Comments & Corrections on Combat Statistics...COMMENTS AND CORRECTIONS ON THE CD-ROM VERSION OF...
Transcript of Comments & Corrections on Combat Statistics...COMMENTS AND CORRECTIONS ON THE CD-ROM VERSION OF...
COMMENTS AND CORRECTIONS ON THE CD-ROM VERSION OFNAVAL AVIATION COMBAT STATISTICS—WORLD WAR II
The CD-ROM version of this publication was preparedusing a scanner and Adobe Acrobat Capture 1.0 software.Several problems were encountering during the scanning andcorrecting of the scanned text. Since the document was notoriginally type set the scanning software and equipment hadsome difficulty reading the typewriter letters and numbersused in 1946. However, the major problems usually dealtwith the table headings, underlining and column lines beingto close to numbers or letters. These three problemsusually resulted in data that could not be read accurately.If a group of numbers could not be corrected they wereusually left in a digitized format. Occasionally thedigitized data would not include letters or numbers thatwere close to column lines and incomplete column lines.Hence, the quality of software and hardware available to theNaval Historical Center limited true reproduction of themonograph.
Following the initial scanning of the document thescanned and processed text was proof read several times.After each reading, corrections were made to the text. Theprimary emphasis was, of course, on accuracy and trying tomake the text word searchable without spending an inordinateamount of time making corrections and proof reading. Datathat was left in the digitized format will normally appearto be in bold and may not be the same type of font.
The monograph is being presented on the CD-ROM just asit was originally published. If there were any spellingerrors or grammatical mistakes they were not corrected.Terminology that would not be acceptable today was notchanged. The flavor of the document comes from the time itwas written, 1946.
A tabulation of commonly used words in the tableheadings is provided to help clarify words that may have nothave been read correctly by the software, could not becorrected or a letter was left off a word and could not becorrected. The following list of words or abbreviations maybe found in the monograph as a single heading or in variouscombinations: A/A, A/C, Action, Air, Aircraft, Airfield,Ammunition, Areas, Armored, Attack, Attacking, Base, Boat,Bombers, Bombs, Carrier, carrier designations (CV, CVE,CVL), Casualties, Combat, Complement, Dates, Defensive,Dest. (Destroyed), Destroyed, Enemy, Engaged, Engine,Expended, Expenditures, Fighters, Fl’ts (Flights), Flights,Float, Single, Flying, Force, Forces, Ground, Hand, Harbor,Hit, Including, Land, Local, Loss, Losses, Lost,Merchantmen, Military, Misc. (Miscellaneous), Mission,Month, Night, No. (number), Number, Offensive, On,
Operating, Operational, Other, Over, Own, Patrols, Per,Percent, Plane, Purpose, Ratios, Rec. (Reconnaissance),Reconnaissance, Rockets, Search, Ship, Sorties, Sqdns.(Squadrons), Squadrons, Strike, Support, Sweep, Targets,Tons, Total, Trainer, Transport, Transportation, Twin, Type,Unarmored, Under, Unknown, and Warships. See the booksUnited States Naval Aviation 1910-1995 or Dictionary ofAmerican Naval Aviation Squadrons - History of VA, VAH, VAK,VAL, VAP and VFA Squadrons for any questions regardingaircraft designations or aircraft class designations.
The original document did not have page numbers 12 or128. There is no page number listed in the CD-ROM documentfor the page with Table 19. The scanner did not pick upthis page number which should be 59.
THE FOLLOWING ARE CORRECTIONS BY PAGE NUMBER:
PAGE 31: In the 3rd column GHT should read FLIGHTS,
PAGE 35: In the 2nd column the last entry is blank andshould read 997 In the 3rd column the number for February-June1945 Period Total should read 48,831 In the 4th column the number for February-June1945 Period Total should read 43,383 and the number forJuly-August 1945 Period Total should read 11,494 In the 5th column the number for February-June1945 Period Total should read 14,794 In the 6th column the number for February-June1945 Period Total should read 121,302
PAGE 41: In the 2nd column the Dates of Action forGuadalcanal Support should read 10/12-10/16 and the Dates ofAction for Guadalcanal Battle should read 11/13-11/14
PAGE 43: In the 7th column under Air, the Okinawa Campaignnumber should read 1692; the CV-CVL Total number should read1563 and the Ryukyus Total number should read 1277.
PAGE 47: In the 6th column the heading should read OnGround
PAGE 49: In the 2nd column an * should be in the space for1943 Total
PAGE 50: In the 4th column the head should read OWN LOSSES
PAGE 53: The first sentence below the table should beginwith an *
PAGE 59: This page is missing the page number. The lastcolumn for Table 19, under Lost: the number for Land-Basedshould read 10.1, the number for F4F should read 18.6, thenumber for F2A should read 82.4, the number for SBD shouldread 22.1 and the number for PBY should read 35.6
PAGE 61: In the column head Sorties Engaging Enemy Aircraftwith the sub-head Number, the number for Carrier-Based VFfor 1944 should read 4127 and the number for 1945 shouldread 3844
PAGE 62: In the last column under Lost, the entries for1942 February, May, June, August and October should read11.5, 15.8, 29.7, 16.2 and 17.2
PAGE 63: In the last column under Lost, the entry for 1942February should read 100.0
PAGE 66: In the 3rd column under Grand Total the numbershould read 3019
PAGE 67: In the 2nd column, Action Sorties, the entry forCarrier-Based Ryukyus should read 37,421, for Marianas itshould read 18,747, for Western Carolines it should read10,234 and for Philippines it should read 22,323. In the 2ndcolumn under Action Sorties, the entry for Land-BasedWestern Carolines should read 11,456, for Marshalls itshould read 21,552 and for Bismarcks, Solomons it shouldread 62,628.
PAGE 71: In the 2nd column the entry for Carrier-Basedshould read 20,499.
PAGE 72: The headings should read SINGLE-ENGINE FIGHTER ORRECONNAISSANCE and SINGLE-ENGINE BOMBER and the Allied CodeNames should read ZEKE, HAMP; OSCAR; TONY; TOJO; NATE;FRANK; JACK; GEORGE; MYRT; OTHER & U/I; VAL; JUDY; KATE;JILL and OTHER.
PAGE 74: In the 2nd column under the entry for 1945 Augustthe number should read 35.
PAGE 76: In the 2nd column under the entry Grand Total thenumber should read 3518. In the 3rd column the aircraftdesignation should read F4U and the last entry under GrandTotal should read 1042.
PAGE 78: The heading for the 5th column should read % LOSTOF A/C HIT
PAGE 93: In the 2nd column the letter L should be under theheading KOREA, NO. CHINA.
PAGE 103: In the 2nd column under Grand Total the numbershould read 121,482.
PAGE 106: In the 4th column under Total the number shouldread 21,052.
PAGE 109: The two major headings should read LAND TARGETSand SHIPPING TARGETS
PAGE 110: The second major heading should read LAND-BASEDand the 4th column heading should read SBD with the secondpart of the column heading as % Total.
PAGE 111: The 3rd column (TRUK, MARIANAS) under the entryfor 500-lb. GP the number should read 197, the entry for1000-lb. GP should read 117, the entry for the 1000-lb. SAPshould read 124 and the TOTAL entry should read 610.
PAGE 113: The 3rd column (Carrier VTB) under TOTALS thenumber should read 1311 and under the 5th column (VPB) theentry for TOTALS should read 41.
PAGE 120: The aircraft designation heading after F6F shouldread F4U.
BACKGROUND ON THE MONOGRAPHNAVAL AVIATION COMBAT STATISTICS—WORLD WAR II
The publication Naval Aviation Combat Statistics—World War II was compiled during thewinter of 1945—1946 and the following spring by a group of some 30 officers, enlisted men, andcivilians headed by Lieutenant Commander Stuart B. Barber, USNR.1 The group, a section within theAir Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), had the function of IBM tabulation of naval airaction. It began declining rapidly in size as wartime coding backlogs were eliminated and currenttabulations were kept up to date, and the production of this volume soon became its principal task.
Barber personally designed the final series of some 160 tabulations for this report and wrote theaccompanying text. He was uniquely experienced for this task. Originally assigned to the Bureau ofAeronautics to develop a standardized action reporting system, in 1943 Barber designed the AircraftAction (ACA-1 and -2) forms and drafted the instructions to be used in completing them. Following atraining tour at the Navy's Air Combat Intelligence School, he served at Pearl Harbor on the staff ofCommander Air Force, Pacific Fleet (COMAIRPAC) from November 1943 until July 1945. For mostof that period, he was responsible for producing the COMAIRPAC Analysis of Pacific Air Operations,from the incoming squadron ACA and higher-echelon reports which covered aircraft carrier operationsin detail, as well as providing a monthly statistical summary and an analysis and overview of all otherPacific air operations. During the final months of the war, Barber also initiated and wrote a series ofCOMAIRPAC Ordnance and Target Selection Bulletins, as a way of highlighting the important pointsraised in the Pacific Air Operations analyses.
The report included herein was completed in May 1946, and by the time Stuart Barber leftactive duty in June of that year, hundreds of copies were in the process of being printed for distributionthroughout the Navy and Marine Corps.2 It was at this point that the document fell afoul of postwarservice politics.
In the wake of the Navy Department's ongoing fight with the War Department over serviceunification, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal had set up an organization in the fall of 1945designated SCOROR (Secretary's Committee on Research on Reorganization) to review unificationand other issues. In July 1946, SCOROR was given a copy of Barber's report for review. A highlycritical memorandum resulted from this examination. In this paper, an anonymous SCOROR staff
1Information concerning the compilation of this document comes from an interview conducted bythe author with Mr. Barber on 25 February 1989; from a copy of a portion of a draft memoir by StuartBarber on his Navy service that was loaned to the author by Mr. Barber in May 1996; and fromadditional information supplied by Mr. Barber in a review of a draft of the introduction.
2For the proposed distribution, see Naval Aviation Combat Statistics—World War II OPNAV-P-23V NO. A129 (Washington, D.C.: Air Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, Office of the Chief ofNaval Operations, 17 June 1946), ii.
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member, apparently acting as a devil's advocate, asserted that the study had been "compiled for Navypropaganda purposes" and took the accompanying text to task for containing a number of apparenterrors of interpretation. Because of the Army Air Forces' express concern over the Navy's continuinguse of land-based aircraft, the reviewer seemed particularly upset that some of the tables illustrated theNavy's extensive (and successful) operation of land-based air in the Pacific War.3
As a result of this review, Rear Admiral Thomas H. Robbins, Jr., the Assistant Head ofSCOROR, sent a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Intelligence on 2 August 1946 providing hiscomments on Naval Aviation Combat Statistics—World War II. In this paper, Robbins stressed:
(a) As a compilation of statistics it is an excellent work containing much information ofvalue to those concerned with Operations Planning. In addition it serves as an excellent source ofinformation for historical and other purposes.
(b) Page iv contains statements which, while probably not intended to give theimplications which they do, nevertheless in my opinion would reflect discredit upon the NavyDepartment and the Naval Service. . . .
(c) Many of the tables of statistics could be misused, from the point of view ofmerger [of the services], were the publication to be given wide distribution among the armed services.
In light of these concerns, Robbins recommended that the publication not be distributed at that time,although he noted that pertinent excerpts could be made available on a "need to know" basis by thehead of the Air Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence.4 Agreeing with Robbins's recommendation,ONI ordered the destruction of all but a handful of copies of the printed report, which it kept for itsfiles.
Barber first discovered this fact when he returned to the Office of the Chief of NavalOperations (OPNAV) in mid-September 1946, as one of a dozen or so Reserve Air CombatIntelligence Officers (ACIOs) specially selected to support a project set up by Vice Admiral ForrestSherman, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations. The idea behind the project was thatsuch a group of officers, possessing wide-ranging wartime experience, could assemble from the massof facts about Naval Aviation during the war material of great potential value for supporting Navypositions during the ongoing fight over unification. Each man was ordered to two weeks of temporaryduty, reporting to Captain Wallace Beakley and his assistant, Captain George W. Anderson, Jr.
At the end of the two weeks, Barber was given an additional week of active duty to enable himto pull the material together. While its final destination after delivery to Captain Anderson is not 3Copy of [SCOROR] memo entitled “’Naval Aviation Combat Statistics,’ Comments on,” no serial,29 July 1946; "A21/1-1 Navy (1917 thru July 1948) /S&C/" Folder, Series II, Op-23 Records,Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center (hereafter OA).
4Copy of memo from RADM Robbins to the Chief of Naval Intelligence, no serial, 2 August 1946;"A21/1-1 Navy (1917 thru July 1948) /S&C/" Folder, Op-23 Records, OA. Robbins had suggested inhis memo that all copies of page iv of the report be burned. This apparently was carried out, since nopage iv is present in the copy reproduced here.
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known, this material appears to have provided the main factual input to a thin, unclassified, hard-covervolume published in 1947 entitled U.S. Naval Aviation in the Pacific, for which Admiral Shermanwrote a preface.5 It contains many verbatim extracts from the material assembled by the group,including Stuart Barber's comparison of carrier and Army Air Forces air-to-air combat results.
Although all members of the Reserve ACIO group had had access to the suppressed reportduring their time in OPNAV, when a copy turned up missing, Miss Eleanor Linkous, the Air Branch'ssecretary, rightly suspected that Barber was the culprit. Fortunately, however, no one in the officetook any action to retrieve it, because this is the copy that he turned over to the Naval HistoricalCenter more than forty years later—the one from which this CD-ROM version is being reproduced.
The fate of the other file copies of Naval Aviation Combat Statistics remains unknown. Formany years, the Air Branch employed Miss Blanche Berlin, the only member remaining from thewartime coding and tabulation crew, whose knowledge was invaluable for filling special requests foraction report data from the files. But so far as is known, no broad release of statistical data from thesuppressed report has ever been made—with the conspicuous exception of the air-to-air combat datareleased in the spring of 1948 and described in the author's book, Revolt of the Admirals.6
While historians may still find the data in this report to be of great value, the fifty years of itssuppression undoubtedly have reduced its usefulness for other purposes. For example, one of itsimportant original objectives—documenting the reasons for the naval aviators' evident pride in theirwartime accomplishments—is no longer of concern for the majority of the participants.
What remains inexplicable to this day is why the Navy made no effort to prepare and issue acarefully edited version of the study, at least once the heat of the unification controversy had dieddown. It is particularly baffling since Stuart Barber served as a senior civilian employee in OPNAVfrom 1947 to 1970 and since as the report's author he was in a favorable position to have at leastproposed this course, but he never attempted to do so.
Whatever the report's current value, however, it is unthinkable that this mass of descriptive andinterpretative data covering the efforts of so many thousands of men—constituting one of history'sgreatest and most decisive striking forces—should not be released in full as originally written. One ofthe best lessons to be learned from this story may well be that rather than suppress information toprevent its possible misuse, the best course of action may be to aggressively use the information toconfound opponents, once it has been reviewed for accuracy.
-----This section, Background on the Monograph, was written by Dr. Jeffrey G. Barlow, a
Historian in the Naval Historical Center's Contemporary History Branch. Dr. Barlow is the author ofRevolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945—1950.
5See U.S. Naval Aviation in the Pacific (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,United States Navy, 1947).
6Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945—1950(Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1994), 62—63.
NAVAL AVIATION
COMBAT STATISTICS
WORLD WAR II
AIR BRANCH
OPNAV-P-23V NO. A12917 JUNE 1946
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONSNAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.
NAVAL AVIATION COMBAT STATISTICSWORLD WAR II
CONTENTSPage
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 11. General Scope of Report 12. Data not Included 13. Scope of the Data 24. Sources and Methods 2
DEFINITIONS 4
COMPLETENESS OR ACCURACY OF DATA1. In General 92. With Respect to Specific Items 9
TABULAR DATA AND TEXTUAL COMMENT
A. GENERAL DATA ON FLIGHTS, ACTION SORTIES, BOMBTONNAGE DROPPED, ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED, ANDOWN AIRCRAFT LOSSES 131. General Summaries of Carrier and Land-Based
Operations 132. Carrier Operations, General Data 273. Land-Based Operations, General Data 45
B. SPECIALIZED DATA, BY SUBJECT MATTER1. Aerial Combat Data in Detail 572. Anti-Aircraft Loss and Damage 583. Attack Data, by Geographical Area 784. Attack Data, by Type of target Attacked 815. Ordnance Data 101
(a) Expenditures, General 101(b) Bomb and Torpedo Expenditures 106(c) Rocket and Ammunition Expenditures 114
6. Night Air Operations 119(a) Night Attack 119(b) Night Air Combat 121
7. Long Range Search Plane Operations 124
APPENDIX: JAPANESE SHIPPING SUNK BY NAVAL AIRCRAFT 126
SUBJECT INDEX TO TABLES 129
EVALUATION SECTIONAIR BRANCH
NAVAL AVIATION COMBAT STATISTICS,WORLD WAR II.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1. GENERAL SCOPE OF REPORT
This report contains air combat , attack, and combat operations statistics of Naval andMarine aviation during the war. It is designed as a basic reference document, compressing intoone volume the most pertinent statistical data compiled in the IBM tabulation system maintainedby Air Branch, ONI, and its predecessors, Air Intelligence Group,Divis ion ,
ONI, and Air Technical AnalysisDCNO(Air). Certain related data from other sources, compiled on statistical bases com-
parable to those used in the Op-23-V tabulation system, have been added.
The 60 statistical tables herein are supplemented by an in terpre t ive text , t ied c losely tothe data presented. In no sense is any attempt made in this text to present a connected narra-tive account of the war record of Naval aviation. The essence of the report is combat statistics,and the s tory is to ld sole ly as the s ta t i s t ics themselves may be led to te l l i t . The story toldis a lso l imi ted to the overa l l s tory , a perspective of Naval aviation and its many components asa whole, and data for individual ships, squadrons or other units are not provided.
2. DATA NOT INCLUDED
Not all the story of Naval aviation, which could be told in statistical terms, is coveredin this report. The reasons for the omissions arise from the history and assigned functions ofthe s ta t i s t ica l uni t prepar ing the data , and from the lack of any integrated statistical organi-za t ion cover ing a l l naval a i r opera t ion . Postwar personnel shortages prevented this Branchfrom making good these deficiencies.
Naval a i r ant i -submarine warfare i s the f i rs t exclus ion. This resul ts f rom the es tabl ish-ment, many months prior to initiation of the general air combat statistical analysis program,of a special ASW statistical analysis unit, (directly under CominCh, and later under Tenth Fleet).To avoid duplication of a field well covered elsewhere, no records of air ASW activity were keptby this Branch or its predecessors.
The second principal exclusion is complete, detailed data on flights not i n v o l v i n g a c t u a laction with the enemy (for search, reconnaissance, defensive, or other purposes) , and lossessustained on such flights. This arose from (a) the prior existence of another office (FlightS t a t i s t i c , DCNO(Air)) primarily concerned with data on non-action flights, (b) the primary im-portance of devoting the limited manpower and facilities available to the analysis of actionstatistics not compiled elsewhere and (c) a lack of complete, uniform and detailed incomingrepor ts on non-ac t ion f l ights . This exclusion has been partly compensated by including in sometables herein data on total flights reported monthly (for 1944-45 only) by squadrons which wereengaged in action during any month, and non-action losses by such squadrons during the entire war.. —
These items, however, do not give a full picture of the extent of naval air defensive orreconnaissance pat rol ac t iv i ty or losses sus ta ined there in . It is doubtful whether data existwhich would permit a fu l l and accura te s ta t i s t ica l presenta t ion of th is ac t iv i ty .
A further exclusion is data on the operations of VO-VS aircraft. These operations were notregularly reported by the units involved, in a manner permitting their tabulation by the IBMcard system.
The final major exclusion is data on losses of flying personnel. Losses as reported inact ion repor ts are not f ina l , because of subsequent rescues, or return of captured airmen. Dataon these is maintained by BuPers, but is not compiled and reported on a basis comparable withthe a i rcraf t loss data herein .
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3. SCOPJ OF THE DATA
Despi te the exclus ions l i s ted , tie bulk of Naval avia t ion 's achievements , a t leas t in thePacific war, are covered by the data herein. Included are full data on all reported aerialcombat, and all reported attacks on enemy targets other than submarines, by all Navy and Marinecarr ier and land-based a i rcraf t . The following general categories of figures are provided~
Total Flights, by squadrons reporting action against the ene~
Action Sort ies
Losses and damage frora enemy action
Losses from operational ce.usee
Own planes engaging enemy aircraft
Enemy aircraft engaged
Enemy aircraft destroyed, air and ground
Planes a t tacking targets
Bomb and torDedo exwnditures on tarzets
Rocket expenditures
Ammunition expenditures.
And, with respect to each of the above itame, one or more of tie fol lowing cross-c lass i f ica t ionsof data are provided:
Carrier-based vs. land-basedType of carrierNavy vs. MarineTheater of operationYear, monthCarrier raid or campaignType or model of own aircraftType or model of enemy aircraftMission of own aircraftLocation of action, by general areas‘fype of target at tackedType of ordnance usedNight operations.
4. SOURCES AND METHODS
The rmthod used in compiling these data deserves brief description. The basic sourcematirial for most actions was the squadron ACA-1 report for each mission, or the individualsquadron or mission action report for actions prior to adoption of the ACA-1 form. Where noaction reports were available, carrier battle narratives or squadron monthly war diaries wereused. A check list of all carriers and squadrons in combat areas was maintained, and the wardiaries of all such squadrons, and battle narratives of all such ships, were checked for possibleactions in the event that no action reports had been received from any of these units.
The statistical items from these primary and secondary sources were then punched on IBMcards. The mechanical unit, for card-punching purposes, was the action cf one squadron on onemission. From the file of these cards, n u m b e r i n g sonm 48,300 in all, have COB most of thetabula t ions and cross- tabula t ions in this repor t . Additional supplenwntary files of summarycards , some 5,500 in number, prepared fran the main card file, have also been used in preparingsome of the tables.
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Statistical tabulation was begun in early 1944, starting with the air operations of January1944 and following with tiose of subsequent months in order. For 1944 operations a card systemwas used which required filling out not only one card covering each squadron on each mission,but also supplementary cards covering each separate engagement with enemy aircraft, and eachseparate attack on a major type of tar~et, in addition to the primary engagement or attackparticipated in by the squadron.
This system was eventually found unwieldy for handling the large-scale operations of late1944, and beginning with the operations of January 1945 a simplified card system was used inwhich all engagenmnts and attacks by one squadron on one mission were covered on one card. Thechange of card coding systems resulted in some lack of comparability between 1944~d 1945 sta-tistics (discussed in connection witi individual items under appropr ia te headings hereaf ter ) ,and in an inability to secure certain breakdowns of data for one year or the other. This willexplain the limitation of some tables to 1944 only, or 1945 only.
Because of time and personnel limitations, 1942-43 actions were not placed on machine cardsuntil after the end of the war, and the simplified 1945 coding system was therefore used forthese years .
Of the data appearing in the tables, all were taken from the IBM cards except the following,whose origin is described briefly$
(a) Aircraft on hand, and total flights, for squadrons in actiong
These figures, on a monthly basis, were obtained from Flight Statistics Section, DCNO(Air),from the monthly report of each squadron which reported engaging in action against the enemy(o+&er than ASW) during the month. Data were not obtained for squadrons which reported no actionduring a given month, even if they were in action durin~ the preceding or following month andwere known to have been in an active area. Thus these fi~res are not complete records ofplarm strength, patrols or other flights in war areas, but are, as the name implies, figures forsquadrons in action, directly comparable with the action data on a squadron basis. Where numbero f fl lghte~a~reported, or was obviously incorrect as reported, an estimate was made, basedon the performance of comparable units , and the squadrons combat activity. Where number ofplanes reported on hand differed excessively from normal strength and was also out of line withthe number of flights and action sorties reported, normal complenwnt was substituted. Thesefigures are given for 1944-45 only, as hey were not available on a monthly basis for earliery e a r s .
(b) Losses on”other (nonTaction) flights, and losses on ship or ground:
These figures were obtained from Aircraft Records Section, DCNO(Air), and also cover, on amonthly basis, only squadrons reporting action during the month of the loss. Thus they wouldnot cover losse= negatzve patrols by =f~n=c~s~t~,~ even losses on theground or ship to enemy action if the planes were not assigned to aduring the month.
(c) Number of Carriers in Action; Carrier Complenmnt$
The number of carriers in action was taken from action reports.on the apparent normal number of planes carried at the beginning ofcarriers of each class.
(d) Enemy Aircraft Eestroyed on Ground :
squadron reporting action
Carrier complement is basedthe monthts operations by
In the case of planes destroyed on ground by carrier-based aircraft, the final evaluationsof the carrier task force conunanders were used in lieu of the claims advanced in s q u a d r o naction reports. Squadron claims have been used, however, for grounded planes destroyed by ourland-based aircraf%, in view of the small n!xibers involved, and the general lack of final evalu-a t i o n s . (Squadron claims have been used consistently for enemy aircraft destroyed in air combat,since in few instances have higher comnands reduced these claims).
All statistical data, except the types listed in (a) to (d) above, have come from the basicsources previously listad.
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DEFINITIONS
NUMBER OF PLANES ON HAND Number of airoraft reported assigned to a unit during a month inwhich t h a t u n i t reporiied having action against the enemy (other than ASW). Data have beenchecked for erroneous reporting and adjustments made on basis of normal complement and volumeof operations. Not presented for months prior to January 1944.
CARRIER COMPLEMENT Number of a i rcraf t normal ly carr ied by carrier of the class at begimingof the operations in question.
NUMBER OF CARRIERS IN ACTION Totil number whose aircraft engaged in action against the enemyoth e r t ha n ASW) at any tuse during the period in question.
FLIGHTS, SQUADRONS IN ACTION Number of flights, for all purposes including combat and attack,reported for a calendar month by a squadron reporting action against the enemy (other tian ASW)during the sacm month. Data have been checked for erroneous reporting and failure to reportand adjustsmnts made. Not available on monthly basis prior to January 1944.
ACTION SORTIES Number of planes taking off on a mission which eventuated in an attack on anenemy t a r g e t or in aerial casbat, or both. This basis of tabulation was the number of planesof one squadron taking off on the mission. If any of these planes had acticn, the entire squad-ronsrs planes on the mission were counted as action sorties, including abortive planes, planeswhich reached the target but did not at+~ck, and planes which escorted or patrolled but did notengage in combat. Thus if 16 VP took off as escort, 2 returned early, 2 engaged in combat, and4 strafed, all 16 were counted as action sorties. Likewiee if 8 planes took off for CAP, andonly 2 engaged in combat, all 8 were action sorties. On the other hand, if 8 VF took off forescort, and none engaged in any sort of attack or combat, then none were counted as actions o r t i e s , eve=ough they raached the target , and even though t~scorted bombers attacked thet a r g e t . Likewise, CAP planes missions, none of whose planes engaged in combat were not countedas act ion sor t ies .
LOSSES OF OWN AIRCRAFT L O S S data have c- primrily from two sources: (1) action reports,squadron and ship, covering losses from all causes on missions involving actual combat with theenemy, and (2) loss reports, covering losses from all causes whatsoever.
The losses on action sorties reported herein have been taken primarily from action reports,in which the ex=t~ ~ can be determined more accurately. Two major exceptions tothis practice may be noted : (a) losses on unreported or poorly reported combat missions have beenadded from loss report sources; these may sometimes be inflated, because of a tendency in theearly loss reports to ascribe to “combat” or “enemy aircraft” losses whose caus”e was umknown;(b) a i rcraf t l i s ted in ac t ion repor ts as ser iously damged rather than los t , and la ter indicatedin loss reports to have baen scrapped or jettisoned kecause of this damage; these have been addedas losses on act ion sor t ies .
Losses other than on action sorties have been taken from the loss reports, with some confir-mation from carrier and squadron reports.. The accuracy of loss reports, particularly with respectto cause of loss and date of loss, is frequently debatable, and many adjustnwmts have been madewhere indicated.
LOSSES ON ACTION SORTIES I n c l u d e s all planes counted as action sorties, which failed ta return%0 a friendly base or were destroyed in.landing at base ) PIUS planes re turn ing and later d e s t r o y -ed because of damage sustained during the mission, plus P=S lost on unreported missions whichapparently involved action with tie enemy. Al l los=on action sorties have been classified bycause under the three ca tegor ies Enemy A/A, Enemy A/C, and Operational. Where the exact causewas not given in the action report (planes reported missing) the cause most likely under thecircumstances of loss described was arbitrarily assigned, or if the circumstances were not stated,the cause stated in the loss report was assigned.
Losses on Other Flights These are limited to losses, during each month, of planes assigned tosquadrons which reported engaging in action against the enemy during that month. For thesesquadrons these figures represent all operational losses of airborne planes, on missions notinvolving action against the e n e m y ; they include also planes later stricken because of operation-al damage sustained on such flights.
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Losses on Ship or Ground These figures are also limited to losses, during each month, bysquadrons reporting action during the scum month . For these squadrons they included all losses,regardless of cause , of p lanes not a i rborne a t the tinm of the loss, or at the time the damagewas sus ta ined that ultismtely resulted in the loss of the plane. Principal causes of theselosses includedt St ruck by a i rcraf t landing , tak ing of f or tax i ing , or by automot ive vehic les ;explosions and fires; storms, typhoons; enemy bombing or strafing or suicide attacks on carriers;own gunfire. It should be noted that all losses of grounded aircraft to enemy action are notincluded (some such losses were of air=ft assigned to pools or to squadrons not in actio~nor is the greaber part of the listed losses on ship or ground attributable to enemy action.The carrier losses in this category, however, do include all carrier planes lost in enemy attackso n c a r r i e r s .
It should be noted, in connection with all categories of loss, that the f igures for carr iersrepresent a l l losses in ac t ive carr ier combat opera t ions (excluding s t r ic t ly pat rol and escor toperations~n Pacif ic conbat a r ea s , while the land-based figures represent the bulk of, but notall, the losses of squadrons in active combat areas.— — ——
DAMAGE BY ENEMYA/A AND ENEMYA/C Planes receiving major and minor damage from the causess t a t e d , as reported In squadron action reports only.
OWN PMTES ENGAGING ENEMY AIRCRAFT Number of airborne aircraft firing guns at, or fired at by,ZFborne enemy aircraft. In fact, probably a number of p lanes a re inc luded which do not meetth is def in i t ion , but were in f l ights , or in sections or divisions of flights, of which otherplanes did fire guns or were fired at. Also, reports for many early actions did not specify theactual number of planes engaging in combat by any definition, and it was frequently necessary tomake arbitrary assumptions based on own and enemy losses in the engagement. On the whole, how-e v e r , these figures reflect with fair accuracy the number of aircraft engaging in and/or ex-posed to action with enemy aircraft.
ENEMY AIRCRAFT ENGAGED In general, this figure tends to approximate the number of enemy air-c r a f t observed In formations which were actively engaged in aerial combat. ~ attempt has beenmade to exclude formations or parts of formations which were not actively engaged by the re-porting squadron, but frequently tie action reports were so vague with respect to the numberof enemy planes actually enga(;ed that it was necessary to use the total number of enemy planesobserved in the area, or to adopt an arbitrary figure based on the nunber sho t down.
It should also be noted tkt the figures on enemy planes engaged were compiled on a squadronb a s i s . In engagements involving two or more of our squadrons at one time and place it is there-fore likely that the same enemy formations nay have been reported as engaged by each of thesquadrons. Thus from the viewpoint of our mission as a whole, the number of enemy planes engag-ed i s inf la ted by dupl ica t ion . On the othe= from the viewpoint of the number of individualp lane- to-plane engagexmnts, the figures on ene~ planes enga~ed probably represent an unders ta te-ment.
It should be noted that data on number of enemy planes engaged are inherently the leastaccurate of any data in this report, because of the natural inaccuracy of aerial observation;estimates of the size of enemy formations may vary by 50 percent or more depending on the ob-server and the circumstances.
TYPES OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT ENGAGED AND DESTROYED:
BOMBSRS Includes ident i f ied types of s ingle-engine and twin-engine bombers ; a l l unident i f ied~gine a i r c r a f t ; f l y i n g b o a t s ; and for 1942, 1943 and 1945 only, transports. Approximately9@ of the total consists of identified single-engine and twin-engine bombers, though the pro-portion varies from period to period.
FIGETERS (More proper ly ent i t led “Fighters and o ther types”) inc ludes ident i f ied types ofsingle-engine and twin-engine fighters; a l l unident i f ied s ingle-engine a i rcraf t , a l l f loat p lanes ;a l l t ra iners ; and for 1944 only , t ranspor ts . A p p r o x i m a t e l y 90% of the total consists of planesident i f ied as s ingle-engine f ighters , though the proportion may vary from operation to operation.
It may be noted that identification was frequently deficient, many instances having beennoted of Japanese Army planes reported in exclusively Navy theaters, of confusion between dive
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bombers and fip>ters, and between varicus models of single-engine fighters, and twin-enginefighters and bombers.
ENEMY AIRCPAFI’ DESTROYED IN COMBAT Airborne enemy aircraft olaismd destroyed by naval aircraft,In ae r i a l combat o n l y . P l a n e s d e s t r o y e d by own anti-aircraft fire or in suicide crashes are notincluded. Enemy aircraft reported as “probably destroyed” are not included. Squadron claims,as made in ACA-1 or other action reports, are the bas is for these f igures . They thus representthe evaluations only of the squadron intelligence officer, squadron commander, and in some casesthe air group commander. However, rarely was there any further evaluation by higher authorityof squadron claims with respect to airborne enemy aircraft.
In evaluating pilot claims for ACA-1 repor ts squadron inte l l igence off icers were ins t ructedto follow the definitions of “destroyed” established for the command or theater. Subsequent toearly 1944 this was the standard Army-Navy definition that the plane must be seen to crash, dis-integrate in the air, be enveloped in flames, descend on f r iendly te r r i tory , or tha t i t s p i lo tand ent i re crew be seen to bail out. Prior to this time the definitions varied between commands,but the def in i t ions used in the pr inc ipal naval thea ter (SoPac) were a t leas t equal ly s t r ingent .
The degree to which squadron in’=lligence officers and commanders succeeded in eliminatingduplicating and optimistic pilot claims is not known, but it is believed the amount of over-s ta tement i s re la t ively low. Since 93% of all enemy aircraft claimed destroyed by Naval air-craft were claimed by single-seat fighters and the bulk of the remainder were claimed by two-place dive bombers and by lone search planes, the tremendous duplication of gunnere~ claims ex-perienced by air forces operating large formations of heavy bombers with multiple gun poeitionsis largely eliminated. Duplication of claims between fighter planes can be more easily con-t ro l led by careful in ter rogat ion .
Over-optimism has always been difficult to control. During the early part of the war, beforestandard definitions were in force, before ful l - t ime t ra ined Air In te l l igence Off icers were avai l -able to apply them, and before the need for conservative operational intelligence was fullyapprecia ted, action reports may often have overstated enemy losses. Evidence from the Japanesehas tended to indica te tha t in SOSB of the ear ly ac t ions , and even as late as the Rabaul ra idsof early 1944, there was such overstatement.
It must be remembered, however, that the bulk of Naval aer ia l engagements in the Paci f icdid not involve the mass combat of Europe. Even the large-size engagements seldom involvedmore than 30 of our planes against 30 of the enemy~e at any one time within visible range of anyone point. By far the greatest number of engagements involved only 1 to 8 of our planes, or thesame number of the enemy!s. Thus in the main the claims under this heading, off set as they areby the exclusion of planes classified as “probably destroyed”, are belie-d to be near thetruth, with only local exception, and to be as conservative as those of any major airforce.
ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED ON GROUND In the case of carr ier operat ion, these f igures repreeentt he number of non-airborne enemy aircraft reported by the task force commander ae destroyed onground or water, or on enemy carriers. These figures were normally based largely on photo-graphic assessment, and only planes visibly burned out or obviously unrepairable were includedunless there was o ther pos i t ive evidence to w a r r a n t thei r c lass i f ica t ion as des t royed. Assess-ment was on a field-by-field basis, eliminating duplication of squadron claime. For small-scaleear ly opera t ions , where no report was available from the tack force commander, an estimate wasmade by OP-23-V-3, based on all available squadron and ship action reports, eliminating dupli-ca t ion of c la ims. For land-based opera t ions , in view of the small volume involved, the claimsin action reports were used.
TONS OF BOMBS ON TARGETS Calculated for each mission by taking the number of bombs of each%fpe (plue clustere, torpedoes and mines) expended on targets , multiplying by the nominal weightof each, and rounding the total to the nea=s%=.—Bombe jettisoned are not included, nor bombein abor t ive p lanes , nor bombs hanging up, nor rockets fired. In the case of search planes,par t icular ly PB4Ys on single-plene long-range searches , tonnage dropped is understated by thesefigures, because of the large num~r of miseions wherein less than ½ ton was dropped per mission,the tonnage being rounded down to zero in the figuree. For 1945 this difference is approximately120 tons for PB4Ys, and lese for other typee of VPB. For other types of planes there may be smalldi f ferences in e i ther d i rec t ion, due to &is rounding of tonnages.
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THEATER OF OPERATIONS For operations by land-based Naval and Marine aircraft, the breakdown~Y ~e a t e r o f operations (Tables 4 and 18) is based on the area command under which the oper-ations were conducted. Thus operations by planes based in ~S~cific Area were includedunder that area even thou& they attacked targets me Southwest or Centra l Paci f ic . Theofficial limits of each comnmnd ware used -out , except that actions in the first few monthsof the war, before establishment of the area commands, were distributed on the basis of the com-mands subsequently established.
The method of ass igning car r ie r operations to are- is explained in the text referring toTable 4.
AREA (GEOGRAPHICAL) OF TARGET OR ENGAGE?QWT Each geographical area includes not only the landareas covered by i ts name, but all coasta1 waters . Engagemmts and shipping a t tacks far a t seawere a l located to the nearest area. Most area names are believed self-explanatory, but tiefollowing additional explanations are given:
Hokksido, No. HonshuTokyo AreaCentral HonshuKyushu, Kure AreaR@cyus
FormosaBonins
Western Carolines
Eastern CarolinesSolomons, BismarcksKorea, North ChinaCentral ChinaSouth China
Japan, N. of 40°N.Japan, S. of 40°N., E. of 138°E.Japan, S. of 40° between 133°E. and 138%.Japan, W. of 133°E.All islands in area bounded by 123°E, 24°N., 132%, and 31°N.,
i n c l u d i n g Tanegs, Minami, Daito, Miyako and Sakishima groups.Inc ludes PescadoresIncludes IW O Jima, in addition to main group, plus the sea areas
within about 300 miles of Chichi Jima.West of 150°E., inc lud ing Pslau, Yap, Woleul and intervening sea
a r ea s .East of 150°E., i n c l u d i n g Truk, ponape, Kusaie, Nomoi G r o u p .Includes Nev$ Britain, New Ireland, Emirau and Bismarck Sea.Includes Manchuria end Shantung province.Chekiang and Kiangsu provinces .Fukien and Kwangtung provinces, Hainan Island, Hong Kong.
HIRPOSE OF MISSION OF OWN AIRCRAFT Assigned primary mission of aircraft at time of takeoff,regard 1ess o f l a t er changes. Thus a search mission which finds and attacks shipping is classi-fied as a search mission, a fighter sweep diverted ta defense of force is still an attack mission.Note tha t in th is repor t only ac t ion sor t ies - planes in actual action against the enemy - areclassified by purpose of mission, and~rge volume of negative patrols and searches, as wellas the small volume of abortive offensive aircraft, are not included in the data. C l a s s i f i c a t i o n sby purpose of mission differed in the 1944 machine tabulations from those for other years, andadditional detail is thus provided for 1944, not available for other years.
BASE OF OWN AIRCPA~ The base is that from which the planes operated on the mission in question.us carrier alrcraf% temporarily operating from land bases are classified as land-based.
PLANE MODEL OF OWN AIRCRAFT Because of lack of detail in many action reports and limitationsin the IBM system it has not been possible to distinguish between modifications or differentmanufacturers of the same basic aircraft. Thus “F4U” in the tables msy include F4U and FG air-c r a f t o f all m o d i f i c a t i o n s , “F6Fn will i n c l u d e the -3, -5, -3N a n d -5N, lt’fBF1~ or !tTB~ ~Y in-“clude modifications of either or both. However, the F4F and the FM-2 have been distinguishedthroughout.
SORTIES ATTACKING TARGETS There are two definitions for this item, one for 1944, and one forother years, because of the differing methods used in preparing IBM machine cards:
1942, 1943, 1945 Each plane attacking targets is counted only once per mission, regardlessof how many targets it attacked successively, with bombs, rockets or guns.
1944 Each plane attacking targets is counted once for each major type of target attackedw= bombs, rockets or guns. This permits one plane to be counted as making two or moreattacks on one mission. The number of “sor t ies a t tacking targets” as reported on this basisfor 1944, is believed on the average to be about 15% greater than if recorded on the 1945 basis.
Note that “sor t ies a t tacking targets” di f fers f rom “act ion sor t ies” in a l l years , by excludingplanes taking off which did not individually attack targets.
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ROCKETS ON TARGETS Number of aircraft rockets (of all sizes) expended on targets by planesa ttacking targets, as defined above.
AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES For 1944 these figures represent expenditures on enemy targete, byplanes at tacking targets, and expenditures in aerial combat are excluded~ ~9~1945the f igures represent total expendi ture on targete and in aerial combat. Because of a generalfailure to report rounds expended prior to late 1943, ammunition expenditures for 1942 and early1943 are not given herein.
TARGET TYFE CLASSIFICATION Two moderately diverse systems of classifying the types of targetsa ttacked have been used in compi l ing these s ta t i s t ics , one for 1944, the other for the remainderof the war. These differences, combined with the varying methods of counting sorties attackingt a r g e t s , r e q u i r e smne discuss ion as to thei r ef fect on the s ta t is t ics .
For 1944, as has been noted, planes attacking targets were counted once for each major typeof target attacked on the same mission. In car ry ing out th is tabula t ing procedu=e exactnumber of planes xmaking primary or secondary attacks on a tar~t was allocated to that precisetype of target. Thus if from one 8 plane fighter mission 6 planes bombed a destroyer, 2 bombeda large tanker , and 4 in addi t ion s t rafed smal l f i sh ing craf t , the statistics on the 1944 basiswould show 6, 2 and 4 planes attacking unarmotied warships, large merchant vessels, and smallmerchant vessels, respectively, and the ordnance expended would be distributed accordingly.
The simplified tabulating system adopted for 1945, and carried back to 1942 and 1943, pro-vided for counting only once per mission each plane attacking targete, and for assigning onlyone ta rge t per squadron ~m=i~e target classification assigned was that receivi~e~a=e~t of attac~ ~e example above, if included in 1945 statistics, would show8 s o r t i e s , and all ordnance, expended on unarmored warships.
The 1944 syetem undoubtedly provided much greater statistical precision, but involved aninordinate amount of labor in tabulation. There is some question whether, in the end, theprecision was much greater than in the 1945 system, because: (a) the number of missions split-t i n g t a r g e t s , whi le substant ia l , is not a large proportion of the total, and (b) over a numberof missions the errors may well cancel, e.g. a target type which is secondary on one splitmission becomes primary on another split mission.
A rough estimate of the relative statistical effects of the two systems is as follows:the 1944 system, by giving full weig,~t as attack sorties to secondary strafing and rocket runson the types of targets normally attacked on such runs over-emphasized the we&ght of attack onsuch targets; the 1945 system, ignoring those types of targets which seldom receive the majorweight of attack, under-emphasizes the amount of effort expended on them. The principal typeof target affected is undoubtedly small shipping under attack by carrier aircraft; there isprobably a major effect in the case of minor military targets but this is emall when comparedto the to ta l weight of a t tack on mi l i tary targets ; there is probably a minor effect on the"harbor areas” and “ l a n d t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ” t a r g e t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . on the whole , i t i s not bel ievedthat these fac tors unduly dist~rt the overali p ic ture of the propor t ion of thesive expended against the various classes of enemy targets.
Major d i f ferences in classification of specific items between 1944 and thebe briefly noted as follows:
(1)
(2)
The 1945 classification “Airfields” includes parked aircraft, runways,o t h e r a i r f i e l d bt’ildin~s, and a l l a i r f ie ld defenses . The 1944 f igures
Naval air offen-
other years may
hangars andf o r a i r f i e l d s
p r o b a b l y e x c l u d e most,-b~t not all attacks on airfield buildings,-”but include all theother ta rget sub- types l i s ted . (The 1944 attacks on “airfield runwaye” undoubtedly in-c lude SO- attacks on buildings and guns also). Airfield buildings not included underairfields for 1944 are covered under “Other Military Targets”.
“wrbor Areas” for 1945 includes waterfront A/A defenses. For 1944 sonm of these maybe included in “Other Military Targets”.
COMPLETIHTESS OR ACCURACY OF DATA
1. Completeness and Accuracy In Oeneral
Accuracy of Machine Tabulation: All general tables, and special tables of aerial combat anda n t i - a i r c r a f t d a t a (Tables 1 - 29 inclusive) have been cross-checked ta assure complete internalconsistency within each table and between tables, except as speci f ica l ly noted in individual cases .
All tables containing breakdowns by type of target, by geographical area, and by type ofordnance, have been checked to insure that no significant discrepancies are present. In tie caseof these tables the complications of machine tabulation have made a certain number of minor dis-crepancies inevitable; these were considered not to warrant expenditure of the inordinate mountof time required to correct them, since none can have any effect on conclusions to be drawn fromthe data .
For data on night operations no master check data were available. Spot checks were made,and the totals and breakdowns appear to be generally reliable.
