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Communist regimes and historicallegitimacy: polemics regarding the roleof the Red Army in Romania at the endof the Second World WarCezar Stanciu aa University Valahia , Targoviste , RomaniaPublished online: 20 May 2013.

To cite this article: Cezar Stanciu (2013) Communist regimes and historical legitimacy:polemics regarding the role of the Red Army in Romania at the end of the Second WorldWar, European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire, 20:3, 445-462, DOI:10.1080/13507486.2012.745832

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Communist regimes and historical legitimacy: polemics regarding therole of the Red Army in Romania at the end of the Second World War

Cezar Stanciu*

University Valahia, Targoviste, Romania

(Received 6 March 2012; final version received 12 June 2012)

How did Communism come to power in Romania? The scientific answer to thisquestion was of no concern to the Romanian and Soviet Communists. History was justanother tool of Party propaganda, aimed at providing people with official narratives.But when the Romanians and the Soviets pursue different propaganda goals, a fightover interpretations begins in which each side uses specific descriptions of historicalevents to serve its political needs. After Stalin’s death, dictator Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej of Romania tried to find legitimacy and revolutionary prestige for his party, callinginto question the Soviet contribution to Romania’s Communisation. In doing so, hispropaganda tried to demonstrate that Communism in Romania was not a product ofSoviet intervention, but a materialisation of historical Romanian aspirations.

Keywords: Communism; Romania; Soviet Union; history; propaganda; legitimacy

Most politicians and decision makers in Bucharest had understood that Romania’s war

against the USSR was a lost cause, long before Soviet troops crossed the Romanian border

in the summer of 1944. A second plan was needed to limit the losses but military dictator

Ion Antonescu seemed inflexible, unwilling to abandon his alliance with Adolf Hitler.1 In

the late afternoon of 23 August 1944, Antonescu entered the Royal Palace in Bucharest as

a Marshall, for an audience with King Mihai, but left the Palace as a prisoner. A plot

organised by King Mihai and four political parties resulted in his arrest and signalled the

end of Romania’s war against the United Nations. Among those also involved was the

Communist Party in Romania (PCR).2 In the following days, German troops stationed

in Bucharest attempted to regain control of the situation while the Red Army was

approaching the capital.3 Well before the Soviets entered Bucharest, Romanian troops had

already disarmed the Germans and gained control of the city, giving the local Communists

a chance to welcome the Soviets as victors.

Although a marginal member of the plot to remove Antonescu, the PCR was on its way

to obtaining an increasingly prominent role in the Government, as Stalin’s plans to impose

Soviet-type regimes in Eastern and Central Europe began to unfold from 1945 onwards.4

Under these circumstances, the narrative of 23 August 1944 became a focal point in the

propaganda effort to explain and justify the Communists’ position in power.5 However, as

the political and ideological confrontation between East and West was aggravated,

Moscow imposed its own version of events, derived from an ideological interpretation

which emphasised the role of the Red Army in the ‘liberation’ of Eastern and Central

Europe, ignoring the actions of local parties.

q 2013 Taylor & Francis

*Email: cezar.stanciu@centrulgafencu.ro

European Review of History—Revue europeenne d’histoire, 2013

Vol. 20, No. 3, 445–462, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13507486.2012.745832

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This article details the way in which Romanian Communists presented and explained

their accession to power as well as how they related it to the Soviet factor. The period

taken under scrutiny is 1948–65, when leadership of the PCR belonged to Gheorghe

Gheorghiu-Dej. The period of reference is justified by the fact that it includes two different

stages in Romanian–Soviet relations: on the one hand, complete subordination, specific to

the Stalinist era; and on the other, the claim for political autonomy in the Communist bloc

which coincided with the emergence of National-Communism. In this general frame, the

interpretations of power accession also oscillated between two major narratives: the Red

Army brought the PCR to power, which was characteristic of the first stage; and the PCR

obtained power by itself through insurrection, which was characteristic of the second

stage.

My fundamental hypothesis is that the historical events of 23 August 1944 were used

by Gheorghiu-Dej’s regime for political purposes and formed part of his effort to gain

legitimacy at home and revolutionary prestige abroad. His construction of a new narrative

came into conflict with the Soviet version and therefore a dispute arose between Romania

and the USSR over interpretations. This article describes key moments of this dispute,

relying on recently declassified documents from the Romanian Communist Party’s

archives which demonstrated first that history was used as a political tool by Party

propaganda, and second, that the specific use of it was conditioned by domestic and

foreign factors.

The troubled birth of a national celebration

Participating in the plot to remove Antonescu as well as in the military resistance against

German troops before the Soviets entered Bucharest was a source of pride and celebration

for the Romanian Communists up until 1948. A Communist-led government was

appointed on 6 March 1945 as a result of Soviet pressures, but King Mihai remained in

power and the PCR had to co-exist with the other parties that participated in the plot. In

addition, the USSR had not imposed, until 1948, major ideological interpretations as it was

striving to save its relations with the former Western allies. As historian Edward Mark had

demonstrated, during 1945–7 Stalin pursued a ‘national-front strategy’ in Central and

Eastern Europe, which aimed to ensure control over this region without necessarily

compromising his relations with the West.6

During this period, and in the absence of any official interpretation elaborated in

Moscow, the Romanian Communists’ public discourse stressed their role in the coup

which removed Antonescu as well as the important role played by the Communist-led

Patriotic Guards in fighting against the German troops in Bucharest. The coup was

organised in the absence of ‘Muscovite’ Communists led by Ana Pauker and it was

therefore advantageous for Gheorghiu-Dej’s faction to emphasise the Party’s involvement

in the events.7 However, although Stalin appointed Gheorghiu-Dej as leader, there still

was an issue of power in the Party’s leadership.8 Ana Pauker made use of her contacts in

Moscow to undermine Gheorghiu-Dej’s influence, which is why her competitor did

everything possible to stress the importance of the Party’s participation in the overthrow of

the ‘Fascist dictatorship’, in which Ana Pauker did not take part. The coup of 23 August

1944 was depicted as an essential step in the Communist transformation of the country, as

Gheorghiu-Dej himself pointed out at the Party Congress in February 1948:

. . . let us take a look on the past, so that in light of recent transformationswe can fathom themainstages of the fight carried by our democratic forces from 23August to this day. In the mass of ourpeople – workers, soldiers, poor peasants, the best part of the intellectuals – overthrowing

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Antonescu’s dictatorship produced a profound searching and a strong fighting animus [ . . . ]. 23August, 6 March, the participation in the anti-Hitlerist war, the agrarian reform, theparliamentarian elections, the changes which occurred in the second half of last year, are all linksin the same chain, stages of the same process of building, through the fight of the working people,of a regime of peoples’ democracy in our country.9

The role of the Soviet Army in Romania was barely mentioned throughout the report.

