiction is determined will the issue of venue be taken up. This second question shall be governed by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.

4. Tortious conduct as ground for the petitioner’s complaint is within the purview of the Warsaw Convention. Allegations of tortious conduct committed against an airline passenger during the course of the international carriage do not bring the case outside the ambit of the Warsaw Convention.

5. Special Appearance to Question a Court’s Jurisdiction Is Not Voluntary Appearance Respondent, in seeking remedies from the trial court through special appearance of counsel, is not deemed to have voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court.

Compilation 4 Transpo Digest

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