Accuracy of Compilation: Human error, when thousands of coding cards are prepared from actionrepor ts of variable and confused pa t te rns by persomel of clerical grade, is inevitable. Themos t thorough prepexation of definitions and instructions, and oonstant supervision, do noteliminate the need for constant exercise of judgmmt by such personnel, when reducing to simplestatistics an operation as complex as an action by Naval aircraft bombing, rocketing and straf-ing a nmltiplici~ of targets and engaging in aerial combat. To this inherent difficul~ thelack of uniform report forms during the first half of the warof repor ts in the las t ha l f , cont r ibuted .
, and the lack of uniform qualityHowever, every possible source of error has been
either (a) anticipated and provided against, (b) checked and corrected, (c) checked and the dataeliminated as not susceptible ta accura te compi la t ion, or (d) checked and presented with foot-notes and reservations as expressed hereafter. It is the opin ion of those respons ib le for th i scompi la t ion tha t the data conta in no s igni f icant b iases resul t ing f rom the s ta t i s t ica l compi-lation methods used, which are not fully noted in connection with the items affected.
Accuracy of Reporting: It is axiomatic that observations made in the heat of fast-moving airact ion are subJeCt ~ a large margin of error. It is also well known to those who have partici-pated in carr ier opera t ions , and in land-based operations under the front-line conditions whichhave prevailed in such areas as the Solomons and Okinawa, that the obstacles in the way of fullin ter rogat ion of p i lo ts , eva lua t ion o} the data received , and preparation of thorough actionreports, have been extreme. The data herein suffer much more from the latter factor than fromthe basic difficul~ of inaccurate observat iondepend upon aerial observation.
, s ince the bulk of the s ta t i s t ica l i tems do not
Accuracy of observation enters into only two major items in these tables; enemy aircraftengaged and enemy aircraft destroyed in combat, and the second of these has generally been thesubject of the most careful interrogation and evaluation prior to reporting. The inabi l i ty ofthe intelligence officer to perform his duties at an optimum quality level may affect a largernumber of items, particularly thoee concerning attacks on targetst the number of planes actuallyat tacking each target , and tie number and type ordnance actually expended on each. The effectof these deficiencies on the statistics herein cannot be ~asured; items wherein it was beliewdto be large have been eliminated from the tabulations , and in the remaining items it is believedto be moderate, subject to a few specific exceptions described under individual items.
Completeness of Reporting: So far as is known, a 11 carrier air action against the enemy duringthe entire war is completely comred h e r e i n . It is ~d that 98% or more of every category
of action by land-based planes is cowred for the period from the latter months of 1943 to theend of the war. For the period from 7 December 1941 to mid-1943 it is known that a substantialamount of action by land-based planes has not been covered by the reports available, and is thusnot included. The amount excluded is not believed to exceed 10% of the total reported for thisper iod. Pract ica l ly a l l of th is def ic iency was in the Solomons a r ea .
For 1942 and 1943 particularly, and to a limited extent in later years, data were not alwaysavailable to indicate whether escort fighters on a given mission strafed or were fired at byenemyA/A. Where no informationwae available it was assumed Mat escort fighters did not meetthe def in i t ion for ac t ion sor t ies .~ Thus the number of fi@ter action sorties, and fighter sor-
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t i e s a t t a c k i n g t a r g e t s , may be understated for the early part of tie w a r . It should be notedthat the number of fi~hter sor t ies a t tacking targets (and offensive f ighter ac t ion sor t ies) ,as reported herein will in all years be less than the number of fighters over target (a figurenot compiled), by the number of escort fighters not actually attacking or engaging the enemy.The difference became progressively smaller in 1944 and 1945, however, as the increased ratioof fi@ters to bombers, the emphasis on strafing of parked aircraft and A/A guns, and the in-stallation of bomb racks and rocket launchers on VF, resulted in attacks by a larger proportionof the f ighters reaching a target area .
2. Accuracy and Completeness with Respect to Specific Items
(Iteme not mntioned have no speci f ic individual def ic iencies , but are subject to the gener-a l qual i f ica t ions above) .
Planes on Hand, and Flights: Original data have been arbitrarily edited to remove obviouserrorf3; s ee discus~ Defini t ions . Items are subject to inaccuracy in reporting, but nopar t icular b ias i s suspected.
Act ion Sor t ies : Subject to incomplete reporting (for land-based units only), and undercountingof fighters over target, as noted above.
Own Aircraft Losses: Losses to enemy aircraft are probably overstated by up to 25~for 1942-43 ,becauee of the l ack of an adequa~skem for reportin~ cause of loss accurate ly . Operationallosses are probably understated, but to a lesser amount, the difference being chargeable tolosses on ground. This item is not affected by incompleteness of action reports, because of thecheck available in the independent strike reports.
Own Aircraft Engaging in Air Combat: Probably slightly understated for 1942-43, because off a i l u r e o f action reports to specify exact number engaging, and slightly overstated thereafterbecause of inolusion of entire flight in some cases where only a part actially engaged .
Enemy Aircraft Engaged: .3verstated throughout. See discussion under Definitions.
Enemy Aircraft Destroyed: See discussion under Definitions. Also, slight understatement for1942-43 (land-based only~ because of incomplete reporting.
Bomb Tonnage on Targets: Believed slightly understated for -1942-43, because of incomplete re-porting (land-based only), and failure to report full bomb load in some instances (carrier-based and land-based). Affected somewhat by rounding bomb tonnage per mission to nearest ton;see discussion under Definitions.
No. of Squadrons in Action~ Affected in 1942-43 by failure of some land-based squadrons to re-p o r t a c t i o n .
Sor t ies At tacking TargetsS Affected by incomplete reporting, by inadequate reports (especiallyVP, see above), and @d ifference between 1944 and 1942-43-45 coding systems (see discussionunder Definitions). Note that, even for 1944, and increasingly for other years, the total numberof sortie s a t tacking targets .is greater than the number attacking either with bombs, or withrockets , o r s t r a f i n g , considered separa te ly , because inc luded in the figure are sorties whichattaclmd with only one of these three types of attack, as well as sorties combining two or threemethods.
Rocket Expenditures: Subject to some under-reporting, par t icular ly by CV f ighter squadrons inl a t e 1944 and early 1945, and to considerable carelessness in the reports of some squadrons.
Ammunition Expenditures: Not shown for period prior to late 1943 because of almost total failureto repor t thi s i t e m . Believed partially incomplete for late 1943 and first half of 1944, forland-based VSB and VTB operating in the Solomons. A tendency to report expenditures on ana r b i t r a r y b a s i s , such as 1000 rounds per plane per mission, has been observed in the case ofsonm f ighter squadrons , and it is certain that for a large proportion of the action reports theammunition expenditure figures were the roughest of estimates. To what extent this may biasthe overall figures or figures for any single plane model, i t i s imposs ib le to say , but i t i sdoubted that the error is in excess of 25‰ low or high.
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Own Planes Damaged by A/A or Enemy A,’C: These figures are probably considerably understated?or many 1942-43 act ions, and sllghtly understated for 1944-45, because of failure to reportall instances of minor damage, and damage inflicted by one of these agents to planes lost fromanother cause.
Purpose of Mission~ Subject to personnel error in coding. The only probable general bias wouldbe t o favor an off ensive classification at the expense of reconnaissance, but the extent of th iswould be small. It should be noted that defensive and reconnaissance missions are included inthese tables only if they actually engaf:e or attack the e n e m y , and thus are considerably under-stated from the point of view of total missions flown.
Type of Target : Subjec t to e r r o r s o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i ns u l t ing from the two coding systems used (see discussionof these factors are approximately as follows :
coding, and to systematic errors re-under Eefinitione). The net effects
1944, An overs ta tement of a t tack act iv i ty in compar ison wi th other years , but a re la t ivelyaccur~distribution of a t tacks , bombs and rockets by target type. Ammunition, usually arbitra-rily distributed by the coding clerk between the several targets on a mission, is subject toconsiderable er ror , but the d i rec t ion of the b ias , i f there i s any genera l b ias , cannot be es t i -mate d.
1942-43-45: A general bias in favor of large assigned primary targets attacked in forceby the majority of a mission's planes, at the expense of small secondary targets attacked byone or two of the mission's planes or on second runs over target. The net effect is probably tounderstate the amount of attacks, bombs, rockets and ammunition expended on small merchantv e s s e l s , on land transportation targets, and on harbor areas, and to overstate expenditures onlarge vessels , a i r f i e l d s , a n d m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s .
Type of Bomb: This item was subject to coding errors , which have been largely detected andcorrected. However, instances of inadequate reporting may also have resulted in slight errorsas to size and type of bomb, and number expended on target, but not suff ic ient ly to af fec t thegenera l va l id i ty of the f igures .
Models of Enemy Aircraft Destroyed: Subject to a major degree to mis-identification by pilots,and presented only as a matter of general interest, and as reliable only with respect to themajor type c lass i f ica t ions ( f ighters , bombers , f loat p lanes , e tc . ) .
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PART A. GENERAL DATA ON FLIGHTS, ACTIONSORTIES , BOMB TONNAGE DROPPED, ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED,
AND OWN AIRCRAFT LossES
The tables in this section of the report (Tables 1-18) provide a broad overall picture ofNaval and Marine air operations as a whole. There are three general subdivisions in thiss e c t i o n ;
1.
2 .
3 .
I n
General summaries of both carrier and land-based air operations, including breakdcmsbetween carrier an~l=~=en Navy an~ =ine, by plane model, by theater,and by months. (Tables 1-7).
General data on carrier operations~i~~o-ns,
, including breakdowns b:y plane model and by typeby areas, and by months, plus special tabular analyses of
carr ier opera t ing ra t ios dur ing var ious per iods . (Tables 8-15).
General data on land-based air operations, including data broken dom between Navy andMm ~=e model, by =a~er, and by months. (Tables 16-18).
general the tables will be allowed to tell their own story, but for each table or zrou~of re la ted tables a narra t ive conmntary wi l l ca l l a t tent ion to s ignif icant i tems or relat~on-ships, and note any special qualifications applying to the data -presen~d.
1 . General Summaries of Carrier and Land-Based Operations
NOTES TO TABLES 1 AND 2
Tables 1 and 2 assemble, for the entire war, all tie basic general s ta t is t ics of Naval andMarina carrier and land-based oombat operations included in this report. Table 1 breaks downthe data between land-ba8ed and carrier operations, and between Navy and Marine aviation; Table2 consolidates the data by plane model without reference to base or arm of service.
A further breakdown of the carrier figures by type of carrier will be found in Table 8.
Table 1 shows the overall combat effort exerted by Naval Aviations 284,073 sorties engagingin attacks or aerial combat, or both, and 102,917 tons of ~mbs, torpedoes and mines expended ont a r g e t s . Of these to+~ls the carr ier forces held a s l ight edge in number of ac t ion sor t ies ,whi le land-based avia t ion (with a lesser proportion of fighters to bombers) held a slight advan-tage in bomb tonnage.
5@ of the combat effort, about 165,000 sorties out of 284,000, was by planes attached toNavy units. From carriers, 9 8 ‰ was by Naval planes; from land bases 84$was by Marine aircraft.Of the Navy’s share of the land-based action sorties, about 4% were flown by VPB, the remainderby carrier squadrons temporarily based ashore in emergency or when opportunities for carrier em-ploymnt were lacking, and by a few land-based Naval support squadrons employed in 1943 andearly 1944.
The overall loss rate for Navy and Marine aircraft on action sorties was 1.5 percent. Ofthe losses on ac t ion sor t ies , 47 percent resulted from enemy antiaircraft, 21 percent from com-bat with enemy aircraft and 32 percent from operational causes. The loss rate on action sortiesby carr ier a i rcraf t was 2 .0 percent (49% to antiaircraft, 16% to enemy a i rcraf t , and 35$ o p e r -a t ional causes) . The ac t ion loss ra te for land-based a i rcraf t was only 1 .0 percent of sor t ies ;this difference reflects the greater employment of carrier aircraft against heavily defendedadvanced tarEets, while a major employment of land-based planes was in clean-up operationsagainst by-passed enemy bases or secondary targets.
o-rational losses of Naval and Marine aircraft on fli~hts not involvin~ ac t ion (but made-=.- .—by squadrons having otherable against an estimatedal loss rate of about 0.5this non-action flying by
700380 0- 46- 2
action during the same month) were 3,045 in number; these are charge-600,000 non-action flights by these squadrons, indicating an op%ration-percent on the patrol and search missions which made up the bulk ofcombat squadrons. 1313 planes attached to %e same squadrons were
(Cont. on p. 15)
- 1 3 -
TABLE 1. CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY OF NAVY AND MARINECARRIER AND LAND-BASED AIR OPERATIONS AND RESULTS FOR ENTIRE WAR.
By Model of Aircraft Employed
ENEMY AIRCRAFTTOTALiCTIONSORTIES——
147,094
143,357mqzm6,48812,9251,102
18,8086,048
35,564182
3,737~
1462
496
136,979
114,127m
1,6461,074
2540,8722,023
177,1518,390
52169
21,373~1,269450
5,283332
3,2903,6242,6361,371
506142
1,479
2844048413741
TONS OFBOMBS
OliTARGETS—
CkTN LOSSESON SHIPOR
GROUND
974.
936m7671228835
22714
%o00
.—
339—
135
5260
3600
162200
202
0201963
72224393
;00000
— . .1313——
BASIS, SERVICE,PLANE MODEL
ONOTHJZRLIGHTS
1988
1932
1822834918465
3391
+801
1057
724
27340
104131
5623503
333
529552
20853447332
0T00000
3045
DESTROYEDIN COMRAT~ Fighters
CARRIER-BASED, TOTAL 1428 452 1001— — —
1577 436 979-5m Z%m93 18 4862 13 7517 47 31268 18 21840 43 48
348 27 23111 25 8
1997 4487—— 45,659
Navy TotalF6FF4U, FGFMF4FSB2C, SBWSBDTBF, TBMTBD
1938 4328mm??m100 260194 228190 11213 3031 7522 501 5
%%o 00 00 0
44,972~
954148
610,9942,524
24,245134
Marine TotalF4U, FGF6FF4FTBM
-%4+2 0 00 0 15 0 0
687~
250
304
L4ND-RASED, TOTAL 759
533m46
175600010500
225
1953000
1253067
1T01000
——
2048
1484mm
47281
42206
180600
562
141941007
18169
101
400000
554 455.
270m
275142401
110101
344—
259
3110
5633
1412000
-%4741
151812511
1700100
57,258
Marine TotalF4U, FGF6FF4FF2ASBDSB2C, SB’iVSB2UTBF, TBMPBJPvPB4YPBY
386
540
9611
5318100
47,269m
28400
18,1471,086
55,4378,002
201
l?a~ TotalF6F
168 185 9,796227
40
2,185104
F4UF4F, FMSBDSB2C, SBWTBF, TBMpB4yPvPBYPBMpB2Y
53
172
16602815131
14561209
285
3530
2,7o11,4131,912
94920497
Service UnknownF4U
0700000
0700000
193
F6FW, type unknownSBDTBFVPB, type unknown
014865043
GRAND TOTAL 1982 907 1345 102,917284,073 2756 6535
- 1 4 -
TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF AIR OPERATIONS AND RESULTS, FOR ENTIRE WAR
PL4NE MODEL
~ ~~t~lF(37F4U, FGFMF4FF2AType Unknown
VSB TotalSBDSB2C-SBWSB2U
VTB TotalTBF, TBMTBD
VPB TotalPB4YPvPB ,JPBYPBlhPB2YType Unknown
—. -. .—
GRAND TOTAL
By Type and Model of Aircraft(Land and Carrier, Navy and Marine Combined)
TOTALLCTIONSORTIES
146,599m,m64,05112,9252,628
25440
73,867W21,163
17
46,820m
182
16,787~2,6888,3901,380
50614241
— — - .
284,073
———
— . .CWN LOSSES
2X ACTION .SORTIESTo Enemy Opera-~ tional
988m349622400
425*.
2711
433m11
136m~g
18151310
.—-.
66427018913
178140
98m181
72n25
73m60
36300
— — -
694
230754900
334
2223
268m
8
49m12125110
-—1:)82 907 1345
.—-—.—
—
ON3THIiRFLIGHTS
1972-Tzzi692283112
00
424m199
1
417WG
1
232m3923503s20
—-
3045.—
ON SHIPOR
GROUNE
716
164716800
184m940
260m14
1537242
43930
——
1313
— .
ENEMY AIRCRA~—DESTROYEDIN COMRAT~ Fighters
2542m478194418
61
E130
&1
146m
800670
6099
1662228487
40
143m306
E5
213m1209
1010
2756 6535
TONS OFBOMBS
ONTARGETS
22,292~15,621
14860
14
35,131-12,184
5
32,871_
134
12,623~1,9148,002
9502049743
—.
102,917
lost to enemy action or in accidents while not in flight. More detailed analyses of loss rates,for tie years 1944 and 1945 only, are given in Tables 9 and 16 of this report.
Over ten enemy aircraft were shot down by Naval and Marine aircraft for each loss in aircombat. The great bulk of the destruction of enam!! aircraft in aerial combat is credited to theF6F, which shot down 5,163 enemy planes (56% of the total for Naval aviation) in exchange for270 air combat losses, or over 19 enemy planes destroyed per loss in air combat. The F4U wassecond, with 2,140 enemy planes to its credit, the F4F, FM, and PB4Y following next in order with915, 422 and 306 respectively. only 355 enemy planes were shot down by all other types of navalaircraft combined. It may be noted that all ty~s of bombers combined shot down 650 enemy plane~,and lost 243 in combat, a superiority cf over 2½ to 1, evidencing super ior equipnwnt, tactics, andgunnery t ra in ing . bss than 1/5 of one percent of all naval banber sor t ies a t tacking or engagingthe enemy were shot down by enemy aircraft. (Most of these were in the early stages cf the war,as Table 21 will indicate).
For carrying the maximum weight of explosives against the enemy the TBF (and TBM) aircraftwas the Navyts workhorse . F ly ing cnly 16 percent of the total action sorties, it delivered 32percent of the total tonnage (plus 29~ of all rockets expended on targets; see Table 50). Divebombers accounted for 34% of total bomb tonnage, but in a 58% greater number of action sortiesthan the VTB f lew. F i g h t e r s , f l y i n g o v e r 5Q% of all act ion sor t ies , de l ivered only 22% of totalbomb tomage; on ly 3@ of tk.is (or 16?{ of total carrier bomb tonnage) was dropped by carrier-basedfichters, w h i c h f l e w n e a r l y 6@ of all carrier action sor t ies . Fighters, however, fired over138,000 rockets at targets, two-thirds of the Navy total , and fired offensively over 50,000,000rounds of armnunition, which was also over two-thirds of the total for Naval avia t ion .
Patrol bombers, flyin~ @ of the Navyts a c t i o n s o r t i e s , dropped 12% of the bomb tonnage. Halfof these sorties and nearly two-thirds of &is tonnage is credited to Marine PBJ attack bombers.The Navy VPB, being primarily search planes, seldom carried or used their maximum bomb loads, andengaged in action against the enemy on only a small fracticn of their missions.
- 1 5 -
TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF MONTHLY OPERATIONS AND RESULTSFOR ALL CARRIER-BASED AND ALL LAND-BASED NAVAL
AND MARINE AIRCRAFT
MONTH
1$11+1-December
lg42J8nuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMqJuneJulyAuguetSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1~43-JonwryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDoc&mber
lg4WmuuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJuIyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAU#w?.t
1941-42 TOTAL1943 TOTAL1944 TOTAL1945 TOTAL
GRAMU TOTAL
FLIGHTS,3QUADIK)NS[N ACTIOI
*
************
************
17,04513,1118,603
13,9063, 4g6
~, 93224,1426,E05
?2 ,4792 ,911ll,oq11,005
25,74720,89628,31241,24830,19719,79324,089
17,726**
Mo, 522208,008
XU3!l
* No data available.
CA
ACTION
SORTIES
0
0243142
6332374
6s:
28;608
0
78200
i07
290196933
2,989528
2,7934,7721, 7fq5,2T0
902g, 766
12,5491,716
13,16610, 94g4,3972,062
g, 6375,y59
12,13216,0529,0535,635g,J6g
_Ux!2,6735,127
6g,12g70,166
147,094
.IER-BASQNS OFBOMBS ONTARGETS
0
7:51
13;100
0Ml
:ggo
23000400
116
3;;962lgg
go1,4L
6081., 77g
3432,4354,266
473b,20T3,3391,517
333
2,3081,2463,1625,0333,5251,8282,969
&!x.l_707
1,72121,633
?UzK45,659
)mEMY PLAmDESTROYEDAir Groun
0
3;
(ii
o86
9:3;
114000000
4;19146
5216211194
79?112
3?31,189272111
2434323491,04927821
L
0
0120021
140
3:0
21300
00000007
15
:;32
106154
3921521
215g4
5;;6624g13230
4742313369304122
4;;610—
yt4 254300 1243301 2gol2499 2675
6484 5854
.16-
FLIGHTS ,IQUADRONSIN ACTIOll
*
************
************
14,37814,17520,228U3,gqg19,20516,74/315,2g7lg,i3133;:; ;;~
25,39525,019
20,37720,41722,g6327,01230,44534,85328,761
17.207**
232,626
~
!3!@x
LAND-BASEDlTONS OF
ACTION BOM6S Oi
70 5
13 00
: 00 06 3
100 204 1
M5?: 74%48606
M{
334 g3
?96
4897
30 261$
211159
u;! 226
4?344
3,17 1,6751,135 4271,643 5991,602 6~92,835 1,181 2,924 1 # 379
3s293 g6g4,203 1,146; ;;~; 2, g37
5,638 ;:$;3,591 1,0275,45&l 1,9557,326 2,8476,195 2, 2g27,270 2, go27,0gi3 2,5114,457 2,133
ENEMY PLANESDESTROYEDAir Ground
12 0
1 01 01 00 00 c1
21 00 .
52’ 0111 117777 ;19
04i 015 0
128 0186109 2;108 9
3701492014M21449
19
$
152726
15626113828
1
205
:80
102
3;*
1223
20213015105
2211 1
476941 6;728 127662 124
2807 328
NOTES TO TABLE 3
This table presents condensed monthly data for carrier and land-based operations. Inp a r a l l e l c o l u m n s i t i l l u s t r a t e s :
(a) the slow growth of air activity from 1942 to the peak in April 1945;
(b) the great preponderance of land-based operations during the rebuilding of the carrierforce in 1943;
(c) the rapid rise of the carrier force during 1944 to the point where its major operationsfar exceeded the more regular monthly volume of effort of the land-based air forces.
Revealed in the table are the peak performances of Naval aviation:
( a )
(b)
( c )
(d)
( e )
( f )
The
the 41,248 flights made from carriers in cmnbat in April 1945, the 16,052 action sor-ties flown that month, and tie 5,033 tons of bombs dropped on target (40,870 rocketsand about 6,500,000 rounds of ammunition were expended by carrier planes during t~same month);
the tremendous destruction of enemy planes by the carrier forces in June 1944 (1,012),October 1944 (1,851), and April 1945 (1,353);
the seven other months in which carrier aircraft destro~d more than 500 planes permonth (9,250 enemy planes were destroyed by carrier aircraft in their 10 peak months,and 10,319 in the last 15 months of the war alone);
the exceptional feat of increased performance by the small South Facific air force forthe New Georgia operation of July 1943;
the relatively high destruction of enemy planes by the small forces engaged in thebrief carr ier oprations o f 1942 , and the land-based Solomons operations of lateAugust to November 1942;
the air-combat peaks by land-based aircraft over Rabaul in January-February 1944,and at Okinawa in April-June 1945.
table also shows the superior record of carrier-based planes over land-based planes indestroying enemy aircraft: over twice as many in air combat, 18 times as many on the ground and4 times as many in total. The ruling factor here was the mobility of the carrier forces, theirability to penetrate deep into enemy territory, concentrating. overwhelming force in surprisestrokes against large sectors of the enemyfs secondary a i r defenses . Land-based aircraft, onthe other hand, were seldom within reach of main concentrations of enemy air strength, exceptfor a tirm at Rabaul, where the heavy defenses precluded successful attack on grounded aircre.ft.Thus the land-based Marine and Nawal air forcee, whi le ef fect ive agains t ene~ ai rborne a i r -craft both in a defensive capacity and as bomber escorts, could not be the main agent of theirwholesa le des t ruct ion . It is doubted that any other airforce has been as effective in destroy-ing grounded enemy aircraft (or grounded and airborne enemy aircraft combined) as the Navalcarrier force; in the last year of the war our carr ier a i rcraf t des t royed 4 ,622 grounded enemyaircraf t , and 4 ,944 a i rborne a i rcraf t , for a to ta l of 9 ,566.
- 1 7 -
TABLE 4.CARRIER-BASED
COMBAT AIR OPERATIONS AND RESULTS,AND LAND-BASED, BY THEATRE AND BY YEAR.
THEATRE,YEAR
CARRIE&BASED
Central Pacificl+l_J2194319441945
Smth Pacific1942194319U
SOuthwest Pacific1912194419115
Wrth Pacific
Atl~ti~
S~utheast Asie
=FDAASED
Central Pacific1941-12194319441945
South ?acific194219~31244 (to 6/30)
South!?est Pacific1941-42;::
;1545
Atkntic
North Pacific-—
TOTAL
Central PacificSouth PacificSvdthwe5t PacificXor%h PacificAtlFJlticSo.~thezst Asi?.
ACTIONS0RTIES
147,094
%#
41;95661,447
++%915?o~
*35,496b3
26,3148,719
~
u
u
136,979
w*1
16525,15EiM,W8
=
15:73720,904
52,862 40
lM20,38332,321
~
jQ——
284,073
152,44341,20488,358
79)1,161
117
—-
TONS OFBOMBSONTARGETSm
2L!$
1,43313,29819,261
26874
10, 65;
8,1412,337
L.z4
2— . . .57,258
q
9, 0;;6,327
l&cJJ512
7,0457,529
1048,316
IZ, 926
. — .
102,917
49,60215,69037,10s
30117739
—--
ENEMY AIRCRAFTD.EsTROYD
In On–
6+ q
1363 2;
569 30
533 33
4449 32612264 l~q2526 2670
14;
5 2;
-—--—
——-- — .OWN IASSES
ON ACTION SORTIES
m
!@ U5 --3E-
—— -.-—
1982 907 1345
1140 303 727224 416 18456g 162 41213 16 1334 10 9300
—-
ENTAGES OF TOTons Enemy~f A/cBombs Dest.100.0~
* ~
3.1 ?.029.1 16.542.2 36,1
1.4 U~ 1.9
. l.)i
. 0.2
; ~;.—0;17.8 32:35.1 5.8
* 00- A
Q 0 6=-
01 0 4A -
&~ &* 1.00.1 0.5
lp.g 2.811.1 19.1
~ 64.00.9 m
12.3 31.713.1 lg.Cl
4& ~* 0.10.2 (?.0
14.5 6.031.5 !5.2
*_- Q
~- O&
100.0 100.0
48.2 49.815.2 15.336.1 33.60.3 *0.2 0.5* ~.3
——TALSKActionLosses-—~
22.435.2
15.6
&410.425.415.6
7.111.0
2J— .—100.0
51*P19.527.01.01.20.1
* Less than l/20 of one psrcent.
- 1 8 -
NOTES TO TABLE 4
This table measures the contributions of the Naval carrier and land-based air forces to thecampaigns in the various theaters of war. Land-based operations are allocated to theaters onthe basis of the command under which the individual squadron operated, regardless of the locationof the target attacked. Thus operations by South Pacific aircraft against the Bismarck A r c h i -pelago (in the SoWesPac area) are classified under SoPac (and in fact they were normally insupport of SOPSC object ives) ; in few other cases were attacks made over theater boundaries.
In the case of carr ier operat ions , the fact that the fast carriers remained under CinCPOAcommand in all operations, though actually directly supporting oampaigns in other areas, hasnecess i ta ted adopt ing a geographical bas is of c lass i f ica t ion. Thus all carrier operations areallocated to areas in accordance with (a) the theater in which the target area was located, or(b) the theatar whose current campaign the carriers were primarily supporting.
Under these definitions all carrier operations against New Guinea, Halmahera, Morotai andthe Philippines, the Coral Sea Battle, and the Formosa-Ryukyus-China Sea operations of October1944 and January 1945 have been classified as Southwest Pacific. The Palau and Truk oprationsof March and April, though partly subsidiary to the Hollandia strikes, have been classified asCentra l Pacif ic ; the carr ier s t r ikes on Rabaul and Kavieng as South Pacif ic . I t i s bel ievedthat a l l o ther carr ier opera t ions fe l l c lear ly wi thin one theater .
The overall picture presented by this table shows that slightly over half of Naval aircombat operations, in terms of sorties and enemy planes destroyed, were conducted in the CentralFacific t h e a t e r , about one-third in the Southwest Pacific, s l ight ly less than one-s ix th in theSouth, P a c i f i c , and less than one percent in other theaters. (Addi t ion of ASWactivi~ wouldof course substant ia l ly a l ter the balance in favor of the At lant ic) .
These figures should dispel any impression that naval aviation’s primary war contributionwas in the South Pacifio theater . Less than 2% of the total carrier action was in this theater,though most of this minor total consisted of critical actions involving all our carriers avail-able a t the t ime. Of the to ta l land-based ac t ion, only slightly over one quarter was carriedon by aircraft under SOPSC command (an additional 15% was action by Marine aircraft in theSolomons-Bismsrcks area after command passed to SoWesPac).
The carrier force was primarily a Central Pacific force, the spearhead of the mainadvance agains t Japan. Near ly three-four ths of i t s ac t ion was in th is theater . Yet i t s con-t r ibut ion to the Southwest Paci f ic thea ter , accounting for nearly a quarter of total actions o r t i e s , was vi ta l , and was the action which in fact culminated the military defeat of Japanas an air-sea power.
The bulk of the carrier contribution to the Southwest Pacific campaign occurred in the fivemonths from September 1944 to January 1945. In these f ive months pract ica l ly al? of the fastc a r r i e r o f f e n s i v e , and the majority of the CVE effor t , was employed against Southwest Pacifictargets. In these five months over 4500 enemy aircraft were destroyed by the carrier forces inthe campaigns suppor t ing SoWesPac operations; this represents nearly three-eighths of the totalenemy planes destroyed by carrier forces during the war in all theaters. This contribution(involving also a wholesale destruction of shipping in the Philippines-Formosa-Chine Sea area,and the destruction of the bulk of the remsinin~ Jap battle fleet) assured the capture of thePhilippines by Southwest Pacific Forces.
The contribution of Naval and Marine land-based aircraft to the Southwest Pacific campaignhas not been fully recognized. Leaving aside the 22,000 attack sorties flown against targetsin the Bismarcks and Solomons after control of the Solomons air force passed to SoWesPac, N a v a land Marine planes flew some 30,000 sorties in the Southwest Pacific area. The bulk of these26,000 were attacks by Marine aircraft on targets in the Philippines. Marine fighters werebased at Leyte from late November 1944, and took part in assuring the conquest of that islandand defending it from Jap suicide attackers and reinforcing sea convoys. These f ighters la terassisted in the recapture of the Central and Southern Philippines. Marine dive bombers wentashore at Lingayen in January 1945 and provided air support to Army ground forces in Luzonunt i l the i r la ter d ivers ion to ass is t the reconquest of the Cent ra l Phi l ippines and Mindanao.Navy patrol bombers extended their searches to the Philippines and began their single-planeattacks on shipping as early as August 1944, and continued them until capture of Philippinesbases and the end of Jap shipping movermnte in the area enabled them to extend their searchesand attacks to Formosa, the China Coast, Indo-China and Malaya, protecting all enemy paths ofapproach to the Philippines. For the year 1945 well over half the offensive operations of Navalland-based air were carried on in the forward sectors of the Southwest Pacific theater.
- 19 -
TABLE 5. NUMBER OF SQUADRONS IN ACTION, AND ACTION SORTIES FLOWN, MONTHLY,
MONTH
1942-FebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneAugustOctoberNovember
1943-JanuaryFebruaryMayJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1944-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
1942 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total
GRAND TOTAL
F4F, FM*No. of Ac-Sqdns. tion
in Sor-Action ties
33
24326
212
111
2525
89
1315
6
181118161412
2
4924
8391
181143367
382086
21144
23841443
517748
15351273
191
11651132180324734741409
23
938183
4,4288,479
14,028
By Model of Aircraft
A. CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT
F4U, FGNo. of Ac-Sqdns . tionin Sor-
Action ties
1
11
29
1711108
1111
2
61
131652
227419161021520
20121C47
009
9,573
9,582
F6FNo. of Ac-Sqdns. tionin Sor-
Action ties
336
157
131511167
18191219201713
1320192022181818
10885
3781382208
13862166907
2607402
4538580411225546497224531600
44822465385356523583142534731789
02,161
33,50326,722
62,386
——S?3D
No. of Ac-Sqdns. tionin Sor-
Action ties
5 1476 932 64 1836 23$6 4224 825 198
2 24
1 72 881 504 2947 6424 105
8 5508 10273 3144 7681 192 6362 154
1,3701,2103,468
0
6,(!48
SB2C, SBWNo. Of AC-Sqdns. tionin Sor-
Action ties
11
1122357689
117
57
109879
10
17968
152197145558275
11312698316
290321961008108
703500
12311515921288
1162554
0247
11,6876,874
18,808
* F4F through October 1943, FM thereafter.#TBD through June 1942, TBFand TBM thereafter.
NOTE : No carrier action was reported for the months not listed in the table.Composite squadrons are counted once for each type of plane included.
TBD, TBF, TN+#No. of Ac-Sqdns. tionin Sor-
Action ties
22
23324
1
337
147
172013217
26281132351719
3127383635292022
4725
6644786243
16
9461240768147
6821298407
129220619383144278
31822507936163
2156121029714496305419931821817
3651,326
16,03318,518
36,242
(Notes to this table are on p.23)
- 2 0 -
MONTH
1$)41.Dec@mber
1942 -Merch*June#AugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1943-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1944-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
194142 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total
GRANTI TOTAL
F4F, FMNo. of Ac-Sqdns. tierin Sor-
Action ties
1
123763
2311143
1
49
657
25947817540
8410
8793
81167
11
125
1,064432
c2E
1,524
TABLE 5. Continued
B. LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT, OF CARRIER TYPES
F4U, FGNo. of Ac-Sqdns. tionin Sor-
Action ties
346655796
109
14131213142021232324
1917181921191915
118113156358414430384821467
115117501108115915941332290142873563472448752932
2365311827753463243127112423547
03,261
31,37619,833
54,470
F6FNo. of Ac-Sqdns. tiOnin Sor-
Action ties
4343
314411122322
22346463
16972
100261
25414940240535823123444423
27326
68206245164232274116
5
0602
2,2321,310
4,144
SBDNo. of Ac-Sqdns. tierin Sor-
Action ties
1 222 316 2255 3117 3594 284
3 2845 3575 1574 8~2 1284 2709 14305 3748 5588 6469 107710 1232
6 9157 132211 304611 251610 242110 15268 21129 232410 19979 19209 866
10 370
7 3848 39997 43507 30178 29126 17976 1012
1,2326,601
21,33517,471
46;639
SB2C, SBWNo. of Ac-Sqdns. tionin Sor-
Action ties
TBF TBMNo. of Ac-Sqdns. tion
in Sor-Action ties
245554
50281379768556321
000
2,355
2,355
1
1131
124426645465
545531111233
22422343
6
2249727
2629
159152203218
1125315393353646751
427661
1439943600484
282118
16197
27012916413237427021749
1564,3704,4471,605
10,578
* 1 F2A squadron flew 4 action sorties.# 1 F2A squadron flew 21 action sorties and one SB2U squadron 17 action sorties.11~: NO action by these types of planes was reported for the months not listed above.
Compositi squadrons are counted once for each type of plane included.
- 2 1 -
TABLE 5, Continued
MONTH
1941-December
1942-JanuaryFebruaryMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1943-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1944-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
1941-42 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total
SRAND TOTAL
PBYNo. of Ac-Sqdns. tionLn Sor-
Action ties
4
3229234312
144252543369
696356356363
2431
1
21
1366
284108
10
3
21614578
251017355463
14564
12562
10763547394735839
331941
1
10925695758
1,380
;%
Sqdns. tionin Sor-1
Action tieel
111
21111
2
12i’87862
251
64211
22
44
73100133874714
00
44462
506
PATROL AIRCRAFT
PB2YNo. of Ac-Sqdqs. tionin Sor-
Action ties
221111
1
11111
171856
215
19
1524282
00
9151
142—
PB4Ym’FSqdns. tionin Sor-
Action ties
111
1323566
567586684586
87
111214141615
18234
4251764519396
10011063
116828797
1044684
105145
52171261259408356425174
0395
1,1392,106
3,640
PViix-o~Sqdns. tionin Sor-
LCtiOn ties..—
2332535
765564566774
56754434
38145
12614454
9612325616930215281
21296
105105141
5371
11274
1781061315
0228
1,838622
2,688
PBJo. ofN
Sqdns. Actionin Sor-
&ction ties
1 1291 1422 1531 1413 1824 2334 3334 3226 6556 685
6 5157 8455 6987 10207 10237 5267 6286 160
00
2,9755,415
8,390
NOTE : No action by VPB aircraft was reported for March and April 1942.
- 2 2 -
NOTES TO TABLE 5
Among the items worthy of note in this table are the following:
( a )
(b)
(c)
(d)
( e )
( f )
(g]
(h)
( i )
( j )
(k)
(1)
(m)
( n )
(o)
The predominance of dive bombers, and the relatively small number of f ighter sor t ies ,in the carrier actions of 1942, resulting from the relatively low fighter complementsof the time.
The t ransfer f rom the F4F to tie F6F in the rebuilt carrier force of 1943, the gradualtransfer from SBD to SB2C in 1944, and the decrease in SB2C use in late 1944 and 1945as Complements changed to meet the kamikaze threat.
The slow emergence of ‘&e FM as an offensive aircraft, beginning in June 1944, after6 months of primarily defensive use.
The sudden rise of the F4U as a major carrier aircraft in early 1945.
The predominance of tie TBF as the primary carrier bomber from 1944 on.
The shi f t , in land-based a i rcraf t , f rom the F4F to the F4U, and the later addition ofthe F6F. (Note that land-based F4F action sorties are probabl-- ser ious ly unders ta ted ,because of inadequate reports of most of their offensive missions; the same applies, toa lesser extent, to land-based F4Us for 1943).
The deoline and subsequent rise of land-based F6F combat activi~. The decline re-sulted from the abolition of land-based Navy support squadrons in early 1944 (and theincreasing problem of supplying a larger number of carriers with F6FS). The later re-turn of the F6Fs was as Marine land-based night fighters.
The decline in use of the land-based F4U in 1945, as carrier demands for fighters in-creased.
The persistence of the land-based SBD in combat mtil nearly the end of the war.
The withdrawal of the TBM from general land-based combat duty after the peak of theSolomons campaign, and its restriction to a few Marine squadrons engaged principallyin local anti-submarine patrol and special support duties, including supply dropping.
The persistence of the PBY in combat (largely night attacks on shipping and by-passedJaps) unt i l ear ly in 1945.
The sudden expansion of PBM combat activity in March 1945 aftar 14 months of largelynegat ive pat ro ls .
The considerable volm of offensive activity by PB4Y patrols and anti-shipping missionsin early 1945.
The diversion of PVs from offensive to more routine missions in 1945.
The sizeable offensive volume flown by the relatively small force of Marine PBJs.
- 2 3 -
NOTES TO TABLES 6 AND 7
These tables classify, by assigned mission of own aircraft at time of takeoff, all sortienwhich actually attacked or engaged the enemy. It should be noted that sorties which did notac tual ly engage the ene~ are not included; thus the bulk of defensive patrols, search and re-connaissance missions, and a re la t ively smal l number of abor t ive offens ive sor t ies , a re not re-flected herein. The purpose of the table is to show the origins of the missions that resultedin ac t ion .
It has been necessary to make this presentation in two tables because of differences be-tween the classification methods employed for 1944 and for other years. Table 6 presents year-ly data by plane type, with a little less detail for 1944 because of inability to make the 1944class i f ica t ions f i t those avai lable for o ther years . Table 7 presents the expanded detailedclass i f ica t ion avai lable for 1944 only .
The fo l lowing explanatory mater ia l will assist in an appreciation of the data in Table 6 :
(a) Ground Support: The considerable increase in the volum of direct air-ground supportmissions flown by carrier aircraft from less than 15% of total action sorties in 1942-43, toover 2% of a greatly increased total in 1945, deserves notice. In the case of land-based ~and VSB-VTB the increase was from 2% in 1942 to over 3@ in 1945. This ref lects the increasingperfection of air-ground teamwork between Naval aviation and Army-~rine ground forces, - thefunction of direct air support having always been recognized as a primary mission of Naval andMarine avhation. The record of Naval aviation s destruction of such primary enemy strategictargets as aircraft and shipping indicates that this large volume of air-ground support wassuppl ied wi th no loss of s t ra tegic ef fec t iveness .
In fact the number of action sorties on missions classified in the Table as “Air-GroundSupport" does not reflect the full weight of offensive put forth by Naval aviation, and parti-cularly by the carrier forces, on behalf of ground forces. Carrier offensive missions wereclassified as air-ground support only when flown under the control of air support commanders.A number of pre-invasion offensive missions were flown against beach defenses, gun positions,and other ground targets, which were not controlled by air support commands, and are thus classi-fied as strike or sweep missions.
Also, the bulk of the carrier “VP ac t ion sor t ies l i s ted under “Defensive pat ro ls Over Tar-get or Other Forces" involved atticka by patrolling VP on qnemy ground forces, under the direotionof air support commanders, rather than merely defensive engagements with enemy aircraft. It wasa normal practice for fighter combat patrols over invasion beachheads to carry bombs and rockets,and to report to the air support commander for assignment of targets on completion of the patrolperiod. It is estimated that a total of some 40-45,000 car r ie r ac t ion sor t ies , and some 20-25,000 land-based action sorties, were flown in effective direct support of ground forces.
(b) Search or Reconnaissance Missions, A noteworthy trend was the increasing displacementof’ carrier bombers by carrier VF on search missions. In part the large volume of carrier VFmissions in this category in 1944 and 1945 reflects a vast increase in number of photographicmissions, includinK escort fighters which often strafed guns and other targets. However, therewas also an increased use of VF for sector search in place of VSB and VTB.
It should be noted that the action engaged in by most search action sorties was attack ontargets of opportuni~, rather than combat with enemy aircraft. Only 425 carrier-based searchand reconnaissance action sorties out of 4,672, and 789 land-based (mostly VPB) out of 8,431,actually engaged enemy aircraft in combat (See Table 23). Some of those which engaged in com-bat, and all of the remainder, attacked land or ship targets in addition to carrying out theirreconnaissance funct ions .
(c) Defensive Patrols: The increasing predominance, as the war advanced, of action bydefens ive pat r ols over Invasion forces afloat and ashore, as agains t ac t ion res t r ic ted to de-fense of base, i s c lear ly i l lus t ra ted by f igures for both carr ier and land-based ~. In 1942our fizhters were devoting most of their defensive energies to warding off attacks on their ownbases . By 1945 the bulk of the defense could be diverted to keeping the enemy from attackingother land ins ta l la t ions or f r iendly forces .
The relative lack of defensive action by land-based ~ in 1944 deserves notice. During
(Cont. on next page)
- 2 4 -
TABLE 6. ACTION SORTIES, BY PURPOSE OF MISSIONBy Plane Type, Carrier-Based and Land-Based., by Years.
BASE ,PLANE TYPE,
YEAR
1$)42194319441945
CARRIER VSB-VTB:
1942194319441945
LAND-BASED VF:
1941-4219h319441945
LAND-BASED VSB.VTB:
l’jb2194319441945
PATROL BOMBERS
lyul~2194319441945
ACT 10~OFFENSIVE
Strike AiF
Sweep Support
396 1091,547 257
32, 241*26,371 6,512
1,274 2872,396 342
29,499*15,126 9,590
411 03,050 56
32,848*14)40&3 4,4go
1,16510,215 3%
25,016*11,459 9,372
27 0334 0
4,513*5,850 64
&%i%F-OR REC-CONNAIS-SANCE
6
96Z2,388
128
72390
6;93194
164125719530
69484
2,4232,8l8
BY PURPOSE OF MISSIONDEFENSIVE PATROLSCarrier Target,
Force, Base, or otherother Local Forces
427406
2,528
3121
90
652a15
67
00
3:
:
5
0125
4,633*6,758
00
84P27
13290
1472,066
070
10
02Ei
24* 3
*1944 data are not separsble between these types Of Offens ive or defens ive miss ions .
ORUN-KNOWN
0
9?217
156
t33169
617
12256
42404730
1333
12574
TOTAL
93fli2,34037,94044,774
1,7352, 7g7Jl,l&3?5,392
l,ot394,29534,0482l,171
1,40510,97125,78221,431
109g83
7,0g5g, 714
(Cont. from preceding page)
this year the enemy was unable to bring any appreciable offensive effort to bear against thebases ( largely in the Solomons, Marshalls, Marianaa and Palau) gar r i soned by Naval a i r c r a f t . T h e1945 increase reflects the use of Marine ~ at Okinawa.
Another in teres t ing var ia t ion is the high rate of action by carrier bombers on defensivepatrola in 1944. These were largely anti-submarine patrols by VTB over landing force areas;after completion of patrols the planes bombed nearby shore targets. In 1945 this practice gener-a l ly ceased, or the duties were taken over by fighters.