However, at the time this speech was delivered, fundamental changes were already taking

place in Soviet policy towards the satellites.10 The Soviet–Yugoslav split, as well as the

deepening conflict in Soviet–American relations, convinced Stalin to bolster his grip

on the satellite parties. An important component of this process was its ideological

background. The Cominform (Informative Bureau of Communist Parties) meeting held in

Bucharest in June 1948 claimed that the only model for Socialist construction was the

Bolshevik one and rejected as ‘deviations’ claims to a national model of socialism.11 Soon,

the anti-cosmopolitan campaign already under way in the USSR was also imposed on the

satellites.12

These evolutions had a dramatic impact on the way Romanian Communists envisaged

their accession to power. Ideological interpretations elaborated in the Kremlin were

compulsory for all Communist parties, under the fatal threat of ‘deviation’, which caused a

radical change in the discourse regarding 23 August 1944. The fundamental question

concerned the Communist regimes’ emergence to power in Central and Eastern Europe.

According to the Cominform position, the peoples’ national struggle against Fascism

evolved into a social struggle against exploitation under the direct influence of the Red

Army. Since the Fascist regimes had been supported by ‘reactionary’ and ‘bourgeois’

forces, the fight for liberation soon took a Socialist turn with the help of the Red Army,

which encouraged revolution and repressed counter-revolutionary forces. Benefiting from

Soviet assistance, the Communist parties assumed control of the struggle, leading to the

emergence of Communist regimes.13

The presence of the Soviet Army was therefore determined to be the fundamental

factor which changed the nature of the popular fight. In this case, all Communist

regimes had to relate to this aspect in their revolutionary narratives and emphasise the

USSR as a helpful and liberating factor. For the Romanian Communists, the story of

23 August was becoming dangerous: claiming that the Party participated in a plot to

take power and had fought on the streets of Bucharest long before the Soviets arrived

could have been interpreted as a denial of Soviet merits in Romania’s liberation from

Fascist domination. This was a direct path to ‘deviation’ with all its sombre

consequences.

The role of the Red Army in Central and Eastern Europe was depicted in a similar way

by most Communist regimes. In countries like Czechoslovakia or Poland, official

propaganda described the arrival of the Soviet Army in the same terms, as ‘liberation’.

Propaganda emphasised the importance of the Soviet Union in protecting these countries

against German hegemony, and in the restoration of their independence and statehood.14

Nations such as Czechoslovakia and Poland, whom had much to suffer under Nazi

occupation, were susceptible to anti-German arguments. But in East Germany too,

propaganda depicted the arrival of the Soviet Army as ‘liberation’, associating Germany’s

defeat in the war with the victory of Socialism. One commonly used slogan in the GDR

was: ‘Learning from the Soviet Union means learning victory!’15 The events at the end of

the Second World War were therefore not a defeat for Germany, but a victory for the

working-class and Marxism-Leninism. It was not until the fall of Communism that the

East German Party propaganda evolved along this line.

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Ana Pauker’s influence on the Romanian Party leadership increased significantly as

a consequence of these changes. There were insistent rumours at various levels that

Gheorghiu-Dej was considered a ‘Titoist’ by Moscow, rumours which were partially

confirmed by the fact that he was later appointed by Moscow to deliver the report which

condemned Yugoslavia and Tito for betrayal and ‘deviation’.16 There was even a public

incident when an important member of the Political Bureau had made a comparison

between Tito and Gheorghiu-Dej.17 Years later, after having purged Ana Pauker,

Gheorghiu-Dej would recount that people he worked with started to fear discussions

related to him and that plans were being made for his demise.18

Ana Pauker, in contrast, saw her influence rise again. As a Jew who was abroad most of

the time, she thought she was safe from ‘Titoist’ accusations. The events of 23 August

1944 were no longer a prime focus of Party propaganda and this worked to her advantage.

Regarding the Party’s accession to power, she specifically emphasised the role of the Red

Army. In a speech delivered in 1951, she said: ‘Because of the victories of the Soviet

Army, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania and Romania gained their

freedom. [ . . . ] Our people could walk towards Socialism only because we were liberated

by the glorious armies of the Soviet Union.’19

The events of 23 August 1944 changed their meaning in public rhetoric. Instead of

celebrating the Party’s direct participation in the coup and the armed resistance which

followed, the Romanian Communists were simply celebrating the change of regime,

without emphasising their role in events. On the anniversary of 23 August in 1954, Party

leader Gheorghiu-Dej declared: ‘23 August is for the Romanian people a great national

celebration, because it meant a turn towards a radical change in its life – from the

bourgeois-landlord regime of oppression and savage exploitation of the working masses,

of economic and political enslavement by the Imperialist powers, to a peoples’ democracy

regime.’20

Gheorghiu-Dej himself, during a meeting in July 1949, proposed that 23 August be

proclaimed as Romania’s National Day and as a celebration of Socialist construction and

friendship with the Soviet Union. As he cautiously explained, the day represented the end

of Romania’s exploitation by foreign imperialists and domestic bourgeoisie as well as the

beginning of the Socialist transformation.21 One year later, an order issued by the Minister

of Defence to celebrate 23 August in the army, made clear the significance of the

celebration by stating: ‘Today we celebrate six years since our country’s liberation by the

glorious army of the great Union of Soviet and Socialist Republics.’ It continued by

expressing gratitude to Stalin and the Soviet Union and emphasising the regime’s

successes over the past six years.22 This was the cautious version of events but not by any

means the final version.

New changes in the Communist bloc produced new interpretations of the same event.

The Party’s official version was going to be clarified along with the emergence of

National-Communism. Gheorghiu-Dej’s position as Party leader significantly improved in

1952 when he managed to purge Ana Pauker and her faction. The famous ‘doctors’ plot’ in

the Kremlin was only the tip of the iceberg when it came to Stalin’s increasingly anti-

Semitic policies and Gheorghiu-Dej knew how to take advantage of it. He carefully staged

accusations against Ana Pauker’s most loyal men in the Political Bureau in order to finally

turn against her with Moscow’s approval.23 The successful strike against the Pauker group

left him in absolute control of the Party. However, additional challenges for his regime

soon emerged, when Stalin’s death was followed by radical changes in the USSR’s policy

towards its satellites.

