MYTH BUSTING SAFETY

ATTITUDES IN

COMMERCIAL DIVING A PRESENTATION BY KYRA RICHTER IN ASSOCIATION WITH

THE DIVERS ASSOCIATION

FOR UNDERWATER INTERVENTION 2015

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Whether you are or were a diver, or are running a business or working for one which employs or contracts divers, I am sure you did not pick this job because you wanted an easy job. You did not pick this job because you wanted to be part of an average. You knew it would be hard at times, you knew it would present challenges and that you’d likely have to sacrifice a lot more than “the average Joe”. But I certainly hope you did not pick this career because you wanted to be placed in unnecessarily risky situations, or because you wanted to be the one putting people in unnecessary danger. In the nuclear industry we often use the term “Special and Unique” to refer to our chosen field of work, but we are not the only ones out there. It takes an uncommon personality to take on certain professions like commercial diving. To take on the jobs that most people think you’d have to be crazy to do. There are plenty of “odd jobs” out there and plenty of “Top ten most dangerous jobs” lists. But I find only two can be compared. And I will tell you why: Though logging continues to rate as the number one most dangerous job, it’s not comparable to commercial diving. For starters the rating, of course, is based on the fatalities which occur in one year and then a calculated fatality rate per 100,000 full time equivalent workers. Note: the CDC gave logging a fatality rate of 73.7 deaths for 100K workers… tell me- what exactly is .7 dead? In addition, logging statistics include more than just the loggers or “fallers”; they include supervisors and managers, drivers, equipment operators and the wood tenders among others. That is like including every person in a commercial diving operation; in which case I am sure our own statistics would take a leap as well. So let’s just stick to the guys I’m calling “A BREED APART” and compare those. How many astronauts are out in space right now?

Yes, there’s an app for that.

SLIDE 1

How many divers are underwater right now, do you think? Not just here in the gulf, but globally?

Definiteey a ayteaoteeaea niait. anni a ee,aeaeieaewtatccup titniiaa veatfteniabeeniactop e bye

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A BREED APART

3600

0

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2000

3000

4000

Total Divers

Underwater

Total Divers in US Total Divers to Date

Definitely more than

6643

547

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300

400

500

600

Total Astronauts in

Space

Total Astronauts in

US

Total Astronauts to

Date

SLIDE 2

Twta tffeeenieaytfeap eai,abueaniteaquteeaita tffeeenie anieetni ueactoeiafetoaeaeaGeeeka ni aoe niia“Sp ceai tyte” anieetni ueia eeaoenia ni awtoeniatfao ni aiktyyi,a eeatfeeniaa veatnieaipect ye aTae a eeaniteajuiea“ aettfee”a( niteaeeaetpaeeniaotieaa z e tuiajtb) aTae a eeaictenietiei,aEnigtnieeei,ajeeaptytei aMucaaytkea agtt a tveeawtyya yitaa vea aouyeteu eatfaiktyyi,abueaa vea aipect ye afetoaeaeaoeca nitc yaetaeaeaoe tc y Tatugaaeae a eeabteaaatgay aipect ytze atccup ettniiawteaa aytotee aniuobeeatfapetpyeafetoa7bniawtey aptpuy ettni,aeaeieaewtaitoty eatccup ettniiabegtniaetaiatwa agy etniga tffeeenice aLeeaoeaiatwa tuawa eateati: Taea otunieatfaetoea ni aotnie apueatnietaeeie ecaapetjeceiaetabenieftea ieetni uei,aetaeniiueea ni actniie niey atopetveaeaeteaae yeaa ni ai fee ati,aweyy,a ieetnitotc yactop ee aetaea eaipenieaieu tnigactooeect ya tveei aTaeeea eeao ni atni tvt u yiatueaeaeeea e tc ee aetaeaeaweyy-betnigatfa tveei aBueaotiea eeaceee tniy aniteabetnigafuni e afteaeaeteawtek aa Tatugaactooeect ya tvtnigaa iabenieftee afetoaotyte e aR&D,aweatfeeniaa veaetaw teaunietyateatia ecy iitfte anni ,atveeaeaea e eiaeaeaotyte e aa ia tnieayeiia tvtniga ni aoteeaROVa ppytc ettnii,a iactop ee aeta ec eiap ie aIeatiacye eaea eaeae awtyyaa veayeiia ni ayeiiatfa niatnicytni ettniaetactnietniueactopye.aeeie eca

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A BREED APART, INDEED

NASA and private industry

• Spend millions on current research to improve health and minimize risks

to astronauts.

• Ongoing Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health (LSAH), to monitor

occupational related injury and disease.

Instead, this is our history

• In 1972 the Norwegian government sent two highly trained naval divers to professor Ruff in Germany to establish decompression tables for the Norwegian oil industry.

• The former Nazi scientist’s experiments ended with both being injured for life.

Disclaimer: Yes, we have concerned and dedicated doctors and a medical community which continues to make great advances in diver health. But are they as well funded?

SLIDE 3

Onieatfaeaeay ieapubytcy a v ty byeaieu teiatniactooeect ya tveeia ni atccup ettni ya tvtnigaf e yteteiaw ia tnieatnia1998 a16a e eia gt 16

neaea eaetoeaOSHnaeieto ee aeaeaptpuy ettniatfactooeect ya tveeiaetabea btuea3000 aBueaIa ika tu:aHtwactuy aeae aeieto eea aptpuy ettniatfapetfeiittni yiafteawatcaa niatccup ettnia t aniteae.tieatniaeaeteabttki?

16a e eia gtaeaeaCDC,abteetwtnigaeaeieaniuobeeia ni af e yte aeecte iafetoaOSHnaeaeniapubytiae aeaeteatwniaieu ai tniga tveeia e eaae eeaw ia40Xaea eatfaeaeani ettni ya vee ge Iniaeueni,aOSHnatiiue a atnieap geaNOWanRCHIVEDa tcuoenieaie etnigaea eaeae aniee e aetapettetetzeaeeguy ettniatopetveoeniea ni aenifteceoenieatniaCtooeect yaDtvtnig Inia1998aNnSna yitapeefteoe a aieu atfaeaeaeffeceiatfactiotcae t ettniatnia ieetni ueia ni aeaeteaetikatfac niceeaotee yte aTae aup ee atea2000a ni aeaenia g tniatnia2011 Inia2005aeae a t a ac e t caae yeaaieu ae tytee aeta ieetni uei Inia2005aeae a t aBea vtte yaae yeaaieu teia yitae tytee aetanieetni ueia( tuaknitw,aeae aipeni a ayteatfaetoeacttpe aupatniaetni apeeiiuetze ac piuyei-aituni af otyt e?) Inia2013aeae aieu te aeaeaeffeceiatfaee uce age vte atniaouicyeao iia ni abtniea eniite nni aeae aa veawa eatiac yye aeaeaLtfeetoeaSuevetyy niceatfanieetni ueaHe yeaa(LSnH),aetaotniteteafteatccup ettni yaeey ee atnijue a ni a tie ie Yei,awea taa vea e tc ee a tceteia ni ae.peetenice atni tvt u yia ttnigatnigttnigaieu teiatniaeaeaeffeceiatfaa peeb etcactni tettniiatnia tveei aBueaeatiatiaitoeatfatueaatiete : Inia1972aeaeaNtewegt niagtveenioenieaw niee aetageea ae atfaeaeattya ni ag iabtto,aeae aw niee aetacee eeaeaeteatwnia tveae byeiaeae aw niee aeatiaqutcky a ni acae py aitaeae abeg niawtektnigawteaa agetupatfaictenietieia