(d) General: The predominance of offensive missions amofig sorties involving action with thee n e m y , fo~~pes of planea other than VPB, is clearly s h o w n . Even in the case of carrier VF,near ly 8% of their missions which eventuated in action were offensive. For single-engine bombers,and land-baaed fighters, of fens ive miss ions resul ted in a l l but 3% to 1~ of the i r ac t ion agains tthe enemy. In the oaae of patrol bmnbers, over one-third of their action was on eearch miss ions ;if the primarily offensive Marine PBJs were deducted, Nell over half of their action would be onsearch !nisaione.
- 2 5 -
TABLE 7. ACTION SORTIES, BY DETAILED PURPOSEAND OBJECTIVE OF MISSION, 1944 ONLY
By Type of Aircraft, Carrier-Based and Land-Based..—. .——.— —
PURPOSE OF MISSION
BONBING OR ROCKET ATTACK:Lznd Objective —
Ship ObjectiveLand ,and/or Ship
SWEEP, OR STRAFING ATTACK:Lend ObjectiveShip ObjectiveLancl and/or Ship
RECONNAISSANCE WITH BOMBS
RECONNAISSANCE WITHOUT BOYJ3S
DEFENSIVE STANDING PATROLS#
INTERCEPTION 01’ ATTACK
MINE.LAYING*
MIsCELLANIDUS
UNKNOWN
l’OTALS ——
x
VF
21,0613,5943,916
3,073
5ii
630
339
3,969
664
31
61
L
37,940
.IER&
VSB
9,/3512,5672,266
20264
325
45
43
0
0
a
0
15,155
ACTION SOa
VTB
10,5442,2341,947
30~2
346
4g
793
6
53
15
7
16,033
RTIES, BY BASE AND
VF
27,955627359
2,2591,116
532
651
2~o
139
a
0
go
42
34,048
VSB
20,253440100
100
530
2
0
0
0
0
2
~
TYPELAND-BAS
Vm
4,025193
0
400
179
g
0
0
27
0
11
4,447
— . .AIRCRWI
EDPBJPv
3,912SI13
100
726
35
16
0
14
3
12
4,813
PB4Y
923CI1
000
EK?y
150
3
0
32
4
2
~_
— .FlyingBoats
322
:;
000
6g1
6
5
0
2g
22
g—
~# Includes Cm, A S P , and ~trols over target .* Some addi t iona l minelaying attacks may have been classified as bombing ottacks on shiD
ob~ectives.NOTE: This de ta i led breakdown of -purpose of mission is. not available for yeers other than lqbA.
It should be noted that the targets ultimately attacked may have differed from the or~gin,alo b j e c t i v e s listed in the table.
Table 7 provides a more detailed analysis, for 1944 only, of the missione flown by Naval air-craf t which resul ted in ac t ion. Of interes t are
(a) The high proportions of carrier bombersf ighters agains t land targets .
(b) The relatively small number of fighterspatrols in warding off enemy attacks. Naval airi n the a i r .
the following items;
sent out against shipping targets, and of carrier
sent up especially to reinforce the standingdefense was largely by standing patrols already
(c) The relatively small volume of anti-shipping attacks by land-based VF, VSBand VTB (gener-ally based out of reach of major enemy shipping). A partial exoeption is noted for VF, which flewmany s t raf ing miss ions agains t smll craft in the Solomons area.
(d) The contrast between the employments of the various types of patrol bombers. The MarinePBJs were used predmninantly as formation bombers and night hecklers, rather tian as single searchplanes, while the Pvs were used extensively for small strikes by 2 to 6 planes against minor landtargets in the Solomons area, at Nauru, in the Southwest Paci f ic , and in the Kuriles. Both t:ypeswere used for search, but principally in negative sectors. PB4Ys, on the other hand, were usedmainly for sector search. The flying boats were used for a variety of purposes, and the 1944 datareflect such diverse missions as night anti-shipping eearches by PBY Black Cats, PBY missionsagainst barges and coastal targets in the Solomons in cooperation with PT boats, sector searchesby PBMs and PB2Ys, night heckler missions over enemy bases by PBYs,by PB2Ys .
and bombing strikes on Wake
- 2 6 -
2. CARRIER OPERATIONS, GENERAL DATA
TABLE 8. SUMMARY OF CARRIER AIR OPERATIONS AND RESULTS FOR ENTIRE WAR,By Type of Carrier, by Plane Model, and by Service (Navy-Marine)
TYPE CARRIERPLANE MODEL,SERVICE—.—. —
W TotalF6FF4U (Navy)F4U (Marine)F4FSBZC, SEWSBDTBF, TBb!TBD
CVL, TotalF6FTBF, TBld
CVE, TotalFMF6F (Navy)F6F (Marine)F4U (Marine)F4FSBDTBF, TBM (Navy)TBF, TBM (Marine)
GRAND TOTAL
— .
TOTALACTIONSORT IES—.—
94,917~-56,4882,650
96818,8085,852
18,254182
21,478m6,379
30,699V5,426
146443136196
10,931496
147,094
OWIJ LOSSESON ACTION SORTIESTo Eneqy Opera-‘~ tional
1,028
934011
268 4019911
200
72
200
442460
775
370
18164418432125
%4
E2003020
719
482122
21843
1478
131
40
151
180095
440
1,428 452 1,001
~CYNmRFLIW’TS
1,148-5W
1824242
18461
1271
364
85
476
418574
1271
1,988
ON;HIP
610m7637208833
10914
179
57
185
480122
610
974
ENEMY AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMBAT
Bombers Fighters
10053
1851330131
3,317m 2601591093075385
410 882m m
4
259
48065150
6
288
51003060
1,997 4,487
TONS OFBOMBS
ON!ARGETS
31,755~
954277
210,9942,46713,461
134
6,323~4,831
7,58114~
1,00925814
575,953
304
45,659
NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, all planes are Navy.
‘fha table indicates that some 65% of a l l ac t ion sor t ies were f lown from ~Vs, 15% from CVLS,and 2QZfrom CVES. CVLS accounted for 2% Of all enemy aircraft destroyed in combat, CVBs forless &an 9$, while CVS were creditid with Over 7%.
Attention is invited to the low CVE plane losses to enemy aircraft in comparison with then~bers destroyed in combat: 20 losses as against 547 destroyed. The CVE F6F record Of 99enemy planes destroyed against 2 air combat losses, and the FM record of 422:13, far exceed thefast carrier records, and only 2 CVE bombers are credited as lost in air combat.
-27-
TYP13 CARRIER,PLANE MODEL,
SERVICE
CV TOTALF6FF4U , Na~F4U, llarineSB2C, SBWSBDTBF, TBM
CVL TOTALF6FTBF, TBM
CVE TOTALFMF6F, NavyF6F, MarineF4u, MarineS13DTBF, TBk, NayTBM, Marine
GRAND TOTAL
TABLE 9. LOSSES, LOSS RATES, AND OPERATIONAL DATA,CARRIER-BASED NAVAL AND MARINE AIRCRAFT. PACIFIC ONLY. 1944-1945 ONLY
By Carrier Type, Plane Model, and Service (Navy-Marine)
AIR- FLIGHTSCRAFT SQUAD-ON RONS INHAND ACTION
*
I15430 209,1507369 108.6671384 22:266539 7,554
2764 30,506633 7,786
2741 32,371
3892 69,2742-&ilT ~1046 17,099
I5914 109 0752’m-3&i2670 14,72724 513
118 2,23654 903
2078 37,77072 1,614
25236 387,499
ACTIONSORTIES
88,335’40,1786,4892,650
18,5613,33117,126
20,679,~6,062
-1
29,744m4,748
146443137
10,867496
138,758
OWN LOSOPERATIONALAc- Ontion OtherSor- F1’tsties
619 1013m x48 18221 42
216 1828 17
126 109
125 325m m39 78
138 450T m18 390 80 54 3
41 1140 1
882 1788
SES
ONSHIP
540m7637883
107
175m55
179
47012
600
894
TOTAL,Inclu-dingEnemyAction
3366m41715676646
543
862
240
963m13710109
2926
5191
OWN LOSS~Per Per100 100Action OtherSor- Fl'tsties
0.70 0.84m m0.74 1.150.79 0.861.16 1.520.24 0.380.74 0.71
0.60 0.67m m0.64 0.71
0.46 0.57m m0.38 0.39
0 2.180 0.28
2.92 0.390.38 0.42
0 0.09
0.64 0.72
RATES -smP-Per100
Planes Per
Month
3.5m5.56.93.20.53.9
4.5n5.3
z7.0@
0.8@
2.9@
3.5
I5mr- FLIGHTSPer Per Per100 Plane Ac-Planes P8r tionPer Menth Sor-
21.819.530.128.927.87.3
19.8
13.6 2.414.7 m16.1 3.414.0 2.911.0 1.612.3 2.311.8 1.9
22.1 17.8 3.3m m m22.9 16.3 2.8
16.3 18.4 3.7T’?Z m m20.4 22.0 3.1
@ @ 3.58.5 18.9 5.0@ @ 6.6
14.1 18.2 3.5@ @! 3.3
1
* In terms of plane months ; sum of aircraft reportsd on hand each month by squadrons in action.fiero no sui-q-was reported for ai~craft on hand , authorized complement was used. Amonthly average strength in action can be Obtained by dividing by 20.
@ Re.tio not calculated; less than 100 planes on hand.
NOTE: All planes are l?a~ unless o therwise speci f ied .—
-28-
NOTES TO TABLE 9
T h i s t a b l e is of pr imary in teres t as a source of overal l carr ier a ircraf t loss rates incombat operations for tie last 20 months of the war - the months of fu l l -scale , regular carr iero p e r a t i o n s . I n c l u d e d a r e a l l f l i g h t s , action sorties and losses for each carrier, for the wholeof each month that the carrier reported any air action against the enemy.
Many interesting comparisons between loss rates are invited by the tablet
( a )
(b)
( c )
(d)
( e )
Operational loss rates, both on action sorties and on other flights, are highest on CVS,lowes t on CVES. This is true for all types of planes combined,and also for the F6F andTBF separately; the F6F and TBF were used on all three types of carrier. When thesetwo types alone are considered, the margin of the CVL over the CV is very slight andthe superiority of the CVX more pronounced .
Operational loss rates are almost invariably lower for sorties involving action againstthe enemy than for other flights. This may reflect only the erroneous attribution toenemy action of mission planes actually lost for operational causes; this factor ismore likely to apply to fast carriers than to CVES.
The SBD was the shfest plane , operationally, follcwed in order by the F6F and TBF.F6F operat ional 1 0SS rates were far lower than those for the FM and F4U. The SB2Cranked a poor last operationally.
NO par t icular pattarn is discernible in lOSS ra tes for non-airborne a i rcraf t aboardship , o ther than &at CVLS had the highest losses, and CVES the lowest . These areinfluenced heavily by the accidents of kamikaze attack (which affected the CVES least)and typhoons.
In total losses to all causes , inc luding enemy ac t ion , CVES again fared best, partlybecause of their lower rate of losses to enemy action, and their lower proportion ofa c t i o n s o r t i e s t o t o t a l f l i g h t s . The relatimsly low operational loss rates of the F6Fand TBF help them to maintain their superiority over the F4U and SB2C in total losses.SBD and FM totil losses remain the lowest, however.
From the table it will W seen that the average carrier aircraft in combat operations madeabout 15 flights per month, about 5 or 6 of which resulted in action against the enemy. ForCVES and CVLS these figures would read 18 and 5, for CVS 14 and 6. These averages, however,include months of very light operations; figures for peak months are given in Tables 12 and 13.In general, fighters made more flights and had less action sorties per month than the overallaverage, while bombers had more action in a smiler number of flights. The highest average ofaction sorties per plane per month, however, was reported for CW F6Fs (7.1) which also had thehighest average flights per monti, showing the heavy reliance placed upon the SANG&MON classcarriers during amphibious operations; SB2CS were next with 6.7.
700360 0- 46- S -29-
TABLE 10. SUNM4RY OF CARRIER AIR OPERATIONS AND RESULTS, MONTHLY
A. LARGE CARRIERS (ESSEX ClaSs and other CVS)
MONTH
1941-December
1942-FebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneAu~stOctoberNovember
1943-JanuaryFebruaryJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1944-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilHayJuneJulyAufyetSeptemberOotoberNovemberDecember
1945-JanuaryPsbruarytirchApri1MayJuneJulyAugust
1941-42 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total
GRAND TOTAL
CVsINAc-TION—
#
33123322
21121465
6656478689
107
811101098
1011
FLIGHTS,SQUAD-RONS INACTION
*
********
********
10,3145,9385,6426,0442,2209,474
11,9234,32212,26912,2908,4467,416
12,76812,04615,00419,63014,2637,78317,85213,506
*
96:298112,852
209,150
— .
ACTIONSORTIES
#
243142
6332374681287494
78207
270128763
2,286471
1,9523,1?,51,4153,747
8155,4926,3201,0368,7797,2763,8301,551
5,7843,8657,2807,7954,6231,3356,8853,440
2,5594,023k7,328L1,007
94,917
. .ON ACTION SORTIES
%%%- ~=
0 1
3 62 00 01 2120 416 231 209 2
0 00 10 03 01 07 012 165 3
9 216 618 221 48 075 3148 1021 351 10113 5773 923 0
82 835 3584 3171 1138 510 4129 433 4
42 11428 20476 134482 102
0
900
11166
192
00012
12211
7139
211
98343
29722918
4634614222154718
6337
334285
1028 370 719
5N-OTHERFL'TS
0
6453
251455
311649
2717
232019151123301521644038
618889772622
24883
6768
319694
1148
7X-SHIP
0
200
37111
150
00000022
13030
1172
1556278
54488989110971
664
133407
610
8NEMY AIRCRAFTDESTROYNDIN COMBAT
Bombers Figh-t ers
#
2310
243365483
1140003
836
9186
212
16595
271962913
444573
290410
1021
197107500524
#
1000
4236234225
00000
268235
2512547311
3537511
21155518946
75332206455190172923
178143
1,6691,327
1,328 3,317
TONS OFBOMBSON
TARGETS
#
77511
1391001816074
2300
10955
298767183
6271,008
5431,377
3231,7303,068
3553,3322,5901,349
263
1,581915
2,0102,8161,817452
2,2811,200
6831,43516,56513,072
51,755
#Na action r e p o r t e d ; loss reported maybe from unreported action, or may be an erroneousr e p o r t .
* NO data available.
- 3 0 -
MONTH
1943-AugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1944-JanuaryFebruaryHarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1945-JanuaryFebruaryIkirchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total
CVLsINAc-TION
12352
666‘738738866
55666467
GRAND TOTAL
* No data available.
NOTES TO TABLE 10
TABLE 10.Continued
B. SIL4LL CARRIERS (CVLS, INDEPENDENCE Class)
SQUAD-R0NS INACTION
*****
4,5883,0742,2483,9371,2765,9384,519
8435,2735,2092,6412,133
2,6802,5774,1325,1203,7071,6084,4813,290
41:67927,595
69,274
ACTIONSORTIES
2068
17048457
7231,136
3451,276
872,0541,559
1351,7291,177
567309
921487
2,0152,2771,349
3391,447
747
79911,0979,582
21,478
—OWN LOSSES
~ ACTION SORTIES
~
0 04 06 13 101 0
3 32 04 111 10 0
22 138 41 013 316 109 25 0
16 05 525 113 58 01 020 34 0
14 1194 3792 14
00240
45231
158
1:979
77
1865171
67352
200 62 131
High points in the 3 pages of this table are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
m-OTHERFL'TS
o95
196
15107
155
21135
11381016
21211917137
4714
39166159
364
m-SHIP
00040
121002302
672
35
142
1728
1421
1:60
179
ENEMY AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMBAT
Bombers Fighters
05684
11315110
6310
19121202
74
296710022
23266121
008
171
176
42300
165280
115116345
265035
125290
1815
26558298
410 882
TONS OFBOMBSON
TARGETS
72837
16015
18723464
28420
46853734
38221916867
261110599796500163656327
2472,6643,412
6,323
The peak CV flight performance of April 1945, when 10 CVS averaged 1963 flights pership for the month.
The peak CV combat performance of September 1944, when 8 CVS, during 11 or 12 strikedays per ship, flew an awrage of 1,534 flights and 1,097 action sorties per ship, andplaced an average of 416 tons of bombs on target per CV, with a loss of only 16 planesper ship, a record not equalled subsequently, but approached in July 1944.
The peak CV records for planes destroyed in combat per month: 518 by 8 CVS in June 1944,751 by 9 CVS in Ootober 1 9 4 4 , and 745 by 10 in April 1945.
The peak CVL perfornmnce record of April 1945, when 6 CVLS averaged 853 flights, 380a c t i o n s o r t i e s , 753 roclmta and 133 tons of bombs per CVL for the month, with 7 planelosses per CVL.
(Cont. on next page)
-31-
TABLN 10. Continued
c. ESCORT CARRIERS (All Classes)
MONTH
1942-November
1943-MarchMayAugustNovemberDecember
1944-JanuaryFwbruaryI&mchAprilJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberDecember
1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
1942-43 Total1944 Total1945 Total
—GRAND TOTAL
CVEsINAC-TION
3
f
g
1
5828
11114
16186
18111520201743
FLIGHTS,SQUAD-ONS INACTION
*
*****
2,1434,099
7133,9255,5207,7001,6407,9377,4121,456
10,2996,2739,176
16,49812,22710,402l,756
930
*42,54567,561
11O,1O6
ACTIONSORTIES
114
#86#
2154
11852127
2471,2202,670
5452,6582,495
202
1,9321,6072,8375,9803,0813,961
13643
41910,70319,577
30,699
CWN LOSSBSON ACTION SORTIBS
i%%- $=
5
00200
0100
188
148
380
10131239161411
787
106
0
10200
0000400072
20020000
3134
5
07010
3202
14608
460
133
11149700
138157
——200 20 151
im-OTHERFL'TS
11
021
100
9141
1435302
23488
94244144421643
24184268
476
mSHIP
2
00020
70039013
3 71
22302
19361100
461
120
185
.—
BNEUY AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMRAT
Bombers Fighters
6
g
f
0
0001
26050
9210
2314
748134
7134118
3
g
~
0
0010
25031
10935
6802
380300
3174111
259 288
—
TONS OF
OliTARGETS
24
f
#350
56222
111723766184
493530
3
466221553
1,4211,2081,213
320
632,4045,114
7,581
* No data avai lable .# NO action reported; losses reported may be from unreported action or may be erroneous reports.
(Cont. from preceding page)
(e) AISO during April, the 192 enemy planes destroyed in combat bya c t i o n . Other peak CVL performances were in June 1944, when 8and in October 1944, when 8 CVLs destroyed 237 of the enemy.
airdraft of the 6 CVLS i nCVLs deatropd 228 planes,
(f) CVE peak performance in April 1945, when 20 CVES averaged 825 flights, 299 action Eorties,71 tons of bombs and 1,335 rockata per ship for the month, and shot down 112 enemy planeswith only 2 air combat losses.
(g) The CVE air combat record of Ootober 1944 , when 201 enemy planes were shot down against7 losses to enemy aircraft.
-32-
NOTES TO TABLES 11, 12 AND 13
These three tables provide analyses of some aspects ofmonths or per iods , durti~ tie rna.ior pert of the Pacific war
carr ier operat ions for success ive(early actions and Atlantic oper-
a t ions excluded) . Percentages and averages have been calculated, to show trends in performancewith respect tog
(a)
(b)
( c )
The
R e l a t i v e VQIUUEI Of f l ights , ac t ion sor t ies , and ordnance on target, credited to eachtype of carr ier and type of a i rcraf t .
Average bomb and rocket load delivered to target by each type of aircraft and each typeo f c a r r i e r .
Flights and action sorties flown per plane of complemnt, for each type of aircraft andeach type of carr ier .
data will be useful to show, among other items :
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Most of
The composition and employment of the combat carrier forces during various periods.
The physical capabilities of the f’orce and its components during varicus types ofopera t ions , and for periods of various lengths.
The extent to which the offensive potentialities of the force or any of its compo-nents were less than fully utilized during various periods.
The relative parts played by various components of the force in providing the airef for t necessary for the opera t ion.
the informat ion in these tables i s of technical ra ther than ceneral interest . andno detailed analysis will be made, but the following will be crf general interest$
,
( a )
(b)
( c )
(d)
( e )
( f )
The increased utilization of carrier VF for bombing and rocket a t tacks , par t icular lyCVL and CVE fighters, which during some periods averaged as much as a quarter ton ofbombs per F6F attack sortie, and 3 or 4 rockets per a t tack sor t ie .
The average loading of over 5 rockets (plus over 1000 pounds of bombs) per attack sortiecarried by CVE TBMe in the IW O J ima and Okinawa opera t ions .
The general tendency for CVL and CVE ordnance loadings per sortie to equal or exceed thoseof CV planes of the same types, particularly in 1945 operations, despite the smaller sizeof the carr ier .
The general reliance on CVL and CVE planes for the bulk of the patrols not involvinga c t i o n , and on CVE for the major weight of offensive activity. This pract ice was par t i -ally reversed during the Okinawa operations, when the offensive capabilities of theCVLS were for tie first time fully utilized on a scale comparable with the CVs, the CVEstook over a major share of the offensive, and the CVS increased their re la t ive vol~o f p a t r o l a c t i v i t y .
The parallel tendency of requiring CVLs (and the CVEs in months of major amphibiousoperations) to fly a higher number of flights per plane per month than the CVs, and alower number of action sorties per plane. Even in the Okinawa operations this tendencywas not eradicat-e Table 12 for April 1945, when CVLS and CVES not only made 26f l ights per p lane agains t the CVSI 20 , but flew far more action sorties as well).
The record performances in flighte per plane per month,
F6F : 37.1 from CVES, 30.3 from CVLS, and 24.2 from CVs, in April 1945.
TBM: 28.7 frm CVES in July 1944, 20.0 from CVs in October 1944,21.3 from CVLs in July 1944.
-33-
TABLE 11. ANALYSIS OF CARRIER AIR OPERATIONS DATA, FORSUCCESSIVE PERIODS IN 1944-45 (PAIFIC ONLY)
By TYPE Carrier and by Model Aircraft
PEECENT OF PERIOD TOTAL AVERAGUSTons RocketsAc- Tons
tion of Rock-Tllts Sor- Bombs ets
ties
per perAttack AttackSortie Sortie
January - Xey 1944
15,3724,7902,6101,4622,402
0
2,107926
77lm
A
~202
1,119714
1,s430
:1
0
3;
~00
76;0
00
000
13FIIOD WTALCL F@
SBD
5Q214,M06,5663,0256,226
161
10,3154,!308
2,2913,152
{J&__
0% %%0:43 0.000.49 0.000.77 0.320.00 0.00
SB2CTBF , TBNF4tJ
CVL F6F—TBF, TBM
0.04 0.000.77 0.00
CVE F@’— FM
SBDTBF,TBM
0.00 0.000.04 0.00o.2g 0.000.67 0.73349 i 384
June - &yst 1944
PERIOD TOTAL o gllg~ F6F %12, 1
SBD 1,220SB2C 6,610
22,294+, ;:;
4,2043,047
0
2,178l,lM
l,w61,1411,134
%2o
2,;$2,060
0
2379;
32;
JisL
54281,487
00
1,8700
00
0
A&_
~ ~0.07 0.220.47 0.000.54 0.00o.6g 0.610.00 0.00
TBF, TBMF4U
5 ;099176
CVL F6F— TBF,TBM
6,g743 ,L24
0.11 0.000.71 0.00
CVE F@— FM
4,2204 ,Mo
A&L
0.17 0.000.00 0.050.52 1.78TBF . l’BM
September - October 1944
PERIOD TOTAl~ F67?
SB2CTBM
CVL F6F— T B M
CVE F@— FM
TBM
%3’o
13,6,8344,279
7,7372,745
1,9337,666JL.liL
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0S- 77?* s %
0.57 0.000.70 0.32
13.6 Z.i 41.g 0.0f3.5 13.2 30.1 7.4
15.4 9+.2 1.2 14.75.4 2.g 6.8 0.0
3.g 11.6 0.4 0.015.2 2.2 0.01104 7.6 l;:t ?7.3
0.04 1.020.74 0.00
0.01 0.000 .Og 0.010.52 2.90
NOTE : Sorties attacking targets, end averages based thereon, are not comparable between1944 and 1945, since attacks on multiple targets were counted as multiple attacksin 1944 end single attacks in 1945.
- 3 4 -
TABLE 11. Continued
TYPE OFCARRIER,
PLANT MODEI
PERIOD TO!CAIg F6F
F4USB2CTBM
CVL F6F—TBM
CVE FM—‘l?BM
PERIOD TOTAL~ F6V
F4u,F@SB2CTBM
CVL F6F—TBM
CVE F6F— F4U,F’G
mTBM
PERIOD TOTfiQ F(2?
F4U,FGSB2CTEN
CVL F6F—TBM
cm F6F— F~,FG
FMTBM
ACTION I I TARGIWSI TARGETS
47, g3q21, l&7
3, IQ()3,433
6,2&+1,190
-xl-
+1 446.39
18, ml6,/337~, 719
13,9453,199
7,4951,190
27,373M. w
41, q12, ggo10,0633.7!304,615
6,03g1* 733
~ .3&
‘w
15,096%7.2
ROCXETSIXPEND.m 0sTARGETS
p~cm OF PZRIOD TOTAL I AVIWGESAc- Tong I Tons Rocketstion of Rook- per per
I?llts Sor- Bombs ets Attack Attackties Sortie Sortie
November 19~ - January 1945
WI%101 12
1,709 l,oLq1, g3g l,kog
1,175 117507 379
4; 3214,562
3,6701, ggg
2,697339
6, tm6. g22
1;730
1,217790
+1 &Tl10, 3
4;y17
2,2900
2,475~
February - June 1945
14,794-%1,00
72132, goo3,478
6761,492
60976
&
121 02+1 lg14:0113,9543,116
10,1401,756
10,348l,yg
25,70j’W&L_
July - August 1945
4 4 6+-42&55
1,505
2EW695
35
2!
22.2269,131g,og6
58146
3,841113
54173
-1
0.11 0.000.64 0.030.77 0.21
0.10 1.950.75 0.00
2.76:% 3.20
%! $&0.15 2.900.65 0.920.76 o.6g
0.18 2.760.79 0.92
a 23 3.840.22 4.100.01 3.770.56 5.34
~ 1.-%2.7
O:M 3.040.52 0.35o.f37 0.03
0,24 3.16O.m 0.14
0.13 2.25O.og 2.750.00 6.33o.n 2.g2
See note on previous page.
-35-
TABLE 12. CARRIER AIR OPERATIONS DATA AND OPERATING RATIOS,By Type Of Carrier, Monthly frOm August 1943 to August 1945, Pacific only.
MONTH
1943Au~
September
October
November
December
1944January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
CAR-RIESINACTION
2 w1 CVL
1 Cv2 CVL
3 CV3 CVL
6 CV5 CVL5 CVE
5 CV2 CVL
6 CV6 CVL5 CVE
6 CV6 CVL8 CVE
5 CV6 CVL2 CVE
6 CV7 CVL8 CVE
4 CV3 CVL
7 CV8 CVL11 CVE
8 CV7 CVL11 CVE
6 CV3 CVL2 CVE
8 CV8 CVL16 CVE
—
:oM-%E -LENT
18033
9066
27099
510165128
43066
513198138
513198210
43019856
524231232
33899
617264311
706231311
5339957
728256452
FLIGHTSSQUAD-RONS INACTION
**
**
**
***
**
10,3144,5882,143
5,9383,0744,099
5,6422,248
713
6,0443,9373,925
2,220 1,276
9,4745,9385,520
11,9234,5197,700
4,322843609
12,2695,2737,937
ACTIONSORTIES
.—
27020
12868
712170
2,286484215
47157
1,952723118
3,1151,136
521
1,41534527
3,7471,276247
81587
5,4922,0541,220
8,3201,5592,670
1,036135
9
8,7791,7292,658
TONSOF
BOMBSON
TARGETS— ..—.
1097
5528
28237
76716035
18315
62718756
1,008234222
543641
1,377284117
32320
1,730468237
3,068537661
355343
3,332382493
— — - .OPEIWTINGRATIOfiACTION ACTION TONS
FLIGHTS SORTIES SORTIES PERPER PER PER ACTION
.PERCENT OFMONTIi TOTAL
ACTION TONSFL’TS SOR- OF
TIES BOMBSPLANE PLANE FLIGHT SORTIE
**
**
**
***
**
20.123.215.5
11.615.519.5
13.111.412.7
11.517.016.9
6.612.9
15.422.517.7
16.919.6
24.8
8.18.5
10.7
16.920.617.6
1.50.6
**
0.400.35
0.430.41
0.400.22
0.340.330.16
0.390.26
0.320.260.47
0.320.210.43
0.380.190.04
0.370.220.47
0.400.23
0.320.230.19
0.370.340.25
0.340.250.33
0.380.220.19
937
6535
8119
77167
8911
70264
652411
79192
71245
9010
632314
661321
88111
671320
946
6634
8812
80164
928
72217
691615
89110
77167
946
711910
721315
9091
799
12
**
**
**
***
**
612712
452431
66268
442828
6436
452926
491932
751510
482131
1,41.0
**
2.61.7
**
4.52.91.7
***
1.10.9
**
3.83.70.9
0.190.160.06
6.15.72.5
0.520.370.13
3.31.70.5
@.250.150.04
7.25.51.1
0.620.320.06
2.40.9
0.370.07
8.97.83.9
0.580.350.22
11.86.78.6
0.700.340.35
1.91.40.2
0,240.160.01
12.16.85.9
0.720.330.33
* Data not available.
-36-
MONTH
1944CcW%&
November
December
1945Ja=y
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
-—
CAR-RIERSIN
ACTION
9 Cv8 CVL18 CVE
10 CV6 CVL
7 CV6 CVL6 CVE
8 CV5 CVL18 CVE
11 CV5 CVL11 CVE
10 CV6 CVL15 CVE
10 CV6 CVL
20 CVE
9 CV6 CVL20 CVE
8 CV4 CVL17 CVE
10 CV6 CVL4 CVE
11 CV7 CVL3 cm
COM-PLE-MENT
805256506
960190
721190198
775157574
1,055165350
981198 474
981198634
878198630
775132536
981198122
1,08423194
FLIGHTSSQUAD-RONS INACTION
12,2905,2097,412
8,4462,641
7,4162,1331,456
12,7682,680
10,299
12,0462,5776,273
15,0044,1329,176
19,6305,120
16,498
14,2633,707
12,227
7,7831,608
10,402
17,8524,4811,756
13,5063,290
930
TABLE 12. CONTINUED .
ACTIONSORTIES
7,2761,1772,495
3,830567
1,551309202
5,784921
1,932
3,865487
1,607
7,2802,0152,837
7,7952,2775,980
4,6231,3493,081
1,335339
3,961
6,8851,447
136
3,44074743
TONSOF
BOMBSON
TARGETS
2,590219530
1,349168
263673
1,581261466
915110221
2,010599553
2,816796
1,421
1,817500
1,208
452163
1,213
2,28165632
1,200327
0
OPERATING RATIOSACTION ACTION TONS
LIGHTS SORTIES SORTIES PERPER PER TER ACTIOli
PLANE PLANE FLIGHT SORTIE
15.320.314.6
8.813.9
10.311.27.4
16.517.117.9
11.415.617.9
15.320.919.4
20.025.926.0
16.218.719.4
10.012.219.4
18.222.614.4
12.514.29.9
9.0 0.594.6 0.234.9 0.34
4.0 0.453.0 0.21
2.2 0.211.6 0.141.0 0.14
7.5 0.455.9 0.343.4 0.19
3.7 0.323.0 0.194.6 0.26
7.4 0.4910.2 0.496.0 0.31
7.9 0.4011.5 0.449.4 0.36
5.3 0.326.8 0.364.9 0.25
1.7 0.172.6 0.217.4 0.38
7.6 0.397.3 0.321.1 0.08
3.2 0.253.2 0.230.5 0.05
0.360.190.21
0.350.30
0.170.220.01
0.270.280.24
0.240.230.14
0.280.300.19
0.360.350.24
0.390.370.39
0.340.480.31
0.330.450.24
0.350.440.00
FllRCENT OFMONTH TOTAL
ACTION TONSL,TS SoR - oF
TIES BOMBS
492130
7624
672013
501040
581230
531532
481240
471241
398
53
74197
76195
661123
8713
751510
671122
658
27
601723
491437
511534
246
70
81172
81181
777
16
8911
79201
691120
739
18
641917
561628
521434
259
66
77221
79210
-37-
TABU 13. CARRI~ AIR OPERATIONS DATA AND OPm ING IWIOS,By Type of Carrier and by Model of Aircraft,
for Selected Months of Major operations (Pacific Only)A. FAST CARRIES FORCE
PLANETYPEANDcoMPIiE.
216 F6F160 SBD32 sB2c
105 TBF
120 I@45 ml’
304 F@3 F4U
40 SBD21/3 SB2C141 TBF
16g 3’6F63 TBF
FLIGHTS,QUAD-ONS INACTION
****
**
TONSOFBmBsON
!ARGENU
o256
&$
o160
OPIEWTING RATIOS—TAction Action
Flights Sorties Sorties perPer Per Per Actionplane Plane Flight Sortie
PERCENT OFMONTH TOTALCAIL
IERSIN
cTXOX
6 CV
5 CVL
g Cv
7 CVL
MONTH ACTIONSORTIES
957615in535
283201
Comple- Flightsrnent
@gNovembe] * 4.4 * 0.00
* 3.8 * 0.42* 5.6 ~ ;.;* 5.1 .
* * 0.00* ::; ‘ 0.80
32 @23 *
5 *15 *
18 *
7 *
569013
25234652503
31761343
3640
1$26g81827
1074485
2920
15$1200
192345
1~.7 12.0 0.64 0.084.J 0.3 0.08 0$006.3 3.9 0.61 0.45
15.9 12.4 0.78 0.5617.a 13.0 0.73 0.66
lg.g 6.4 0.34 0.1821.3 7.7 0.36 0.71
19.4 9.9 0.51 0.0711.6 8.1 0.70 0.6220.0 g.p 0.71 0.72
21.3 5.0 0.24 0.0218.0 3.6 0.20 0.77
4 223 2115 15
18 197 g
374 F6F272 s32c159 TBM
lg4 F6F72 TBM
9 Cv
8 CVL
$ Cv
5 CVL
10 Cv
6 CVL
10 Cv
6 CVL
7272316
1907
39131296
372121961359
921256
2551359976
22197
17 227 6
UJ4JJanuary 551 F6F
36 F4U75 SB2C
113 Ttw
112 F6F45 !FEM
390 F6F303 F4U135 SB2C153 TBM
144 F6F54 TsM
9673600
10011494
224Ef432
y370131703
logo
612309
27791916151515/35
1644633
2554193711621232
8g2555
435
3%753
49212
17.6 7.0 0.40 0.1116.7 0.22 0.0913.3 ;:: 0.70 0.5413.2 9.6 0.72 0.70
52 624
g 612 10
12 155 3
20.1 5.5 0.27 0.089.6 6.9 0.72 0.69
24.2 7.1 0.29 0,1119.9 6.3 0.32 0.1314.3 11.2 0.79 0.6514.8 10.4 0.70 0.81
30.-3 11.4 O.y 0.1614.0 11.7 0.84 0.85
9426601719292258
4365755
7347537423622769
3499982
April
July
292250g84
1290
259537
y32 241113 ;
12 1/35 3
412 F6.V281 F4U135 SB2C153 TBM
1~ F6F$ TBM
ailable.
17.g 6.2 0.35 0.1519.1 6.9 0.36 0.1617.5 8.6 0.49 0.49lg.1 13.1 0.44 0.82
387319569
1(M6
197459
35 3324 2411 1113 12
24.3 6.2 0.25 0.2218.2 10.3 0.57 o.g3
12 165 b
-38-
TABLE 13. continued
B. ESCORT CARRIERS
T
CVESMmTH n’?
Ac-i! ION
T
Q&February g
-
JuIy 11
October ! 18
1945January 18
April 20
PLANE FLIGHTS,TYPE SQUAD-AND RONS IN ACTIONcoMPLE- ACTION SORTIESMENT
41;2; /34522 log
li377 2sf3
60 F@12g FM123 Tm
171d
109024 74f33533 g32
54 F6P24/? ml204 TBF
gg3 33038g7 12732622 gg2
364 FM210 !mM
@+ I@32t3 FM222 TBM
7137 11653162 767
3117 12291303g 247353k2 227g
TONSOF
BOMSSON
TARGETS
0
3;la
2360
b25
13
51:
h462
23616
1169
P& Per Per Action Comple- FlightsPlane Pl~e Fli&.t Sortie ment
16.5 6.1 0.37 0.0415.7 0.33 0.0012.9 ?:; 0.34 0.57
19.6 3.? 0.16 0.0015.1 3.7 0.24 0.60
37.1 14.6 0.39 0.1924.5 7.5 0.31 0.o124.1 10.3 0.43 0.51
63 @37 31
13 1949
% 32
-39-
NOTES TO TABIE 14
h this table all c a r r i e r c o m b a t a c t i v i t y h broken down into cmpaigns, r a i d s a n d b a t t l e s ,
and the longer campaigne into major periods and areas of activity.
Especial a t tent ion
of enemy planes engaged
ations here in .
is invited to the known overstatement, in these data, of the number
(see Def in i t ions) , which will be obvioue in sonm of the smaller oper-
Among the in teres t ing i tems in this table are the figures ehowing the re la t ively smal l
scale of opera t ions , compared with results accomplished , in some of the operation, including
Coral Sea, Midway, the Solomons actions, the North Africa landings, the Tarawa raid, the
Rabaul raids, the first Truk strike and Marianas raid, and the Bonins s t r ikes of June-July 1944
(par t icular ly th; second, on 24 June) .
Also worthy of note is the tremendous destruction of enemy aircraft. achieved in the
Philippines in the operation of September-December 1944, against Japan on three days of
February 1945, in the Okinawa campaign, end in the final assault on Japan..
-40-
TABLE 14. AIR OPERM?IONS AND RESULTS. FOR INDIVIDUAL
RAID, BAITLE,OR CAMPAIGN:Target Area,Tme of Carrier
1942i4~*Ds
Marshalls RaidsRabaul RaidFirst Walce hidFirst Marcue RaidSalamaua RaidTokyo Raid
CORAL SEA BATTLETulagi RaidMain Battle
BATTLE OF MIDWAY
SOLOMONS CAMPAIGNGuadalcanal Landi~Eastern Solomons -
Tonolei RaidGuadalceQal SupportBattle of Santa CruzGuedalceuml BattleKolombangem. RaidRennell I. BattleSolomons Su&pport
NORTH AFRICA LANDING
ATTU LANDING
SECOND MARCUS RAIDBAKER ISLAND IANDINGTARAWA RAIDNORWAY RAIDSECOND WAJQi RAID
BOUGAINVILLN SUPPORT. Buka-Bonis Strikes
First Rabaul Raidl Secund Rabaul kid
GILBIiRT IS. CAl@AIGNGilbert Is., CV-CVL
" " C’?FISoutheru MarshallsNauru StrikeKwajalein RaidlTau.ru Strike
FIRST KAVIENG RAIDSE03ND K4VIENG BALDTHIRD KAvIENG RAID
* Estimated lost aboar# Estimated.
CARRIER OPERATIONS AND PHASES THEREOF.
JMHEB or&RRIERsIN ACTIONCV CVL CVE
5 - -2--L--l--L--2--l--
2--l--2--
3 - -
4-3--3--l--l--2--l--l--l--l--
1 - 3
- - 1
21--2-12-l--33-
7 2-11-11-
6%L5- - i21-
;;:11-
11-11-11-
rriers, or be
ACTIONSORTIES
+1
152751y
1046
+$
225
374
1.16250317t369sg
129;:
1624
512
g6
29012
lg4
13z
g
3;;
*2 01, 1
2154602102s7130
103w90
cause of
TONS OFBOMBSON
TARGETS
~
o1/311401
~
go
100
@
2s121929212300
77
4
1160
g316
319
210z
;;
ill?13
1;;a
1154g
35y?35
AIR-
NGAGED
g
301010
+1s
172
294
6 0+12200
66
2162so
226
61
0
032
9;
3.7.+
llg252
-%1
12110
1021
227
AIRCRAFT
Air Ground
~1002000
+
20*
140*
g
10*4
125*o000
#
o
70
150
27
~
o0
630
192
275
000
sinking of enemy csniers.
OWN LOSSESNJLCT ION SORTI~QEtaemg ~era-AjA A/C tioaal
H0 21 01 01 00 0
~ ~0 11 20
20 41
:3
5 100 00 01 201 10 00 00 1
14 1
0 0
300 04 03010 1
f~lg3 14
~ $;0
4 10 123:
1 00 30 1
io1000
Q3g
16
~
501
lgo000
7
7
1021
13
Q703
y
17110
000
-41-
TABLE 14. Continued
I&iID, BATTLE,OR CAl@AI@i
g4JMARSHA.LLS CAMPAIGNMarsholl Is., CV.CVL
" " CVEFirst Truk StrikeMarisnas Raid
MILLE STRIKER.iIRAU SL%PPORT
PALAU, YAP, WOLEM
HOLLAND IA-AITAPEFast CarriersCVES
SECOND TRW STRIIGi!
SABANG RAIDsOERABAJA RAIDTHIRD WAKE & MAR(WS
SOUTHERN FIWiCEI’IFT.H BONINS STRIKXFOURTH WAKE RAID
PALAUJ!OROTAIW. Carolines, CV-CVLW. Carolines; CVEPhilippines, CV-CVLHalmahera-MorotaiCelebes, Borneo
LEYTE CAMPAIGNRydryug AreaFormosa AreaphilipphI13S, CV-CVL
" cm"I CV-CVL
Western Carolines
MINDORO CIMPAIGNFast Carriers,kzonCVXS, Vieayas
ACTIONSORTIES
i“++,ggg639
1,456w
11127
2,172
+2 412,31
227
2,2i33
62
722
2242e,gg21,2207,4552,679
47gg6
873q2
l,jtq
556
53361
12.653j,wg2,2g26,025
li23
9
15,3211,5382, gog4,1002,4844,299
gg
2.062l,g52
210
TONS OFBOMBSON
TARGETS— .
@l,y32
278499102
461
712
~
117
tn~
1920
2g6
0 0%1-2,0 5
2372,726
664152
30;3076Q9
1;;34
%-1, ‘;f?40
?,ll~560
+g-+;6;
1, 2i32524
1,47146
#
3
OWN LOSSES2N ACTION SORTIESTo Enamy Opera-A/A AiC tional
f
o
;
o0
3
0Eo
5
000
g
41025
1312
000
y
91200
8+
23427
110
~o2
5g1
00
15
2
3
001
040
4+
6 2g20
0
-42-
TABLE 14. Continued
RAID , BATTLE,OR CAMPAIGNTareet Area.voe of Carrier
+&_ ~mA1w
Philippines, CV-CVL" CVE
TormosaIndo ChinaSouth ChinaRyakyus
IWO JIMA CAMPAIGNJapanBonins, CV-CVL
II CVERyukyae
OKINAWA CAMFAICN
Ryukyus, CV-CVLII CVE
Japan
Ryu.ky-us, CV-CVLII cm
Jq)an
CV.CVL TOTALCVE TOTAL
RYUKYUS TOTALJ2J?AN TOTAL
ASSAULT ON JAPANHokkaidoTokyo, N. HonshuCentral HonshuKjmshu, Kure Area
MINOR 1945 ACTIONSMaloelap StrikeFifth W&e StrikeBelikpapan LadingActions off OkinawaSixth Wake StrikeMarianas StrikesSeventh Wake StrikeChina Sea Stri.kcsEighth Wake Strike
DATES OFACTION
1/3 -1/30~/6 -~/71/4 -1/301/3 -1/21
1/12~/~5-~/~6
l/22
w?2/u3-y82Jl;7:/g
LL!&44@
21-31 Mamh25-31 MarchL?-29 March
1-30 April1-30 April7-17 April
1-31 May1-31 May.3-21 May
1-10 June1-22 June3-8 June
3/&6/lo3/25-6/22
3/21-6/223/w6/8
m7/ l0-8/157/24-8/ 107/2 L7/2g
w
6/20J[l -7/37/6+,;~23
7j2b, 7/ 26@
@ -8/6gj 6
NUMBER OFCARRIERSIN ACTIONCV CVL CVE
:$2
- 1;g5-g5-g5-75-
ll~g1111 ; ~
- 12;3-
& ~ g
a6-; 13
10 -
10 6- G
Y6-
9 6 -- 20
;4-
6 3 -- 17
5 3 -
14 g -- 2g
13 &3 2g13 g -
QQJ
:~~- -
21-- - 1- - 1l - -- - 1
1 -- - 3
1-:
-——
ACTIONSORTIES
g 6-H1, 21,9322,8g4
910799676
gol+2, 931,9322,746
920
40,157
y, 24~1,6983,054
9,442S,ggo
630
4,0003,0$31~,777
8553,961
431
25,43714,720
34,265s,g~p
12,1532,3495, 66g2,6651,471
1,128195ymg216
~673$33935
168
.—TONS Ol?BOMBSON
TARGETS
q
466834324235161
1 6 1*37
667441207
12,888
1,640
333744
3,3741,421
23~
1, yn1,208
656
4261,2139
8,7131+,~75
11,1961,692
4 %2~l,E%2
&3gg619
ZJ
13529
3?
;
4;
ENEMYAIR-CRAFTENGAGED
151120
&o
1 262@i
1297
Ygo
1,155147130
337
142
17
9?