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In the context of Khrushchev’s reforms, Romanian Communists reacted by pursuing a

course of autonomy in the Communist bloc, which stemmed from political and economical

factors. Politically speaking, Gheorghiu-Dej felt threatened by de-Stalinisation, since a

key component of this policy had been the removal of Stalin’s men from the leadership of

satellite parties.24 Economically, the CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Aid) reforms

envisaged by Khrushchev, mainly the principle of specialisation, also threatened

Romania’s industrialisation programme.25 This paper will not discuss the origins of

Romania’s policy of autonomy, nor will it address the emergence of National-

Communism, but suffice it to say that the regime’s claim for autonomy in the Communist

bloc was accompanied by unceasing efforts aimed at gaining popularity and legitimacy at

home. Reinterpretation of history was vital in this effort because it had the potential to

provide Gheorghiu-Dej’s regime with a certain degree of legitimacy which was lacking

until then.26

A fundamental question which arises at this point pertains to the meaning of

legitimacy. For the purpose of this study, legitimacy is understood as a belief in the just

and correct character of a state or governing, in the righteous character of governing in

which its orders are obeyed by people not only for fear of coercion, but also for reasons

of moral authority.27 Rodney Barker distinguished between legitimacy, as a quality of

government, and legitimation, as a continuous activity of any government, attempting to

convince both the subjects and itself of its right to govern, as well as of its moral authority.

Legitimation is an activity which characterises governments more than the possession of

legitimacy itself.28 This separation of concepts is useful to this study because the following

parts will describe actions taken by the Communist regime to legitimate itself. However,

as it is a non-democratic regime, it is difficult to argue whether or not it actually gained

legitimacy. Seen as a continuous activity, not necessarily conditioned by its result,

legitimation can better explain, from a theoretical point of view, decisions and actions

undertaken by Gheorghiu-Dej’s regime.

Various authors have attempted to explain the longevity of Communist regimes using

the concept of legitimacy. Fatos Tarima, for example, argued that, despite the extensive

use of coercion, the regime had to be accepted and legitimated in order to function. The

author identified three factors that produced legitimacy for the Communist regimes, one of

which was that peoples’ expectations were at least partially satisfied.29 In addition, David

Beetham demonstrated that, as large as the gap between regime and society may have

been, the two could not be isolated simply because the Party and state apparatus consisted

of people, and citizens coming from different layers of society. This provided any

Communist regime with a certain degree of receptivity for social needs and expectations.30

In the years following Stalin’s death, Khrushchev’s de-Stalinisation policies were

particularly important in determining a visible anti-Soviet reaction among the Soviet

satellites, especially at a social level, although this was not their only achievement. Poland

is a good example in that sense. Polish society engaged, at various levels, in a strong

criticism of Soviet-Polish relations which was intensified after Władisław Gomułka’s

rehabilitation and ascendance to power. He requested and obtained from Khrushchev,

during the autumn of 1956, the removal of many Soviet advisers from Poland, including

the removal of Marshall Rokossovsky from the Defence Ministry.31 Gomułka became

very popular with the Poles especially because he had the reputation of a national

Communist, with the courage to oppose the Soviets when it came to Poland’s interests.

Nevertheless, he did manage to maintain control over anti-Soviet and anti-Communist

public manifestations so as to avoid military intervention from Moscow.

European Review of History—Revue europeenne d’histoire 449

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This was not the case in Hungary, where the events of 1956 began in a similar way,

with increasing social unrest and public debates which soon gained a pronounced anti-

Soviet tone. In October 1956, Hungarians in Budapest tore down a statue of Stalin and

chanted anti-Soviet slogans. Various authors have argued that the Hungarian revolution of

1956 had a double character, both anti-Communist and anti-Soviet.32 In Romania, on the

other hand, anti-Soviet reactions were controlled by the regime and progressively

assimilated as an instrument of legitimacy.

In a recent study, Dragos� Petrescu argued that the emergence of Romanian National-

Communism can be traced back to the years following Stalin’s death, when Gheorghiu-

Dej started to promote an official discourse according to which Romanian Communists

were national, in their beliefs and loyalties, and the abuses of the Stalinist period were

caused by the ‘Muscovites’ in the Party leadership – led by Ana Pauker – but purged in

1952.33 The reasons behind this turn towards nationalism, as explained by Steven Roper,

were the need for popular support, on the one hand, combined with a decreased reliance on

the USSR for support, on the other.34 An increased emphasis on national values also

encompassed a historical component, which aimed to explain and justify the Communists’

position in power by historical reasons.35 Unavoidably, accession to power had to be part

of this historical component.

In this context, the events of 23 August 1944 gained new significance. The discourse

which claimed that the emergence of Communist regimes to power was a direct

consequence of the Red Army’s presence in Central and Eastern Europe did not fit into a

national framework. Gheorghiu-Dej made the Party’s involvement in the coup of 23

August a milestone of his national re-interpretation of the Communist Party’s history.36 He

attempted to depict the Party as the initiator of the coup against Ion Antonescu as well as

the organiser of the armed resistance against German troops. In this way, the country’s

‘liberation from Fascism’ would no longer be the merit of the Red Army, but of the Party

itself. In addition, the Communist Party would no longer appear as an instrument of

foreign occupation, but as an active and popular actor, deriving its motivation and support

from society. One of the most important obstacles encountered by Gheorghiu-Dej in his

historical re-interpretation was the Soviet opposition.

A moderate turn in the interpretations of 23 August is visible even from 1955.

Gheorghiu-Dej had to endure what he saw as an insult from the ‘Soviet comrades’ in the

summer of 1953, when the new leadership in the Kremlin summoned all satellite parties

to Moscow for discussions concerning the implementation of the ‘New Course’. After

Stalin’s death, Malenkov, Khrushchev and the other high-ranking members of the Party

leadership attempted to address some of Stalin’s mistakes, especially in the field of the

economy. Investments were re-oriented from heavy industry to the consumer-goods

industry in an attempt to appease the social restlessness stemming from low standards of

living.37 Gheorghiu-Dej met the new leadership in August 1953 and had to endure strong

criticism because of his policy of industrialisation. It was in this context that Molotov

bluntly informed Gheorghiu-Dej that the Romanian Party would not remain in power even

for two weeks without Soviet support, for it was nothing but a creation of Soviet swords.38

This made Gheorghiu-Dej terribly upset, although he was not in a position to express those

feelings.

Soon after this meeting, the discourse regarding 23 August 1944 began to change.

There was no visible sign in 1954, but in 1955, when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev

visited Romania for the anniversary of the coup, Gheorghiu-Dej’s speech was already

nuanced.39 Major changes did not appear in the next three years as Gheorghiu-Dej was

preparing for another significant move: the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania.