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ye ab aPetfeiiteaStegfete aRuff aTaeaNtewegt niagtveenioenieaienieaewtaatgay aee tnie ani v a tveeiaetawtekawteaaato aTae aeni e aupatnijuee afteaytfe aPetfeiiteaRuffaw ia afteoeeaN ztaictenietieawataa ao eaotieatfaatiapeeiiueeae.peetoenieia eaD ca u a Ieae keiaotnie aeta tapetpeea ni aeeatc yaeeie eca,a tu’aotgaeai a Stayee’iae ykaotnie : TaeaNnSnabu gee,aftea2015atiaoteeaea niaeaeabu geeafteaee niiptee ettniatfa14BNa ea18 1BN,abueateap yeiatniactop etitniaetaeaeaftyytwtnigae. opyei: IniaNtew ,aeaeagtveenioenieapetvt eiaiubit teiafteattya ni ag iae.pyte ettniawatcaaeefuni aupaeta78%atfactieiaetactop nitei aIniveieoenieiatniaOtya ni aG iatnia2014aweeea btuea28 7BNaDtyy ei aIniaeaeaUSaeaeae.peni teueeaftea2013-2017awtyyabea etuni a106BNaftea eepaw eeea eveytpoenieia ytnie a 2013aw ia aeecte aipeni tniga e eawteaa678Btyyttniaptuni i a160BNatfateaw iaUKatniveieoenieatniatffiateeawtni Dteiateaniee aetabeaie ee aea eaeaeao jtete atfactooeect ya tveeiawtekafteaeaeattya ni ag iatni uiee ,a ni anitwatffiateeawtni …a ni anitatnieatiatnieeeeiee atniaeaeaae yeaa ni ai fee atfaeaeieagu i?

PAR·A·DIGM SHIFTNOUN

A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN APPROACH OR UNDERLYING

ASSUMPTIONS.

SLIDE 4

Iai ateatiaetoeaftea ap e tgoaiatfe aIe’iaetoeaetaie eeaeatniktniga btueatopetvtnigaeaeai fee atfaeaeapetpyeawata taitoeatfaeaeaa e eieawtekatniaitoeatfaeaeaotieaa z e tuiaenivtetnioenieiafteaitoeatfaeaeaotieapetfte byeactop niteiatniaeaeawtey Iabeyteveatnieatfaeaeao tniaee itniiawe’veabeeniaiytwaetao keaeatiaiatfeatiabec uieaweaee ty a ccepeateaeveniabeyteveaitoeab itcao eai aI’oaaeeeaetae yka btuea5atfaeaeo

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Fteieayeeaoeaeeyya tuawa eaIa t aIacee ee a avee ab itc,avee aitopyea15aqueiettniaiueve aIaw niee afteauiaetaa vea aie eetnigapttnie;aetaieeatfaweaweeeaettaf eatffafetoawa ea tveeiatueaeaeeeaeatnik ania tuaknitw,aeaeaDnaa iabeeniavee avtc ya ni a cetveatniaeaeapuiaafteabeeeeeaeeguy ettni,afteatopetve a cctunie btyte ,a ni ae uc ettni aaYtuactuy ai aea eaeaeaDnatiaotiey ao eaupatfa abunicaatfaty ageuop agu i-a ni awa eawtuy aweaknitwa btueawa ea tveeiaw niea ni aeatnik?aaOueagt yatia yitaetatopetveai fee a ni actoounitc ettniiawteaa tveeia yya etuni aeaeawtey anfeeea yy,a150afeeeatfaw eeeaaeeeatiaeaeai oea ia150afeeeatfaw eeeatffaeaeact ieatfanfetc aa Iaia ee aeatiaiueve atniaEnigytiaa ni atniaSp nitia,atnia yyaeaeaitct yaoe t aca ninieyiaptiitbye aF ceBttk,afteuoi,aTwteeee,aIaeo tye ateaetaicattyi,afeteni i,actop nitei,aicattyi;aeaeaDnaptiee atea ni ao eaiueeateaeeiaeeptiee ate Iaeecetve a aete yatfa462aeeiptniieiafteaeatiapeeienie ettniabueaeta eeaweaa veaeecetve atveea500aeeiptniiei a

357aeepyteiatniaEnigytiaa ni a105atniaSp nitia aTaea niiweeiac oeafetoa yya etuni aeaeawtey ,aUS,aMe.tct,aStueaa

noeetc ,anuiee yt ,aOce nit ,anit ,anfetc ,aEuetpe

5 MYTHS THE INDUSTRY BELIEVES ABOUT ITSELF

#1& #2

• We’ve reduced diving fatalities to near zero.

• “Diving is inherently dangerous.”

SLIDEa5

Heeea eeaewtawatcaa teecey actniee tceae caateaeea eeaweaa vea yyaae e atnieateabteaabeftee aIaiupptieatea yya epeni iatniaatwa tuayttka eate aaOea teiate?

Stayee’iaie eeab ae ktniga abeeeeeayttka ea“We’veaee uce af e yteteiaetanie eazeet ”

Tatiatiawa eateayttkiaytkeafteaeaeap iea14a e ei aI’ aytveaetaknitwatfa ni tnieaa iat e ia iaetawa ,a feeeaitao ni a

e ei,awe’ aietyyaa veaiucaa niaupw e aeeeni atniaeaea21ieacenieue ,ateaeveniaoteeatnieeeeietnig,awa eac uie aeaea

ieeepa etpatniaeaeay ieaewta e ei?aTatugaateati,atni ee a av ieatopetveoenie,aeatiatianite,anie eazeet aTeyyaea eaetaeaeaf otyteiatfaeaeieagu i Ntee:awe’eea btueaetaie eeageeetnigatnietaeaeaeatckatfaeatia ni a tuawtyyaieea ayteatfaniuobeei aStoeatfaeaeiea eeaniteae. ceatniaea eaeae ao abeaotee-abueanieveeayeii aIatnicyu eaaeeeatniy awa eaIac niav yt ee

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GLOBAL FATALITIES*

21

17

12

1517

2021

27

33

27

44

58

46

1213

2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14

Looking good, but still nowhere “near zero”.

* These numbers are still NOT accurate but every fatality counted here has been verified. Ex: The forum in the DA had the 2013 fatalities at 36, 2012 at 63 and 2011 with 74.