20J2
o0300040
OWN IOSSESON ACTION SORTIES
~
108 10~ ~
23619 ;26 4g o
g +
15 225 012 0
m !u
4s 2
4: 3:
59 1639 ;25
28 316 018 2
2 014 07 4
235 5769 2
206 23gg 36
186 11T 753 767 3Y+ 1
4 g5 02 01 00 00 00 00 01 00 0
# Approximations based on proration of Force total for campaign.
-43-
TABLE 15. MARINE CARRIER AIR OPERATIONS AND RESULTS, 1945Monthly, By Model of Aircraft and Type of Carrier
TYPE CARRIER,TYPE PJ.ANE,
MOIWH
~ F4U January—FebruaryMarchAprilMayJune
TOTAL
CVE F4U May— —JuneJulyAuguet
TOTAL
CVE F6F May— —JuneJulyAuflBt
TOTAL
CVE TBM May— —JuneJulyAugust
TOTAL
GRAND TUT.AL
FLIGHTS,
-1
SQUAD-RONS IN ACTIONACTION SORTIES
6001780184920251000
131498897702399
586 62604 288887 75159 I 18
2236 443I
4=
287 59157 7755 814 2
513 146
473 181513 298399 17229 0
1614 496
11917 3735
OWN LOSSES ENEMY AIRCRAFT~ON SORTIES ON DESTROYEDTo Enemy Opera- OTHER ON IN COMBATA~ tional FLIGHTS SHIP Bombers Fighters
1 1 7I
4I
1I
9 08 6 5 21 0 5 24
2 0 0 3 1 1 02 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 1 0 3 00 0 0 1 0 2 04 0 0 5 1 6 0
0 0 0 6 0 0 01 0 0 1 0 0 01 0 0 1 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 8 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 02 0 0 1 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 05 0 0 1 0 0 0
51 16 21 56 38
I
59 159
NOTES TO TABLE 15
TOILS OFBOMBS
ONTARGETS
12525384733
277
136350
81
101500
25
106186120
304
687
This table ehowe the eeparate eotivity of Marine carr ier a i rcraf t , which has been includedin all previous tables but not shown separately. A total of twelve 18-plane F4U squadronsoperated from CVe for varying periods, and four CVES fully oomplementid by Marine VF, VF(N) andVTB were in action during the laet four months of the war.
-44-
3. Ixind-Based Operations, General Data
TABLE 16. LOSSES, LOSS RATES, AND OPERATIONAL DATA,LAND-EASED NAVAL AND MARINE AIRCRAFT, PACIFIC ONLY, 1944 - 1945 ONLY,
By Service (Navy-Marine) and Plane Model
SERVICE,PLANE MODEL
IK4RINE SQUADRONSF4U, FGF6F*SBDSB2C, SBWTBF, TBMPBJPBY#PVPB4Y
NAVY SQUADRONSF6FF4U, FGFMSBDSB2C, SBWTBF, TBMPB4YPVPBMPBYPB2Y
GRAND TOTAL
AIR-CRAFTONHAND
*.—
138737715511
13115418995
10483
4621
6751
10918
39682
12822441406730
1C63213
20624
FLIGHTSSQUAD-RONS INACTION
346,342201,35211,038
2569,52613,79628,11820,770
611,413
243
88,219~2,123
2427,2302,0092,421
26,98716,8967,672
12,6002,332,
434,561
ACTIONSORTIES
102,32450,1181,646
335,3412,0234,7588,390
82116
14,414~
74225
2,981332
1,1573,2152,439
5061,007
142
18,217
OiiN LOSSOPERATIONALAc- Ontion OtherSor- F1’tsties
189 523m m
3 270 133 513 137 3112 230 00 50 0
E %2 40 11 161 23 413 689 231 331 201 2
234 709
ES
ONGR'D
4
90 ~G50
250
152000
120To0063
7018973
—212
~Inclu-dingEnemyAction
1169m
421
173178755060
521
191
291116
2247959357
1693
OWN LOSS RATESOPERATIONALPar P8r100 100Action OtherSor- F11 tsties
0.19 0.210.26 m0.18 0.29
@ @0.09 0.150.15 0.110.15 0.130.14 0.19
@ @@ 0.36@ 0.00
0.31 0.25m m0.27 0.29
@ 0.460.03 0.380.30 0.120.26 0.320.40 0.290.37 0.160.20 0.460.10 0.170.70 0.09
0.20 0.22
GROUNDPer100PlanesPerMonth
0.7m1.0@
0.80.01.50.2@@?@
+$0.0a
0.0@
2.33.11.31.20.71.4
1.0
TOTALPer100PlanesPerMonth
8.4l?XZ8.2@
5.64.18.75.2
@l@@
&17.3
@7.3@
12.510.05.68.13.33.3
8.2
FLIGHTSPer PerPlane .\c-Per tionMonth Sor-
tie
25.0 3.4— .26.1 4.021.6 6.7
@ @22.3 1.733.0 6.828.3 5.919.8 2.5
@ a@ e@ e
13.1 6.1m Kf19.5 2.9
@ @18.3 2.424.5 6.118.9 2.112.0 8.412.0 6.910.5 15.211.9 12.510.9 16.4
21.1 3.7
* In terms of plane-months; sum of aircraft reported on hard each month by squadrons in action.Where no sui= -was reported for aircraft on hand, authorized complement was used. Amonthly average strength in action can be obtained by dividing by 20.
# Attached to Hedrons.@ Ratio not calculated; less than 100 action sorties, fliEhts, or planes on hand.
NOTE: 1481 action sorties by planes not identified as to branch of service are excluded from allf igures in th is table except the grand to ta l . These are broken down by plane model asfo l lows: 349 F4U, 28 F6F, 440 unidentified VF, 484 SBD, 137 TBF, 41 unidentified VPB.Also in the same catagory are 2 F4US destroyed on ground, and 1 SBD lost operationally onan act ion sor t ie .
NOTES TO TABLE 16
This table presents deta i led data on loss ra tes and f l ight activi~ for land-baeed aircraftin combat operations, for the yeare 1944-45 and in the Pacific only. The data are comparablewith those for carriers given previously in Table 9.
Attention is invited to the low operational and overall loss rates for land-based planes,part<.cularly for SBD, PBJ and PBY aricraft. Overall loss rates were influenced by the low loseesto enemy action sustained by land-based aircraft, which made a large proportion of their attackson lightly defended or undefended targets, with little airbor~e opposi t ion in the per iod coveredby &is table. The higher lees rates for Navy planes of same types than for Marine planee of thesam types are not especia l ly s igni f icant ; tie Navy planes in these cases were frequently usedin more demanding operations, and in any event the volume of Navy action in this period waa rel-a t ively smal l .
(Cont. on next page)
700380 o-4&4 -45-
(Cont. from preceding page)
It will be noted that land-based VF, VSB and VTB generally made far more flights per monththan carrier planes; about 25 per VP, 22 per VSB, 27 per V’fB, compared with carrier averages ofabout 17, 11, and 15 respectively. Land-based planes of these types also flew more action sortiesp e r m o n t h: ovwr 6 per VP, 10 per VSB, 5 per VTB, as against 5, 6, and 6 respectively.
Patrol bombers, other than tie Marine PBJs, avwraged 10 ta 12 flights per month; only from6 to 17 percent of these resulted in action. PBJs, used primarily as shor t - range format ionbombers, averaged 20 flights per month, 40 percent of which resulted in action.
Marine F6Fs were almost entirely night fighters, and flew a higher ratio of patrol toaction flights than the F4U day fighters. Marine TBMs were also largely used for patrol work,as were the Navy SB2CS in inshore patrol squadrons.
NOTES TO TABLE 17 (The purpose of this table is primarily to provide a historical record. Anumber of interesting observations may be made from the tables:)
(a) Marine fighters carried the greatest burden of aerial combat activity of any of theland-based planes. Part A shows their defensive and offensive combat record through the Solomons-Rabaul campaign. In few months from August 1942 to February 1944 did their relatively smallforce fail to shoot down 50 or more Jap planes. In Decenber 1944 a Marine fighter group wentt o IAe rescue at Leyte. In April-June 1945 at Okinawa Marine VP renewed their early performancesby accounting for 479 Jap planes in 3 months, this time without the high losses that had markedtheir successes under the difficult conditions of Guadalcanal (when tb combination of F4Fs,p o o r a i r s t r i p s , and superior enemy forces had held them to a 5 or 6-to-1 combat superiority overthe Japs instead of their 36-to-1 ratio of 1945).
(b) After the remo=l of the enemy air force from tie Bismarcks area, the Mrine VF tookto bombing, and after the middle of 1944 averaged nearly a third of a ton of bombs on each ofthei r low-level sortiee against the Japs.
(c) The Marine dive and torpedo bonber force, building up from small beginnings to a sub-s tant ia l s t r ik ing power , was the backbone of the anti-shipping and tactical striking force inthe Solomons, contributed greatly to the reduction of the Jap bases in the Marshalls, and latercontributed the bulk of its strength to give tactical air support in the reconquest of Luzonand the southern Philippines. During late 1942 and early 1943 its few planes were devoted main-ly to stopping Jap naval and transport vessels from reinforcing Guadalcanal. Later it carriedi t s an t i - sh ipping s t r ikes to Bougainvi l le , and in early 1944 cleaned the last Jap ships out ofRabaul. Meanwhile as its force expanded it built up its attacks on nearby airfields (Munda andVila), gave heavy direct support in the New Georgia and Bougainville campaigns, and made the mostaccurate and effective attacks in the campaign for destruction of the Jap base at Rabaul. InMarch and April 1944 it was a major factor in turning back the Jap counter attacks on Bougainville,doubling its previous volume of activity, then returned to neutralization of the entire Bismarckarea. In late 1944 the Marine SBDS were largely withdrawn from the Bis~rcks area for transferto Luzon, where they began their biggest, though not their most important, job of the war.
(d) Navy fighters and single-engine bombers were used ashore largely to supplemmt theMarines in cr i t ica l per iods . Son@ of the shore-based naval squadrons were from sunk, damagedor non-avai lable carr iers ; others were merely surplus carrier groups for which there was nocurrent need afloat; a few in late 1943 and early 1944 were specially formed as shore-basedsupport squadrons. After June 1944 the latter were decommissioned, and the surplus of carriergroups disappeared; thereafter the only Navy VP, VSB and V’TB in shore-based action were fromcarrier groups conducting training exercises in forward areas, or Navy inshore patrol squadronspat ro l l ing in the Marshalls.
Navy shore-based fightars provided the extra strength needed in the Solomons in late 1942,in the New Georgia and Bougainville campaigns, and against Rabaul. In tkse campaigns theyaccounted for 422 Jap planes (in some 2,500 action sorties flown). In addition, one squadronaided in the early neutralization of the Marshalls.
Navy shore-based bombers, while used more continuously than the fighters, were also employedto bolster our Marine forces for major encounters. Thus in September-November 1942 carrierbomber squadrons were used ashore in the critical struggles on Guadalcanal, then withdrawn whenthe emergency ended. From March to June 1943 (when the Marines had few VTB) Navy squadrons pro-vided most of the weight of attack in the Solomons. In July reinforced Navy equadrons delivereda remarkable total of 1,238 tons to support the New Georgia campaign (against the Marine bombers!395 tons), then withdrew again for rest. Thereafter Navy land-based bombing effort continued at
(Cont. onpaga 52)-46-
TABLE 17. MONTHLY OPERATIONS AND ~SULTS, FOR IAND-BASED AIRCRAFT,By Type of Aircraft and by Service (Navy-Marine), Pacific only
A. MARINE FIGRTERS
MONTH
1941-December
1942 -FebruaryMarchJuneAugustSeptemberCctoberNovemberDecember
1943-Janu~FebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1944-JanuaryFebruaryMarc!Apri1MayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1945-JcummryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugu8t
1941-2 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 TotalGRAND TU1’AL
* NO data available
~G~SQUAD-RONS INLCTION
*
********
************
3,6794,5546,5935,9568,3347,3148,029
11,05611,14515,01314,63815,533
11,61110,0367,914
12,43515,39518,83715,7538,590
**
11,84400,57112,415
.
ACTIONSORTIES
49
f
2757
17740116840
8410#
197113156358414430282401462
9511,160
8191,1691,5941,3322,9014,3313,6074,7475,1482,958
2,4333,3242,9453,6182,6622,9802,540
548
9232,90730,717?1,05055,597
~ LOSSESON ACTION SORTIESTo Enemy Opera-A/A A/C tional
0
00001110
000100013442
227
139
101088
121612
1111129
1515142
315
10989
0
10
157
1219164
752
115
1718101435
10
20130100000003
00
2
00000360
000310248134
660353648598
89
0 55 123 95 131 130 2
74 11107 2637 6314 71
216 232 171
m--OTHERFL’TS
0
00016444
58061
20139798
14
147
14118
116
11109725
3216182846427213
19100133267K
ON
18
00020600
000201000011
201122001035
580
135000
265
173179
ENEMY AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMBAT
Bombers Fighters
10
f
8215551220
4
i130
24271511070
07020000000
10
100
98844182
10810619
0
~
73122
1004417
4810#331565909359571273
249731500100010
44
411
4713376101
221555383
234 273527 1,432
TONS OFBOMBS
ONTARGETS
0
~
o00000
0
:000000000
00
51149278165745
1,4201,0911,5581,4021,056
6211,127
9531,173
924976767133
00
7,9156,67414,589
# No action reported; losses reported may have been sustained in unreported actions during thismonth, or in previous monthat ac t ion , or may be erroneous reports.
No action was reported during months not listed above.
-47-
TABLE 17. Continued
B. MARINE DIVE AND TORPEDO BOM8ERS
MONTH
1942-JuneAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1943-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAu~atSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1944 -Janua~FebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptamberOctoberNovemberDecember
1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAUgU8t
1942 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total
GRAND TOTAL
FLIGRTS,SQUAD-RONS INACTION
******
************
3,4953,4215,1545,8554,7005,1564,4134,7614,3606,3356,0195,234
4,0845,7687,4947,8038,5679,3276,3073,167
*
58,&f52,537
111,440
* No data available.
ACTIONSORTIES
3920125123321291
31037416212269
102808655788774
1,3311,527
9141,4212,9512,2692,0301,5742,1162,3522,0181,9381,026
466
6544,1284,5083,4023,6232,7311,699
302
9197,02221,07521,047
50,063
OWN LOSSESON ACTION SORTIES
~
410453
280
1111417223
101578
137323200
14553130
17427022
602211
490101100010
410000000000
02000000
121752
304210
101225121314
620411100131
03921431
10232023
151 36 76
m-OTHERFL’TS
114418
596
1015311667
4103142042466
2216
1511111
19604649
174
;ROUNI
o00700
000000002120
21110010001
10
02199110
75
1723
52
ENEMY AIRCRAFT—DESTROYEDIN COMBAT
lombers Fighters
o00000
000000000000
000000000000
00000100
0001
600442
261000202000
1420000000000
00001000
1613161
1 46
TONS OFBOMBSox
I!ARGETS
118
3151
12683
9716781614757
395373460435874
1,000
427707
1,6581,205
942659983
1,047915892455214
2931,7672,1271,6021,9291,422
919155
3104,(X710,10410,214
24,675
NO ackion waa reported during months not listed above.
-48-
.
TABI.E 17. Continued
C . NAVY FIGHTERS
FLIGHTS,SQUAD-RONS INkCTION
***
**********
1,8041,2422,0771,7481,015
9000
886891
48262
*
8,7861,286
ONN LOSSESON ACTION S~TIES
ENENY AIRCRAFT TONS OFBOM8SON
TARGETS
o00
g
~
o00000
01
1985
10150
200000
00
21120
MONTH ACTIONSORTIES
82777
~
~
81167169174520266
41262949436735823123
761015
29
1661,3882,514
121
GROUNDOTHERFL‘TS
221
5012782142
5045200
10001
532162
DESTROYBD
* ‘ra-A A A C tlonalIN COMPAT
Bombers Fizhters
1960
g
g
20800
281
2000000
00000
255720
1574
g
g
1949277
3921
945600000
00000
26162150
0
1942-SeptemberOctoberNovember
0 40 150 0
2 40 01 70 00 100 160 80 46 40 3
0 152 33 00 00 00 00 0
1 00 00 01 00 0
0 199 565 182 0
110
0000231050
6132020
00000
211140
0163
1000000001
1010000
20000
19222
1943-FebruaryHarchAprilMayJuneJulySeptamberOctoberNovemberDecember
1944-JanuaryFbbruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJuly
1945-MarchAprilMayJuneAugust
1942 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total
84 338GRAND TOTAL 10,072 4,189 16 93 27 55 25 231
D. FIGHTERS, SERVICE UNKNOWN
1944-January * 288 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0February * 110 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0March * 420 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0April * 59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
Total * 817 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 14
* No data avai lable .# No action reported; losses reported may have been sustained in unreported actions during this
month, or in prev ious mouthsv aotion, or may be erroneous reports.
No acticm was reported during montia not listed above.
- 4 9 -
——
MONTH
1942-JuneAugustSeptemberOctoberITovemberDecember
1943-FebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAu~6tSeptemberoctoberNov8mberDecember
1944-JanuaryFebruaryl&wchAprilmyNovemberDecemkr
1945-MarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
1942 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total
GRAND TOTAL
FLIGRTS,SQUAD-RONS INACTION
******
***********
1,508977
2,4372,4581,423
225249
219323364447394636
*
9,;772,383
11,660
TABLE 17. Continued
B. NAVY DIVE AND ‘IQRPEDO BOMBERS
ACTIONSORTIES
611
122237110#
12154118262386
1,74734
163225392456
405537
1,1151,051
97611
562842
1048668
4863,9494,086
384
8,905
001120
00122300301
3353200
002100
412163
500622
10001200010
0000000
000010
15501
000500
01031201110
0112000
000010
51041
35 21 20
=m-3TBER?LITS
0043
127
1221
10401512
6435000
100120
2629184
77
TN-}ROUND
000
1710
00000000001
0010000
800000
18118
28
AIRCRAFTcDESTROYRDIN COMBAT
Bombers Fighters
o000
;
o0000000000
0000000
000000
0000
0009
;
o0000400000
1000000
000000
12410
0 17
TONS OFBOMBSON
TARGETS
44
4210458#
69791
179248
1,23825
103160227262
161236533555523
00
3521
423024
2122,6362,008134
4,990
F. DIVE AND TORPEDO BOM8ERS, SERVICE UNKIKXN
1944-January * 23 1 0 0 0 0 0February
o 0 1* 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
March * 419 0 0 1Apri1
0 0 0 0139
56* o 0 0 0 0 0 0
May 1569
* o 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Total * 621 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 136d
* No data available.#No action reported; losses reported may have been sustained in unreported actions during this
month, or in previous monthst actions, or may be erroneous reports.
NO action was reported for months not listed above.
-50-
TABLE 17. Continued
G. IL4VY PATROL BOMBERS
MONTH
1941-December
1942-JanuaryFebruaryMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1943-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1944-JanuaryFebruaryMarch @AprilMayJuneJulyAugu8tSeptemberOctoberNovemberDeoember
1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
1941-2 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total
GRANtI TOTAL* No data available
FLIGHTS,SQUAD-RONS INACTION
*
**********
************
3,5413,5603,2802,6572,8562,9422,3663,2202,2792,5433,1992,729
2,9002,7264,9214,3954,0274,3904,4333,523
*
35,17:31,31566,487
.
ACTIONSORTIES
21
1366
284108
10~
2343797
50633088
143176164
349313486353506302226403237263267347
141265450449743552493205
109803
4,0523,2988,262
OWN LOSSESINACTION SORTIES
m ~=
o
0005000000
001000020012
522423212625
19
106
201074
56
36
8
250
13010120
030000110002
100010112332
00103311
327
14c1
o
0021000000
002000002400
102012120010
23103321
38
10
ON
FL'TS
o
0006213000
001041514467
8842
119254546
66
129
1014147
123368
+
ONGROUND
18
4500011341
000000003103
3510040311
168
02
10159
11135
347
42
-I-%
ENEMY AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMBAT
Bombers Fighters
o
0000000
;
o00000112421
23499
12216929
313149
15132
01168
2
1100040
;
o00000505198
61038823398
27
713112
281976
82878
T2i72+-
# NO action reported; losses reported may have been sustained in unreported actions, or in pre-
-I&-2%-
TONS OFBOMBSON
TARGETS
5
0035161
~
o753370
394129369479
114
280193450249383155108237103154147193
4242
17316136734720358
23547
2,6521,3934,615
vious monthst actions, or may be erroneous reports. .
@ Including 33 sorties, and 41 tins of bombs, by VPB of unknown branch of service. .
No action was reported in months not listed above.1
1
-51-
..
TABLB 17. Continued
H. MARINE PATROL BOMBERS
MONTH
1943, Total
1944-JanuaryFebruaryl&uchApri1MayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovwmberDecember
1946-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
1943-4 Total1945 Total
GRAND TOTAL
FLIGHTS,SQUAD-RONS INACT ION
*
351421687285877436479846789885
1,3141,274
1,7821,8671,4291,9672,0911,8041,8741,029
8,64413,843
22,487
&CTIONSORTIES
32
116
132142158148188239333322655685
516845698
1,0201,023
526628160
3,0515,416
8,467
–, –-–,.
o
012011105100
02014000
127
2
000000000000
00000000
20
0
000201000110
02300200
57
19 2 12
ONOTHERFL’TS
3
015020011140
11051122
1813
31
oxGROUND
2
000000000000
00000011
22
4
BNEMY AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMBAT
ombere Fighters
2 1
1 01 41 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
5 60 0
5 6
TONS OFBOMBSON
TARGETS
3
00
70816043119143173198507670
560817731
1,1901,278489724149
2,0675,938
8,005
*Data not available.(Cont. fromp. 46)
a reduced scale in the Bougainville and Rabaul campaigns ,tion in ktay 1944 .
a n d i n t h e Marshalls, until its cessa-
(e) The story of Navy Patrol bombers, par t icular ly wi th respect to thei r ant i -shippingcampaign of 1945, is more fully told elsewhere in this report. Certain items of Table 17G re-quire detailed comment here~
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(f)
Patrol bomber losses to enemy aircraft in June 1942 are believed overstated, but towhat extent is not known. .
The high bomb tonnages reported for February and March 1943 result from initial use ofthe first PB4Y squadron for horizontal bcrabing in formations. They were later restoredto their norml s ingle-plane search funct ion .High tonnage in January 1944 rssults from extensive minelaying operations in the Marshalls.High tonnages in March 1944 result from the use of VPB to meet the emergency created by theJap counter attack on Bougainville, plus extansive use of PVs (during April and Mayalso) for bombing strikes against the Marshalls and Nauru.The lull in activity in ear ly 1945 represented exhaus t ion of ta rge ts wi th in r~nge of pre-sent bases , followed by redisposition of the force to Luzon, Iwo, and Okinawa, from whichextensive new target areas came within range.The record of the pa’:rd bombers against enemy aircraft in 1944 and 1945 is worthy of note.Though VPB generally operated singly, without esccrt, they were able to destroy 146 planesagainst 14 losses in combat in 1944, and 153 against 9 losses in 1945.
M a r i n e VPB activity is largely the story of the PBJ, which first appeared in combat inMarch”1944. These planes were used-for day and night patrol; for night heckling strikes in theSclcmons a r ea , and for daylight formation attacks almost entirely in the Sclcmons. The PBJ con-stituted the bulk of the bombing force in that area during 1945, and the only significant Naval airs t r e n g t h rerrxiining in * a rea . During late 1944 and 1945 otier PBJ squadrons undertook long-rangeanti-shipping searches and similar specialized missions from Central Pacific bases.
-52-
MONTH
~9h2-&YJuneAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1943-Jm UaryI’ebmaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptanberOct~berNOvem&rDecember
lgbumualyFebruaryMarchAprilMay June*
1942 TOTU1943 TOTAL1944 TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL
TABLH 18. CONDENSED MONTHLY DATA ON OPERATIONS AND RESULTS,NAVAL AND MARINE LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT
By Operational Thea,tre and by Type of Aircraft
A. SOUTH PACIFIC THEATRE
m
ACTIONSORTIES
-TONS 02?BOMBSON
TARGETS
o000000
000000000000
013
14
7:
0
-&_
%
ENEMYAIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMBAT
o
5:1111647017
5215
4:15
12g1741089764a694
346138
7001
414879
__w-
-.Lm-
ACTIONSORTIES
o0
2G3&l431291
310386316240
{31w
2,5556gg951999
1,723l*97g
1,3421,9834,0812,8392,348
g3$3
1,360.0,966-
D
VSB-VTBTONS OFBOMBSON
TARGETS
o01273
155N34133
1;:17Z3152226305
1,633Jgg563595
1,1011,260
5Z39951
2,0721,5691,2253 9 3
6,%!-&_7X_13.987
ENEMYAIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMBAT — .
o000
1372
261000602000
1520000
22
-&_
-_@_
TONS OFBOMBSON
TARGETS
3200000
0
;;70
10312236
[:M
6531
223116115g4
5
_&l_
A&93_
“mAIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN 00MBAT
o020000
000000617
:2
393531
3;24
56
☛ South Pacific Theatre combat areas were placed under operational control of the Southwest. P a c i f i c e.rea ~mmend on 16 June 1944. The figures here for June 1944 cover the entiremonth, and no division ia practicable.
No action waa reported during montfis not noted above..
NOTES TO TABLE 18
Sou th Facific combat activity has already been diacu88ed, and will be covered in more de-t a i l i n s t u d y i n g tie Solomons-Bismarck area in later tables.
.
-53-
TABLE 18. Continued
B. SOUTH’W13ST PACIFIC TFDIA!l!RE
MONTH
1~1-December
1+2-JenuaryFebruarySeptember
lgb+OctoberNovemberDecemter
lg44-JenuaryFebrunryMarchAprilM~JuneJtiyAugustSeptemberOctoberYovemberDecember
1945-JenuryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJd.yAugust
194143 TOTAL1944 TOTAL1945 TOTAL
TOTAL
w’TONS OF ENEMY
ACTION BOMBS AIRCRAFTSORTIES ON DESTBDYED
TARGliYCS IN @MBAT
l,4g6 431~,343 7252,041 m?2,1922,27g 5931,001 239
1 ,05g 2921,644 919l,34g1,994 2;2
goo 93yo 146515 294
0000
5:
4012000
129 53 00 0 0
11,341 3,;$ 547,788 3.
19,129 6,522 61
TSB - VTBTONS OF ENEMY i
ACTION BOMBS AIRCRAFTSORTIES ON DESTROYED
TARGETS IN COIGIAT
1,Q951,0741,3481,405
644152
2go3,9g94,3503,0162,9111,9471,012
5J355156x)6632@j74
1111,7192,0321,3921,475‘y2475
000000
0000000
18l ‘gg o0 0 0
5,718 2,742 017,686 g.2T5 0
23.404 11,017 0
VPB~ACTION BOM8S AIRCRAIT30RTIZS ON DESTROYED
TARGETS IN COMBAT
19
1362
274546
43
:;337
2;;12
?445:772wl
5591,011
9531,2651,438
7c@727
5
000
5
$
37
g2526
150lp2323015137729
566&jo7U
1,270l,?:
744194 i4sl!X 109 h
NOTE: From 1 July 1944 the data include aircraft operating in the Solomons-Bismarcke area..
transferred from the South Pacific commend on 16 June 1944. 1941 and early 1942figares aover activities by VPB of PatWing 10 before establishment of SouthwestP a c i f i c Commaad, in territory later aseigned to tha t commend.
ITo action was reported for months not shown above.
In the Southwest Pacific VPB were the sole naval aircraft until transfer of the SouthPacific air force to this command in June 1944. From November 1943 to Narch 1944 these VPBwere the celebrated PBY Black Cats, on their nightly anti-shipping sweeps of the Bismarck Seaand New Guinea coaat. Thereafter PB4Y and later PV search planes began to operate frcmn SoV?esPacbases, and by 1945 a major part of the land-based Naval air force was under SoWesPec cont ro l ,and was shifted progressively westward and northward to met the changing needs of that command'scampaigns.
- 5 4 -
MONNI
lghl-December
lgb2-MarchMayJuneOctober
1943-JulyAugutOctoberNovemberDecember
1944-JEmla ryFebruaryMarchAprilwJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1945-JamuwyFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJuly
TABLE 18. Continued.
c. CEN- PACIFIC THEA~
49
40
270
0006
38
0
47:1,0301,4281,0251,438l,gi3g1,566:.;;:
1:957
1,5751,6801,6731,6341,8632,6g5
o
0000
00000
0
6;23437596
314695hga877809g17
329
R4&
S30473go
10
10
150
00001
00g200000100
11c
143217117
:2,025
+% O 2716,333 4,782 li13,383 3.434 500
29,840 8,216 53s
VSB - VTBTONS OF ENEMY
ACTION BOMBS AIRCBM’TSORTIES ON DESTROYED
TARGETS IN COMMT
o
0
4;o
00005
0
40!620673736
1,0211,27S
6705333s3315
374139214414-l%
o
00
150
00002
00
175260242266398532295229170140
1824g1302124554g247490,7
0
0060
00000
000000000000
0000110
10.U2I3 4.797 6
VPBTONS OF ENEMY
ACTION BOMBS AIRCRAFTSORTIES ON DESTROYED
TARGRi?S IN COMBAT
2
02
141
23
257
200211247178331U3611726653
log142151
9479
1s0186306
0
0030
003
2:
159116:;:
279626~
1s3
K67
134
369
12381
132200
0
0000
000
i!
6022
116016
1242
20
350394 1/33 $151 56 6135 12
2,192 ls:~ 521,740 67
3115
4,o67 2.406 131
NOTE : Includes all operations by aircraft based at Hawaii, Midway, Wake, the Ellice andGilber t Islend~, the former Japanese Mandated Islands (Mar&alls, Camlines, Marianas),Iwo Jima, and the Ryukyus.
No action was reported during months not listed above.
The Central Pacific data also represent a series of campaigne in successive areas (seeTable 33). First cam the early actione at We&a a n d M i d w a y , then the atticks on the Gilberts andMarshalls from bases in the Ellices and Gilberts, s u c c e s s i v e l y . Then as short-range planes cameinto the Marshalle to maintain pressure on local targets, the VpB reached out to the Carolines.Acquisition of the Marianas and Peleliu took the VF to these islands to wipe out enemy remnants,while the VPB extended their range still farther. Finally the VP and light bombers moved fromthe umndatad islands to Okinawa, and VPB based there co-red Japan, Korea, and the entire Yellowand China Sea areae.
-55-
MONTH
J~ua.ryFebruaryMarchAprilwJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberEovemberDecember
Y&U? TOTALS
T~LE 180 Continued
D. NORTH PACIFIC THE4TKN (All Plmes ~e VPB)
19&2TONS OF
ACTION BOMBSSORTIES on
TARGETS
0 00 00 00 00 0
12 04 19 6
1; 20 01 0
M 10
1943TONS OF
ACTION BOMBSSORTIES ON
TARGE?l!S
2 01 03 01 02 0
39 2917 11u 70 02 00 06 4
a 51
1944!RINS OF
ACTION BOl&3SORTIES OIT
TARGETS
25 1926 lg
lgcgi3 :;52
262 964 2768 2219 3g o0 0
4?6 216
1945TOW OX’
ACTION BOUBSSORTIES OF
TARGETS
42015lg222go
20
00001
1603
127 20
GMND TOWLS: 704
Two enemy aircraft
s o r t i e s , 297 t o n s .
were destroyed in August 1942, one in August 1944, twm in September 1944.
The North Pacific air campaign had three phases. First came the holdin~ period, whenNaval PBYs were confined largely to patrol. This culminated with the capture of Attu inMay 1943. T h e n f o r t h r e e months the Na~l PV force helped to h~r Kis~. FinallY, b e g i n n i n gin the early winter of 1944 the PVS began reguler night strikes (and later day searche6 andst r ikes) on Jap ins ta l la t ions and ships in the Kuriles. These continued until the end of thewar, rocket loadings be ing subs t i tu ted for bombs dwing eonm months, and the PVS being relievedby PB4Ys at the end.
- 5 6 -
PART B. SPECIALIZED DATA, BY SUBJECT MATTER
This section of the report is composed of six sub-sections covering specific types of data,a s followsx
1 .
2 .
3 .
4.
5 .
6 .
7.
Detailed Date on Aerial Combat, by both Carrier-Based and Land-Based Aircraft, includ-ing 1 0SS rates and combat r a t i o s . BreaEd owns are provided for Navy vs. Marine, and byplane model, type of carrier, year, month, area, and mission of own aircraft. Data Onmodels of enemy aircraft destropd are also inc luded . (Tables 19-28).
Anti-Aircraft Loss and Damage, and Loss Rates, with breakdown by plane model, carrierand land-based , year ly . (Table 29).
Atticks on Targets, by Geographical Area. Detailed breakdowns of attacks on targets,and total bomb tonnages expended on target, monthly and yearly, by area, and brokendown between land and ship targets, with special emphasis on shipping targets.(Tables 30-35).
Attacks cm Targets, by Type of Target Attacked. Attack sorties and bomb tonnage, forcarrier-based and land-based aircraft, yearly, by plane model attacking, and monthlydeta i l on sh ipping a t tacks . (Table 36-40) .
Details of Ordnance Expenditures. TPS of bombs used, and torpedo, rocket andammunition expenditures, broken down by plane type, by type of target, yearly andmont~y and by operation. (Tables 41-54).
Night Air Operations. Data on night attacks and aerial combat, for carrier-basedland-based a i r c r a f t , monthly and by plane model. (Tables 55-59).
and
Long Range Search Plane Combat Operations, 1945. Detailed data on PB4Y and PBM per-formance. (T %1a es 60-61).
-57-
1 . Aerial Combat Eata in Detail (Own and Enemy PlanesEngaged and 12estroyed; Loss Rates and Combat Ratios)
NOTES TO TABIES 19, 20, 21
One of the principal achievements of Naval aviation in the war was the devastating supremacyNaval p lanes a t ta ined over Japanese a i rcraf t in a i r ccsnbat. These tibles, and otbera in thissection, provide the evidence.
At the beginning Of the war Naval superiority in the air was rather slim. Our forces weresmall and scattered. When they met the enemy in air combat they were often outnumbered. Eyenif the opposing forces were of equal strength a clear-cut victory could not be assured, thoughfor 1942 as a whole we claimed a 3-to-1 ratio over the enemy in air combat.
In 1943, with newer planes, more planes, better training, and some deterioration of theenemy, our air combat superiority rose to approximately 5-to-1, and the F6F, employed in strong,concentrated surprise attacks from the new, more mobi le carr ier forces , showed.promise in thelast months of tie year. In early 1944 the praise was proved. In the f i r s t four months of tha tyear Naval carr ier aircraft , roaming the Central Pacific from the Marshalls to Truk, Saipan,Pslau and New Guinea, shot down 419 Jap planes and lost but 19 in air combat, a ratio of 22 to 1.This ra t io fe l l dur ing Vm oampaigns a@inst the Marianas and Iwo, and in the b i t te r ba t t les ofFormosa and Leyte, but it was exceeded in the Visayas and Luzon operations of September, October,and December, and the roving raids of January 1945. After falling to 11-to-l in the ‘To~o a n dKyushu strikes of February and March, the supremacy became almost absolute in the Okinawas dur-ing April and May; the enemy might get planes through to attack our ships, tut he could notcompete successful ly agains t our a i rcraf t . During these two months the Japanese lost 1,744planes in aer ia l combat , to the Navyts 34 losses, a ratio of over 51-to-l.
For these la ter opera t ions , of course , the Japanese had few effective combat pilots orplanes remaining, and generally attempted to avoid direct combat with our planes. Nevertheless,over half of the Jap planes shot down in these two months were of single-engine fighter types,including 461 Zekes and 197 newer VP types.
Table 19 presents the record for individual types of a i rcraf t for the ent i re war . I t wi l lbe clear from the foregoing data that direct comparisons cannot always be made between varioustypes of aircraft, because of the varying tires and conditions under which they engaged in combat.Thus comparisons are valid between the carrier F6F and F4U totals because they generally operatedfrom the sanm ships during the sam periods. The FM, howevor, opera t ing from CVES, did not usuallyencounter the same heavy res is tance as d id tie fast carriers operatin~ in advance of the Fleet.Marine F4Us were used on CVs largely in the more difficult February and March actions, and werepresent only in small quantities to reap the rich April and May harvest which fell to Navy F4US.Land-based F4Us were handicapped by the difficult conditions of the Solomons in 1943-44. Land-based Navy F6Fs operated in the Solomons; land-based Marine F6Fs operated under the comparative-ly lush conditions of Okinawa in 1945. The effect of these differences on the totals for theentire war may be partly judged by comparing the yearly data
Certain tentative conclusions may Ee reached from these
( a )
(b)
( c )
(d)
( e )
The F6F was slightly superior to tie F4U in combat,greater ability to survive damage.
CVL F6Fs enjoyed an advmtage over CV F6Fs.
FMs and CVE F6Fs both turned in remarkable records.superior to the FL! under CVE combat conditions. but
by plane model in Table 20.
two tablest
apparently chiefly because of its
The F6F appeared b be clearlythe high combat ratio in favor of
the FM, its ability to destroy over 55% Of the planes it engaged, and its low ratio ofloss to damage indicate that it was an exceptionally good fighter within its speedl i m i t a t i o n s .
The PB4Y, normally flying unescorted single-plane long range searches, was one of tieNavy’s best fighter planes.
Navy single-engine bombers, far from being the highly mlnerable aircraft claimed byt h e i r d e t r a c t o r s , gave out far more punishment than they took.
(Cont. on page 60)
- 5 8 -
.
BAm, —
PLANE lK)DEL ,TYPE CARRIER,
SERVICE
OARRIER-BASEDF&F4U,F13FNFMSS2C, SWSBDTBF ,TBMTED
LAND-BASED@F4U, F@F@’I?4FF2ASBDSB2UTBF-TBM
PB4YPvPBSPDTPBMPB2Y
F@, Cv, NavyF6F, CVL, NavyF6F, CVE, NavyF@, Land , NavyF@, Lend, USMC
F4U , CV , NavyF4U , CV , USMCF4U, CVE, USMCF4U, Land, NavyF4U , Land , USMC
F4F , CV , NavyF@, CVE, NavyFM, Land, NavyF4F , Land , USMC
FM. CTE, Nav
TABIJ 19. AERIAL COKSAT DATA, FOR ENTIRE WAR,By Model of Aircraft, Carrier-Based and Land-Based,
and for own VF, by Type of Carrier and by Service (Navy~arine)
)Rl!IESWiGIIVGDmlYEK)RAm
982065821042753422237yl4%
44S13w
;:{
1;;
;;
5957611
101
x
b71217121513307g6
60341920
21520bj
40913
2bIj459
ENEKYAIRCRAFTENGAGED
mberB Fiehtera
~l/37i320005
{173776601
d161
6;;31202
27522
5:26
ENEMY AIRCRAFTlIESTROYIIDIN 00MBAT
Bombers Fkhterg
~
159194190133221
~
5g22g
6001
125go067
4487356841922g1123075505
204gZz’i150375
3;6
25
1s11209
10., 1,
933 2641406 8764L3 51
103E 47
100 26053 1596 0
1413:: 1100
Wj 109
5; 9<12 103
194 228
OWN AIRORAIWCASUALTIESTO ENEMY A/CLost Damaged
622q31262311
:20
g
jg62
2;
3[
99:
32
--L
1s5 *Jy3 *2 *23 *2 *
lg *16 *O*14 *1 4 1 *
44 **
52 *7 5 *
13 26
FEimmESTROYkDPER OWNLOSS
*
17:052.56.42.42.52.70.2
&10.1
::2
$!
1:3
10.93i3
0.3
x
19.322.149.5
4%;
20.013i3
11.49.9
6.72.72.61.5
~
ERomT OFOWN A/CENGAGINGLost Dameged
!y~
3:3 3:01.7 3.511.1 5.57.6 4.614.3 21.96.3 10.746.3 0.O
4.7 16.67.9 11.8
3.9 *3.4 *1.3 *
*
::; *
3.0 ;~g0. 0 *6.5 *6.9 *
10.8 *23.1 :22.916.3 *
# No l o s s e s ,@ Includes a negligible amount of combat tiy planes of unidentified types, not shown sepruately.* Data not available.
.
TABLE 20. AERIAL 00MBAI DATA, BY YEARSBy Model of Aircraft, Carrier-Based and Land-Based,
( Principal plane models only)
BASE,PLANE MODEL,
YEAR
CARRIER-BASED:1942—194
y&i 19d1945
F@’ 194—19d1945
F4U,FG 1945
SBD lg41-2—194319d
SB2C 1943194?1945
mm, 1942TBM 1943—
194.?1945
LAND-BASED:F4P lg41-2—
1943
F4U.FG 19419d1945
m 1943—19d1945
PB4Y 194319d1945
(a)
ENGAGINGENEMYAIRCRAFT
383
3i?;362
404
4?373127
1035
la
g
819534
1656
2t3473
501203
7g139794131
17415366
91251
3
AIRCRAFTENGAGED
Bombers Fighters
y37
1;106
1471128603
185
6673
$1
1123413
57974
213M
231
25
E
101;;
3750
2614?
yo4og&?2409
1024
2674347
2020221
3262
266gei
563385
16641592361
23121734
216376
J!I?_
ENEMY AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMBAT
Bombers Fighters
17317
10193
10772510
154
2821
1120
1g76
1::
11014
195
12
3;
13
L
112
13!94
14g22061214
419
60114
221
4
3:
243132
526;g
59
??
2872a
CASUALTIESTO ENEMY A/cLost Damaged
4{
221
12 171 9
18 55149 24
i?lg 11
34 31
39 ;!22 8
0lt 112 0
7 2g M7 21
5 5
79 4052 20
24 1179 97
12 17
11
20M
2 0
10cL
ESTROY7JDPER OWNLOSS
t;19.6
l&f.o
13.920.022.1
16.9
2.36.52.5
2.0
$;
0.71.5. z2.13
5.11
3.3
6.g10.036.3
4.210.836.0
4.111.9
_xliL
OWN A/CENGAGINGLost Danmgd
11.2 5.710.3 2.63.1 4.40.3 2.5
4.5 13.64.93.2 ::;
3.3 3.~
20.7 19.73.1 32.&34.1 16.3
25.0 0.07.2 5.65.9 O*O
43.8 12.514.3 32.1~.5 7.46.8 6.g
15.8 g.o25.6 9.9
11.8 14.75.9 9.92.5 3.5
9.8 11.53.9 11.83.0 0.0
11.0 22.0 .4.4 15.2.8 15.?
,Table 21 gives evidence ofx
(Cont. from page 58)
The formidable enemy air opposition to Naval air operations throughout the war. Far
(b)
(c)
more enemy planes were engaged (and destroyed) in combat in 1944 and 1945 than duringthe adverse years of 1942-43.
The relative decline in enemy air opposition in proportion to the vast increase in ouro w n offeneive and defensive air effort. In 1942 a quarter of our action sorties en-gaged enemy aircraft; in 1945 only 4 percent engaged.
The increasing effectiveness of Naval aircraft against the enemy, measured in the ratioI
of enemy planes destroyed to own losses, in the percentage lost of own planes engagingin combat, and in percentage of own action sorties lost in air combat. In 1942 ~ ofall Navy action sorties were lost in aerial c o m b a t . in 1945 less than one-eighth of onepercent ..
-60-
(Cent. on next page)
TABLE 21. AERIAL COMBAT RATIOS , BY YEARSBy Type of Aircraft, Carrier-Based and Land-Rased
BASE , ACTIONPLANE TYPE SORTIES
CARRIER-BASED:I
g 1942 961943 i2,3 01944 37,9401945 44,774
wLU?ILBASED:
I
(Cont. from preceding page)
ENEMY AIRCRAFTENGAGE
Bomb- Fight-ers ers
3f37 ;g;1791340 4363&14 3577
6g 33721 12571 51514 119
610 !jp312 228029 Mog
271 395
1 lgo1 951 2301 3
32 67ly 252116 498105 449
ENEMYAIRCRU’TDESTROYXDIN COMBATBomb- F’ight-ers era
173 112120 148Wo 2340757 1727
30 6911 2120 616 9——
193 247163 71722 535
234 273
0 2g0 170 171 1
0 815 29
%3i% 93-
Mn?MY?LANEsI)Es.PROYEDPER OWNLOSS
6.612.220.022.0
1.42.73.52.1
4.75.4
10.136.2
1.0O.L!3.k
0.7
0.3
;:?
JiL!L
‘mmam OFOWNLAN-asiNGAG_ING
11.24.9
u
27.59.44.46.5
U3.O13.94.92.6
25.240.74.9
75.0
y).o11.2
L
(d) The increas ing ef fec t iveness of Naval f ighter escor t of single-en~ine bombere. In1942 fifteen percent of carrier VSB-VTB action sorties had to engage enemy aircraftand four percent were lost to enemy air action; in 1944 only 1.7 percent met enemyaircraft, and only one-thirteenth of one percent were lost; in 1945 less than ~ of onepercent were forced to engage enemy planes, and only 7 bombers, or l/36 of one percent,were lost in air combat.
700380 0- 46-5- 6 1 -
MONTHSORTIESENGAGING
AIRORAFT
*
52
13;:g
11657
1520*
1*
15gb
36274
121222142203
gg13147
57$31572483154
4g6950630lwj363113
&11
57;4655
E
TABLE 22. AERIAL COMBAT DATA, MONTHLY
A. ALL CARRIER-BASED AIFf-
AIRCRJWCENGAGED
Bombers Fightere
*
3:
37a
2079015
235*
1*
517
13019
$243s
47:1215
6:6131
g5
1;;4747;
17
*
150
14122611913t!74
00*
0*0
3:92
119223179133
1n 311:;
66916454s3114
2s71184574::g
811S6
200 bg:1411
ENEMY AIECW.FTDESTROYEDIN COMBA!I
Bombers Fighter!