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For that he had to prove to Khrushchev that he was reliable, just as he did during the events

in the autumn of 1956.40 Soviet troops had a bad reputation in Romania for their misdeeds,

not to mention the anti-Russian feelings deeply rooted in Romanian society. The

withdrawal was therefore a major success for Gheorghiu-Dej as it helped boost his

popularity at home.41 At the festivities which marked the withdrawal of Soviet troops from

Romanian territory, it was the last time Gheorghiu-Dej mentioned Soviet involvement in

liberating Romania:

. . . during the secondWorld War, the brave Soviet armies, delivering a crushing hit to Hitler’shordes, also freed our country from the yoke of Hitler’s imperialism, giving a chance to ourpeople to take its fate in its own hands, stepping on the road to popular revolution and buildingits life according to its aspirations and vital interests. The Romanian people honour thememory of those heroic sons of the Soviet people, soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army,who fell in the fight to cast Hitler’s hordes out from our country’s territory and definitelyliberate Romania.42

Only one year later, the discourse was entirely different. In 1959, on the 15th

anniversary of the 23 August coup, Gheorghiu-Dej delivered another speech, at a public

meeting, where the entire narrative of events was changed. As a precautionary measure,

the fundamental structure of the narrative was not significantly altered, with only the

accent moving from one factor to the other:

The Romanian Communist Party was the initiator and the organizer of the armed insurrectionwhich led to the overthrow of the military-fascist dictatorship. The insurrection started on 23August; according to the plan elaborated by the party, Antonescu and the other members ofthe fascist government were arrested at the palace and held by a formation of Patriotic Guardsunder arrest in a house of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party.43

There was no mention of the other political parties which participated in the plot, or of

the role of King Mihai. Furthermore, Gheorghiu-Dej described the armed resistance

organised by the Party and its Patriotic Guards, as well as the claimed enthusiasm of the

people joining the fight against German troops in Romania. The speech did mention the

Red Army and its warm welcome in Bucharest, but it also implied that Communists were

already in power at the time the Soviets entered the capital. Moreover, Gheorghiu-Dej

asserted that the victorious insurrection of 23 August 1944 was the beginning of the

popular revolution which evolved from its initial anti-Fascist character to an anti-

Bourgeois character.44 It was not the presence of the Red Army which encouraged this

evolution, according to him, but the successful insurrection directed by the Communists.

A fight over interpretations

An important step in Gheorghiu-Dej’s efforts to gain legitimacy was a consistent

and ‘canonical’ interpretation of the Party’s history, relating it to national values and

minimising the role of the Soviets or that of his political opponents. A ‘canonical’ and

official history of the Party, setting the future course of all historical and political

interpretations, was what Stalin did in the 1930s.45 Starting from 1955, Gheorghiu-Dej

became increasingly preoccupied with history. At the second Party Congress in 1955, he

assigned historians the special task of compiling a new history of Romanians from the

standpoint of Marxism-Leninism.46 However, it was not only the country’s history which

concerned him, but also the Communist Party’s history.

In May 1956, a Political Bureau meeting decided that a history of the Romanian

Communist Party was essential for propaganda purposes and took organisational measures

to have it elaborated. The Institute of Party History, subordinated to the Central

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Committee, was charged with comprising a summary.47 The text itself would be written by

old Party members who were loyal to Gheorghiu-Dej and had to be approved by the

Political Bureau. It is interesting to note that future dictator Nicolae Ceaus�escu was a

member of the team of authors charged with writing the text. The Institute of Party History

was required to maintain close connections with all Central Committee sections for

political guidance and had to finish the volume by 1957.48

In the following years, the deadline for completion was repeatedly extended, due to the

delicate character of the work. The book was not only meant as a history, but also as a

textbook for propaganda. Indeed, Gheorghiu-Dej’s determination to assert his autonomy

in the Communist bloc continued to increase, especially after 1958, which in turn caused

new changes in interpretations and re-writings of the text. According to official practices,

the Soviets were asked to formulate suggestions concerning the text and this unavoidably

led to confrontations of ideas which were difficult to hide.

In the autumn of 1959, an influential member of the Party leadership, Emil Bodnaras�,

travelled to China to participate in the anniversary of the Chinese Revolution and made a

stop in Moscow to discuss with Soviet propaganda activists the content of the textbook.

Gheorghiu-Dej was very cautious in sending him, because Bodnaras� was a key figure in

the events: he was the one who instructed the Communist Patriotic Guards to detain Ion

Antonescu following the coup and was therefore directly involved in the events of 23

August 1944. The main point of disagreement was whether or not the Soviet Army

liberated Bucharest in the summer of 1944. Moscow claimed that it did while the

Romanians asserted that Bucharest was already free of German influence when the Soviets

entered.

Bodnaras�’ position was aggressive: he expressed discontent with the fact that Soviet

history books presented false versions of the events, underestimating the role of the

Romanian Communist Party and only serving the interests of the ‘class enemy’. Only

reactionaries, he added, depreciate the role of the Party in the coup:

. . . but we met with such points of view even within Soviet organizations. Even in the highlevels of leadership we meet different opinions. You remember Molotov and his outburstagainst our party, what he said in 1953. I don’t think it was then when he first formulated thisidea. This is a conception. To whom does it serve, what the reactionaries want, to prove thatthe regime in Romania is the result of Soviet swords and relies upon them and if they leave theregime will collapse.49

Instead of blaming the Romanians for underestimating the role of the Red Army, the

Soviets were now in a position to defend themselves. Bodnaras� cleverly used a reference

against Molotov, because at that moment he and Malenkov had already been purged by

Khrushchev and all Soviet activists were forced to delineate themselves from him. As

Bodnaras� recalled when he returned home, his interlocutor, M. N. Ponomariov, activist of

the CPSU Central Committee, was perplexed by the Romanian approach, for which he was

not prepared. Gheorghiu-Dej organised a meeting of the Political Bureau when Bodnaras�

came back from his visit and congratulated himself for sending someone directly involved

in the events of 23 August. Bodnaras� further recalled:

What would have happened in Romania if the party hadn’t been strong? It would havehappened like in Hungary. He said that the number of Communists who participated in theinsurrection was small as if we asked how many Communists were around Lenin in 1917. Thefact is that we accomplished something and the party had the leading role.50

At that point, Khrushchev did not have a reason to doubt Gheorghiu-Dej’s loyalty, so

as inconvenient as these attitudes may have been to them, the Soviets chose not to

forcefully impose their point of view. In 1960, the long-prepared textbook appeared,

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synthesising the Party’s official version of events. This textbook would remain a milestone

in Gheorghiu-Dej’s National-Communism.51 The textbook was a legitimating narrative

which maintained a careful balance between Gheorghiu-Dej’s needs and the Soviet

pretensions. It did mention the Red Army as a positive factor, in the sense that its

advancement intensified the revolutionary spirit of the masses and the ‘decomposition’ of

the Fascist state apparatus. Nevertheless, the initiative to overthrow Antonescu’s

dictatorship belonged to the Communist Party who called the popular masses to fight and

also organised their fight.52

Romania’s ‘turning of weapons’ against the Germans and joining the United Nations

was therefore, as stated in the textbook, the direct result of the actions initiated by the

Communist Party and supported by the will of the people, all of which were meant to

liberate the country from Fascism and exploitation. In what concerned the situation in

Bucharest, the book was very clear in claiming that the liberation took place long before

the Red Army arrived.53 Maintaining friendly appearances, the text mentioned, in

extensive paragraphs, how the people of Bucharest welcomed with warmest feelings the

Soviet soldiers entering the capital and even provided a short quote from one of

Gheorghiu-Dej’s speeches delivered on that occasion:

Comrades, heroes of the liberating Red Army, through our own forces, of the army and armedpatriots, we dismantled the nests of Hitlerist resistance, providing peace to our capital.54

It is worth noting that although the text still called the Red Army ‘liberating’, the

epithet seems rather honorary, since the text itself described an entirely different situation.