SLIDEa6

WE’VE REDUCED FATALITIES TO NEAR ZERO

Offshore Fatalities Inland/Inshore

0

1

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6

7

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

OSHA

DA

SLIDE 7

Wa ea tuajuieai watniaiyt ea6aw iagytb yaniuobeei aTaeiea eeafteaeaeaUS aaTatiatianiteanie eazeet anni aeaea tip ete abeeweeniatffiateea ni atniy ni /tniiateeaf e yteteiatiatbvttui aniatiaeaeatnieabeeweeniaOSHn’ia e a ni atuei aaniagtt a iateao ayttk-aeatnika btuea2007-awteaa aete yatfa10af e yteteiaaeee-aeaeaUSaw iaeeiptniitbyeaftea37%atfaeaea2007af e ytetei!a

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IS THIS THE TREND OF A STRONG SAFETY CULTURE?

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45.0%

YES NO SKIPPED

HAVE YOU LOST A COWORKER OR FRIEND ?

SLIDE 8

Ia ike a aitopyeabueaa e aqueiettni a“H vea tuaeveeaytiea actwtekeeateafeteni aeta actooeect ya tvtniga cct enie ”aIaknitwaIaa ve aTaea niiweeaaeeeafueeaeea etveiaeaeapttnieaea eawea eeaniteanitwaeeeanie eazeet a152apetpyea niiweee aYES a(Ntee,a iatfaeaea aweao eaeatiapeeienie ettni,aweanitee aea eaeaeapeecenieatfaeatieawata niiweee a eiaa anitwajuope aeta82%!)

FOR EVERY FATALITY, HOW MANY MORE UNREPORTED INJURIES OR NEAR MISSES?

SLIDE 9

Bueaeatiatiajuieaeaeaetpatfaeaeatcebeeg aWeaknitwaea eateatiavee a tfftcuyeaetapetpeey aee cka ni ageea nia ccue eeaniuobeeafteaf e ytetei aHtwaoucaaoteea tfftcuyeatiateaetaeieto eeatnijueteia ni anie eaotiiei?a

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Oniceatfaeaeagt yiatfaeaeaDnatiaetacee eea a e b ieatfatpee etnigae.peetenicea ni ayeiitniiaye enie awatcaac niabea cceiie ab a ni tniea feeea yy,a iatnieaeeiptni enieai t a“Weaa veaniteaa a ni aniewa cct enieiatniaewenie a e ei,aweatniy akeepaeepe etnigaeaeai oeaotie kei” a Stao bea tua eeaeteaeeatnia geeeoenieaea eawe’eeaniteanie eazeet-atea tua eeatniaeaea“Dtvtnigatiatniaeeeniey a nigeetui”ait eatfaeaeafenice

DIVING IS INHERENTLY DANGEROUS

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HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN OR WITNESSED AN

ACCIDENT?

SLIDE 10

Fteaeati,aweafteiea ike a aitopyeaqueiettni:a“H vea tuaeveeabeeniatniateawtenieiie a ni a cct enie ”aOfawatcaaeaeaeeiptniieatiaaeee aTati,atnicea g tniaeeotni iauiaea eawea eea aytnigaw a w afetoa“nie eazeet” aBuea yitabegiaeaeaqueiettniatiaeatieatniaeaeaftey apeea pia ccepeatea iap eafteaeaeactueieawaeniateactoeiaetaeaeteacatieniac eeee aIa tni’eaknitwa btuea tu,abueaIaa veaae e aeaea“Taeee’ianiteatniga tuac nia taetaietpaitoeaeatnigiafetoaa ppenitnig ” Iawtekatniaeaeaniucye eatni uiee a ni atnieatfatueapetnictpyeiatia“ncct enieia ni aauo niaeeeteaevenieia eeapeevenie bye” aIfa tua tni’eawatyeaae eee y abeyteveaeatia ni awtekawteaaeatiapetnictpyeatniaotni a tuac niae.pecea avee aiateeac eeeeatnianiucye e Staeaeanie.eaqueiettniaIa ike aw ia“Ifa ei,actuy ateaa veabeeniae ity apeeveniee ?”a

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COULD IT HAVE BEEN EASILY PREVENTED?

SLIDE 11

IS THIS THE TREND OF A STRONG SAFETY CULTURE ?

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YES NO NO* SKIPPED

COULD IT HAVE BEEN EASILY

PREVENTED?

SLIDE 12

Taeagu iatniaeaeaftey ,aeaea tveeiawata niiweee aeati?aTae ao jtete abeyteveaea ea“YES”ateactuy aa veabeeniapeeveniee aWeaa veaetaeaenia iiuoeaea eaeaeao jtete atfaeaeagu iatueaeaeeeagtaetawtekawtyytniga ni aw nietnigaeta tawa eateae keiaetapeevenieaeaeoafetoatnijuetnigateaktyytnigaeaeoieyveiatea actwtekee Nteeaeaeanitawteaa nia ieeetik aTa eaeepeeienieiaeaeatnieiawata niiweee a“Nt abec uiea tvtnigatiatniaeeeniey a nigeetuia ni aeaeaetikatiawa aIaytkeao ajtb ”aSta tuaknitwaea eaeaeeea eea ppet.to eey a13actwbt iatueaeaeeea tuaniee aetaw ecaatueafte!a

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5 MYTHS THE INDUSTRY BELIEVES ABOUT ITSELF

#3

• It’s always the diver’s fault.

SUPERVISOR

22%

DIVER

21%

CONTRACTOR

14%

OTHER

7%

CLIENT

4%

SKIPPED

32%

SLIDE 13

Sta a tveeageeiaaueeateaktyye aIa tni’eaknitwa btuea tuabueaIaa veaee af eaettao ni atnict enieaeepteeiawatcaapttnieaityey aetaeaea tveea iaeaeatniy aeeiptniitbyeap ee aTaeeeatia ayteatfa eb eea btueawatatiaeeiptniitbyeatniceaeaea cct enieaa iaa ppenie aIaa a aetugaaetoeawteaaeaeaeeiuyeiaetaeaeaqueiettniaIaptie : “Inia tueatptnittni,awataw iaotiea cctunie byeatniaeaea cct enie?”aI e yy a yyaeatieawata niiweee a eiaetawtenieiitniga niatnict enieateaytitniga afeteni aiatuy aa veaa a aeeiptniieaetaeati,abuea ayteatfapetpyeaiktppe aeatiafteaitoeaee itni a Tatugaaeaea niiweeaietyyaiuppteeiaeaeatptnittniaea eaeaea tveeateaiupeevtiteatiauiu yy aotiey aetaby oe,aeaeeeaw ia aieetnigaiuppteeaftea cctunie btyte atfaeaeactniee cetea ni acyteniea iaweyy anni aeatiatia aetugaaqueiettni,abec uieaIakepeateaitopyeaita t aniteaa veawetgaee a niiweeiawaeeeaweactuy a iitgniap eeatfaeaeaby oeaetatniea ni ap eeaeta niteaeea ia tuawtyyaieeatnia niteaeeaqueiettniaiateey anni aIa oteaIaw ia eaf uyeaaeeeabec uieawea yyaknitwaea eatnia nia cct enieateaevenieajuieaytkeaeaeeea eea yw ia afewactnieetbuetnigac uiei,aeaeeea eea yita actobtni ettniatfapetpyeawatac niabea cctunie bye,a ni aeaeactooenieiaiecettni,aia ee avee aptweefuya ni actopeyytnigae. opyeiatfa cct enieiawatcaacye ey a eotniiee eea actobtni ettniatfaf cetei a Taeaeeueaatiawaenia nia cct enieatccueiaeaeeeatiauiu yy anitatnieaitnigyeaeyeoenieawatcaac niabeaityey aby oe anni aeatiage paa eotniiee eeiaea e,a iaoucaa iawea taeeni aetai a“teaw iaeaea tvee’iaf uye”,ateatiauiu yy a actobtni ettniatfaewtateaotee aNtee auni eeateaeeaweeeaequtpoenieaf tyueei,a ni a aeeituni tnigacetetqueatniaptteactoounitc ettni a