*
231
243365u9
114*0*
5
9;10
10312133
2$10
24094925
7450
1064315:
1527 7i
203 la131 169900 2401
%+H%
OWN AIROR.AFICASUALTIEST0 EX?L3MY A/C&at Damaced
1
60
e23202
011020
2;3
5635
4:143
17{112
104032M
z7
ii+t
o
90
214
13122
100001
7210
17191311
7?11
3?1051s3
21642530707K
184 3:;
L1
2 22
ENEMY A/CESTROYEDPER OWNLoss
*
5i5
3.11.7
;:;U3.5
4:0
;
;43.07.3
15.3
10.427.037.0lg.g+
16.6S.1S.o
2s.716.124.755.5
24. jlo.a10.9ys.355.6
S:g
c3.S.s
17.920.8r
3, 4.0L
+ No l o s s e s .* No ange.gementg reported; the losses reported may have been sustained in unreported
actio& during this month, or in previous months’ acticm, or the cause of 10SS m a yhave been incorrectly ascribedother months in 1942 and 1943.
NOTE: No engagements were reported
to aerial combat. The latter factor may apply also to
in months not listed above.
-62-
TABLB 22. Contizlmsd.
B. ALL IJUKMASED AIRORAIW
MONTH
lg41-December
1$)42-JamaryFebruaryMarchMayJuneJdyAugustS.eptenbexOctoberNovemberDecember
1943 -JamlaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1944-JanuaryFebruaryMarchApri1wJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
lg4~-JanuaryFebruarykiarchAprilMayJuneJuly
-lcj44?
TO ML1~ TOTAL1545 !JOTNG&WD TOTAL# No loese
TSORTIESN13AGINGENW’AIRCRAFT
34
961
7{
4;lgl2049227
54264
53
1:26!)167224106143189
71444531326L17302325
<7
17
23
$175279216619
6;913631577 ;
*
AIRORAFTENGAGED
Bombers Fi&ters
90
12g1
4;
3:2741175:
g7
3;
62
z61Mf3234
71511221122
4
;102
29
72716
129ly5014L
22
1500
109
7;20124013543
10947177625
18457736840220919541g
130865139
g49
$
2469
199
145949
10725925172?6
64 133545: 2627146 2537377 g47
1617 6846
ENEMY AIRORAFTDESJ?ROYEDIN COWJW
3ombers Fi&ter
10
0010go
217457220
450
13
4!3616154
3/33
6115
119
1221692
19
41314
107994311k
2
1100
130
??Ml5519
5016
3;1584
15093936560
103
36413i315
$
2
;10
7:
11141249
16295177
WN AIRCRAFTCASUALTIES
TO ENIW A/CLost DamaEed
g
260
3;og
C217
11222
20
2Y313267
1116
40lg2110112
;5
02156g~
5
30
!lto4
281072
182
115M342526162035
10442405
;7227
20
{15
241764
Lp; 77200 20177 20326 64455 545
imi’qtDESTROY3ZPER OWNLOSS
1.5
0.50.2##
cl. ~+7.06.24.13.72.7
4.91.0o.~2.3
U4.9
:::9.9g.~6.6
9.38.3
10.014.018.0#
:::4.56.33.3M.o
#13.526.031.243.517.39.3
11.03.1
9:5
2:2
PERCENT orOWN A/CENGAGING
Lost Damez~
17.09.I.La.122. g25.9
20*1.Lz4.6y.o37.723./325.014.6
14.7
3;.;
100:0100,()18.90.0
3::;50 .~20. r323.g15.513.115.C
1::: 11.66.6 l~; l7.7 14.@g.~ lg.~
5.6 14.64.0 9.k6.5 12.93.1 0.02.L3 13.9o.@ 17.55.9 17.63.3 23.3g.7 i3.712.0 g.o8.1 18*:3.4 13.6
0.0 13.0j.g 7.72.9 2.9
2.9 2.92.7 8.6
Yote: Delsyed repor t ing of losses , and failure to report exact date of loss, may have undulyinflated apparent loss rates for come moaths of light combnt activity succeeding months of heavy
~~~i8~~~AoEYf~~~1~$ et~~&~9~~~ been $@orte&, an%th~t s o m e ~ossesqrom other ca.u.eskveAlso there is reason to believe that some aerial combat in
.been incorrect ly ascr ibed to-enemy ai rcraf t b; the reporting unit.
-63-
NOTE TO TABLE 22
This table is inser ted largely for h is tor ica l record , and i t s majortouched on in previous discussions. T h e rather violent f luctuat ions in
features have beenm o n t h l y volum of air
combat activity my be noted , as well as f luc tuat ions in the loss ra t ios . To smse extent thela t ter are chance f luctuat ions , but largely they represent ac tual var ia t ions in the in tensi tyand quality of enemy aerial resistance encountered, and in the predominant types of enemy planesengaged.
NOTES TO TABLES 23 AND 24
These tables provide a breakdown c-f air combat activity by type of aircraft and primarypurpose of the mission during which the combat occurred.
Well over half of the total number of sorties engaging enemy aircraft in combat were onoffensive missions, one-twelfth were on reconnaissance and miscellaneous missions, and less than40 percent were on defensive missions. Of the total enemy aircraft shot down, 7 percent wereencountered on reconnaissance and search missions , and the remainder were evenly divided betweenoffeneive and defensive encounters. Thus, as would be expected, more enemy planes were destroy-ed per own plane engaging in defensive combat than in offensive combat.
On offensive missions the enemy planes engaged were over 9@ fighter types, while in defen-sive actions about 4C@ were normally bombers. For the same reason losses in air combat were nor-mally higher on offensive missions; over 6@ were sustained on such missions, and only 3@ of thetotal in defensive engagements. Normally from 40~ to 7% of the ene~ planes engaged by ourfighters were reported destroyed. Bombers claimed the destruction of only about 15% of theenemy fighters encountered, and 30% or more of the enemy bombers engaged.
Table 23 gives anti-aircraft and operational losses on action sorties as well as losses inair combat. Of the total losses on action sorties over 80 percent were on offensive missions,12 percent on defensive missions, and about 7 percent on search, reconnaissance and miscellan-eous miss ions resul t ing in ac t ion . Primarily the combat action of Naval aircraft was offen-s i v e , and the losses sustained in action were in lar~e part sustained in carrying the offensiveto the enemy.
Table 24 is an ex~nsion to a monthly basis of the “Enemy Aircraft Destroyed” columns ofTable 23. It provides an interesting historical record of the fluctuations between offensiveand defensive combat at various stages of the war. In 1942 the air combat, by carrier andland-based planes, was predominantly defensive. In addition, because of a shortage of fighterson carr iers , carrier bombers had to handle a considerable share of the combat on offensivemiss ions . In the latter part of 1943 the balance shifted in favor of the offensive, and so re-mained during most of 1944, with the exception of the two great air campaigns of June and Oct--ober, when the carriers defended themselves and the amphibious forces against everything theJaps could get into the air to stop the carrier-paced invasions of Saipan and Leyte.
The emphasis on offensive air combat continued into early 1945, particularly in Februaryand to a lesser extent in March. In April and May combat shifted almost wholly to the defensiveas carriers and land-based aircraft combined their efforts to turn back the Japanese counter-attack on our forces at Okinawa. For 1945 as a whole the balmce was clearly in favor of de-fensive combat, by 2-to-1, while in 1944 it favored the offensive by the sam ratio.
-64-
TABLE 23. URN SORTIES AND LOSSES, AND COMBATWITR ENEMY AIRCIWT, BY MISSION OF OWN AIRCRAFf
By Type of Aircraft, Carrier-Based and Land-Based, for Entire War.
BASE, PLANE TYPE,PURPOSE OF MISSION
CARRIER-BASED :OffensiveDefensiveRecce. & Misc.Unknown
VSB- OffensiveVTB Defensive
Recce. & Misc.unknown
L4ND-BASED:V-F Offensiva
DefensiveRecce. & Misc.Unknown
VSB- OffensiveVTB Defensive
Recce. & Misc.U-own
VPB OffensiveDefensiveRecce. k Misc.Unlmown
*
ICTIONSORTIES
67,43714,8773,596
106
58,5141,1361,3CM
144
55,2534,1931,099
58
57,68347
1,84712
10,69064
5,99637
mFmE-rENGAGINGENEMYAIRCRAFT
4,3774,081
3421
85482830
1,9631,378
300
2370
320
9516
72710
ENEMYAIRCRAFTENGAGED
Bombers Fighters
513 5,4832,090 2,883192 324
1 0
69 95161 6548 860 0
1891,034
10
1030
1317
3590
3,2991,725
350
4570
620
1467
1,10312
ENEMY AIRCRAFTDESTRoYEDIN COMBAT
Bombers Fighters
380 2,5691,394 1,624
155 1341 0
28 13221 918 190 0
79 1,028533 726
0 180 0
0 550 01 80 0
1 136 4
139 1960 0
OWN LOSSESON ACTION SORTIES
m=;
614 204 35753 102 12431 10 1458* 23w 1*
597 86 4940 8 325 9 750* 10* 1*
180 141 15816 120 397 1 129* 63* o
136 28 890 0 015 5 735* 24* 1*
33 12 210 1 082 38 2821* 22,* o
Lo8ses l i s ted under “Unknown” are not comparable with the action sorties reported underthis category; they represent larg~ losses on offensive, defensive or reconnaissancemiss ions which were repor ted tirough aircraft record channels rather than in action re-ports and are thus not classifiable by type of mission. These losses should be pro-ratedamong the three types of mission, in proportion to the losses where type of mission wasknown, if loss rates for various types of mission are computed.
NOTE : Losses to enamyA/A on “defensive” miss ions are largely a t t r ibutable to a t tacks~tirget combat air patrols after comple t ion of the i r defens ive pr imary miss ion . I t
should be noted that action sorties ~hose primary purpose was search or reconnaissancenormally involved attacks on targets of opportunity.
(See notes on page 64)
TABLE 24. ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED IN AERIAL COM8ATBY ALL NAVAL AND MARINE AIRCRAFT
By Base, Mission, and Type of Own Aircraft Accomplishing tieir Destruction, Monthly.
BASCARRIER-BASDEFENSIVE
VSB
MISSION, I
REC. & MISC(VSB-
VF VTB
TYPE OF OWN
OFFENSIVEVSB-
VF VTB VPB
AIRCRAFTLAND-BASEDDEFENSIVE TOTAL
12
1342
6690
14411126711419 \
65251
4615
128186109113112289152
422311131108 21
81811728
3821208282201
258459375
12055391599076
860124140293161Zzz3-i
OFFENSIVEVSB -
VF VTB
MONTH REC. & Misc.VSB-
VF VTB VPBVFVPBVF VTB
1
131
323
1058
1941-December 10
1
155177
13848
10
401582817342
785
3612
36
41
141214108103
34039048
481
1
11
4
6195
119
855
121820318
189
36
9262511431785
741
143144
- -
- -47
118 1621 4
10- -16 232 4- -
- -- -- -- -- -- -- --.- -27 -120 2030 8
34 1139 387 270 31 1
279 696 -16 -349 5499 29196 765 -
88 2378 5184 1131 128 110 -43 -18 -
61 65177 281831 57880 102949 160
21
164472
4130
114
516477
17171921
465151
165815845
14828
136823246111741
22490
12551450
1
14
2
3
3
41
1
17381
1
22
138273
68101
42127923
26
01
134155
2
4
101
1
11
6
8
12
171
163
- -
- -- -- -- -
61 -34 -26 820 517 2
42 215 6- -6-- -46 -93 627 -93 262 -8 -90 -
343 15132 213 -- -- -1-- -.-- -- -- -14 -
1-- -1-4 -3 17-8-- -
98 21482 16503 1724 1
12
14
1
1
0361
1942-JanuaryFebruaryMarchMayJuneAugustSeptemberCetoberNovemberDecember
252
1943-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSept8mberOctoberNovemberDecember
1
8
1944-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilIdayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberEecember
1
1
4
1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
1S41-42 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total
--
2 1
2862
7101
GRAND TOTAL 290 37 1107 55 14 ~6 9 335
No enemy planes were destroyed in April or July 1942.
(See notes on page 64)
-66-
TABLE 25. OWN SOR3?IES AND COMSAT IOSSES. AERIAL COMBAT DATAAND ENZMY AIRCRAF?C DESTROYED ON GRiIJND. BY AREA.
BASE,AREA OF ‘I?ARGET OR
ENGAGEMENTCARRIER-BASEDHokkaido, No. HonshuTokyo AreaCentral HonshuK<yushu, Kure Ars.Ry.dcyusFormosaCentral & South ChinaIndo China
BoninsMarianasWestern CarolinesEastern CarolinesMarshallsGilberts, NauruWalct>, MarcusMidway Area
Philipl)inesRew Guinea, HalmeheraCelebes, BorneoSumatra Java
Bismarclcs, Solomons
Aleutians
Europe, AfricaLAND-BASEDTokyo, Central HonshuKyushu, Kure AreaRyukyusFormosaKorea, North ChinaCentral & South ChinaIndo ChinaMalay Peninsula
BoninsMarianasWestern CarolinesEastern CarolinesMarshallsGilberts, NauruWake, MarcusMidway Area
Philippines,Rew Guinea, H<itmaheraCelebes, Borneo
Bismarcks, Solomons
AleutiansKurilesAt~a tic
(See notes on pp 69-70)
FOR ENTIRE WAR
-—SORTIESENGAGING
AIRCRAFT
410022206gl
16126414432
24298g15727614997
1:;
24~11340
13
819
0
___@._
;:
537
&30
3319
613223go37162372
167
:;
3014
23372g
ENEMYMRCMFLIENGAGED
Bombers Fighter~
9;3565
684207
95
394$3026
;:421771
5872904
494
0
01191146g62
12595ql3913
3341012M4322lg735g2
226
24591501
787
0
22 51
-67-
ENilM AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMWT
Bombers Fi~ters
6;
22
5/3:157
84
272632221q23
3;
3g72304
247
0
14
44
?4g103
10104
925
2032
119
24g5
364
012———
41:47
3487t303001710
205)+7g92135lo2223436
1235901
202
9
26
1927
26210118
147
13g3
201720
13
75g
10
1513
220
AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDON GROUND
91;
?1
4;:521
9;
167217991671622536
140
1590133
;;
91
0
30
25
lg603
11g
92
111160
2
1120
la
ltil
o10
OWN LOSSESTo ToEnemy EnemyAfA A / C
32;;
130236.s02g17
.s7141643g27102320
27i31113
19
c1
X__
g
:4
101560
114
39
5!
{4
6635
241
5
L
1?1400111
100031
3;
16’36
343
11
3
TABLE 26• OWN SORTIES MD I.OSSES , mRIAL COMBAT DATA,AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED ON GROUND, MONTHLY, IN
BASE,MONTH
UND-BASIJD1+2-August
SeptemberOctgberNovemberDecember
1943-JmaIYP ebruaryMarchApri1MeyJuneJdyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecemker
1~44-JanuaryI?ebrwwyMarchApril%’JuneJulyAugustSe~temberOctoberNovemberDecember
1~45-Jan.-Aug.
CARRIER-BASED1942_~ebruaq?
MayAugustOctoberNovember
1943-Janw3ryFebruaryJulyNovanberDecember
ACTIONSORTIES
62,622
5%838606334
39442935s445451729
3,1191,1161,6091,5652,7722,781
j,04a3,$Ik25,6303,6453,0g7l,55g2,7633,6733,73g4,0193,5931,173
4,612
-ZzE
3;;bgl2~796
7g20
70;103
17s254
;5.~67
SORTIESENGAGINGLNFJ4YAIRCRAFT-—
017
*2lg6204yz27
54254
5320
1152C01572131011~~153
7044441~
i4020001
0
~
13314211620
1520
26;12
6942—.—
-L&L
NIJOR AREA CAMPAIGNS
A. SOKM3NS -ENEMY
AIRCRAFTENGAGED—.-
Bombers Fkhters%+-5,122
7227i 1$8117 24o59 1350 41
g 1097 451 17
30 7625
6; U3395 57731 35335 380
2og6; l?gg 341
7 1,:;;122 PO2 301 :0 01 10 00 00 00 13
0 0
--Q+ ~30 0~7 141
207 119qo 13g2 26
23 05 01 0
93 2784 0
1 860 2
0~ 35: 5,919
BISMARCKS mEi4ENEMY AIRCRAFT
DESTROYED
7457220
4
213
4:3616134
362
4102001000000
0
3i1205519
5016
3;15g4
150919165
;:
36013~
6011010000
0
24 42654g :?2 5
11 04 0
1; 6;3 0
1 240 11 0— .
611 1,717—..
ENEMYAIRCRAFTDESTROYEDON GROUND
1017
1700
4200003
21g
2310
1753020011100
0
910
2130210
000
190
000
-_KE__
OWN U3ssrsON ACTION SORTIES
cpera-
?=PA/A A/C tional21~~ 1 g 0
26 ;!!g 213 g
0 0
~+!g
1 21 115 23 61 20 191 1 0
0 0 00 1 00 2 0g 22 101 0 0
lg44-Janmry 0 4 0March 0 0 0Apr i l 0 c1 Q
GRi4.ND TOTAL 273 444 225Note: M i n o r d.iscreyaucies between this snd the preceding table resul f rom ineradicable dl.ffer-
ences “oetween m:.chine tabula t ions and are too small to affect the usefulness Of tile d a t a .
(See notes onpp 69-70)
- 6 8 -
BASE,MONTH
CAIUUER-BASED1944-September
OctoberNovemberDecember
1945-January
LAND-BASED~
AugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1945-JanuaryFebruaryMerchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
GR4ND TOTAL——
ACTION;ORT IES
22,328 6,0256,5844,2992,062
3,356
&!w
i!;;
7;;
1,3475,6615,7345,1963,9092,2891,567
310
A2@5
See note to Part A of this table
NOTES TO TABLES 25 AND 26
TABLE 269 continued
B. PHILIPPINES AREA
EmMTAIRCRAFTENGAGED
Bombers l’i~htere
33 159
1 00
2 30 21
20 134
1000000c1
70110000
624 2,666——
ENEMT AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COKBAT
Bombers Fighters
30 86
0ii 040 :
14 59
0 70 00 10 00 00 00 00 0
409 1,307
ENEMY\IRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN GROUND
+?1
29249t3230
103
1127
07
211016
20M1361000
1,702
OWN LOSSESIN ACTION SORTIES
QdlnemY %era-A/A A/C tional
~zz2g*
112 49 112m 11 3628 2 27
19 3 39
0 0 60 0 04 1 01 2 0
12 5 1
9 0 913 2 1210 0 1313 0 6
0 2$ 1 g0 0 71 0 0
348 &3g 300
Table 25 shows the distribution among areas of aerial combat by Navy and Marinefor tie ent i re war . Table 26 gives the mo~thly record for the four &jor-areas whereest destruction of enemy planes took place.
The area in which Naval aircraft destrowd the largest nunber of enemy aircraft
a i r c r a f t ,t h e great-
was thePhi l ippines - 1,721 in air combat, 1,702 on the ground. Nearly all of this was accomplished thelast four months of 1944 and January 1945, 1,073 in October alone, 833 in Sepkember, 770 in Nov-ember.
Second in importance were the Japanese home islands taken as a whole. In Japan the des-truction was primarily of grounded aircraft, the bulk of which (1,102, plus 120 in air combat)were destroyed in the concluding carrier campaign of July and August 1945. The greatest enemylosses in aerial oombat (420) were sustained in the February carrier raids on the To~o area;during the same month 228 grounded planes were also destroyed, for a total of 648. The remainderof the total of 2,831 planes was accounted for in the four intervening months, March-June 1945.
The area of third importance was the Ryukyus, where destruction was accomplished largelyin air combat. Here too the results (1,871 in air combat, 509 on the ground) were largelyaccomplished in a verywere destroyed in &is
In all the above
few months, the bulk in the one month of April 1945, when 1,337-Dlanesarea a lone, and May 1945, when 466 were accounted for.
areas carrier aircraft were the primary ar,ent of des t ruct ion , of grounded
(Cont. on next page)
- 6 9 -
I
TABLE 26. Continued
c. RYUKYUS ARIA
=7
CARRIELBASED1944-October
1945-JanuaryMarchAprilMayJuneJuly
LAND-BASED1945-Jauar7
FebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJtiyAugust
GRAND TOTAL
ACTIONSORTIES
421%1. 3
6767,866
lIj,b2j7,0tn4,8].6
16
q
z846
1,3712,021
957137
*
ENGAGING
AIRCRAFT
1,61287
13;1,100
2572g4
5+
55
151212149103
2,149
-
Bombers Fighters
052
4$ g4627g
1 213 0
1z 2
117 82112 16746 1409 22 1
gal 1.654
ENEMY AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMBAT
Bombers Fi~hters
0 0
4: $:521 103 0
2k3 262-z 3
4 13
100 4;
W9 1,042
irRcRm!OESTROYEEIN GROUNE
~
2810622729130
~000212
130
-JQ-
OWN LOSSESN ACTION SORTIES
~
0 26: 2102 M44
%: 34
17 120 0 0
See note to Part A of this table.(Cont. from preceding page)
aircraft bulked high in the total, and the campaigns were short. In the fourth-ranking area, theSolomons and Bismarcks, land-based aircraft accounted for 1,988 of the 2,520 planes destroyed,all but 192 were destroyed in air combat, and the active air campaign lasted 20 months. It wasalso the most expensive campaign for the Navy, in terms of air combat losses.
The Japs had a number of bad months in the Solomons and Bismarcks, but their woret three,from the standpoint of planes lost, were January 1944 (406 lost to the Navy, largely in raids onRabaul), November 1943 (246 lost between Rabaul and Bougainvillea), and October 1942 (295 lossesnear Guadalcanal and Santa Cruz). Other particularly bad months for the Japs were June and July1943 (the New Georgia campaign), and August 1942 (the initial invasion of Guadalcanal, and theBattle of the Eastern Solomons). In all of tiese peak months except June-July 1943 our carrierforces helped increase the total des t ruc t ion .
In %ree other areas was the destruction of Japanese aircraft sufficiently high to warrantspecial notice. These were: (1) Formosa, where 477 were downed in air combat and 527 destroyedon the ground, almost entirely by carrier planes in October 1944 and January 1945; (2) the Marianss,where 751 were destroyed in air and 219 on ground , also almost entirely by carrier planes and large-ly in the one month of June 1944; and (3) the Bonins, where 430 Jap planes were accounted for,pr inc ipal ly in three br ief car r ier ra ids in June-July 1944.
Over three hundred plaes were destroyed in each of two other areas, the Narshalls and theEastern Carolines, over two hundred in the Midway area and the Western Carolines, over a hundredin Hew Guinea and Indo China.
- 7 0 -
!!~~ 26. Continued.
D. JAPANESE ROME ISLANDS
BASE , AREA,MONTH (1945)
CARRIER43ASED
HOKXAIDO, NO. HONSHUJulyAugust
TOKYO AREAFelmmryMarchJulyAugust
CEWLWJ.I HONSHUFebruaryMarchMayJulyAugust
KYUSHU, KuRE AREAFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJUIyAugust
LAIuuMsm
TOKYO, CENTRAL HONSHUMarchAprilMayJuneJuI.yAugust
KYUSRU, KURE AREAMarchAprilMayJuneJUIyAugust
GRAND TOTALSee note to Part A of this
ACTIONSORTIES
NEMY PLANESENGAGED
Bomb- Fight-ers ers
XUWU
~ 02 T0 0
??%4 02 15
2g 58
T146F
21 210
10 4;0 20
8626+=
36 4971$3 1129 1351 930 251 0
& 16J
++
0 07 242 320 60 24
Q;0
01 3:2 142 3:0
211 2366
TINY PLANES DESIN COhC3AT~Oab- F@ht-ers ers
&
17
0
%21
23
~
200
100
413724167001
SwJ
0T
0
LLlcj~
3!
q
?2
197
yw+
191715710190
g M
4 ~750 04 50 g0 00 6
4 ZJ750 11 111 52 100 0
157 J3jl
TROYEDON GROUND
2
~001001
~
50000
&xi
OWN I13SSESON ACTION SORTIES
&n_x.3
309 85
06: 30 0
130 370 0M 3025 01~ 2
43; 10 0
P-J
*124
g
01513
&830130
W_0
3;
110150
0 0 051:1 00 1 00 1 0
loJ g0 0 00 0 01 2 02 0 261g1 0 2
(See notes on pp. 69-70)
- 7 1 -
TABU 27. JAF’A14Es2! AIRCRAFT DES’i!BDYED Il? AERIAL COMBAT
MONTH
lgbl-December
lgq2-JsuNwyFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
lg4j-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
lgU-JanuaryFebruaryMarchApril&JuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovenberDecember
1945-Jrmum’yFebruaryMarchAprilwJuneJ~yAWUst
TOTALS
SINK=3
—
0
1
;02426
4:25
1215015
47161
?;69
14gg48996
127117
386200&352
46:gg
:3517066
1;?122361100426
ISJ
3896
MB—
61
1
;3000
52124
E
34761961221331—-
529
BY UL NAVAL AND MARINE AIRCRAIWBy Type and Allied Code Name, Monthly
m—
ATX—
100
25901
017
4:3780~
~
Zim
012;3537426K
@_
iiE&—
ACK—
613
1
;1663
A
*
fCE
mln.
:
15
14156056——
J&
ITHES
L?uL
1
01000
14230
133
1s00
000000010010
626g20rK21
1952
1
45
;6200
247
rAL—
g20
4;
3240
450
130
174
1510
20
1;100
2g00
lay
9
11?6
30461M20—
801_
iim—
m—
00
t0
g200
6?6
5
46
15501032g—
a
m—
Am—
0
0100
1019070
1100
000000000
3;1
3605
4;222
10.21
13
2;3002—
20J
ii-m
JILL
0002
3:00
5:73
;1926121
L
174
Em
lmR
000100000101
00
2;
;
Q_
L
(See notes onp.75)
- 7 2 -
.
TABLW 27. Continued
MONTH
lghl-December
1912-JanuaryFebnaaryMarchAprilwJuneJulyAuguEtSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1943-JsnuaryFebrueryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
l$W-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilwJuneJdyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
lg4~anuaryFebruaryMsrchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
TOTALS
FLO—
RUFE—
97
:
0000000100
z
011100190~
010
06604100—
L
AT P—
JAKE—.
20000
27001
Is111
252
12
11159
12410—
m
LANES—
PETE—
20022
070000003211
i00
14
:2—
AL
OTHER& U/I
1
0000720401690
30000
15200122
151000000201
112g7120
—
NELL—
301200
100001001
1210
33301101—
*
TWIN
SALLY
216000
000000000020
000713002
29
:
62133320
ENGINE
BETTY
120
114000
2723
:9
2710
g1514M
4;01
165;
g
4
24g201162
4J’J_
BOMB—
NICK—
01030220g
1712
269
123
:
EL
ER,DI-NAH
00010001
10633
88
:2316J
3
FIGHTIR-VING
90027
;
2
ii42101
41
ER, REFRAN-CES
230
7{104
608
2491
1
149_
CONN
LILY
02000200
3;35
3105
:00
AISS
HELEN
10
00010
;01700
73201000
~
NCE
PEGGY
002:
000
OTHER& U/I
9
0M10000
27555020
000000600010
04160
1550
1?51
001:
000
=
(See notes on p. 75)
-73-
TABU 27. ‘Continu&
MONTH
1941-Deceuber
1942-JmumyFebruaryMarchApril&JuneJd yAugw tSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
194j-JanuaryFebruaryMachApril%JuneJulyh@8tSeptemberOctoberNovanberDecember
1944-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJuI.yAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1945-JanuxyFebruaryMarchAprilMegJuneJulyAugust
TOTALS
SINGLE-ENGINllFIGHTER
1
11100g
{9
~
1395015
47161
;;69
14L3
!;981P131
4042Y310460
51;9312
295727214123
1623652s6432gg10356
5962
-SINGLE-ENGINEBOMBER
0
0100M39
5:
4;
0
450
130
174
1510
9:1
52110120
MT22
1%1$119
290
?443691271020
Jz?fL
TOTALS, BY
FLOATPLANE
1
00007204
2;104
;
000
15250
;g
3;201
1610
i294
14
132617
Gg7
2
-3!&_
MAJOR TYPTWIN.ENGINIl:OKSAT
9
0M10000
;?53M0
114000
273205
113110
922153610in10
4;2583533
443173
1077321
_i-
1267
ES
FLYING30AT
1
041030050320
000000013022
00001923
;
;
11513000
_!z!.-
!RANSPORT
;001600
116
;
96g75022
80
DU.INER
2g010
_251_
TOTAL,ALL
TYPES
12
42231113110s21W3117
3::12WZgz201
2y3459375
12055391599076
-QEL__
-74 -
NOTES TO TABLE 27
Table 27 shows the monthly bredcd~ by model and type of Japanese aircraft destroyed incombat by carrier-based and land-based aircraft combined.
If the reported identifications by Naval pilots can be accepted as generally correct,65 percent of tie Japanese aircraft destroyed in air combat were single-engine fighters, 16percent were single-engine bombers, 14 percent were twin-en~ine fighters or bombers, and only5 percent were float planes or of miscellaneous types.
The 65% of single-engine fighters may h further broken down: nearly two-thirds were Zekes,less than one-fifth were Tonys, Oscars and Nates, one-tenth were Tojos and newer types, and thesmall remainder were of other or unidentified types.
@or half of the single engine-bombers were the vulnerable Vals, the remainder Judys,Kates and Jills in decreasing magnitude. Nearly 40 percent of the twin-engine planes wereidentified as Bettys, 12 percent as Frances; eiZht other principal types were identified insmall numbers, and over 15 percent could not be identified.
The worst month for Zekes was June 1944, when 461 were shot down by Naval planes, but alltypes of Jap fighters had bad months in October 1944 (727 shot down) and April 1945 (698 lost).By far the worst losses of single-engine bombers were in April 1945, when 304 Vals and 132 otherswent down. Twin-engine planes had their worst month in October 1944, when 258 of assorted typeswere destroyed in combat off Formosa and the Philippines.
-75-
TABLE 28. AERIAL COMBAT RESULTS , INDIVIDUAL MODELS OFOWN VS. JAPANESE AIRCRAFT, 1 SIIPTEMIYiR 1944 . 15 AUGUST 1945
(Figures in left-had column for-each plane type are enemy planes destroyed in combatby own planes of type listed; figures in right head column are cwn planes lost in
combat with enemy plaaee of the types listed. )
AIRCRAXTMODEL
Zeke, HampOscarTonyTojoFrankJackGeorgeMyrtNateU/I S’IE VF*
TOTAL S/E VF
ValJudyKateJillSoniaOther VB-VT
TOTAL m-w
JakePeteRufeRexPaulDave
TOTAL F/P
BettyDinahFrancesIrvingNicksallyHelenLilyNellPeggyU/I T/E Combat
TQTAL T/E COMBA!
FLYING BOINSImAmsPoms
GRAND TOTAL.—
F6F
1000396 ;;275 1128
{9
11 1233 928 036 0
u
2314 149
215134 126
1052114 1
515 2
50lg15060
89
185 648
ll&3
til331227M6
M--A
* 27 F6% shot down by unidentified VF,
.—.—
FM
.!37 2y 32917 201001
10
U33 7
n
?710
L05
700000
7
21M94
16021 11
-&.
gl 1
010
0 1
377 9
14 F6F
OWN AIRCFAI’T K) DEL——SB2C,TM
17 g14 14 261000
L
44 16
;1000
6
301010
5
30015102000—
12
130 0 4
71 20
s l o s t
. — .
PB4Y
25 41~ 2
221600
L
64 11
1217320
25
31g232
2
4g
14310
3200701
31
/32go02-—
204 13
—.-)THERVPB——
2 221200 100
L
10 6
203200
7
20000~
3
00000000000— .
0
1100
22 6
TO&.LF’IGH’lJERj
11114 1044go 30364 13;:: 15
1643 123555
142al
3131 198
490 2175 243
1352919 1
891 5
6326156
__l___
120
216 772
1433166 15421 151 1191026 I
709 11
!.740%1
4937 2M.-
——TOTALBOMBERS
39 1431 310 41626 100
L
118 33
191
11520
38
36i?33
L_
56
173111330270~
43
103200[
297 39
——GRANDTOTALS
1453 118511 33374 17369 15144 1649 13 3555142 2110 lZ
3249 231
509 2176 254
1403119 1
9934My
196
176
3274 15721 153 126
2772$9d
to unknown types of aircraft, and 1down by unidentified ~, have been arbitrarily prorated among the various single engine enemyfighter typee in accordance with the number of ee.ch reported to have been shot down by F6Fs andF4US, and the number of F6Fs and F~s reported shot down by each. Similar proration is notpossible for other plane tfles.
-76-
NOTES TO TABLE 28
Table 28 is a combination of two tabulations. It covers only the period from 1 September1944 to 15 August 1945, during which period were destroyed 5,234 airborne planes, or 577%, ofthe to ta l Jap planes credi ted to Naval a i rcraf t during the w a r . The f i rs t l ine of f igures ineach column is the number of Jap planes, of tie model and type listed at the left, destroyedin combat during this 12-month period by Navy and Marine carrier and land-based planes of themodel or type listed at the top. The second line of fiowres is the number of Navy and Marineplanes lost during the same period in encounters between the same types or models of aircraft,based on a special study of our own aircraft losses.
In tie case of F6F and F4U losses the bulk of those reported as destroyed by unidentifiedtypes, amounting to one-fourth of the total, have been prorated as noted in the footnote to tietable . This , pl:s the errors in identification which may normally be expected in the action re-ports, results in a decrease of accuracy wi.ich leaves somdhing to be desired, but permits com-parisons which are believed sufficiently near the truth to be of considerable value and in teres t ,and are in any event the best available.
The result of comparing each pair of figures is to produce a combat ratio for air combatbetween each two models or types of planes involved - subject to the limitation on accuracy notedabove.
The F6F appears to have shot down 15* sin@e-engine Jap fighters for each F6F destroyed incombat with them. Against the Zeke the F6F ratio was over 13-tc-l; against Oscar over 15-to-l;against Tojo (probably including a large proportion of misidentifications) over 31-to-l. Againstthe most advanced types the F6F did less well: 8&to-1 against the Frank, Jack and George com-bined .
Unusual is the loss of 6 F6Fs in combat with Betty; however, with respect to enemy twin-engineplanes as a whole the ratio was 66-to-1, and against all other bomber types combined =8s 225-to-l.
The F4U nearly matched the F6F performance during this period, wi th a 15- to- l ra t io agains ts ingle-engine fi@ters, and 12-to-l against Zeke. The F4U, however, included a relatively largenumber of obsolete Nates among its kills, and while its record against Oscar and Tony was super-ior to the F6F$f, the F4U scored only 13-to-l against Tojo, and only 6-to-1 against Frank, Jackand George combined.
The phenomenal FM leads all fighters during this period, with a 26-to-1 ratio over Japs ingle-engine f ighters , only 2 losses sustained in destroying 87 Zekes, and only two losses indowning 194 bombers and miscellaneous types.
Bomber losses, as might be expected, were higher against enemy fighters, though the PB4Y re-ported destroying over 5 fighters for every PB4Y combat loss. NO Navy bombers were lost, h o w -ever , in the combats which resulted in destruction of 179 enemy bombers, float planes. andmiscellaneous types during this period.
The catholic taste of the PB4Ys during the 12 months may be no+~d. They accounted, in all,for planes of 24 different identified combat types, plus transports and unidentified types, andthey destroyed over 15 Jap planes for each of their own losses.
From the Japanese angle, the ineffectiveness of their e.ir forces against the Navy duringthis period is clearly shown. They lost 3,131 fighters in destroying 198 of ours, and expended118 of their fighters in destroying only 33 of our bombers. Even their best fighter, Jack,sustained 49 losses in destroying 13 Navy planes.
700380 0 4E 6- 7 7 -
The Japanese single-engine bombers knouked down only one of our planes for every 186 oftheir losses (our VSB and VTB enjoyed a 3~-to-l advantage over the Japs). Their twin-enginebombers and f ighters d id l i t t le be t ter , losing 68 planes for every kill they made. Their fly-ing boats and float planes made no kills at all to offset their 203 losses. Nor did their 72trtinsports l o s t - 4% of which were destroyed by our roving search planes. In a l l , the Japslost over 20 planes for each of ours destroyed in air combat during this period.
TABLE 29. ANTIAIRCRAFT LOSS AND DAMAGE,By Plane Model, Carrier-Based and Land-Based, by Years.
1941-42 1943LOSS AND lmRCENT OF ~ “ SORTIES
OST ATTACKINGSORTIES
ATTACKINGTARGETS
With AATotal Present
LOSS AND PERCENT OF)AhWGE TO SORTIESBASE ,
PLANEMODEL
-J--
DAMAGE TO SORTIESENEMY AA MEETINGM
Dam- Dam-Lost aged Lost aged
CARRIERI’4F
1,976 1,238-’?-% -I?%
4,217 3,6327 71,481 1,2931,147 973
237 213
44 4857 724 1876 892 3110 l?20 0
1.2 13.4mm1.9 14.50.6 9.10.9 14.60.9 16.10 0
&116650
G4425100
2166
40
F6FSBDSB2CTBFTBll
0 01,209 817
0 0142 83169 169
0 0 0 018 37 2.2 4.50 0 0 03 4 3.6 4.8
11 11 6.5 6.5
0330
4350
E00
5525116000
1,2450
11,94456
1,053131
6,0220
4,077184217204
1,0670
LAND-BASEDF4F
1,564x %
86 43373lv 232 623 2150 031 1162 332 314 6
9,090T
42766
4,9410
3,24913115696
0.9 4.8mm4.2 5.43.0 9.10.5 4.40 0
1.0 3.61.5 25.21.3 19.94.2 6.3
F4UF6FSBDSB2UTBFPBYPB4YPv
00
1,14917
1353900
00
55017
1012300
00
1812600
0 0 00 0 0
15 3.3 2.73 5.9 17.6
16 2.0 15.84 26.1 17.40 0 00 0 0
1 1945
I944
%0
34112821
61,951 41,943m -7,993 5,9827,651 3,396
0 06,555 4,87017,787 11,357
CARRIER~F4U, FGmSBDSB2C, SBWTBF, TBM
69,752 33,592
04,2743,539 12,341 16,006
44,684_
02,1372,5269,3289,674
657 2060mm0 022 4216 131162 424174 646
1.5 4.6m ?mo 0
1.0 2.00.6 5.21.7 4.51.8 6.7
680 1808mm137 20140 1300 0
104 215166 584
1.6 4.3m m2.3 3.41.2 3.80 0
2.1 4.41.5 5.1
1.1 4.9m -2-zT2.6 2.20.0 0.00.3 2.10.3 5.61.1 5.23.4 31.06Y5 28.44.2 20.84.5 28.23.6 13.50.6 2.10.0 0.0
27l-%4124
3:22
:540
125
171019171421220
E11090
109
13
48,068~
16,578~
LAND-BASEDF4U, FGF6FU/i VPSBDSB2C, SBWTBF, TBMPBYPBMPB2YPB4YPVPBJU/i VPB
59,716 27,4981,587
51 19,713
04,109
9933776
1,0681,6602,884
40
31,614m
77427
13,6670
2,7653081846
5121,1121,512
5
248 1646 0.8 5.2mnz-z m m
4 31 0.5 4.00 0 0.0 0.059 591 0.4 4.30 0 0 027 251 1.0 9.16 59 1.9 19.22 14 11.1 77.80 14 0.0 30.4
15 101 2.9 19.714 94 1.3 8.511 69 0.7 4.60 0 0.0 0.0
190 808-m m
1,19127
26924
4,60294984829
16924
953304
7 60 013 973 539 441 911 481 543 26911 417 250 0
17,0132,1951,530
5538736
1,769569
0131314 5,249 1,1990 0 0
2 . ANTIAIRCRAFT LOSS AND DAMAGE
Data on number of planes lost to enemy A/A fire, from which can be.calculated loss rates interms of action sorties flown, will be found in many of the preceding tables of this report. In
7Table 29, are additional data on number of planes damaged by enemy A A, and loss and damage ratesin terms of (a) Number of sorties attacking tar~ts, and (b) Number of sorties attackinr tarzetsin the face of enemy A/A fire.
, . .0.
On first glance at Table 29 the predominant impression will be the diversity of the figures.It may be grantmd that some of the smaller figures involved are affected by chance (and possiblypoor reporting). Yet upon closer inspection a number of fairly consistent relationships becomev i s i b l e :
(Cont. on next page)
-78-
(Cont. from preceding page)
(al Loss rates to enemv A/A were hiphest in 1942. and ~enerallv lowest in 1943. increasiruz.,— . ,slightly from then until the end of the war. The 1942 rates reflect the predominance of largeenemy warships among the targets for that year, figures for 1943 and subsequent years the relative-ly lower but increasing effectiveness of Japanese land A/A. Actually enemy A/A mterial improvedand increased in volume at a far greater rate, but th is t rend was offse t by the improwd perfor-mance characteristics of Naval a i rcraf t , and improved tictics agains t A/A.
(b) Loss rates for carrier-based aircraft were consistently higher than for land-based air-craft, despite inclusion in the latter of the re la t ive ly vulnerable VPB. The reason is thatland-based aircraft generally were assigned to attack the less well-defended rear area targets,already well beaten down by the carrier forces, such as those in the Marshalls and Phi l ipp ines .Also their campaigns against such heavily defended targets as the Rabaul area were of long duration,and by the later stages enemy A/A guns had been Sreatly reduced in number and ammunition suppliesdeple ted . C a r r i e r a i r c r a f t , on the other hand, were constantly reaching out toward the mostheavily defended targets, pressing their attacks close to wipe out such small and vital targetsas grounded aircraft, warships and merchant vessels, and seldom staying long enough to enjoy thebenefits of the reduced A/A defenses resulting from their attacks.
(c) The lesser effectiveness of enemy A/A against our land-based planes did not result froman appreciably lower rate of hits per sortie attacking defended tarEets, but fro= generallylower le thal ef fect of h i ts . A smaller percentage of the land-based planes hit by A/A was lost.. —In part, also the lower rate of losses for land-based planes reflected the extensive use of theless vulnerable SBD, whi le tie carriers were shifting to the highly vulnerable SB2C.
(d) The SBD, carrier-based or land-based, had consistently the best record of any plane model.It generally received slightly less hits per sortie than other planes, and in addition had thelowest ratio of losses to hits of any single-engine plane.
(e) The F6F appears to have had considerable advantage over the F4U when flown under the samecondi t ions . Receiv ing about the same number of hits per sortie in comparable operations, theF6F had a far lower rate of loss per plane hit.
(f) The TBM 1oss rate appears to have been lower than that of the SB2C. It received more hitsper sor t ie , but showed grea ter abi l i ty to survive h i t s . Both SB2C and TBM were somewhat moresubject to A/A loss than fighters.
(Note that in the above statements allowance has been made for non-comparable emplo~ent ofthe various plane models, not shown in the table, and particularly for the heavy use of the TBMin CVE support operations against targets whose A/A defenses had already been well reduced. The‘TEL! A/A 1oss rate “on fast carriers was 5@ greater than on CVES, but was still less than thefast carr ier ra te for SB2CS. The following table shows loss ra tes per 100 ac t ion sor t ies for theent i re war :
— —
CV-CVL CVEF6F .e7 xF4U 1.46 .90FM .40SBD .68SB2C 1.43TBM 1.10 .72
.
(g) The loss rates for VPBwere generally higher than for single-engine planes, but not ex-cessim considering the effectiveness of the minimum altitude attack tactics customarily used.The PBJ is an exception; the bulk of its attacks were made from higher altitudes against ratherpoorly defended targets, and its loss rate is correspondingly low.
The following table combines and summarizes the data for the principal models of bothcarrier-based and land-based planes for the entire war. I n u t i l i z i n g i t , it should be noted
(Cont. on next page)
- 7 9 -
(Cont. from preceding page)
that the use of F6Fs, SB2CS and TBW predominantly in carrier operations, and of F4Us and SBDSmainly in land-based operations tends to distort the relationships between these planes, andproduces rates differing from those which would be expected from figures based on performancein comparable operations.
Plane Model
lL/A Losses per100 Action
Sorties
Planes Hit Per100 Attacks,A/A Present
F6FF4U, FGFMSBDSB2CTBF, TBM
PB4YPVPBYPBJ
.83
.55
.48
.291.28.91
1.651.081.09.21
5.734.924.234.736.477.74
28.411.224.54.1
A/A Losses per100 Attacks,A/A Present
1.391.421.12.54
1.761.45
3.701.923.06.66
$ Lostof Planes
Hit
242927122719
13171316
.
.
-80-
3 . ATTACK DATA . BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
(It should be noted that, because of mechanical difficulties arising from the use ofseveral different machine tabulations made at different times, there are s l ight d iscrepanciesbetween the tables covering attacks on targets, broken down by area and by target type. Noneof these are suff ic ient to af fect the val id i ty or essent ia l accuracy of the data . )
This section of the report breaks down the offensive effort of Navy and Marine carrierand land-based aircraft by the geographical areas in which the targets were located, withfurther detail in some cases on tie types of targets a t tacked in each area . Offensive effor tis expressed only in terms of (a) sorties attacking targets (see definition of this term, andnote difference between definitions for 1944 and for other years), and (b) tons of bombs ex-pended on targets. Data on rockets and ammunition expended will be found in subsequent sec-t i o n s , but not broken down by area.