The version was deliberately contradictory: the authors stated in one paragraph that the

Red Army liberated Bucharest and in another that Bucharest was already liberated at the

time of its arrival. The book also stressed repeatedly the importance of Romania’s fight

against Germany, from August 1944 to May 1945, alongside the Soviets, especially with

regards to casting the Germans out of the rest of Romania.55 The implicit meaning was that

Romania fought against the Germans with Soviet support, not the other way around. The

Soviets did not officially react to this version presented in the textbook, as Romanian

irritability on the issue was known. To discourage such unwanted reactions, Gheorghiu-

Dej maintained an aggressive stance, by closely monitoring Soviet publications and

raising discussions on the topic every now and again.

Such an episode occurred one year later, in 1961. Moscow’s Romanian ambassador,

Nicolae Guina, in a meeting he had in March 1961 with activists from the External Section

of the Central Committee of the CPSU, complained about ‘inaccuracies’ in the Soviet

press or history books, which ‘underestimated’ the role of the Romanian army in the

Second World War, as well as that of the Romanian Communist Party. The Soviet

counterparts seemed to be reconciliatory, blaming it on the authors and their insufficient

documentation.56 Nevertheless, there was a visible attitude of disregard for the Romanian

demands, as the ambassador himself noticed during the meeting. When in Bucharest,

Nicolae Guina recounted an episode in the discussions:

When I was talking about the fact that in the journal State and Law, no. 11 from 1960,appeared some incorrect references about the period which followed 23 August, before I evenhad the chance to mention what those were, cmd. Zavolzhski asked me with an ironic smile:‘It probably said that the Red Army liberated Bucharest?’ The tone in which the question wasraised, as well as its content, determined me to take immediate attitude. I said that we neverunderestimated the role of the Red Army in creating favourable conditions for the act of23 August. Without the Red Army’s victory over Hitler’s armies there wouldn’t have been a23 August. The merit of the Romanian Communist Party was that it fully exploited thepossibilities opened by the victorious advancement of the Red Army to draw Romania out of

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the Fascist yoke and turn the weapons against Hitler. We cannot say the same thing about theHungarian Communist Party who was unable to make such a turn. I tried not to leave thewrong impression, like we would underestimate the role of the Red Army in liberatingRomania. I noticed that while I was speaking, any trace of a smile disappeared from cmd.Zavolzhski’s face.57

What Gheorghiu-Dej was attempting, due to reasons of caution, was to create the

impression that interpretations were not in opposition and that opposition was only

apparent. But appearances were not going to be maintained for long: Romanian-Soviet

divergences became public after two key moments which occurred in 1962 and 1964. At

the CMEA session in June 1962, Khrushchev laid out his vision regarding the reforms

needed inside CMEA: further economic integration through the principle of specialisation.

This meant that each country had to develop those specific branches of economy for which

it had favourable conditions.58 For countries such as the GDR or Czechoslovakia,

specialisation involved the development of various industries, while for countries such as

Romania or Bulgaria, agriculture had to be the investment priority. Gheorghiu-Dej

resented specialisation terribly, firstly because it called for an abandonment of its vast

industrialisation programme, and secondly, because it would have increased Romania’s

dependence on the Communist bloc for delivery of industrial products.59 Both

contradicted his policy of autonomy.

Romania officially opposed the reform of CMEA and the implementation of

specialisation and made its opposition public, much to the fury of Nikita Khrushchev. The

Soviet leader was infuriated, not by the fact that Gheorghiu-Dej opposed specialisation,

but because he made his opposition public.60 At the time the Sino-Soviet conflict was

gaining momentum and, as relations with Albania had already severely deteriorated,

Khrushchev did not need another centrifugal force in the Communist bloc.61 In the spring

of 1963, after the Romanian–Soviet divergences were debated by Gheorghiu-Dej in a

meeting of the Central Committee, Khrushchev sent two delegations to Bucharest to

appease him.62 The second, which visited Romania in May 1963 and was led by Yuri

Andropov, also brought a letter from Khrushchev. The letter contained many assurances

that specialisation did not involve a renouncing of sovereignty, as Gheorghiu-Dej feared,

and insistently called for a private meeting between the two leaders. Most of its content is

not of special interest to this article but, among other things, when talking about

Romanian-Soviet relations, Khrushchev also mentioned that the USSR had been loyal to

its relationship with Romania and had helped liberate it from the Germans, despite the fact

that Romania had fought a long and bloody war against the Soviet peoples during the

Second World War.63 More than anything, it was this reference which drove Gheorghiu-

Dej mad.

A special meeting of the Political Bureau was convoked to decide on an official

response to the letter, but discussions focused mainly on the references to the war.

Gheorghiu-Dej saw it as an innuendo that Romania was somehow responsible for the

USSR because of its attitude in the Second World War and had to be ‘friendly’ and

submissive as a form of compensation.64 Above all, this also involved a depreciation of the

Communist Party’s role in 1944. Gheorghiu-Dej roared against the Soviets in the Political

Bureau meeting:

Romania paid, although the Romanian people were not guilty of anything, but it paid anyway,aside from its blood and sacrifices, it also paid for the heavy conditions of Armistice; let’s talkabout the war reparations, let’s talk about the Armistice, because it was very expensive for usRomanians. [ . . . ] we paid everything, we paid and overpaid, we paid double. If this is aboutinternationalism, let’s talk about it, why should you cast blame upon a nation, a nation that

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was pushed into a war it didn’t want, when we should talk about its participation alongside theSoviet army in the liberation of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, for which it gave a lot of moneyand human sacrifices.65

Eventually, the other members of the Political Bureau calmed him down and

the response letter had a moderate tone, but, nevertheless, offered a sharp reply to

Khrushchev’s hints. The letter did not contain references to the war reparations paid by

Romania, although it did make reference to the fact that Romanian and Soviet soldiers had

fought together against Germany from August 1944 to May 1945; it also mentioned that it

was the Communist Party which organised the overthrow of the military dictatorship in

1944.66 Soon after this episode, a change of nuance occurred in the public rhetoric around

23 August 1944. On the 1963 anniversary of the coup, a speech was delivered by

Gheorghiu-Dej’s future successor, Nicolae Ceaus�escu, and was published on the front

page of Party newspaper Scanteia. After a long review of the events, described according

to the official narrative, Ceaus�escu concluded that the ‘popular insurrection’ of 23 August

1944, aimed at both national and social liberation, had been a long-awaited aspiration of

the Romanian people.