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5 MYTHS THE INDUSTRY BELIEVES ABOUT ITSELF

#4

Accidents mostly happen to young, untrained,

inexperienced divers.

SLIDE 14

Taeaqueiettniatfaee tnitniga ni ae.peetenicea yitactoeiaupa ayte aaWea eeiie aeatia“o ea”awteaaitoeab itca

eotge patc yaqueiettnii

5 MYTHS THE INDUSTRY BELIEVES ABOUT ITSELF

#4

Accidents mostly happen to young divers.

A random sample (40)of

(251)fatalities from 2002-2014 yielded an average

age of 37.

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WHAT IS YOUR AGE RANGE?

SLIDE 15

Nteeaea eaweaa veaitoty eteteiabeeweeniaeaea geatfaeeiptni enieia ni aeaea geatfaotieaf e ytetei aFteaeatia vee ge,aIaettka ae ni toai opyeatfaeaea geiatfa40atueatfa251agytb yaf e ytetei aTaeaoe nia geafteaf e yteteiaw ia37 aTaeaoe nia geatfaeatieawata niiweee aeaeaiueve aw ia43

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TRAINING

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DID YOU ATTEND A DIVE SCHOOL?

SLIDE 16

nike atfaeae a eeeni e a a tveaicattyaeaea niiweeaw ia yitaptitetvey a ei Bueajuieaknitwtnigaeae awenieaetaicattyatini’eaenituga aWea taeeni aetaoeniettniay ckatfaee tnitnigatfeeniatnia ticuiittniatfaeveniei aneea tveeiaeveniagttnigaetapetpeeaicattyia ni aeecetvtnigapetpeeaee tnitnig?

TRAINING

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COMMERCIAL DIVING ACCREDITATION

SLIDE 17

nccte tnigaetaeati,a ei aTaeaicattyiaa veaitoeaiteeatfab cktniga ni aeectgnitettniafetoaanDCI,aIMCn,anDnS,aHSE,aDCBCa otnigateaeei a

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5 MYTHS THE INDUSTRY BELIEVES ABOUT ITSELF

25% of these are Military trained.

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

100.0%

YES NO SKIPPED

DID YOU HAVE PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE?

SLIDE 18

nni aniteeaea ea ayteatfaeaeateaeeia ni anitiafetoaeaeapeevttuiaiyt eaweeeaNnVY,aROYnLaNnVYa ni aotyte e a tveei,aitaeae aietyyaeecetve aee tnitniga ni aa apeevttuiae.peetenice aania t ao ni ateaeeaeeiptni enieiawataa ae.peetenicea iaeeni eeia ni a ppeenietceiafteae. opye,atniac ieao ni atfa tuaietyya tni’eaeatnikaSCUBnae.peeteniceactunieia iapeevttuiae.peetenicea

EXPERIENCE

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

40.0%

45.0%

1-5 5-8 8-10 10-15 20+ SKIPPED

YEARS

How long have you been a diver?

SLIDE 19

Inieeeeietnigy ,aeaeao jtete atfaeaeaeeiptni enieiaa vea ayteatfae.peetenicea iactooeect ya tveei aaIniaeatiac ie,aIaw iavee aa pp aetaieeaea eaweaietyyagtea ayteatfa niiweeiafetoaeaeanieweeagu i aI’ aytkeaetaeatnikaea eaeatieawat

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aettkaeaeaetoeaeta niiweeaeatiaiueve awtuy a yitabeaoteeaytkey aetaipe kaupawaeniaeae aieeaitoeeatniganiteabetniga tnieaetgae a

EXPERIENCE VS. TRAINING

SLIDE 20

5 MYTHS THE INDUSTRY BELIEVES ABOUT ITSELF

#5

The last thing Divers want is more regulations.

0

1

2

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5

Main cause Contributed

strongly

Partly the

cause

Did not

contribute at

all

Did not

matter

All Regions

Lack of Training

Lack of Experience

Lack of Supervision

Poor Safety

Poor Regulations

“#1 problem in Commercial Diving: weak regulations with no enforcement. #2, Poor communications skill throughout the industry.”

SLIDE 21

Ntwafteatnieatfaeaeaotieatoptee nieaqueiettnii aIatfeeniaae ea eb eeia btueaeeguy ettni aIaa veaae e a ni aee atptnittniapteceiawatcaai aea eaeaeay ieaeatnigaweaniee atiaoteeaeeguy ettni aIaee yy awtni eee atfaotieapetpyeafeeyaeatiaw a

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Iafteatniea oanitea af niatfa ueatete aIa tni’eaee yy aytkeabetnigactniiee tnie ateawtektnigatnia aiufftc etnigaenivtetnioenie,a ni aIa tni’eaoe niauni eew eee aTatugaaIawtekatniaeaeaniucye eatni uiee ,aIafeeyaeaeaeeguy ettnii,apetce ueeia ni apetceiieiaIawtekab a eeaeiieniet yafteactniitieenic ,afteactnietniute atfapetceiieia ni aqu yte awteka ni afteaee ce btyte atfa ee iafteatopetveoenie aStatniaeeg e aetaeaeaqueiettniatfaeaeawtenieiie a cct enie,aIa ike awa eaeaeao tnia ni actnieetbuetnigac uieiawaeeea ni awatcaa t aniteaa veaeeyev nice Taea niiweeiaweeeavee atnieeeeietnig aIaeni e aupaa vtnigaetacee eea niatni tvt u yage paafteaeaea niiweeiawatcaac oeatniaSp nitiaafetoaeaeaEU aBueaFteieaeaeagytb yaiueve Taeaeeituni tnigao tniac uieaw iaptteai fee aSeetnigy actnieetbuetnigaw iay ckatfaiupeevtittni anap eet yac uieaw iay ckatfae.peetenice aInieeeeietnigy ,aee tnitniga ni aeeguy ettnia t aniteaeveniaenieeeaeaeaptceueeafteaeaeieaeeiptni eei a (Ntee,atniaeaeaftyytwtnigage paiaeaea1-5a tuaieeatia ia niae i avtiu yaeefeeenicea iawaenia ike a“Onia aic yeafetoa1-5awteaa5abetnigaotieatoptee niea ni a1abetnigaye ieatoptee nie”)

5 MYTHS THE INDUSTRY BELIEVES ABOUT ITSELF

#5

The last thing Divers want is more regulations.