Table 30 is the comprehensivein each major area, for tie ent i re
Table 31 breaks down the areas h i p t a r g e t s , and by years.
picture of the effort placed upon each major type of targetwar, by all of Naval aviation.
totals of sorties attacking targets between land targets and
Table 32 breaks down on a monthly basis the attack sorties andareas where the most important long campaigns were carried oq: thethe Philippines, the Ryukyus, and Japan. Dab are given separatelyland-based attacks, for land targets and ship targets, on a monfily
bomb tonnage for the fourSolomons-Bismarcke a r ea ,for carr ier-based andb a s i s .
Table 33 gives data on a monthly basis, for attacks on land targets in the principalCentral Pacific island groups. Tables 34 and 35 show monthly shipping attack sorties. for1944 and 1945, for all major areae.
.
-81-
TABLE 30. SORTIES ATTACKING TARGETS, AND BOMB TONN4GEEX133NDED ON TARGETS (CARRIER-BASED ANO LAND-BASED cO~Iw,D)
By Type of Target, and by Target Area, for Entire War
Other Land Other WARSHIPSAir- Mili- Trans- Harbor & Un-
TARGET AREA fields tary porta- Areas known Ar- Unar-Targets tion Land * mored mored
Hokkaido, No. HonshuTokyo AreaCentral HonshuKyushu, Kure AreaRyukyusFormosaPhilippines
BoninsMarianasWestern CarolinesEastern CarolinesMarshallsGilberts, NauruMidway, Wake, I&u_cus
Solomons, BismarcksNew Guinea, HalmaheraOther NEI, [email protected]
China, KoreaIndo China
Aleutians, KurilesAtlantic
TOTAL
Hokkaido, No. HonshuTokyo AreaCentral HonshuKyushu, Kure AreaRyulvsFormosaPhilippines
BoninsMarianasWestern Carolines!Sastern CarolinesMarshallsGilberts, NauruMidway, Wake, Marcus
Solomons, Bism~rckeNew Guinea, HahsaheraOther NEI, Malaya
China, KoreaIndo China
Aleutians, KurilesAtlantic
TOTAL
* Includinz industrial
SORTIES ATTACKING TARG
566 334 232 904259 382 144 2551556 126 64 1204250 318 44 144
14554 17665 810 12531842 1176 102 1268792 26578 2323 655
1304 4388 loi’ 743630 13822 432 42798 12649 991 11531613 1687 1 613519 20156 85 416771 1238 1 133737 1907 12 5
10777 33009 1928 9681394 1259 15 49161 332 28 73
188 104 65 184114 56 102 45
196 279 (J 797 312 390 0
63118 137777 7876 5815
2881222427
12394575348
2318
3291215743557
1473400403
699641945
4320
1437
23210
12716243llC
7528541
12153
128442943833665
8640497828
17980476237
4830
11665
59657
TONS OF BOM8S85 2932 14621 374 49
343 38424 55
720 306
14 26162 0221 381
0 4630 2041 548 6
806 5316 192 8
29 8465 6
0 256 0
2629 2373
22376168
23212414641022
232773
196118
16316
144
10521311
131
5101
8514
PENDED
Y3391180
408221362
16191443
9795
35
49304
60
22
G
mrgets ~so-ons ).# Includin~ minelaying.
ETS
10 76259 166533 134919 182
5 2734 222
1526 1123
55 302152 8273 332
178 319119 49
0 0308 54
766 92629 92 6
5 5324 239
0 1133 28
5000 4586—
5 44125 51333 44604 76
5 790 75
722 307
21 11099 724 7889 7477 00 0
100 7
472 46511 62 3
4 2915 99
0 614 3
2722 1563
493 106291 291172 151496 2531325 11881163 4204175 1591
699 405541 494
1129 1534754 237716 109519 3026 30
1069 2029270 314128 291
474 344400 92
9 6045 35
14394 10990——
2066368243461543
1716
221151342262115
610
60510549
226196
6
70713053
16658
238
81205420
15745
3353441
10830
816 6
5610 1589
623
285188
91
341
9560
15500
44141
502
733
1134
300
2421203
70
11414
12800
30000
870
38—
741
TOTAL
2192681129526889
383225527
47876
760019931227154928
2647322083223
5296533561033
14801075
5741074
259204
982221110382479139511865
18845
2109613962331736
10903967
1402
289831076391
664461
286177
102898
-82-
NOTES ‘TO TABLE 30
This table makes it clear that the three areas of heaviest Naval offensive a i r ef for t werekhe Solomona and Bismarcks, t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , and the Ryukyus, in that order, followed next bythe Marshalls, the Western Carolines, the Marianas, and Japan as a whole. Other areas, thoughimportant a t par t icular t imes , received a far less to ta l weight of a t tack.
These seven pr inc ipal areas were the targets of over 85$ of tie Navy’s a i r of fens ive;over 2@ of the total sorties and 28% of the bomb tonnage were expended against Bisrmrcks-Solomons targets, 18% of each were expended against Philippines targets, and 14% of each wereexpended against Ryukyus targets, while the Marshalls claimed 1%.
The targets attacked =ried with the area and the purposes of theabout a quarter of tie to ta l offensive was di rected agains t a i r f ie lds ,other military ground targets, about one-seventh against shipping, andcellaneous land tar~ets. In Japan. however. nearly 60% of the attacks
campaign. Overa l l ,about one-half againstone-tenth against mis-were on airfields. and. . .
a b o u t 25$ on shipping, with less attention to other land targets. I n t h e Marshalls thre~quarters of the attacks were on military ground targets other than airfields. In Formosa andthe Eastern Carolines airfields and shipping each accounted for a third of the total. ForChina and Indo China two-thirds of the attacks were on shipping along the coast and in theharbors .
The pr incipal areas of a i r f ie ld a t tack were the Ryukyus, the Solomons and Bismarcks,Japan, and the Philippines. In the Solomons airfields were principally bombed; in the otherareas fighter strafing and rocket attacks were moro impor tant .
Heavy attacks on military land targetsMarshalls and tie Western Carolines,
s p redominant in the Solomons end Bismarcks, thewere largely the result of the long campaigns for complete
neutralization and reduction of enemy installations in the parts of these areas that were by-passed, though a large volume of pre-invasion and direct support attacks was made. The heavyat tacks on mi l i ta ry land targets in the Phi l ippines , the Ryukyus, the Marianas, and the Bonins,reflect almost entirely pre-invasion air bombardment and direct air support of ground forces,by carrier and land-based planes.
The heaviest volume of shipping attack, 25$ of all Navy shipping attacks, was f lown,largely f rom carr iers , in the Philippines campaign. Japan itself was the second most importantarea for shipping attack, particularly attacks on heavy warships in harbor. Rnemy warshipswere also heavily attacked in the Solomons area, and merchant shipping was heavily attacked inhalf a dozen other areas.
- 8 3 -
TABLE 31. SORTIES ATTACKING LAND TARGETS AND SHIP TARGETS(C.4RR13tR-BAS~ AND ~ND-BAsED COMBI~)
By Target Area and by Years
TARGET AREA
Solomons, BismarcksNew Guinea, HalmaheraCelebes, Bornoo
Midway AreaWake, MarcusGilberts, NauruMarshallsEastern CarolinesWestern CarolinesMarianasBonins
PhilippinesFormosaRyukyus
Kyushu, Kure AreaCentral HonshuTokyo AreaHokkaido, No. Honshu
Korea, No. ChinaCentral ChinaSouth ChinaIndo ChinaJava, Sumatra, Malaya
AleutiansKuriles
Atlantic
TOTAL, ALL AREAS
NOTES TO TABLE 31
SO1942
1,09018
0690
7?
20
430
1,686
RTIES AT1943
10,639109
01,o381,830
5448
1245
0
14,207
TACKING1944
31,5892,691
115
0857297
21,2683,127
11,98618,5671,860
12,1542,273
860
98
0278
483
108,503
LAND TARm
4,4872
372
082632
2,457245
7,56896
4,239
27,2141,43034,613
4,9521,9345,7941,445
3235
48331719
078
0
98,670
GETSI’OTAL
47,8052,721
496
02,7902,15924,3463,38019,55418,6636,099
39,3683,703
35,473
4,9521,9345,7941,445
3235
483317117
126361
913
223,066——
— .SORTIES
1942
1,239851
32042
063
6
140
67
1,837
-
%&— .
1,66880
05
47180
5
0
21
55
1,971
——ATTACKING1944
2,266525169
0362
1,7171,5172,7661,2701,224
7,839683849
11
31
041
39
20,976
SHIP TARm
18
192
000
17226
3970
270
6611,1341,950
1,9011,0181,012
747
28211952675636
029
0
11,237
GETSX’Ol!AL
5,174626362
3208349
2,1321,5483,1631,2701,494
8,5C61,8172,799
1,9011,0181,012
747
28211952775767
1671
161
36,021
The predominance of the Solomons campaign in 1942-43 is clearly shown. The equal importanceof land and shipping targets in 1942, and the staady decrease in th~ relative importance of ship-ping as a target i s a lso i l lus t ra ted . 1944, as the table indicates , was tie year when Navalaviation was first able to come to grips with sizeable quantities of the Jap ~rchant m a r i n eand was the year when the ‘bulk of it was eliminated.
The table a180 i l lus t ra tes graphical ly the expansion of the areas of operation of theNaval a i r forces , and the shifts from old areas to new as enemy bases were captured or ky-passed and neutralized , and ene~ shipping eliminated from successive areas.
-64-
TABLE 32. SORTIES ATTACKING TARGETS , AND BOMB TONNAGEEXPENDED ON TARGETS, IN MAJOR ARFA CAMPAIGNS
Monthly, for Carrier-Based and Land-Based Attacks, on Land and Shipping Targets.
A. SOLOMONS - BISMARCKS AR!%
MONTH
1942 - MayAugustseptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1943 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNo~mber
Ee cember
1944 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1945 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
1942 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total
GRAND TOTAL
~ttackinz Bombs onTargets Targets
30
89154197212
1s1258201224229408
2,127670983
1,0431,8842,130
1,0461,5543,9383,1132,5831,4092,5743,4853,5663,7993,3971,118
465805644765798426458
30
24545748
46138116145129303
1,482363592674
1,0991,272
519866
2,1531,6581,320
5481,1251,3861,3781,5801,397
818
550815726885
1,044457624
126 143655 186
10,348 6,35931,582 14,7484,487 5,244
47,072 26,537
——
TTACRSSHIPPI1$G TARGETSSorties Tons of.ttackinc Bombs onTargets - Targets
028
17226624793
1291069532
12718
3079089
11918387
26331651517214055
1268179
23617810
0000Io0
01149
10112735
511109514977
1765639
7359
15912814335203
10112768311
0000200
0 0—806 323
1,382 7502,171 636
1 2
4,360 1,711
ttacking Bombs onTargets Targets
0 0389 147
0 044 190 00 0
51 23
240 880 0
0 00 07 0
.—433 166291 111
7 00 0
731 277
BASED ATTACKSSHIPPING TARGETS
Sorties Tons ofttacking Eloxbs onTargets Targets
220 13965 340 0
89 4159 210 0
0 0
217 12269 35
91 731 03 0
433 235286 15795 730 0
814 465
NOTES TO TABLE 32A.
The predominance of land-based operations in the Solomons-Bismarcks area may be especiallynoted. ~arrier o f f e n s i v e a c t i v i t y a~ainst l a n d t a r g e t s w a s l a r g e l y l i m i t e d t o ~utting” the -
Marines ashore in August 1942, and neutralizing Buka and Bonis airfields in support of theBougainvillea landings in November 1943. The carriers concentrated solely on enemy shipping in
(Cont. on next page)
-85-
the
(Cont. from preceding page)
Coral Sea , Eas tern Solomons, Santa Cruz and Guadalcanal battles of 1942, and in the Rabaul andKavieng strikes of 1943-44.
Land-based aircraft were forced to devote a major part of their offensivm effort to ship-ping targets during the first ten critical months of the Solomons campaign, to prevent enemyreinforcement of their forces and naval bombardment of our installations. A substant ia l anti-shipping effort continued throughout the balance of 1943 and 1944, reaching a peak in the early1944 strikes which nxide Rabaul Harbor untenable, but after l!ay 1943 land targets received farg r e a t e r attOntion.
Peaks of offensive activity against land targets may be noted in July 1943 (direct supportof New Georgia landings), Novembar-l)ecember 1943 (Bougainville landings), March 1944 (Japanesecounter-offensive on Bougainville). The decline in volume in January-February 1944 reflectsthe longer missions flown against Rabaul during these months , contrasted with the previousshort-range hops in the Solomons. The heavy volume of attacks in July-November 1944 reflectsthe withdrawal of Army planes, leaving the principal responsibility of neutralizing the Solomonsto an increased force of Marine aircraft operating from Bougainvillea, Green Island and Emirau.It also reflects the withdrawal of enemy air strength, permitting use of Marine VF entirely foroffensive purposes.
In December 1944 the bulk of the single-engine planes were withdrawn from this area fort ransfer to tie P h i l i p p i n e s , leaving PBJs as the principal Naval a i rcraf t remaining. Thisaccounts for the larger bomb tonnage per sortie thereafter, and the cessation of shipping attacks,which during late 1944 had been largely fighter attacks on barges.
-86-
MONTH
1944 - AugustSepteaberOctoberNovemberDecember
1945 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
TOTAL
TABLE 32. Continued
B. PHILIPPINES P.REA
CARRIER-B‘UIJD TARGETSSorties Tons of
Lttacking Bombs onTargets Targets
0 03,944 1,4143,386 8072,o83 4762?,205 287
2,270 6630 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
13,888 3,647
ASED ATTACKSSHIPPING TARGETSForties Tons ofAttacking Bombs onTargets Targets
o 02,300 6992,737 9951,958 995
501 46
3870000000
910000000
7,883 2,826
LAND-BASED ATTACKSIAND TARGBXT3
Sorties Tons ofAttacking Bombs onTargets Targets
1 04 3
33 117 0
481 125
1,183 4015,446 2,6165,594 2,5865,022 2,3803,752 2,0062,212 1,1601,434 794
301 142
25,480 12,214
SHIPPING TARGETSSorties Tons ofAttacking Bombs onTargets Targets
3 033 847 li55 21
204 66
104 6107 2538 515 510 80 00 00 0
616 155
NOTES TO TABLR 32B
There were three main stages to the Naval air campaign in the Philippines : (a) the des-truction of enemy air strength and shipping throughout the area (plus a minor amount of pre-invasion shore bombardment and direct support) carried out by carrier forces during September,October and November, 1944; (b) protection of the amphibious forces and direct support of groundforces by both carrier and land-based planes in the Mindoro and Lingayen landin~s of Decemberand January; end (c) extensive ground support end pre-invasion bombardment by Marine aircraftin the Luzon campaign and subsequent invasions of the Visayas and Mindanao.
The table shows t!le considerable emphasis on shipping attack in the first stage; half ofthe bombing offensive was against enemy naval and merchant vessels, while the remainder of thebombing effort, plus most of the fighter offensive, was sent largely agains t a i r f ie lds . Theat tacks of September-November 1944 in the Philippines constituted the Navyvs heaviest sustainedanti-shipping offensive; they resulted (see Appendix) in 279,000 tons of combat veseels and474,000 tons of large merchant vessels sunk (including attacks at Formosa and the Ryu@ue). Atthe same time the air offensive resulted (see Table 26B) in the destruction of 1406 enemy air-craft in air combat and 1,295 on the ground.
By the beginning of the second stage, enemy shipping had been almost completely eliminated,and the enemy air force largely nullified. 676 more planes were destroyed, however, and sub-stantial attacks were made on ground targets in support of ground forces.
For the third stage the carriers were no longer required, enemy aircraft were almost com-ple te ly absent , and the bulk of the offensive consisted of direct air support of Army groundtroops. The table shows the considerable volmne of attacks flown by Marine fighters and divebombers in the Philippines from December 1944 to the end of the war. Although the Marineoffensim in this theater during these few months amounted to nearly a quarter of Marine aviationstota l for the war , i t has been prac t ica l ly ent i re ly unpubl ic ized.
-8’7-
TABLE 32. Continued
c. RYUKYUS ARM
CARRIER-IAND TARGETS
MONTH Sorties Tons ofAttacking Bombs orTargets Targets
1944 - October 859 249
1945 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
TOTAL
536 1600 0
6,347 1,96212,799 4,6716,332 2,7694,555 1,629
0 00 0
31,428 11,440
BASED ATTACKSSHIPPING TARGETS=ties Tons ofAttacking Bombs onTargets Targets
845 318
53 10 0
868 218522 113172 2047 100 00 0
2,507 680
L4ND-BASED ATTACKS
=
4t+~cking Bombs on Attacking Bombs on
160
585982
1,60077595
000
305584700195
2
823371023
1056220
2250
10920
4,045 1,786I
292 33
NOTES TO TABLE 32c
The pattern of the Philippines campai.m was repeated in the Ryukyus, but in more condensedform. Enemy shipping was more quickly and easily eliminated in March-and April 1945 (it hadalready been hit in a one-day strike incidental to the Lay+& campaign) , but the a i r f ie lds ,which had been hit comparatively lightl-- in October and January, presented more difficulty.Those on Okinawa were quickly neutralized, but it was necessary to attack those in the SouthernRyukyus constantly through the entire 5 months of the operation. The bulk of the remainingoffensive effort was concentrated on beach and inland defenses, and on guns, caves, and otherdefens ive pos i t ions , in direct support of Marine and Army troops. In this work land-basedMarine aircraft began to assist the carrier forces early in April; they assumed an increasingproportion in May and June, and on 22 June took over from the carriers the entire burden ofsuppor t .
NOTES TO TABLE 32D
This table (see next page) shows the distribution of Naval attack effort between landand shipping tar@s in the various segments of Japan. (See Definitions for geographicallimits of the various areas; note especially that the Tokyo area includes all of northernHonshu except the tip*.
Tokyo area land targets , par t icular ly a i r f ie lds , received the heaviest fraction of thec a r r i e r o f f e n s i v e , o v e r 4% of the total attacks on land targets. These attacks were deliveredin three periods: (a) the first strikes of 16, 17and25 February , were concent ra ted on a i r -fields a n d a i r c r a f t f a c t o r i e s , and resulted in the destruction of 203 grounded aircraft aswell as 413 in air combat; (b) the strikes of 10-18 and 30 July, and (c) the final operationsof 9-15 August. In the latter two periods 762 grounded enemy aircraft were destroyed in thisarea alone . Over half the enemy aircraft destroyed by the Navy in or over Japan, were in theTolqJo area . (See Table 26D).
In the Kyushu-Kure area, the next most heavily attacked, the offensin effort was spreadover fivs months, though the heaviest concentrations were in March and May, in strikes aimed atbreaking up enemy air concentrations capable of being employed against Okinawa. The Apriloffensive involved also the strikes against the YAMATO and her escorts, which resulted in des-troying the bulk of that suicide naval force.
Central Honshu, including the Kobe-Osaka (Inland Sea) area, and tie Nagoya area, wasattacked heavily only during the short period of 24-30 July. Half of the bombing effort wasdi rec ted agains t sh ipping.
Hokkaido, and the adjacent tip of Honshu, were attacked only on 14-15 July and 9-10August .
(Cont. on next page)
-88-
TABLE 32. Continued
D. JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS
MONTH
KYUSHU, KURE AREA1945 - March
AprilMayJuneJulyAugust
CENTRAL HONSHO
1945 - FebruaryMarchAprilMay.TuneJulyAugust
TOKYO AREA
1945 - FebruaryMarchAprilMay,TuneJulyAugust
HOKKAIDO, NO. HONSHI
1945 - JulyAugust
GRAND TOTAL
CARRIER-BASED ATTACKSLAND TARGETS
Sorties Tons ofAttacking Bombs onTargets Targets
4,329
1,761233
1,570341424
0
1,911
20587080
1,508103
5,782
1,3390000
2,1002,343
1,445
830615
1,357
52722
65154
1030
539
811000
40948
Qy285
0000
736873
627
299328
13,467 4,417
SHIPPING TARGETSSorties Tons ofAttacking Bombs onTargets Targets
1,688
407313300
9380
920
3697080
7790
865——244
0000
366255
747
521226
914
182216
00
5160
481
T34050
4420
283
100000
156117
355
~110
4,220 2,033
LAND-BASEDLAND TARGE?TS
Sorties Tons of’Attacking Bombs onTargets Targeta
630 126
T 721 1113 7
123 17336 82137 9
23 0
T 70 01 0
11 00 00 0
11 0
12 7
T To 00 03 15 30 04 3
0 0
Y xo 0
665 133
ATTACKSSHIPPING TARGETSSorties Tons ofAttacking Bombs onTargets Targets
211 83
7 128 1124 1334 1780 2941 12
100 18— —0 0
10 115 029 823 721 22 0
147 27
012112634568
00347
112
0 0
458 128
(Cont. from preoeding page)
The heaviest carrier attacks on shippin~ in Jap home waters were on 21-28 July in theInland Sea; in this series of strikes tl.e-buik of tie remaining Jap Navy was crippied.
L a n d - b a s e d Naval air attacks on Japan were carried out largely by Naval search planes,though Marine fighters from Okinawa were active against Kyushu from June on. Search planetargets were normally shipping, usually of the smaller types, along the coasts. It should benoted tiat the bomb tonnages expended in these attacks by single search planes are understatedin the above table. Where such a plane dropped less than half a ton in an attack, it was re-corded in the machine system as zero. Frequently 2 or 3 small bombs, and heavy strafing, weresufficient to destroy the small vessels encountered, an d the remaining bombs of the usual loadof a ton or less were saved for other targets that might be found.
-89-
TABLE 33. NAVAL AND MARINE AIR ATTACKS ON PRIIJCIPAL CENTRAL PACIFICIsLAm GR0t77 (LAND-BAsED AND cARRIER-BAsED c0M81m )
Sorties Attacking, and Tons of Bombs Expended, on Land Targets Only, Monthly
MONTH
1942 - FebruaryMarch
1943 - JuneJulyAugustSeptnmberOctoberNovwmberDecember
1944 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptembbrOctoberNovemberDecember
1945 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
1942-1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total
GRAND TOTAL
WAKE,MARCUSS T
45* 1824* 6
000 0
261* 1140 0
775* 3190 00 0
17 2021 22841 0
690* 2%50 00 0
12 861* 346 423 2218 19
10 121 046 789 19
21 34393* 169153* 31193* 59
10? 457857 416826 402
2790 1275
GILBERTS
e
6 56 60 0
165* 855 2
1515* 551133* 60
5 54 31 11 29 642 2212 11
135 12613 113 0
54 1918 19
20 200 00 00 00 00 012 30 0
1830 709297 22532 23
2159 957
MARSHALLSs T
77 300 0
0 00 00 00 06 1
424* 193114* 13
2218* 8072363* 924971* 4831526 6042147 8311674 4012332 7472895 12251620 7241468 8011164 609890 624
479 25633 15
241 129196 119438* 227526 256418 331126 76
621 23721268 87802457 1409
24346 10426
EASTERNCAROLI1/lt%——s T
5 53 2
16 9452* 11063 12
2064* 790170* 4930 925 1541 91 060 30118 5787 37
0 080 3389 5823 169 127 619 1018 8
8 73127 1127245 143
3380 1277
=
s T
809* 160465* 1573 02 0
1897* 57314 4
6142*1769859 258
1228* 262567 150
983 2461536 2171468 397725 256896 329879 339907 415174 89
0 011986 33337568 2288
19554 5621
MARIANASs T
214* 550 0
10 020 0
6617* 20589722* 3305398* 102285 56392 15503 74406 193
27 08 03 06 05 05 042* 40 0
0 018567 5858
96 4
18663 5862
BONINSS T
491* 129614* 178304* 94426* 183
4 112 19 2
2 03102* 8491132* 232
0 03 00 00 00 0
0 01860 5884239 1081
6099 1669
s - Sor t ies attackinK land tarzets.T - Tons of bombs ex~ended on ~and targets.
#After December 1943 all attacks were on Nauru.* Denotes months during which carrier strikes were made.
NOTES TO TABIE 33
Shown above is the Naval and Marine offensive air effort azainst enemy lend tarzets alonrthe Central Pacific line of advance,
. “ .and against islands fringing the route.
Wake and Marcus are of the least importance. They were used mainly as targets for trainingraids by new carriers and air groups reporting to the Fleet, althou~h most of these missions werealso tim?d for d ivers ionary ef fec t , and in addition succeeded in making the islands militarilyineffect ive as a i r bases . All months of heavy activi~ against these islands involved carrierr a i d s ; T/ake was otherwise attacked only by F’B2Ys from Midway, and PB4Ys and PVs from Eniwetok,and Marcus by a few P84Ys from the Marianas. Some 600 Japanese were killed by air attack onWake during the war, and 1,300 more died of disease or starvation as a result of the enemy!s un -willingness to expose ships to attack by sending in supplies to the garrison.
Against tie Gilberts the bombing campaign was short and heavy, and confined largely to the
(Cont. on next page)
-90-
(Cont. from preceding page)
actual invasion period in November 1943, following a sma1l but effective one-day raid on Tarawain September. All subsequent activity in the Gilberts column represents attacks on Nauru (andOcean Island): a carrier raid in December 1943, and strikes by PVs from Tarawa thereafter, forthe purpose of neutralizing the air base to prevent its use to reconnoiter our activity in theMarshal ls .
The Marshalls air campaign was an extended one. It began witi carrier attacks in November1943 to neutralize the Marshalls air bases during the Gilberts campaign; it continues witha carrier strike on Kwajalein in Eecember; and was followed by heavy poundings from tie entirecarrier force supporting the landings on Kwajalein and Eniwetok in January and February 1944.Thereafter Marine and Navy fighters, dive bombers and patrol bombers took over the job ofcompletely destroying the airfields in the four remaining Jap-held islands, and destroying allremaining enemy installations and supplies. To this task a substantial force, operating fromMajuro and Kwajalein, was devoted during the remainder of the war. The offensive reached itspeak durinG August of 1944 and declined thereafter. About 2,300 of the 13,000 Japanese person-nel on these four islands were killed by air attack; another 4,500 died of disease or starvationas a result of the air blockade maintained.
Against the Eastern Carolines the bulk of the Navy’s offensive consisted of two 2-daycarrier strikes on Truk in February and April 1944, followed by a small carrier attack on Ponape.Marine F4Us from Eniwetok thereafter made occasional attacks on Ponapa, and Navy searchplanesfrom time to time bombed Kusaie, Ponape, the Nomoi Islands and Truk.
The Western Carolines were the victims of a carrier raid on Palau, Yap and Woleai duringthe period 30 March - 1 April 1944, a further heavy raid on Palau and Yap in .Tuly. 1944, andintensiw carrier operations supporting the Marine and Army landings on Fwleliu and Angaur inSeptember 1944. In the latter part of that month Marine fighters and torpedo bombers basedat Peleliu took over the direct support duty from the carriers, and after Peleliu was securedthey maintained a steady volume of neutralizing attacks on the extensi~ enemy forces on theremaining islands of the Palau and Yap groups until the end of the war. Woleai also receivedoccasional attacks from Navy search planes based at Manus and Guam.
The Naml pre-inv=.ion and wnphibious support campaign in the Marianas was the Pacific’sheaviest, except for Okinawa, in terms of close support missions flown and bomb tomage andstraffing delivered with low altitude accuracy. It extended over a period of 8 weeks, from theinitial strikes preceding the landing on Saipan, to tie conclusion of organized resistance onTinian and Guam. Subsequent activity by land-based Marine fighters in the Marianas was con-fined to neutralization missions against the two remaining Japanese airfields on Rota and Pagan.
The carrier campaign against the Bonins was one of the longest of the Pacific war, and wasunusual in that tie first strikes preceded the landings on Iwo Jima by 10 months. The fivestrikes of June-September 1944 were primarily directed toward nullifying the value of Iwo as anair base, as well as driving major shipping from the area and destroying naval base facilitiesat Chichi Jima. These operations succeeded in all these purposes; 418 enemy planes were des-troyed during their course, and relatively few planes or major vessels were found in the areat h e r e a f t e r .
In the following five months Naval aviation left the Bonins strictly alone, except foroccasional search plane at+acks. In Febrwry of 1945 the Marine invasion of Iwo was supportedfor several days by the ent i re fas t carr ier force , and for three weeks by a substantial CVEf o r c e . Its success completed the chain of bases across the Central Pacific.
- 9 1 -
TABLE 34. SORTIES ATTACKING SHIP TARGETS, MONTHLY, 1944.
— ------
MONTH
JanuuryFebruaryMarchAprilmyJuneJulyAugustSeptenberOctoberNovemberDecember
TOTAL
MONTH
JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
TOTAL
By Area, Carrier-Based and Land-Dased (Pacific ~ly)
.—------ —SOLOMONS,BISMARCKS.—— -C L—
91 2631 3163 515
17214055
1268179
23617810
95 2171
MARIANAS—-.—c L
150
1010 587 0
00
1303
1247 21
~? GUINEA,EALMAHERAC L——
152226
305 1577
239
64 21007
369 152
——..
BONINSC L-
110 1378 16621 2
BORNEOCELEBES.—
L
22336323739
169
I EASTERNM4RSHALLSC L—.—626 13389 1521 80
7795
12221516852
110159
736 981
-—FORMOSA ,
PHILIPPINEs RYIJKYUS—C L c
131
41 10 2300 3316 2737 47 152615 1958 5514 501 204
1150 74 7496 343 1526
CARCLINES. — _ _ _C L
1021 170 12
341 4216 9
101611
12145
1378 139.—
GTHERAREL4SC, L
o00
114302
2424754
120
~R~CAROLINES. ——C L
1151 010 60 60 6
279 20 2
563 280 2530 2790 181
2003 763
c - Carr ier-based sor t ies .L - Land-based sorties.
lIOTES TO TABLES 34 AND 35
The bulk of Naval air attack on shipping prior to 1944 is covered by the data for theSolomons-Bismarcks campaign, in Table 32A. Enemy shipping had also been-attacked and drivenfrom the Midway area and Eastern New Guinea in 1942, the Aleutians and the Gilberts in 1943.In 1944 the mobile carrier force, and Navy searchplanes operating from new bases won in cam-paigns spearheaded by tie carriers, extended the area untenable for Japanese shipping to 10additional sectors of the Pacific, including the Philippines, Formosa and the Ryukyus, and theBonins. In 1945 Naval aviation extended the untenable area to include the entire Pacific andits connecting waters, with the sole exceptions of the Sea of Okhotsk, the Japan Sea, and thesouthernmost waters of the N.E.I..
Tables 34 and 35 show the progressive movement of naval air shipping attack across tieFacific. In most areas there is a standard progression : (1) a heavy carrier strike wiping outmost of the major vessels in the area, followed by withdrawal of the reminder by the enemy;(2) the substitution of smaller vessels to run the loose blockade established by Naval searchplanes from new bases bordering the area, and a period of busy attack activi~ by these planes;(3) a steady decrease in patrol plane attacks as all shipping disappears from the area. Varia-tion from the pattern occur. In some cases the searchplanes preceded the carriers, or carrierstrikes were not needed (Korea, China, Borneo) ; in Sme cases fighter bases were established inthe area and used to conduct an intensive campaign against coastal barges and small craft as
(Cont. onn6xt page)
- 9 2 -
—TOTAL
ALL AREAS—c———L———
717 4111261 3701175 633665 31458 258
1120 206744 209621 196
2978 2904263 6661958 693501 626
16061 4872
TABLE 35. SORTI’ES ATTACKING SHIP TARGETS, MONTHLY, 1945By Area, Carrier-Based and Land-Based
MONTHI 1 I
JAPAN RYUKYUS BONINS FORMOSAC L C L C L c L
0 0280 0504 26313 5438 790 91
2604 157481 51
53 80 23
868 37522 10172 2347 1050 620 20
0 32169 924 152 5
7340
961 17262329252617
Januaryl%bruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
TOTAL
387 104107381510
1841459163675
327
594
10
4220 458 1662 288 195 75 961 173 387 274
KOREA,MONTH NO. CHINA
BORNEO,CELEBES
L
January 101012944 [6450 83203
114
19
2345 358449 363
1396 339837 316210 44947 440
2608 429489 159
8381 2853
610214167211312
FebruaryMarchApri1MayJune
02
1384
104
0 2216 5723 468 42
24 28
1811173422
July 60 31 21August 19 4 12
3213
TOTAL 282 106 294 232 645 147 191 50I I
c - Carr ier-based sor t ies .L - Land-based sorties.
(Cont. from preceding page)
well as ocean-going shipping, as in the Solomons, Marshalls, =d Palau a r e a s . B u t t h e e v e n t u a lexhaustion of targats always came.
The Solomons-Bismarcks anti-shipping campaign ran out of ocean-going target vessels inMarch of 1944, and for the rest of that year was directed at barges. The New Guinea campaignwas initially a Black Cat and subsequently a PB4Y enlmrprise, in which the carriers assistadwhile supporting the Hollandia and Morotai landings. In the Marshalls and Western Carolines theland-based attacks were all, after the month of the last carrier attacks, directed against bargesand small boats useful for inter-island transportation of food and supplies for the enemy garri-sons . The same was largely true of the land-based attacks in the Philippines. In the otherareas most of these attacks were by Ptrol planes on ships of ocean-going typss.
The geographical extent of these attacks, and their volae, can be seen from the @bles.At one time or another Navy VPB were nmking at least 20 and up to 100 individual attacks on shipsper month in each of the following areas:. —
New Guinea FormosaBorneo, Celebes JapanEastern Carolines Korea, No. ChinaBonins Central ChinaPhi l ipp ines Indo China, MalayaRyukyus
It can be seen that the effect of these many small, accurate attacks, spread throughouteach area and throughout each month, while different from the crushing blows administered bycarr ier forces agains t concentra t ions of ships , could meet effectively disrupt shipping movemmtsand destroy a large number of vessels. P a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n i s i n v i t e d t o the VPB a t t a c k s o nshipping in the waters of Japan, Korea and the entire Asiatic Coast from March 1945 to the end
(Cont. on next page)
700380 0 -46-1 - 9 3 -
(Cont. from preceding page)
Of the war. These attacks, largely byPB4Ys and PBMs, singly and in paire, achieved an averagevolume of 400 per month during this period.
Of the carr ier attacka, particularly important are those in Formosa and the Philippinesduring September-November 1944, which wmpletely broke up enemy reinforcement of the archipelagoand accounted for a rmjor part of the Jap Navy as well as substantial merchant tonnages (SeeAppendix). The progressive eeries of attacks through the Marshalls, Eastern and WesternCarol ines , Marianas and Bonins, from January to August 1944, while theirthan that of the Philippines anti-shipping campai~, were a lso impor tantand in size of ocean area cleared of the enemy.
In 1945 three carrier campaigns are outstanding: the January sweepChina Sea from Formosa to Indo Ch~a, the March strikesheavy July offensive against the last Japanese shippingthe remnants of the enemy!s combat and merchant fleets.
combined volume was lessboth in tonnage sunk
of tie ent i re Southon Kyushu and the Ryukyus, and therefuge - the Inland Sea - which crippled
-94-
4. Attack Data, by Type of Target Attacked
TABLE 36. PERCENTAGE OF CARRIER-BASED AND LAND-EASEDOFFENSIVE AIR EFFORT DIRECTED AGAINST EACH MAJOR
TYPE OF TARGET, BY YEARS
TYPR OF TARGET
CARRIER-BASED ATTACKS
LAND TARGETSAirfieldsOther Military TargetsLand TransportationHarbor Area8Other and Unknown Land
SHIPPING TARGETSArmored Warships‘IJnarmored WarshipaMerchant, Over 500 TonsMerchant, Under 500 TonsUnlmown Shipping*
LAND-BASED ATTACKS
LAND TARGETSAirfleldsOther Military TargetsLand TransportationHarbor AreasOther ancl Unlamwn Lend
SHIPPING TARGETSArmored WarshipsUnarmored WarshipsMerchant, Over 500 ?onaMerchant, Under 500 TonsUnknown Shipping*
* Including minelaying.
NOTES TO TABLE 36
SORTIES ATTACKING TARGETS1942 1943 1944 1945
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0.— — .
52.3 87.3 76.9 86.5mmmm29,6 41.8 48.2 33.40.4 0.0 2.0 2.81.3 2,4 0.7 3.17.0 0.7 2.5 4.7
47.7 12.7 23.1 13.5mmmm3.3 1.4 3.0 2.18.1 4.4 12.1 5.61.3 0.9 4.7 2.81.7 0.0 0.4 0.2
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0— — ——42.2 88.0 91.8 94.1mmmm29.5 46.1 71.8 67.10.6 0.6 3.3 5.64.5 3.7 0.8 4.90.9 1.2 2.7 4.0
17.6 3.7 0.4 0.314.6 2.2 1.9 1.19.1 3.8 5.4 4.40.3 2.1 0.5 0.1
mir
100.0
81.2m41.12.31.83.5
18.8m2.58.93.60.4
100.0
91.6m66.93.92.73.0
8.4m0.91.84.90.5
TONS OF BOMBS ON TARGETS1942 1943 1944 1945 TOTAL
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0— — —— .
38.5 83.1 76.8 84.4 80.0ZZ&mmmm25.5 41.2 53.3 36.4 44.40.6 0.0 1.4 2.7 1.91.1 1.8 0.8 3.3 2.01.5 .8 2.3 4.7 3.4
61.5 16.9 23.2 15.6 20.0mmmmm2.1 2.2 2.6 2.2 2.49.9 5.3 13.9 6.5 10.00,7 0.3 1.6 1.5 1.51.1 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.5
I
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.O 1OO.O
28.30.02.20.2
65.3m14.920.25.00.6
89.3 94.9 97.1 94.6Wmmm45.9 74.1 70.9 68.80.4 2.5 4.5 3.12.9 0.9 4.2 2.51.4 1.9 2.7 2.2
WliL
This is the first of a series of tables breaking down the Naval air offensive by tvpes oftarget a t tacked, regardless of geographical locat ion of tie target. For the most pa~t ~~isseries contains data only on number of sorties attacking targets, and bomb tonnage expended.Data on types of bmbs, and on rockets, ammunition and torpedoes expended on various types oftargets, will be found in the next section of the report.
Table 36 shows where carrier-based and land-based offensive effort was directed in eachyear of the war. Noteworthy is the concentration of both carrier and land-based offensiveson enemy shipping, particularly heavy warships, during the first year of the war, and +&e in-creased emphasis on land targets thereafter. Enemy airfields came in for heavy attention in1943, received less attention in 1944, but in 1945, to courucer the kamikaze mnace, became thepr incipal carr ier target again . In 1943 mil i tary ins ta l la t ions became the pr imary target oiland-based planes; and except for the attacks by VPB, shipping targets became of continuouslyless importance for land-based planes.
For the carr iers , shipping remained an important target until the end of the war, thoughmost important in 1944 because of dwindling opportunities for major attacks thereafter. Forland-based planes most shipping attacks after 1944 were on small vessels, the only types ordinarilywithin range.
The tible makes clear that Naval aviation’s most important offensive function in terms ofvolume was reduction of enemy ground defenses, in direct support of our own ground forces or be-fore thei r ar r ival in the landing area . Second in importance was destruction or neutralization
(Cont. on next page)
-95-
(Cont. from preceding page)
of enemy air force installations, and planes on the ground. Third was destruction of enemywarships and merchant vessels, par t icular ly of the larger types . Miscel laneous land targets , in-c luding t ranspor ta t ion , htirbor and indust r ia l areas , were attacked in the least volume.
I t maybe noted that airfields (in attacks by carrier planes) and small merchant vesselsgenerally receive a lower share of tie total bomb tonnage than of the attack sorties, mhilemilitary targets and heavy warships received more tonnage. This results from extensive use ofVF rockets and strafing against the first and lighter classes of targets, and maximum bomberforces and heavy bomb loads
IWTES TO TABLE 3?
T h i s t a b l e i l l u s t r a t e sis invi ted to~
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
See
against the heavier targets.
the offens ive uses made of the var ious mcdels of a i rcraf t . Attent ion
The extensive use of the carrier F6Frnerohant shipping. The FM, based onin air-ground support operations.
The heavy use of carrier VSi3 (25% of
and F4U against airfields, and of the F6F againstCVES, was used primarily against military targets
tota l a t tack sor t ies) agains t shipping, andespecially against heavy warships. The use of carrier VTB against shipping, anda g a i n s t a i r f i e l d s , is reduced by inclusion in the figures of CVE VTB which engagedprimarily in air-ground support operations.
The predominant use of land-based VP and VSB against military targets. The land-basedVTB data indicate a hea~ use agains t a i r f ie lds largely because thei r offensiw use wasprincipally in the Solomons campaign of 1943 and early 1944, when airfields were theprincipal target. Note also the extensive use of land-based VF against snwll vessels,la rgely barges in the Solomons and Marshalls areas.
The heavy use of the PBJ and PV against land targets, contrasted with the primary em-ployment of other VPB against merchant shipping.
also Table 38, for more detailed data for 1944 only.
-96-
TABLE 37. SORTIES ATTACKING TARGETS, BY PLANE MODELAND TYI% OF TARGET ATTACKED, FOR ENTIRE WAR
With Percentages for Each Type of Aircraft, Carrier and Land-Based
BASE,PLANE MODEL
CARRIER-BASEDF6FF4U, FGFMF4FSB2C, SBWSBDTBF, TBMTBD
LAND-BMmF4U , FGF6FF4F, mU/i VFSBDSB2C, SBWSB2UTBF, TBM
PBJPvPB4YPBYPBMPR2YU/i VTB
PERCEI$TAGES,~m ,
CarrierCwrier VSBCarrier VTB
J.and-Based VpLand-Based VSBLand-Based VTB
vpB, 2/E Land~, 2/E SeaW, 4/E
AIR-FIELDS
22,7164,1152,334
1293,9821,7659,750
27
6,0953593939
5,368194
02,695
2,30962141113115508
37.822.927.6
13.112.127.4
27.88.9
14.5
OTHERWILI-rARYTARGETS— .
19,1111,8697,281
2119,0082,33816,842
0
30,9011,482
7612
34,0751,758
05,570
4,8751,303
482484761511
36.745.347.7
65.177.756.6
58.532.915.7
LANDTRANS-PORTA-TION
1,258171559
026720
8590
2,6472200
1,365410
216
25717
1817100
2.61.12.4
5.43.02.2
2.60.55.7
* Including minelaying.
95827518024
28437
7250
1,82094500
484850
385
20956
10246100
1.81.32.1
3.91.23.9
2.52.73.2
OTHER& UN-KNOWNLAND
1,59448953697
76986
1,2720
1,688690
30
68921
P179
26963
10422217
3.53.43.6
4.81.51.3
3.21.83.3
WARSHIPSAr - Unar-mored mored
1,013 1,779263 140203 12220 32
924 638639 157
1,511 638107 0
0 1050 012 870 0
155 4710 017 088 140
0 180 285 132
16 606 340 10 0
1.9 2.76.3 3.24.6 1.8
0.0 0.40.4 1.00.9 1.4
0.0 0.41.3 5.40.2 4.2
?RCHANTMENOver Under500 500ons Tons
5,473 2,965472 195170 52326 12
2,729 490726 77
,.526 77335 0
327 2,97732 24517 350 0
483 7590 960 0
290 78
97 7043 249
492 1,055214 202115 16918 143 3
7.9 4.813.8 2.37.5 2.2
0.8 6.51.1 1.93.0 0.8
1.3 3.019.1 21.516.1 33.8
.—SHIPS,TYPEUN-KNOWN*
18545
124257183
0
19400
4100
250
255291895
138
0.30.40.5
0.00.12.5
0.75.93.3
TOTAL
57,0527,993
11,913563
19,1335,902
35,179169
46,5792,928
31951
43,8902,195
179,841
8,1292,4323,0551,271
42411240
100.0100.0100.0
100.0100.O100.0
100.0100.0100.0
-97-
TABLE 38. SORTIES ATTACKING TARGETS, BY DETAILED TARGET TYPEAND BY PLANE MODEL, CARRIER-EASED AND LAND-BASED, 1944 ONLY
CARRIER-BASEDTYPE OF TARGBT
G
Cefense Installations, Guns 6777Personnel and Bivouac Areas 900Buildings, Storage Areas* 5080
Docks and Waterfront 228Roads, Bridges, Vehicles 398Other and Unknown Land 675
Armored WarshipB 572Unarmored Warships 1153Merchant, Over 500 Tons 3797Merchant, Under 500 Tone 1899Ships, Type Unknown# 126
Total Land Targete 23249Total Ship Targets 7547
TOTAL ALL TARG3’TS 30796
CV-CVL
I
SBDSB2C
10292116
36224903620
81151349
534530
271445054
114584282
15740
TBFTBM
8002101
24596923083
110116303
422290
1654377117
96642860
12524
CVE
7
FMF6F
518392
196711931158
23641214
233105191432
5
6106966
7072
LAND
TBF SBD
87 219 9194 2826 2169
1252 9403 9405664 4823 2066628 6675 4446
17 227 120101 1268 523225 1209 140
250 0 026 78 4769 330 176
114 2078 5671~ 12 38
3168 26650 18878460 2498 828
3628 29148 19706
-BASED‘fBF Il’BM PBJ
7 42944 817
1703 221442 664559 851
18 26115 3625 150
2 022 3
171 2059 3332 17
3813 2807286 73
4099 2880
OtherVPB
65803
790315531
852089
1182
418481184
26981176
3874
TOTAL
8,06116,268
37,59912,24926,631
9353,3693,379
2,0242,3369,5406,490
586
108,49120,976
129,467
* Including airfield buildings and buildings of unidentified types, but excluding barracks.# Including minelaying.