In this sense, he made a direct connection between the dreams of social equality

nurtured by nineteenth-century revolutionaries and the social liberation brought about by

the Socialist transformations which occurred in Romania after 23 August 1944.67 In other

words, what Ceaus�escu claimed was that the Communist Party pursued centuries-old

Romanian aspirations, not only Marxist-Leninist ideology. In this way, the Party was

described as a corollary of the entirety of Romanian history. Years later, during Nicolae

Ceaus�escu’s regime, this would become a basic tenet of National-Communist ideology, in

its radical, neo-Stalinist version.68 It is safe to presume that such ideas were not generated

by Nicolae Ceaus�escu alone, but were approved by the entire leadership with Gheorghiu-

Dej’s consent.

In April 1964, the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party adopted

a ‘Declaration’ explaining the Party’s position in what concerned relations among

Communist parties worldwide. It stated that each Communist Party must build Socialism

according to its specific national characteristics – an idea inspired by Titoism – and there

could be no leading or subordinated parties in the World Communist Movement.69

Furthermore, with regards to relations between Communist parties, the ‘Declaration’

emphasised that they must be based on principles such as equality and non-interference in

domestic affairs. As it was clearly aimed at Moscow, the ‘Declaration’ remained the

ideological core of Romania’s policy of autonomy in the Communist bloc.70 It

incorporated the Party’s national objectives in Marxist-Leninist terms so that Gheorghiu-

Dej would be safe from accusations of ‘deviation’.

The continuous aggravation of the Sino-Soviet split and Moscow’s incapacity to

subdue the Chinese created a good opportunity for Gheorghiu-Dej to take such a

courageous stand, as he was playing the role of mediator between the two superpowers,

refusing to take the Soviet side.71 This behaviour brought him increasingly closer to the

Chinese. As evidence of this, in August 1964, when Romania was pompously celebrating

the 20th anniversary of the 23 August coup, a Chinese delegation led by Vice Prime

Minister and Politburo member Li Xiannian visited Romania to take part in the festivities.

In his private conversations with the Chinese guest, Gheorghiu-Dej complained about

Khrushchev:

It was because of our party that Romania quit the anti-Soviet war. One of their reproaches isthat, apparently, we are reducing the Soviet army’s role in liberating Romania to zero. This isnot true; we admitted the role of the Soviet army, its merits, the help provided by the Soviet

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army, by the peoples of the Soviet Union in our struggle for liberty and independence. But forour liberty, we also fought ourselves, we were neither numb nor sleepy.72

Li Xiannian expressed his sympathy for the Romanian cause and told Gheorghiu-Dej

that Romania’s role in the war, after August 1944, was known even in China. It is clear that

the Romanian Communists were not looking to improve their image only at home, but also

abroad. In Gheorghiu-Dej’s opinion, China’s support would have counterbalanced Soviet

pressures and it was important for him to have his party regarded as an active, dynamic

factor in the World Communist Movement, with a voice of its own. As he mentioned

himself, Gheorghiu-Dej was not interested in denying the Soviet Army’s role in Romania;

he was only trying to improve his party’s position in the narrative of events. In order to

achieve this, he claimed it was not sufficient: he needed to obtain approval from other

parties for his version, because this was an implicit recognition of the Party’s

revolutionary merits and placed his party in an honourable position in the World

Communist Movement. Including the new version of the narrative in domestic propaganda

was only one part of the complex goals pursued by Gheorghiu-Dej.

This statement is demonstrated by the fact that, after 1963–4, the Romanian

Communists brought up the issue in their talks with just about any Communist Party, not

only the Soviets or the Chinese. A good opportunity for this was the 20th anniversary of the

coup, celebrated in 1964, when numerous Communist delegations visited Romania.

During talks with a delegation of the French Communist Party, Nicolae Ceaus�escu brought

up the issue of 23 August, recounting:

The Soviet army arrived in Bucharest on 29–30 August 1944, when Hitler’s armies wereliquidated in Bucharest, by Patriotic Guards in cooperation with the Romanian army [ . . . ]which strengthened our party’s authority and built a base for action and for the successes ourparty had obtained.73

On the same occasion, Gheorghiu-Dej received a Cuban delegation and described the

events in the same way:

We were not a large party, but we guided ourselves by revolutionary spirit, prestige andexperience, we had a plan, we were aware of our historical mission, although the adversaryhad underestimated us. [ . . . ] when they expected less, that’s when they were grabbed by theirnecks and we arrested the Antonescu government, who was in our hands the whole time. Wehad the capacity to come to power alone, without combinations with other parties. But wedidn’t want to.74

The festivities organised on the occasion of 23 August 1964 were pompous, and were

an attempt to impress all delegations. This way, Gheorghiu-Dej claimed a revolutionary

past that his party did not have.

The epic of 23 August served multiple purposes. Connecting the Party to the nation’s

history was one element, and aimed to produce domestic legitimacy. However, the

evolution of Romanian–Soviet relations brought new challenges to which Gheorghiu-

Dej had to respond. Opposing the Soviets on the issue of specialisation and claiming its

autonomy in the Communist bloc required different strategies and approaches, among

which the Party’s prestige was vital. Only a Communist Party which had real

revolutionary experience could claim the right to decide on the model of Socialist

construction, as was stated in the Declaration of 1964. In addition, opposition to Moscow

could only have been successful if Romania could rely on China as a counterbalance.

But, then again, only a Communist Party with prestige and revolutionary experience

could assume the right to mediate between the two Communist superpowers. It was

precisely a revolutionary past that the Romanian Communist Party did not have, as it was

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nothing more than a divided and factional section of the Comintern in the inter-war

period. This way, reinterpreting the events of 23 August 1944 served the Party’s

purposes both at home and abroad, thus explaining the energy involved when the Party

confronted the Soviets on this issue.

Conclusions

The Romanian Communist Party was described by political scientist Vladimir

Tismaneanu as a ‘political sect’ formed in the underground of Romanian political

life.75 Romania did not have a strong workers’ movement before the Second World War

and Marxism had little impact on Romanian political thinking. The Communist leadership

was dominated by factional struggles and there was a terrible instability in power, which

can account for the Party’s complete obedience to the Soviet Union. When, in the

aftermath of the war, the Party found itself propelled to power by Stalin, it was still an

outsider in Romanian political life. Its ideology did not seem to have any impact on

Romanians and everyone saw in the Communists exactly what they were: Stalin’s

instrument in Romania. During Stalin’s years, while the Party was weak and Soviet

pressures strong, the Romanian Communists accepted this situation for what it was. The

only concern at the time was avoiding the fatal epithet of ‘Titoist’. But after Stalin’s death,

when Moscow granted its satellites a larger space to manoeuvre, coming to terms with

society became a priority for Gheorghiu-Dej.