0

1

2

3

4

5

Main cause Contributed

strongly

Partly the cause Did not

contribute at all

Did not matter

EU RESULTS

Lack of Training

Lack of Experience

Lack of Supervision

Poor Safety

Poor Regulations

SLIDEa22

Bec uieaeaeatnieenieatfaeaeaDtveeianiitct ettniatiaetatnicyu eactooeect ya tvtniga etuni aeaeawtey ,aeaeieaeeiptniieiafetoa aeegttniateaeeaea niaeaeaSe eeia eeatoptee nieaenitugaaeta eieevea eeeniettni IniaEUaeaea niiweeiaweeea tffeeenie aSupeevtittnia ni aS fee aweeeaete a iaeaeao tniac uie abueaTaeaieetnigactnieetbueteaw iaptteaeeguy ettnii aL ckatfaee tnitnigaw iaeteaeea ap eet yac uieateatea t aniteao eeee aL ckatfae.peetenicea t aniteao kea a tffeeenice

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SUPERVISION AND SAFETY

* Except Spanish speaking EU

0

1

2

3

4

5

5 Main cause

4 Contributed strongly

3 Partly the cause

2 Did not contribute

at all

1 Did not matter

0

1

2

3

4

5

5 Main cause

4 Contributed strongly

3 Partly the cause

2 Did not contribute

at all

1 Did not matter

All Regions*

Spanish Speaking EU

SLIDE 23

OUR GOALS

1.Regulation

2.Education

3.Communication

SLIDE 24

Peea piaeatiatiawaeeeaweaniee aetaftcuiatueaeffteei aBueaeatia teiatnicyu eaee tnitnig aTe tnitnigaSupeevtitei,aDtveei,aCytenieia ni aCtniee ceteiaetapetvt ea ai feawtekaenivtetnioenieaftea tvtnig aTe tnitnigaeatieatniaeaeatni uiee aeta taeaeaetgaeaeatnig,aetaknitwai fee aeeguy ettniia ni aftyytwaeaeo,abec uieateatini’eaea eawea tni’eaniee aoteeaeeguy ettniate’iaea ea yyaeaeaeeguy ettniaeevtittniia ni aup eeiawtni’eao eeeeatfapetpyea eeaniteatnifteoe atfaeaeo,aee tnie aetaknitwaeaeoa ni aftyytwaeaeo anni aea eatnivtyveianiteatniy aee tnitnig,abueactoounitc ettni a

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TIME TO BREAK THE PARADIGM!

The most dangerous phrase in the language: “We’ve

always done it this way.” Rear Admiral Grace Hopper

SLIDE 25

THANK YOU

KYRA RICHTER, BOARD MEMBER, DIVERS ASSOCIATION

PARTNER, NEDCON INTERNATIONAL

SLIDE 26

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Commercial Diving Safety Survey Comments from respondents

#1 problem in Commercial Diving: weak regulations with no enforcement. #2 Poor communications skill throughout the industry.

There is always room for improvement where safety is concerned, we have had close calls but thankfully no Fatalities.

We need minimum 4 man teams on all dive sites in the US. Please, please, please.

North sea incident diver died coming back to bell after reporting breathing difficulties. Old tired system/bell that was too small/inadequate. Lack of proper fitting neck damns and lack of saturation experience all contributing factors. Although safety culture was present, major and basic safety factors were overlooked with: 'that's the way it’s always been done' attitude from management.

Contractors have concealed incidents, often with the clients’ assistance. This practice appears to allow them to celebrate longer periods without lost time incidents. This appears on their Corporate Resume to their benefit.

The incident was why I became a commercial diving instructor so that no one else would make the same mistakes.

Regardless of the fact that this particular accident was not related to regulations, 1910 subpar To is so narrowly focused and unhelpful to real issues requiring guidance it is almost laughable

Sometimes I believe you can have so many safety rules, it makes the job impossible or more

dangerous.

Before commencing operation dive, always carry out risk assessment or job safety analysis as a mandatory in details and specific as a prevent from injury, incident or accident.

Diving safety is still of no priority to most contractors, clients or divers. What are regulations for if following them is an option, but not a must? Example IMCA. Incompetent supervisors, superintendents, and clients seems to be normal. The lowest bidder gets the job; the result is death and injuries.

There is a lot of "brave" behavior amongst divers. Besides, dive supervisors rarely interfere if they see anything wrong or that could get wrong. Or maybe they just don't see?

The closest I've come was a diver that panicked and we brought him up, all was good. Most of my diving is in Canada working for reputable companies and feel quite safe in how operations are done. If only it was like this everywhere.

Too much rests on the supervisor. Even project related issues not directly under his control. While the client who is generally a sub, sub, sub-contractor is bullet proof and easily removed from accountability.

I think a lot of accidents happen because for the lack of experience of the dive personnel, improper planning and pressure from dive companies to finish the job.

Here is no international authority to report incidents to, the falling oil price will increase pressure on contractors to cut corners.

Accident was a failure of third party. Failure of pillar valve.

The boss decided to go in, he got bent, he didn't need to go in, it was all very silly, but he paid the price for thinking we're rubbish!

Three of the incidents were working on SCUBA back in the day when this was permitted.

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The main contributing factor was the yard hired sport divers. The victim had convinced the yard that he was a "master" diver. Due to the yard being near a Navy base, it was assumed that the victim was a Navy Master Diver. The truth is that he was a PADI divemaster. He selected to dive in a Desco "jack brown" facemask with no comms. He could not find his weight belt so he had his tender place him in an old Mark V weight belt that requires someone to don for the diver. The cradle rolled back and cut his airhose/lifeline and without comms, he stood in 7 feet of water and drowned because he could not get himself out of the weightbelt.

Myself due to following procedures and strong work ethics also very thankful for excellent training and Instructors I have never had an incident or my teams. However our trade needs strong control from someone like HSE but a separate organization with legislative powers and enforcement etc. but managed by Diving experienced professionals.

ADC dive supervisors are considered capable since they study and pass a written test. But the younger dive sups are supervising because they don't want to be in the water. Their knowledge is limiting and they don't really have enough in water experience to know if that junior diver is in a bad spot, since they never dove enough. I actually had a Sat supervisor ask me how long a joint of pipe was while I was walking pipe. I had plenty of experience, so he was never a factor in my safety. I know the magic word to safely, "NO". But it would seem pretty clear that inept supervisors and the lack of tenders being able to get in the water to have some real experience is a contributor to unsafe conditions.