I?OTES TO TABLE 38
This table presents the additiond target detail available for 1944 only, plus a divisionof the carr ier -based offensive between fas t carr iers and CVES, and thus i l lus t ra tes in moredetail the employment of various models of carrier aircraft. Among items worthy of nore are:
( a )
(b)
( c )
(d)
( e )
( f )
(g)
The concentration of fast carrier F6Fs on parked aircraft, while the bombers concen-t ra ted on runways and o ther a i r f ie ld ins ta l la t ions .
The fas t carr ier emphasis m the larger land targets , as contras ted withphasis on personnel, guns and vehicles.
T h e CVES’ concent ra t ion Of 75$ of tieir offensi- effort on land targets
t h e CVS em-
other thana i r f i e l d s , a g a i n s t t h e f a s t carriers! E@.
The fas t carr iers’ 25% on sh ipping ta rge ts , aga ins t the CVES!represent ing the Layte Gulf ba t t le .
T h e f a s t c a r r i e r s ’ 25% on a i r f ie lds , agains t the CVE’S 11%.
The dearth of grounded aircraft, warships, and large merchantattack by land-based planes other than VPB.
13%, much of the latter
vessels avai lable for
The predominant neutralization mature of the employment of land-based VF, VSB, VTB,and PBJs (PVs and PBYs to a lesser extent); in 1944 these plane Qpee were usedprimarily against by-passed enemy bases in the Solomons, Bismaroks, Marshalle andW e s t e r n Carolines. Typical is the concentration on airfield runways, defenses, guns,personnel, t ranspor ta t ion , and smal l craf t .
-98-
TABLE 39. ATTACKS , AND ORDNANCE EXPENDITURESBY ALL CARRIER-BASED AND LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT.
TYPE OF TARGET
Grounded AiroraftAirfield Runways
Defense Install at ions,, GunsPersonnel and Bivouac AreasBuildings, Storage Areas +
Docks and WaterfrontRoads, Bridges, VehiclesIndustrial FacilitiesUrban AreasOther and Unknown Land
Armored WarshipsUnarmored WarshipsMerchant, Over 500 TonsMerchant, Under 500 TonsShips, Type Unknown @
Total Land TarEetsTotal Ship Tar&ts
TUfALALL TARGETS
By Detailed Type of Target
CARRISORTIES
ATTACKINGTARGETS
7,7198,709
16,0773,93913,569
4591,407
681544541
2,0112,1048,4253,272
303
53,64516,115
69,760
,-BASED~TONS OFBOMBS
1,0843,024
5,0141,2625,250
16829924916686
973573
3,011347125
16,602 5,029
21,631
ON TARGETS,1944 ONLY.
.TTACKS~
ROCKETS
3,6991,(X)2
6,4132,9875,380
3091,119452112246
780617
2,80589712
21,719 5,111
26,830 s
n LAND-BASED ATTACKS
M.G.
2,243 3423,135 7,559
6,095 21,5221,523 8,3104,263 13,062
136 476593 1,962209 77152 1,10757 429
454 13642 232
1,805 1,115840 3,21869 283
18,406 54,8463,810 4,861
22,216 59,707
Exl!ONS OFBOMBS
873,809
9,7043,3205,590
21761919
39469
1494
463475232
23,8281,278
25,106
NDIT~
ROCKETS
0136
24072
376
6000
24
08
10212758
854295
1,149
M.G.AMMO.*
1221,282
4,2742,8413,832
9465227
30327
274
45278623
13,4541,337
14,791
* In thousands of rounds expended on targets.#Inc luding a i r f ie ld bui ld ings and buildings of unidentified ties. but exc luding bar racks .@ Including minelaying.
. . . .
NOTES TO TABLE 39
This table sums up the data for 1944 given in Table 38, and provides additional figureson ordnance expenditures on targets.
The oarrier emphasis on strafing and rocket attacks on grounded aircraft may be noted,together with the heavy volumm of bombing attack on other airfield targets (Note that sortiesclassified as attacking primarily aircraft runways may have expended some of their bombs, andthe bulk of the i r rockets and s t raf ing f i re , on grounded aircraft and airfield buildings andins ta l la t ions ) .
It may also be noted that carrier planes expended over 5% of their rockets and strafingf i r e , and land-based p lanes 75%, on military land targets.
The table illustrates the intensity of attack on large merchant vessels during 1944, thecons iderable volume of strafing attacks on small vessele, and the heavy tonnage per sortieagains t armored warships . Also of in teres t a re the a t tacks on land t ranspor ta t ion targets .The urban areas attacked included principally tuwne on Guam and Palau, and the c i t ies of llavaoand Naha. Indust r ia l fac i l i t ies inc luded oi l s torage and manufactur ing fac i l i t ies in thePhilippines and Formosa.
From the table may be calculated average ordnance expenditures per sortie against eachtype of target. Note, however, that rockets were not fully utilized during 1944.
-99-
MONTH
1941- December
1942- JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1943 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugueiSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1944 -JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1945 -JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
1941-42 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total
GRAND TOTAL
TABLE 40. ATTACKS ON SHIPPING, BY ALL NAVAL AND MARINECARRIER-BASED AND IAND-BASED AIRCRAFTBy Type of Ship Attacked, Monthly
ARMOREDWARSHIPS
Sorties TonsAttack- ofing Bombs
4
3529
166289
504615012313
1
18
17986
36176642
152
6834
14059010
2911
159253
22
127528
1811
114109
2823767710
1
18
10563
2786243
99
216
653653
153
93189
4
77314
90!) 466284 187
2037 9871759 1091
4985 2731
UNARMOREDWARSHIPS
Sorties TonsAttack- of ing Bombs
23
1
418261
1323
1465135
5472
2215
2221928
4542
123350146567
6376
230419404341120
53097
3751182014
125125
176
48
507
12
2040
104
1342611
2826
678641645
259678
11112720
2013
11458159
5259
341 95501 290
2335 6661404 511
4581 1562
63RCHANT SHIPSOVER 500 TONSSorties TonsAttack- ofing Bombs
5
33756
363
224
4316416
4833
148
40424
4764150
67080591843689
500402276
175618951391402
1524264570202155116891293
5
1129
183
129
16706
2669
126
23303
1839
110
1413683134228
13214695
65470976185
67759
176667635
4C6126
389 1 79450 3369540 34744015 1621
14394 5610
i@%CHANT SHIPSJNDER 500 TONSSorties TonsAttack- ofing Bombs
2
2
1
11101212
27
241
17
3303587
11012363
167241547409177611471272
10351215751593
617441631580470302608196
517217
51
1
333187
13
1947804812338255
10213614761
7417
107998455
18965
167 32493 45
6489 8223845 690
10994 1589
TOTALALL T&S*Sorties TonsAttack- ofing Bombs
34
373856
220319
199
17436037393
1271069532
12718
3109693
166455345
112816311810979316
1326952867
3268493126511127
2700813
17351153661487
3040648
5
29401
139118
5257
14416335
511109514977
178595
27207217
35260761212593
269255270842
16091103169
96782
490412181186
1495264
1840 7831970 1067
20986 630611237 4077
36033 12233
L.
* Including chips of unknown types, and minelaying, not shown separately (total 1079 sorties,741 tons).
-100-
NOTES TO TABLE 40
This table is the monthly summary of all Naval air attackis invited between the attack effort expended, as shown above,plished, as shcwn in the Appendix.
It may be no+ad that merchant shipping received its first
on enemy shipping. Comparisonand the monthly results accom-
heavy weight of attack inF6bruary-h&rch 1944, and was next attacked in the greatest force in tie Phi l ippines-China Seacampaigns of September 1944 - January 1945. Thereafter, only in July 1945 was enough shippingfound to prmit repet i t ion of th is scale of a t tack. I t i s a lso in teres t ing to note tha t abouthalf of the total Naval air offensive against armored warships was expended in three briefcampaigns: the Imyt-e Gulf Battle of 24-26 Octcber 1944, the yamato attack on 7 April 1945, andthe Inland Sea strikes of 18 July and 24-28 July 1945.
5. Ordnance Data
This section of the report consists of three separate groups of tables:
Tables 41-42, providing summary data on ordnance expenditures of all types, and average crdnanceexpended per attack.
Tables 43 to 49, giving data ont a r g e t type, and operation.
Tables 50 to 54, giving data on%&r get type, and month.
NOTES TO TABLE 41a .-
bomb expenditures by type of bomb, with detail by plane type,
rocket and ammunition expenditures, with detail by plane @pe,
Ordnance Expenditures, in General
Naval and Marine aircraft during the war expended against the enemy nearly 103,000 tone ofbombs, over 210,000 aircraft rockets, and about 85 million rounds of annnunition.
45$ of the bomb tonnage, 87$ of the rockets, and 60$ of the ammunition were expended byc a r r i e r a i r c r a f t . A p p r o x i m a t e l y 95% of the totals for carrier and land-based aircraft combinedwere expended in dive, glide or masthead bombing, rocket or strafin~ attack from altitudes of50 to 5000 feet, usually 3500 feet or less. Thus the amounts expended are hardly comparablein tonnage terms with ordnance expenditures for air forces employing less accurate methods ofattack. They may, however, generally be compared between types of Naval aircraft, since nor-mally only the PBJ, of all Naval aircraft, employed horizontal bombing from altitudes of over5000 feet as more than an occasional me+kod of attack.
(Cont. on next page)
- 101 -
BASE,PLANE MODEL
CARRIRR-BASED
F6FF4U, FGFMF4FSB2C, SHIVSBDTBI’, TBMTBD
LAND-BASED
F4U, FGF6FF’4F, FMU/i VF
SBDSB2C, SBWSB2UTBF, TBM
PB4YPVP!3JPBYPBldPB2YU/i VPB
TOTAL
TABLE 41. ATTACK SORTIES, AND ORDNANCE EXPENDED,ON LAND AND SHIPPING TARGETS, FOR ENTIRE WARBy Plane Model, Carrier-Based and Land-Based
L4ND TARGETSExpenditures on TarcetsSorties
Attack-ingTargets
111,938
45,6376,919
10,890461
14,3104,246
29,44827
111,22843,1512,647
16851
41,9812,099
08,995
1,2802,0607,919
690956626
223,166
Tonsof
Bombs
36,542
5,0931,112
1436
8,2691,888
20,01120
54,130
14,107504
014
19,7331,178
07,454
6891,8027,966
544575626
90,672
Rockets
165,532
59,42021,27227,287
04,383
053,170
0
25,477
14,80S892144
0
144917
04,486
02,2191,866
0000
191,009
imii=-nition(1000)
42,529
25,8954,0756,376
1,72;41O*
4,051*
27,512
14,60063831*0
6,58i*332
*1,087*
898733
2,47175*54120
70,041
SortiesAttack-
ingTargets
25,966
11,4151,0741,023
1024,8231,6565,731
142
10,0553,428
281151
0
1,9099617
846
1,7753722105813294614
36,021
SHIPPINGExpendTonsof
Bombs
9,117
901200
50
2,725636
4,536114
3,1142041100
685124
726
71411235
4061474117
12,231
TARGETSitures on
Rockets
17,037
10,9972,3971,050
0195
02,398
0
QIQ
3902800
88470
122
0250
1,0850000
19,047
TargetsAmmu -nition(1000)
~
5,257571611
*51493*
619*
4,791
94485*0
123*22*
43*
2,91017828
175*268150
12,456
NOTE: Ammunition expenditure data do not cover the period vrior to Aurust 1943 in the case C?c a r r i e r - b a s e d pla~es,
.or prior to October 1943 in the case of land-based planes. Expendi-
tures were not genera l ly given in action reports prior to these da+ms (nor were they complete-ly r e p o r t e d t h e r e a f t e r Particularly W l a n d - b a s e d VSB and VTB in the Solomons). I t i s e s t i -mated that between 2 and 3 million additione.1 rounds were expended in str~fing but not re-ported, of which approximately 8% was by land-based planes, and 8% against land targets.The lack of data for the early part of tie war affects mater ia l ly (5% or more) only thef igures indica ted by an as ter isk (*) . For other plane models the ammunition expendituredata are believed to be 9% or more complete.
The table above indicates that the TBF-TBM torpedo bomker, accounting for a total ofover 32$ of total bomb expenditures, a n d 2% of a l l rocket expendi tures , was the Navyls p r i n c i -pal carrier of heavy ordnance. All types of fi@ters combined carried less than 22% of thetotal bomb tonnage to target, IAough they flew half the attack sorties; however, they expendednear ly 2 /3 of a l l rockets , and 7% of all ammunition.
Dive bombers of all types combined carried a total of 34‰ of all Navy bomb tonnage, butwere re la t ively negl igible factors as rocket carr iers . Patrol bombers (aside from tie MarinePBJs, which carried 8% of to~l bomb tonnage) accounted for less than ~. of total bomb tonnage,and about 7% of the ammunition expenditures.
Most ammunition was expended against non-airborne ta~ets. Data distinguishing such targetexpenditures from those in air combat are not available, but only 14,308 Naval planes engaged inai r combat , som but br ie f ly , or only 5~ of a total of 284,073 action sorties involving 259,187attacks on targets. It is estimated that not over 2@ of a l l ammuni t ion expendi tures were in a i rcombat, leaving a minimum of perhaps 70 million rounds expended on other targets.
- 102 -
TABIJi 42. SWY OF BOMB, ROCKET, AND AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES,By Model of Aircraft, Land-Based, and Carrier-Based by Type of Carrier,
BASE ,PLANE MODEL
CV-BASED~
F4USB2C!Lm
CVL-BASEDF6F~M
CVE-BASEDFMFeF4uTBM
LANDJ3ASEDF4UF&mSBDSB2Cm).!
PB4YPBSPvPBMPB2YFBY
CA3RIER TOTALLAND-BASllC TOTALGRAND TOTAL
ACTIONSORTIES
# All calibers combined.
SORTIESATTACKINGTARGRTS
13,L1307,5916,5557,243
5,4142,97Q
7,6512,721402
7,574
18,0471,191
2717,0132,1951,530
1,7695,249
569y373655
~
110,019
TONS OFBOMBSON
TARGETS
2,0691,2314,0365,736
1,0132,399
6;;
4,3;;
6,39130;
g,1251,1901,033
gbz5*93g
304191M2g
21,598— 24,373 45,971
1945 ONLY
ROCKETSON
MllGETS
——
29,13622,1074,5353,395
15,y321,869
28,27710,4021,562
y3,t37t3
15,199920144
0
4,;;
2, 53;2,240
000
=
&&,
ROUNDS OFAMMUNITIONEXPENDED
.30-.50 20 LMM.(1000) (1000)
8,891 74, 6i?g 135
326 474820 -
3,905 -3&j -
4,616 -1,654
275 6l,2g4 -
6,653 297192 --1 -?02,9 -
164 225299 -
3,299 71,672 -409 -332 -19 -9 -
26,844 622
AVERAGE EXlPER ATTACK
SORTIEBombJ!ons Rockets
.15
.16
.62
.79
.19
. a
,01.22.20.57
.35
.25
.;
.54
.68
2.12.90.7Q*5
::2
3.73.&33.95.1
O.gO.gl
0.00.42.g
0.0Q.53.90.0**
.34 2.5
.51 5
.42 1:7
TDITUIWS
LOOO RoundsPer Action
Sortie#
.51l 53.12.11
.60
.13
.9+
.59
.63
.16
l 35.15*.17.17.19
1.57.31.66.:2
*
.39
--++
* Not computed; less than 100 sor t ies .
ITOTES TO TAME 4 2
Because of the varying periods, conditions, and plane types involved, and the incomplete-ness of ammuni tion expenditure data for 1942-43, it has not been thought desirable to preparedata on average ordnance expenditures per attack covering the entire -r as a whole. The abovetable provides such data for 1945 only. For the most part the 1945 performance in respect toordnance expenditure per plane is believed superior to that for previous years.
Most significant item in the above table is the relatively low average bomb and rocketload expended by car r ie r VP per sortie attacking targets. It is a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g to n o t e t h a tboth the average bomb load and the average rocket load were greatest for CVE-based VF, least forCV-based VF. It would not appear from these data that maximum advantage wee taken of the offen-sive ordnance-carrying capabilities of carrier VF, or that the fighter-bomberpeted with the dive and torpedowas concerned.
The table indicates that
bombers it displaced, so far as of fens ive use
credi t amfit be awarded to the CVE forces , for(Cont. on
- 103 -
successful ly dom-of heavy ordnance
placing 750 lbs. ofnext page)
(Cont. from preceding page)
bombs and rookets on target per F6F attick, agains t less than 600 lbs. per CV F6F; for put t ingan average of 3 3/4 rockets on target per attacking fighter (against a per-plane capacity of 6,and a fast carrier average of Z+); for placing over 5 rockets on target per TBM attacking, anda total bomb-and-rocket load per TBM nearly equal to the CV-CVL average; and for out-strafingCV and CVL planes of the sam types.
The table indica tes tha t land-based f ighters , though free from the take-off limitations ofthe carrier VF, and less burdened by air combat, also did not average in practice the rccket andbomb carrying capabilities urged in behalf of VBF by advocates of the fighter-bomber; they carriedm o r e bombs but far fewer rockets than carrier fighters.
Carrier VSB and VTB in general averaged 8% or better of their standard maximum loadingsof 1,500 lbs. and 2,000 lbs, respect ively . CVE VTB carried less weight of bombs but made up forit with the largest average rocket loadings of any plane.
Land-based SBDs repcrted excellent loadings relative to their normal loadings; land-basedSB2CS and TBMs carried less ordnance than the sam types on carr iers .
PBJs, performing largely short-range bombing missions, general ly carr ied thei r maxim.ncloads of l-l% tons, depending on type of bomb carried. Other types of VF’B, usually flying long-range search, rarely tried to carry or expend full bomb loads on the targets of opportunity en-countered, and often destroyed them with only a part of the load carried.
In ammuni t ion expendi ture the carrier fighter excelled, averaging 500 to over 600 roundsper ac t ion sor t ie , exceeded among major types only by the PB4Yst 1,570 rounds - PB4Y strafinghas set afire and destroyed many a small vessel and silenced many an A/A gun. The PV and PBMaveraged less than half as many rounds per sortie , and single-engine bomber expenditures wereconsistently under 200 rounds. Land-based VP averaged only 6% as high a rate of expenditure asc a r r i e r W, largely because the types of targets generally encountered were less vulnerable tos t r a f i n g .
A n interestin~ inquiry in the field of ordnance expenditures is the total weight of or-dnance of all types expended on target per plane lost to anti-aircraft. This provides a roughmeasure of a t tack effect iveness against targets , although the limitations are obvious. Thedi f fer ing nature of the targets , and of the defenses of these targets, attacked by fast carrier,CVE, and land-based planes affect the figures. Also, tonnage measurements, while they may re-flect with fair accuracy the effectiveness of rockets, probably do not do justice to the valueo f s t r a f i n g f i r e . S u b j e c t t o t h e s e l i m i t a t i o n s , the following figures are presented:
TONS OF ORDNANCE EXF’ZNDED ON TARGET, PERAIRCRAFT LOST TO ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE, 1945 ONLY
Tons ofCarrier Type, Ordnance Land-BasedPlane Model Per A/A Loss Plane Model
CV F6F 32.4 F4UF4U 25.6 F6FSB2C 43.1 SBDTBM 72.1 SB2C
TBM
Tons ofOrdnance
Fwr A/A Loss
99.656.0
647.6440.3151.9
CVL F6F 46.3 PB4Y 29.4TBM 71.4 PV 46.6
PBJ 903.6CVE FM 44.9 PBM 21.2
F6F 77.2TBM 130.6
NO1’ES Rockets and ammunition added to bomb tonnage on basis of approximate weight of completaround (1000 .50 cal. rounds equal 250 lbs etc.) Plane models expending less than200 tons of ordnance in 1945 are excluded from the table.
(Cont. on next page)
- 1 0 4 -
(Cont. fr~mpreoeding page)
The relatively higher efficiency of the TBM over the SB2C is apparent above; the extent towhich a lesser bcrnbing accuracy may reduce its super iori~ is not known. The apparent relativeineffect iveness of w is conditioned by the consideration that 5% or more of the total weightof ordnance carried by carrier VP was rockets or ammunition (2% to 3% was ammunition) whichmay have been more effective, ton for ton, than bombs.
T h e a p p a r e n t CVE superiority over fast carriers of course reflects the use of their planesagains t ta rgets previously par t ia l ly neutra l ized by fas t carr ier p lanes and surface gunf i re .The apparent superiority of land-based W, VSB and VTB and PBJs reflects their use againstthoroughly neutralized by-passed bases, and targets with light defenses, and in the case of PBJsreflects the effect of mdium a l t i tude bombing in addi t ion . Yet the superior performance of theSBDS, operating largely in the Philippines, may well be noted.
.
The PB4Y and PBM averages reflect use of only partial bomb loads, coupled with heavy strafing,in masthead attack.
- 105 -
b. Bomb and Torpedo lkpenditures
TABLE 43. ANNUAL ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES BY ALL CARRIER-BASEDAND LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT
By Type of Ortinance
TYPE OF ORDNANCE
100-lb . GP?50-lb. GP500-lb. GP
looo-lb. GP2000-lb. GP
500-lb. SAP1000-lb. SAP
Armor-Piercing
Napalim (Tank)Other IncendiaryFragmentationDepth Bombs
TorpedoesMinesType Unknown
TOTAL
1942
400
192279
0
00
0
0288
1310
52
CARRIER-BASITONNAGES
=13
712
1150
639426223
0113
10
0262
50
11600
1,720
2,0361,2817,9143,9441,119
6241,401
264
118480335668
7725046
--m-45
3,59f3927
12,8781,336
558
160209
29
56068
95736
29200
PERCENT OF TOTAL*1942-3 19 44 19 54
6.5 9.7 16.70.0 6.1 4.334.9 37.6 59.629.6 18.8 6.29.4 5.3 2.6
0.0 3.0 0.74.8 6.6 1.0
0.4 1.3 0.1
0.0 0.6 2.61.2 2.3 0.30.4 1.6 4.42.4 3.2 0.2
10.4 3.7 1.30.0 0.2 0.0
* * *
100.0 100.0 100.0
m
310
101182
0
00
0
0006
830
156
565
LAND-BASEDTONNAGES 1 % OF TOTAL*194T-47583
1,3472,5552,192
00
0
0114819
27212320
7,289
19 54 1942-3 1945
815 6.9 3.42,982 1.1 12.37,482 19.6 30.97,652 37.1 31.6
815 29.7 3.4
93 0.0 0.4294 0.0 1.2
7 0.0 0.0
2,062 0.0 8.5264 0.2 1.1
1,257 0.7 5.2368 0.3 1.5
30 1.5 0.187 2.9 0.40 * *
4,208 100.0 100.0
*Percentages are based on totals of ordnance of known types only.
N(WIS : 1944 ordnance expenditures, by type of ordnance, are not available from OP-23-V machine=rds because of deficiencies in the coding sysbm. ‘The carr ier-based expendi~ures for 1944
given herewith are from data compiled by ComAirPac OpIntel, and are believed reasonably completeand comparable. Similar lsnd-baoed figures for 1944 are not available.
NOTBS TO TABLE 43
This table, the first of seven on the subject of bomb expenditures by type and size of bombs,shows trends from year to year during the war.
Outstanding in the carrier data are ihe following trends from 1942 to 1945:
( a )
(b)
( c )
(d)
( e )
Substantial increase in use of 100-lb. GP bombs , used largely in TBMs to secure maximumarea coverage against targets susceptible mainly to fragmentation damage and small de-molition charges.
Increasing use of 250-lb. GP bombs, largely on SB2C wing racks, particularly in 1944.
A trend toward concentration on use of the 500-lb. GP bomb as an all-purpose weapon, re-sulting partly from its heavy use by tie increased VF complement.
Substantial decrease in the use Of heavy GP, SAP and AP bombs, from 44$ of the totalin 1942-43 to 11% in 1945.
Increasing use of Napalm fire bombs and fragmentation bombs (particularly after intro-duction of the 260-lb. frag. bomb in 1945), amd decreasing use of other special ordnance,such as torpedoes, incendiary clusters, and depth bombs.
In the data for land-based planes, though 1944 figures are not available, the same trendscan be seen. The heavy 1945 use of depth bombs, SAP bombs, and incendiary clusters, representslargely a c leaning Out of surplus stocks in the Solomons area.
-106-
TABLE 44. TOYS OF BOMBS, CLUSTERS, TORPEDOES AND MINESEXPENDED BY VARIOUS MODELS OF NAVAL AND M4R1NE AIRCRAFT, 1945 ONLY
By Type of Ordnance
LAND-TYPE OF ORDNANOE
BASED#~SW?
6747
2344573
0
25202
28
00
1020
00
ARRIERFG,F4U
312
893226
0
00
0
1193
551
00
C
F6F
3397
2402455
0
127
1
3732
3007
00
BASED
PB4Y
1792363753210
00
0
03743
587
F4U,F6F
6924
2008236822
22119
2
1794344425
00
SBD
86134523473667
o
00
0
100
6100
00
—
PV
126663110
00
0
1111606
00
285
SB2C,SBW
23 I92 ~
563600
5837
0
147188796
00
— -1181
1.97.847.75.10.0
8.0
12.51.57.4
8.10.0
7PBJ
1791179145~1466717
7138
5
0140429183
00
5893
3.020.024.624.912.2
2.5
0.02.47.3
3.10.0
bmmVPB *
49409200
00
0
0166
16
250
l’BM
354863
723582
558
1230
0
063
50028
2920
l’BM
2180
5844866
60
0
93
7739
00
TONS EXPENDED100-lb. Gp250-lb. W @500-lb. W
1000-lb. GP2000-lb. GP
500-lb. SAPlooo-lb. SAP
Armor-Piercing
Napalm (Tank)Other IncendiaryFragmentationDepth Bombs
TorpedoesMines
TOTAL TONNAGE
PERCENT OFTOTAL T6NNAGE
3689 1312 4027 12492
28.40.5
57.90.74.5
1.0
0.00.54.0
0.22.3
6531 8065 1041
20.90.0
56.14.66.3
0.6
0.00.37.4
3.80.0
968 244
0.92.665.112.30.0
0.5
10.20.18.1
0.20.0
0.20.968.117.20.0
0.0
9.10.24.2
0.10.0
0.118.658:214.30.0
6.3
0.00.02.5
0.00.0
1.00.430.736.30.3
2.2
27.50.50.7
0.40.0
1.116.729.145.50.0
0.0
0.10.07.5
0.00.0
20.116.437.70.00.0
0.0
0.06.62.5
6.510.2
100-lb. GP250-lb. GP500-lb. GP
looo-lb. GP2000-lb. 5P
SAP-AP
Napalm (Tank)Other IncendiaryFragmentation
Depth BombsTorpedoes, Mines
18.524.438.83.31.0
O.0
0.03.80.4
0.39.5
4.23.22.13.90.0
0.0
38.95.60.0
2.10.0
#Carrier FMS, not shown here, expended 88 tons, as follows: 68 tons of Napalm, 8- - tons of100-lb. GP, 8 tons of 250-lb. GP, 4 tons of 500-lb. GP.
* Largely PBM@ Including a small quantity of 300-lb. Army GP bombs.
NOT5S TO TABLE 44
This table illustrates the ordnance-carrvinz advantages and l imi ta t ions of indiv idual modelsof aircraft, and shows howof the war.
The principal fighterloads, were bombs of three
. -each model was used as an ordnance carrier during the last 7-& months
bomb loadings, accounting for 87 to 94 percent of their total bombtypes: the 500-lb. and 1000-lb. GP, and the fire bomb. The 500-pounderVP, because of range and weight considerations, while the three typespredominated among carrier
were nearly evenly matchedmentation (usually withfast carr ier at tacks on
among land-based VP. Only one other type of bomb, the 260-lb. frag-fuzing) enjoyed substantial use on fi~hbrs: this was lar~elv in the
Japanese a i r f ie ldsVT . . “ .
in the last few months of the war.
bombs of 250 to 1000 pounds size, carrying no ZOOO-VSB, in turn, were l a r g e l y limi’~d to
- 107 -
pounders and few small bombs or clusters. Land-based SB2CS were used to carry fire bombs,however, and both types of VSB carried 260-pound frag bombs on wing racks at the end of thewar .
The TBM carried most of the Navy's 100-pounders, though that type constituted only 28$ ofi t s t o t a l l o a d . Unable to carry effective loads of bombs of the 250 and 1000-lb. sizes, theTBM could carry any items of 100, 500 or 2000-lb. size, yet it was rarely used for such specialitems as 100-lb. or 500-lb. incendiary, f ragmenta t ion or but ter f ly c lus ters , and was insuff i -ciently used to carry 100-pounders.
The versatility of the PB4Y and PBJ is well illustrated by the table. The PB4Y loadingsof small bombs reflect the predominance of small vessels among its targets. The heavy fire-bomb loadings on PVs should be noted. These were largely used in strikes on isolated enemypositions in the Borneo area.
NOTES TO TABLE 45
This table analyzes bomb expenditures by type of target, for 1945 only. Inspection of thistable permits the general statemmt that while bomb selection did vwy somewhat with the varyingrequirements of d i f ferent targets , the outstanding characteristic of the table is the samenessof the bulk of the loadings from column to column.
The la t ter character is t ic resul ts in large par t f rom the re la t ive inf lexibi l i ty of loadingarrangements on fighter and dive bomber aircraft. The former were limited to one or two bombsper plane, and clustere were generally excluded by safety considerations; the VSB were limitedto 3 or 4 bombs per plane and here again clusters were excluded and other types of bombs limitad.Only the TBM, PB4Y and PBJ were widely flexible as to variety of ordnance which could be carriedwith minimum sacrifice of their total load. Under these circumstances, the fact that bomb ex-penditures varied between types of targets as much as they did, i s evidence that se lec t ion ofattacking aircraft and type of bomb was to some extant consciously directed toward the require-ments of the targets. That selection was not perfectly adapted to target requirement goes with-out saying; specific cases have been covered at length in analytical reports by Op-23-v and Com-AirPac . I t i s impor tant to note , however , tha t even the c loses t a t tent ion paid to sc ient i f icselection of ordnance will be of little value if plane design seriously limits the variety ofuseful ordnance that can be carried.
Attacks on airfield targets show evidence of conscious planning in the high use of 100-lb.GP bombs and fragmentation bombs reported, and the comparatively small use of bombs larger than500 pounds. The first two types are recommended for attacks on parked aircraft, and GP bombs of100 or 500 pound size are recommended for runway cratering and destruction of buildings. Theheavy reported use of 1000-lb., 2000-lb., and SAP bombs probably largely reflecte deficienciesin operational planning and in bomb supply; the use of over 5% 500-pounders may reflect in addi-tion the plane loading problem referred to above.
The ca tegory of o ther mi l i ta ry land targets i s so large and in ternal ly d iverse tha t l i t t lecomment can be made, other than to point out the extensive use of fire bombs, and the relativelylight use of small bombs against targets which are frequently small and difficult to hit, yetvulnerable to f ragmenta t ion ef fec t .
Likewise little comment can be made with respect to the miscellaneous categories of landtargets, other than to point out the small variation between the three COlumnS, and to suggestthat industr ia l targets ( included in “other land”) frequently require a large proportion of heavybombs.
The record with respect to armored warships shows a commendable restraint with respect tothe use of ineffective small bombs, but a rather inadequate use of the 2000-lb. GP bombs, whichhave been adjudged superior to SAP and AP bombs for glide and dive attack on most types of armoredvessels. The 500-pounders, which made up over one-third of the tonnage, were probably largelyi n e f f e c t i v e . The heavy use of fragmentation bombs to neutralize A/A may be noted. The light useof torpedoes results from the fact that most attacks in 1945 were made on ships in harbor.
Attacks on unarmored warships were distinguished by a ccncmndable concentration on 500-lb.GP bombs. The use of heavier GPs was permissible, but SAP and AP bombs are wasteful against thesetargets, and torpedoes have a rather small chance of hitting fast maneuvering small vessels ofthese types . (Cont. on next page)
- 108 -
TABLE 45. NUMBER OF BOMBS, CLUSTERS, TORPEDOES AND MINES, ANDTHEIR PROPORTION TO TOTAL TONNAGE, I+XPENDEII ON TARGET
BY ALL lJAVAL AND MARINE CARRIER AND LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT, 1945 ONLYBy Type of Ordnance and Type of Target
UN-KNOWNSHIPS
rO’lXL
LANDYTHER
TARGETSLANDTRANS-PORTA-ION
2,2611,4243,126
78889
434
9
7181
2645300
8,213
AIRFIELDS
37,4834,29124,2052,915
379
69205
6
3561,0667,090452
00
78,517
HARBORAREAS
OTHEROR UN-KNOWNLAND
2,8701,1363,538
58779
t0
0
1464-444898820
TiARSHIPSBB, CA, CVE, DDCL,CV, DE, PC,CVL ETC.
TYPE OFORDNANCE MILI-
TARYTARGETS
38,43920,92738,61811,953
620
61S395
0
5,0512,22210,6171,127
00
130,588
500 Tons orTons Under
NUMBER OF BOMBS100-lb. GP 2,388
7373,405
49378
7266
10
267222589252
00
8,599
157 29860 314
1,575 1,281704 6739 39
1,240 3,1231,046 1,1733,959 1,463432 2816 34
00
26060
011
0
01
1303
96
88,25931,10881,43017,9731,373
250-lb. GP*500-lb. GP
1000-lb. GP2000-lb. GP
500-lb. SAP1000-lb. SAP
26 1O8143 51
61 0108 0
1,0061,003
Armor-Piercing # 21 15 9 0 70
5,9224,85819,9202,106
32296
Napalm BombsOther IncendiaryFragmentationDepth BombsTorpedoesMines
0 00 2
623 lCo c
110 590 c
3,458 2,244
1,070 566
0 31152 69811A 11114 120
138 100 0
7,289 6,791
1,650 810
TOTAL BOMBS @ 9,357
1,707
390
165
O.w0.0
39.41.80.0
0.03.6
0.0
0.00.00.60.01.8
52.8
255,446
45,81611,577 24,912 1,657 1,702TOTAL TONNAGE
PERCENT OFTOTAL TONh1A GE
100-lb. GP250-lb. GP*500-lb. GP
1000-lb. GP2000-lb. GP
16.2‰4.752.3l2.63.4
0.10.9
0.0
1.30.76.81.00.00.0
00.%
8.5$8.4
51.817.24.6
0.10.0
0.0
3.41.83.20.90.10.0
Oo.q
0.8‰0.7
36.832.93.6
2.6‰6.9
56.66.06.9
3.8‰7.960.013.01.0
19.3%18.145.21.74.2
9.7$8.5
44.419.63.0
7.7$10.538.824.02.5
0.60.8
0.0
9.00.64.70.80.00.0
6.9$10.747.223.85.4
0.70.1
0.3
2.10.61.70.50.00.0
Oo.q
1100 bo
~.w5.550.014.54.6
1.12.5
0.3
7.40.83.82.50.00.0
,Oo.q
0.76.7
0.93.3
0.61.1
500-lb. SAP1000-lb. SAP
4.84.4
0.00.0
Armor-Piercing # 1.0 1.2 0.3 0.0 0.1
0.00.06.50.0
10.30.0
0.00.00.20.0
10.40.0
0.00.40.80.28.40.0
1.94.31.52.61.20.0
5.70.74.80.90.70.2
Napalm BombsOther IncendiaryFragmentationDepth BombsTorpedoesMines
loo.ojz Oo.oj!z loo.q Oo.cyz 100.% ,00.$ 100.*TOTALS
number (about# Largely 1000-lb.@ Counting clusters as one bomb each. It is estimated that the 4,858 “other incendiary” units
* Includes a small of Army 300-pound GP bombs.
were a lmost ent i re ly c lus ters , averaging 25 individual incendiary bombs apiece, or a total ofabout 120,000 bombs. possibly 1/3 of the fragmentation units were 6 - bomb clusters, raisingthe total of frag bombs to over 50,000.
NOTE : Total tonnages in this table differ somewhat from those in other sections of this report,in which tonnages were based on total bomb-tonnage of all types, rounded to a whole number of
tons for each separate mission.(Continued from preceding page)
The selection of bombs ‘against merchant vessels appears to have been excellent. However,more 1000-lb. GP bombs and torpedoes could well have been used against large vessels, and SAPbombs eliminated. The excellent selection of small GP bombs, incendiary and fragmentation clusters(largely by VPB) against small vessels, should be especially noted.
700380 O-46- 8 - 109 -
TABLE 46. REPORTED ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES OF NAVAL AND MARINESBDs AND TBFs, 1942-1943 *
TYPE OF ORDNANCE
100-lb. GP250-lb. GP500-lb. GP
1000-lb, GP2000-lb. GP
SAP and AP
FragmentationIncendiaryDepth Bombs
TorpedoesMines
TOTALS
CARRIER-SBD
% ofTons Total
380
167640
0
91
30
16
00
4.0%0.0
17.567.00.0
9.5
0.30.01.7
0.00.0
955 100.0%
BASEDTBF
‰ ofTons Total
105 9.0%o 0.0
622 53.418 1.5
223 19.2
0 0.0
2 0.219 1.632 2.7
144 12.40 0.0
1,165 100.0%
* Figures for these two planes given in this table accountNaval and Marine aircraft during these two years.
NOTES TO TABLE 46
Tons Total
177 5.9‰38 1.3
216 7.12,588 85.6
0 0.0
0 0.0
0 0.00 0.03 0.1
0 0.00 0.0
3,022 100.0%
-BASEDTBF
% ofTons Total300 8.0%32 0.9
920 24.418 0.5
2,184 58.1
0 0.0
0 0.04 0.10 0.0
102 2.7200 5.3
3,760 100.0%
for 87% of all tonnage expended by
The above figures for the Navy’s two principal bomb carrying planes of 1942-43 present aninteresting contrast with the data for 1945. The overwhelming concentration on the heaviesttypes of bombs in 1942-43 is not believed to have had any especial justification in the natureof the targets attacked, which were principally airfields and lightly constructed military landtargets. This concentration may have resulted in part from the difficulties of bomb supply toforward areas, or from operating conditions which favored the loading of the smallest possiblenumber of bombs. It is believed, however, that the primary factor was the absence of any scienceof ordnance selection, or of any standard doctrine in the field; the first steps by the Navy toorganize the study of bomb damage and to produce a doctrine for ordnance selection were taken inlate 1943 and were not effective until 1944. Thus field commanders in the South Pacific andelsewhere were free to follow the path of least resistance - loading the fewest bombs - and thethen current “blast” theory of bomb damage (which favored the largest bomb available, and ignoredthe desirability of using a larger number of smaller bombs to increase the probability of gettinghits, on such targets as were susceptible to damage by smaller bombs).
I t wi l l be noted that the carr ier forces , although they had among their targets a largerpercentage of armored warships and others requiring larger bombs, were less inclined to emphasizelarge bombs than the land-based airforces. Neither made much use of fragmentation or incendiaryordnance. By contrast with 1942-43 the ordnance selection in 1945 exhibited exceptional improve-ment, for which credit may be assigned to an increasing awareness of the importance of correctordnance, and an increasing volume of information concerning the science of ordnance selection.
- 110 -
TABLE 47. ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES OF ALL CARRIER-BASEDAIRCRAFT, BY TYPE OF ORDNANCE AND BY OPERATION, 1944
TYPE OFORDNANCE
100-lb. GP250-lb. GP500-lb. GP
1000-lb. GP2000-lb. GP
500-lb. SAPlc)c)o-lb. SAP
Armor-Piercing
Napalm (Tank)Other IncendiaryFragmentationDepth Bombs
TorpedoesMines
TOTAL
MAR-SHALLS
Jan.-Feb.
24385
741218144
**
0
00
39106
00
1576
PALAU,YAP,WOLEAI
March-April
4927
20313318
*79
51
014100
3550
669
(Figures are in tons)
HOL-LAN-DIA
April
12351
35215425
232
0
0343322
00
819
SECONDTRUK,PONAPE
April-May
5726
18516192
53158
5
0341024
00
805
MARI-ANAS,BONINS,PALAUJune -August
664337
26071479367
193524
51
0247153347
610
7030
PALAU,YAP
Sept
23815269828155
50119
0
70c
2477
cc
1764
PHIL- RYUKYUSIP- FORMOSA,PINES, PHILIP-BONINS PINES
Sept. Oct.
192 288140 260878 1070565 462170 100
36 17974 223
0 106
0 046 5821 1318 22
72 3540 0
2212 3135
PHIL-IP-PINES
Nov.-Dec.
144185762281115
5186
13
2171516
1360
1823
TOTALMINOROPERA-TIONS1944
234
2219320
3912
7
46140
36
480
609#
* Included with 500-lb. GP. or 1000-lb. GP. respectively: amounts are believed to be small.# T o t a l i n c l u d e s 4 6 t o n s o f u n k n o w n t y p e s .
NOTE: These data are from compilations prepared by ComAirPac OpIntel, with miner adjustments,and are believed reasonably complete and accurate.
NOTES TO TABIX 47
The above table, taken from AirPac sources, shows the carrier ordnance expenditures for in-dividual operations and groups of operations during 1944.
The most significant characteristic of the ordnance data, when so arranged, is the relative-ly high expenditure of small bombs during short operation , and the greater expenditure of heavybombs during extended operations or the later phases thereof (including (a) the Truk and Marianasstrikes which were the second phase of the Marshalls operation, (b) the Second Truk strikes whichwere the second phase of the Hollandia operation, (c) the Marianas operation as a whole, and (d)the Philippines strikes of September which succeeded the Palau operations). The reason for thiswas principally early exhaustion by some carriers of the limited allowances of small bombs; thisrequi red subs t i tu t ion , in the la t te r phases of the opera t ion , of the large bombs which werecarried in excess of reasonable needs, and these were then used regardless of the requirementsof the targets. This situation was corrected in 1945 by altering the carrier allowances infavor of small bombs, and by replenishing bombs at sea during extended operations.
- 111 -
TABLE 48. ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES OF ALL CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT,BY TYPE OF ORDNANCE, MONTHLY, 1945
TYPE OF ORDIT.4NCE
100-lb. Gp250-lb. GP500-lb. GP1000-lb. GP2000-lb. Gp
500-lb. SAP1000-lb. SAP
Armor-Piercing
Napalm (Tank)Other IncendiaryFragnentatio~Depth Bombs
Torpedoes
TOTAL
JanuaryTons ~
331 14101 41318 57249 1135 2
72 342 2
17 1
0 02
28 ;8 *
109 5
2312 100
FebruaryTons %
252 20106 8696 5557 516 1
0 00 0
0 0
109 90 0
19 20 0
0 0
1255 100
March~
856 27236 71692 5362 212 *
23 18Q 3
2 *
85 316 142 11 *
72 2
3179 100
April~
887 18244 53066 61209 4211 4
13 *56 1
10 *
193 44 *42 112 *
111 2
5058 100
MayTons ‰
665 19132 42401 68
85 218 1
30 10 0
0 0
87 244 153 25 *
0 0
3520 100
JuneTons ‰
523 2816 1
1058 5739 28 *
23 10 0
0 0
97 51 *
104 67 l
0 0
1876 100
July-Augustrolls g
85 290 2
2649 60636 14260 6
0 032 1
0 0
2 *1
689 1;4 *
0 0
4448 100
* Less than & of one percent,
NOTES TO TABIE 48
The principal trend to h noted in the 1945 carrier ordnance expenditures is the shift from100-lb. and 250-lb. GP bombs to the 260-lb. fragmentation bomb in the last tiree months of thewar. These bombs, with the new fl fuzing, were used by all types of planes against such primarytargets as grounded aircraft and A/A guns. Heavy bombs received scant use in 1945, except in theheavy anti-shipping strikes of January and July. In the latter month armored warships were thep r i n c i p a l t a r g e t s , and 21% of total timage consistad of 1000 or 2000-lb. bombs.
NOTES TO TABLE 49: (use next page).
Torpedoes accounted for 12% of the total weight of bombs, torpedces and mines expended byNaval and Marine aircraft against enemy shipping during the war. In carr ier-based at tacks theyaccountad for 14%, in land-based a t tacks only 5%.
In shipping attacks by carrier VTB torpedoes represented 29% of the total weight of heavyordnance carried, and in shipping attacks by land-based VTB only 15%. The proportion of torpedosto total weight of ordnance carried by VTB against shipping declined throughout the war, as indi-cated by the following figures :
$ of Torpedoes to Total OrdnanceExpended on Shipping, by Weight
Year C a r r i e r VTB Land-Based ~
1942 73$ 94‰1943 68 51944 32 31945 16 0
Torpedoes constituted over one quarter of the tatal weight of ordnance expended against armor-ed warships, slightly over 10 percent of expenditures against unarmored warships, and slightlyless than 10 percent of expenditures against large merchant vvssels. Nearly half of the totaltorpedo expenditures were directed against armored warships.
The table shows, monthly, tie targets against which torpedoes were expended, and the typesof planes carrying them. All but 3% of total aticraft torpedo expenditures were by VTB, largelyTBFs or T?!@.
- 112 -
TABLE 49. AERIAL TORPEDOES EXPENDED ON TARGETS, MONTHLY
MONTH
1942 - FebruaryMarchMayJuneAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1943 - JanuaryFebruaryJulyNovemberDecember
1944 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchJuneAugustSeptemberOctoberNovember
1945 - JanuaryMarchAprilMayJuneJuly
TOTALS
TOTALNo. OF
TORPEDOESEXPENDED
9136424125
32487
1534
7744
566735223972
354136
10973
1141286
1,460
NUMBER
CarrierVTB
9136417120880
000
7343
486635223972
354136
10972
111000
DROPPEDLand-BasedVTB
o00405
24407
153400
6
108
BY
VPB
3
41
21
013
1286
NUMBER DROPPWARSHIPS
Ar- Unar-mored mored
90
6421115
23397
000
5935
16140
2040
23934
30
103400
000000500
630
140
1616161
110
1313
28109480
710 173
ED, BY TARGE
MERCHANTVESSELS
0130310490
90449
636161
19707489
78602206
515
T TYPE
DATA NOTAVAILABLE
1813052
280
030200
62
NOTE : 1944 totals are from AirPac data, and 1944 breakdowns by type of target are approximateonly . No torpedo expendi tures were repor ted for months not l i s ted above .