Striving to find a place for the Communist Party in Romania’s recent history,

Gheorghiu-Dej’s regime anchored itself to the only event in which the Party had a

role: the overthrow of Ion Antonescu’s military dictatorship on 23 August 1944.

Rewriting the events became one of the focal points of the Party’s legitimating

narratives, which aimed to explain and justify its position in power. Reinterpretations

varied for a long period of time, according to the evolution of Romanian–Soviet

relations as well as to Gheorghiu-Dej’s capacity to claim autonomy in the Communist

bloc. In either case, the events of 23 August were only a source of political and

ideological justification and all narratives eluded the historical truth, as much as it

could have been retraced.

Reinterpretations began with denying the king’s role in the events, as well as that of

any other party. The 23rd of August was described as the starting point of a Socialist

revolution which transformed the country, aligning it with the Soviet model. The main

question which arose was who organised this starting point and what the triggering force

was. In the context of the Soviet–Yugoslav split, all the credit was ascribed to the Red

Army, as official Soviet explanations dictated. As pressures grew weaker after 1953,

Gheorghiu-Dej challenged this version, claiming the status of initiator for his own party.

This served as part of the regime’s legitimating efforts, attempting to find a place in

Romanian history for the historically frustrated Communist Party. Later on, as Gheorghiu-

Dej entered onto a collision course with Moscow, the events of 23 August increased in

significance, as a tool of demonstrating the Party’s revolutionary past and building its

prestige in the World Communist Movement.

This article demonstrates the way in which historical facts were reinterpreted and used

by propaganda so as to serve specific political purposes, whether domestic or foreign. The

epic of 23 August was a milestone in the legitimating narratives of Romanian National

Communism and would remain so during Nicolae Ceaus�escu’s years in power, after 1965.

Reinterpretation of the events of 23 August served two purposes: legitimacy at home and

autonomy in the Communist bloc.

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research,CNCS – UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-1056.

Notes

1. Haynes and Rady, In the Shadow of Hitler, 291. http://books.google.ro/books?id¼ILRJ2ChennYC&dq¼antonescu%27sþrefusal&hl¼ro&sitesec¼reviews.

2. Weinberg, A World at Arms, 789.3. Mitcham, The German Defeat in the East, 1944–45, 183–4. See also Deletant, Hitler’s

Forgotten Ally.4. Wettig, Stalin and the Cold War in Europe, 244.5. Lucret�iu Patras�canu was the PCR’s contact with the king and the other political parties

involved in the coup. But he was far from being the Party’s leader. S�tefan Foris� was officiallyappointed by the Comintern, but earlier that year Foris� had been “deposed” by a plot organisedby Gheorghiu-Dej, leader of Communists in prison. A temporary leadership was established, inthe absence of any contact with the Comintern. Gheorghiu-Dej managed to escape from prisonshortly before the coup, although he was not directly involved in it. After August 1944, twogroups appeared to compete for Party leadership: the Communists in Romania, imprisonedduring the war and led by Gheorghiu-Dej, and the Communists in Moscow, who returned homewith the Soviet Army after August 1944, led by Ana Pauker. The coup of 23 August 1944,organised in the absence of Communists in Moscow, was used by Gheorghiu-Dej as ajustification of his claims to party leadership. Detailed descriptions about the PCR’sinvolvement in the coup of 23 August and the narrative of events are available in English inDeletant, “What was the Role of the Romanian Communist Party in the Coup of 23 August1944?,” 103–18.

6. Mark, Revolution by Degrees, 6–7. Practically, the “national front” strategy consisted ofmaintaining the appearances of “bourgeois democracy” by means of coalition. See also theclassic work by Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, 169.

7. Deletant, What was the Role of the Romanian Communist Party, 103.8. Deletant, Communist Terror in Romania, 164–7.9. Raportul politic general facut de tovaras�ul Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej la Congresul Partidului

Muncitoresc Roman din 21–23 februarie 1948, 14–20. Author’s translation. All translationsfrom original Romanian documents belong to the author.

10. Mark, Revolution by Degrees, 45.11. Ghibianski, “The Beginning of the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Cominform,” 472.12. Azadovskii and Egorov, “From Anti-Westernism to Anti-Semitism,” 67–8.13. For detailed explanations, see Anonymous, “The Character of a Peoples’ Democracy,” 145–7.14. See a classic work on this issue: Reisky de Dubnic, Communist Propaganda Methods: a Case

Study on Czechoslovakia, 45. The Nazi atrocities in Poland were sometimes described as if notdirected against Jews in particular, but against Poles in general, so that propaganda couldemphasise the dichotomy between the sufferings of the past and the “liberation” brought aboutby Soviet soldiers. For details: Zubrzycki, The Crosses of Auschwitz, 104–5.

15. Nothnagle, Building the East German Myth, 162–3. For depictions of Soviet soldiers as“liberators” in Hungary, see for example Marai, Memoir of Hungary: 1944–1948, 128.

16. Deletant, Communist Terror in Romania, 147. For a comprehensive biography of Ana Paukersee Levy, Ana Pauker: the Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist.

17. Anton, “La limita devierii. Iosif Chis�inevschi s�i rezolut�ia Biroului Informativ,” 316–19.18. Betea, Lucret�iu Patras�canu, Moartea unui lider comunist, 193.19. Pauker, Cuvantare rostita la s�edint�a solemna ın cinstea celei de a 34-a aniversari a Marii

Revolut�ii Socialiste din Octombrie, 12.20. Gheorghiu-Dej, Cuvantare rostita la adunarea festiva pentru sarbatorirea celei de-a 10-a

aniversari a eliberarii Romaniei, 4.21. Stenogramele s�edint�elor Biroului Politic s�i ale Secretariatului Comitetului Central al PMR,

vol. II 1949, 299.22. Romania. Din viat�a politica. Documente 1950, 239.23. Levy, Ana Pauker, 194–220.24. Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel, 81.

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25. Jovanovic, International Economic integration: Limits and Prospects, 387.26. Petrescu, “Community Building and Identity Politics in Gheorghiu-Dej’s Romania (1956–

1964),” 416.27. Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State, 11.28. Barker, Legitimating Identities, 6–14.29. Conces, “Book Review: The Quest for Legitimacy and the Withering Away of Utopia,” 24–5.30. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, 118. Grzegorz Ekiert argued that society continuously

exerted pressure upon the Communist regimes in Europe, especially after Stalin’s death, whichgenerated positive responses in the form of reforms aimed at satisfying, even partially, socialneeds and expectations. See Ekiert, The State against Society, 3–6.

31. Kemp-Welch, Poland Under Communism, 98–9. Marshall Konstantin Rokossovsky was aSoviet officer who became Minister of Defence in 1949, during the height of Stalinisation.

32. See for example Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961, 80; Gati, Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 HungarianRevolt, 20.