Most accidents are caused by not following the plan.

We need to do more to recognize that divers (especially inshore divers) will not reach the pensionable age of 67. Offshore divers are not the only divers with high (work or diving) pressures on their bodies,

This is a pretty basic questionnaire of questionable value. Lack of training? Really? You allow people to work for you that have not been properly trained and assessed? I would also take issue with the "Diving is inherently dangerous etc." First of all if done properly Diving is not inherently dangerous and second of all anyone who answers that question should not be part of a dive team.

I have seen more than a few accidents and one death. In most cases it was always the contractor or client putting money or time constraint on the workers to get the job done over following safety protocols.

In this incident; the diver had little experience; but personal physical underlying health issues that had not been picked up during his Dive Medical gave rise to the event. Therefore I can't even justify saying that it was mainly the diver that was responsible. All systems was in place and all regulations well adhered to. This in the end was what saved his life.

Your reliant so much on supervisors in this business...it never cease to amaze me that if he can't be a good tender let's make him a diver if he can't dive let's make him a supervisor and when he can't supervise let make him a project manager or operations manager.

The diving industry has developed new techniques and practices for various tasks and associated rigors of diving, some being good and some have been taken to far. Proper training, standards, policies and task check off lists are necessary control measures to mitigate and communicate the risks.

in short , every dive is different with what you did in past. what more important is to avoid any incident is communication & understanding of job by both diver & supervisor and follow mutually agreed procedure as per situation on site. not the cut copy paste method statement written in office.

Need rigorous training to become a commercial diver.

It's time the diving community as a whole took back our craft from big business.

survey fails to allow for poor communication as a cause. Poor communication is in my opinion the most frequent cause.

SINCE THE RISK ASSESSMENT STARTED COMMERCIAL DIVING ACCIDENTS ARE ALMOST CONTROLLED

We have not had a new' diving accident in 30 years, we just keep repeating the same mistakes.

The only safety issue with diving in the gulf is mother nature and Dive Company Management. I can control the Cheap Diver or friend of whomever as much as I can control a manta ray or rogue wave. Safety cost (life or money) Their chose not mine. So I say to the penny pinchers 30-50k extra or

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whatever it cost for the right man. Or pay with the wrong man life and millions in law suit and your company losing business.

So many times saftey goes out the window when deadlines have to be met or a job is hard bid and we get behind. Yes ultimately anyone can call an all stop but it's my belief many guys are scared of the backlash that would cause their careers.

I start my career as a freediver collector on the fishing industry and them I jump to surface supplied on huka system, every diver has their own gear at the time. That kind of diving was safer than more companies now at days, as they have the appropriate gear but they don´t know how or they don´t want to use it.

A friend was killed in a trench collapse.

In 1981, when this fatality occurred, the same regulations that are mostly still in place today were not generally known and enforcement was nonexistent (in the port of L.A. and L.B. CA). But no amount of regulation would have prevented the death.

I have been lucky in not witnessing any real accident, but I have seen and been involved I plenty of near misses, most due to lack of experience, but some due to supervisor, contractor and also crane operator

The diver is the Job-Boss, and if he isn't, he'd better think like he is. All the accidents I've seen, are Diver Fault.... not keeping the entire scene under scrutiny. I look at everyone, guy mixing gas smoking a cigarette, the tender who's been assigned to me, the vessel, the skipper, the condition of the gear, from fuel, compressor, air lines, all of it. If you don't... it's your fault.

IMCA needs to accept ADCI, just like ADCI recognizes IMCA, furthermore there are far too many no skilled "divers" working in the industry, especially here in Florida, lastly the cheapest bid is not the right way, clients and contractors are making big bucks on the backs of those in the water when in fact those folks in power have no idea what it takes to do the job let alone the risks.

In 30+ years as a commercial diver I have witnessed far too many accidents and even a number of diving fatalities. In my humble opinion, the main causes of the accidents that resulted in fatalities that I know about has been due to completely overriding, overlooking or ignoring proper safety measures by the contractor or client and also the lack of proper supervision and planning for the dives that unfortunately ended in death to the divers. Ignoring safety measures and a lack of safety measures in place before, during and after the dives has been the direct cause of the diver fatalities in the cases I can think of. It had nothing to do with the diver's lack of training or experience or even any existing regulations that are, or were, in place. The divers were killed by the contractor or client or supervisors who forced the diver to work under dangerous situations and questionable conditions, totally ignoring proper safety measures and safety regulations in order to get the work finished and the job done on time. It is my opinion that the only way the divers could have prevented these accidents and deaths from happening is by refusing to have dived in the first place under those conditions. But then another diver would have been "obliged" or coerced into going down to complete the work and then that diver would have been killed instead. I'm not saying this because I'm still alive and still active and just an angry diver wanting to defend the divers who got hurt or lost their lives. But simply because nearly all of the diving accidents that I can think of were caused by either rushing to get the job done too quickly and the subsequent underlying lack of safety measures employed by the contractor or client, or the lack of proper supervision and planning to get the job done safely, as well as quickly and on time. Diving jobs very often have to be done quickly under difficult circumstances and rushing to get the work done quickly means that the safety aspect of the dive is all too often overlooked or ignored. There have been some minor accidents where the diver's lack of experience and training may have partly contributed to an accident, but in my opinion the vast majority of accidents and deaths have been down to cutting safety procedures and cutting safety corners and trying to rush to get the diving work done to save the client or contractor time and money. Diving to get the work done under pressure from the contractor or client or supervisor in order to get the work done quickly and without proper safety measures in place and without proper planning has led to so many accidents and caused so much injury and death to the divers. In the past 30 years I have often been coerced or been forced and "obliged" to dive in unacceptable and questionable, dangerous situations and conditions, cutting safety corners in order to save the contractor time and money. But in recent years I have just learnt to say NO. Perhaps that's why I'm still alive when so many of my friends are not.

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Companies like Dulam Int are flagrantly ignoring safety both in working conditions & the state of their equipment & no-one seems to want to do anything about it.

Thanks to all who give to help keep the industry safe. I am also a company president. With that said, in the 8 years we have been in business we have had 0 hours lost or any safety issues due to the training that we conduct even while on dive station.

Worked in Ireland, nobody cares about the divers, no ACOPS, no inspectors and safety is a joke.

In many parts of the world Regulation is not enforced so Clients & Contractors want Supervisor & Divers that will play fast and loose with basic diving safety.

While Safety is everyone’s responsibility sups and Divers Need to know when to say No without fear of repercussions and without having to worry about the young guys coming up behind and "volunteering" to do things that are not being done with ALL of the dangers mitigated to the best possible way of safely getting the job done.

I love diving and the work. It's the politics, brown nosing and lack of work ethic is the reason I left

There´s too much lack of commercial diving laws around the world.

