Comments on Panel: Basel II and Emerging Markets Liliana Rojas-Suarez Senior Fellow Center for...
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Transcript of Comments on Panel: Basel II and Emerging Markets Liliana Rojas-Suarez Senior Fellow Center for...
Comments on Panel:Comments on Panel:Basel II and Emerging MarketsBasel II and Emerging Markets
Liliana Rojas-SuarezSenior Fellow
Center for Global Development
London School of EconomicsApril 2005
What I liked in the papers:What I liked in the papers: The explicit (or implicit) prioritization of “economic” capital
as a guiding tool for banks’ allocation of risk. The recognition of the role of markets (through Pillar 3 of
Basel II) in enhancing banking strength. Most importantly, there is consensus that Emerging Market
countries should not rush into Basel II. There is recognition about the concerns raised by Emerging
Markets, especially those related to:• The potential increase in the procyclicality of capital flows• Potential for competitive problems and distorted playing field, since
subsidiaries of foreign banks and local banks might use different capital standards.
A comment on Gerd Häusler’s paperA comment on Gerd Häusler’s paperWhile the IMF recognizes concerns raised by Emerging Markets, I view the role of the Fund as “too passive”.For example:• In the standardized approach, Basel II lowers the maturity
of interbank loans subject to lower capital charges (preferential treatment). This implies that some foreign banks will have an incentive to shorten the maturity of loans to emerging markets. Since this adversely affects countries’ current efforts to lengthen the maturity structure of foreign liabilities, doesn’t the IMF believe that Basel II might clash with the objective of financial stability?
• Improving supervisory practices and implementation of Basel Core Principles is certainly necessary, but what additional policies particular to the features of emerging markets does the IMF recommend?
A comment on Jerry Caprio’s paperA comment on Jerry Caprio’s paper Goes to the heart of an important weakness of Basel
(I and II), namely the assumption in the Accord that countries have an adequate institutional and political framework.
Makes a strong case regarding the ineffectiveness of government interventions in autocratic political systems.
Rescues the role of Pillar 3 of Basel II. But in my view, falls short in providing specific
recommendation on what emerging markets should do with their existing capital requirements at home.
What I missed in the papers:What I missed in the papers:
Two related issues:I. What is needed for any capital requirement to
work in emerging markets given their particular features that distinguish them from industrial countries?
II. What kind of alternative policies (besides improved supervision and adoption of Basel Core Principles) might be needed in Emerging Markets to effectively improve capital requirements? (Daníelson & Jónsson paper has something to say in this regard)
I. What is needed for any capital requirement I. What is needed for any capital requirement to work in Emerging Marketsto work in Emerging Markets
In contrast to industrial countries where net real equity decreased before the eruption of a crisis, net real equity growth reached very high levels in the eve of severe banking crises in emerging markets…
Capital requirements have not always constrained risk-taking behavior of banks in many emerging markets
Real Net Equity Growth in Selected Banking Systems at the Eve of a Crisis(in percent)
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
Norway
199
1
Sweden
199
1
Japa
n 19
94
Argen
tina
1993
Mal
aysia
199
6
Thaila
nd 1
996
Mex
ico 1
993
Ecuad
or 1
995
I. What is needed for any capital I. What is needed for any capital requirement to work in Emerging Marketsrequirement to work in Emerging Markets
For capital requirements to work as effective indicators of bank strength two sets of conditions must be met:
a) The well-known condition related to the appropriate accounting, regulatory, supervisory and judicial frameworks.
b) Capital requirements need to reflect the “true risk” of emerging market bank’s portfolio. And this might be extremely difficult since there are no deep capital markets that validate the quality of reported capital.