33. Petrescu, “Building the Nation, Instrumentalizing Nationalism,” 528. See also Deletant,Romania under Communist Rule, 85–8. One of the accusations formulated against Ana Paukerand her group was that she underestimated and discredited the Party’s participation in the“victorious insurrection” of 23 August 1944. See Neagoe-Ples�a and Ples�a, Dosarul AnaPauker, 167.

34. Roper, Romania: the Unfinished Revolution, 29.35. Boia, History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness, 73–6.36. Roper, Unfinished Revolution, 30.37. Kramer, “The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe,”

7–10.38. “S�edint�a din 8 iulie 1953,” ANIC (National Historical Archives of Romania), fund CC al PCR

(Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party), section External Relations, dossier no.26/1953, 3.

39. Roper, Unfinished Revolution, 30.40. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania was part of Khrushchev’s peace initiatives.

Initially it was Gheorghiu-Dej who brought up the issue and, despite a negative reaction at first,Khrushchev took on the idea and the withdrawal took place in the summer of 1958. Romaniabecame the only Soviet satellite in which there were no Soviet troops stationed. In order toobtain this “favour”, Gheorghiu-Dej tried to gain Khrushchev’s confidence, especially througha very submissive attitude. Moscow also appreciated Romania’s stability in the context of theHungarian revolution of 1956 and also Gheorghiu-Dej’s direct involvement in theorganisational measures which followed the Soviet intervention in Hungary. It was inRomania that Imre Nagy was detained for two years before his staged trial. On the withdrawalof Soviet troops from Romania, see Falls, “Soviet Decision-Making and the Withdrawal ofSoviet Troops from Romania.”

41. For a comprehensive study regarding the stationing of Soviet troops in Romania, see Hlihorand Scurtu, The Red Army in Romania. A large collection of documents on this topic waspublished in Romania Scurtu, Romania. Retragerea trupelor sovietice 1958.

42. Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole s�i cuvantari decembrie 1955 – iulie 1959, 496.43. Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole s�i cuvantari august 1959 – mai 1961, 9.44. Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole s�i cuvantari 1961, 11.45. Zakharovich Rogovin, Stalin’s Terror of 1937–1938, 426.46. Georgescu, Politica s�i istorie, 17.47. “Nota a Direct�iei Treburilor a CC al PMR,” ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery,

dossier no. 56/1956, 18.48. “Nota a Direct�iei Treburilor a CC al PMR,” 19.49. “Stenograma s�edint�ei Biroului Politic al CC al PMR din 9.X.1959,” ANIC, fund CC al PCR,

section Chancellery, dossier no. 37/1959, 21.50. “Stenograma s�edint�ei Biroului Politic al CC al PMR din 9.X.1959,” 22.51. Lect�ii ın ajutorul celor care studiaza istoria PMR.52. Lect�ii ın ajutorul celor care studiaza istoria PMR 1960, 462–3.53. Lect�ii ın ajutorul celor care studiaza istoria PMR 1960, 468.54. Lect�ii ın ajutorul celor care studiaza istoria PMR 1960, 469.

European Review of History—Revue europeenne d’histoire 459

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55. Lect�ii ın ajutorul celor care studiaza istoria PMR 1960, 469–70.56. “Nota de convorbire a tov. N. Guina cu tov. Medvedev, adjunctul Sect�iei Externe a CC al

PCUS,” ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 70/1961, 1.57. “Nota de convorbire a tov. N. Guina cu tov. Medvedev, adjunctul Sect�iei Externe a CC al

PCUS,” 2.58. Dunbabin, The Cold War: the Great Powers and their Allies, 563.59. Jovanovic, International Economic Integration, 387.60. Retegan, Razboi politic ın blocul comunist. Relat�iile romano-sovietice ın anii s�aizeci.

Documente, 190–1.61. On the evolution of the Sino-Soviet split, see Radchenko, Two Suns in the Heavens.62. Dan Catanus�, “Romania s�i schisma sovieto-chineza, V. Demersuri sovietice, 1963,” 165.63. “Stenograma s�edint�ei Biroului Politic din ziua de 5 iunie 1963,” ANIC, fund CC al PCR,

section Chancellery, dossier no. 25/1963, 15.64. “Stenograma s�edint�ei Biroului Politic din ziua de 5 iunie 1963,” 15–16.65. “Stenograma s�edint�ei Biroului Politic din ziua de 5 iunie 1963,” 15.66. “Tovaras�ului Nikita Sergheevici Hrus�ciov, Prim-secretar al CC al PCUS,” ANIC, fund CC al

PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 25/1963, 33–4.67. Scanteia, 23 August 1963.68. Details about this ideological evolution are found in Verdery, National Ideology under

Socialism, 216–23; Fischer, Nicolae Ceaus�escu: A Study in Political Leadership, 169–71. Seealso: Boia, History and Myth, 77–82.

69. Tismaneanu, Stalinism Revisited, 420. Full text of the Declaration: Declarat�ie cu privire lapozit�ia Partidului Muncitoresc Roman ın problemele mis�carii comuniste s�i muncitores�tiinternat�ionale adoptata de Plenara largita a CC al PMR din aprilie 1964.

70. Petrescu, “Legitimacy, Nation-Building and Closure,” in Stolarik, The Prague Spring and theWarsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968, 239.

71. Radchenko, Two Suns in the Heavens, 44.72. Catanus�, Intre Beijing s�i Moscova, 367.73. “Stenograma primirii de catre tovaras�ii Nicolae Ceaus�escu, Chivu Stoica s�i Leonte Rautu a

delegat�iei Partidului Comunist Francez,” ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossierno. 61/1964, 33.

74. “Nota de convorbire,” ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 41/1964, 3.75. Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, 37. A good description of the Romanian Communist

Party’s situation in the inter-war period, in Tanase, Auntie Varvara’s Clients. For an English-language history of the Romanian Communist Party, see King, A History of the RomanianCommunist Party.

Notes on contributor

Cezar Stanciu is doctor in history and senior researcher at the Grigore Gafencu Center for the Historyof International Relations in Targoviste, Romania. He has published several articles and books onRomania’s foreign policy during the Communist regime. His areas of interest are Romanian–Sovietrelations, Romania’s foreign policy in the Cold War, and Ideology in International Relations.

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***. Stenogramele s�edint�elor Biroului Politic s�i ale Secretariatului Comitetului Central al PMR,1949. Bucures�ti: Arhivele Nat�ionale ale Romaniei, 2003.

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Deletant, Dennis. Communist terror in Romania. Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State 1948–1965.London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1999.

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de Dubnic, Vladimir Reisky. Communist propaganda methods: a case study on Czechoslovakia.New York: Praeger, 1960.

Dunbabin, J. P. D. The Cold War: the great powers and their allies. Harlow: Pearson Education,2008.

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