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COMMENTS FROM SPANISH SURVEY

En España la situación del buceo comercial y su enseñanza es caótica y responde interés privados por lo que difícilmente tiene un standard que considero que es la primera cosa que debe cambiar También es de señalar la legislación anticuada en las normas de seguridad y el mapa de pseudo empresas que actúan sin ninguna norma amparadas por las propias administraciones. En España también existe otro problema muy grave en materia de legislación pues cada Autonomía o pequeño estado tiene normas propias haciendo muy difícil su control

In Spain the situation with commercial diving and training is chaotic and answers to private interests, for this reason it hardly has a standard, which I consider is the first thing which has to change. Also bears pointing out that safety regulations are antiquated and that companies do not follow the law and are protected by the regulators. In Spain we also have the added problem that each state has its own laws, making it difficult to control.

Tiene que estar más controlada la seguridad en el momento de

bucear.

Safety must be more controlled during diving.

En Chile, tenemos un grupo grande de buzos profesionales y deportivos y no es primera vez que suceden accidentes descompresivos aunque se efectúe un correcto uso de las tablas US Navy, creo que el biotipo es distinto, la alimentación, horas de descanso, tipo de trabajo, temperatura del agua, etc. son diferentes a las condiciones que generaron las tablas USN

We have a large number of professional and sport divers in Chile and this is not the first time we have DCS accidents even when the US NAVY dive tables were used correctly. I believe the biotype is different, as are nutrition, hours of rest, type of work, water temperature etc. which were used in generating the USN dive tables.

Es grandioso ver que en otros países el buceo es tomado en cuento con la seriedad que se mérese y es triste que en mi país nos traten como un simple obrero

Ie’iawtni eefuyaetaieeaea eatniateaeeactunieetes diving is taken with the gravity it deserves, whereas it is sad that in my country we are treated as mere labor.

Falta de legislación en gran parte de parte de Sudamérica por

ende explotación abusiva

Lack of regulations in most of South America results in abusive exploitation.

En los casos que he tenido conocimiento, los accidentes son por falta de experiencia del supervisor y presiones del contratista por sacar lo más rápido el trabajo ojala tuvieran más conocimientos antes de presionar y más perspicacia de los supervisores.

In the cases I know of, accidents have occurred due to lack of experience of the supervisor and pressure from the contractor to finish the job quickly. I wish they had better knowledge before pressuring and more input from the supervisors.

En España hay una normativa obsoleta, una formación deficiente y un gran desamparo por parte de la administración.

In Spain, regulation is obsolete; training is deficient and abandonment from the administration.

Más responsabilidad por todas las partes y unificación del

sector.

More responsibility from all, and unification of the industry.

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No hay que permitir que los empresarios recorten en seguridad. hay que supervisar las operaciones de buceo y hay que poner en manos de los que las efectúan los conocimientos y el equipo adecuados para cada ocasión.

We must not allow corporations to cut back on safety. We have to supervise diving operations and we have to give the right tools and knowledge to those who perform the work.

Muchas empresas están trabajando incumpliendo los

protocolos y mínimos de seguridad

A lot of companies perform work without adhering to protocols and the bare minimum in safety.

Hay q unificar titulaciones y hacer cumplir la normativa vigente así como el convenio....y no interpretarla cada cual a su antojo. Escueto pero sincero. Gracias.

We must integrate degrees and enforce current regulations and agreement, and not allow it to be interpreted by each to fit his desires. Short but sincere. Thank you.

Falta mucho control por parte d la administración

Better control from the government is lacking.

Si se refiere a quien sufrió daño.. el buzo ósea yo, si es quien cargo con la responsabilidad.. amigos en España NADIE es responsable.

If you mean who suffered the injury (question 13), I was diver and I was saddled with the responsibility. Friends, in Spain, NO ONE is responsible.

Tablas de buceo actualizadas a la más moderna.

More modern dive tables.

Fallas en la aplicación de la regulación, uso de equipos sin mantenimiento apropiado, desdén del comitente e imprevisión de la empresa de buceo.

Failures in the enforcement of regulation, use of equipment lacking in maintenance, disdain from the committee, and lack of foresight from the dive company.

En mi opinión, la falta de una formación adecuada es la mayor

causa de accidentes de buceo en España.

In my opinion, lack of proper training is the major cause of dive accidents in Spain.

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EXAMPLES OF OPERATING EXPERIENCE

DESCRIPTION: On December 8, 1999, during day shift the diver was in the 2C circulating water pump bay in the crib house as part of the biannual cleaning and inspection. The bay was isolated, and OOS (out of service) from the circulating water system and the service water system. Clamtrol had been placed in the water for the zebra mussel kill. The injury occurred after the bay drain valve was slowly opened .The bay drainpipe is a 14" diameter pipe which leads to the screen refuse pit. The diver was to observe adequate flow through this drainpipe to ensure that Clamtrol is coursing through the pipe to the refuse pit. This distributes the Clamtrol to all areas of the piping to kill zebra mussels in the drain pipe area, flushing them to the refuse pit. This pipe is part of the station's Ultimate Heat Sink and moves needed flow during plant accident conditions. The manpower set-up is one diver in the water with one tender on top of the bay with headset communications with the diver. A mechanical maintenance safety watch, with radio, is stationed with the tender. An operator with radio contact with the safety watch is staged at the bay drain valve located in the crib house. In this instance, the valve was slowly opened to the fully open position by Operations. The diver reported flow through the drainpipe. Several minutes later, the drain pipe flow took a step jump to apparent full flow which drew the diver, who was at the pipe opening, against the pipe opening. The diver's knee, with hand placed on top, was drawn into the opening and banged against the interior of the pipe, causing him to break his finger tip. The diver communicated to the attendant to close the drain valve, and this was rapidly accomplished by the operator staged by the valve. Once the valve was closed, the diver exited the pipe area and the bay. CAUSES: It is speculated that we had a partial plug of zebra mussels in the pipe which subsequently let loose as a result of the Clamtrol addition, resulting in the unexpected rapid rush of flow through the drainpipe The incorrect assumptions used by the original 1998 team assembled by environmental engineering which determined that the maximum flow relative to the diver would not cause injury.

Analysis: Further background is: 1. This bay drain evolution began in 1998 and this was the second time for this bay. No previous bay has seen

this type of flow volume. It is believed that the previous cleaning, while allowing flow, did not adequately break or clean the crud from the pipe internals.

2. The pre-job briefing covered the potential hi flow conditions of the pipe with the valve open, with all individuals aware of the corrective action to close the drain valve.