- 113 -
MONTH
19~-JanuawFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
TOTALS
c. Rocket and Ammunition Expenditures
TABLE 5O. NUMBER OF ROCKETS EXPENDED ON TARGETS, MONTHLY.By Model of Aircraft, For Land-Based and Carrier-Based Aircraft,
and by Type of Carrier
A. CARRIER-BASED
MONTH
19~ebruaryMarchAprilMayHovemberDecember
1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
TO!l?ALS
41,012 22,107 4578 7208
F4U.FG
025
3,27;3,334~,5233,099
941
_m.uE_
F6F
00
1220
227~lg5:
z
CVL-BASED
F6F TBM—
00
1,2387al354
335
1,601 0693 330
2,955 6934,01s 5021,936 190
5313 412,210 1131,631 0
18,290 1869_
B. LAND-BA
FM SBD
232
FASTCARRIERTOTAL
00
i;134525
2,97325
3,7724,7842,bgl3,267
7,4217,147
16,06314,16gg,16g1,849
13,464g,jo+
XL@!
CVE-BASEDF4U,
FM F6F FG TBM22g142140
64;56 1,3730 7134 0 3,9060 0 1,3040 0 0
TOTAL--Ez
142140
64;1,429
713 3,9101,304
00 0 4 4
2,4752,&?715,9659,0381,6036,230
9;1
28,337 11,115 1562 46,b91!a7,@cj
TBM
154942g000
295261195346
2,12792412064
4,608
EBJ
0000
2/33129
19440
g716425
z
2,951
PQ
0006
la
39175261219
1,022477470
A!i69--
TOWL.L
1$942g
2r3 2293
52g501590
4,3137,5187,1014,3291,458
?L!E.z_No rockets were expended during months not listed above.
- 114 -
‘TABLE 51. ROCKRT EXPENDITURES ON TARGETS, 1945By Plane Model, Carrier-Eased and Land-Based, and by Target Type
TARGET TYPE
AirfieldsOther Military TargetsHarbor and WaterfrontLand TransportationIndustrialOther and unknown land
Armored WarshipsUnarmored WarshipsMerchemt, over 500 tons$lerchant, under 500 tonsShips, Type urdmown
TOTAL
CARRIER-RASEDF6F F4U FM SB2C TBM
295501S462174611281167698
295134037591818157
119446472738595
1227296
154368
117868116
759416871
6881186108780
0114195741
0
1210274521796740
3210031320
1491424525
8271678227
1056
083
21759124
55120 23669 28277 4535 44142
LAND-RASEDF4U, TEIJ. PBJ PVF6F* 5B2~
3539 123 141 410803 3973 1128 17881004 768 154 77410 265 66 48
0 24 88 7889 24 21 8
0 0 0 00 0 114 92
96 0 563 30322 119 204 115
0 0 60 0
16263 5296 2539 2240
TOTAL
69,01981,7656,2195,4722,9932,972
4812,2116,0694,623
257
182,081
— ,
* Includes 144 by FM
NOTES TO TABIX 50
T h e rzradual increase in the use of rockets. as their combat use suread to more squadrons and.more types of plaues, is c lear ly indica ted above. The f i rs t substanti~l use of rocke& by fas tcarriers, CVES, and land-based aircraft, came in each case with the appearance of rocket-equippedf ighter squadrons , an CVs and CVLs during the Guam and Palau campaigns of July and September 1944,on CVZS during the Lingayen opera t ion . Rocket-equipped land-based Wrine fighters did not appearuntil the beginning of the Okinawa campaign. Fighters accounted for 65% of the aircraft rocketsfired at the enemy; CVE TBMs fired 60j% of those expended by bombers.
Noteworthy are the expenditures for April 1945, when carriers alone fired nearly 41,000 HSrockets at enemy targets, largely on Okinawa. 116 ,000 , o r 55% af all rocket expenditures for thewar, were a=minst targets in the Ryukyus area; all but 5,600 of these were fired at land targets.Other areas heavily attacked with rockets were Japan (31,000), the Philippines (19,000), and theBonins, principally Iwo Jima (15,000).
NOTES TO TABLE 51
1945 aircraft racket expenditures accounted for over 85$ of the Naval total for the war.Thus the above table, for 1945 only, gives a nearly complete picture of the use of rockets byNaval p lanes . 45% of all rocket expenditures were against military land targets, such as guns,defenses , personnel , s tores , e tc . Another 38$were expended against parked aircraft, hangars,and other a i r f ie ld targets . About 7%were expended against shipping, l@ against miscellaneousland targets .
Fast carrier fighters made the bulk of the rocket attacks on airfields and shipping; CVE FMsand TBMs made most of the attacks an other milita~ land targets, though CVE planes also heavilyattacbd air f ie lds (par t icular ly in June 1945) and fas t carr ier F6Fs were qui te ac t ive agains tmil i tary targets . SB2CS made few rocket a t tacks , in comparison with other plane models. Bombersin general made relatively few rocket attacks on sh ipp ing , reserving thei r pr imary ef for t forbomb-carr~ng.
Land-based planes used rockets primrily against military installations in the Okinawaarea, though fighters in the later stages of that campaign made rocket attacks on airfields inKyushu and the Southern Ryukyus.
- 115 -
TABLE 52. MONTHLY EXPENDITURE OF ROCKETS, BY ALL NAVAL ANDMARINE CARRIER AND LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT, BY TYPE OF TARGET, 1945
BASE ,MONTH
CARRIER-BASED
JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
LAND-BASED
JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
TOTAL
AIR-FIELDS
65,224
4,3883,2369,06612,2969,94113,5607,1475,590
3,823
02518
206557
1,0321,651
334
69,047
OTHERMILI-TARYTARGETS
64,077
2,7167,957
11,47324,33110,5094,5721,983
536
17,683
100153112
3,7475,9664,8411,934
830
81,760
HARBORAREAS
4,223
489180
1,47393737512
430327
2,000
250243297
012764935876
6,223
LANDTRANS-PORTA-TION
4,684
1,115208522
1,229360184726340
788
000
32140154120
5,472
OTHER& UN-KNOWNLAND
5,608
443265
1319642552455
1,128804
327
82400
18380248
5,935
WARSHIPSAr- Unar -mored mored—481 2,005—
0 7048 1024 727
112 530 00 0
297 15960 260
0 206
0 460 160 920 60 00 140 320 0
481 2,211
MERCHANTMENOver Under500 500Tons Tons
5,382
1,587239
1,265438100160
1,158435
69112424221096
138166111
3,864
775150
1,00883233990
534136
804
0164923
18829313699
6,073 4,668
SHIPS,UN-KNOWNTYPE
197—0000
210
1760
16
000000
160
213
TOTAL
155,745
12,21712,34526,85740,87022,19719,03313,7388,488
26,338
528501590
4,3137,5187,1014,3291,458
182,083
NOTES TO TABLE 52
This table traces the pattern of rocket attacks in 1945. Pr imary carr ier rocket targetsin January were the airfields of the Philippines, Formosa, China and Indo China, though landtargets in the Lingayen area ware also heavily hit by the CVEs and shipping in the China Sea byt h e f a s t c a r r i e r s . In February the emphasis in rocket attacks shifted to land targets at Iwo,with the Tokyo airfields a good second. In March a considerably stepped up attack was directedat airfields in Kyushu and the Ryukyus, at Okinawa defenses before the invasion, and at shippingin Kyushu ports.
April witnessed the greatest rocket offensive, mostly in support of ground forces onOkinawa, but with heavy attacks on Kyushu and Ryukyus airfields also. In May the close supportrequirements relaxed, and land-based planes took over the major share of this duty, but air-f ie ld a t tacks cont inued. In late May and June, after withdrawal of the British Task Forcecovering the Southern Ryukyus, and of the U.S. fast carrier force, the CVE force diverted itsmajor attention to airfields, while the Marine planes ashore provided the bulk of the airsuppor t .
July and August were devoted almost entirely to attacks on Japan, in which airfields andshipping were the primary rocket targets.
- 116 -
TABLE 53. AIRCRAFT AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES ON TARGETS (IN THOUSANDS OF ROUNDS) 1945
BASE,MONTH
CARRIER-BASED
.TanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
LAND-BASEDJanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
TOTAIS
COMPARATIVETOTALS, 1944
Carrier-Based and Land-Based, by Target Type, Monthly
AIR-FIELDS
12,471
1,5801,0772,3742,3491,2421,5001,1081,241
1,43817429413518211123624066
13,909
6,782
OTHERMILI-TARYTARGETS
7,378
342992
2,0082,606
67633836749
El&J240
1,4801,5962,0901,8451,018
643243
16,533
22,824
HARBORAREAS
842—11025
2941913512
12352
844G162114917097
17926
1,686
230
LANDTRANS-PORTA-TION
826—17672
1081642427
19263
1,14920513613926115887
1585
1,975
1,241
5Tm%-% uN-KNOWNLAND
868—58
1172511265325
16276
259x148132
2321220
1,127
863
RARSRIPSAr- Unar -mored mored
376—115
852700
23414
1T
o000100
656—25190
1693320
5358
1057
7351934
292
377 761
456 715
WERCHM?I’M5N%mr Under500 500rons Tons
1708 992
688 z131 102414 292110 18627 4816 18
227 12295 19
~ 2&7J14 13956 16390 22761 287
217 397124 402113 56032 202
2415 3,369
2253 1,627
, .
SHIPSTYPEUN-KNOWN
8
00001070
1243
0000
12400
132
0
TOTAL
26,125
3,4212,6115,9955,7922,1081,9362,5951,667
16,159913
2,4462,3492,9932,8242,1141,944
576
42,284
36,991
NOTES TO TABLE 53
The pattern of ammunition expenditure differed fron that for rocket expenditure. as a.comparison of the above table with Table 52 will illustrate. Airf ie ld targets consu&ed a h igherpropor t ion of the s t raf ing ef for ts of car r ier a i rcraf t than of the i r rocket expendi tures . Therewerse appeared to be true in the case of land-based a i rcraf t . In the case of shipping targetsa lso , carr ier a i rcraf t appeared to re ly more on s t raf ing than rocket f i re , whi le for mil i taryland targets rockets were used more heavily. These tendencies probably reflect the largerrocket loadings generally carried b
A?WE planes agains t mi l i tary targets , p lus extenaiw straf-
ing of parked aircraf t , a i r f ie ld A and ship ~A by fast carrier VP. The heavy use of r0Cket8agains t harbor areas , versus s t raf ing agains t t ranspor ta t ion targets , by land-based planes , mayalso be noted.
Carr ier p lanes devoted thei r pr incipal s t raf ing to a i r f ie ld targets , wi th other mi l i tarytargets second. Land-based planes put military targets first, merchent shipping second, andairfields a poor third. The remarkable strafing record of land-based planes against smallmerchant vessels reflects principally the work of PB4Ys , which during 1945 expended 1,679,000rounds in missions against merchant vessels of under 500 tons, including 436,000 rounds inJu ly 1945 a lone .
The comparative data in the bottom lines of the table show trends in strafing between 1944and 1945. Major increases from 1944 to 1945 may be noted with respect to airfields, harbor areas,and small vessels, and a decrease with respect to military targets. Part of this decrease, andpar t of the a i r f ie lds increase , msY have resul ted f rom differences in c lass i f icat ion, s ince in1944 airfield buildings and guns were someti~s classified under military targets. The growingimportance of harbor areas reflects the movement of the war to sectors where substantial portsand facilities were found.
- 117 -
TABIJ3 54. AIRCRAFT AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES ON TARGETS(IN THOUSANDS OF ROUNDS), DURING 1944
Carrier-Based and Land-Based, by Type of Carrier, and by Type of Target
TYPB OF TARGET
Grounded AircraftAirfield Runways
Defense Installations, GunsPersonnel, Bivouac AreasBuildings, Storage Areas*
Docks and WaterfrontRoads, Bridges, VehiclesIndustrial FacilitiesUrban AreasOther and Unknown Ixmd
Armored ‘~rshipsUnarmored WarshipsMerchant, over 500 toneMerchant, under 500 tons
TOTAL LAND TARGETSTOTAL SHIP TARGETS
TOTAL, ALL TARGETS
F6F
17862463
3897464
2707
951381329479
2515071330660
118552648
14503
CV-CVLSBD,SB2C
104258
42264
403
83353102
3654
23444
1357368
1725
CARRIER
TBF,TBM
79230
304118376
1919192112
2945
15958
1197291
1488
-BASED
FM
11998
848619386
35558
27
96244483
E247
2415
CVE
F6F
G66
420158273
11323
063
207
3283
G142
1546
TBF,TBM
z16
203100115
0250
133
2256
11
z44
530
F4U,F6F
81679
295020162368
6241019
1994
02398
404
8788525
9313
LAND-SBD,TBF
2432
1071407993
17216
41213
01
5069
3167140
3,307
-BAS
PB4Y
4140
558
32
0423
21
242213149
ZX406
612
IOtherVPB
2131
198410439
15182
8512
07
87146
1312240
1552
TOTAL
2,3694,413
10,3684,3648,092
2301,241
236451176
456715
2,2531,627
31,9405,051
36,991
* Including airfield buildings and buildings of unidentified types, but excluding barracks.
NOTES TO TABLE 54
Herein is shown, for 1944 only, a more detailed breakdown of the types of targets strafed,plus data on the amount of strafing by each type of plane.
- 118 -
6. NIGHT AIR OPERATIONS
TABLE 55. SORTIES, BOMB TONNAGE. AND LOSSES IN NIGHT ATTACKS
BASE,PLANE MODEL
LAND-BASED
PB4YPBJPV
PBYPBMPB2Y
F6FF4USBDTBF, TBM
CARRIBR-BASEDF6FF4UFMSBDTBF, TBM
GRAND TOTAL
PLANESTAKINGOFF
5164
E1306449
99716564
132774
121559
636K174
23291
5800
BY NAVAL AND MARINE AIRCR&, FOR ENTIRE WARBy Plane Model, Land-Based and Carrier-Based
PLANES ATTACK-
INGTARGETS
4973
921278377
105814256
130070
110490
582?%?164
23272
5555
TONS OFBOMBSON
TARGETS
2796
x747310
8705874
2689
31351
2047
00
12173
3000
OWN LOSSES OliACTION SORTIES
%%% %%,,-
37
142
690
3129
12—40017
3
z00
100
0101
0E0000
32
-z36
510
2119
1270004
49 3 44
PLANES LOSTFER 100SORTIES
Enemy Oper.
0.8G0.30.4
0.75.5
*
0.2
1.;1.8
1.9E
***
0.6
G0.21.3
0.50.6
*
0.2*
0.81.6
1.9n
***
2.4 1.4
0.9 0.8
PERCENT OFNIGHT SORTIESTO TOTALSORTIES
3.8
z15.616.7
72.232.645.1
32.00.10.35.3
0.4n0.2#
0.40.8
2.0
* Not computed; less than 100 sor t ies .#Le88 +JWIQ.05.
(a) Night Attack
Tables 55 and 56 give brief statistical data on Navy and Marine night attacks on targets.While the number of sorties attacking targets at night was only 2 percent of total attack-sortiesby Naval aircraft, the total volume is more impressive than might ordinarily be thought, amount-ing ta 5,800 sorties and 3,000 tons of bombs, IarCely by land-based planes. For some types ofa i rcraf t , mainly the f ly ing boats , land-based F6F night fighters, and to a lesser extant PVs a n dPBJs, night a t tacks cons t i tu ted a major por t ion of the i r offensiw a c t i v i t y .
For the PBY, too slow and vulnerable for day attack on defended targets, night work con-stituted a profitable and principal employment. The 1,058 attacks made by PBYs on 997 sortieswere divided between ship and shore targets. Black Cats from New Guinea flew low level nightbombing missions against Jap ships in the Bismarck Sea area in the winter of 194344, and BlackCats in the Solomons cooperated with PT-boats in spotting and attacking Jap barges and shoreinstallations. PEWS were also used for night heckling raids on Jap bases throughout the Southand Southwest Pacific, and for minelaying, and were still pursuing Jap shipping as far west asCelebes in late 1944.
PBMs and PB2Ys made a number of night attacks, largely on shipping (plus two PB2Y long-range night raids on Wake), but these two plane types ware largely used for anti-sub patrol andsector search in quie t areas , and thus flew far fewer night attack missions.
PBJ n ight miss ions fell into +-o pr incipal c lasses : night heckling missions over Rabaula n d Kavieng, constituting the bulk of the sorties, and night rocket attacks on shipping, princi-pally in the Bonins area. PV night missions were principally attacks on the Northern Kuriles,flown over the 600 miles from Attu under difficult weather conditions. PB4Ys flew few nightmissions: a few heckling sorties over Rabaul, and some minelaying flights.
The number of night missions by single-engine land-based planes is surprisingly large. Thoseby TBFs were predominantly for minelaying in the Solomons area, but included also night hecklingattacks and shipping attacks there, and in 1945 some heckling missions at Okinawa.
The F6F night missions were flown almost entirely by Marine night fighter squadrons. Thosefrom November 1944 b March 1945 were flown against Palau and Yap, in preparation for those insubsequent months in the Okinawa area, where substantial support was given our ground forces byregular heckling missions over enemy lines.
- 119 -
(Cont. on next page)
TABLE 56. NUMSER OF NAVAL AND MARINE AIRCRA~ ATTACKING
MONTH
1942 - MayJuneAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1943 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSwp+&mberOctoberNovemberDecember
1944 - JanufiryFebruaryMurchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1945 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
1942 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total
GRAND TOTAL
TARGETS AT NIGRTBy Plane Model, Carrier-Based and Land-Based, Monthly
931000
010
200
271211
124
31
54
246118420—o
40109118—267
ARRIERTBFTBM—
18306
240
013000000040
17
158
3338474
150—o
7834160—272—
-BASED
Other
1112000
000103000400
000
120000
0238
12
43
)
Total
38736
240
0140
210
301211
204
48
201257
111658
170
0131151290
582
F6F
6028
13259
7
24202147115181241 950
oo
295005
1300
200404
37900
120
02000000—o0
682—
70
—
SBD—o03
173077
04
366
—644
420—
110—
mTBM—
o001300
01
12948
10529
2500
370
629271000000000
000
1741000—4
3567258—
490.
LAND-
p~y
3500000
297006
165
10284353
1356083177455638393695136
3117210100
817981952
1058
BASED
PBJ
00
568092
10511710868267036
47102328177867421
00
758520
1278
—
PV—
139
1418
25224335905010170
23160
00000001—o
45311—
377—
OtherPB*
o0
11203702024
191636
1598
21003
18
21
2947371753
031
118141
290
TOTAL
353
183377
214
14750
10511323115379675
18712721215230723523524016913141197
10432421026133634517425
76615
25031779
4973
GRANDTOTAL
353
183377
214
14750
1 C51132698843
12075
187141212173307265247241170151415145
12433626737240135319125
76746
26542069
5555
* Including 92 by PB4Y, 142 by PBM, 56 by PB2Y.
Carrier night offensive missions were flown largely by VF(N) and VTB(N), which came aboardin early 1944 and in September 1944 respectively. although pre-dawn attacks accounted for a numberof sor t ies f lown ear l ier . The number of night attacks flown increased greatly in the Okinawa oper-ation, as a night CV and a night CVE made available full night air groups for regular neutraliza-tion attacks on enemy airfields and attacks on shipping.
Surprisingly low 1oss rates were reported for night Operations by lend-based F6Fs end PBJs.PBYs, considering their vulnerability in minimum altitude attacks, and PVs, considering the diffi-cult conditions of the North Pacific, also reported remarkably low losses. Carrier loss rates,though higher than the day rates, were not excessive considering the hazards involved and thevalue of the work done.
- 120 -
TABLE 57. NIGHT AERIAL COMBAT RECORD FOR LAND-BASEDAND CARRIER-BASED NAVAL AND MARINE AIRCRAFT, MONTHLY
MONTH
1943 - July
NovemberDecember
1944 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember
1945 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
TOTAL
LAND-BASED CARRIEROwnOwn
AircraftOnMission
1867
1271
16172030203
000
2131 23 93
181
(b) Night Air Combat
OwnAircraftEngagingIn Combat
867
771732030103
0007
202093
114
Enemy Aircraft
DestroyedEngaged In Combat
158
10
671633040104
0007
262310
287
351210010103
0005
25239
3 3
137 99
Own AircraftOnMission—
030
010207922
172
18
439
552000
10
164
AircraftEngagingIn Combat
030
010105511
1215
327
3312003
95
-BASED
Enemy Aircraft
DestroyedEngaged In Combat
0 04 20 0
0 01 00 03 10 07 74 41 01 1
10 101 16 5
4 42 2
12 1136 3317 160 00 08 6—
117 103
U.S. Naval and Marine aircraft during World War II shot down a total of 202 enemy aircraftat night and lost only 7 planes in night aerial combat, or 1/29 of the enemy losses in the sameactions. If operational losses on missions involving night combat are included, 15 enemy planeswere destroyed per own plane lost. It should be noted that the chance of over-optimistic claimsof enemy aircraft destroyed in night combat is negligible, since most enemy planes crash inf lames vis ible for mi les , and usually only one or two aircraft are engaged at a time.
103 of the enemy planes were shot down by carrier night fighters, or planes acting as nightfighters, 90 by land-based night fighters, and 9 by patrol bombers.
Of the 7 losses to enemy aircraft, only one involved a carrier-based F6F(N), and only 2 in-volved land-based F6F(N)s, which became the standard night fighters for land and carrier use, andaccounted for three-fourths of the enemy planes destroyed in night combat.
The first night fighters consisted of a small Marine squadron of PVs converted to nightfighters, sent to the Solomons in late 1943 to discourage the nightly "Washing Machine Charlie”r a i d s . This squadron accounted for 11 enemy planes between November 1943 and May 1944, including7 float planes and 4 bombers, and lost one plane in air combat. It was supplemented by a Navysquadron of F4Us equipped with intercept radar gear. This squadron accounted for 4 floatplanesand 4 bombers, with no air combat losses. Another F4U (N) squadron (Marine) brought down twoBettys in the Marshalls, with one loss.
After these three squadrons all land-based night fighters were the new F6Fs with AI inter-cept gear , and all were in Marine squadrons. Their first night air combat was in October 1944,when they knocked down a float plane in the Palau area, and in December, when they destroyed 3Jap f ighters in the Phi l ippines . They had no further night combat until April 1945, when the threeMarine VP(N) squadrons sent to Okinawa began their campaign which resulted in the destruction, ina 4-month period , of 64 enemy aircraft, against 2 air combat losses and 1 operational loss sus-
(Cont. on next page)
- 121 -
BASE, PLANEMODEL
CARRIER-BASED
F6FF4UFMTBF, TBM
LAND-BASED
F6FF4UTBFPV(N)PB4YPBJPBYPBM
TOTAL
TABLE 58. NIGHT AERIAL COMHAT RECORD. BY PLANE MODEL,
‘~AIRCRAFTON
MISSION
164—149
546
181—87179
15143081
345
mLIRCRAFTENGAGINGIN COMBAT—
95—85442
114
61133
1310851
209
FOR ENTIRE WAR
BNEw PLANESENGAGED
FightersBombers and F/P
79 38— —70 367 00 12 1
63 74— .39 327 51 2
10 74 161 80 41 0
142 112
ENEMY PL4NESDESTROYED
Fighter8Bombers and F/P
69— 34—62 335 00 12 0
51 48
386052000
305066010
120 82
CViN LOSSBSON MISSION
i?nemy Opera-A/C tional
2 4
2:0 00 00 0
5 2
z T1 10 01 01 00 00 00 0
7 6
tained in these engagements.
The first carrier night fighters to engage in combat were a pair of standard F6Fs, guidedby a radar-equipped TBM, which intercepted a Jap bomber attack in the Gilberts area in November1943. One of the F6Fs (piloted by Cdr. O’Hare) was shot down by the Japs, and the TBM reversedthe concept of the team by shooting down two of the Japs.
In early 1944 these makeshift teams were replaced by 4-plane teams of AI-equipped F6FS ( a n dfor a few months some AI-equipped F4Us) assigned to each CV. These planes accomplished little innight combat until the Marianas campaign, when they shot down 11 Jap planes. In September a nightair group equipped with F6F(N)s was placed aboard the CVL INDEPENDENCE, and during the five monthsof its service its planes shot down 15 Jap planes at night, while the CV teems accounted for 5more. This group was succeeded by a CV night group aboard ENTERPRISE, which in its 5 months ofintermittent service made 18 night killsAugust brought down 6 Jap planes.
, and was in turn succeeded by a third group which in
During the Okinawa campaign the brunt of the night-fighting was borne by the CV night fight-er teams, which brought down 11 Japs in March, 27 in April, and 6 in May. I n a l l , c a r r i e r - b a s e dsingle-engine VF(N) destroyed 60 Jap planes in night combat during the Okinawa campaign, andland-based night fighters an additional 64. These 124 planes were brought down at a cost of fourl o s s e s , combat and operational.
Attention is invited to the large proportion of enemy planes destroyed to enemy planes en-gaged, especially in actions involving the F6F and F4U. Once our night fighters came withinshooting range of the enemy planes, few escaped.
As would be expected, over half of the total enemy planes destroyed were twin-engine fight-ers or bombers, or flying boats. Of the single-engine types destroyed at night, half were floatplanes (See Table 59).
- 122 -
TABLE 59. TYPES OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYEDBY NAVAL AND MARINR AIRCRAFT IN NIGHT AERIAL COMBAT,
FOR ENTIRE WAR
PLANE MODEL,RASE
F6F, CarrierF6F, Land-Based
F4U, CarrierF4U, Land-Based
FM, CarrierTBF, CarrierPV(N)pB4yPBY
TOTAL
SINGLB-ENGINEFIGHTERS
1212
00
00010
25
SINGLE-ENGINEBOMBERS
75
02
00100
15
FLOATPLANES
1112
04
00741
39
TWIN-ENGINFfBOMSERS ORFIGHTERS
4837
55
12310
102
==r=13 40
I2
0 00 0
0 00 00 01 10 0
14 7
TcY1’AL
9568
511
12
1181
202
- 123 -
7. LONG RANGE SEARCH PLANE OPERATIONS
TABLE 60. MONTHLY RECORD OF PB4Y AND PBM PATROL AIRCRAFT, 1945
MONTH
JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust
TOTALMonthlyAverage*
SQUADRONS INNo. Planes
99
18202122
.s-
130124260281296302284&
17 239
ACTION
TOTALFL'TS
1,4911,167;:s;;
3,32343, 91
3,7332,593
22,245
2,781
TOTALACTIONSORTIES
56175;g
541443472
188
2,568
342_
SORTIES ATTACKING SHIPSMerchant Ships
War- over Underships 500 Tons 500 Tons
4 5 204 25
6559
1716 39 J{
82 21712 17516 f% 2024 14 92
84 340 1,002
11 45 134
* On 8 months basis for non-action items, 7% months for action items.
OWN LOSSES#Total,
54 9 198
7.2 1.2 25
# Total losses include 56 on ground, 11 operational on action sorties, and68 operational on non-action flights, in addition to the losses to enemy action listed.
Attention has been paid, in previous sections of this report, to the air combat record ofPB4Y patrol planes, and to the substantial proportion of their attack effort which was directedagains t sh ipping . Unfor tunate ly , in those analyses the PB4Y record was somewhat smothered underthe much larger figures covering action by carrier planes and by the large number of land-baseds ingle-engine p lanes . Thus th is br ief addi t ional sec t ion i s provided to g ive fu l l c redi t to thelong range search planes for their combat achievements.
Emphasis herein is placed on 1945, and on PB4Ys. PBMs, included in onein many noteworthy performances during 1945, and in 1944 PB4Ys performed, oneven greater individual brilliance then in 1945. The 1945 figures, however,press ive se t of data , and fuller detail can be provided.
of the tables , turneda smaller scale, withpresent a more im-
Table 60 above gives 1945 monthly data for all PB4Y and PBM squadrons which reported actionduring the respective months. Not all squadrons in the Pacific are included, since during eachmonth there were some which flew only negative patrols. The squadrons included were based in thePhilippines, the Marianas, and ultimately at Iwo and Okinawa.
Average squadron strength was 14 aircraft, and each plane on the average made 11 or 12 flights,largely sector searches of 600 to 1000 miles, per month. A squadron normally flew 2 to 5 sectorsdaily, each covered usually by single planes , sometimes by 2-plane teams. Occasionally additionalanti-shipping search and attack teams were sent out; rarely were larger strike missions flown.
As the table indicates , 7 out of 8 flights were negative with respect to action with theenemy, but the average plane attacked targets or engaged enemy aircraft once or twice a month.The majority of their attacks were on enemy shipping - large merchant vessels and warships whenthey were sighted, small vessels when nothing larger was available - and land targets were nor-mally attacked only in sectors where shipping had entirely disappeared.
Starting with attacks in the Philippines and the Bonins area in January, the planes worked upto the Ryukyus, the Formosan coast, the North China Coast, the Yellow Sea and the Coasts of Korea,and the shores of Kyushu, Shikoku and Southern Honshu, as new forward bases became available.From the Philippines they also worked down the South China coast, to Indo China, Malaya, and Borneo.Initially in each area a substantial residue of large vessels remained, but as attacks mounted thosewhich were not sunk were withdrawn, or kept in harbor by day, so that the bulk of the vessels re-maining at sea were the small coastal types of 50 to 300 tons on which the Japs had in the end tore ly for supplying the i r d is tant forces and re turning v i ta l mater ia ls to Japan.
These were the vessels the search planes attacked, usually in single plane bombing and straf-ing attacks at 50 to 200 feet altitude. When such tactics are used, accuracy is such that bombtonnages dropped are no measure of the results obtained. In a study of reports on 870 PB4Y mast-
- 124 -
[
head attacks on ships of all sizes, it was found that 370 attacks, or over 4@, resul ted in h i t s ,and that over 18% of all bombs dropped were hits. These figures do not include any measure ofthe hits by small incendiary bombs normally dropped in clusters on the smaller vessels, or ofthe effect of strafing. Dozens of snmll vessels were destroyed by fires caused by incendiary hitsor s t raf ing a lone , and most of the smaller vessels attacked could be sunk by a direct or under-water hit by one 100-lb. or 250-lb. bomb.
During 1945 PB4Ys alone dropped over 4,000 bombs, plus over 500 incendiary clusters, inattacks on probably 600-800 different vessels, and expended over 2,000,000 rounds of ammunitionin strafing these vessels. It is probable that as a result of the 1945 PB4Y and PBM attacks somm300-500 of these vessels were sunk. (No final evaluation or assessment of the claims regardingsrtstll vessels has yet been made). The effect was to cripple the remaining Japanese sea transportin most areas, and to cause withdrawal of many vessels not yet sunk, because of the danger ofattack, and because of fuel shortage resulting from the sinking of tankers.
Table 60 shows the steady building up of anti-shipping attacks in 1945, to the peak operationsof May, June and July, largely in the Yellow Sea and off Korea and Japan itself. In June and. Julyan average of 8 or 9 attacks on ships were made daily.
PB4Y ATTACK RECORD, 1945, BY TARGET TYFE
Number of Bombs ExpendedS o r t i e s I~ “cen-
RoundsAttacking diary Other of Am-Targets 2000# Clusters Types mo. Ex-
TARGETS pended— — . _ .— ——.
Warships 53 129 52 15 7 0 0 85,000Merchant Ships, over 500 Tons 238 296 302 402 13 45 6 566,000Merchant Ships, Under 500 Tons 840 1,953 813 160 7 503 25 1,676,000Minelaying 49 0 0 0 0 0 96 124,000
TOTAL SHIPPING 1,180 2,378 1,167 577 27 548 127 2,451,000
Land Transportation 170 92 448 93 16 42 3 322,000A i r f i e l d s 125 273 36 421 19 25 13 85,000Other Military Targets 161 363 155 278 4 67 3 214,000Other Land Targets 133 477 79 131 8 65 5 126,000
TOTALS 1,769 3,583 1,885 1,500 74 747 151 3,198,000
The above table shows the ordnance expended in the attacks by PB4Ys alone, and illustratesthe predominance of small bombs, incendiary clusters and strafing which were all that were re-quired agains t the smal ler targets , though, as will be noted, heavier bombs were used againstthe larger vessels. Normally, mixed bomb loads were carried, to prmit a choice of bombs depend-ing on the type of target met. Despite the 3 to 4 ton bomb capacity of the PB4Y, rarely wereloads of more than 2 tons carried, and the normal load was usually about 2,500 pounds, becauseof the extra fuel required for long-range searches.
In the minority of attacks which were directed against land targets (in the absence of ships),land t ranspor ta t ion ( inc luding ra i l roads ,t a r g e t .
bridges, trains, and trucks) was the favorite type ofAirf ie ld ins ta l la t ions , miscel laneous mi l i ta ry bui ld ings , and harbor areas of smal l
c o a s t a l v i l l a g e s , were the o ther pr incipal targets a t tacked.
Table 60 also shows the monthly air combat record of PB4Ys and PBMs. The 292 patrol planeswhich engaged in combat met 541 ene~ aircraft, and shot down 150, or nearly 3% of them. Lossesin air combat were 9 planes , only 6$ of the number of eneq planes destroyed, and only 3% of thenumber of our VPB engaging in combat. The best records were in February and March, when 51 enemyplanes were shot down with only 1 combat loss.
Losses to antiaircraft fire in these low level attacks were slightly over 2% of the planesa t t a c k i n g . Operational losses were 1/3 of one percent of the total number of flights.
700380 O-46-9 - 125 -
TYPE OF VESSEL
BattleshipsCarriers, LargeCarriers, MediumCarriers, Escort
Cruisers, HeavyCruisers, Light
TOTAL ARMORED 7UiRSHIPS
DestroyersSmall Warships*
TOTAL WARSHIPS
APPENDIX
JAPANESE SHIPPING SUNK BY
TABLE A. TOTALS FOR WAR,
SHIPS SUNK BYU.S. NAVALCARRIER-BASEDAIRCRAFT ALONENo. Tons
5 184,0005 136,6005 59,1501 17,000
6 72,0006 33,535
28 502,285
28 45,415 103 125,928
TOTAL MERCHANT SHIPS,1000 Gross Tons or Over
TOTALS
159 673,628
275 1,293,875
434 1,967,503
NAVAL AIRCRAFT
BY TYPE OF SHIP
SHIPS SUNK BYU.S. NAVALLAND-BASED
AIRCRAFT ALONENo. Tons
1 14,000
1 14,000
5 8,115 2 2,300
8 24,415
50 182,583
58 206,998
SHIPS SUNK BYNAVAL AIRCRAFTIN COMBINATIONWITH OTHER FORCESNo. Tons
1 30,000
2 22,050
3 41,0002 10,340
8 103,390
8 10,450
TOTAL SHIPSSUNK BY, OR WITHAID OF, U. S. NAVAL
AIRCRAFTNo. Tons
6 214,0005 136,6007 81,2001 17,000
10 127,0007 43,875
37 619,675
41 63,980 119 146,090
197 829,745
41 229,061
71 360,763
* Including a few large auxi l iar ies .
These data, though no t compi led by OP-23-V, are inserted because of their interest in con-nection with the tables covering carrier attacks on shipping.
The data on ships eunk have been compiled by the Statistical Section of the Foreign Branchof ONI (op-23-F44). They are based on a careful study of shipping reported sunk by Japanesesources , correlated with action reports from all Allied forces as evidence of the cause of sink-i n g . Most of the figures included represent final assessments by a joint Army-Navy board; assess-ments have not been completed, however, and the data must thus be regarded as preliminary andsubject to change: For th is reason re lease of the deta i led f igures in a c lass i f ica t ion lowerthan CONFIDENTIAL is not authorized, though the totals may be quoted in round numbere as approxi-mations, if an indication of their preliminary m=is given and they are not attributed to ONIor the joint assessment board.
Ships credited sunk by Naval aircraft alone represent largely inetances where no other agentcould have been responsible for the sinking. Ships credited sunk in attacks involving any combi-nation of Naval aircraft with Army aircraft, Naval surface ships, or submarines, have generallybeen credited as effected by combined efforts, unless unequivocal evidence exists (as in the caseof the Midway Battle) that Naval aircraft were the only agents inflicting damaging hits on theships sunk. The data, in view of their compilation for intelligence purposes by a non-aviationo f f i c e , and with Army representation in the assessment of the bulk of them, can be consideredcompletely conservative with reference to sinkings by Naval aircraft.
It should be noted *at merci=nt vessels of under 1000 gross tons are not included in theset a b u l a t i o n s ; assessments of such sinkings are not known to have been made on any comprehensivebasis by any agency.
Rough but interesting measures of the effectiveness of Naval aircraft in sinking ships, in‘firms of tons sunk per sortie attacking, and per ton of bombs expended, can be obtained by com-paring these data with attack data in the body of this report. A few of the overall figures
- 126 -
MONTH
1941-December
1942 -MarchMayJuneAugustootobrNovember
1943-JanuaryFebruaryMayJulyOctoberNovemberDecember
1944-JanuaryFebruaryIdarohAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberEecember
1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchApri1MayJuneJulyAugust
~4142 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total
GRAND TOTAL
TABLE B. MONTHLY TOTALS OF JAPANESE SHIPS SUNK BY
ARMOREDWARSHIPS
No. Tons
1 15,0005 87,900 1 7,1001 5,1702 39,000
1 5,195
1 28,000
12 185,1403 30,670
2 51,000
8 165,500
10 lb4,170
17 249,00510 216,500
37 619,675
include full to
U.S. NAVAL AIRCRAFT
2
3
11
24111
7671
594
1114195
2115721
155
1,892
1,915
1,8001,800
3,30014,2001,3152,000
492
73011,72011,210
100
2,3956,2635,000
17,66020,01025,9755,300
21,840440
3,10410,250
880100
36,3343,445
7 7,4079 21,307
88 106,36357 76,393
161 211,470
NOTE : Above data nnage of ships sunk byagents. No sinkings were reported in months not
MERCHANT SHIPS,1000 GROSS TOYS
OR OVERNo. Tons
4
13
11
121
110
16332011
1566
44323010
522
19
113
29
15214118
28,780
9,31025,547
. 77,608
6,73210,3861,917
5,82442,300
60,552 203,291
97,8152,7246,500
66,23520,61729,576
204,918129,961138,75442,289
293,60911,10538,843
42,0596,400
91,937
67,1591,003,232
493,883
366 1,705,519
Naval aircraft in combl i s t e d .
TOTALSNo. Tons2
44535
13
123412
11
23402721
21151055585215
733
249
134
527
1,892
28,78016,91587,90018,210 32,517
116,608
6,73210,3865,217
14,2001,3157,824
42,792
61,282220,206 ,109,025
2,8246,50096,63026,88034,576
222,578335,111195,39947,589
315,44911,54541,94761,25042,9396,500
293,77113,375
36 302,822.24 88,466
319 1,358,600185 786,776
564 2,536,664
ination with other
are givmn h e r e w i t h: Tons SunkType of Ene
Tons Sunkmy Vessel Per Sortie Attacking# Per Ton of Bombs#
Armored Warships 114 208Unarmored Warships 43 125Merchant Vessels* 111 284
TOTAL, all three types#Tons sunk includes half the tonnage of ships credited to Naval aircraft in combination with
other agents .* Sorties and Tons of Bombs are for attacks on vessels of 500 tons or over. Tons Sunk are vessels
of 1000 gross tons or over.
Monthly comparisons maybe made with Table 40, but inTable B includes at their full tonnage ships sunk by Navala g e n t s .
- 127 -
making comparisons noteaircraf t in combinat ion
that Appendixwith other
A . GENERAL DATA
SUBJECT INDEX TO TABLES(All tables cover entire war period unless otherwise noted)
ON FLIGHTS, ACTION SORTIES, OWN AIRCRAFT LOSSES, BOMB TONNAGE EXPENDED,PLANES DESTROYED
1 . GENERAL SUMMARIES OF CARRIER AND LAND-BASED OPERATIONSBy Plane Mod el, and Totals for WarNavy and MarineMonthlyBy Theater, YearlyBy Mission of Own Aircraft
2 . CARRIER OPERATIONS, GENERAL DATABy Plane Model, Navy and MarineMonthlyBy Theater, YearlyBy Plane Model and Type CarrierBy Type of Carrier, MonthlyAnalysis, for Selected PeriodsFor Individual Operations, Raids and CampaignsMarine Carrier OperationsOperational Loss Rates, 1944-45By Mission of Own AircraftOperating Ratios, for various periods
TABLES1 - 71, 2, 513,546,7,23
8 - 15
:,548,91011,12,13141,8,9,1596,7,239,11,12,13,42
3 . LAND-BASED OPERATIONS, GENERAL DATABy Plane Model, Navy and Marine wMonthly 3,5By Theater, Yearly 4Operational Loss Rates and Operating Ratios, 1944-45 16Navy and Marine, by Plane Type, Monthly 17By Theater and by Plane Type, Monthly 18By Mission of Own Aircraft 6,7,23
B. SPECIALIZED DATA, BY SUBJECT MATTER
1. AERIAL COMBAT DATA IN DETAIL (OWN AND ENEMY PLANES ENGAGED AND DESTROYED, LOSS RATESAND COMBAT RATIOS) .By Plane Model, Navy and Marine, Carrier and Land-Based 19By Plane Type and Model, Carrier and Land-Based, Yearly 20,21Carrier and Land-Based, Monthly 22By Mission of Own Aircraft 23,24By Geographical Area 25For Major Area Campaigns, Monthly 26Japanese Planes Destroyed, by Model, Monthly 27Air Combat Ratios, by Model of Own and Japanese Aircraft,
Sept. 1944 -Aug. 1945 28
NOTE: Less detailed air combat data are also given in tables— 1,2,3,4,8,10,14,15,17, and 18. Night air combat data are
in tables 57-59.
2. ANTIAIRCRAFT LOSS AND DAMAGE, IN DETAIL
NOTE: Own aircraft losses to enemy A/A are also given in tables— 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 8 , 1 0 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 2 3 , 2 5 , a n d 2 6 .
A/A losses in night action are in table 55.
29
- 129 -
3 .
4 .
5 .
DATA BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREACarrier Camaigns and RaidsAerial Combat Data, in DetailAttack Sorties and Bomb Tonnage, by Target Types AttackedAttack Sort ies , YearlyAttack Sorties and Bomb Tonnage, for Major Area Campaigns, MonthlyAttacks on Land Targets, Central Pacific, MonthlyAttacks on Ships, Monthly, 1944-45
ATTACK DATA, BY TYPE OF TARGET ATTACKED
(a) Totals for all Land Targets and for all Ship TargetsTota l Sorties, Bomb Tons, Rockets, Ammunition by Plane Model.
Carrier and Land-BasedBy Area, Yearly (sorties only)Major Area Campaigns, Monthly (Sorties and Bomb Tons)Land Targets, Central Pacific, Monthly (Sorties and Bomb Tons)Ship Targets, by Area, Monthly 194445 (Sorties only)Ship Targets, by Type of Ship, Monthly (Sorties and Bomb Tons)
(b) Target Types in DetailBy Geographical Area (Sorties and Bomb Tons)Carrier and Land-Based, Yearly (Sorties and Bomb Tons)Carrier and Land-Based, 1944 only (Sorties, Bomb Tons,
Rockets and Ammunition)By Plane Model, Carrier and Land-Based (Sorties only)By Plane Model, 1944 only (Sorties only)Shipping Targets, by Type of Ship, Monthly (Sorties and
Bomb Tons)By Types of Bombs used, 1945 onlyRocket Expenditures, by Plane Model, 1945Rocket Expenditures, Carrier and Land-Based, Monthly, 1945Ammunition Expenditures, Carrier and Land-Based, Monthly 1945Ammunition Expenditures, by Plane Model, 1944
ORDNANCE DATA
(a) Bomb Expenditures, by Type of BombCarrier and Land-Based, YearlyBy Plane Model, 1945By Target Type, 1945For SBDs and TBFs, 1942-43By Carriers, by Operations, 1944By Carriers, Monthly, 1945
Land Targets and Ship-Targets, by Plane ModelBy Plane Model, 1945 (expenditures per attack sortie)By Plane Model, MonthlyBy Detailed Target Type, by Plane Model, 1945By Detailed Target Type, Monthly. 1945
TABLES14 25,263031323334-35
4131323334,3540
3036
393738
404551525354
43-48434445464748
394142505152
Carrier Expenditures, by Periods (expenditures per attack sortie) 11
(c) Ammunition ExpendituresLand and ShipTargets, by Plane ModelBy Detailed Target Type, 1944 39By Detailed Target Type, by plane Model, 1944 54By Detailed Target Type, Monthly, 1945 53Expenditures per sortie, by Plane Model, 1945 42
(d) Torpedo Expenditures 49See also tables 43-48
- 130 -
6.
7.
8 .
TABLES(e) Bomb and Rocket Operating Ratios 11,12,13,42
NIGHT AIR OPERATIONSNight Attacks 55,56Night Air Combat 57,58,59
LONG-RANGE SEARCH PLANE OPERATIONS 60
JAPANESE SHIPPING SUNK BY NAVAL AIRCRAFT APPENDIX
NOTE: For enemy aircraft destroyed in air combat, see Aerial Combat Datasection of index, and note thereto. — — .
For enemy aircraft destroyed on ground, see Tables 3,4,14,25,26.
- 131 -U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICS 0--1946