I. What is needed for any capital I. What is needed for any capital requirement to work in Emerging Marketsrequirement to work in Emerging Markets
For example, advising Emerging Market countries to continue on Basel I will continue encouraging banks to hold government paper at the expense of private sector loans, as there are no local capital markets that penalize excessive risk taking of banks
Claims on central and noncentral government as a percentage of total assets of deposit money banks
1980-1989 vs. 1990-2004*
CHISGP
MYSTHA
KOR
PER
ECU
COL
PHL
ISR
VEN
IDN
BRA
ARG
POL
HUN
TUR
IND
MEX
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Average 1990-2004
Av
era
ge
19
80
-19
89
* Or latest availableSource: IMF, International Financial Statistics (March 205)
I. What is needed for any capital I. What is needed for any capital requirement to work in Emerging Marketsrequirement to work in Emerging MarketsContinuing with the “wrong” pricing of risks in Emerging Markets, especially that of the regulatory treatment of government paper contributes to exacerbate recessions…
Economic Activity and Banks' Claims on Government as Percentage of Total AssetsTotal claims on government as percentage of total assets of deposit money banks
---------- GDP Growth Rate
Source: IMF (2002) International Financial Statistics ; World Bank (2001) World Development Indicators and private sector forecasts.
Argentina
-20.0
0.0
20.0
40.0
1997 1998 1999 2000
Turkey
-100.0
0.0
100.0
1997 1998 1999 2000
total claims ongovernment as
GDP growth rate
Venezuela
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
1997 1998 1999 2000Argentina
-10.00
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Turkey
-20.00
-10.00
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
I. What is needed for any capital I. What is needed for any capital requirement to work in Emerging Marketsrequirement to work in Emerging Markets
… and weakens the quality of bank assets. For example, previous to their crises, banks in Argentina and Turkey continued to increase their relative holdings of government paper even when the international bond markets had signaled increased “riskiness” for these assets.
EMBI Spread and Claims on Government as Percentage of total assets of deposit money banks
Argentina
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
Jul-00 Sep-00 Nov-00 Jan-01 Mar-01 May-01 Jul-01 Sep-01 Nov-01
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
Claims on government EMBI Spread
Turkey
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
Jul-00 Sep-00 Nov-00 Jan-01 Mar-01 May-01 Jul-01 Sep-01 Nov-01
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Claims on government EMBI Spread
In addition to addressing basic weakness in legal, judicial, regulatory and supervisory framework……In the Transition towards an industrial-country-like capital standard, design a capital standard that appropriately reflects the risks of banks’ assets in emerging markets. That is, modify current capital requirements to:– Initiate risk-based regulations in loan loss provisions (ex-ante provisioning
system)– Maintain a simple classification of assets according to risk but drastically
modify the risk categories.Two examples:
– Appropriate risk assessment of government paper (rather than the zero risk weight used by most emerging markets)
– Credit risk distinction between borrowers from tradable and non-tradable sectors.
II. Then, what are adequate alternative or maybe II. Then, what are adequate alternative or maybe “transitional” policies?“transitional” policies?
And, therefore, a comment on And, therefore, a comment on Daníelson - JónnsonDaníelson - Jónnson– What the authors call “currency dependence” is known as the
problem of “liability dollarization” in emerging markets.– “Exchange rate risk” becomes “credit risk” in economies suffering
from liability dollarization (see Rojas-Suárez, 2001).– While the authors’ proposal to denominate capital charges arising
from foreign currency lending in the same currency is certainly helpful to deal with the procyclicality issue, it still does not fully take into account two features of emerging markets:• Exchange rate depreciations bring a reduction in the capacity of the non-
tradable sector to service its foreign-denominated loans.• Sharp depreciations of the exchange rate are a recurrent feature in these
countries.
Together, these two factors seem to indicate that ex-ante bank provisioning requirements need to be higher for loans to the non-tradable sector.
What else can be done in the near future?What else can be done in the near future?
Enhance the mechanisms of market discipline. Lacking deep capital markets to guide supervisors about the “true” value of reported capital, information about the quality of banks’ assets can be obtained through:– Encouraging the offering of uninsured certificate of
deposits.– Developing credit bureaus.– Encouraging the development of the inter-bank market.