3. The dive supervisor and MMD supervisor were present at the job site during the evolution

[OE NUCLEAR DIVING] Diver Injured by Opened Valve and Flow Through Drain Pipe- 1999

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The drain valve is slowly opened so that the diver is not pulled towards the pipe. In this case, the diver reported flow through the 14" drain pipe after the valve was opened and then debris broke loose from the pipe which caused a surge of flow through the line, pulling the diver towards the suction of the pipe. This is the second evolution of this type on this bay, the first being in 1998, which did not create a flow volume of this magnitude. The diver, and the other workers involved, knew the potential existed for a large suction into the drain line after the isolation valve was opened, but did not anticipate a surge from the pipe due to debris breaking loose. As a result, the diver and other workers were not prepared for a surge into the pipe. All other bay cleanings in both 1998 and 1999 did not exhibit such a surge in flow volume through the drain pipe. Further background: when the original game plan was developed in 1998 for drain line cleaning, the expected drain flow through this open pipe was determined to be minimal in relation to diver harm. Similar OE Events: On November 21, 1998, a diver vacuuming the intake well was injured when his arm was pulled into a vacuum hose being used to remove growth from the sides and bottoms of the well. The station attributed this event to communication failures between the diver and tender, and the tender and vacuum pump operator.

On February 24, 1999, during work to replace ECCS suction strainers, unanticipated movement of the reaction arm of a hydraulic torque wrench removed the tip of right index finger of the diver using the wrench. Hydraulic pressure was applied before the wrench was properly positioned. The cause of this event was the failure of the tender to use repeat back communication techniques.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Immediate corrective actions were to:

1. Terminate all diving activities and interview all personnel involved. 2. Further use of the diver in the bay during bay draining evolutions is prohibited and bay cleaning work

packages are being revised. Alternate methods for observing adequate flow through the piping are being used.

3. The bay drain valve will be taken OOS as a precaution during diver bay entries.

Additional Corrective Actions: 1. Coached and counseled the environmental engineer on the incorrect assumptions regarding the determination of

potentially hazardous flow in the bay via the drain pipe. (Also performed a thorough review of all diving activities in the crib house with interviews of divers, maintenance, and environmental engineering--no other incorrect assumptions or similar situations exist)

2. Communicated the event to all MMD personnel, divers, and managers in MMD. Discussed the event about the potential for serious injuries, and the need to question such evolutions.

3. Revise all pertinent work packages, including the model WR, for all Circ bays cleaning PMs such that the isolation valve is closed and OOS whenever there is a diver in the bay.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: There was no nuclear safety significance related to this event. The injured diver was taken to a local hospital and returned to work the following day

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DESCRIPTION:

On October 5, 1998 with the unit in cold shutdown, the lead diver of a two-man team, working on residual heat removal (RHR) suppression pool suction strainer replacement, lost his air supply and was pulled unconscious from the pool. The diver communicated that he had lost his air supply and was pulled unconscious from the water by a rescue team using an electric chain hoist. The diver was unable to drop his weight belt because the dosimetry antenna had been taped to the belt and the emergency suit inflation system was inoperable due to loss of supplied air. The diver was rolled over onto his side, and regained consciousness shortly after his head was tilted. During resuscitation activities the diver received low level contamination to his hair. The diver was transported to the hospital where he was decontaminated and admitted for observation due to conditions related to oxygen deprivation.

The event investigation determined that while in the suppression pool, the diver backed into a support beam, striking his helmet and shearing off the brass nipple which attached the air supply hose to the two-way valve on his helmet. After the diver was pulled from the suppression pool, all equipment was secured and diving activities were suspended pending completion of a root cause investigation.

CAUSES:

The root cause of the event has been determined to be material failure of the tee fitting, which supplied air to the diver's helmet. The final determination for the failure of the tee fitting cannot be completed because the helmet is unavailable for inspection and testing. The cause of the actual equipment failure cannot be determined.

Contributing factors to this event included the issue that the tee fitting that was used on the helmet was not a tested configuration by the manufacturer. The manufacturer identified that the configuration was never tested because it was never requested by a user. The dive company confirmed that they have used this configuration for years and indicated that the configuration was appropriate. During the rescue effort a worker was sent to the site nurse's office in the service building to get an oxygen bottle. The worker crossed the 4-inch line boundary without using the radiation monitors. The worker informed the radiation technician on duty of the emergency and the need to expedite the oxygen. Radiation protection took smears of the areas traveled by the worker and no spread of contamination was identified.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Immediate corrective actions included reconfiguring the helmets so that they meet the manufacturer tested condition. A second air line was supplied to each diver to be used to inflate the suit. A method of connecting dosimetry antenna to diver was devised that will not limit the release of the weight belt. The noted areas where improvements were needed included reducing ambulance response time, which was over one half hour, performing a review of utility procedures, and providing recommended revisions based on lessons learned in from the root cause report. Diver bid specifications will be reviewed and upgraded as necessary. Enhancements to the diving activities included adding a second electric hoist to the lower dive station platform to facilitate retrieving a diver from either side of the platform, and improving communications

[OE NUCLEAR DIVING] Diver Loss of Breathing Air- 1998

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including a dedicated telephone line and a site radio. Rescue team members were shown the arrangement of the dive stations both inside and outside of the suppression pool. An emergency response plan was established for the dive station to include individual responsibilities.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

This event is SIGNIFICANT To The PLANT because it resulted in a near miss/fatality.

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DESCRIPTION:

Whilst conducting dive Number 16 as part of the Reactor 2 Outage work, the diver was working on the

silt removal when he asked for a pull to check his umbilical was clear to surface, which is good

standard and practice for umbilical management. When the tender came up on the diver’s slack and

pulled the umbilical to make sure it was free from obstructions or entanglement, it is believed that a

loop in the umbilical was pulled closed and caused a kink.

The diver calmly reported the loss of primary gas and had switched to “bailout” supply and was

returning to the surface.

The Supervisor opened the secondary supply from the surface and instructed the basket operator to

lower the basket. As per procedures the diver had already begun his return to the surface upon the

opening his bailout supply. Upon reaching the surface the basket was brought down so the diver could

enter and was recovered to the land surface.

CAUSES:

Apparent Cause:- 0407 – Diving Operation in a confined area

Following discussions it was concluded the likely cause of the event was due to the amount of turns in

the divers umbilical built up over the course of the diving operation in the confined area were work was

being carried out . When the slack umbilical was retrieved by the divers tender the loops which had

built up pulled tight and formed a kink enough to lower the air pressure to the diver

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

1. Safety Stand down held with contract partner – Contract Partner Safety Advisor

2. Contract Partner to carry out full investigation into all aspects of the event and file a report to the

Supply Chain Contract Manager and EDF Safety Engineer - Contract Partner Safety Advisor

3. Disseminate Initial OPEX Event Brief to fleet – OPEX Coordinator.

4. Complete Reporting of Injuries Disease and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR) return

form and notify Contract Partner Safety Advisor & EDF Industrial Safety Engineer.

5. Carry out investigation on Material Condition of umbilical cord including any supporting

documentation - Contract Partner Safety Advisor

6. Carry out task observation of diving operations are carried out on site include OPEX from this event

in the pre- job brief – EDF Field Supervisor.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

This event is NOT SIGNIFICANT. But had diver/crew not had experience, could have resulted in a near

miss or event.

[OE NUCLEAR DIVING] Loss of Diver Air Due to kinked Umbilical- 2012